1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::Header;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
23 use bitcoin::key::constants::SECRET_KEY_SIZE;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
28 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
32 use bitcoin::{secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::blinded_path::BlindedPath;
35 use crate::blinded_path::payment::{PaymentConstraints, ReceiveTlvs};
37 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
38 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
39 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, WithChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
40 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
42 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
43 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
44 // construct one themselves.
45 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
46 use crate::ln::channel::{self, Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, WithChannelContext};
47 use crate::ln::features::{Bolt12InvoiceFeatures, ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
48 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
49 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
50 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
51 use crate::ln::onion_payment::{check_incoming_htlc_cltv, create_recv_pending_htlc_info, create_fwd_pending_htlc_info, decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion, InboundHTLCErr, NextPacketDetails};
53 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
54 use crate::ln::onion_utils::{HTLCFailReason, INVALID_ONION_BLINDING};
55 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
57 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
58 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{Bolt12PaymentError, OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs, StaleExpiration};
59 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
60 use crate::offers::invoice::{BlindedPayInfo, Bolt12Invoice, DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY, DerivedSigningPubkey, InvoiceBuilder};
61 use crate::offers::invoice_error::InvoiceError;
62 use crate::offers::merkle::SignError;
63 use crate::offers::offer::{DerivedMetadata, Offer, OfferBuilder};
64 use crate::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
65 use crate::offers::refund::{Refund, RefundBuilder};
66 use crate::onion_message::messenger::{Destination, MessageRouter, PendingOnionMessage, new_pending_onion_message};
67 use crate::onion_message::offers::{OffersMessage, OffersMessageHandler};
68 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider};
69 use crate::sign::ecdsa::WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner;
70 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
71 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
72 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
73 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
74 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
75 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger, WithContext};
76 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
77 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
79 crate::routing::router::DefaultRouter,
80 crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph,
81 crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters},
82 crate::sign::KeysManager,
85 use alloc::collections::{btree_map, BTreeMap};
88 use crate::prelude::*;
90 use core::cell::RefCell;
92 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
93 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
94 use core::time::Duration;
97 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
98 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, ProbeSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
99 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
101 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
103 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
104 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
105 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
107 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
108 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
109 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
110 // before we forward it.
112 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
113 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
114 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
115 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
116 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
118 /// Information about where a received HTLC('s onion) has indicated the HTLC should go.
119 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
120 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
121 pub enum PendingHTLCRouting {
122 /// An HTLC which should be forwarded on to another node.
124 /// The onion which should be included in the forwarded HTLC, telling the next hop what to
125 /// do with the HTLC.
126 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
127 /// The short channel ID of the channel which we were instructed to forward this HTLC to.
129 /// This could be a real on-chain SCID, an SCID alias, or some other SCID which has meaning
130 /// to the receiving node, such as one returned from
131 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] or [`ChannelManager::get_phantom_scid`].
132 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
133 /// Set if this HTLC is being forwarded within a blinded path.
134 blinded: Option<BlindedForward>,
136 /// The onion indicates that this is a payment for an invoice (supposedly) generated by us.
138 /// Note that at this point, we have not checked that the invoice being paid was actually
139 /// generated by us, but rather it's claiming to pay an invoice of ours.
141 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and (potential) proof that this
142 /// is a payment for an invoice we generated. This proof of payment is is also used for
143 /// linking MPP parts of a larger payment.
144 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
145 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
147 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
148 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
149 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
150 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
151 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
153 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
154 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
155 /// If the onion had forwarding instructions to one of our phantom node SCIDs, this will
156 /// provide the onion shared secret used to decrypt the next level of forwarding
158 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
159 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
161 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
162 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
163 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
164 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
165 /// Set if this HTLC is the final hop in a multi-hop blinded path.
166 requires_blinded_error: bool,
168 /// The onion indicates that this is for payment to us but which contains the preimage for
169 /// claiming included, and is unrelated to any invoice we'd previously generated (aka a
170 /// "keysend" or "spontaneous" payment).
172 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and possibly a token to
173 /// associate MPP parts of a larger payment.
175 /// This will only be filled in if receiving MPP keysend payments is enabled, and it being
176 /// present will cause deserialization to fail on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.116.
177 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
178 /// Preimage for this onion payment. This preimage is provided by the sender and will be
179 /// used to settle the spontaneous payment.
180 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
181 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
183 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately bubble back up as
184 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
185 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
186 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
188 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
189 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
190 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
192 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, these will ultimately bubble back up as
193 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
194 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
198 /// Information used to forward or fail this HTLC that is being forwarded within a blinded path.
199 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
200 pub struct BlindedForward {
201 /// The `blinding_point` that was set in the inbound [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC`], or in the inbound
202 /// onion payload if we're the introduction node. Useful for calculating the next hop's
203 /// [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC::blinding_point`].
204 pub inbound_blinding_point: PublicKey,
205 // Another field will be added here when we support forwarding as a non-intro node.
208 impl PendingHTLCRouting {
209 // Used to override the onion failure code and data if the HTLC is blinded.
210 fn blinded_failure(&self) -> Option<BlindedFailure> {
211 // TODO: needs update when we support forwarding blinded HTLCs as non-intro node
213 Self::Forward { blinded: Some(_), .. } => Some(BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode),
214 Self::Receive { requires_blinded_error: true, .. } => Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode),
220 /// Information about an incoming HTLC, including the [`PendingHTLCRouting`] describing where it
222 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
223 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
224 pub struct PendingHTLCInfo {
225 /// Further routing details based on whether the HTLC is being forwarded or received.
226 pub routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
227 /// The onion shared secret we build with the sender used to decrypt the onion.
229 /// This is later used to encrypt failure packets in the event that the HTLC is failed.
230 pub incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
231 /// Hash of the payment preimage, to lock the payment until the receiver releases the preimage.
232 pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
233 /// Amount received in the incoming HTLC.
235 /// This field was added in LDK 0.0.113 and will be `None` for objects written by prior
237 pub incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>,
238 /// The amount the sender indicated should be forwarded on to the next hop or amount the sender
239 /// intended for us to receive for received payments.
241 /// If the received amount is less than this for received payments, an intermediary hop has
242 /// attempted to steal some of our funds and we should fail the HTLC (the sender should retry
243 /// it along another path).
245 /// Because nodes can take less than their required fees, and because senders may wish to
246 /// improve their own privacy, this amount may be less than [`Self::incoming_amt_msat`] for
247 /// received payments. In such cases, recipients must handle this HTLC as if it had received
248 /// [`Self::outgoing_amt_msat`].
249 pub outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
250 /// The CLTV the sender has indicated we should set on the forwarded HTLC (or has indicated
251 /// should have been set on the received HTLC for received payments).
252 pub outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
253 /// The fee taken for this HTLC in addition to the standard protocol HTLC fees.
255 /// If this is a payment for forwarding, this is the fee we are taking before forwarding the
258 /// If this is a received payment, this is the fee that our counterparty took.
260 /// This is used to allow LSPs to take fees as a part of payments, without the sender having to
262 pub skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
265 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
266 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
267 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
268 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
271 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
272 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
273 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
274 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
275 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
278 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
279 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
280 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
282 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
283 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
284 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
287 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
288 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
290 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
291 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
294 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
295 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
296 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
299 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
304 sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32],
308 /// Whether this blinded HTLC is being failed backwards by the introduction node or a blinded node,
309 /// which determines the failure message that should be used.
310 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
311 pub enum BlindedFailure {
312 /// This HTLC is being failed backwards by the introduction node, and thus should be failed with
313 /// [`msgs::UpdateFailHTLC`] and error code `0x8000|0x4000|24`.
314 FromIntroductionNode,
315 /// This HTLC is being failed backwards by a blinded node within the path, and thus should be
316 /// failed with [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`] and error code `0x8000|0x4000|24`.
320 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
321 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
322 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
323 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
324 short_channel_id: u64,
325 user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
327 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
328 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
329 blinded_failure: Option<BlindedFailure>,
331 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
332 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
337 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
339 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
340 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
341 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
343 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
344 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
347 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
348 struct ClaimableHTLC {
349 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
351 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
353 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
354 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
355 sender_intended_value: u64,
356 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
358 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
359 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
360 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
361 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
363 /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
364 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
367 impl From<&ClaimableHTLC> for events::ClaimedHTLC {
368 fn from(val: &ClaimableHTLC) -> Self {
369 events::ClaimedHTLC {
370 channel_id: val.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
371 user_channel_id: val.prev_hop.user_channel_id.unwrap_or(0),
372 cltv_expiry: val.cltv_expiry,
373 value_msat: val.value,
374 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: val.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0),
379 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
380 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
382 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
383 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
384 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; Self::LENGTH]);
387 /// Number of bytes in the id.
388 pub const LENGTH: usize = 32;
391 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
392 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
397 impl Readable for PaymentId {
398 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
399 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
404 impl core::fmt::Display for PaymentId {
405 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> core::fmt::Result {
406 crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
410 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
412 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
413 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
414 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
416 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
417 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
422 impl Readable for InterceptId {
423 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
424 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
429 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
430 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
431 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
432 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
433 OutboundRoute { session_priv: [u8; SECRET_KEY_SIZE] },
436 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
438 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
439 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
440 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
442 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
443 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: session_priv.secret_bytes() },
447 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
448 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
449 (0, short_channel_id, required),
450 (2, htlc_id, required),
452 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
453 (0, session_priv, required),
458 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
459 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
460 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
461 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
462 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
465 session_priv: SecretKey,
466 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
467 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
468 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
469 payment_id: PaymentId,
472 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
473 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
474 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
476 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
478 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
480 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
483 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
484 payment_id.hash(hasher);
485 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
491 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
493 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
494 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
495 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
496 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
497 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
498 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
502 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
503 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
504 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
505 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
506 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
507 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
509 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
515 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
516 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
518 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
519 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
520 pub enum FailureCode {
521 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
522 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
523 TemporaryNodeFailure,
524 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
525 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
526 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
527 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
528 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
529 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
530 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
531 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
532 /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
533 /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
535 /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
536 /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
537 InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
540 impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
541 fn into(self) -> u16 {
543 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
544 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
545 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
546 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
551 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
552 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
553 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
554 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
555 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
557 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
558 err: msgs::LightningError,
559 closes_channel: bool,
560 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
562 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
564 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
566 err: LightningError {
568 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
569 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
575 closes_channel: false,
576 shutdown_finish: None,
580 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
581 Self { err, closes_channel: false, shutdown_finish: None }
584 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
585 let err_msg = msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: err.clone() };
586 let action = if shutdown_res.monitor_update.is_some() {
587 // We have a closing `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, which means the channel was funded and we
588 // should disconnect our peer such that we force them to broadcast their latest
589 // commitment upon reconnecting.
590 msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(err_msg) }
592 msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: err_msg }
595 err: LightningError { err, action },
596 closes_channel: true,
597 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
601 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
604 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
606 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
607 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
611 log_level: Level::Warn,
614 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
616 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
618 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
620 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
621 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
628 closes_channel: false,
629 shutdown_finish: None,
633 fn closes_channel(&self) -> bool {
638 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
639 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
640 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
641 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
642 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
644 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
645 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
646 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
647 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
648 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
649 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
650 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
652 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
656 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
657 struct ClaimingPayment {
659 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
660 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
661 htlcs: Vec<events::ClaimedHTLC>,
662 sender_intended_value: Option<u64>,
664 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
665 (0, amount_msat, required),
666 (2, payment_purpose, required),
667 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
668 (5, htlcs, optional_vec),
669 (7, sender_intended_value, option),
672 struct ClaimablePayment {
673 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
674 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
675 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
678 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
679 struct ClaimablePayments {
680 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
681 /// failed/claimed by the user.
683 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
684 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
686 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
687 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
688 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
690 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
691 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
692 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
693 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
696 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
697 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
698 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
699 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
701 enum BackgroundEvent {
702 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
703 /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
704 /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
705 /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
707 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
708 /// are regenerated on startup.
709 ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
710 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
711 /// channel to continue normal operation.
713 /// In general this should be used rather than
714 /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
715 /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
716 /// error the other variant is acceptable.
718 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
719 /// are regenerated on startup.
720 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
721 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
722 funding_txo: OutPoint,
723 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
725 /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
726 /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
728 MonitorUpdatesComplete {
729 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
730 channel_id: ChannelId,
735 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
736 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
737 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
738 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
739 /// event can be generated.
740 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
741 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
742 /// operation of another channel.
744 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
745 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
746 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
747 /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
749 EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
750 event: events::Event,
751 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
753 /// Indicates we should immediately resume the operation of another channel, unless there is
754 /// some other reason why the channel is blocked. In practice this simply means immediately
755 /// removing the [`RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction`] provided from the blocking set.
757 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
758 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
759 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. However, we use this variant
760 /// instead of [`Self::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel`] when we discover that the claim was in
761 /// fact duplicative and we simply want to resume the outbound edge channel immediately.
763 /// This variant should thus never be written to disk, as it is processed inline rather than
764 /// stored for later processing.
765 FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
766 downstream_counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
767 downstream_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
768 blocking_action: RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
772 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
773 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
774 // Note that FreeOtherChannelImmediately should never be written - we were supposed to free
775 // *immediately*. However, for simplicity we implement read/write here.
776 (1, FreeOtherChannelImmediately) => {
777 (0, downstream_counterparty_node_id, required),
778 (2, downstream_funding_outpoint, required),
779 (4, blocking_action, required),
781 (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
782 (0, event, upgradable_required),
783 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
784 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
785 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
786 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
787 // downgrades to prior versions.
788 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
792 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
793 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
794 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
795 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
796 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
799 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
800 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
801 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
802 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
806 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
807 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
808 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
809 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
810 /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
811 /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
813 ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
814 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
815 channel_id: ChannelId,
816 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
821 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
822 fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
823 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
824 channel_id: prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
825 htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
830 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
831 (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
835 /// State we hold per-peer.
836 pub(super) struct PeerState<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
837 /// `channel_id` -> `ChannelPhase`
839 /// Holds all channels within corresponding `ChannelPhase`s where the peer is the counterparty.
840 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>,
841 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundChannelRequest`.
843 /// When manual channel acceptance is enabled, this holds all unaccepted inbound channels where
844 /// the peer is the counterparty. If the channel is accepted, then the entry in this table is
845 /// removed, and an InboundV1Channel is created and placed in the `inbound_v1_channel_by_id` table. If
846 /// the channel is rejected, then the entry is simply removed.
847 pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, InboundChannelRequest>,
848 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
849 latest_features: InitFeatures,
850 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
851 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
852 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
853 /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
854 /// user but which have not yet completed.
856 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
857 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
858 /// for a missing channel.
859 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
860 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
861 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
863 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
864 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
865 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
866 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
868 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
869 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
870 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
871 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
872 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
873 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
874 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
875 /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
876 /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
877 /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
878 /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
879 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
880 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
881 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
882 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
886 impl <SP: Deref> PeerState<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
887 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
888 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
889 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
890 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
891 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
894 self.channel_by_id.iter().filter(|(_, phase)| matches!(phase, ChannelPhase::Funded(_))).count() == 0
895 && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
896 && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
899 // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
900 fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
901 self.channel_by_id.len() + self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
904 // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
905 fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId) -> bool {
906 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
907 self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
911 /// A not-yet-accepted inbound (from counterparty) channel. Once
912 /// accepted, the parameters will be used to construct a channel.
913 pub(super) struct InboundChannelRequest {
914 /// The original OpenChannel message.
915 pub open_channel_msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
916 /// The number of ticks remaining before the request expires.
917 pub ticks_remaining: i32,
920 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unaccepted inbound channel to be
921 /// accepted. An unaccepted channel that exceeds this limit will be abandoned.
922 const UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: i32 = 2;
924 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
925 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
927 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
930 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
931 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
932 struct PendingInboundPayment {
933 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
934 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
935 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
936 /// this payment being removed.
938 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
939 user_payment_id: u64,
940 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
941 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
942 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
945 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
946 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
947 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
948 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
949 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
950 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
951 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
952 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
954 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
955 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
956 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
964 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
966 Arc<RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
967 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
968 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
973 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
974 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
975 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
976 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
977 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
978 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
979 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
980 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
981 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
983 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
984 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
985 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
994 &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
996 &'h RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
997 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
998 ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
1003 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`].
1005 /// This is not exported to bindings users as general cover traits aren't useful in other
1007 pub trait AChannelManager {
1008 /// A type implementing [`chain::Watch`].
1009 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
1010 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Watch`].
1011 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
1012 /// A type implementing [`BroadcasterInterface`].
1013 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
1014 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Broadcaster`].
1015 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
1016 /// A type implementing [`EntropySource`].
1017 type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
1018 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::EntropySource`].
1019 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
1020 /// A type implementing [`NodeSigner`].
1021 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
1022 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::NodeSigner`].
1023 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
1024 /// A type implementing [`WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner`].
1025 type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
1026 /// A type implementing [`SignerProvider`] for [`Self::Signer`].
1027 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<EcdsaSigner= Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
1028 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::SignerProvider`].
1029 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
1030 /// A type implementing [`FeeEstimator`].
1031 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
1032 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::FeeEstimator`].
1033 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
1034 /// A type implementing [`Router`].
1035 type Router: Router + ?Sized;
1036 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Router`].
1037 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
1038 /// A type implementing [`Logger`].
1039 type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
1040 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Logger`].
1041 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
1042 /// Returns a reference to the actual [`ChannelManager`] object.
1043 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
1046 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
1047 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1049 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1050 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1051 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1052 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1053 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1054 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1058 type Watch = M::Target;
1060 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
1062 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
1064 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
1066 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner;
1067 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
1069 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
1071 type Router = R::Target;
1073 type Logger = L::Target;
1075 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
1078 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
1079 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
1081 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
1082 /// to individual Channels.
1084 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
1085 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
1086 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
1087 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
1089 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
1090 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST durably write each
1091 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] before returning from
1092 /// [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`] or before completing async writes. With
1093 /// `ChannelManager`s, writing updates happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other
1094 /// `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during the serialization process). If the
1095 /// deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to
1096 /// [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds
1097 /// will be lost (modulo on-chain transaction fees).
1099 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
1100 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
1101 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
1103 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
1104 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
1105 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
1106 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
1107 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
1109 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
1110 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
1111 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
1112 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
1114 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
1115 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
1116 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
1118 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
1119 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
1120 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
1121 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
1122 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
1124 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
1125 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
1126 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
1127 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
1128 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
1129 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
1130 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
1131 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
1134 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
1135 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
1136 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
1137 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
1138 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
1142 // `pending_offers_messages`
1144 // `total_consistency_lock`
1146 // |__`forward_htlcs`
1148 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
1150 // |__`per_peer_state`
1152 // |__`pending_inbound_payments`
1154 // |__`claimable_payments`
1156 // |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
1160 // |__`outpoint_to_peer`
1162 // |__`short_to_chan_info`
1164 // |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
1168 // |__`pending_events`
1170 // |__`pending_background_events`
1172 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
1174 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1175 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1176 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1177 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1178 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1179 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1183 default_configuration: UserConfig,
1184 chain_hash: ChainHash,
1185 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1191 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1193 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1195 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1196 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1198 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
1199 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
1200 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
1201 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
1203 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1204 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
1206 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
1207 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
1208 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
1209 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
1210 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
1211 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
1212 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
1213 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
1215 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
1217 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1218 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
1220 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
1222 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1223 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1224 /// and via the classic SCID.
1226 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1227 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
1229 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1231 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1233 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1234 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
1235 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
1237 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1238 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
1240 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
1241 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1243 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1244 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1246 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1247 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1248 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1249 /// active channel list on load.
1251 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1252 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1254 /// Channel funding outpoint -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1256 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1257 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1258 /// the handling of the events.
1260 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1261 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1264 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1265 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1266 /// would break backwards compatability.
1267 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1268 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1269 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1271 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1273 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, PublicKey>>,
1275 pub(crate) outpoint_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, PublicKey>>,
1277 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1279 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1280 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1281 /// confirmation depth.
1283 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1284 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1285 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1287 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1289 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1291 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1293 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
1295 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
1297 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
1298 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
1299 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
1301 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
1302 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1304 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
1305 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
1306 /// keeping additional state.
1307 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
1309 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1310 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1311 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1312 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1314 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
1315 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
1317 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1318 /// are currently open with that peer.
1320 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1321 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
1324 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
1326 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1327 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1328 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1329 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1330 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1332 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
1333 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
1334 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
1335 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
1336 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
1338 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
1339 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
1341 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1342 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1343 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1344 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1345 pub(crate) pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1347 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
1348 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
1350 /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
1351 /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
1352 /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
1353 /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
1354 /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
1356 /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
1358 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1360 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1361 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1362 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1363 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1364 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1365 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1366 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1367 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1368 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1369 /// Tracks the progress of channels going through batch funding by whether funding_signed was
1370 /// received and the monitor has been persisted.
