1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
27 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
31 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
33 use crate::blinded_path::BlindedPath;
35 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
36 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
37 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
38 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
40 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
41 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
42 // construct one themselves.
43 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
44 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel};
45 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
46 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
47 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
48 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
49 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
50 use crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters};
52 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
53 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
54 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
56 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
57 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs};
58 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
59 use crate::offers::offer::{DerivedMetadata, OfferBuilder};
60 use crate::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
61 use crate::offers::refund::RefundBuilder;
62 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
63 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
64 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
65 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
66 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
67 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
68 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
69 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
71 use alloc::collections::{btree_map, BTreeMap};
74 use crate::prelude::*;
76 use core::cell::RefCell;
78 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
79 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
80 use core::time::Duration;
83 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
84 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, ProbeSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
85 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
87 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
89 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
90 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
91 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
93 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
94 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
95 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
96 // before we forward it.
98 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
99 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
100 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
101 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
102 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
104 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
105 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
107 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
108 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
109 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
110 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
113 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
114 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
115 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
116 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
117 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
118 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
121 /// This was added in 0.0.116 and will break deserialization on downgrades.
122 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
123 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
124 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
125 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
126 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
127 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
131 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
132 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
133 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
134 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
135 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
137 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
138 /// Sender intended amount to forward or receive (actual amount received
139 /// may overshoot this in either case)
140 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
141 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
142 /// The fee being skimmed off the top of this HTLC. If this is a forward, it'll be the fee we are
143 /// skimming. If we're receiving this HTLC, it's the fee that our counterparty skimmed.
144 pub(super) skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
147 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
148 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
149 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
150 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
153 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
154 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
155 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
156 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
157 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
160 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
161 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
163 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
164 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
165 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
168 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
169 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
171 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
172 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
175 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
176 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
179 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
183 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
184 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
185 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
186 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
187 short_channel_id: u64,
188 user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
190 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
191 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
193 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
194 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
199 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
201 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
202 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
203 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
205 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
206 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
209 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
210 struct ClaimableHTLC {
211 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
213 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
215 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
216 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
217 sender_intended_value: u64,
218 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
220 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
221 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
222 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
223 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
225 /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
226 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
229 impl From<&ClaimableHTLC> for events::ClaimedHTLC {
230 fn from(val: &ClaimableHTLC) -> Self {
231 events::ClaimedHTLC {
232 channel_id: val.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
233 user_channel_id: val.prev_hop.user_channel_id.unwrap_or(0),
234 cltv_expiry: val.cltv_expiry,
235 value_msat: val.value,
240 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
241 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
243 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
244 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
245 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; Self::LENGTH]);
248 /// Number of bytes in the id.
249 pub const LENGTH: usize = 32;
252 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
253 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
258 impl Readable for PaymentId {
259 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
260 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
265 impl core::fmt::Display for PaymentId {
266 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> core::fmt::Result {
267 crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
271 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
273 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
274 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
275 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
277 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
278 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
283 impl Readable for InterceptId {
284 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
285 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
290 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
291 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
292 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
293 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
294 OutboundRoute { session_priv: SecretKey },
297 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
299 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
300 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
301 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
303 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
304 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: *session_priv },
308 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
309 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
310 (0, short_channel_id, required),
311 (2, htlc_id, required),
313 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
314 (0, session_priv, required),
319 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
320 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
321 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
322 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
323 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
326 session_priv: SecretKey,
327 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
328 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
329 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
330 payment_id: PaymentId,
333 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
334 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
335 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
337 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
339 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
341 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
344 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
345 payment_id.hash(hasher);
346 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
352 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
354 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
355 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
356 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
357 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
358 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
359 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
363 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
364 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
365 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
366 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
367 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
368 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
370 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
376 struct InboundOnionErr {
382 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
383 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
385 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
386 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
387 pub enum FailureCode {
388 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
389 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
390 TemporaryNodeFailure,
391 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
392 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
393 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
394 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
395 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
396 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
397 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
398 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
399 /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
400 /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
402 /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
403 /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
404 InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
407 impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
408 fn into(self) -> u16 {
410 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
411 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
412 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
413 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
418 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
419 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
420 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
421 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
422 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
424 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
425 err: msgs::LightningError,
426 chan_id: Option<(ChannelId, u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
427 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
428 channel_capacity: Option<u64>,
430 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
432 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
434 err: LightningError {
436 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
437 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
444 shutdown_finish: None,
445 channel_capacity: None,
449 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
450 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None, channel_capacity: None }
453 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId, user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>, channel_capacity: u64) -> Self {
454 let err_msg = msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: err.clone() };
455 let action = if let (Some(_), ..) = &shutdown_res {
456 // We have a closing `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, which means the channel was funded and we
457 // should disconnect our peer such that we force them to broadcast their latest
458 // commitment upon reconnecting.
459 msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(err_msg) }
461 msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: err_msg }
464 err: LightningError { err, action },
465 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
466 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
467 channel_capacity: Some(channel_capacity)
471 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
474 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
476 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
477 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
481 log_level: Level::Warn,
484 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
486 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
488 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
490 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
491 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
499 shutdown_finish: None,
500 channel_capacity: None,
504 fn closes_channel(&self) -> bool {
505 self.chan_id.is_some()
509 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
510 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
511 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
512 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
513 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
515 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
516 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
517 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
518 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
519 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
520 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
521 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
523 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
527 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
528 struct ClaimingPayment {
530 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
531 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
532 htlcs: Vec<events::ClaimedHTLC>,
533 sender_intended_value: Option<u64>,
535 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
536 (0, amount_msat, required),
537 (2, payment_purpose, required),
538 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
539 (5, htlcs, optional_vec),
540 (7, sender_intended_value, option),
543 struct ClaimablePayment {
544 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
545 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
546 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
549 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
550 struct ClaimablePayments {
551 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
552 /// failed/claimed by the user.
554 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
555 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
557 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
558 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
559 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
561 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
562 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
563 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
564 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
567 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
568 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
569 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
570 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
572 enum BackgroundEvent {
573 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
574 /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
575 /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
576 /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
578 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
579 /// are regenerated on startup.
580 ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
581 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
582 /// channel to continue normal operation.
584 /// In general this should be used rather than
585 /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
586 /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
587 /// error the other variant is acceptable.
589 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
590 /// are regenerated on startup.
591 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
592 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
593 funding_txo: OutPoint,
594 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
596 /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
597 /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
599 MonitorUpdatesComplete {
600 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
601 channel_id: ChannelId,
606 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
607 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
608 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
609 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
610 /// event can be generated.
611 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
612 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
613 /// operation of another channel.
615 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
616 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
617 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
618 /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
620 EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
621 event: events::Event,
622 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
624 /// Indicates we should immediately resume the operation of another channel, unless there is
625 /// some other reason why the channel is blocked. In practice this simply means immediately
626 /// removing the [`RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction`] provided from the blocking set.
628 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
629 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
630 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. However, we use this variant
631 /// instead of [`Self::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel`] when we discover that the claim was in
632 /// fact duplicative and we simply want to resume the outbound edge channel immediately.
634 /// This variant should thus never be written to disk, as it is processed inline rather than
635 /// stored for later processing.
636 FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
637 downstream_counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
638 downstream_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
639 blocking_action: RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
643 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
644 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
645 // Note that FreeOtherChannelImmediately should never be written - we were supposed to free
646 // *immediately*. However, for simplicity we implement read/write here.
647 (1, FreeOtherChannelImmediately) => {
648 (0, downstream_counterparty_node_id, required),
649 (2, downstream_funding_outpoint, required),
650 (4, blocking_action, required),
652 (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
653 (0, event, upgradable_required),
654 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
655 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
656 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
657 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
658 // downgrades to prior versions.
659 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
663 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
664 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
665 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
666 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
667 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
670 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
671 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
672 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
673 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
677 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
678 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
679 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
680 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
681 /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
682 /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
684 ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
685 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
686 channel_id: ChannelId,
687 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
692 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
693 fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
694 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
695 channel_id: prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
696 htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
701 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
702 (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
706 /// State we hold per-peer.
707 pub(super) struct PeerState<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
708 /// `channel_id` -> `ChannelPhase`
710 /// Holds all channels within corresponding `ChannelPhase`s where the peer is the counterparty.
711 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>,
712 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundChannelRequest`.
714 /// When manual channel acceptance is enabled, this holds all unaccepted inbound channels where
715 /// the peer is the counterparty. If the channel is accepted, then the entry in this table is
716 /// removed, and an InboundV1Channel is created and placed in the `inbound_v1_channel_by_id` table. If
717 /// the channel is rejected, then the entry is simply removed.
718 pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, InboundChannelRequest>,
719 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
720 latest_features: InitFeatures,
721 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
722 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
723 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
724 /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
725 /// user but which have not yet completed.
727 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
728 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
729 /// for a missing channel.
730 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
731 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
732 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
734 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
735 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
736 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
737 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
739 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
740 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
741 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
742 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
743 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
744 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
745 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
746 /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
747 /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
748 /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
749 /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
750 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
751 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
752 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
753 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
757 impl <SP: Deref> PeerState<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
758 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
759 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
760 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
761 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
762 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
765 self.channel_by_id.iter().filter(|(_, phase)| matches!(phase, ChannelPhase::Funded(_))).count() == 0
766 && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
767 && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
770 // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
771 fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
772 self.channel_by_id.len() + self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
775 // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
776 fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId) -> bool {
777 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
778 self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
782 /// A not-yet-accepted inbound (from counterparty) channel. Once
783 /// accepted, the parameters will be used to construct a channel.
784 pub(super) struct InboundChannelRequest {
785 /// The original OpenChannel message.
786 pub open_channel_msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
787 /// The number of ticks remaining before the request expires.
788 pub ticks_remaining: i32,
791 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unaccepted inbound channel to be
792 /// accepted. An unaccepted channel that exceeds this limit will be abandoned.
793 const UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: i32 = 2;
795 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
796 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
798 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
801 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
802 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
803 struct PendingInboundPayment {
804 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
805 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
806 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
807 /// this payment being removed.
809 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
810 user_payment_id: u64,
811 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
812 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
813 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
816 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
817 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
818 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
819 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
820 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
821 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
822 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
823 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
825 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
826 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
834 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
836 Arc<RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
837 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
838 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
843 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
844 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
845 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
846 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
847 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
848 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
849 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
850 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
851 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
853 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
854 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
863 &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
865 &'h RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
866 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
867 ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
872 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`].
874 /// This is not exported to bindings users as general cover traits aren't useful in other
876 pub trait AChannelManager {
877 /// A type implementing [`chain::Watch`].
878 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
879 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Watch`].
880 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
881 /// A type implementing [`BroadcasterInterface`].
882 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
883 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Broadcaster`].
884 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
885 /// A type implementing [`EntropySource`].
886 type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
887 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::EntropySource`].
888 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
889 /// A type implementing [`NodeSigner`].
890 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
891 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::NodeSigner`].