1372 /// This information does not need to be persisted as funding nodes can forget
1373 /// unfunded channels upon disconnection.
1374 funding_batch_states: Mutex<BTreeMap<Txid, Vec<(ChannelId, PublicKey, bool)>>>,
1376 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
1378 event_persist_notifier: Notifier,
1379 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool,
1381 pending_offers_messages: Mutex<Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>>>,
1385 signer_provider: SP,
1390 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1392 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1393 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1394 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1395 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1396 pub struct ChainParameters {
1397 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1398 pub network: Network,
1400 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1402 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1403 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1406 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1410 SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1411 SkipPersistNoEvents,
1414 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1415 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1416 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1417 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1418 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1419 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1421 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1422 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1423 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1424 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1425 event_persist_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1426 needs_persist_flag: &'a AtomicBool,
1428 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1429 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1432 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1433 /// Notifies any waiters and indicates that we need to persist, in addition to possibly having
1434 /// events to handle.
1436 /// This must always be called if the changes included a `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, as well as in
1437 /// other cases where losing the changes on restart may result in a force-close or otherwise
1439 fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1440 Self::optionally_notify(cm, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
1443 fn optionally_notify<F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C, mut persist_check: F)
1444 -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1445 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1446 let force_notify = cm.get_cm().process_background_events();
1448 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1449 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1450 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1451 should_persist: move || {
1452 // Pick the "most" action between `persist_check` and the background events
1453 // processing and return that.
1454 let notify = persist_check();
1455 match (notify, force_notify) {
1456 (NotifyOption::DoPersist, _) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1457 (_, NotifyOption::DoPersist) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1458 (NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents, _) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1459 (_, NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1460 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
1463 _read_guard: read_guard,
1467 /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
1468 /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first (or
1469 /// [`Self::optionally_notify`] used).
1470 fn optionally_notify_skipping_background_events<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>
1471 (cm: &'a C, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1472 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1474 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1475 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1476 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1477 should_persist: persist_check,
1478 _read_guard: read_guard,
1483 impl<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1484 fn drop(&mut self) {
1485 match (self.should_persist)() {
1486 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
1487 self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
1488 self.event_persist_notifier.notify()
1490 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
1491 self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
1492 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
1497 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1498 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1500 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1502 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1503 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1504 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1505 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1506 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1508 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1509 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1511 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1513 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1514 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1515 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1516 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1517 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1518 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1519 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1520 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1521 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1522 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1523 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1524 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1525 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1527 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1528 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1530 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1531 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1532 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1533 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1535 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1536 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1537 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1538 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1539 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1540 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1542 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1544 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1545 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1547 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1549 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1550 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1552 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1553 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1554 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1556 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1557 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1558 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1560 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1561 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1562 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1563 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1565 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1566 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1567 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1569 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1570 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1571 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1573 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1574 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1575 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1576 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1577 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1578 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1579 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1580 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1581 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1582 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1583 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1586 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1587 /// to better separate parameters.
1588 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1589 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1590 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1591 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1592 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1593 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1594 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1595 pub features: InitFeatures,
1596 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1597 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1598 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1600 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1602 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1603 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1604 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1605 /// payments to us through this channel.
1606 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1607 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1608 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1609 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1610 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1611 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1612 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1615 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1616 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1617 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1618 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1619 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1620 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1621 /// lifetime of the channel.
1622 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
1623 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1624 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1625 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1626 /// our counterparty already.
1628 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1629 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1630 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1631 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1633 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1634 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1635 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1636 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1638 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1639 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1641 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1642 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1644 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1645 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1646 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1647 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1648 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1649 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1650 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1651 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1652 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1655 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1657 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1658 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1659 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1660 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1661 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1662 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1663 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1665 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1666 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1668 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1669 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1670 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1671 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1672 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1673 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1674 /// this value on chain.
1676 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1678 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1680 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1681 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1682 /// The `user_channel_id` value passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound
1683 /// channels, or to [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
1684 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] config flag is set to true. Otherwise
1685 /// `user_channel_id` will be randomized for an inbound channel. This may be zero for objects
1686 /// serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1688 /// [`ChannelManager::create_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_channel
1689 /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
1690 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels
1691 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1692 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1693 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1695 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1696 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1697 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1698 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1699 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1701 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1702 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1703 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1704 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1706 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1707 pub balance_msat: u64,
1708 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1709 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1710 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1711 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1713 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1715 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1716 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1717 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1718 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1719 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1720 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1721 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1722 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1724 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`],
1725 /// [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`], and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1726 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1727 /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
1728 /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
1729 /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
1730 /// route which is valid.
1731 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1732 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1733 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1734 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1735 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1736 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1738 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1739 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1740 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1741 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1742 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1743 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1744 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1745 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1746 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1748 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1750 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1751 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1752 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1753 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1754 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1756 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1757 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1758 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1759 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1760 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1761 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1762 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1764 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1765 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1766 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1767 pub is_outbound: bool,
1768 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1769 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1770 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1771 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1772 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1774 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1775 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1776 /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
1777 /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
1778 pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
1779 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1780 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1782 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1783 pub is_usable: bool,
1784 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1785 pub is_public: bool,
1786 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1787 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1788 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1789 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1790 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1791 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1793 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1794 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1797 impl ChannelDetails {
1798 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1799 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1800 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1802 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1803 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1804 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1805 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1808 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1809 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1810 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1812 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1813 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1814 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1815 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1818 fn from_channel_context<SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
1819 context: &ChannelContext<SP>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
1820 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
1823 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1824 F::Target: FeeEstimator
1826 let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
1827 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1828 context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1830 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
1831 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1832 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1833 features: latest_features,
1834 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1835 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1836 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1837 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1838 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1839 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1840 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1841 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
1842 Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1843 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1845 funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
1846 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1847 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1848 channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1849 short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
1850 outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1851 inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1852 channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
1853 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1854 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1855 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1856 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1857 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1858 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1859 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1860 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
1861 confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
1862 confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1863 force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1864 is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
1865 is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
1866 is_usable: context.is_live(),
1867 is_public: context.should_announce(),
1868 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1869 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1870 config: Some(context.config()),
1871 channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
1876 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1877 /// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
1878 /// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
1879 /// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
1880 /// the channel will be removed shortly.
1881 /// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
1882 /// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
1883 pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
1884 /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
1886 /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
1888 /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
1889 /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
1891 /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
1892 NegotiatingClosingFee,
1893 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
1894 /// to drop the channel.
1898 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1899 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1900 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1901 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1902 /// When an invoice was requested and thus a payment has not yet been sent.
1904 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1905 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1906 payment_id: PaymentId,
1908 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1910 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1911 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1912 payment_id: PaymentId,
1913 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1915 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1916 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1917 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1920 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1921 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1922 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1924 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1925 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1926 payment_id: PaymentId,
1927 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1928 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1929 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1931 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1932 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1933 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1935 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1936 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1937 payment_id: PaymentId,
1938 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1939 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1943 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1945 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
1947 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1948 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1949 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1950 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1952 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1953 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1954 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1957 macro_rules! handle_error {
1958 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1959 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1960 // entering the macro.
1961 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1962 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1966 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish, .. }) => {
1967 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1969 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1970 let counterparty_node_id = shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id;
1971 let channel_id = shutdown_res.channel_id;
1972 let logger = WithContext::from(
1973 &$self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_id),
1975 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel: {}", err.err);
1977 $self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1978 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1979 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1984 log_error!($self.logger, "Got non-closing error: {}", err.err);
1987 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1989 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1990 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1991 action: err.action.clone()
1995 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1996 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1997 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1998 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1999 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
2003 // Return error in case higher-API need one
2010 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
2011 ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
2012 if let Some(outpoint) = $channel_context.get_funding_txo() {
2013 $self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&outpoint);
2015 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2016 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
2017 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
2019 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
2020 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
2021 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
2022 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
2023 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
2025 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
2026 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
2028 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
2032 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
2033 macro_rules! convert_chan_phase_err {
2034 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, $channel_update: expr) => {
2036 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
2037 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), *$channel_id))
2039 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
2040 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), *$channel_id))
2042 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
2043 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$channel.context);
2044 log_error!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", $channel_id, msg);
2045 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel.context);
2046 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: msg.clone() };
2047 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true, reason);
2049 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $channel_update);
2054 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, FUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2055 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, { $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast($channel).ok() })
2057 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2058 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, None)
2060 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_phase: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
2061 match $channel_phase {
2062 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
2063 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL)
2065 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel) => {
2066 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2068 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel) => {
2069 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2075 macro_rules! break_chan_phase_entry {
2076 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2080 let key = *$entry.key();
2081 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2083 $entry.remove_entry();
2091 macro_rules! try_chan_phase_entry {
2092 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2096 let key = *$entry.key();
2097 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2099 $entry.remove_entry();
2107 macro_rules! remove_channel_phase {
2108 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2110 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
2111 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context());
2117 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
2118 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
2119 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
2120 node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2121 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
2123 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
2124 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
2125 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2126 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2127 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2128 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2129 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
2130 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2131 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2132 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2137 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
2138 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2139 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
2140 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
2141 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2142 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
2143 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2144 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2145 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
2147 $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
2152 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
2153 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2154 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
2155 debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
2156 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
2157 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2158 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2159 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2160 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
2162 $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
2167 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
2168 ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2169 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context);
2170 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&&logger,
2171 &$self.node_signer, $self.chain_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
2172 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
2173 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
2174 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
2175 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
2176 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
2177 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
2178 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
2180 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
2181 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2182 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2188 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
2189 .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
2191 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
2192 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
2193 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
2194 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
2195 updates.announcement_sigs);
2196 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
2197 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
2200 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
2201 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = $chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2202 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
2203 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
2205 // If the channel belongs to a batch funding transaction, the progress of the batch
2206 // should be updated as we have received funding_signed and persisted the monitor.
2207 if let Some(txid) = unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2208 let mut funding_batch_states = $self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2209 let mut batch_completed = false;
2210 if let Some(batch_state) = funding_batch_states.get_mut(&txid) {
2211 let channel_state = batch_state.iter_mut().find(|(chan_id, pubkey, _)| (
2212 *chan_id == channel_id &&
2213 *pubkey == counterparty_node_id
2215 if let Some(channel_state) = channel_state {
2216 channel_state.2 = true;
2218 debug_assert!(false, "Missing channel batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2220 batch_completed = batch_state.iter().all(|(_, _, completed)| *completed);
2222 debug_assert!(false, "Missing batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2225 // When all channels in a batched funding transaction have become ready, it is not necessary
2226 // to track the progress of the batch anymore and the state of the channels can be updated.
2227 if batch_completed {
2228 let removed_batch_state = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2229 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2230 let mut batch_funding_tx = None;
2231 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, _) in removed_batch_state {
2232 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2233 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2234 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2235 batch_funding_tx = batch_funding_tx.or_else(|| chan.context.unbroadcasted_funding());
2236 chan.set_batch_ready();
2237 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2238 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, chan);
2242 if let Some(tx) = batch_funding_tx {
2243 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting batch funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
2244 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
2249 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
2251 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
2252 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
2254 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
2255 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2256 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2257 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
2262 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
2263 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $completed: expr) => { {
2264 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
2265 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context);
2267 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::UnrecoverableError => {
2268 let err_str = "ChannelMonitor[Update] persistence failed unrecoverably. This indicates we cannot continue normal operation and must shut down.";
2269 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
2270 panic!("{}", err_str);
2272 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
2273 log_debug!(logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
2274 &$chan.context.channel_id());
2277 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
2283 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
2284 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $chan, _internal,
2285 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
2287 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2288 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
2289 .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
2290 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
2291 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
2292 // filter for uniqueness here.
2293 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
2294 .unwrap_or_else(|| {
2295 in_flight_updates.push($update);
2296 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
2298 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
2299 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $chan, _internal,
2301 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
2302 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
2303 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
2309 macro_rules! process_events_body {
2310 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
2311 let mut processed_all_events = false;
2312 while !processed_all_events {
2313 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
2320 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
2321 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
2322 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2324 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
2325 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
2326 result = $self.process_background_events();
2328 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
2329 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
2330 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
2331 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2335 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
2336 let num_events = pending_events.len();
2337 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
2338 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2341 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
2343 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
2344 $event_to_handle = event;
2346 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
2347 post_event_actions.push(action);
2352 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2353 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
2354 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
2355 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
2356 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
2357 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
2360 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
2361 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
2362 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
2363 processed_all_events = false;
2367 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
2368 $self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
2369 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify();
2371 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
2372 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
2373 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
2379 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
2381 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
2382 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2383 ES::Target: EntropySource,
2384 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2385 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2386 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2390 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
2392 /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
2394 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
2395 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
2397 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
2399 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
2400 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
2401 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
2404 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
2405 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
2406 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
2408 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
2409 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
2410 current_timestamp: u32,
2412 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2413 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
2414 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
2415 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
2417 default_configuration: config.clone(),
2418 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(params.network),
2419 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
2424 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
2426 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
2427 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2428 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
2429 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2430 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
2431 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2432 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2433 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2435 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
2438 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
2439 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2441 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2443 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
2445 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2447 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2448 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
2449 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2450 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2451 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
2452 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
2453 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
2454 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
2456 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2466 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
2467 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
2468 &self.default_configuration
2471 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2472 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2473 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
2476 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
2477 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
2479 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
2481 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
2485 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
2490 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2492 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2493 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2494 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2495 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2496 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2498 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2499 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2501 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2502 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2503 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2505 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2506 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2507 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2509 /// If `temporary_channel_id` is specified, it will be used as the temporary channel ID of the
2510 /// channel. Otherwise, a random one will be generated for you.
2512 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2513 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2514 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2515 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2516 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2517 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2519 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2520 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2521 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2522 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<ChannelId, APIError> {
2523 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2524 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2527 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2528 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2529 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2531 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2533 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2534 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2536 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2538 if let Some(temporary_channel_id) = temporary_channel_id {
2539 if peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(&temporary_channel_id) {
2540 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Channel with temporary channel ID {} already exists!", temporary_channel_id)});
2545 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2546 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2547 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2548 match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2549 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2550 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias, temporary_channel_id)
2554 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
2559 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash);
2561 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
2562 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
2563 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2565 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
2567 panic!("RNG is bad???");
2570 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel)); }
2573 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
2574 node_id: their_network_key,
2577 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
2580 fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&ChannelId, &Channel<SP>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2581 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2582 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2583 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `outpoint_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2584 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2585 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2586 // the same channel.
2587 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2589 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2590 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2591 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2592 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2593 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2594 res.extend(peer_state.channel_by_id.iter()
2595 .filter_map(|(chan_id, phase)| match phase {
2596 // Only `Channels` in the `ChannelPhase::Funded` phase can be considered funded.
2597 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => Some((chan_id, chan)),
2601 .map(|(_channel_id, channel)| {
2602 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2603 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2611 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
2612 /// more information.
2613 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2614 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2615 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2616 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `outpoint_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2617 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2618 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2619 // the same channel.
2620 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2622 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2623 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2624 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2625 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2626 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2627 for context in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, phase)| phase.context()) {
2628 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height,
2629 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2637 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
2638 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
2640 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
2641 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
2643 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2644 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2645 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2646 // really wanted anyway.
2647 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
2650 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2651 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2652 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2653 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2655 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2656 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2657 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2658 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2659 let context_to_details = |context| {
2660 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2662 return peer_state.channel_by_id
2664 .map(|(_, phase)| phase.context())
2665 .map(context_to_details)
2671 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2672 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2674 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2675 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2676 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2678 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2679 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2680 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2681 .filter_map(|(payment_id, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2682 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {
2683 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2685 // InvoiceReceived is an intermediate state and doesn't need to be exposed
2686 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {
2687 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2689 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2690 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2691 payment_id: *payment_id,
2692 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2693 total_msat: *total_msat,
2696 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2697 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2699 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2700 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2702 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2707 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2708 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2710 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
2711 let mut shutdown_result = None;
2714 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2716 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2717 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2719 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2720 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2722 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2723 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
2724 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
2725 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
2726 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2727 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) =
2728 chan.get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2729 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2731 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2732 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2733 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2734 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2735 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2739 debug_assert!(monitor_update_opt.is_none() || !chan.is_shutdown(),
2740 "We can't both complete shutdown and generate a monitor update");
2742 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2743 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2744 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
2745 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
2748 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
2749 shutdown_result = Some(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
2752 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2753 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2755 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
2756 channel_id, counterparty_node_id,
2763 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2764 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2765 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2766 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2769 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
2770 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2776 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2777 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2778 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2780 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] and
2781 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
2783 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2784 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] feerate or the feerate which
2785 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2786 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2788 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2790 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2791 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2792 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2795 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2796 /// [`ChannelCloseMinimum`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum
2797 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
2798 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2799 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2800 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2803 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2804 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2805 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2807 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2808 /// the channel being closed or not:
2809 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2810 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2811 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
2812 /// fee estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2813 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2814 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2815 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2817 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2818 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2819 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2820 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2822 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2824 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2825 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2826 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2829 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2830 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
2831 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2832 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2833 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2836 fn finish_close_channel(&self, mut shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2837 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2838 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2839 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
2840 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2843 let logger = WithContext::from(
2844 &self.logger, Some(shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id), Some(shutdown_res.channel_id),
2847 log_debug!(logger, "Finishing closure of channel due to {} with {} HTLCs to fail",
2848 shutdown_res.closure_reason, shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.len());
2849 for htlc_source in shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.drain(..) {
2850 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2851 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2852 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2853 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2855 if let Some((_, funding_txo, monitor_update)) = shutdown_res.monitor_update {
2856 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2857 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2858 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2859 // ignore the result here.
2860 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2862 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
2863 if let Some(txid) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2864 let mut funding_batch_states = self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2865 let affected_channels = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2866 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2867 let mut has_uncompleted_channel = None;
2868 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, state) in affected_channels {
2869 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2870 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2871 if let Some(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id) {
2872 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
2873 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::FundingBatchClosure));
2876 has_uncompleted_channel = Some(has_uncompleted_channel.map_or(!state, |v| v || !state));
2879 has_uncompleted_channel.unwrap_or(true),
2880 "Closing a batch where all channels have completed initial monitor update",
2885 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2886 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2887 channel_id: shutdown_res.channel_id,
2888 user_channel_id: shutdown_res.user_channel_id,
2889 reason: shutdown_res.closure_reason,
2890 counterparty_node_id: Some(shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id),
2891 channel_capacity_sats: Some(shutdown_res.channel_capacity_satoshis),
2894 if let Some(transaction) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_funding_tx {
2895 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2896 channel_id: shutdown_res.channel_id, transaction
2900 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
2901 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2905 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2906 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2907 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2908 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2909 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2910 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2911 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2912 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
2913 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2914 let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2915 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
2917 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
2919 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*peer_node_id), Some(*channel_id));
2920 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2921 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", channel_id);
2922 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
2923 mem::drop(peer_state);
2924 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
2926 ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) => {
2927 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast, closure_reason));
2928 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2930 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
2931 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
2932 // Unfunded channel has no update
2933 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
2936 } else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
2937 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
2938 // N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
2939 // don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
2941 (None, *peer_node_id)
2943 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, peer_node_id) });
2946 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
2947 // Try to send the `BroadcastChannelUpdate` to the peer we just force-closed on, but if
2948 // not try to broadcast it via whatever peer we have.
2949 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2950 let a_peer_state_opt = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2951 .ok_or(per_peer_state.values().next());
2952 if let Ok(a_peer_state_mutex) = a_peer_state_opt {
2953 let mut a_peer_state = a_peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2954 a_peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2960 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
2963 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2964 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2965 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2966 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2967 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2968 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2969 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2970 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2971 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2972 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2973 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
2974 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
2985 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2986 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2987 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2989 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2990 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2991 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2994 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2995 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2996 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2998 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2999 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
3000 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
3001 -> Result<(), APIError> {
3002 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
3005 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
3006 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
3007 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
3008 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3009 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
3013 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
3014 /// local transaction(s).
3015 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
3016 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3017 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
3021 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
3022 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey,
3024 (onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg
3026 let (next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_details_opt) = decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion(
3027 msg, &self.node_signer, &self.logger, &self.secp_ctx
3030 let is_intro_node_forward = match next_hop {
3031 onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
3032 // TODO: update this when we support blinded forwarding as non-intro node
3033 next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedForward { .. }, ..
3038 macro_rules! return_err {
3039 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3042 WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id)),
3043 "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg
3045 // If `msg.blinding_point` is set, we must always fail with malformed.
3046 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
3047 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3048 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3049 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3050 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
3051 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
3055 let (err_code, err_data) = if is_intro_node_forward {
3056 (INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, &[0; 32][..])
3057 } else { ($err_code, $data) };
3058 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3059 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3060 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3061 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason(err_code, err_data.to_vec())
3062 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3068 let NextPacketDetails {
3069 next_packet_pubkey, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_scid, outgoing_cltv_value
3070 } = match next_packet_details_opt {
3071 Some(next_packet_details) => next_packet_details,
3072 // it is a receive, so no need for outbound checks
3073 None => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
3076 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
3077 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
3078 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
3079 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid).cloned();
3080 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
3081 None => { // unknown_next_peer
3082 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
3083 // phantom or an intercept.
3084 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
3085 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)) ||
3086 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)
3090 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3093 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
3095 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
3096 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3097 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3098 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3099 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3101 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3102 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3103 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).map(
3104 |chan_phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
3107 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
3108 // have no consistency guarantees.
3109 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3113 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
3114 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
3115 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
3116 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
3117 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3119 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
3120 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
3121 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
3122 // we don't have the channel here.
3123 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3125 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3127 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
3128 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
3129 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
3130 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
3131 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
3132 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
3133 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
3134 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
3135 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
3136 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
3137 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
3139 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
3142 if outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
3143 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
3145 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value) {
3146 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
3153 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3155 if let Err((err_msg, code)) = check_incoming_htlc_cltv(
3156 cur_height, outgoing_cltv_value, msg.cltv_expiry
3158 if code & 0x1000 != 0 && chan_update_opt.is_none() {
3159 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
3160 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
3161 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
3162 break Some((err_msg, 0x2000 | 2, None))
3164 let chan_update_opt = if code & 0x1000 != 0 { chan_update_opt } else { None };
3165 break Some((err_msg, code, chan_update_opt));
3171 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
3172 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
3173 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
3174 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3176 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
3177 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3179 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3180 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3181 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3183 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3184 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3185 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3186 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3187 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
3188 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
3189 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
3193 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
3195 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, Some(next_packet_pubkey)))
3198 fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
3199 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
3200 decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop, allow_underpay: bool,
3201 next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>,
3202 ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
3203 macro_rules! return_err {
3204 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3206 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id));
3207 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3208 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
3209 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(
3210 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3211 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3212 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3213 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
3214 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
3218 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3219 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3220 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3221 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3222 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3228 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
3230 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3231 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
3232 msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat,
3233 current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
3236 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
3237 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
3238 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
3239 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
3240 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
3242 Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3245 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
3246 match create_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
3247 new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
3248 Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
3249 Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3255 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
3256 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
3257 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
3259 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
3260 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
3261 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3263 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3264 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3265 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3266 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
3267 return Err(LightningError {
3268 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
3269 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
3272 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
3273 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
3275 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3276 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3277 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
3280 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
3281 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
3282 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
3283 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
3285 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
3286 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
3287 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3289 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3290 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3291 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3292 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3293 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
3294 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
3295 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
3299 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
3302 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3303 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3304 log_trace!(logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
3305 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3307 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
3308 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
3309 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
3310 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
3311 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
3314 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
3315 chain_hash: self.chain_hash,
3317 timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
3318 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
3319 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
3320 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
3321 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
3322 fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
3323 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
3324 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3326 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
3327 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
3328 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
3330 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
3332 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
3339 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3340 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3341 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
3342 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3347 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3348 let SendAlongPathArgs {
3349 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3352 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
3353 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3354 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
3355 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
3357 let (onion_packet, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::create_payment_onion(
3358 &self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height,
3359 payment_hash, keysend_preimage, prng_seed
3361 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None);
3362 log_error!(logger, "Failed to build an onion for path for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
3366 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3367 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
3369 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None);
3370 log_error!(logger, "Failed to find first-hop for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
3371 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()})
3373 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3376 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(id));
3378 "Attempting to send payment with payment hash {} along path with next hop {}",
3379 payment_hash, path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
3381 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3382 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3383 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
3384 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3385 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3386 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
3387 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
3388 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
3389 if !chan.context.is_live() {
3390 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3392 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3393 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3394 let send_res = chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
3395 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3397 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
3398 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
3400 }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
3401 match break_chan_phase_entry!(self, send_res, chan_phase_entry) {
3402 Some(monitor_update) => {
3403 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
3405 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
3406 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
3407 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
3408 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
3409 // which we do in the send_payment check for
3410 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
3411 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
3419 _ => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel to first hop is unfunded".to_owned()}),
3422 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
3423 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
3424 // `channel_by_id` map.
3425 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
3426 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
3430 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
3431 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3433 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
3438 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
3440 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
3441 /// fields for more info.
3443 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
3444 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
3446 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
3448 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
3449 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
3450 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
3451 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
3452 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
3454 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
3455 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
3456 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
3457 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
3458 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
3460 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
3461 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
3462 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
3463 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
3465 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
3467 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
3468 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
3469 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
3471 /// In general, a path may raise:
3472 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
3473 /// node public key) is specified.
3474 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available as it has been
3475 /// closed, doesn't exist, or the peer is currently disconnected.
3476 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
3477 /// relevant updates.
3479 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
3480 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
3481 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
3483 /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
3484 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3485 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3486 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
3487 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
3488 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3489 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3490 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3491 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3492 self.pending_outbound_payments
3493 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
3494 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3495 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3498 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
3499 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3500 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
3501 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3502 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3503 self.pending_outbound_payments
3504 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
3505 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
3506 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3507 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3511 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3512 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3513 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3514 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
3515 keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
3516 best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3520 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
3521 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3522 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3526 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3527 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3530 pub(super) fn send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&self, invoice: &Bolt12Invoice, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), Bolt12PaymentError> {
3531 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3532 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3533 self.pending_outbound_payments
3534 .send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(
3535 invoice, payment_id, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3536 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer,
3537 best_block_height, &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
3538 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args)
3542 /// Signals that no further attempts for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
3543 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
3544 /// retries are exhausted.
3546 /// # Event Generation
3548 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
3549 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
3551 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
3552 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
3553 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
3555 /// # Requested Invoices
3557 /// In the case of paying a [`Bolt12Invoice`] via [`ChannelManager::pay_for_offer`], abandoning
3558 /// the payment prior to receiving the invoice will result in an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`]
3559 /// and prevent any attempts at paying it once received. The other events may only be generated
3560 /// once the invoice has been received.
3562 /// # Restart Behavior
3564 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated and we restart without first persisting the
3565 /// [`ChannelManager`], another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated; likewise for
3566 /// [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
3568 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
3569 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
3570 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3571 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
3574 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
3575 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
3576 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
3577 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
3578 /// never reach the recipient.
3580 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
3581 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
3583 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
3584 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
3586 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
3587 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
3588 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3589 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3590 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
3591 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
3592 &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3595 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
3596 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3598 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
3601 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
3602 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
3603 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3604 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3605 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
3606 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3607 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3608 &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3611 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
3612 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
3613 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
3614 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
3615 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3616 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3617 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
3618 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3619 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3622 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
3625 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
3626 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
3629 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay the given
3630 /// amount to the given `node_id`.
3632 /// See [`ChannelManager::send_preflight_probes`] for more information.
3633 pub fn send_spontaneous_preflight_probes(
3634 &self, node_id: PublicKey, amount_msat: u64, final_cltv_expiry_delta: u32,
3635 liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3636 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3637 let payment_params =
3638 PaymentParameters::from_node_id(node_id, final_cltv_expiry_delta);
3640 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, amount_msat);
3642 self.send_preflight_probes(route_params, liquidity_limit_multiplier)
3645 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay a route found
3646 /// according to the given [`RouteParameters`].
3648 /// This may be used to send "pre-flight" probes, i.e., to train our scorer before conducting
3649 /// the actual payment. Note this is only useful if there likely is sufficient time for the
3650 /// probe to settle before sending out the actual payment, e.g., when waiting for user
3651 /// confirmation in a wallet UI.
3653 /// Otherwise, there is a chance the probe could take up some liquidity needed to complete the
3654 /// actual payment. Users should therefore be cautious and might avoid sending probes if
3655 /// liquidity is scarce and/or they don't expect the probe to return before they send the
3656 /// payment. To mitigate this issue, channels with available liquidity less than the required
3657 /// amount times the given `liquidity_limit_multiplier` won't be used to send pre-flight
3658 /// probes. If `None` is given as `liquidity_limit_multiplier`, it defaults to `3`.
3659 pub fn send_preflight_probes(
3660 &self, route_params: RouteParameters, liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3661 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3662 let liquidity_limit_multiplier = liquidity_limit_multiplier.unwrap_or(3);
3664 let payer = self.get_our_node_id();
3665 let usable_channels = self.list_usable_channels();
3666 let first_hops = usable_channels.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>();
3667 let inflight_htlcs = self.compute_inflight_htlcs();
3671 .find_route(&payer, &route_params, Some(&first_hops), inflight_htlcs)
3673 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to find path for payment probe: {:?}", e);
3674 ProbeSendFailure::RouteNotFound
3677 let mut used_liquidity_map = HashMap::with_capacity(first_hops.len());
3679 let mut res = Vec::new();
3681 for mut path in route.paths {
3682 // If the last hop is probably an unannounced channel we refrain from probing all the
3683 // way through to the end and instead probe up to the second-to-last channel.
3684 while let Some(last_path_hop) = path.hops.last() {
3685 if last_path_hop.maybe_announced_channel {
3686 // We found a potentially announced last hop.
3689 // Drop the last hop, as it's likely unannounced.
3692 "Avoided sending payment probe all the way to last hop {} as it is likely unannounced.",
3693 last_path_hop.short_channel_id
3695 let final_value_msat = path.final_value_msat();
3697 if let Some(new_last) = path.hops.last_mut() {
3698 new_last.fee_msat += final_value_msat;
3703 if path.hops.len() < 2 {
3706 "Skipped sending payment probe over path with less than two hops."
3711 if let Some(first_path_hop) = path.hops.first() {
3712 if let Some(first_hop) = first_hops.iter().find(|h| {
3713 h.get_outbound_payment_scid() == Some(first_path_hop.short_channel_id)
3715 let path_value = path.final_value_msat() + path.fee_msat();
3716 let used_liquidity =
3717 used_liquidity_map.entry(first_path_hop.short_channel_id).or_insert(0);
3719 if first_hop.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat
3720 < (*used_liquidity + path_value) * liquidity_limit_multiplier
3722 log_debug!(self.logger, "Skipped sending payment probe to avoid putting channel {} under the liquidity limit.", first_path_hop.short_channel_id);
3725 *used_liquidity += path_value;
3730 res.push(self.send_probe(path).map_err(|e| {
3731 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to send pre-flight probe: {:?}", e);
3732 ProbeSendFailure::SendingFailed(e)
3739 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
3740 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
3741 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: FnMut(&OutboundV1Channel<SP>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
3742 &self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, is_batch_funding: bool,
3743 mut find_funding_output: FundingOutput,
3744 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3745 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3746 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3747 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3749 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3750 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3752 let (mut chan, msg_opt) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
3753 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(mut chan)) => {
3754 funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
3756 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3757 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, is_batch_funding, &&logger)
3758 .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
3759 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
3760 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: msg.clone() };
3761 let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false, reason);
3762 (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, shutdown_res, None))
3763 } else { unreachable!(); });
3765 Ok(funding_msg) => (chan, funding_msg),
3766 Err((chan, err)) => {
3767 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3768 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3769 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
3770 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3771 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3777 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(*temporary_channel_id, phase);
3778 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3780 "Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is not an unfunded, outbound V1 channel",
3781 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3784 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {err: format!(
3785 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3786 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3790 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
3791 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3792 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3796 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
3797 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3798 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3800 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3801 let mut outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3802 match outpoint_to_peer.entry(funding_txo) {
3803 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => { e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()); },
3804 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(o) => {
3806 "An existing channel using outpoint {} is open with peer {}",
3807 funding_txo, o.get()
3809 mem::drop(outpoint_to_peer);
3810 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3811 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3812 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.clone() };
3813 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(true, reason));
3814 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err });
3817 e.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan));
3824 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3825 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, false, |_, tx| {
3826 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3830 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3832 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3833 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3835 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3836 /// across the p2p network.
3838 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3839 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3841 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3842 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3843 /// keys per-channel).
3845 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3846 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3847 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3849 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3850 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3851 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3853 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3854 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3855 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3856 /// for more details.
3858 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3859 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3860 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3861 self.batch_funding_transaction_generated(&[(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id)], funding_transaction)
3864 /// Call this upon creation of a batch funding transaction for the given channels.
3866 /// Return values are identical to [`Self::funding_transaction_generated`], respective to
3867 /// each individual channel and transaction output.
3869 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. This batch funding transaction
3870 /// will only be broadcast when we have safely received and persisted the counterparty's
3871 /// signature for each channel.
3873 /// If there is an error, all channels in the batch are to be considered closed.
3874 pub fn batch_funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channels: &[(&ChannelId, &PublicKey)], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3875 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3876 let mut result = Ok(());
3878 if !funding_transaction.is_coin_base() {
3879 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3880 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3881 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3882 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3887 if funding_transaction.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
3888 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3889 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3893 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3894 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3895 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3896 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3897 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3898 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) &&
3899 funding_transaction.lock_time.is_block_height() &&
3900 funding_transaction.lock_time.to_consensus_u32() > height + 1
3902 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3903 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3908 let txid = funding_transaction.txid();
3909 let is_batch_funding = temporary_channels.len() > 1;
3910 let mut funding_batch_states = if is_batch_funding {
3911 Some(self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap())
3915 let mut funding_batch_state = funding_batch_states.as_mut().and_then(|states| {
3916 match states.entry(txid) {
3917 btree_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3918 result = result.clone().and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3919 err: "Batch funding transaction with the same txid already exists".to_owned()
3923 btree_map::Entry::Vacant(vacant) => Some(vacant.insert(Vec::new())),
3926 for &(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in temporary_channels {
3927 result = result.and_then(|_| self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(
3928 temporary_channel_id,
3929 counterparty_node_id,
3930 funding_transaction.clone(),
3933 let mut output_index = None;
3934 let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3935 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3936 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
3937 if output_index.is_some() {
3938 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3939 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3942 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3945 if output_index.is_none() {
3946 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3947 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3950 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() };
3951 if let Some(funding_batch_state) = funding_batch_state.as_mut() {
3952 funding_batch_state.push((outpoint.to_channel_id(), *counterparty_node_id, false));
3958 if let Err(ref e) = result {
3959 // Remaining channels need to be removed on any error.
3960 let e = format!("Error in transaction funding: {:?}", e);
3961 let mut channels_to_remove = Vec::new();
3962 channels_to_remove.extend(funding_batch_states.as_mut()
3963 .and_then(|states| states.remove(&txid))
3964 .into_iter().flatten()
3965 .map(|(chan_id, node_id, _state)| (chan_id, node_id))
3967 channels_to_remove.extend(temporary_channels.iter()
3968 .map(|(&chan_id, &node_id)| (chan_id, node_id))
3970 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
3972 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3973 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in channels_to_remove {
3974 per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3975 .map(|peer_state_mutex| peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap())
3976 .and_then(|mut peer_state| peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id))
3978 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
3979 let closure_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: e.clone() };
3980 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
3984 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
3985 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
3991 /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
3993 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3994 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3995 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3996 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3998 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3999 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4001 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4002 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4004 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4006 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4007 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4008 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4009 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4010 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4011 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4012 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4013 pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
4014 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
4015 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4016 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
4017 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4018 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
4022 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4023 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4024 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4025 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4026 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4027 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4028 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4029 if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
4030 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4031 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4035 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4036 if let Some(channel_phase) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
4037 let mut config = channel_phase.context().config();
4038 config.apply(config_update);
4039 if !channel_phase.context_mut().update_config(&config) {
4042 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = channel_phase {
4043 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
4044 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
4045 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
4046 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4047 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4054 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
4055 debug_assert!(false);
4056 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4058 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
4059 channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4066 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
4068 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4069 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4070 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4071 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4073 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4074 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4076 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4077 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4079 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4081 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4082 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4083 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4084 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4085 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4086 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4087 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4088 pub fn update_channel_config(
4089 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config: &ChannelConfig,
4090 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4091 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
4094 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
4095 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
4097 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
4098 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
4100 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
4101 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
4102 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
4103 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
4104 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
4106 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
4107 /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
4108 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
4111 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4114 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
4115 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4116 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
4117 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
4118 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
4119 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &ChannelId, next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4120 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4122 let next_hop_scid = {
4123 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4124 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
4125 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
4126 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4127 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4128 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
4129 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) => {
4130 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
4131 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4132 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", next_hop_channel_id)
4135 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
4137 Some(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4138 err: format!("Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is still opening.",
4139 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
4142 let error = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
4143 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id);
4144 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(next_node_id), Some(*next_hop_channel_id));
4145 log_error!(logger, "{} when attempting to forward intercepted HTLC", error);
4146 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4153 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4154 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4155 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4158 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
4159 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, blinded, .. } => {
4160 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4161 onion_packet, blinded, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid
4164 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4166 let skimmed_fee_msat =
4167 payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
4168 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
4169 skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
4170 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
4173 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
4174 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4175 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4176 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
4177 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
4179 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
4183 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
4184 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
4186 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4189 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4190 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4191 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4193 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4194 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4195 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4198 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
4199 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4200 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4201 user_channel_id: Some(payment.prev_user_channel_id),
4202 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4203 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
4204 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4205 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4206 blinded_failure: payment.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
4209 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
4210 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
4211 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4212 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4217 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
4219 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
4220 /// Will likely generate further events.
4221 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
4222 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4224 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
4225 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
4226 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
4228 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
4229 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
4231 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
4232 if short_chan_id != 0 {
4233 let mut forwarding_counterparty = None;
4234 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
4236 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4237 match forward_info {
4238 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4239 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4240 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4241 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4242 outgoing_cltv_value, ..
4245 macro_rules! failure_handler {
4246 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
4247 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, forwarding_counterparty, Some(prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()));
4248 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
4250 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4251 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4252 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4253 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4254 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4255 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4256 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
4257 blinded_failure: routing.blinded_failure(),
4260 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
4261 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
4263 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
4266 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4267 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
4273 macro_rules! fail_forward {
4274 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4276 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
4280 macro_rules! failed_payment {
4281 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4283 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
4287 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref onion_packet, .. } = routing {
4288 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
4289 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.chain_hash) {
4290 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4291 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
4292 phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac,
4293 payment_hash, None, &self.node_signer
4296 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4297 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).to_byte_array();
4298 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
4299 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
4300 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
4302 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
4304 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4305 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
4309 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
4310 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4311 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
4312 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4313 outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None,
4314 current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
4316 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
4317 Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
4323 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4326 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4329 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } | HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { .. } => {
4330 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
4331 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
4332 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
4333 // problem, not ours.
4339 let chan_info_opt = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id).cloned();
4340 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match chan_info_opt {
4341 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id, chan_id),
4343 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4347 forwarding_counterparty = Some(counterparty_node_id);
4348 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4349 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4350 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
4351 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4354 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4355 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4356 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
4357 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4358 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4359 let queue_fail_htlc_res = match forward_info {
4360 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4361 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4362 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4363 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
4364 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4365 onion_packet, blinded, ..