892 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
893 /// A type implementing [`WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner`].
894 type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
895 /// A type implementing [`SignerProvider`] for [`Self::Signer`].
896 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<Signer = Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
897 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::SignerProvider`].
898 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
899 /// A type implementing [`FeeEstimator`].
900 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
901 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::FeeEstimator`].
902 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
903 /// A type implementing [`Router`].
904 type Router: Router + ?Sized;
905 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Router`].
906 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
907 /// A type implementing [`Logger`].
908 type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
909 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Logger`].
910 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
911 /// Returns a reference to the actual [`ChannelManager`] object.
912 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
915 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
916 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
918 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
919 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
920 ES::Target: EntropySource,
921 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
922 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
923 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
927 type Watch = M::Target;
929 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
931 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
933 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
935 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer;
936 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
938 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
940 type Router = R::Target;
942 type Logger = L::Target;
944 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
947 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
948 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
950 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
951 /// to individual Channels.
953 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
954 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
955 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
956 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
958 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
959 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST durably write each
960 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] before returning from
961 /// [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`] or before completing async writes. With
962 /// `ChannelManager`s, writing updates happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other
963 /// `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during the serialization process). If the
964 /// deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to
965 /// [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds
966 /// will be lost (modulo on-chain transaction fees).
968 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
969 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
970 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
972 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
973 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
974 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
975 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
976 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
978 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
979 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
980 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
981 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
983 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
984 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
985 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
987 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
988 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
989 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
990 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
991 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
993 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
994 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
995 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
996 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
997 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
998 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
999 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
1000 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
1003 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
1004 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
1005 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
1006 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
1007 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
1011 // `total_consistency_lock`
1013 // |__`forward_htlcs`
1015 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
1017 // |__`per_peer_state`
1019 // | |__`pending_inbound_payments`
1021 // | |__`claimable_payments`
1023 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
1025 // | |__`peer_state`
1027 // | |__`id_to_peer`
1029 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
1031 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
1033 // | |__`best_block`
1035 // | |__`pending_events`
1037 // | |__`pending_background_events`
1039 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
1041 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
1042 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1043 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1044 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1045 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1046 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1050 default_configuration: UserConfig,
1051 chain_hash: ChainHash,
1052 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1058 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1060 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1062 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1063 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1065 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
1066 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
1067 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
1068 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
1070 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1071 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
1073 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
1074 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
1075 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
1076 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
1077 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
1078 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
1079 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
1080 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
1082 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
1084 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1085 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
1087 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
1089 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1090 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1091 /// and via the classic SCID.
1093 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1094 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
1096 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1098 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1100 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1101 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
1102 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
1104 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1105 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
1107 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
1108 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1110 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1111 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1113 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1114 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1115 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1116 /// active channel list on load.
1118 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1119 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1121 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1123 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
1124 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
1125 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
1127 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1128 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1129 /// the handling of the events.
1131 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1132 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1135 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1136 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1137 /// would break backwards compatability.
1138 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1139 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1140 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1142 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1143 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<ChannelId, PublicKey>>,
1145 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1147 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1148 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1149 /// confirmation depth.
1151 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1152 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1153 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1155 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1157 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1159 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1161 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
1163 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
1165 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
1166 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
1167 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
1169 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
1170 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1172 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
1173 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
1174 /// keeping additional state.
1175 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
1177 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1178 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1179 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1180 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1182 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
1183 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
1185 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1186 /// are currently open with that peer.
1188 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1189 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
1192 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
1194 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1195 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1196 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1197 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1198 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1200 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
1201 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
1202 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
1203 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
1204 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
1206 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
1207 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
1209 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1210 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1211 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1212 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1213 pub(crate) pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1215 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
1216 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
1218 /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
1219 /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
1220 /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
1221 /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
1222 /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
1224 /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
1226 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1228 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1229 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1230 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1231 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1232 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1233 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1234 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1235 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1236 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1237 /// Tracks the progress of channels going through batch funding by whether funding_signed was
1238 /// received and the monitor has been persisted.
1240 /// This information does not need to be persisted as funding nodes can forget
1241 /// unfunded channels upon disconnection.
1242 funding_batch_states: Mutex<BTreeMap<Txid, Vec<(ChannelId, PublicKey, bool)>>>,
1244 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
1246 event_persist_notifier: Notifier,
1247 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool,
1251 signer_provider: SP,
1256 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1258 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1259 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1260 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1261 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1262 pub struct ChainParameters {
1263 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1264 pub network: Network,
1266 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1268 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1269 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1272 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1276 SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1277 SkipPersistNoEvents,
1280 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1281 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1282 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1283 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1284 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1285 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1287 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1288 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1289 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1290 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1291 event_persist_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1292 needs_persist_flag: &'a AtomicBool,
1294 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1295 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1298 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1299 /// Notifies any waiters and indicates that we need to persist, in addition to possibly having
1300 /// events to handle.
1302 /// This must always be called if the changes included a `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, as well as in
1303 /// other cases where losing the changes on restart may result in a force-close or otherwise
1305 fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1306 Self::optionally_notify(cm, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
1309 fn optionally_notify<F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C, mut persist_check: F)
1310 -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1311 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1312 let force_notify = cm.get_cm().process_background_events();
1314 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1315 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1316 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1317 should_persist: move || {
1318 // Pick the "most" action between `persist_check` and the background events
1319 // processing and return that.
1320 let notify = persist_check();
1321 match (notify, force_notify) {
1322 (NotifyOption::DoPersist, _) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1323 (_, NotifyOption::DoPersist) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1324 (NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents, _) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1325 (_, NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1326 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
1329 _read_guard: read_guard,
1333 /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
1334 /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first (or
1335 /// [`Self::optionally_notify`] used).
1336 fn optionally_notify_skipping_background_events<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>
1337 (cm: &'a C, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1338 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1340 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1341 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1342 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1343 should_persist: persist_check,
1344 _read_guard: read_guard,
1349 impl<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1350 fn drop(&mut self) {
1351 match (self.should_persist)() {
1352 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
1353 self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
1354 self.event_persist_notifier.notify()
1356 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
1357 self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
1358 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
1363 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1364 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1366 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1368 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1369 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1370 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1371 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1372 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1374 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1375 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1377 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1379 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1380 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1381 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1382 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1383 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1384 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1385 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1386 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1387 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1388 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1389 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1390 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1391 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1393 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1394 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1396 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1397 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1398 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1399 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1401 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1402 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1403 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1404 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1405 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1406 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1409 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1411 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1412 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1415 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1417 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1418 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1420 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1421 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1422 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1424 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1425 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1426 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1428 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1429 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1430 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1431 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1433 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1434 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1435 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1437 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1438 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1439 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1441 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1442 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1443 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1444 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1445 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1446 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1447 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1448 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1449 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1450 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1451 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1454 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1455 /// to better separate parameters.
1456 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1457 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1458 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1459 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1460 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1461 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1462 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1463 pub features: InitFeatures,
1464 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1465 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1466 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1468 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1470 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1471 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1472 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1473 /// payments to us through this channel.
1474 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1475 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1476 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1477 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1478 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1479 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1480 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1483 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1484 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1485 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1486 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1487 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1488 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1489 /// lifetime of the channel.
1490 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
1491 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1492 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1493 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1494 /// our counterparty already.
1496 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1497 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1498 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1499 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1501 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1502 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1503 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1504 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1506 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1507 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1509 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1510 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1512 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1513 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1514 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1515 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1516 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1517 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1518 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1519 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1520 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1523 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1525 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1526 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1527 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1528 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1529 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1530 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1531 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1533 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1534 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1536 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1537 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1538 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1539 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1540 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1541 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1542 /// this value on chain.
1544 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1546 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1548 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1549 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1550 /// The `user_channel_id` value passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound
1551 /// channels, or to [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
1552 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] config flag is set to true. Otherwise
1553 /// `user_channel_id` will be randomized for an inbound channel. This may be zero for objects
1554 /// serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1556 /// [`ChannelManager::create_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_channel
1557 /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
1558 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels
1559 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1560 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1561 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1563 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1564 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1565 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1566 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1567 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1569 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1570 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1571 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1572 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1574 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1575 pub balance_msat: u64,
1576 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1577 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1578 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1579 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1581 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1583 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1584 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1585 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1586 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1587 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1588 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1589 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1590 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1592 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`],
1593 /// [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`], and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1594 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1595 /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
1596 /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
1597 /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
1598 /// route which is valid.
1599 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1600 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1601 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1602 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1603 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1604 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1606 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1607 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1608 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1609 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1610 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1611 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1612 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1613 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1614 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1616 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1618 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1619 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1620 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1621 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1622 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1624 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1625 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1626 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1627 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1628 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1629 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1630 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1632 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1633 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1634 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1635 pub is_outbound: bool,
1636 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1637 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1638 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1639 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1640 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1642 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1643 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1644 /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
1645 /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
1646 pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
1647 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1648 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1650 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1651 pub is_usable: bool,
1652 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1653 pub is_public: bool,
1654 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1655 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1656 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1657 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1658 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1659 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1661 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1662 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1665 impl ChannelDetails {
1666 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1667 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1668 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1670 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1671 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1672 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1673 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1676 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1677 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1678 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1680 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1681 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1682 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1683 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1686 fn from_channel_context<SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
1687 context: &ChannelContext<SP>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
1688 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
1691 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1692 F::Target: FeeEstimator
1694 let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
1695 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1696 context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1698 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
1699 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1700 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1701 features: latest_features,
1702 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1703 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1704 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1705 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1706 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1707 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1708 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1709 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
1710 Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1711 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1713 funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
1714 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1715 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1716 channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1717 short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
1718 outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1719 inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1720 channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
1721 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1722 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1723 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1724 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1725 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1726 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1727 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1728 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
1729 confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
1730 confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1731 force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1732 is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
1733 is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
1734 is_usable: context.is_live(),
1735 is_public: context.should_announce(),
1736 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1737 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1738 config: Some(context.config()),
1739 channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
1744 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1745 /// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
1746 /// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
1747 /// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
1748 /// the channel will be removed shortly.
1749 /// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
1750 /// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
1751 pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
1752 /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
1754 /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
1756 /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
1757 /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
1759 /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
1760 NegotiatingClosingFee,
1761 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
1762 /// to drop the channel.
1766 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1767 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1768 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1769 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1770 /// When an invoice was requested and thus a payment has not yet been sent.
1772 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1773 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1774 payment_id: PaymentId,
1776 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1778 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1779 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1780 payment_id: PaymentId,
1781 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1783 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1784 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1785 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1788 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1789 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1790 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1792 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1793 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1794 payment_id: PaymentId,
1795 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1796 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1797 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1799 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1800 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1801 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1803 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1804 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1805 payment_id: PaymentId,
1806 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1807 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1811 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1813 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
1815 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1816 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1817 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1818 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1820 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1821 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1822 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1825 macro_rules! handle_error {
1826 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1827 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1828 // entering the macro.