4366 }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4369 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id);
4370 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4371 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4372 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4373 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4374 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4375 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4376 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
4377 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4378 blinded_failure: blinded.map(|_| BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode),
4380 let next_blinding_point = blinded.and_then(|b| {
4381 let encrypted_tlvs_ss = self.node_signer.ecdh(
4382 Recipient::Node, &b.inbound_blinding_point, None
4383 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4384 onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(
4385 &self.secp_ctx, b.inbound_blinding_point, &encrypted_tlvs_ss
4388 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
4389 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
4390 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, next_blinding_point, &self.fee_estimator,
4393 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4394 log_trace!(logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", &payment_hash, msg);
4396 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
4398 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan);
4399 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4400 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
4401 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
4407 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
4408 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
4410 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
4411 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4412 Some((chan.queue_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &&logger), htlc_id))
4414 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
4415 log_trace!(logger, "Failing malformed HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4416 let res = chan.queue_fail_malformed_htlc(
4417 htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion, &&logger
4419 Some((res, htlc_id))
4422 if let Some((queue_fail_htlc_res, htlc_id)) = queue_fail_htlc_res {
4423 if let Err(e) = queue_fail_htlc_res {
4424 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4425 log_trace!(logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
4427 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_{{malformed_}}htlc() were not met");
4429 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
4430 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
4431 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
4437 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4441 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4442 match forward_info {
4443 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4444 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4445 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4446 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
4447 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4450 let blinded_failure = routing.blinded_failure();
4451 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
4452 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
4453 payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret,
4454 custom_tlvs, requires_blinded_error: _
4456 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
4457 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
4458 payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
4459 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
4460 Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
4462 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs } => {
4463 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
4464 payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
4468 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
4469 payment_data, None, onion_fields)
4472 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
4475 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
4476 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
4477 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4478 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4479 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4480 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4481 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4482 phantom_shared_secret,
4485 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
4486 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
4487 // if routing nodes overpay
4488 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
4489 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
4491 total_value_received: None,
4492 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
4495 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
4498 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
4500 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
4501 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
4502 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
4503 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4504 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
4505 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
4507 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4508 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
4509 user_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.user_channel_id,
4510 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4511 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
4512 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
4513 phantom_shared_secret,
4516 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
4517 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
4519 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
4522 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
4523 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4524 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4525 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4526 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4529 macro_rules! check_total_value {
4530 ($purpose: expr) => {{
4531 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
4532 let is_keysend = match $purpose {
4533 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(_) => true,
4534 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { .. } => false,
4536 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4537 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
4538 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4540 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
4541 .entry(payment_hash)
4542 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
4543 .or_insert_with(|| {
4544 committed_to_claimable = true;
4546 purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
4549 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
4550 let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
4551 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), &payment_hash, log_keysend(!is_keysend));
4552 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4554 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4555 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", &payment_hash);
4556 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4558 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
4559 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
4560 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4563 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
4565 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
4566 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
4567 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
4568 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
4569 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
4570 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
4571 if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4572 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
4573 &payment_hash, claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
4574 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
4576 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
4578 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
4579 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
4580 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
4581 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4582 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4583 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
4585 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4586 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4587 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4588 committed_to_claimable = true;
4590 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
4591 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4592 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
4593 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
4594 let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
4595 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
4596 debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
4597 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
4598 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
4599 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4603 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
4604 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
4605 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4606 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
4607 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
4609 payment_claimable_generated = true;
4611 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
4612 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
4614 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4615 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4616 committed_to_claimable = true;
4619 payment_claimable_generated
4623 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
4624 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
4625 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
4626 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
4627 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
4628 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
4629 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4630 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4631 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4632 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4633 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
4634 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4635 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
4636 Ok(result) => result,
4638 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", &payment_hash);
4639 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4642 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
4643 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
4644 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
4645 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
4646 &payment_hash, cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
4647 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4650 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4651 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4652 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4654 check_total_value!(purpose);
4656 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
4657 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
4658 check_total_value!(purpose);
4662 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
4663 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4664 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", &payment_hash);
4665 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4667 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4668 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
4669 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", &payment_hash);
4670 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4671 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
4672 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
4673 &payment_hash, payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
4674 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4676 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4677 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
4678 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4680 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
4681 if payment_claimable_generated {
4682 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
4688 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } | HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { .. } => {
4689 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
4697 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4698 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
4699 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4700 &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
4702 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
4703 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4705 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
4707 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
4708 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
4709 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
4711 self.check_free_holding_cells();
4713 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
4714 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4715 events.append(&mut new_events);
4718 /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
4720 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
4721 fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
4722 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
4724 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
4726 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
4727 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
4728 if background_events.is_empty() {
4729 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4732 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
4734 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, update)) => {
4735 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
4736 // monitor updating completing.
4737 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4739 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update } => {
4740 let mut updated_chan = false;
4742 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4743 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4744 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4745 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4746 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4747 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase) => {
4748 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase.get_mut() {
4749 updated_chan = true;
4750 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
4751 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4753 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't have an update for a non-funded channel");
4756 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {},
4761 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
4762 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4765 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
4766 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4767 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4768 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4769 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4770 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
4771 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4773 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
4774 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
4775 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4776 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4777 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
4783 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4786 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4787 /// Process background events, for functional testing
4788 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
4789 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
4790 let _ = self.process_background_events();
4793 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &ChannelId, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
4794 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
4796 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4798 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
4799 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4800 if new_feerate != chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4801 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4802 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4804 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4806 if !chan.context.is_live() {
4807 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
4808 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4809 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4811 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4812 &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4814 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
4815 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4819 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
4820 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
4821 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
4822 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
4823 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
4824 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4825 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4827 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4828 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
4830 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4831 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4832 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4833 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4834 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
4835 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
4837 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4842 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4843 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4851 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
4853 /// This currently includes:
4854 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
4855 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
4856 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
4858 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
4859 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
4860 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
4861 /// * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
4862 /// * Forgetting about stale outbound payments, either those that have already been fulfilled
4863 /// or those awaiting an invoice that hasn't been delivered in the necessary amount of time.
4864 /// The latter is determined using the system clock in `std` and the highest seen block time
4865 /// minus two hours in `no-std`.
4867 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
4868 /// estimate fetches.
4870 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4871 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
4872 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
4873 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4874 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4876 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4877 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
4879 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
4880 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
4881 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
4882 let mut shutdown_channels = Vec::new();
4884 let mut process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
4885 chan_id: &ChannelId,
4886 context: &mut ChannelContext<SP>,
4887 unfunded_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
4888 pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4889 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
4891 context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4892 if unfunded_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
4893 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context);
4895 "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner", chan_id);
4896 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
4897 shutdown_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
4898 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4899 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4900 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4901 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
4902 channel_id: *chan_id,
4903 data: "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake".to_owned(),
4914 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4915 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4916 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4917 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4918 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
4919 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
4920 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, phase| {
4922 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
4923 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4928 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4929 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4931 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
4932 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
4933 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
4934 if needs_close { return false; }
4937 match chan.channel_update_status() {
4938 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
4939 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
4940 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
4941 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
4942 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
4943 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
4944 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
4946 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4947 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
4948 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4949 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4953 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4955 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
4958 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
4960 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4961 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
4962 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4963 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4967 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4969 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
4975 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4977 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
4978 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4979 log_debug!(logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
4980 counterparty_node_id, chan_id);
4981 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4982 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4983 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
4984 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
4985 channel_id: *chan_id,
4986 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
4994 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
4995 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
4996 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
4998 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
4999 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5000 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5005 for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
5006 if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
5007 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(*chan_id));
5008 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", &chan_id);
5009 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
5010 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5011 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5012 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5013 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_id.clone(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5019 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.retain(|_, req| req.ticks_remaining > 0);
5021 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
5022 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
5027 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
5028 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
5029 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
5030 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
5031 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
5032 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
5033 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
5034 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
5035 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5036 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
5037 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
5038 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
5039 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
5040 // have no channels to the peer.
5041 let remove_entry = {
5042 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
5043 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
5046 entry.remove_entry();
5049 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
5054 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
5055 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
5056 // This should be unreachable
5057 debug_assert!(false);
5060 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
5061 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
5062 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
5063 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
5064 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
5065 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
5066 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
5069 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
5070 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
5071 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
5073 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
5074 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
5081 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
5082 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
5083 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
5084 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
5085 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5088 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5089 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5092 for shutdown_res in shutdown_channels {
5093 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
5096 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
5097 let duration_since_epoch = std::time::SystemTime::now()
5098 .duration_since(std::time::SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH)
5099 .expect("SystemTime::now() should come after SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH");
5100 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
5101 let duration_since_epoch = Duration::from_secs(
5102 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire).saturating_sub(7200) as u64
5105 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_payments(
5106 duration_since_epoch, &self.pending_events
5109 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
5110 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
5111 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
5112 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5113 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5120 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
5121 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
5122 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
5124 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
5125 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
5126 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
5127 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
5129 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
5130 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
5131 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
5132 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
5133 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
5134 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
5137 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
5138 /// reason for the failure.
5140 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
5141 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
5142 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5144 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
5145 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
5146 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5147 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
5148 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5149 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
5150 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5155 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
5156 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
5157 match failure_code {
5158 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5159 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5160 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
5161 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5162 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
5163 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
5165 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
5166 let fail_data = match data {
5167 Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
5170 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
5175 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5176 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5178 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
5180 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5181 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
5182 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
5183 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
5184 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
5185 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
5186 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
5188 chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
5190 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
5191 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
5193 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5198 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5199 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5200 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5201 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
5202 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
5203 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
5204 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
5205 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
5206 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
5207 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5209 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5210 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5211 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5212 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
5214 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
5215 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
5216 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
5217 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
5218 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5222 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
5223 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
5224 // be surfaced to the user.
5225 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
5226 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: ChannelId,
5227 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
5229 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
5230 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5231 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
5232 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5233 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5234 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
5235 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
5236 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get() {
5237 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan)
5239 // We shouldn't be trying to fail holding cell HTLCs on an unfunded channel.
5240 debug_assert!(false);
5241 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5244 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5246 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
5249 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
5250 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
5251 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
5252 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5256 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
5257 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
5258 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
5259 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
5260 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
5261 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
5262 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
5263 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5264 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5265 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5268 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
5269 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
5270 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
5273 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5274 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
5275 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5277 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
5278 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
5279 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
5280 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
5281 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5283 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5284 ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret,
5285 ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint, ref blinded_failure, ..
5288 WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(outpoint.to_channel_id())),
5289 "Failing {}HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us: {:?}",
5290 if blinded_failure.is_some() { "blinded " } else { "" }, &payment_hash, onion_error
5292 let failure = match blinded_failure {
5293 Some(BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode) => {
5294 let blinded_onion_error = HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32]);
5295 let err_packet = blinded_onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
5296 incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
5298 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }
5300 Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode) => {
5301 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC {
5303 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
5304 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32]
5308 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
5309 incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
5311 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }
5315 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
5316 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5317 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
5318 push_forward_ev = true;
5320 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
5321 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5322 entry.get_mut().push(failure);
5324 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5325 entry.insert(vec!(failure));
5328 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
5329 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5330 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5331 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
5332 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
5333 failed_next_destination: destination,
5339 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
5340 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
5342 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
5343 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
5344 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
5345 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
5347 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
5348 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
5349 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
5350 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
5352 /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
5353 /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
5354 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
5356 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5357 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
5358 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
5359 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
5360 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5361 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5362 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
5363 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5364 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
5367 /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
5368 /// even type numbers.
5372 /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
5373 /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
5375 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5376 pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5377 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
5380 fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
5381 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
5383 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5386 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
5387 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
5388 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
5389 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
5390 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
5391 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
5392 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
5393 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
5398 let htlcs = payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect();
5399 let sender_intended_value = payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat);
5400 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
5401 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
5402 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id, htlcs, sender_intended_value
5404 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
5405 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
5406 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
5410 if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = payment.onion_fields {
5411 if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
5412 log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
5413 &payment_hash, log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
5414 claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5415 mem::drop(claimable_payments);
5416 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5417 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
5418 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5419 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5420 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5429 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
5431 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
5432 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
5433 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
5434 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
5435 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
5436 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
5437 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
5438 let mut valid_mpp = true;
5439 let mut errs = Vec::new();
5440 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5441 for htlc in sources.iter() {
5442 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
5443 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5444 debug_assert!(false);
5448 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
5450 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
5451 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5452 debug_assert!(false);
5456 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
5457 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
5459 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5460 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
5461 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5462 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
5465 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
5466 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5467 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
5468 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
5472 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5473 let prev_hop_chan_id = htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
5474 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
5475 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
5476 |_, definitely_duplicate| {
5477 debug_assert!(!definitely_duplicate, "We shouldn't claim duplicatively from a payment");
5478 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash })
5481 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
5482 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
5483 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
5484 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop_chan_id));
5485 log_error!(logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
5486 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
5491 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5492 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5493 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
5494 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5495 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
5496 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5497 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5499 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5502 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
5503 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
5504 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5505 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
5509 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>, bool) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
5510 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
5511 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
5512 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
5514 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
5515 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
5516 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
5517 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5519 // As we may call handle_monitor_update_completion_actions in rather rare cases, check that
5520 // the required mutexes are not held before we start.
5521 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5522 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5525 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5526 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
5527 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
5528 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
5532 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
5533 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5534 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
5537 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
5538 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
5539 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5540 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5541 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
5542 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5543 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
5544 let fulfill_res = chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
5547 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } => {
5548 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat), false) {
5549 log_trace!(logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
5551 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
5554 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
5555 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5557 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
5558 // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
5559 // monitor update as a background event.
5560 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5561 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5562 counterparty_node_id,
5563 funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
5564 update: monitor_update.clone(),
5568 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => {
5569 let action = if let Some(action) = completion_action(None, true) {
5574 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5576 log_trace!(logger, "Completing monitor update completion action for channel {} as claim was redundant: {:?}",
5578 let (node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker) =
5579 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5580 downstream_counterparty_node_id: node_id,
5581 downstream_funding_outpoint: funding_outpoint,
5582 blocking_action: blocker,
5584 (node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)
5586 debug_assert!(false,
5587 "Duplicate claims should always free another channel immediately");
5590 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
5591 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5592 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state
5593 .actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
5594 .get_mut(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
5596 let mut found_blocker = false;
5597 blockers.retain(|iter| {
5598 // Note that we could actually be blocked, in
5599 // which case we need to only remove the one
5600 // blocker which was added duplicatively.
5601 let first_blocker = !found_blocker;
5602 if *iter == blocker { found_blocker = true; }
5603 *iter != blocker || !first_blocker
5605 debug_assert!(found_blocker);
5608 debug_assert!(false);
5617 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5618 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
5619 counterparty_node_id: None,
5620 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5626 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
5627 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
5628 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
5629 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
5630 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
5631 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
5632 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
5633 // again on restart.
5634 log_error!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id())), "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
5635 payment_preimage, update_res);
5638 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
5639 // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
5641 // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
5642 // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
5643 // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
5644 // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
5645 // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
5646 // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
5647 // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
5648 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5649 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
5650 prev_hop.outpoint, preimage_update,
5653 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
5654 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
5655 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
5656 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
5657 // `PaymentForwarded`).
5658 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None, false));
5662 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
5663 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
5666 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
5667 forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, startup_replay: bool,
5668 next_channel_counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>, next_channel_outpoint: OutPoint
5671 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
5672 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
5673 "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
5674 if let Some(pubkey) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5675 debug_assert_eq!(pubkey, path.hops[0].pubkey);
5677 let ev_completion_action = EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
5678 channel_funding_outpoint: next_channel_outpoint,
5679 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
5681 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage,
5682 session_priv, path, from_onchain, ev_completion_action, &self.pending_events,
5685 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
5686 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5687 let completed_blocker = RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&hop_data);
5688 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5689 let claiming_chan_funding_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5690 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
5691 |htlc_claim_value_msat, definitely_duplicate| {
5692 let chan_to_release =
5693 if let Some(node_id) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5694 Some((node_id, next_channel_outpoint, completed_blocker))
5696 // We can only get `None` here if we are processing a
5697 // `ChannelMonitor`-originated event, in which case we
5698 // don't care about ensuring we wake the downstream
5699 // channel's monitor updating - the channel is already
5704 if definitely_duplicate && startup_replay {
5705 // On startup we may get redundant claims which are related to
5706 // monitor updates still in flight. In that case, we shouldn't
5707 // immediately free, but instead let that monitor update complete
5708 // in the background.
5709 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
5710 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
5711 // There should be a `BackgroundEvent` pending...
5712 assert!(background_events.iter().any(|ev| {
5714 // to apply a monitor update that blocked the claiming channel,
5715 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5716 funding_txo, update, ..
5718 if *funding_txo == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint {
5719 assert!(update.updates.iter().any(|upd|
5720 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5721 payment_preimage: update_preimage
5723 payment_preimage == *update_preimage
5729 // or the channel we'd unblock is already closed,
5730 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup(
5731 (funding_txo, monitor_update)
5733 if *funding_txo == next_channel_outpoint {
5734 assert_eq!(monitor_update.updates.len(), 1);
5736 monitor_update.updates[0],
5737 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. }
5742 // or the monitor update has completed and will unblock
5743 // immediately once we get going.
5744 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
5747 *channel_id == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(),
5749 }), "{:?}", *background_events);
5752 } else if definitely_duplicate {
5753 if let Some(other_chan) = chan_to_release {
5754 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5755 downstream_counterparty_node_id: other_chan.0,
5756 downstream_funding_outpoint: other_chan.1,
5757 blocking_action: other_chan.2,
5761 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
5762 if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
5763 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
5766 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5767 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
5769 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
5770 prev_channel_id: Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5771 next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5772 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
5774 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: chan_to_release,
5778 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
5779 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5780 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
5786 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
5787 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
5788 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
5791 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
5792 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5793 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5794 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5796 for action in actions.into_iter() {
5798 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
5799 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5800 if let Some(ClaimingPayment {
5802 payment_purpose: purpose,
5805 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_total_msat,
5807 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
5811 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
5813 sender_intended_total_msat,
5817 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5818 event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
5820 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
5821 if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
5822 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, Some(blocker));
5825 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5826 downstream_counterparty_node_id, downstream_funding_outpoint, blocking_action,
5828 self.handle_monitor_update_release(
5829 downstream_counterparty_node_id,
5830 downstream_funding_outpoint,
5831 Some(blocking_action),
5838 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
5839 /// update completion.
5840 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5841 channel: &mut Channel<SP>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
5842 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
5843 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
5844 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
5845 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
5846 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
5847 log_trace!(logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
5848 &channel.context.channel_id(),
5849 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
5850 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
5851 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
5852 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
5853 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
5855 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
5857 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5858 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5859 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias()),
5860 channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
5863 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
5864 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
5866 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
5867 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5868 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5873 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
5874 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
5875 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5876 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5881 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
5882 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
5883 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
5884 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5885 msg: revoke_and_ack,
5890 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
5894 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
5900 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
5901 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
5902 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
5906 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5907 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
5908 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
5914 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
5915 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5917 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
5918 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5920 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5921 // monitor event, this and the outpoint_to_peer map should be removed.
5922 let outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5923 match outpoint_to_peer.get(&funding_txo) {
5924 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5929 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5930 let mut peer_state_lock;
5931 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
5932 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
5933 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5934 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5936 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5939 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
5940 .remove(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
5941 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5942 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5943 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
5946 let remaining_in_flight =
5947 if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
5948 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
5951 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
5952 log_trace!(logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
5953 highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
5954 remaining_in_flight);
5955 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
5958 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
5961 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
5963 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
5964 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
5967 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5968 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5969 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5971 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
5972 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
5973 /// used to accept such channels.
5975 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5976 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5977 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5978 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
5981 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
5982 /// it as confirmed immediately.
5984 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5985 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5986 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5988 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
5989 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
5991 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
5992 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
5994 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
5995 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
5997 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5998 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5999 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6000 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
6003 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6005 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(*temporary_channel_id));
6006 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6008 let peers_without_funded_channels =
6009 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
6010 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6011 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6013 let err_str = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id);
6014 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6016 APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: err_str }
6018 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6019 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6020 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
6022 // Find (and remove) the channel in the unaccepted table. If it's not there, something weird is
6023 // happening and return an error. N.B. that we create channel with an outbound SCID of zero so
6024 // that we can delay allocating the SCID until after we're sure that the checks below will
6026 let mut channel = match peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
6027 Some(unaccepted_channel) => {
6028 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6029 InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6030 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
6031 &unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
6032 &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|e| {
6033 let err_str = e.to_string();
6034 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6036 APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: err_str }
6040 let err_str = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned();
6041 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6043 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str })
6048 // This should have been correctly configured by the call to InboundV1Channel::new.
6049 debug_assert!(channel.context.minimum_depth().unwrap() == 0);
6050 } else if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
6051 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6052 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6053 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
6054 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
6057 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
6058 let err_str = "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned();
6059 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6061 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
6063 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6064 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
6065 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6066 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
6067 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6068 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6069 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
6070 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
6073 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
6074 let err_str = "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned();
6075 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6077 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
6081 // Now that we know we have a channel, assign an outbound SCID alias.
6082 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6083 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6085 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6086 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6087 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6090 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(temporary_channel_id.clone(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6095 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
6096 /// or 0-conf channels.
6098 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
6099 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
6100 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
6101 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<SP>) -> bool {
6102 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
6103 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6105 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6106 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
6107 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6108 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
6109 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
6110 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
6111 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
6115 return peers_without_funded_channels;
6118 fn unfunded_channel_count(
6119 peer: &PeerState<SP>, best_block_height: u32
6121 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
6122 for (_, phase) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
6124 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6125 // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
6126 // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
6127 if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
6128 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
6130 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6133 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
6134 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
6135 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6138 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6139 // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
6144 num_unfunded_channels + peer.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
6147 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6148 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6149 // likely to be lost on restart!
6150 if msg.chain_hash != self.chain_hash {
6151 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6154 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
6155 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6158 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
6159 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
6160 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
6161 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
6162 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
6164 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6165 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6167 debug_assert!(false);
6168 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
6170 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6171 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6173 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6174 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
6175 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6176 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
6177 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
6178 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
6180 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6181 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
6182 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6185 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6186 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
6187 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6188 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
6189 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6192 let channel_id = msg.temporary_channel_id;
6193 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
6195 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6198 // If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
6199 if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
6200 let channel_type = channel::channel_type_from_open_channel(
6201 &msg, &peer_state.latest_features, &self.channel_type_features()
6203 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id)
6205 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6206 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
6207 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
6208 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6209 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
6210 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
6213 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
6214 open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
6215 ticks_remaining: UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS,
6220 // Otherwise create the channel right now.
6221 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
6222 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
6223 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
6224 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6225 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
6226 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
6229 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
6234 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
6235 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
6236 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6238 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6239 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6242 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6243 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6245 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6246 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6247 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6249 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6253 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6254 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6255 // likely to be lost on restart!
6256 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
6257 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6258 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6260 debug_assert!(false);
6261 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6263 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6264 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6265 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6266 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut phase) => {
6267 match phase.get_mut() {
6268 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
6269 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), phase);
6270 (chan.context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.context.get_user_id())
6273 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected accept_channel message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id));
6277 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6280 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6281 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
6282 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6283 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6284 channel_value_satoshis: value,
6286 user_channel_id: user_id,
6291 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6292 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6294 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6295 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6297 debug_assert!(false);
6298 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6301 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6302 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6303 let (mut chan, funding_msg_opt, monitor) =
6304 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6305 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan)) => {
6306 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &inbound_chan.context);
6307 match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger) {
6309 Err((inbound_chan, err)) => {
6310 // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
6311 // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
6312 // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
6313 debug_assert!(matches!(err, ChannelError::Close(_)));
6314 // Really we should be returning the channel_id the peer expects based
6315 // on their funding info here, but they're horribly confused anyway, so
6316 // there's not a lot we can do to save them.
6317 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, &mut ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan), &msg.temporary_channel_id).1);
6321 Some(mut phase) => {
6322 let err_msg = format!("Got an unexpected funding_created message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id);
6323 let err = ChannelError::Close(err_msg);
6324 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, &mut phase, &msg.temporary_channel_id).1);
6326 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6329 let funded_channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
6331 macro_rules! fail_chan { ($err: expr) => { {
6332 // Note that at this point we've filled in the funding outpoint on our
6333 // channel, but its actually in conflict with another channel. Thus, if
6334 // we call `convert_chan_phase_err` immediately (thus calling
6335 // `update_maps_on_chan_removal`), we'll remove the existing channel
6336 // from `outpoint_to_peer`. Thus, we must first unset the funding outpoint
6338 let err = ChannelError::Close($err.to_owned());
6339 chan.unset_funding_info(msg.temporary_channel_id);
6340 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, chan, &funded_channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL).1);
6343 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funded_channel_id) {
6344 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6345 fail_chan!("Already had channel with the new channel_id");
6347 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6348 let mut outpoint_to_peer_lock = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6349 match outpoint_to_peer_lock.entry(monitor.get_funding_txo().0) {
6350 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6351 fail_chan!("The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible");
6353 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
6354 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
6355 if let Ok(persist_state) = monitor_res {
6356 i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
6357 mem::drop(outpoint_to_peer_lock);
6359 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
6360 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
6361 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
6362 // until we have persisted our monitor.
6363 if let Some(msg) = funding_msg_opt {
6364 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
6365 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6370 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) {
6371 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_state, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
6372 per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6374 unreachable!("This must be a funded channel as we just inserted it.");
6378 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6379 log_error!(logger, "Persisting initial ChannelMonitor failed, implying the funding outpoint was duplicated");
6380 fail_chan!("Duplicate funding outpoint");
6388 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6389 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6390 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6391 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6393 debug_assert!(false);
6394 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6397 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6398 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6399 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6400 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
6401 if matches!(chan_phase_entry.get(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_)) {
6402 let chan = if let ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) = chan_phase_entry.remove() { chan } else { unreachable!() };
6403 let logger = WithContext::from(
6405 Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
6406 Some(chan.context.channel_id())
6409 chan.funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger);
6411 Ok((mut chan, monitor)) => {
6412 if let Ok(persist_status) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
6413 // We really should be able to insert here without doing a second
6414 // lookup, but sadly rust stdlib doesn't currently allow keeping
6415 // the original Entry around with the value removed.
6416 let mut chan = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id).or_insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan));
6417 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) = &mut chan {
6418 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_status, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6419 } else { unreachable!(); }
6422 let e = ChannelError::Close("Channel funding outpoint was a duplicate".to_owned());
6423 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no
6424 // updates should be made on it. Previously, full_stack_target
6425 // found an (unreachable) panic when the monitor update contained
6426 // within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
6427 chan.unset_funding_info(msg.channel_id);
6428 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::Funded(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
6432 debug_assert!(matches!(e, ChannelError::Close(_)),
6433 "We don't have a channel anymore, so the error better have expected close");
6434 // We've already removed this outbound channel from the map in
6435 // `PeerState` above so at this point we just need to clean up any
6436 // lingering entries concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
6437 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
6441 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
6444 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
6448 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6449 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6450 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6451 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6452 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6454 debug_assert!(false);
6455 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6457 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6458 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6459 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6460 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6461 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6462 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6463 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
6464 self.chain_hash, &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6465 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
6466 log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6467 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6468 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6469 msg: announcement_sigs,
6471 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
6472 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
6473 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
6474 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
6475 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
6476 // announcement_signatures.
6477 log_trace!(logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6478 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
6479 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6480 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6487 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6488 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan);
6493 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6494 "Got a channel_ready message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry)
6497 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
6498 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6503 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6504 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
6505 let mut finish_shutdown = None;
6507 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6508 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6510 debug_assert!(false);
6511 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6513 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6514 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6515 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6516 let phase = chan_phase_entry.get_mut();
6518 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6519 if !chan.received_shutdown() {
6520 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6521 log_info!(logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
6523 if chan.sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
6526 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6527 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6528 chan.shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6529 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
6531 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
6532 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
6533 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
6534 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
6535 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6536 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6540 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
6541 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6542 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
6543 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6546 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6547 let context = phase.context_mut();
6548 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context);
6549 log_error!(logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
6550 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
6551 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel));
6555 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6558 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
6559 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
6560 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
6561 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
6563 if let Some(shutdown_res) = finish_shutdown {
6564 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
6570 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6571 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6572 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6574 debug_assert!(false);
6575 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6577 let (tx, chan_option, shutdown_result) = {
6578 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6579 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6580 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6581 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6582 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6583 let (closing_signed, tx, shutdown_result) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6584 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
6585 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
6586 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
6587 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6592 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
6593 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
6594 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
6595 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
6596 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
6597 (tx, Some(remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry)), shutdown_result)
6598 } else { (tx, None, shutdown_result) }
6600 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6601 "Got a closing_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6604 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6607 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
6608 let channel_id = chan_option.as_ref().map(|channel| channel.context().channel_id());
6609 log_info!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id), "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
6610 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
6612 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = chan_option {
6613 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6614 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6615 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6616 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6621 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6622 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
6623 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
6628 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6629 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
6630 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
6631 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
6633 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
6634 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
6635 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
6636 //but we should prevent it anyway.
6638 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6639 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6641 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg, counterparty_node_id);
6642 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6643 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6645 debug_assert!(false);
6646 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6648 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6649 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6650 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6651 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6652 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6653 let pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
6654 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
6655 self.construct_pending_htlc_status(
6656 msg, counterparty_node_id, shared_secret, next_hop,
6657 chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt,
6659 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
6661 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<SP>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
6662 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
6663 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(
6664 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6665 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6666 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
6667 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
6668 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
6672 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
6673 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
6674 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
6675 match pending_forward_info {
6676 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
6677 ref incoming_shared_secret, ref routing, ..
6679 let reason = if routing.blinded_failure().is_some() {
6680 HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32])
6681 } else if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
6682 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
6683 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
6685 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
6686 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
6687 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6688 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6689 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
6692 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
6694 _ => pending_forward_info
6697 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6698 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6700 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6701 "Got an update_add_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6704 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6709 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6711 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
6712 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6713 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6715 debug_assert!(false);
6716 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6718 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6719 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6720 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6721 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6722 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6723 let res = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6724 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop) = &res.0 {
6725 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6727 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
6729 peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates.entry(msg.channel_id)
6730 .or_insert_with(Vec::new)
6731 .push(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&prev_hop));
6733 // Note that we do not need to push an `actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates`
6734 // entry here, even though we *do* need to block the next RAA monitor update.
6735 // We do this instead in the `claim_funds_internal` by attaching a
6736 // `ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate` action to the event generated when the
6737 // outbound HTLC is claimed. This is guaranteed to all complete before we
6738 // process the RAA as messages are processed from single peers serially.
6739 funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().expect("We won't accept a fulfill until funded");
6742 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6743 "Got an update_fulfill_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6746 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6749 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, false, Some(*counterparty_node_id), funding_txo);
6753 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6754 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6755 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6756 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6757 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6759 debug_assert!(false);
6760 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6762 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6763 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6764 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6765 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6766 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6767 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan_phase_entry);
6769 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6770 "Got an update_fail_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6773 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6778 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6779 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6780 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6781 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6782 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6784 debug_assert!(false);
6785 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6787 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6788 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6789 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6790 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6791 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
6792 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
6793 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan_phase_entry);
6795 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6796 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan_phase_entry);
6798 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6799 "Got an update_fail_malformed_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6803 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6807 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6808 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6809 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6811 debug_assert!(false);
6812 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6814 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6815 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6816 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6817 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6818 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6819 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6820 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6821 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6822 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6823 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
6824 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6828 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6829 "Got a commitment_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6832 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6837 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
6838 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
6839 let mut push_forward_event = false;
6840 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
6841 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
6842 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
6843 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
6844 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
6845 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6846 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
6847 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
6849 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
6850 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
6852 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6853 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
6854 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
6855 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6856 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6857 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
6859 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6860 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
6861 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.chain_hash)
6863 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).to_byte_array());
6864 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6865 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
6866 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6867 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
6868 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
6869 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
6870 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
6871 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
6874 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6875 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
6877 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6878 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()));
6879 log_info!(logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
6880 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6881 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
6882 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
6883 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
6884 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
6885 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6886 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6887 blinded_failure: forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
6890 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
6891 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
6892 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
6897 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
6898 // payments are being processed.
6899 if forward_htlcs_empty {
6900 push_forward_event = true;
6902 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6903 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
6910 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
6911 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
6914 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
6915 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6916 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
6918 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
6922 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
6923 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6924 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6925 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
6926 if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
6928 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
6929 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
6930 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
6931 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
6932 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
6933 // real by taking more time.
6934 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
6935 pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6936 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
6941 /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
6942 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
6943 /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
6944 /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
6945 fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6946 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
6947 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
6949 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6950 .get(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
6951 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
6952 action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6953 channel_funding_outpoint,
6954 counterparty_node_id,
6959 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6960 pub(crate) fn test_raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6961 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_id: ChannelId
6963 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6964 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6965 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6966 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
6968 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id) {
6969 return self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
6970 chan.context().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), counterparty_node_id);
6976 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6977 let htlcs_to_fail = {
6978 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6979 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6981 debug_assert!(false);
6982 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6983 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
6984 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6985 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6986 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6987 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6988 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6989 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6990 let mon_update_blocked = if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_opt {
6991 self.raa_monitor_updates_held(
6992 &peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates, funding_txo,
6993 *counterparty_node_id)
6995 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6996 chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger, mon_update_blocked), chan_phase_entry);
6997 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6998 let funding_txo = funding_txo_opt
6999 .expect("Funding outpoint must have been set for RAA handling to succeed");
7000 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update,
7001 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7005 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7006 "Got a revoke_and_ack message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7009 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7012 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
7016 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7017 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7018 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7020 debug_assert!(false);
7021 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7023 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7024 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7025 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7026 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7027 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7028 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7029 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
7031 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7032 "Got an update_fee message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7035 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7040 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7041 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7042 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7044 debug_assert!(false);
7045 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7047 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7048 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7049 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7050 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7051 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7052 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
7053 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
7056 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
7057 msg: try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.announcement_signatures(
7058 &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
7059 msg, &self.default_configuration
7060 ), chan_phase_entry),
7061 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
7062 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
7063 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan).unwrap()),
7066 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7067 "Got an announcement_signatures message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7070 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7075 /// Returns DoPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersistNoEvents or an Err.
7076 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7077 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7078 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
7080 // It's not a local channel
7081 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7084 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7085 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
7086 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
7087 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7089 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7090 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7091 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
7092 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7093 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7094 if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
7095 if chan.context.should_announce() {
7096 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
7097 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
7098 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
7099 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7101 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
7103 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
7104 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
7105 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
7106 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7108 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7109 log_debug!(logger, "Received channel_update {:?} for channel {}.", msg, chan_id);
7110 let did_change = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_update(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
7111 // If nothing changed after applying their update, we don't need to bother
7114 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7118 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7119 "Got a channel_update for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7122 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7124 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
7127 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7129 let need_lnd_workaround = {
7130 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7132 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7134 debug_assert!(false);
7135 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7136 format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
7140 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id));
7141 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7142 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7143 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7144 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7145 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7146 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
7147 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
7148 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
7149 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
7150 let responses = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_reestablish(
7151 msg, &&logger, &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash,
7152 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan_phase_entry);
7153 let mut channel_update = None;
7154 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
7155 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
7156 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7159 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
7160 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
7161 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
7162 // they have the latest channel parameters.
7163 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
7164 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
7165 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7170 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
7171 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
7172 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
7173 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
7174 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
7175 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
7179 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7180 "Got a channel_reestablish message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7183 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
7184 log_debug!(logger, "Sending bogus ChannelReestablish for unknown channel {} to force channel closure",
7186 // Unfortunately, lnd doesn't force close on errors
7187 // (https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/blob/abb1e3463f3a83bbb843d5c399869dbe930ad94f/htlcswitch/link.go#L2119).
7188 // One of the few ways to get an lnd counterparty to force close is by
7189 // replicating what they do when restoring static channel backups (SCBs). They
7190 // send an invalid `ChannelReestablish` with `0` commitment numbers and an
7191 // invalid `your_last_per_commitment_secret`.
7193 // Since we received a `ChannelReestablish` for a channel that doesn't exist, we
7194 // can assume it's likely the channel closed from our point of view, but it
7195 // remains open on the counterparty's side. By sending this bogus
7196 // `ChannelReestablish` message now as a response to theirs, we trigger them to
7197 // force close broadcasting their latest state. If the closing transaction from
7198 // our point of view remains unconfirmed, it'll enter a race with the
7199 // counterparty's to-be-broadcast latest commitment transaction.
7200 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
7201 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7202 msg: msgs::ChannelReestablish {
7203 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7204 next_local_commitment_number: 0,
7205 next_remote_commitment_number: 0,
7206 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [1u8; 32],
7207 my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_slice(&[2u8; 33]).unwrap(),
7208 next_funding_txid: None,
7211 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7212 format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}",
7213 counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7219 let mut persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
7220 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
7221 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
7222 persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7225 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
7226 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
7231 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
7232 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
7233 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
7235 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7236 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
7237 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
7238 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
7239 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
7240 match monitor_event {
7241 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
7242 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, counterparty_node_id, Some(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()));
7243 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
7244 log_trace!(logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", preimage);
7245 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, false, counterparty_node_id, funding_outpoint);
7247 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash);
7248 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
7249 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7250 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7253 MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(funding_outpoint) => {
7254 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
7255 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
7257 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
7258 // monitor event, this and the outpoint_to_peer map should be removed.
7259 let outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7260 outpoint_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint).cloned()
7263 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
7264 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7265 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7266 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7267 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7268 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7269 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
7270 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
7271 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
7272 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7273 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7277 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7278 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7279 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
7280 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
7288 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
7289 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
7295 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7296 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7299 has_pending_monitor_events
7302 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
7303 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
7304 /// update events as a separate process method here.
7306 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
7307 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7308 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
7311 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
7312 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
7313 /// update was applied.
7314 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
7315 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
7316 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7318 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
7319 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
7320 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
7321 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
7323 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7324 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7326 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7327 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7328 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
7329 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
7331 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
7332 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7333 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
7334 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context));
7335 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
7336 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
7338 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
7339 has_monitor_update = true;
7341 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
7342 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7343 continue 'peer_loop;
7352 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty();
7353 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7354 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
7360 /// When a call to a [`ChannelSigner`] method returns an error, this indicates that the signer
7361 /// is (temporarily) unavailable, and the operation should be retried later.
7363 /// This method allows for that retry - either checking for any signer-pending messages to be
7364 /// attempted in every channel, or in the specifically provided channel.
7366 /// [`ChannelSigner`]: crate::sign::ChannelSigner
7367 #[cfg(async_signing)]
7368 pub fn signer_unblocked(&self, channel_opt: Option<(PublicKey, ChannelId)>) {
7369 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7371 let unblock_chan = |phase: &mut ChannelPhase<SP>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>| {
7372 let node_id = phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id();
7374 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7375 let msgs = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger);
7376 if let Some(updates) = msgs.commitment_update {
7377 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
7382 if let Some(msg) = msgs.funding_signed {
7383 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
7388 if let Some(msg) = msgs.channel_ready {
7389 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
7392 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
7393 if let Some(msg) = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger) {
7394 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
7400 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {},
7404 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7405 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, channel_id)) = channel_opt {
7406 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7407 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7408 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7409 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
7410 unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7414 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7415 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7416 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7417 for (_, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
7418 unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7424 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
7425 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
7426 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
7427 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
7428 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
7429 let mut has_update = false;
7430 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
7432 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7434 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7435 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7436 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7437 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7438 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, phase| {
7440 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7441 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7442 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &&logger) {
7443 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt, shutdown_result_opt)) => {
7444 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
7446 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
7447 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
7450 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result_opt.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
7451 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result_opt {
7452 shutdown_results.push(shutdown_result);
7454 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
7455 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
7456 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
7457 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7458 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7463 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
7464 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
7465 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7471 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
7472 handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
7477 _ => true, // Retain unfunded channels if present.
7483 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
7484 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
7487 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
7488 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
7494 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
7495 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
7497 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
7498 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7499 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
7500 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
7501 // reorganized out of the main chain.
7502 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
7503 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
7504 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
7505 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
7506 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = failure.monitor_update.take() {
7507 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
7508 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
7509 assert!(should_broadcast);
7510 } else { unreachable!(); }
7511 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
7512 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
7513 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
7516 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7520 /// Creates an [`OfferBuilder`] such that the [`Offer`] it builds is recognized by the
7521 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`InvoiceRequest`] messages for the offer. The offer will
7522 /// not have an expiration unless otherwise set on the builder.
7526 /// Uses [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`] to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the offer.
7527 /// However, if one is not found, uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] with
7528 /// [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction node instead. In the latter case,
7529 /// the node must be announced, otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction in
7530 /// order to send the [`InvoiceRequest`].
7532 /// Also, uses a derived signing pubkey in the offer for recipient privacy.
7536 /// Requires a direct connection to the introduction node in the responding [`InvoiceRequest`]'s
7541 /// Errors if the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded path for the offer.
7543 /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
7545 /// [`Offer`]: crate::offers::offer::Offer
7546 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
7547 pub fn create_offer_builder(
7548 &self, description: String
7549 ) -> Result<OfferBuilder<DerivedMetadata, secp256k1::All>, Bolt12SemanticError> {
7550 let node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7551 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7552 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7553 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7555 let path = self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7556 let builder = OfferBuilder::deriving_signing_pubkey(
7557 description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx
7559 .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)
7565 /// Creates a [`RefundBuilder`] such that the [`Refund`] it builds is recognized by the
7566 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`Bolt12Invoice`] messages for the refund.
7570 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the refund.
7571 /// See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has been sent.
7573 /// The builder will have the provided expiration set. Any changes to the expiration on the
7574 /// returned builder will not be honored by [`ChannelManager`]. For `no-std`, the highest seen
7575 /// block time minus two hours is used for the current time when determining if the refund has
7578 /// To revoke the refund, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
7579 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received before expiration, the payment will fail
7580 /// with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
7582 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
7583 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
7587 /// Uses [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`] to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the refund.
7588 /// However, if one is not found, uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] with
7589 /// [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction node instead. In the latter case,
7590 /// the node must be announced, otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction in
7591 /// order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
7593 /// Also, uses a derived payer id in the refund for payer privacy.
7597 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in the responding
7598 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
7603 /// - a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link,
7604 /// - `amount_msats` is invalid, or
7605 /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded path for the refund.
7607 /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
7609 /// [`Refund`]: crate::offers::refund::Refund
7610 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7611 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
7612 /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
7613 pub fn create_refund_builder(
7614 &self, description: String, amount_msats: u64, absolute_expiry: Duration,
7615 payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
7616 ) -> Result<RefundBuilder<secp256k1::All>, Bolt12SemanticError> {
7617 let node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7618 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7619 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7620 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7622 let path = self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7623 let builder = RefundBuilder::deriving_payer_id(
7624 description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, amount_msats, payment_id
7626 .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)
7627 .absolute_expiry(absolute_expiry)
7630 let expiration = StaleExpiration::AbsoluteTimeout(absolute_expiry);
7631 self.pending_outbound_payments
7632 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
7633 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat,
7635 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
7640 /// Pays for an [`Offer`] using the given parameters by creating an [`InvoiceRequest`] and
7641 /// enqueuing it to be sent via an onion message. [`ChannelManager`] will pay the actual
7642 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`] once it is received.