1829 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1830 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1834 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish, channel_capacity }) => {
1835 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1837 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1838 $self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1839 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1840 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1844 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1845 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1846 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1847 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() },
1848 counterparty_node_id: Some($counterparty_node_id),
1849 channel_capacity_sats: channel_capacity,
1854 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1855 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1857 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1858 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1859 action: err.action.clone()
1863 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1864 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1865 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1866 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1867 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1871 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1876 ($self: ident, $internal: expr) => {
1879 Err((chan, msg_handle_err)) => {
1880 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1881 handle_error!($self, Err(msg_handle_err), counterparty_node_id).map_err(|err| (chan, err))
1887 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1888 ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
1889 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.channel_id());
1890 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1891 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
1892 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1894 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1895 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1896 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1897 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1898 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1900 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1901 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1903 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1907 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1908 macro_rules! convert_chan_phase_err {
1909 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, $channel_update: expr) => {
1911 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1912 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), *$channel_id))
1914 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1915 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), *$channel_id))
1917 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1918 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", $channel_id, msg);
1919 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel.context);
1920 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
1921 let user_id = $channel.context.get_user_id();
1922 let channel_capacity_satoshis = $channel.context.get_value_satoshis();
1924 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, user_id,
1925 shutdown_res, $channel_update, channel_capacity_satoshis))
1929 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, FUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
1930 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, { $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast($channel).ok() })
1932 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
1933 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, None)
1935 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_phase: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1936 match $channel_phase {
1937 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
1938 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL)
1940 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel) => {
1941 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
1943 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel) => {
1944 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
1950 macro_rules! break_chan_phase_entry {
1951 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1955 let key = *$entry.key();
1956 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
1958 $entry.remove_entry();
1966 macro_rules! try_chan_phase_entry {
1967 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1971 let key = *$entry.key();
1972 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
1974 $entry.remove_entry();
1982 macro_rules! remove_channel_phase {
1983 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1985 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1986 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context());
1992 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1993 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1994 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1995 node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1996 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1998 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1999 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
2000 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2001 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2002 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2003 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2004 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
2005 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2006 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2007 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2012 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
2013 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2014 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
2015 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
2016 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2017 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
2018 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2019 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2020 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
2022 $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
2027 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
2028 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2029 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
2030 debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
2031 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
2032 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2033 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2034 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2035 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
2037 $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
2042 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
2043 ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2044 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
2045 &$self.node_signer, $self.chain_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
2046 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
2047 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
2048 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
2049 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
2050 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
2051 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
2052 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
2054 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
2055 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2056 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2062 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
2063 .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
2065 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
2066 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
2067 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
2068 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
2069 updates.announcement_sigs);
2070 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
2071 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
2074 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
2075 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = $chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2076 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
2077 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
2079 // If the channel belongs to a batch funding transaction, the progress of the batch
2080 // should be updated as we have received funding_signed and persisted the monitor.
2081 if let Some(txid) = unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2082 let mut funding_batch_states = $self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2083 let mut batch_completed = false;
2084 if let Some(batch_state) = funding_batch_states.get_mut(&txid) {
2085 let channel_state = batch_state.iter_mut().find(|(chan_id, pubkey, _)| (
2086 *chan_id == channel_id &&
2087 *pubkey == counterparty_node_id
2089 if let Some(channel_state) = channel_state {
2090 channel_state.2 = true;
2092 debug_assert!(false, "Missing channel batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2094 batch_completed = batch_state.iter().all(|(_, _, completed)| *completed);
2096 debug_assert!(false, "Missing batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2099 // When all channels in a batched funding transaction have become ready, it is not necessary
2100 // to track the progress of the batch anymore and the state of the channels can be updated.
2101 if batch_completed {
2102 let removed_batch_state = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2103 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2104 let mut batch_funding_tx = None;
2105 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, _) in removed_batch_state {
2106 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2107 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2108 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2109 batch_funding_tx = batch_funding_tx.or_else(|| chan.context.unbroadcasted_funding());
2110 chan.set_batch_ready();
2111 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2112 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, chan);
2116 if let Some(tx) = batch_funding_tx {
2117 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting batch funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
2118 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
2123 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
2125 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
2126 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
2128 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
2129 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2130 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2131 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
2136 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
2137 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $completed: expr) => { {
2138 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
2140 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::UnrecoverableError => {
2141 let err_str = "ChannelMonitor[Update] persistence failed unrecoverably. This indicates we cannot continue normal operation and must shut down.";
2142 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err_str);
2143 panic!("{}", err_str);
2145 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
2146 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
2147 &$chan.context.channel_id());
2150 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
2156 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
2157 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $chan, _internal,
2158 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
2160 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2161 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
2162 .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
2163 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
2164 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
2165 // filter for uniqueness here.
2166 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
2167 .unwrap_or_else(|| {
2168 in_flight_updates.push($update);
2169 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
2171 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
2172 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $chan, _internal,
2174 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
2175 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
2176 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
2182 macro_rules! process_events_body {
2183 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
2184 let mut processed_all_events = false;
2185 while !processed_all_events {
2186 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
2193 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
2194 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
2195 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2197 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
2198 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
2199 result = $self.process_background_events();
2201 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
2202 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
2203 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
2204 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2208 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
2209 let num_events = pending_events.len();
2210 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
2211 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2214 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
2216 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
2217 $event_to_handle = event;
2219 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
2220 post_event_actions.push(action);
2225 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2226 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
2227 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
2228 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
2229 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
2230 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
2233 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
2234 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
2235 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
2236 processed_all_events = false;
2240 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
2241 $self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
2242 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify();
2244 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
2245 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
2246 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
2252 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
2254 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
2255 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2256 ES::Target: EntropySource,
2257 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2258 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2259 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2263 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
2265 /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
2267 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
2268 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
2270 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
2272 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
2273 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
2274 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
2277 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
2278 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
2279 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
2281 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
2282 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
2283 current_timestamp: u32,
2285 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2286 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
2287 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
2288 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
2290 default_configuration: config.clone(),
2291 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(params.network),
2292 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
2297 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
2299 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
2300 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2301 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
2302 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2303 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
2304 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2305 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2306 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2308 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
2311 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
2312 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2314 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2316 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
2318 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2320 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2321 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
2322 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2323 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2324 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
2325 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
2326 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
2327 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
2337 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
2338 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
2339 &self.default_configuration
2342 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2343 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2344 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
2347 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
2348 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
2350 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
2352 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
2356 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
2361 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2363 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2364 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2365 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2366 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2367 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2369 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2370 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2372 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2373 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2374 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2376 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2377 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2378 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2380 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2381 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2382 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2383 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2384 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2385 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2387 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2388 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2389 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2390 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<ChannelId, APIError> {
2391 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2392 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2395 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2396 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2397 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2399 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2401 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2402 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2404 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2406 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2407 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2408 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2409 match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2410 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2411 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
2415 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
2420 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash);
2422 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
2423 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
2424 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2426 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
2428 panic!("RNG is bad???");
2431 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel)); }
2434 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
2435 node_id: their_network_key,
2438 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
2441 fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&ChannelId, &Channel<SP>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2442 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2443 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2444 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2445 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2446 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2447 // the same channel.
2448 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2450 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2451 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2452 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2453 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2454 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2455 res.extend(peer_state.channel_by_id.iter()
2456 .filter_map(|(chan_id, phase)| match phase {
2457 // Only `Channels` in the `ChannelPhase::Funded` phase can be considered funded.
2458 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => Some((chan_id, chan)),
2462 .map(|(_channel_id, channel)| {
2463 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2464 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2472 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
2473 /// more information.
2474 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2475 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2476 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2477 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2478 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2479 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2480 // the same channel.
2481 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2483 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2484 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2485 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2486 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2487 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2488 for context in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, phase)| phase.context()) {
2489 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height,
2490 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2498 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
2499 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
2501 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
2502 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
2504 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2505 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2506 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2507 // really wanted anyway.
2508 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
2511 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2512 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2513 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2514 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2516 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2517 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2518 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2519 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2520 let context_to_details = |context| {
2521 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2523 return peer_state.channel_by_id
2525 .map(|(_, phase)| phase.context())
2526 .map(context_to_details)
2532 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2533 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2535 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2536 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2537 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2539 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2540 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2541 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2542 .filter_map(|(payment_id, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2543 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {
2544 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2546 // InvoiceReceived is an intermediate state and doesn't need to be exposed
2547 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {
2548 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2550 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2551 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2552 payment_id: *payment_id,
2553 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2554 total_msat: *total_msat,
2557 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2558 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2560 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2561 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2563 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2568 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
2569 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, context: &ChannelContext<SP>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
2570 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2571 match context.unbroadcasted_funding() {
2572 Some(transaction) => {
2573 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2574 channel_id: context.channel_id(), transaction
2579 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2580 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
2581 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
2582 reason: closure_reason,
2583 counterparty_node_id: Some(context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
2584 channel_capacity_sats: Some(context.get_value_satoshis()),
2588 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2589 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2591 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
2592 let mut shutdown_result = None;
2594 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2596 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2597 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2599 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2600 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2602 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2603 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
2604 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
2605 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
2606 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2607 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2608 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) =
2609 chan.get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2610 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2612 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2613 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2614 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2615 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2616 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2620 debug_assert!(monitor_update_opt.is_none() || !chan.is_shutdown(),
2621 "We can't both complete shutdown and generate a monitor update");
2623 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2624 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2625 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
2626 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
2630 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2631 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
2632 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2633 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2637 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2638 shutdown_result = Some((None, Vec::new(), unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid));
2644 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2645 // If we reach this point, it means that the channel_id either refers to an unfunded channel or
2646 // it does not exist for this peer. Either way, we can attempt to force-close it.
2648 // An appropriate error will be returned for non-existence of the channel if that's the case.
2649 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
2650 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
2651 return self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, false).map(|_| ())
2656 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2657 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2658 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2659 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2662 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
2663 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2669 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2670 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2671 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2673 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
2674 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2676 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2677 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
2678 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2679 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2681 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2683 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2684 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2685 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2688 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2689 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2690 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2691 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2692 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2693 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2696 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2697 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2698 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2700 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2701 /// the channel being closed or not:
2702 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2703 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2704 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2705 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2706 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2707 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2708 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2710 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2711 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2712 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2713 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2715 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2717 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2718 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2719 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2722 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2723 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2724 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2725 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2726 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2727 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2730 fn finish_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2731 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2732 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2733 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
2734 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2737 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs, unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid) = shutdown_res;
2738 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
2739 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2740 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2741 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2742 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2743 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2745 if let Some((_, funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
2746 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2747 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2748 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2749 // ignore the result here.
2750 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2752 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
2753 if let Some(txid) = unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2754 let mut funding_batch_states = self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2755 let affected_channels = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2756 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2757 let mut has_uncompleted_channel = None;
2758 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, state) in affected_channels {
2759 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2760 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2761 if let Some(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id) {
2762 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
2763 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context(), ClosureReason::FundingBatchClosure);
2764 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
2767 has_uncompleted_channel = Some(has_uncompleted_channel.map_or(!state, |v| v || !state));
2770 has_uncompleted_channel.unwrap_or(true),
2771 "Closing a batch where all channels have completed initial monitor update",
2774 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
2775 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2779 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2780 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2781 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2782 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2783 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2784 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2785 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2786 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
2787 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2788 let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2789 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
2791 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
2793 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2794 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", channel_id);
2795 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan_phase_entry.get().context(), closure_reason);
2796 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
2797 mem::drop(peer_state);
2798 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
2800 ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) => {
2801 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2802 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2804 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
2805 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
2806 // Unfunded channel has no update
2807 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
2810 } else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
2811 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
2812 // N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
2813 // don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
2815 (None, *peer_node_id)
2817 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, peer_node_id) });
2820 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
2821 // Try to send the `BroadcastChannelUpdate` to the peer we just force-closed on, but if
2822 // not try to broadcast it via whatever peer we have.
2823 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2824 let a_peer_state_opt = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2825 .ok_or(per_peer_state.values().next());
2826 if let Ok(a_peer_state_mutex) = a_peer_state_opt {
2827 let mut a_peer_state = a_peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2828 a_peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2834 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
2837 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2838 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2839 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2840 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2841 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2842 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2843 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2844 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2845 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2846 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2847 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
2848 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
2859 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2860 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2861 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2863 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2864 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2865 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2868 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2869 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2870 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2872 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2873 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2874 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2875 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2876 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2879 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2880 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2881 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2882 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2883 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2887 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2888 /// local transaction(s).
2889 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2890 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2891 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2895 fn construct_fwd_pending_htlc_info(
2896 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, hop_hmac: [u8; 32],
2897 new_packet_bytes: [u8; onion_utils::ONION_DATA_LEN], shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2898 next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
2899 ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
2900 debug_assert!(next_packet_pubkey_opt.is_some());
2901 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2903 public_key: next_packet_pubkey_opt.unwrap_or(Err(secp256k1::Error::InvalidPublicKey)),
2904 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2908 let (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value) = match hop_data {
2909 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value } =>
2910 (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value),
2911 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. } | msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive { .. } =>
2912 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2913 msg: "Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node",
2914 err_code: 0x4000 | 22,
2915 err_data: Vec::new(),
2919 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2920 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2921 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2924 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2925 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2926 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2927 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward,
2928 outgoing_cltv_value,
2929 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
2933 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(
2934 &self, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, shared_secret: [u8; 32], payment_hash: PaymentHash,
2935 amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>, allow_underpay: bool,
2936 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
2937 ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
2938 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, onion_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata) = match hop_data {
2939 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
2940 payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata, ..
2942 (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata),
2943 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive {
2944 amt_msat, total_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_secret, ..
2946 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData { payment_secret, total_msat };
2947 (Some(payment_data), None, Vec::new(), amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, None)
2949 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { .. } => {
2950 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2951 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2952 err_data: Vec::new(),
2953 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2957 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2958 if outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry {
2959 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2960 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender",
2962 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2965 // final_expiry_too_soon
2966 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2967 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2969 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2970 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2971 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2972 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2973 if cltv_expiry <= current_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 {
2974 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
2975 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
2976 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
2977 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2978 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
2979 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2982 if (!allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat > amt_msat) ||
2983 (allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat >
2984 amt_msat.saturating_add(counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)))
2986 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2988 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
2989 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2993 let routing = if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2994 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2995 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2996 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2997 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2998 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2999 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3000 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
3001 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
3002 err_code: 0x4000|22,
3003 err_data: Vec::new(),
3004 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
3007 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && payment_data.is_some() {
3008 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
3009 err_code: 0x4000|22,
3010 err_data: Vec::new(),
3011 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
3014 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
3018 incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
3021 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
3022 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
3025 incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
3026 phantom_shared_secret,
3030 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
3031 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
3032 err_data: Vec::new(),
3033 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
3036 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
3039 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
3040 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
3041 outgoing_amt_msat: onion_amt_msat,
3042 outgoing_cltv_value,
3043 skimmed_fee_msat: counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
3047 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
3048 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC
3049 ) -> Result<(onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg> {
3050 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
3051 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
3053 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3054 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3055 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3056 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3057 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
3058 failure_code: $err_code,
3064 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
3065 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
3068 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
3069 Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
3070 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
3072 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
3073 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
3074 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
3075 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
3076 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
3077 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
3078 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
3079 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
3081 macro_rules! return_err {
3082 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3084 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3085 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3086 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3087 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3088 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3089 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3095 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
3096 shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac,
3097 msg.payment_hash, &self.node_signer
3100 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3101 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
3103 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3104 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
3107 let (outgoing_scid, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, next_packet_pk_opt) = match next_hop {
3108 onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
3109 next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward {
3110 short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value
3113 let next_packet_pk = onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx,
3114 msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &shared_secret);
3115 (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(next_packet_pk))
3117 // We'll do receive checks in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] so we have access to the
3118 // inbound channel's state.
3119 onion_utils::Hop::Receive { .. } => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
3120 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. }, .. } |
3121 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive { .. }, .. } =>
3123 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0; 0]);
3127 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
3128 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
3129 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
3130 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid).cloned();
3131 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
3132 None => { // unknown_next_peer
3133 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
3134 // phantom or an intercept.
3135 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
3136 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)) ||
3137 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)
3141 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3144 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
3146 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
3147 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3148 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3149 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3150 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3152 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3153 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3154 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).map(
3155 |chan_phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
3158 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
3159 // have no consistency guarantees.
3160 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3164 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
3165 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
3166 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
3167 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
3168 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3170 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
3171 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
3172 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
3173 // we don't have the channel here.
3174 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3176 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3178 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
3179 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
3180 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
3181 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
3182 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
3183 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
3184 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
3185 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
3186 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
3187 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
3188 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
3190 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
3193 if outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
3194 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
3196 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value) {
3197 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
3201 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
3202 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
3203 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
3204 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
3206 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
3213 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3214 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
3215 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
3216 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
3217 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
3218 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
3220 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
3221 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
3223 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
3224 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
3225 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
3226 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
3227 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
3228 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
3229 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
3230 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
3231 if (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
3232 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
3238 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
3239 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
3240 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
3241 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3243 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
3244 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3246 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3247 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3248 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3250 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3251 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3252 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3253 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3254 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
3255 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
3256 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
3260 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
3262 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt))
3265 fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
3266 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, shared_secret: [u8; 32], decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop,
3267 allow_underpay: bool, next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
3268 ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
3269 macro_rules! return_err {
3270 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3272 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3273 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3274 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3275 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3276 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3277 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3283 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
3285 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
3286 msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat)
3289 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
3290 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
3291 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
3292 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
3293 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
3295 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3298 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
3299 match self.construct_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
3300 new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
3301 Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
3302 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3308 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
3309 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
3310 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
3312 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
3313 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
3314 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3316 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3317 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3318 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3319 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
3320 return Err(LightningError {
3321 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
3322 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
3325 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
3326 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
3328 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3329 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
3332 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
3333 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
3334 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
3335 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
3337 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
3338 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
3339 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3341 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3342 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3343 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3344 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3345 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
3346 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
3350 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
3353 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3354 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3355 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3357 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
3358 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
3359 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
3360 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
3361 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
3364 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
3365 chain_hash: self.chain_hash,
3367 timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
3368 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
3369 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
3370 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
3371 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
3372 fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
3373 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
3374 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3376 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
3377 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
3378 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
3380 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
3382 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
3389 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3390 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3391 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
3392 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3397 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3398 let SendAlongPathArgs {
3399 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3402 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
3403 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3405 log_trace!(self.logger,
3406 "Attempting to send payment with payment hash {} along path with next hop {}",
3407 payment_hash, path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
3408 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
3409 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
3411 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
3412 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected".to_owned()})?;
3413 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
3415 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash)
3416 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute { err: "Route size too large considering onion data".to_owned()})?;
3418 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3419 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
3420 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
3421 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3424 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3425 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3426 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
3427 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3428 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3429 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
3430 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
3431 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
3432 if !chan.context.is_live() {
3433 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3435 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3436 let send_res = chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
3437 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3439 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
3440 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
3442 }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
3443 match break_chan_phase_entry!(self, send_res, chan_phase_entry) {
3444 Some(monitor_update) => {
3445 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
3447 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
3448 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
3449 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
3450 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
3451 // which we do in the send_payment check for
3452 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
3453 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
3461 _ => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel to first hop is unfunded".to_owned()}),
3464 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
3465 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
3466 // `channel_by_id` map.
3467 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
3468 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
3473 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
3474 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3476 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
3481 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
3483 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
3484 /// fields for more info.
3486 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
3487 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
3489 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
3491 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
3492 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
3493 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
3494 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
3495 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
3497 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
3498 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
3499 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
3500 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
3501 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
3503 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
3504 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
3505 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
3506 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
3508 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
3510 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
3511 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
3512 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
3514 /// In general, a path may raise:
3515 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
3516 /// node public key) is specified.
3517 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available as it has been
3518 /// closed, doesn't exist, or the peer is currently disconnected.
3519 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
3520 /// relevant updates.
3522 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
3523 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
3524 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
3526 /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
3527 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3528 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3529 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
3530 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
3531 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3532 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3533 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3534 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3535 self.pending_outbound_payments
3536 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
3537 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3538 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3541 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
3542 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3543 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
3544 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3545 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3546 self.pending_outbound_payments
3547 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
3548 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
3549 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3550 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3554 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3555 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3556 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3557 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
3558 keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
3559 best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3563 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
3564 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3565 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3569 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3570 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3574 /// Signals that no further attempts for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
3575 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
3576 /// retries are exhausted.
3578 /// # Event Generation
3580 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
3581 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
3583 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
3584 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
3585 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
3587 /// # Restart Behavior
3589 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated and we restart without first persisting the
3590 /// [`ChannelManager`], another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated.
3591 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
3592 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3593 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
3596 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
3597 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
3598 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
3599 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
3600 /// never reach the recipient.
3602 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
3603 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
3605 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
3606 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
3608 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
3609 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
3610 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3611 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3612 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
3613 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
3614 &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3617 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
3618 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3620 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
3623 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
3624 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
3625 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3626 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3627 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
3628 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3629 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3630 &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3633 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
3634 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
3635 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
3636 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
3637 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3638 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3639 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
3640 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3641 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3644 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
3647 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
3648 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
3651 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay the given
3652 /// amount to the given `node_id`.
3654 /// See [`ChannelManager::send_preflight_probes`] for more information.
3655 pub fn send_spontaneous_preflight_probes(
3656 &self, node_id: PublicKey, amount_msat: u64, final_cltv_expiry_delta: u32,
3657 liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3658 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3659 let payment_params =
3660 PaymentParameters::from_node_id(node_id, final_cltv_expiry_delta);
3662 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, amount_msat);
3664 self.send_preflight_probes(route_params, liquidity_limit_multiplier)
3667 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay a route found
3668 /// according to the given [`RouteParameters`].