7644 /// Uses [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`] such that the [`InvoiceRequest`] it builds is recognized by
7645 /// the [`ChannelManager`] when handling a [`Bolt12Invoice`] message in response to the request.
7646 /// The optional parameters are used in the builder, if `Some`:
7647 /// - `quantity` for [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`] which must be set if
7648 /// [`Offer::expects_quantity`] is `true`.
7649 /// - `amount_msats` if overpaying what is required for the given `quantity` is desired, and
7650 /// - `payer_note` for [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`].
7652 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
7653 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
7657 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the request
7658 /// when received. See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has
7661 /// To revoke the request, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
7662 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received in a reasonable amount of time, the
7663 /// payment will fail with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
7667 /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the reply path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`]
7668 /// as the introduction node and a derived payer id for payer privacy. As such, currently, the
7669 /// node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node
7670 /// in order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
7674 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Offer::paths`] or to
7675 /// [`Offer::signing_pubkey`], if empty. A similar restriction applies to the responding
7676 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
7681 /// - a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link,
7682 /// - the provided parameters are invalid for the offer,
7683 /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded reply path for the invoice
7686 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
7687 /// [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::quantity
7688 /// [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::payer_note
7689 /// [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequestBuilder
7690 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7691 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
7692 /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
7693 pub fn pay_for_offer(
7694 &self, offer: &Offer, quantity: Option<u64>, amount_msats: Option<u64>,
7695 payer_note: Option<String>, payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry,
7696 max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
7697 ) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
7698 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7699 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7700 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7703 .request_invoice_deriving_payer_id(expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, payment_id)?
7704 .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)?;
7705 let builder = match quantity {
7707 Some(quantity) => builder.quantity(quantity)?,
7709 let builder = match amount_msats {
7711 Some(amount_msats) => builder.amount_msats(amount_msats)?,
7713 let builder = match payer_note {
7715 Some(payer_note) => builder.payer_note(payer_note),
7717 let invoice_request = builder.build_and_sign()?;
7718 let reply_path = self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7720 let expiration = StaleExpiration::TimerTicks(1);
7721 self.pending_outbound_payments
7722 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
7723 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat
7725 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
7727 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
7728 if offer.paths().is_empty() {
7729 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7730 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request),
7731 Destination::Node(offer.signing_pubkey()),
7734 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7736 // Send as many invoice requests as there are paths in the offer (with an upper bound).
7737 // Using only one path could result in a failure if the path no longer exists. But only
7738 // one invoice for a given payment id will be paid, even if more than one is received.
7739 const REQUEST_LIMIT: usize = 10;
7740 for path in offer.paths().into_iter().take(REQUEST_LIMIT) {
7741 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7742 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request.clone()),
7743 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
7744 Some(reply_path.clone()),
7746 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7753 /// Creates a [`Bolt12Invoice`] for a [`Refund`] and enqueues it to be sent via an onion
7756 /// The resulting invoice uses a [`PaymentHash`] recognized by the [`ChannelManager`] and a
7757 /// [`BlindedPath`] containing the [`PaymentSecret`] needed to reconstruct the corresponding
7758 /// [`PaymentPreimage`].
7762 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Refund::paths`] or to
7763 /// [`Refund::payer_id`], if empty. This request is best effort; an invoice will be sent to each
7764 /// node meeting the aforementioned criteria, but there's no guarantee that they will be
7765 /// received and no retries will be made.
7769 /// Errors if the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded payment path or reply
7770 /// path for the invoice.
7772 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7773 pub fn request_refund_payment(&self, refund: &Refund) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
7774 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7775 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7776 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7778 let amount_msats = refund.amount_msats();
7779 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
7781 match self.create_inbound_payment(Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None) {
7782 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => {
7783 let payment_paths = self.create_blinded_payment_paths(amount_msats, payment_secret)
7784 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7786 #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
7787 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys(
7788 payment_paths, payment_hash, expanded_key, entropy
7790 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
7791 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
7792 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
7794 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
7795 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
7796 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at, expanded_key, entropy
7798 let invoice = builder.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)?;
7799 let reply_path = self.create_blinded_path()
7800 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7802 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
7803 if refund.paths().is_empty() {
7804 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7805 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice),
7806 Destination::Node(refund.payer_id()),
7809 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7811 for path in refund.paths() {
7812 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7813 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice.clone()),
7814 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
7815 Some(reply_path.clone()),
7817 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7823 Err(()) => Err(Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount),
7827 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
7830 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
7831 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
7833 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
7834 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
7835 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
7836 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
7838 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
7840 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
7841 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
7845 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
7846 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
7848 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
7850 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
7851 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
7853 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
7854 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
7855 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
7856 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
7857 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
7858 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
7859 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
7860 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
7861 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
7862 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
7863 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
7866 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
7867 /// stored external to LDK.
7869 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
7870 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
7871 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
7873 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
7874 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
7877 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
7878 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
7879 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
7880 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
7882 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
7883 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
7884 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
7885 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
7886 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
7888 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
7889 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
7890 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
7891 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
7892 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
7894 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
7895 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
7897 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
7898 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
7902 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
7903 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
7905 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
7907 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
7908 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
7910 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
7911 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
7912 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
7913 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
7914 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
7915 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
7916 min_final_cltv_expiry)
7919 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
7920 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
7922 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
7923 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
7924 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
7927 /// Creates a blinded path by delegating to [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`].
7929 /// Errors if the `MessageRouter` errors or returns an empty `Vec`.
7930 fn create_blinded_path(&self) -> Result<BlindedPath, ()> {
7931 let recipient = self.get_our_node_id();
7932 let entropy_source = self.entropy_source.deref();
7933 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7935 let peers = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap()
7937 .filter(|(_, peer)| peer.lock().unwrap().latest_features.supports_onion_messages())
7938 .map(|(node_id, _)| *node_id)
7939 .collect::<Vec<_>>();
7942 .create_blinded_paths(recipient, peers, entropy_source, secp_ctx)
7943 .and_then(|paths| paths.into_iter().next().ok_or(()))
7946 /// Creates multi-hop blinded payment paths for the given `amount_msats` by delegating to
7947 /// [`Router::create_blinded_payment_paths`].
7948 fn create_blinded_payment_paths(
7949 &self, amount_msats: u64, payment_secret: PaymentSecret
7950 ) -> Result<Vec<(BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath)>, ()> {
7951 let entropy_source = self.entropy_source.deref();
7952 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7954 let first_hops = self.list_usable_channels();
7955 let payee_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7956 let max_cltv_expiry = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY
7957 + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
7958 let payee_tlvs = ReceiveTlvs {
7960 payment_constraints: PaymentConstraints {
7962 htlc_minimum_msat: 1,
7965 self.router.create_blinded_payment_paths(
7966 payee_node_id, first_hops, payee_tlvs, amount_msats, entropy_source, secp_ctx
7970 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
7971 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
7973 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
7974 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
7975 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7976 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
7978 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
7979 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
7980 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
7981 Some(_) => continue,
7982 None => return scid_candidate
7987 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
7989 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
7990 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
7992 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
7993 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
7994 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
7998 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
7999 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
8000 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
8002 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
8003 /// times to get a unique scid.
8004 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
8005 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
8006 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
8008 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
8009 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
8010 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
8011 return scid_candidate
8015 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
8016 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
8017 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
8018 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
8020 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8021 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8022 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8023 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8024 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(
8025 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
8027 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
8028 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
8029 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
8038 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
8039 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
8040 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
8041 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
8042 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
8046 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
8047 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
8048 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8049 events.push_back((event, None));
8053 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
8054 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8055 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
8059 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
8060 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
8064 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
8065 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
8068 /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
8069 /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
8070 /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
8071 /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
8072 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
8073 let logger = WithContext::from(
8074 &self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
8077 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8078 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
8079 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
8080 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
8081 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
8082 // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
8083 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
8084 .get_mut(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
8086 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
8090 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
8091 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id) {
8092 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
8093 // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
8094 // update(s) when those blockers complete.
8095 log_trace!(logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
8096 &channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
8100 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
8101 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
8102 debug_assert_eq!(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
8103 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
8104 log_debug!(logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
8105 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
8106 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
8107 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
8108 if further_update_exists {
8109 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
8114 log_trace!(logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
8115 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
8121 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
8122 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8128 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
8129 for action in actions {
8131 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
8132 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
8134 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, None);
8140 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
8141 /// using the given event handler.
8143 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
8144 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
8148 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
8152 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8154 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8155 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8156 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8157 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8158 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8159 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8163 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
8164 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
8165 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
8166 /// is always placed next to each other.
8168 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
8169 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
8170 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
8171 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
8173 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
8174 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
8175 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
8176 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
8177 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
8178 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8179 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8181 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
8182 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
8183 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
8184 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8187 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
8188 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8190 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
8191 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8194 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
8195 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8196 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8197 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8198 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8199 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
8200 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
8204 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
8205 events.replace(pending_events);
8214 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8216 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8217 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8218 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8219 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8220 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8221 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8225 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
8227 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
8228 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
8229 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
8231 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
8235 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8237 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8238 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8239 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8240 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8241 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8242 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8246 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
8248 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
8249 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
8250 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
8251 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
8252 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
8255 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
8256 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
8259 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
8260 let _persistence_guard =
8261 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8262 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8263 let new_height = height - 1;
8265 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
8266 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
8267 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
8268 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
8269 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
8270 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
8273 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8277 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8279 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8280 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8281 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8282 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8283 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8284 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8288 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
8289 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8290 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8291 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8293 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
8294 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
8296 let _persistence_guard =
8297 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8298 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8299 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context))
8300 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
8302 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
8303 if height < last_best_block_height {
8304 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
8305 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8309 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
8310 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8311 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8312 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8314 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
8315 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
8317 let _persistence_guard =
8318 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8319 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8320 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
8322 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8324 macro_rules! max_time {
8325 ($timestamp: expr) => {
8327 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
8328 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
8329 // having an explicit local time source.
8330 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
8331 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
8332 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
8333 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
8334 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
8340 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
8341 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8342 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
8343 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
8347 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, u32, Option<BlockHash>)> {
8348 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
8349 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
8350 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8351 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8352 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(|phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }) {
8353 let txid_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
8354 let height_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmation_height();
8355 let hash_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in();
8356 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(conf_height), Some(block_hash)) = (txid_opt, height_opt, hash_opt) {
8357 res.push((funding_txo.txid, conf_height, Some(block_hash)));
8364 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
8365 let _persistence_guard =
8366 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8367 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8368 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
8369 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
8370 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
8371 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
8372 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8373 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8378 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8380 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8381 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8382 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8383 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8384 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8385 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8389 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
8390 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
8392 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
8393 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
8394 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8395 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8396 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8398 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8399 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
8401 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8402 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8403 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8404 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8405 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8406 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
8408 // Retain unfunded channels.
8409 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => true,
8410 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
8411 let res = f(channel);
8412 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
8413 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
8414 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
8415 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
8416 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
8418 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
8419 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
8420 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
8421 if channel.context.is_usable() {
8422 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8423 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
8424 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
8425 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8430 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8435 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8436 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
8439 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
8440 log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8441 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
8442 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8443 msg: announcement_sigs,
8445 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
8446 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
8447 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
8449 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
8450 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
8451 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
8456 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
8457 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
8458 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
8459 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
8460 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
8461 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
8462 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
8463 // is always consistent.
8464 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
8465 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8466 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
8467 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
8468 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
8471 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
8472 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
8473 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
8474 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
8475 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
8476 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true, reason));
8477 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
8478 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
8482 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
8483 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8484 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
8485 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage {
8486 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8487 data: reason_message,
8500 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
8501 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
8502 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
8503 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
8504 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
8505 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
8506 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
8507 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8508 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
8509 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
8511 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
8512 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
8513 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
8517 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
8520 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8521 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
8522 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8523 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
8524 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
8525 user_channel_id: Some(htlc.prev_user_channel_id),
8526 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
8527 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
8528 phantom_shared_secret: None,
8529 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
8530 blinded_failure: htlc.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
8533 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
8534 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
8535 _ => unreachable!(),
8537 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
8538 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
8539 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
8540 let logger = WithContext::from(
8541 &self.logger, None, Some(htlc.prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
8543 log_trace!(logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
8549 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
8551 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
8552 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
8556 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] may need to be persisted or
8557 /// may have events that need processing.
8559 /// In order to check if this [`ChannelManager`] needs persisting, call
8560 /// [`Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence`].
8562 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
8563 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
8564 pub fn get_event_or_persistence_needed_future(&self) -> Future {
8565 self.event_persist_notifier.get_future()
8568 /// Returns true if this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
8569 pub fn get_and_clear_needs_persistence(&self) -> bool {
8570 self.needs_persist_flag.swap(false, Ordering::AcqRel)
8573 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
8574 pub fn get_event_or_persist_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
8575 self.event_persist_notifier.notify_pending()
8578 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
8579 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
8580 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
8581 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
8584 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8585 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8586 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
8587 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
8590 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8591 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8593 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
8594 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
8595 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
8596 pub fn bolt11_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
8597 provided_bolt11_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
8600 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8601 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8602 fn bolt12_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
8603 provided_bolt12_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
8606 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8607 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8608 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
8609 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
8612 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8613 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8614 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
8615 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
8618 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8619 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8620 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
8621 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
8625 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8626 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8628 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8629 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8630 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8631 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8632 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8633 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8637 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
8638 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8639 // open_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
8640 // change to the contents.
8641 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8642 let res = self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8643 let persist = match &res {
8644 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => {
8645 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't close a new channel");
8646 NotifyOption::DoPersist
8648 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8650 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8655 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
8656 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8657 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8658 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8661 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
8662 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8663 // accept_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
8664 // change to the contents.
8665 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8666 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8667 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents
8671 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
8672 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8673 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8674 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8677 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
8678 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8679 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8682 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
8683 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8684 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8687 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
8688 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8689 // channel_ready message - while the channel's state will change, any channel_ready message
8690 // will ultimately be re-sent on startup and the `ChannelMonitor` won't be updated so we
8691 // will not force-close the channel on startup.
8692 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8693 let res = self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8694 let persist = match &res {
8695 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8696 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8698 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8703 fn handle_stfu(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Stfu) {
8704 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8705 "Quiescence not supported".to_owned(),
8706 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8709 fn handle_splice(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Splice) {
8710 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8711 "Splicing not supported".to_owned(),
8712 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8715 fn handle_splice_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceAck) {
8716 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8717 "Splicing not supported (splice_ack)".to_owned(),
8718 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8721 fn handle_splice_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceLocked) {
8722 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8723 "Splicing not supported (splice_locked)".to_owned(),
8724 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8727 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
8728 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8729 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8732 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
8733 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8734 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8737 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
8738 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8739 // update_add_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8740 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8741 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8742 let res = self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8743 let persist = match &res {
8744 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8745 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8746 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8748 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8753 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
8754 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8755 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8758 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
8759 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8760 // update_fail_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8761 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8762 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8763 let res = self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8764 let persist = match &res {
8765 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8766 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8767 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8769 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8774 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
8775 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8776 // update_fail_malformed_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state
8777 // only the `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8778 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8779 let res = self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8780 let persist = match &res {
8781 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8782 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8783 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8785 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8790 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
8791 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8792 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8795 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
8796 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8797 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8800 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
8801 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8802 // update_fee message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8803 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8804 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8805 let res = self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8806 let persist = match &res {
8807 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8808 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8809 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8811 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8816 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
8817 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8818 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8821 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
8822 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8823 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
8826 NotifyOption::DoPersist
8831 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
8832 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8833 let res = self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8834 let persist = match &res {
8835 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8836 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8837 Ok(persist) => *persist,
8839 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8844 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
8845 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
8846 self, || NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents);
8847 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8848 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8851 WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None),
8852 "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
8853 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id)
8855 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
8856 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8857 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8858 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8859 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
8860 let context = match phase {
8861 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
8862 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
8863 if chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok() {
8864 // We only retain funded channels that are not shutdown.
8869 // Unfunded channels will always be removed.
8870 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
8873 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
8877 // Clean up for removal.
8878 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
8879 failed_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer));
8882 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
8883 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
8884 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
8885 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
8887 // V1 Channel Establishment
8888 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
8889 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
8890 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
8891 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
8892 // V2 Channel Establishment
8893 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
8894 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
8895 // Common Channel Establishment
8896 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
8897 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
8899 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendStfu { .. } => false,
8901 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSplice { .. } => false,
8902 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceAck { .. } => false,
8903 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceLocked { .. } => false,
8904 // Interactive Transaction Construction
8905 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
8906 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
8907 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
8908 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
8909 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
8910 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
8911 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
8912 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
8913 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
8914 // Channel Operations
8915 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
8916 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
8917 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
8918 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
8919 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
8920 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
8922 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
8923 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
8924 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
8925 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
8926 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
8927 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
8928 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
8929 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
8930 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
8933 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
8934 peer_state.is_connected = false;
8935 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
8936 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
8939 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
8941 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
8943 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
8944 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
8948 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
8949 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None);
8950 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
8951 log_debug!(logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8955 let mut res = Ok(());
8957 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8958 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
8959 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
8960 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
8961 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
8962 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
8963 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
8966 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8967 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
8968 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
8969 if inbound_peer_limited {
8971 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8973 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
8974 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8975 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8976 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
8977 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
8978 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8979 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
8980 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8984 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
8985 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
8986 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
8988 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
8989 if inbound_peer_limited &&
8990 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
8991 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
8994 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8997 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
8998 peer_state.is_connected = true;
9003 log_debug!(logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
9005 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9006 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
9007 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9008 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9009 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
9011 peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(|(_, phase)|
9012 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
9014 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
9015 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
9016 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9017 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger),
9022 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
9023 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
9028 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
9029 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9031 match &msg.data as &str {
9032 "cannot co-op close channel w/ active htlcs"|
9033 "link failed to shutdown" =>
9035 // LND hasn't properly handled shutdown messages ever, and force-closes any time we
9036 // send one while HTLCs are still present. The issue is tracked at
9037 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/6039 and has had multiple patches
9038 // to fix it but none so far have managed to land upstream. The issue appears to be
9039 // very low priority for the LND team despite being marked "P1".
9040 // We're not going to bother handling this in a sensible way, instead simply
9041 // repeating the Shutdown message on repeat until morale improves.