3670 /// This may be used to send "pre-flight" probes, i.e., to train our scorer before conducting
3671 /// the actual payment. Note this is only useful if there likely is sufficient time for the
3672 /// probe to settle before sending out the actual payment, e.g., when waiting for user
3673 /// confirmation in a wallet UI.
3675 /// Otherwise, there is a chance the probe could take up some liquidity needed to complete the
3676 /// actual payment. Users should therefore be cautious and might avoid sending probes if
3677 /// liquidity is scarce and/or they don't expect the probe to return before they send the
3678 /// payment. To mitigate this issue, channels with available liquidity less than the required
3679 /// amount times the given `liquidity_limit_multiplier` won't be used to send pre-flight
3680 /// probes. If `None` is given as `liquidity_limit_multiplier`, it defaults to `3`.
3681 pub fn send_preflight_probes(
3682 &self, route_params: RouteParameters, liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3683 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3684 let liquidity_limit_multiplier = liquidity_limit_multiplier.unwrap_or(3);
3686 let payer = self.get_our_node_id();
3687 let usable_channels = self.list_usable_channels();
3688 let first_hops = usable_channels.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>();
3689 let inflight_htlcs = self.compute_inflight_htlcs();
3693 .find_route(&payer, &route_params, Some(&first_hops), inflight_htlcs)
3695 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to find path for payment probe: {:?}", e);
3696 ProbeSendFailure::RouteNotFound
3699 let mut used_liquidity_map = HashMap::with_capacity(first_hops.len());
3701 let mut res = Vec::new();
3703 for mut path in route.paths {
3704 // If the last hop is probably an unannounced channel we refrain from probing all the
3705 // way through to the end and instead probe up to the second-to-last channel.
3706 while let Some(last_path_hop) = path.hops.last() {
3707 if last_path_hop.maybe_announced_channel {
3708 // We found a potentially announced last hop.
3711 // Drop the last hop, as it's likely unannounced.
3714 "Avoided sending payment probe all the way to last hop {} as it is likely unannounced.",
3715 last_path_hop.short_channel_id
3717 let final_value_msat = path.final_value_msat();
3719 if let Some(new_last) = path.hops.last_mut() {
3720 new_last.fee_msat += final_value_msat;
3725 if path.hops.len() < 2 {
3728 "Skipped sending payment probe over path with less than two hops."
3733 if let Some(first_path_hop) = path.hops.first() {
3734 if let Some(first_hop) = first_hops.iter().find(|h| {
3735 h.get_outbound_payment_scid() == Some(first_path_hop.short_channel_id)
3737 let path_value = path.final_value_msat() + path.fee_msat();
3738 let used_liquidity =
3739 used_liquidity_map.entry(first_path_hop.short_channel_id).or_insert(0);
3741 if first_hop.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat
3742 < (*used_liquidity + path_value) * liquidity_limit_multiplier
3744 log_debug!(self.logger, "Skipped sending payment probe to avoid putting channel {} under the liquidity limit.", first_path_hop.short_channel_id);
3747 *used_liquidity += path_value;
3752 res.push(self.send_probe(path).map_err(|e| {
3753 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to send pre-flight probe: {:?}", e);
3754 ProbeSendFailure::SendingFailed(e)
3761 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
3762 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
3763 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: FnMut(&OutboundV1Channel<SP>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
3764 &self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, is_batch_funding: bool,
3765 mut find_funding_output: FundingOutput,
3766 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3767 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3768 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3769 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3771 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3772 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3773 let (chan, msg) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
3774 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) => {
3775 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
3777 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, is_batch_funding, &self.logger)
3778 .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
3779 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
3780 let user_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
3781 let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
3782 let channel_capacity = chan.context.get_value_satoshis();
3783 (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, channel_capacity))
3784 } else { unreachable!(); });
3786 Ok((chan, funding_msg)) => (chan, funding_msg),
3787 Err((chan, err)) => {
3788 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3789 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3791 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
3792 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3793 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3799 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(*temporary_channel_id, phase);
3800 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3802 "Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is not an unfunded, outbound V1 channel",
3803 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3806 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {err: format!(
3807 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3808 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3812 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3813 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3816 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
3817 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3818 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3820 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3821 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3822 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.context.channel_id(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
3823 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
3825 e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan));
3832 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3833 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, false, |_, tx| {
3834 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3838 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3840 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3841 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3843 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3844 /// across the p2p network.
3846 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3847 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3849 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3850 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3851 /// keys per-channel).
3853 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3854 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3855 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3857 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3858 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3859 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3861 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3862 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3863 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3864 /// for more details.
3866 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3867 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3868 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3869 self.batch_funding_transaction_generated(&[(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id)], funding_transaction)
3872 /// Call this upon creation of a batch funding transaction for the given channels.
3874 /// Return values are identical to [`Self::funding_transaction_generated`], respective to
3875 /// each individual channel and transaction output.
3877 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. This batch funding transcaction
3878 /// will only be broadcast when we have safely received and persisted the counterparty's
3879 /// signature for each channel.
3881 /// If there is an error, all channels in the batch are to be considered closed.
3882 pub fn batch_funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channels: &[(&ChannelId, &PublicKey)], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3883 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3884 let mut result = Ok(());
3886 if !funding_transaction.is_coin_base() {
3887 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3888 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3889 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3890 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3895 if funding_transaction.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
3896 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3897 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3901 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3902 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3903 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3904 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3905 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3906 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 1 {
3907 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3908 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3913 let txid = funding_transaction.txid();
3914 let is_batch_funding = temporary_channels.len() > 1;
3915 let mut funding_batch_states = if is_batch_funding {
3916 Some(self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap())
3920 let mut funding_batch_state = funding_batch_states.as_mut().and_then(|states| {
3921 match states.entry(txid) {
3922 btree_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3923 result = result.clone().and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3924 err: "Batch funding transaction with the same txid already exists".to_owned()
3928 btree_map::Entry::Vacant(vacant) => Some(vacant.insert(Vec::new())),
3931 for &(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in temporary_channels.iter() {
3932 result = result.and_then(|_| self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(
3933 temporary_channel_id,
3934 counterparty_node_id,
3935 funding_transaction.clone(),
3938 let mut output_index = None;
3939 let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3940 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3941 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
3942 if output_index.is_some() {
3943 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3944 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3947 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3950 if output_index.is_none() {
3951 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3952 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3955 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() };
3956 if let Some(funding_batch_state) = funding_batch_state.as_mut() {
3957 funding_batch_state.push((outpoint.to_channel_id(), *counterparty_node_id, false));
3963 if let Err(ref e) = result {
3964 // Remaining channels need to be removed on any error.
3965 let e = format!("Error in transaction funding: {:?}", e);
3966 let mut channels_to_remove = Vec::new();
3967 channels_to_remove.extend(funding_batch_states.as_mut()
3968 .and_then(|states| states.remove(&txid))
3969 .into_iter().flatten()
3970 .map(|(chan_id, node_id, _state)| (chan_id, node_id))
3972 channels_to_remove.extend(temporary_channels.iter()
3973 .map(|(&chan_id, &node_id)| (chan_id, node_id))
3975 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
3977 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3978 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in channels_to_remove {
3979 per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3980 .map(|peer_state_mutex| peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap())
3981 .and_then(|mut peer_state| peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id))
3983 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
3984 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context(), ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: e.clone() });
3985 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
3989 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
3990 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
3996 /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
3998 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3999 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4000 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4001 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4003 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4004 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4006 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4007 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4009 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4011 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4012 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4013 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4014 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4015 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4016 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4017 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4018 pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
4019 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
4020 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4021 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
4022 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4023 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
4027 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4028 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4029 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4030 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4031 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4032 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4033 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4034 if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
4035 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4036 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4040 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4041 if let Some(channel_phase) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
4042 let mut config = channel_phase.context().config();
4043 config.apply(config_update);
4044 if !channel_phase.context_mut().update_config(&config) {
4047 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = channel_phase {
4048 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
4049 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
4050 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
4051 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4052 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4059 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
4060 debug_assert!(false);
4061 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4063 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
4064 channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4071 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
4073 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4074 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4075 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4076 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4078 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4079 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4081 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4082 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4084 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4086 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4087 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4088 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4089 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4090 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4091 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4092 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4093 pub fn update_channel_config(
4094 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config: &ChannelConfig,
4095 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4096 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
4099 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
4100 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
4102 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
4103 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
4105 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
4106 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
4107 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
4108 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
4109 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
4111 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
4112 /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
4113 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
4116 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4119 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
4120 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4121 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
4122 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
4123 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
4124 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &ChannelId, next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4125 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4127 let next_hop_scid = {
4128 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4129 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
4130 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
4131 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4132 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4133 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
4134 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) => {
4135 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
4136 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4137 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", next_hop_channel_id)
4140 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
4142 Some(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4143 err: format!("Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is still opening.",
4144 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
4146 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4147 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
4148 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
4153 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4154 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4155 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4158 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
4159 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
4160 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
4162 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4164 let skimmed_fee_msat =
4165 payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
4166 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
4167 skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
4168 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
4171 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
4172 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4173 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4174 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
4175 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
4177 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
4181 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
4182 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
4184 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4187 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4188 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4189 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4191 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4192 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4193 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4196 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
4197 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4198 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4199 user_channel_id: Some(payment.prev_user_channel_id),
4200 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4201 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
4202 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4203 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4206 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
4207 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
4208 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4209 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4214 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
4216 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
4217 /// Will likely generate further events.
4218 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
4219 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4221 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
4222 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
4223 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
4225 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
4226 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
4228 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
4229 if short_chan_id != 0 {
4230 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
4232 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4233 match forward_info {
4234 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4235 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4236 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4237 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4238 outgoing_cltv_value, ..
4241 macro_rules! failure_handler {
4242 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
4243 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
4245 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4246 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4247 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4248 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4249 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4250 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4251 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
4254 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
4255 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
4257 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
4260 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4261 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
4267 macro_rules! fail_forward {
4268 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4270 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
4274 macro_rules! failed_payment {
4275 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4277 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
4281 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
4282 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
4283 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.chain_hash) {
4284 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4285 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
4286 phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac,
4287 payment_hash, &self.node_signer
4290 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4291 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
4292 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
4293 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
4294 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
4296 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
4298 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4299 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
4303 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
4304 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
4305 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4306 outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None)
4308 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
4309 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
4315 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4318 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4321 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4322 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
4323 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
4324 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
4325 // problem, not ours.
4331 let chan_info_opt = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id).cloned();
4332 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match chan_info_opt {
4333 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id, chan_id),
4335 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4339 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4340 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4341 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
4342 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4345 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4346 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4347 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
4348 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4349 match forward_info {
4350 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4351 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4352 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4353 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
4354 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4357 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id);
4358 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4359 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4360 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4361 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4362 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4363 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4364 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
4365 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4367 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
4368 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
4369 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, &self.fee_estimator,
4372 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4373 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", &payment_hash, msg);
4375 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
4377 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan);
4378 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4379 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
4380 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
4385 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
4386 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
4388 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
4389 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4390 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_fail_htlc(
4391 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
4393 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4394 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
4396 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
4398 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
4399 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
4400 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
4407 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4411 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4412 match forward_info {
4413 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4414 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4415 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4416 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
4417 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4420 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
4421 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret, custom_tlvs } => {
4422 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
4423 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
4424 payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
4425 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
4426 Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
4428 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs } => {
4429 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
4430 payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
4434 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
4435 payment_data, None, onion_fields)
4438 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
4441 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
4442 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
4443 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4444 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4445 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4446 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4447 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4448 phantom_shared_secret,
4450 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
4451 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
4452 // if routing nodes overpay
4453 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
4454 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
4456 total_value_received: None,
4457 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
4460 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
4463 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
4465 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
4466 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
4467 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
4468 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4469 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
4470 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
4472 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4473 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
4474 user_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.user_channel_id,
4475 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4476 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
4477 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
4478 phantom_shared_secret,
4480 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
4481 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
4483 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
4486 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
4487 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4488 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4489 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4490 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4493 macro_rules! check_total_value {
4494 ($purpose: expr) => {{
4495 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
4496 let is_keysend = match $purpose {
4497 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(_) => true,
4498 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { .. } => false,
4500 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4501 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
4502 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4504 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
4505 .entry(payment_hash)
4506 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
4507 .or_insert_with(|| {
4508 committed_to_claimable = true;
4510 purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
4513 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
4514 let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
4515 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), &payment_hash, log_keysend(!is_keysend));
4516 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4518 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4519 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", &payment_hash);
4520 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4522 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
4523 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
4524 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4527 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
4529 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
4530 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
4531 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
4532 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
4533 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
4534 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
4535 if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4536 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
4537 &payment_hash, claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
4538 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
4540 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
4542 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
4543 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
4544 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
4545 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4546 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4547 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
4549 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4550 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4551 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4552 committed_to_claimable = true;
4554 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
4555 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4556 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
4557 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
4558 let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
4559 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
4560 debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
4561 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
4562 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
4563 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4567 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
4568 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
4569 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4570 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
4571 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
4573 payment_claimable_generated = true;
4575 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
4576 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
4578 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4579 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4580 committed_to_claimable = true;
4583 payment_claimable_generated
4587 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
4588 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
4589 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
4590 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
4591 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
4592 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
4593 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4594 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4595 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4596 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4597 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
4598 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4599 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
4600 Ok(result) => result,
4602 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", &payment_hash);
4603 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4606 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
4607 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
4608 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
4609 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
4610 &payment_hash, cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
4611 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4614 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4615 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4616 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4618 check_total_value!(purpose);
4620 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
4621 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
4622 check_total_value!(purpose);
4626 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
4627 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4628 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", &payment_hash);
4629 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4631 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4632 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
4633 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", &payment_hash);
4634 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4635 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
4636 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
4637 &payment_hash, payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
4638 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4640 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4641 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
4642 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4644 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
4645 if payment_claimable_generated {
4646 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
4652 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4653 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
4661 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4662 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
4663 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4664 &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
4666 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
4667 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4669 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
4671 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
4672 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
4673 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
4675 self.check_free_holding_cells();
4677 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
4678 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4679 events.append(&mut new_events);
4682 /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
4684 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
4685 fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
4686 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
4688 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
4690 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
4691 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
4692 if background_events.is_empty() {
4693 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4696 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
4698 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, update)) => {
4699 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
4700 // monitor updating completing.
4701 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4703 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update } => {
4704 let mut updated_chan = false;
4706 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4707 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4708 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4709 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4710 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4711 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase) => {
4712 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase.get_mut() {
4713 updated_chan = true;
4714 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
4715 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4717 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't have an update for a non-funded channel");
4720 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {},
4725 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
4726 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4729 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
4730 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4731 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4732 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4733 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4734 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
4735 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4737 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
4738 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
4739 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4740 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4741 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
4747 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4750 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4751 /// Process background events, for functional testing
4752 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
4753 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
4754 let _ = self.process_background_events();
4757 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &ChannelId, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
4758 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
4759 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
4760 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4761 if new_feerate != chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4762 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4763 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4765 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4767 if !chan.context.is_live() {
4768 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
4769 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4770 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4772 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4773 &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4775 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
4776 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4780 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
4781 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
4782 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
4783 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
4784 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
4785 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4786 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4788 let normal_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4789 let min_mempool_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum);
4791 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4792 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4793 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4794 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4795 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
4796 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
4798 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4803 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4804 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4812 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
4814 /// This currently includes:
4815 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
4816 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
4817 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
4819 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
4820 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
4821 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
4822 /// * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
4823 /// * Forgetting about stale outbound payments, either those that have already been fulfilled
4824 /// or those awaiting an invoice that hasn't been delivered in the necessary amount of time.
4825 /// The latter is determined using the system clock in `std` and the block time minus two
4826 /// hours in `no-std`.
4828 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
4829 /// estimate fetches.
4831 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4832 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
4833 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
4834 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4835 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4837 let normal_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4838 let min_mempool_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum);
4840 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
4841 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
4842 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
4843 let mut shutdown_channels = Vec::new();
4845 let mut process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
4846 chan_id: &ChannelId,
4847 context: &mut ChannelContext<SP>,
4848 unfunded_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
4849 pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4850 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
4852 context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4853 if unfunded_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
4854 log_error!(self.logger,
4855 "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner", chan_id);
4856 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
4857 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4858 shutdown_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false));
4859 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4860 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4861 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4862 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
4863 channel_id: *chan_id,
4864 data: "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake".to_owned(),
4875 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4876 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4877 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4878 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4879 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
4880 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
4881 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, phase| {
4883 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
4884 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4889 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4890 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4892 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
4893 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
4894 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
4895 if needs_close { return false; }
4898 match chan.channel_update_status() {
4899 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
4900 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
4901 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
4902 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
4903 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
4904 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
4905 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
4907 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4908 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
4909 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4910 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4914 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4916 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
4919 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
4921 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4922 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
4923 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4924 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4928 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4930 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
4936 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4938 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
4939 log_debug!(self.logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
4940 counterparty_node_id, chan_id);
4941 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4942 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4943 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
4944 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
4945 channel_id: *chan_id,
4946 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
4954 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
4955 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
4956 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
4958 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
4959 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
4960 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
4965 for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
4966 if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
4967 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", &chan_id);
4968 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
4969 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4970 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4971 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4972 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_id.clone(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
4978 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.retain(|_, req| req.ticks_remaining > 0);
4980 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
4981 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
4986 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
4987 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
4988 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
4989 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
4990 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
4991 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
4992 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
4993 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
4994 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4995 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
4996 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
4997 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
4998 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
4999 // have no channels to the peer.
5000 let remove_entry = {
5001 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
5002 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
5005 entry.remove_entry();
5008 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
5013 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
5014 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
5015 // This should be unreachable
5016 debug_assert!(false);
5019 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
5020 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
5021 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
5022 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
5023 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
5024 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
5025 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
5028 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
5029 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
5030 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
5032 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
5033 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
5040 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
5041 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
5042 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
5043 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
5044 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5047 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5048 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5051 for shutdown_res in shutdown_channels {
5052 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
5055 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
5056 let duration_since_epoch = std::time::SystemTime::now()
5057 .duration_since(std::time::SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH)
5058 .expect("SystemTime::now() should come after SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH");
5059 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
5060 let duration_since_epoch = Duration::from_secs(
5061 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire).saturating_sub(7200) as u64
5064 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_payments(
5065 duration_since_epoch, &self.pending_events
5068 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
5069 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
5070 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
5071 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5072 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5079 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
5080 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
5081 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
5083 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
5084 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
5085 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
5086 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
5088 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
5089 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
5090 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
5091 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
5092 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
5093 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
5096 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
5097 /// reason for the failure.
5099 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
5100 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
5101 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5103 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
5104 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
5105 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5106 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
5107 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5108 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
5109 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5114 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
5115 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
5116 match failure_code {
5117 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5118 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5119 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
5120 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5121 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
5122 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
5124 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
5125 let fail_data = match data {
5126 Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
5129 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
5134 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5135 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5137 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
5139 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5140 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
5141 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
5142 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
5143 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
5144 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
5145 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
5147 chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
5149 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
5150 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
5152 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5157 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5158 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5159 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5160 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
5161 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
5162 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
5163 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
5164 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
5165 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
5166 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5168 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5169 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5170 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5171 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
5173 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
5174 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
5175 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
5176 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
5177 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5181 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
5182 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
5183 // be surfaced to the user.
5184 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
5185 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: ChannelId,
5186 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
5188 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
5189 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5190 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
5191 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5192 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5193 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
5194 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
5195 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get() {
5196 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan)
5198 // We shouldn't be trying to fail holding cell HTLCs on an unfunded channel.
5199 debug_assert!(false);
5200 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5203 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5205 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
5208 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
5209 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
5210 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
5211 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5215 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
5216 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
5217 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
5218 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
5219 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
5220 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
5221 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
5222 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5223 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5224 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5227 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
5228 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
5229 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
5232 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5233 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
5234 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5236 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
5237 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
5238 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
5239 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
5240 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5242 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint, .. }) => {
5243 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", &payment_hash, onion_error);
5244 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
5246 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
5247 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5248 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
5249 push_forward_ev = true;
5251 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
5252 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5253 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
5255 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5256 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
5259 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
5260 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5261 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5262 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
5263 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
5264 failed_next_destination: destination,
5270 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
5271 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
5273 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
5274 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
5275 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
5276 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
5278 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
5279 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
5280 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
5281 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
5283 /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
5284 /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
5285 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
5287 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5288 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
5289 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
5290 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
5291 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5292 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5293 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
5294 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5295 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
5298 /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
5299 /// even type numbers.
5303 /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
5304 /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
5306 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5307 pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5308 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
5311 fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
5312 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5314 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5317 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
5318 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
5319 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
5320 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
5321 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
5322 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
5323 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
5324 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
5329 let htlcs = payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect();
5330 let sender_intended_value = payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat);
5331 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
5332 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
5333 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id, htlcs, sender_intended_value
5335 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
5336 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
5337 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
5341 if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = payment.onion_fields {
5342 if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
5343 log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
5344 &payment_hash, log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
5345 claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5346 mem::drop(claimable_payments);
5347 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5348 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
5349 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5350 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5351 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5360 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
5362 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
5363 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
5364 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
5365 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
5366 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
5367 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
5368 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
5369 let mut valid_mpp = true;
5370 let mut errs = Vec::new();
5371 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5372 for htlc in sources.iter() {
5373 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
5374 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5375 debug_assert!(false);
5379 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
5381 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
5382 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5383 debug_assert!(false);
5387 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
5388 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
5390 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5391 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
5392 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5393 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
5396 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
5397 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5398 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
5399 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
5403 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5404 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
5405 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
5406 |_, definitely_duplicate| {
5407 debug_assert!(!definitely_duplicate, "We shouldn't claim duplicatively from a payment");
5408 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash })
5411 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
5412 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
5413 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
5414 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
5415 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
5420 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5421 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5422 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
5423 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5424 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
5425 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5426 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5428 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5431 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
5432 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
5433 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5434 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
5438 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>, bool) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
5439 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
5440 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
5441 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
5443 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
5444 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
5445 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
5446 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5448 // As we may call handle_monitor_update_completion_actions in rather rare cases, check that
5449 // the required mutexes are not held before we start.