9042 if !msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
9043 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9044 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9045 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
9046 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9047 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&msg.channel_id) {
9048 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_outbound_shutdown() {
9049 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
9050 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9054 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
9055 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9056 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
9057 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
9058 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
9059 data: "You appear to be exhibiting LND bug 6039, we'll keep sending you shutdown messages until you handle them correctly".to_owned()
9061 log_level: Level::Trace,
9071 if msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
9072 let channel_ids: Vec<ChannelId> = {
9073 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9074 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9075 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
9076 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9077 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9078 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
9079 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
9080 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
9081 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
9083 for channel_id in channel_ids {
9084 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
9085 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
9089 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
9090 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9091 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9092 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
9093 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9094 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9095 if let Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
9096 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
9097 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
9098 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9106 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
9107 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
9111 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
9112 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
9115 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
9116 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
9119 fn get_chain_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
9120 Some(vec![self.chain_hash])
9123 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
9124 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9125 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9126 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9129 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
9130 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9131 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9132 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9135 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
9136 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9137 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9138 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9141 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
9142 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9143 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9144 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9147 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
9148 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9149 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9150 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9153 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
9154 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9155 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9156 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9159 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
9160 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9161 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9162 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9165 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
9166 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9167 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9168 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9171 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
9172 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9173 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9174 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9178 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9179 OffersMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9181 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9182 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9183 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9184 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9185 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9186 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9190 fn handle_message(&self, message: OffersMessage) -> Option<OffersMessage> {
9191 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
9192 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
9195 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request) => {
9196 let amount_msats = match InvoiceBuilder::<DerivedSigningPubkey>::amount_msats(
9199 Ok(amount_msats) => amount_msats,
9200 Err(error) => return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
9202 let invoice_request = match invoice_request.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
9203 Ok(invoice_request) => invoice_request,
9205 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidMetadata;
9206 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
9210 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
9211 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = match self.create_inbound_payment(
9212 Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None
9214 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => (payment_hash, payment_secret),
9216 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount;
9217 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
9221 let payment_paths = match self.create_blinded_payment_paths(
9222 amount_msats, payment_secret
9224 Ok(payment_paths) => payment_paths,
9226 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths;
9227 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
9231 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
9232 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
9233 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
9236 if invoice_request.keys.is_some() {
9237 #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
9238 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys(
9239 payment_paths, payment_hash
9241 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
9242 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
9243 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
9245 match builder.and_then(|b| b.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)) {
9246 Ok(invoice) => Some(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
9247 Err(error) => Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
9250 #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
9251 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with(payment_paths, payment_hash);
9252 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
9253 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with_no_std(
9254 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
9256 let response = builder.and_then(|builder| builder.allow_mpp().build())
9257 .map_err(|e| OffersMessage::InvoiceError(e.into()))
9259 match invoice.sign(|invoice| self.node_signer.sign_bolt12_invoice(invoice)) {
9260 Ok(invoice) => Ok(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
9261 Err(SignError::Signing(())) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
9262 InvoiceError::from_string("Failed signing invoice".to_string())
9264 Err(SignError::Verification(_)) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
9265 InvoiceError::from_string("Failed invoice signature verification".to_string())
9269 Ok(invoice) => Some(invoice),
9270 Err(error) => Some(error),
9274 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice) => {
9275 match invoice.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
9277 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string("Unrecognized invoice".to_owned())))
9279 Ok(_) if invoice.invoice_features().requires_unknown_bits_from(&self.bolt12_invoice_features()) => {
9280 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(Bolt12SemanticError::UnknownRequiredFeatures.into()))
9283 if let Err(e) = self.send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&invoice, payment_id) {
9284 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed paying invoice: {:?}", e);
9285 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string(format!("{:?}", e))))
9292 OffersMessage::InvoiceError(invoice_error) => {
9293 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received invoice_error: {}", invoice_error);
9299 fn release_pending_messages(&self) -> Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>> {
9300 core::mem::take(&mut self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap())
9304 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9305 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9306 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
9307 let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
9308 node_features.set_keysend_optional();
9312 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9313 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9315 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
9316 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
9317 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
9318 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt11_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
9319 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9322 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9323 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9324 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt12_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
9325 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9328 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9329 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9330 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
9331 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9334 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9335 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9336 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
9337 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
9340 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9341 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9342 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
9343 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
9344 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
9345 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
9346 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
9347 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
9348 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
9349 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
9350 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
9351 features.set_payment_secret_required();
9352 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
9353 features.set_wumbo_optional();
9354 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
9355 features.set_channel_type_optional();
9356 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
9357 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
9358 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
9359 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
9364 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
9365 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
9367 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
9368 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
9369 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
9370 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
9373 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
9374 (2, node_id, required),
9375 (4, features, required),
9376 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
9377 (8, forwarding_info, option),
9378 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9379 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9382 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
9383 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9384 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
9385 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
9386 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
9387 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
9388 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9389 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
9390 (2, self.channel_id, required),
9391 (3, self.channel_type, option),
9392 (4, self.counterparty, required),
9393 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
9394 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
9395 (7, self.config, option),
9396 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
9397 (9, self.confirmations, option),
9398 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
9399 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
9400 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
9401 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
9402 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
9403 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
9404 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
9405 (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
9406 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
9407 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
9408 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
9409 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
9410 (30, self.is_usable, required),
9411 (32, self.is_public, required),
9412 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9413 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9414 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
9415 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
9416 (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
9422 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
9423 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9424 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9425 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
9426 (2, channel_id, required),
9427 (3, channel_type, option),
9428 (4, counterparty, required),
9429 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
9430 (6, funding_txo, option),
9431 (7, config, option),
9432 (8, short_channel_id, option),
9433 (9, confirmations, option),
9434 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
9435 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
9436 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
9437 (16, balance_msat, required),
9438 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
9439 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
9440 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
9441 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
9442 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
9443 (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
9444 (22, confirmations_required, option),
9445 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
9446 (26, is_outbound, required),
9447 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
9448 (30, is_usable, required),
9449 (32, is_public, required),
9450 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9451 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9452 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
9453 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
9454 (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
9457 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
9458 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
9459 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
9460 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
9461 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
9465 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
9467 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
9468 outbound_scid_alias,
9472 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
9473 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
9475 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
9476 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
9477 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
9478 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
9479 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
9480 confirmations_required,
9482 force_close_spend_delay,
9483 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
9484 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
9485 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
9486 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
9487 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
9488 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
9489 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
9490 channel_shutdown_state,
9495 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
9496 (2, channels, required_vec),
9497 (4, phantom_scid, required),
9498 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
9501 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(BlindedForward, {
9502 (0, inbound_blinding_point, required),
9505 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
9507 (0, onion_packet, required),
9508 (1, blinded, option),
9509 (2, short_channel_id, required),
9512 (0, payment_data, required),
9513 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
9514 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
9515 (3, payment_metadata, option),
9516 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
9517 (7, requires_blinded_error, (default_value, false)),
9519 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
9520 (0, payment_preimage, required),
9521 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
9522 (3, payment_metadata, option),
9523 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
9524 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
9528 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
9529 (0, routing, required),
9530 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
9531 (4, payment_hash, required),
9532 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
9533 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
9534 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
9535 (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9539 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
9540 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9542 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
9544 channel_id.write(writer)?;
9545 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
9546 reason.write(writer)?;
9548 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
9549 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
9552 channel_id.write(writer)?;
9553 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
9554 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
9555 failure_code.write(writer)?;
9562 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
9563 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9564 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9567 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
9568 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9569 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9570 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
9574 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
9575 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9576 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9577 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
9578 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
9581 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
9582 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
9583 // messages contained in the variants.
9584 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
9585 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
9586 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
9588 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
9589 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
9590 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
9591 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
9592 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
9595 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
9596 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
9597 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
9598 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
9599 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
9601 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
9606 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
9611 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(BlindedFailure,
9612 (0, FromIntroductionNode) => {},
9613 (2, FromBlindedNode) => {}, ;
9616 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
9617 (0, short_channel_id, required),
9618 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
9619 (2, outpoint, required),
9620 (3, blinded_failure, option),
9621 (4, htlc_id, required),
9622 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required),
9623 (7, user_channel_id, option),
9626 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
9627 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9628 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
9629 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
9630 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
9632 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9633 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
9634 (1, self.total_msat, required),
9635 (2, self.value, required),
9636 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
9637 (4, payment_data, option),
9638 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
9639 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
9640 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
9641 (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9647 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
9648 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9649 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9650 (0, prev_hop, required),
9651 (1, total_msat, option),
9652 (2, value_ser, required),
9653 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
9654 (4, payment_data_opt, option),
9655 (5, total_value_received, option),
9656 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
9657 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
9658 (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9660 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
9661 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
9662 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
9664 if payment_data.is_some() {
9665 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9667 if total_msat.is_none() {
9668 total_msat = Some(value);
9670 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
9673 if total_msat.is_none() {
9674 if payment_data.is_none() {
9675 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9677 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
9679 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
9683 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
9686 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
9687 total_value_received,
9688 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
9690 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
9691 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
9696 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
9697 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9698 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9701 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
9702 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
9703 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
9704 let mut payment_id = None;
9705 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
9706 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
9707 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9708 (0, session_priv, required),
9709 (1, payment_id, option),
9710 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
9711 (4, path_hops, required_vec),
9712 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
9713 (6, blinded_tail, option),
9715 if payment_id.is_none() {
9716 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
9718 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
9720 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
9721 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
9722 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9724 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
9725 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
9726 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
9727 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9731 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
9732 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
9733 first_hop_htlc_msat,
9735 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
9738 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
9739 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
9744 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
9745 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
9747 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
9749 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
9750 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9751 (0, session_priv, required),
9752 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
9753 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
9754 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
9755 (4, path.hops, required_vec),
9756 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
9757 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
9760 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
9762 field.write(writer)?;
9769 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
9770 (0, forward_info, required),
9771 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
9772 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
9773 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
9774 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
9777 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
9778 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9779 const FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID: u8 = 1;
9781 Self::AddHTLC(info) => {
9785 Self::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
9786 FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID.write(w)?;
9787 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
9788 (0, htlc_id, required),
9789 (2, err_packet, required),
9792 Self::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
9793 // Since this variant was added in 0.0.119, write this as `::FailHTLC` with an empty error
9794 // packet so older versions have something to fail back with, but serialize the real data as
9795 // optional TLVs for the benefit of newer versions.
9796 FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID.write(w)?;
9797 let dummy_err_packet = msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new() };
9798 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
9799 (0, htlc_id, required),
9800 (1, failure_code, required),
9801 (2, dummy_err_packet, required),
9802 (3, sha256_of_onion, required),
9810 impl Readable for HTLCForwardInfo {
9811 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9812 let id: u8 = Readable::read(r)?;
9814 0 => Self::AddHTLC(Readable::read(r)?),
9816 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(r, {
9817 (0, htlc_id, required),
9818 (1, malformed_htlc_failure_code, option),
9819 (2, err_packet, required),
9820 (3, sha256_of_onion, option),
9822 if let Some(failure_code) = malformed_htlc_failure_code {
9823 Self::FailMalformedHTLC {
9824 htlc_id: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_id, required),
9826 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?,
9830 htlc_id: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_id, required),
9831 err_packet: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(err_packet, required),
9835 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
9840 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
9841 (0, payment_secret, required),
9842 (2, expiry_time, required),
9843 (4, user_payment_id, required),
9844 (6, payment_preimage, required),
9845 (8, min_value_msat, required),
9848 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9850 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9851 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9852 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9853 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9854 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9855 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9859 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9860 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
9862 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
9864 self.chain_hash.write(writer)?;
9866 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
9867 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
9868 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
9871 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
9873 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9874 let mut number_of_funded_channels = 0;
9875 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9876 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9877 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9878 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
9879 serializable_peer_count += 1;
9882 number_of_funded_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(
9883 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { chan.context.is_funding_broadcast() } else { false }
9887 (number_of_funded_channels as u64).write(writer)?;
9889 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9890 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9891 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9892 for channel in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter_map(
9893 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = phase {
9894 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() { Some(channel) } else { None }
9897 channel.write(writer)?;
9903 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
9904 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9905 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
9906 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
9907 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9908 for forward in pending_forwards {
9909 forward.write(writer)?;
9914 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
9916 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
9917 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
9918 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
9920 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
9921 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
9922 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9923 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
9924 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
9925 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9926 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
9927 htlc.write(writer)?;
9929 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
9930 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
9933 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
9934 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
9935 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9936 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
9937 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
9938 // per_peer_state lock at all.
9939 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
9942 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
9943 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
9944 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
9945 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
9946 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
9948 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
9949 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
9950 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
9951 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
9952 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
9953 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
9954 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
9959 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
9960 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
9961 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
9962 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
9963 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
9964 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
9965 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
9966 // well save the space and not write any events here.
9967 0u64.write(writer)?;
9969 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9970 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
9971 event.write(writer)?;
9975 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
9976 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
9977 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
9978 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
9979 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
9980 0u64.write(writer)?;
9982 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
9983 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
9984 // likely to be identical.
9985 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
9986 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
9988 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9989 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
9990 hash.write(writer)?;
9991 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
9994 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
9995 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
9996 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
9997 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
9998 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
10001 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
10002 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
10004 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
10005 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
10006 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
10007 session_priv.write(writer)?;
10010 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {},
10011 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {},
10012 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
10013 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
10017 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
10018 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
10019 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
10021 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
10022 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
10023 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
10029 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
10030 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
10031 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
10032 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
10035 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
10036 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
10037 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
10038 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
10039 pending_claiming_payments = None;
10042 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
10043 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
10044 for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
10045 if !updates.is_empty() {
10046 if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(HashMap::new()); }
10047 in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
10052 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10053 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
10054 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
10055 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
10056 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
10057 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
10058 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
10059 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
10060 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
10061 (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
10062 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
10063 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
10064 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
10071 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
10072 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10073 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
10074 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
10077 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
10078 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
10079 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
10080 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
10081 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
10082 // check that the event is sane here.
10083 let event_encoded = event.encode();
10084 let event_read: Option<Event> =
10085 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
10086 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
10092 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
10093 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10094 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10095 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
10096 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
10097 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
10100 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
10101 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
10102 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
10103 events.push_back((ev, action));
10104 } else if action.is_some() {
10105 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10112 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
10113 (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
10114 (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
10115 (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
10116 (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
10117 (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
10120 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
10122 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
10124 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
10125 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
10126 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
10127 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
10128 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
10129 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
10130 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
10131 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
10132 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
10133 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
10134 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
10135 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
10136 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
10138 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
10139 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
10141 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
10142 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
10144 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
10145 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
10146 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
10147 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
10148 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
10149 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
10151 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
10152 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10154 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10155 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10156 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10157 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10158 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10159 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10163 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
10164 pub entropy_source: ES,
10166 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
10167 pub node_signer: NS,
10169 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
10170 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
10172 pub signer_provider: SP,
10174 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
10176 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
10177 pub fee_estimator: F,
10178 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
10180 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
10181 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
10182 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
10183 pub chain_monitor: M,
10185 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
10186 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
10187 /// force-closed during deserialization.
10188 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
10189 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
10190 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
10192 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
10194 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
10195 /// deserialization.
10197 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
10198 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
10199 pub default_config: UserConfig,
10201 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
10202 /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
10204 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
10205 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
10206 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
10207 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
10209 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
10212 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
10213 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>,
10216 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10217 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
10219 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10220 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10221 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10222 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10223 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10224 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10228 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
10229 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
10230 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
10231 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
10232 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>) -> Self {
10234 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
10235 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
10240 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
10241 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
10242 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10243 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
10245 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10246 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10247 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10248 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10249 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10250 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10254 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10255 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
10256 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
10260 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10261 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
10263 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10264 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10265 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10266 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10267 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10268 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10272 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10273 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
10275 let chain_hash: ChainHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10276 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10277 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10279 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
10281 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10282 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10283 let mut funded_peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10284 let mut outpoint_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10285 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10286 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
10287 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
10288 for _ in 0..channel_count {
10289 let mut channel: Channel<SP> = Channel::read(reader, (
10290 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
10292 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context);
10293 let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10294 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
10295 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
10296 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
10297 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
10298 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
10299 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
10300 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
10301 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
10302 log_error!(logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
10303 if channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
10304 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
10305 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
10307 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() {
10308 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at holder commitment number {} but the ChannelManager is at holder commitment number {}.",
10309 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number());
10311 if channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() {
10312 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at revoked counterparty transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at revoked counterparty transaction number {}.",
10313 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
10315 if channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() {
10316 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at counterparty commitment transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at counterparty commitment transaction number {}.",
10317 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
10319 let mut shutdown_result = channel.context.force_shutdown(true, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
10320 if shutdown_result.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid.is_some() {
10321 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10323 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = shutdown_result.monitor_update {
10324 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
10325 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
10328 failed_htlcs.append(&mut shutdown_result.dropped_outbound_htlcs);
10329 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
10330 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
10331 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
10332 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
10333 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10334 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
10336 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
10337 let mut found_htlc = false;
10338 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
10339 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
10342 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
10343 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
10344 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
10345 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
10346 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
10347 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
10348 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
10350 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
10351 &channel.context.channel_id(), &payment_hash);
10352 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
10356 log_info!(logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
10357 &channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
10358 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
10359 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
10360 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
10362 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
10363 outpoint_to_peer.insert(funding_txo, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
10365 match funded_peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
10366 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
10367 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
10368 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
10370 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
10371 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
10372 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
10373 entry.insert(by_id_map);
10377 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
10378 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
10379 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
10380 // safely discard the channel.
10381 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
10382 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
10383 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
10384 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
10385 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
10386 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10387 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
10390 log_error!(logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", &channel.context.channel_id());
10391 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10392 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10393 log_error!(logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10394 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10395 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10399 for (funding_txo, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10400 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
10401 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor);
10402 log_info!(logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
10403 &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10404 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
10405 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
10406 counterparty_node_id: None,
10407 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
10409 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
10413 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
10414 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10415 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
10416 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
10417 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
10418 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10419 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
10420 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
10421 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
10423 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
10426 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10427 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
10428 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
10429 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10430 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10431 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
10432 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
10433 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
10435 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
10438 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
10441 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
10442 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
10443 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
10444 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10445 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
10446 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10447 is_connected: false,
10451 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10452 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>)>()));
10453 for _ in 0..peer_count {
10454 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
10455 let peer_chans = funded_peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new());
10456 let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
10457 peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
10458 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
10461 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10462 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
10463 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
10464 for _ in 0..event_count {
10465 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
10466 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
10471 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10472 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
10473 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
10475 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
10476 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
10477 // on-startup monitor updates.
10478 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
10479 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
10481 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
10485 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
10486 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10488 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10489 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
10490 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
10491 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
10492 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10496 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10497 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
10498 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
10499 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
10500 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
10501 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
10502 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
10504 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
10505 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10509 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
10510 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
10511 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
10512 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
10513 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
10514 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
10515 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
10516 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
10517 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
10518 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
10519 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
10520 let mut events_override = None;
10521 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
10522 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10523 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
10524 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
10525 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
10526 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
10527 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
10528 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
10529 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
10530 (8, events_override, option),
10531 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
10532 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
10533 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
10534 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
10536 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
10537 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10540 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
10541 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10544 if let Some(events) = events_override {
10545 pending_events_read = events;
10548 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
10549 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
10552 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
10553 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
10554 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
10555 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
10556 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
10557 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
10559 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
10561 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
10562 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
10563 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
10566 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
10567 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
10568 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
10569 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
10570 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
10572 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
10573 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
10574 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
10576 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
10577 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
10578 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
10579 ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
10580 $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $logger: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
10582 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
10583 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
10584 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
10585 log_trace!($logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
10586 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, &$funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10587 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
10588 pending_background_events.push(
10589 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
10590 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
10591 funding_txo: $funding_txo,
10592 update: update.clone(),
10595 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
10596 // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
10597 // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
10598 // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
10599 pending_background_events.push(
10600 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
10601 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
10602 channel_id: $funding_txo.to_channel_id(),
10605 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
10606 log_error!($logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
10607 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10609 max_in_flight_update_id
10613 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
10614 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
10615 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10616 for phase in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
10617 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
10618 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context);
10620 // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
10622 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10623 let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
10624 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
10625 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
10626 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
10627 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
10628 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
10629 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
10630 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, ""));
10633 if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
10634 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
10635 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
10636 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
10637 chan.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
10638 log_error!(logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
10639 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10640 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10641 log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10642 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10643 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10646 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
10647 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
10648 debug_assert!(false);
10649 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10654 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
10655 for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
10656 let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(counterparty_id), Some(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
10657 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
10658 // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
10659 // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
10660 // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
10661 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
10662 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(HashMap::new()))
10664 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10665 handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
10666 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, "closed ");
10668 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
10669 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.",
10670 &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10671 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10672 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10673 log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10674 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10675 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10680 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
10681 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
10683 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
10684 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
10685 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
10686 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
10689 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
10690 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
10691 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
10692 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
10693 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
10694 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
10695 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
10697 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10698 let counterparty_opt = outpoint_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0);
10699 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
10700 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor);
10701 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
10702 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
10703 if path.hops.is_empty() {
10704 log_error!(logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
10705 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10708 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
10709 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
10710 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
10711 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
10712 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
10713 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
10714 log_info!(logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
10715 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), htlc.payment_hash);
10717 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
10718 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
10719 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
10720 retry_strategy: None,
10721 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
10722 payment_params: None,
10723 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
10724 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
10725 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10726 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10727 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10728 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10729 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
10730 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
10731 total_msat: path_amt,
10732 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
10733 remaining_max_total_routing_fee_msat: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10735 log_info!(logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
10736 path_amt, &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
10741 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
10742 match htlc_source {
10743 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
10744 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
10745 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
10746 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
10748 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
10749 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
10750 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
10751 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
10752 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
10753 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
10754 forwards.retain(|forward| {
10755 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
10756 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
10757 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
10758 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
10763 !forwards.is_empty()
10765 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
10766 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
10767 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
10768 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
10769 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
10770 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
10771 intercepted_id != ev_id
10778 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
10779 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
10780 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
10781 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
10782 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
10783 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
10784 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
10785 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
10786 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
10787 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
10788 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
10790 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
10791 channel_funding_outpoint: monitor.get_funding_txo().0,
10792 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
10794 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv,
10795 path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &&logger);
10796 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
10803 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
10804 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
10806 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
10808 .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
10809 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
10810 if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
10811 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
10812 // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
10813 // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
10814 // channel_id -> peer map entry).
10815 counterparty_opt.is_none(),
10816 counterparty_opt.cloned().or(monitor.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10817 monitor.get_funding_txo().0))
10820 // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
10821 // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
10822 // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
10823 // channel still live case here.