5450 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5451 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5454 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5455 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
5456 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
5457 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
5461 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
5462 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5463 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
5466 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
5467 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
5468 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5469 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5470 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
5471 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5472 let fulfill_res = chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
5475 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } => {
5476 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat), false) {
5477 log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
5479 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
5482 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
5483 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5485 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
5486 // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
5487 // monitor update as a background event.
5488 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5489 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5490 counterparty_node_id,
5491 funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
5492 update: monitor_update.clone(),
5496 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => {
5497 let action = if let Some(action) = completion_action(None, true) {
5502 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5504 log_trace!(self.logger, "Completing monitor update completion action for channel {} as claim was redundant: {:?}",
5506 let (node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker) =
5507 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5508 downstream_counterparty_node_id: node_id,
5509 downstream_funding_outpoint: funding_outpoint,
5510 blocking_action: blocker,
5512 (node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)
5514 debug_assert!(false,
5515 "Duplicate claims should always free another channel immediately");
5518 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
5519 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5520 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state
5521 .actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
5522 .get_mut(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
5524 let mut found_blocker = false;
5525 blockers.retain(|iter| {
5526 // Note that we could actually be blocked, in
5527 // which case we need to only remove the one
5528 // blocker which was added duplicatively.
5529 let first_blocker = !found_blocker;
5530 if *iter == blocker { found_blocker = true; }
5531 *iter != blocker || !first_blocker
5533 debug_assert!(found_blocker);
5536 debug_assert!(false);
5545 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5546 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
5547 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5553 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
5554 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
5555 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
5556 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
5557 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
5558 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
5559 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
5560 // again on restart.
5561 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
5562 payment_preimage, update_res);
5565 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
5566 // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
5568 // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
5569 // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
5570 // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
5571 // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
5572 // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
5573 // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
5574 // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
5575 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5576 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
5577 prev_hop.outpoint, preimage_update,
5580 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
5581 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
5582 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
5583 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
5584 // `PaymentForwarded`).
5585 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None, false));
5589 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
5590 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
5593 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
5594 forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, startup_replay: bool,
5595 next_channel_counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>, next_channel_outpoint: OutPoint
5598 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
5599 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
5600 "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
5601 if let Some(pubkey) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5602 debug_assert_eq!(pubkey, path.hops[0].pubkey);
5604 let ev_completion_action = EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
5605 channel_funding_outpoint: next_channel_outpoint,
5606 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
5608 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage,
5609 session_priv, path, from_onchain, ev_completion_action, &self.pending_events,
5612 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
5613 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5614 let completed_blocker = RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&hop_data);
5615 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5616 let claiming_chan_funding_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5617 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
5618 |htlc_claim_value_msat, definitely_duplicate| {
5619 let chan_to_release =
5620 if let Some(node_id) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5621 Some((node_id, next_channel_outpoint, completed_blocker))
5623 // We can only get `None` here if we are processing a
5624 // `ChannelMonitor`-originated event, in which case we
5625 // don't care about ensuring we wake the downstream
5626 // channel's monitor updating - the channel is already
5631 if definitely_duplicate && startup_replay {
5632 // On startup we may get redundant claims which are related to
5633 // monitor updates still in flight. In that case, we shouldn't
5634 // immediately free, but instead let that monitor update complete
5635 // in the background.
5636 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
5637 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
5638 // There should be a `BackgroundEvent` pending...
5639 assert!(background_events.iter().any(|ev| {
5641 // to apply a monitor update that blocked the claiming channel,
5642 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5643 funding_txo, update, ..
5645 if *funding_txo == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint {
5646 assert!(update.updates.iter().any(|upd|
5647 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5648 payment_preimage: update_preimage
5650 payment_preimage == *update_preimage
5656 // or the channel we'd unblock is already closed,
5657 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup(
5658 (funding_txo, monitor_update)
5660 if *funding_txo == next_channel_outpoint {
5661 assert_eq!(monitor_update.updates.len(), 1);
5663 monitor_update.updates[0],
5664 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. }
5669 // or the monitor update has completed and will unblock
5670 // immediately once we get going.
5671 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
5674 *channel_id == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(),
5676 }), "{:?}", *background_events);
5679 } else if definitely_duplicate {
5680 if let Some(other_chan) = chan_to_release {
5681 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5682 downstream_counterparty_node_id: other_chan.0,
5683 downstream_funding_outpoint: other_chan.1,
5684 blocking_action: other_chan.2,
5688 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
5689 if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
5690 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
5693 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5694 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
5696 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
5697 prev_channel_id: Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5698 next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5699 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
5701 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: chan_to_release,
5705 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
5706 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5707 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
5713 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
5714 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
5715 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
5718 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
5719 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5720 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5721 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5723 for action in actions.into_iter() {
5725 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
5726 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5727 if let Some(ClaimingPayment {
5729 payment_purpose: purpose,
5732 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_total_msat,
5734 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
5738 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
5740 sender_intended_total_msat,
5744 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5745 event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
5747 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
5748 if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
5749 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, Some(blocker));
5752 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5753 downstream_counterparty_node_id, downstream_funding_outpoint, blocking_action,
5755 self.handle_monitor_update_release(
5756 downstream_counterparty_node_id,
5757 downstream_funding_outpoint,
5758 Some(blocking_action),
5765 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
5766 /// update completion.
5767 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5768 channel: &mut Channel<SP>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
5769 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
5770 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
5771 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
5772 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
5773 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
5774 &channel.context.channel_id(),
5775 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
5776 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
5777 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
5778 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
5779 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
5781 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
5783 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5784 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5785 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias()),
5786 channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
5789 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
5790 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
5792 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
5793 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5794 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5799 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
5800 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
5801 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5802 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5807 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
5808 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
5809 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
5810 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5811 msg: revoke_and_ack,
5816 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
5820 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
5826 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
5827 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
5828 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
5832 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5833 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
5834 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
5840 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
5841 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5843 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
5844 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5846 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5847 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5848 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5849 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5850 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5855 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5856 let mut peer_state_lock;
5857 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
5858 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
5859 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5860 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5862 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5865 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
5866 .remove(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
5867 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5868 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5869 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
5872 let remaining_in_flight =
5873 if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
5874 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
5877 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
5878 highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
5879 remaining_in_flight);
5880 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
5883 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
5886 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
5888 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
5889 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
5892 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5893 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5894 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5896 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
5897 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
5898 /// used to accept such channels.
5900 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5901 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5902 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5903 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
5906 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
5907 /// it as confirmed immediately.
5909 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5910 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5911 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5913 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
5914 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
5916 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
5917 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
5919 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
5920 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
5922 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5923 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5924 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5925 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
5928 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5929 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5931 let peers_without_funded_channels =
5932 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
5933 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5934 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5935 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
5936 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5937 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5938 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
5940 // Find (and remove) the channel in the unaccepted table. If it's not there, something weird is
5941 // happening and return an error. N.B. that we create channel with an outbound SCID of zero so
5942 // that we can delay allocating the SCID until after we're sure that the checks below will
5944 let mut channel = match peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
5945 Some(unaccepted_channel) => {
5946 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5947 InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
5948 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
5949 &unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
5950 &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|e| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.to_string() })
5952 _ => Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() })
5956 // This should have been correctly configured by the call to InboundV1Channel::new.
5957 debug_assert!(channel.context.minimum_depth().unwrap() == 0);
5958 } else if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
5959 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5960 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5961 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5962 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
5965 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5966 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
5968 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
5969 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
5970 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
5971 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
5972 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5973 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5974 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5975 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
5978 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5979 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
5983 // Now that we know we have a channel, assign an outbound SCID alias.
5984 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
5985 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
5987 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
5988 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5989 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
5992 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(temporary_channel_id.clone(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
5997 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
5998 /// or 0-conf channels.
6000 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
6001 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
6002 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
6003 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<SP>) -> bool {
6004 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
6005 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6007 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6008 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
6009 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6010 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
6011 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
6012 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
6013 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
6017 return peers_without_funded_channels;
6020 fn unfunded_channel_count(
6021 peer: &PeerState<SP>, best_block_height: u32
6023 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
6024 for (_, phase) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
6026 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6027 // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
6028 // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
6029 if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
6030 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
6032 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6035 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
6036 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
6037 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6040 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6041 // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
6046 num_unfunded_channels + peer.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
6049 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6050 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6051 // likely to be lost on restart!
6052 if msg.chain_hash != self.chain_hash {
6053 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6056 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
6057 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6060 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
6061 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
6062 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
6063 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
6064 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
6066 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6067 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6069 debug_assert!(false);
6070 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
6072 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6073 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6075 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6076 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
6077 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6078 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
6079 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
6080 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
6082 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6083 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
6084 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6087 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6088 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
6089 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6090 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
6091 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6094 let channel_id = msg.temporary_channel_id;
6095 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
6097 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6100 // If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
6101 if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
6102 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6103 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
6104 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
6105 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6106 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
6107 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
6108 channel_type: msg.channel_type.clone().unwrap(),
6110 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
6111 open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
6112 ticks_remaining: UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS,
6117 // Otherwise create the channel right now.
6118 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
6119 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
6120 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
6121 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6122 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
6123 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
6126 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
6131 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
6132 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
6133 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6135 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6136 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6139 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6140 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6142 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6143 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6144 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6146 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6150 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6151 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6152 // likely to be lost on restart!
6153 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
6154 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6155 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6157 debug_assert!(false);
6158 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6160 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6161 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6162 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6163 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut phase) => {
6164 match phase.get_mut() {
6165 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
6166 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), phase);
6167 (chan.context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.context.get_user_id())
6170 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected accept_channel message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id));
6174 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6177 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6178 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
6179 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6180 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6181 channel_value_satoshis: value,
6183 user_channel_id: user_id,
6188 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6189 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6191 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6192 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6194 debug_assert!(false);
6195 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6198 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6199 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6200 let (chan, funding_msg, monitor) =
6201 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6202 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan)) => {
6203 match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger) {
6205 Err((mut inbound_chan, err)) => {
6206 // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
6207 // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
6208 // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
6209 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &inbound_chan.context);
6210 let user_id = inbound_chan.context.get_user_id();
6211 let shutdown_res = inbound_chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
6212 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(format!("{}", err),
6213 msg.temporary_channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, inbound_chan.context.get_value_satoshis()));
6217 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(_)) | Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_)) => {
6218 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected funding_created message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id));
6220 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6223 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
6224 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6225 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
6227 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6228 let mut id_to_peer_lock = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6229 match id_to_peer_lock.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
6230 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6231 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6232 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
6233 funding_msg.channel_id))
6235 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
6236 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
6237 if let Ok(persist_state) = monitor_res {
6238 i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
6239 mem::drop(id_to_peer_lock);
6241 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
6242 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
6243 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
6244 // until we have persisted our monitor.