10827 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
10828 pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
10833 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
10834 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
10835 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
10836 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
10837 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
10838 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
10839 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
10840 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
10844 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
10845 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
10847 let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
10848 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
10849 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
10850 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10852 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
10853 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
10854 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10856 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
10857 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
10859 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10860 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
10862 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10865 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
10866 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10867 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
10869 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10873 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
10874 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
10875 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
10876 if htlcs.is_empty() {
10877 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10879 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
10880 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
10881 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
10882 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
10883 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
10884 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
10885 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
10886 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
10888 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", &payment_hash);
10889 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10893 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
10895 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10897 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
10898 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
10900 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10901 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
10906 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10907 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10909 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
10911 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10913 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
10914 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
10915 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
10916 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10920 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
10921 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
10922 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10923 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10924 for (chan_id, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
10925 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
10926 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context);
10927 if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
10928 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
10930 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
10931 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &chain_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
10932 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
10934 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
10935 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
10936 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
10937 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
10938 log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
10939 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10941 if chan.context.is_usable() {
10942 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
10943 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
10944 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
10945 log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
10946 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10950 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
10951 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
10952 debug_assert!(false);
10953 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10958 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
10960 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10961 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
10962 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
10963 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", &payment_hash);
10964 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
10965 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
10966 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
10967 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
10968 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
10969 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
10970 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
10972 for claimable_htlc in &payment.htlcs {
10973 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
10975 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
10976 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
10977 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
10978 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
10980 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
10981 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
10982 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
10983 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
10985 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
10986 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
10987 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
10988 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
10990 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
10991 if let Some(peer_node_id) = outpoint_to_peer.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
10992 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
10993 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10994 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10995 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(channel)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
10996 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context);
10997 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
11000 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
11001 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
11004 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
11007 purpose: payment.purpose,
11008 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
11009 htlcs: payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect(),
11010 sender_intended_total_msat: payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat),
11016 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
11017 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
11018 for (channel_id, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
11019 let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), Some(*channel_id));
11020 for action in actions.iter() {
11021 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
11022 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
11023 Some((blocked_node_id, blocked_channel_outpoint, blocking_action)), ..
11025 if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&blocked_node_id) {
11027 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
11028 blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id());
11029 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
11030 .entry(blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id())
11031 .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
11033 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
11034 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
11035 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
11036 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
11040 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately { .. } = action {
11041 debug_assert!(false, "Non-event-generating channel freeing should not appear in our queue");
11045 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
11047 log_error!(WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), None), "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
11048 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11052 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
11054 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
11055 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
11056 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
11057 router: args.router,
11059 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
11061 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
11062 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
11063 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
11064 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
11066 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
11067 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
11068 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
11069 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex::new(outpoint_to_peer),
11070 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
11071 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
11073 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
11075 our_network_pubkey,
11078 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
11080 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
11082 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
11083 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
11084 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
11085 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
11086 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
11088 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
11089 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
11091 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
11093 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
11095 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
11096 node_signer: args.node_signer,
11097 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
11099 logger: args.logger,
11100 default_configuration: args.default_config,
11103 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
11104 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
11105 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
11106 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
11107 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
11110 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding) in pending_claims_to_replay {
11111 // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
11112 // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
11113 // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
11114 channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value),
11115 downstream_closed, true, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding);
11118 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
11119 //connection or two.
11121 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
11127 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
11128 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
11129 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
11130 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
11131 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
11132 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
11133 use crate::ln::ChannelId;
11134 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{create_recv_pending_htlc_info, HTLCForwardInfo, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
11135 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
11136 use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
11137 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
11138 use crate::prelude::*;
11139 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
11140 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
11141 use crate::util::ser::Writeable;
11142 use crate::util::test_utils;
11143 use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
11144 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
11147 fn test_notify_limits() {
11148 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
11149 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
11150 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
11151 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
11152 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
11153 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11155 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
11156 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
11157 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11158 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11159 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11161 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11163 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
11164 // to connect messages with new values
11165 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
11166 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
11167 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
11168 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
11169 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
11170 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
11172 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
11173 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11174 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11175 // ... but the last node should not.
11176 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11177 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
11178 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11179 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11181 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
11182 // about the channel.
11183 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
11184 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
11185 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11187 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
11189 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
11190 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
11191 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
11192 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
11193 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11194 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11196 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
11197 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11198 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11200 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
11201 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
11202 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
11203 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
11204 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
11205 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
11207 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
11208 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
11209 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
11210 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
11211 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11212 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11213 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11214 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11216 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
11217 // the channel info has updated.
11218 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
11219 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
11220 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11221 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11222 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11223 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11227 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
11228 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
11230 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11231 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11232 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11233 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11234 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11236 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
11237 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
11238 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
11239 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
11241 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
11242 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
11243 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
11244 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
11245 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
11246 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
11247 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
11248 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
11249 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11250 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11251 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11252 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
11254 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
11255 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11256 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11257 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11258 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11259 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11260 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11261 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11262 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11263 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11264 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11265 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11266 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
11267 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11268 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11269 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11270 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11271 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11272 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11273 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11274 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11275 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11276 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
11278 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
11279 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
11280 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
11281 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11282 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11283 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11284 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
11286 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
11287 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
11288 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
11289 // lightning messages manually.
11290 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
11291 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
11292 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
11294 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11295 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
11296 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
11297 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
11298 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11299 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11300 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
11301 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11302 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11303 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
11304 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11305 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11306 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
11307 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
11308 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11309 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11310 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
11311 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11312 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11313 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
11314 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11315 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
11316 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11317 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11318 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
11319 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11321 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
11322 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
11323 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11324 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
11326 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
11327 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
11328 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
11329 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
11331 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11334 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
11335 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
11336 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
11337 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
11339 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11344 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
11345 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
11346 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
11349 fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
11350 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
11351 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
11352 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
11353 // fails as expected.
11354 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
11355 // payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
11356 // reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
11357 // secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
11358 // `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
11359 // payment secrets and reject otherwise.
11360 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11361 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11362 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11363 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
11364 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
11365 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11366 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11367 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11368 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11370 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
11371 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
11372 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
11374 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
11375 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11376 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(),
11377 TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false), 100_000);
11378 let route = find_route(
11379 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11380 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11382 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11383 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11384 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11385 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11386 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11387 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11388 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11389 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11390 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11391 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11392 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
11393 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
11394 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11395 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11396 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11397 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11398 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11399 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11400 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11401 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11402 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11403 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11404 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11405 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11407 // Finally, claim the original payment.
11408 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11410 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
11411 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11412 let route = find_route(
11413 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11414 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11416 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11417 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11418 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11419 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11420 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11421 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
11422 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
11423 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
11425 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
11426 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
11427 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
11428 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
11429 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11430 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11431 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11432 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11433 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11434 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11435 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11436 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11437 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11438 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11439 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11440 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11441 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11442 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11443 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11444 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11445 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11446 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11447 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11448 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11450 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
11451 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11453 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
11454 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
11455 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11456 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
11457 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11458 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11459 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11460 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
11461 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
11462 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
11464 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
11465 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11466 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
11469 let route = find_route(
11470 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11471 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11473 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
11474 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11475 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
11476 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11477 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11478 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11479 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11480 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11481 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11482 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11483 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11484 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11485 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11486 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11487 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11488 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11489 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11490 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11491 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11492 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11493 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11494 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11495 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11497 // Finally, claim the original payment.
11498 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11502 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
11503 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
11504 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
11505 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11506 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11507 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11508 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11510 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
11511 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11513 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
11514 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11515 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
11516 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
11517 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
11518 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11519 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11520 let route = find_route(
11521 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
11522 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11525 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11526 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
11527 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
11528 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
11529 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
11530 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
11531 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11533 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11534 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
11535 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11536 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
11537 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11538 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11539 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
11541 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
11545 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
11546 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
11547 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
11548 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11549 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
11550 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11551 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11552 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
11553 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11555 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
11556 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11558 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
11559 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11560 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
11561 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
11562 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
11563 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11564 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11565 let route = find_route(
11566 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
11567 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11570 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11571 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
11572 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
11573 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
11574 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
11575 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
11576 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
11577 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
11578 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11580 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11581 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
11582 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11583 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
11584 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11585 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11586 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
11588 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
11592 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
11593 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
11594 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
11595 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
11596 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11598 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11599 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11600 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11601 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11603 // Marshall an MPP route.
11604 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
11605 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
11606 route.paths.push(path);
11607 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11608 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
11609 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
11610 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
11611 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
11612 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
11614 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
11615 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
11617 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
11618 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
11620 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
11625 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
11626 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11627 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11628 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11629 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11631 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11633 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11634 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11636 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11637 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
11638 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11639 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
11642 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
11643 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
11644 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
11645 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
11646 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
11647 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
11650 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
11653 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
11654 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
11659 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
11660 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
11661 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11662 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11663 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11664 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11666 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
11667 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11669 total_msat: 100_000,
11672 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
11673 // payment verification fails as expected.
11674 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
11675 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
11676 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
11677 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
11679 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
11683 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
11684 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
11688 fn test_outpoint_to_peer_coverage() {
11689 // Test that the `ChannelManager:outpoint_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
11690 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
11691 // the channel is successfully closed.
11692 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11693 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11694 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11695 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11697 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11698 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11699 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
11700 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11701 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
11703 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
11704 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.txid().to_byte_array());
11706 // Ensure that the `outpoint_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
11707 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
11708 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11709 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11712 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
11714 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
11715 // as it has the funding transaction.
11716 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11717 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11718 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
11721 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11723 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11725 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
11727 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11728 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11729 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
11731 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11734 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as
11735 // soon as it has the funding transaction.
11736 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11737 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11738 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
11740 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11741 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11742 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
11743 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11744 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11745 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
11746 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
11747 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
11749 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11750 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
11751 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11752 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
11754 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11755 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
11757 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `outpoint_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
11758 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
11759 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
11760 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
11761 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11762 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11763 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
11767 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
11768 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
11769 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
11770 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map.
11771 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11772 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11773 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
11776 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
11778 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
11779 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
11780 // closing transaction).
11781 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map as it can be
11782 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
11783 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11785 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
11786 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
11787 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11788 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11789 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
11792 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11794 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
11796 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `outpoint_to_peer` map once
11797 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
11798 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11800 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11802 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
11803 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
11806 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
11807 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
11808 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11811 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
11812 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
11813 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11816 fn check_channel_unavailable_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_channel_id: ChannelId, peer_node_id: PublicKey) {
11817 let expected_message = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_channel_id, peer_node_id);
11818 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11821 fn check_api_misuse_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
11822 let expected_message = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_string();
11823 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11826 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
11828 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
11829 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
11831 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
11832 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
11834 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
11835 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
11840 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
11841 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
11842 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
11843 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
11844 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11845 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11846 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
11847 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11850 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
11851 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
11852 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
11854 // Test the API functions.
11855 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None), unkown_public_key);
11857 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
11859 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11861 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11863 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11865 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
11867 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
11871 fn test_api_calls_with_unavailable_channel() {
11872 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` and a `channel_id`
11873 // as input, behaves as expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is a known peer in the
11874 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map, but the peer state doesn't contain a channel with
11875 // the given `channel_id`.
11876 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11877 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11878 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
11879 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11881 let counterparty_node_id = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11884 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
11886 // Test the API functions.
11887 check_api_misuse_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, 42));
11889 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11891 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11893 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11895 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(InterceptId([0; 32]), &channel_id, counterparty_node_id, 1_000_000), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11897 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&counterparty_node_id, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11901 fn test_connection_limiting() {
11902 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
11903 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11904 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11905 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11906 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11908 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11910 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11911 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11913 let mut funding_tx = None;
11914 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
11915 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11916 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11919 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
11920 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
11921 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
11922 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
11923 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11925 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
11926 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11927 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11929 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11931 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
11932 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11933 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11935 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11938 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
11939 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11940 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11941 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11942 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11944 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
11945 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
11947 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
11948 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
11949 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11950 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11951 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
11952 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11953 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11956 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11957 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11958 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11959 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11960 }, true).unwrap_err();
11962 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
11963 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
11964 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11965 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11966 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
11967 for ev in chan_closed_events {
11968 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
11970 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11971 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11973 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11974 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11975 }, true).unwrap_err();
11977 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
11978 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11979 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11980 }, false).unwrap();
11981 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11983 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
11984 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
11986 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
11987 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
11988 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
11989 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
11990 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11992 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11993 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
11994 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11996 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
11997 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11998 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
12000 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
12001 // "protected" and can connect again.
12002 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
12003 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12004 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12006 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12008 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
12010 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12011 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
12015 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
12016 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
12017 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12018 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12019 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12020 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12022 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
12024 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12025 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12027 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
12028 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12029 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12030 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12033 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
12035 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12036 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
12037 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
12039 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
12040 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12041 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12043 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
12044 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12045 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
12046 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
12050 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
12051 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
12052 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
12053 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12054 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12055 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
12056 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
12057 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
12058 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12060 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
12062 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12063 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12065 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
12066 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
12067 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12068 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12069 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12070 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12073 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12074 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12076 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12077 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
12079 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12081 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
12082 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12085 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
12086 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12087 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12088 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12089 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12091 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12092 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12094 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12095 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
12096 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
12097 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
12101 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12103 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
12104 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
12106 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
12107 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12108 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12110 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12111 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
12113 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12115 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
12119 fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
12120 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
12121 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
12122 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
12123 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12124 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
12125 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
12126 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
12127 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
12128 cltv_expiry_height: 42,
12129 payment_metadata: None,
12130 keysend_preimage: None,
12131 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12132 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
12134 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
12136 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
12137 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
12138 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
12139 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundHTLCErr { err_code, .. }) =
12140 create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
12141 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
12142 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
12144 assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
12145 } else { panic!(); }
12147 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
12148 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
12149 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
12150 cltv_expiry_height: 42,
12151 payment_metadata: None,
12152 keysend_preimage: None,
12153 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12154 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
12156 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
12158 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
12159 assert!(create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
12160 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
12161 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend).is_ok());
12165 fn test_final_incorrect_cltv(){
12166 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
12167 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
12168 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
12169 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12171 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
12172 let result = create_recv_pending_htlc_info(msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
12173 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
12174 cltv_expiry_height: 22,
12175 payment_metadata: None,
12176 keysend_preimage: None,
12177 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12178 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: 100,
12180 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
12181 }, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]), 100, 23, None, true, None, current_height,
12182 node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend);
12184 // Should not return an error as this condition:
12185 // https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/4dcc377209509b13cf89a4b91fde7d478f5b46d8/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L334
12186 // is not satisfied.
12187 assert!(result.is_ok());
12191 fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
12192 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
12193 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
12194 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
12195 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
12197 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
12198 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
12200 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
12201 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
12202 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
12203 &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
12204 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12206 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12207 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12209 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12210 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
12211 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12212 match &msg_events[0] {
12213 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
12214 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12216 ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
12217 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
12218 _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
12221 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12224 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12225 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12227 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
12228 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
12229 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12231 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12235 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
12236 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
12237 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
12238 // the channel without the anchors feature.
12239 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12240 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12241 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
12242 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
12243 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
12244 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
12245 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12247 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None, None).unwrap();
12248 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12249 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
12251 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12252 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12254 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12255 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12257 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12260 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12261 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
12263 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12264 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
12266 // Since nodes[1] should not have accepted the channel, it should
12267 // not have generated any events.
12268 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
12272 fn test_update_channel_config() {
12273 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12274 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12275 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
12276 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
12277 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12278 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12279 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
12281 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
12282 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12283 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12285 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
12286 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
12287 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
12288 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12289 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12291 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12292 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12295 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
12296 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12297 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12299 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
12300 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12301 cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
12302 ..Default::default()
12304 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
12305 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12306 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12308 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12309 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12312 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
12313 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12314 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
12315 ..Default::default()
12317 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
12318 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
12319 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12320 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12322 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12323 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12326 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
12327 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
12328 let bad_channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_txid(&[10; 32], 10);
12329 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
12330 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
12333 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12334 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
12335 ..Default::default()
12337 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
12340 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
12341 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
12342 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12343 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12347 fn test_payment_display() {
12348 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
12349 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12350 let payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
12351 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_hash), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12352 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12353 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_preimage), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12357 fn test_trigger_lnd_force_close() {
12358 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12359 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12360 let user_config = test_default_channel_config();
12361 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
12362 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12364 // Open a channel, immediately disconnect each other, and broadcast Alice's latest state.
12365 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12366 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12367 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12368 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12369 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
12370 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
12371 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12373 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
12374 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
12375 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
12378 // Since they're disconnected, Bob won't receive Alice's `Error` message. Reconnect them
12379 // such that Bob sends a `ChannelReestablish` to Alice since the channel is still open from
12381 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12382 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12384 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12385 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12386 }, false).unwrap();
12387 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
12388 let channel_reestablish = get_event_msg!(
12389 nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()
12391 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channel_reestablish);
12393 // Alice should respond with an error since the channel isn't known, but a bogus
12394 // `ChannelReestablish` should be sent first, such that we actually trigger Bob to force
12395 // close even if it was an lnd node.
12396 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12397 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
12398 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { node_id, msg } = &msg_events[0] {
12399 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12400 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 0);
12401 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
12402 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
12403 } else { panic!() };
12404 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
12405 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
12406 let expected_close_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
12407 err: "Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_string()
12409 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, expected_close_reason, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12411 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
12412 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
12413 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
12418 fn test_malformed_forward_htlcs_ser() {
12419 // Ensure that `HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC`s are (de)serialized properly.
12420 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
12421 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
12424 let chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
12425 let deserialized_chanmgr;
12426 let mut nodes = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &chanmgrs);
12428 let dummy_failed_htlc = |htlc_id| {
12429 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: vec![42] }, }
12431 let dummy_malformed_htlc = |htlc_id| {
12432 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code: 0x4000, sha256_of_onion: [0; 32] }
12435 let dummy_htlcs_1: Vec<HTLCForwardInfo> = (1..10).map(|htlc_id| {
12436 if htlc_id % 2 == 0 {
12437 dummy_failed_htlc(htlc_id)
12439 dummy_malformed_htlc(htlc_id)
12443 let dummy_htlcs_2: Vec<HTLCForwardInfo> = (1..10).map(|htlc_id| {
12444 if htlc_id % 2 == 1 {
12445 dummy_failed_htlc(htlc_id)
12447 dummy_malformed_htlc(htlc_id)
12452 let (scid_1, scid_2) = (42, 43);
12453 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
12454 forward_htlcs.insert(scid_1, dummy_htlcs_1.clone());
12455 forward_htlcs.insert(scid_2, dummy_htlcs_2.clone());
12457 let mut chanmgr_fwd_htlcs = nodes[0].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
12458 *chanmgr_fwd_htlcs = forward_htlcs.clone();
12459 core::mem::drop(chanmgr_fwd_htlcs);
12461 reload_node!(nodes[0], nodes[0].node.encode(), &[], persister, chain_monitor, deserialized_chanmgr);
12463 let mut deserialized_fwd_htlcs = nodes[0].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
12464 for scid in [scid_1, scid_2].iter() {
12465 let deserialized_htlcs = deserialized_fwd_htlcs.remove(scid).unwrap();
12466 assert_eq!(forward_htlcs.remove(scid).unwrap(), deserialized_htlcs);
12468 assert!(deserialized_fwd_htlcs.is_empty());
12469 core::mem::drop(deserialized_fwd_htlcs);
12471 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
12477 use crate::chain::Listen;
12478 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
12479 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
12480 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
12481 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
12482 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
12483 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
12484 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
12485 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
12486 use crate::util::test_utils;
12487 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
12489 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
12490 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
12491 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
12492 use bitcoin::{Block, Transaction, TxOut};
12494 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
12496 use criterion::Criterion;
12498 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
12499 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
12500 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
12501 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
12502 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
12503 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
12504 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
12506 struct ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
12507 node: &'node_cfg Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>,
12509 impl<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg, P> {
12510 type CM = Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>;
12512 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P> { self.node }
12514 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
12517 pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
12518 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
12521 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
12522 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
12523 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
12525 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
12526 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
12528 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
12529 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
12530 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
12531 let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
12532 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
12534 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
12535 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
12536 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
12538 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
12539 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
12540 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
12541 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
12543 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
12544 }, genesis_block.header.time);
12545 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
12547 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
12548 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
12549 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
12550 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
12551 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
12553 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
12554 }, genesis_block.header.time);
12555 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
12557 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
12558 features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12560 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
12561 features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12562 }, false).unwrap();
12563 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12564 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12565 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12568 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
12569 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
12570 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
12572 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
12573 } else { panic!(); }
12575 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12576 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12577 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
12578 match events_b[0] {
12579 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12580 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12582 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12585 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12586 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12587 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
12588 match events_a[0] {
12589 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12590 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
12592 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12595 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
12597 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), 42, vec![tx]);
12598 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
12599 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
12601 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12602 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12603 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
12604 match msg_events[0] {
12605 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
12606 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
12607 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12611 match msg_events[1] {
12612 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12616 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12617 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
12618 match events_a[0] {
12619 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12620 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
12622 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12625 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12626 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
12627 match events_b[0] {
12628 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12629 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12631 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12634 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
12635 macro_rules! send_payment {
12636 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
12637 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
12638 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
12639 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
12640 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
12641 payment_count += 1;
12642 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
12643 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
12645 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
12646 PaymentId(payment_hash.0),
12647 RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000),
12648 Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
12649 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
12650 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12651 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
12652 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
12653 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
12654 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
12655 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12657 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
12658 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
12659 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
12660 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
12662 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
12663 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
12664 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
12665 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
12666 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
12668 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
12671 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
12672 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
12673 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
12674 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12676 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
12680 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
12681 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
12682 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);