6245 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
6246 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6250 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) {
6251 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_state, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
6252 per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6254 unreachable!("This must be a funded channel as we just inserted it.");
6258 log_error!(self.logger, "Persisting initial ChannelMonitor failed, implying the funding outpoint was duplicated");
6259 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6260 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
6261 funding_msg.channel_id));
6269 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6270 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6271 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6272 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6274 debug_assert!(false);
6275 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6278 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6279 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6280 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6281 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6282 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6283 ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => {
6284 let monitor = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6285 chan.funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6286 if let Ok(persist_status) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
6287 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_status, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6290 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel funding outpoint was a duplicate".to_owned())), chan_phase_entry)
6294 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
6298 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
6302 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6303 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6304 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6305 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6306 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6308 debug_assert!(false);
6309 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6311 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6312 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6313 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6314 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6315 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6316 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
6317 self.chain_hash, &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6318 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
6319 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6320 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6321 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6322 msg: announcement_sigs,
6324 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
6325 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
6326 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
6327 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
6328 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
6329 // announcement_signatures.
6330 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6331 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
6332 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6333 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6340 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6341 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan);
6346 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6347 "Got a channel_ready message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry)
6350 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
6351 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6356 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6357 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
6358 let mut finish_shutdown = None;
6360 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6361 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6363 debug_assert!(false);
6364 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6366 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6367 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6368 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6369 let phase = chan_phase_entry.get_mut();
6371 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6372 if !chan.received_shutdown() {
6373 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
6375 if chan.sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
6378 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6379 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6380 chan.shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6381 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
6383 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
6384 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
6385 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
6386 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
6387 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6388 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6392 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
6393 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6394 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
6395 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6398 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6399 let context = phase.context_mut();
6400 log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
6401 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel);
6402 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
6403 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
6407 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6410 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
6411 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
6412 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
6413 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
6415 if let Some(shutdown_res) = finish_shutdown {
6416 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
6422 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6423 let mut shutdown_result = None;
6424 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid;
6425 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6426 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6428 debug_assert!(false);
6429 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6431 let (tx, chan_option) = {
6432 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6433 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6434 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6435 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6436 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6437 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
6438 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6439 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
6440 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
6441 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6446 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
6447 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
6448 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
6449 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
6450 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
6451 (tx, Some(remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry)))
6452 } else { (tx, None) }
6454 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6455 "Got a closing_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6458 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6461 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
6462 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
6463 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
6465 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = chan_option {
6466 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6467 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6468 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6469 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6473 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
6474 shutdown_result = Some((None, Vec::new(), unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid));
6476 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6477 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
6478 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
6483 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6484 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
6485 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
6486 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
6488 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
6489 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
6490 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
6491 //but we should prevent it anyway.
6493 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6494 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6496 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
6497 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6498 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6500 debug_assert!(false);
6501 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6503 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6504 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6505 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6506 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6507 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6508 let pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
6509 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
6510 self.construct_pending_htlc_status(msg, shared_secret, next_hop,
6511 chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt),
6512 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
6514 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<SP>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
6515 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
6516 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
6517 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
6518 match pending_forward_info {
6519 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
6520 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
6521 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
6522 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
6524 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
6525 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
6526 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6527 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6528 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
6531 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
6533 _ => pending_forward_info
6536 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6538 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6539 "Got an update_add_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6542 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6547 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6549 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
6550 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6551 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6553 debug_assert!(false);
6554 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6556 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6557 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6558 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6559 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6560 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6561 let res = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6562 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop) = &res.0 {
6563 log_trace!(self.logger,
6564 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
6566 peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates.entry(msg.channel_id)
6567 .or_insert_with(Vec::new)
6568 .push(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&prev_hop));
6570 // Note that we do not need to push an `actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates`
6571 // entry here, even though we *do* need to block the next RAA monitor update.
6572 // We do this instead in the `claim_funds_internal` by attaching a
6573 // `ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate` action to the event generated when the
6574 // outbound HTLC is claimed. This is guaranteed to all complete before we
6575 // process the RAA as messages are processed from single peers serially.
6576 funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().expect("We won't accept a fulfill until funded");
6579 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6580 "Got an update_fulfill_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6583 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6586 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, false, Some(*counterparty_node_id), funding_txo);
6590 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6591 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6592 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6593 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6594 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6596 debug_assert!(false);
6597 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6599 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6600 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6601 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6602 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6603 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6604 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan_phase_entry);
6606 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6607 "Got an update_fail_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6610 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6615 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6616 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6617 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6618 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6619 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6621 debug_assert!(false);
6622 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6624 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6625 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6626 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6627 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6628 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
6629 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
6630 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan_phase_entry);
6632 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6633 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan_phase_entry);
6635 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6636 "Got an update_fail_malformed_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6640 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6644 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6645 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6646 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6648 debug_assert!(false);
6649 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6651 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6652 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6653 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6654 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6655 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6656 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6657 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6658 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6659 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
6660 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6664 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6665 "Got a commitment_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6668 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6673 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
6674 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
6675 let mut push_forward_event = false;
6676 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
6677 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
6678 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
6679 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
6680 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
6681 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6682 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
6683 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
6685 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
6686 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
6688 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6689 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
6690 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
6691 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6692 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6693 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
6695 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6696 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
6697 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.chain_hash)
6699 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
6700 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6701 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
6702 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6703 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
6704 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
6705 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
6706 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
6707 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
6710 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6711 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
6713 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6714 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
6715 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6716 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
6717 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
6718 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
6719 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
6720 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6721 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6724 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
6725 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
6726 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
6731 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
6732 // payments are being processed.
6733 if forward_htlcs_empty {
6734 push_forward_event = true;
6736 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6737 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
6744 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
6745 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
6748 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
6749 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6750 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
6752 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
6756 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
6757 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6758 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6759 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
6760 if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
6762 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
6763 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
6764 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
6765 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
6766 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
6767 // real by taking more time.
6768 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
6769 pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6770 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
6775 /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
6776 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
6777 /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
6778 /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
6779 fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6780 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
6781 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
6783 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6784 .get(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
6785 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
6786 action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6787 channel_funding_outpoint,
6788 counterparty_node_id,
6793 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6794 pub(crate) fn test_raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6795 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_id: ChannelId
6797 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6798 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6799 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6800 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
6802 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id) {
6803 return self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
6804 chan.context().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), counterparty_node_id);
6810 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6811 let htlcs_to_fail = {
6812 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6813 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6815 debug_assert!(false);
6816 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6817 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
6818 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6819 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6820 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6821 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6822 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6823 let mon_update_blocked = if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_opt {
6824 self.raa_monitor_updates_held(
6825 &peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates, funding_txo,
6826 *counterparty_node_id)
6828 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6829 chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger, mon_update_blocked), chan_phase_entry);
6830 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6831 let funding_txo = funding_txo_opt
6832 .expect("Funding outpoint must have been set for RAA handling to succeed");
6833 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update,
6834 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6838 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6839 "Got a revoke_and_ack message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6842 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6845 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
6849 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6850 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6851 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6853 debug_assert!(false);
6854 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6856 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6857 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6858 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6859 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6860 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6861 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6863 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6864 "Got an update_fee message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6867 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6872 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6873 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6874 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6876 debug_assert!(false);
6877 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6879 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6880 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6881 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6882 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6883 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6884 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
6885 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
6888 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6889 msg: try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.announcement_signatures(
6890 &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
6891 msg, &self.default_configuration
6892 ), chan_phase_entry),
6893 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6894 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6895 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan).unwrap()),
6898 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6899 "Got an announcement_signatures message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6902 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6907 /// Returns DoPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersistNoEvents or an Err.
6908 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6909 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
6910 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
6912 // It's not a local channel
6913 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6916 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6917 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
6918 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
6919 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6921 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6922 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6923 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
6924 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6925 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6926 if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6927 if chan.context.should_announce() {
6928 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
6929 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
6930 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
6931 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
6933 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
6935 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
6936 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
6937 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
6938 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
6940 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update {:?} for channel {}.", msg, chan_id);
6941 let did_change = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_update(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6942 // If nothing changed after applying their update, we don't need to bother
6945 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
6949 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6950 "Got a channel_update for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6953 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6955 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
6958 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6960 let need_lnd_workaround = {
6961 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6963 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6965 debug_assert!(false);
6966 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6967 format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
6971 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6972 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6973 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6974 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6975 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6976 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
6977 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
6978 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
6979 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
6980 let responses = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_reestablish(
6981 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash,
6982 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan_phase_entry);
6983 let mut channel_update = None;
6984 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
6985 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6986 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6989 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
6990 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
6991 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
6992 // they have the latest channel parameters.
6993 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
6994 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6995 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7000 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
7001 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
7002 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
7003 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
7004 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
7005 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
7009 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7010 "Got a channel_reestablish message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7013 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
7014 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending bogus ChannelReestablish for unknown channel {} to force channel closure",
7015 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id.0));
7016 // Unfortunately, lnd doesn't force close on errors
7017 // (https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/blob/abb1e3463f3a83bbb843d5c399869dbe930ad94f/htlcswitch/link.go#L2119).
7018 // One of the few ways to get an lnd counterparty to force close is by
7019 // replicating what they do when restoring static channel backups (SCBs). They
7020 // send an invalid `ChannelReestablish` with `0` commitment numbers and an
7021 // invalid `your_last_per_commitment_secret`.
7023 // Since we received a `ChannelReestablish` for a channel that doesn't exist, we
7024 // can assume it's likely the channel closed from our point of view, but it
7025 // remains open on the counterparty's side. By sending this bogus
7026 // `ChannelReestablish` message now as a response to theirs, we trigger them to
7027 // force close broadcasting their latest state. If the closing transaction from
7028 // our point of view remains unconfirmed, it'll enter a race with the
7029 // counterparty's to-be-broadcast latest commitment transaction.
7030 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
7031 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7032 msg: msgs::ChannelReestablish {
7033 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7034 next_local_commitment_number: 0,
7035 next_remote_commitment_number: 0,
7036 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [1u8; 32],
7037 my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_slice(&[2u8; 33]).unwrap(),
7038 next_funding_txid: None,
7041 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7042 format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}",
7043 counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7049 let mut persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
7050 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
7051 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
7052 persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7055 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
7056 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
7061 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
7062 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
7063 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
7065 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7066 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
7067 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
7068 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
7069 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
7070 match monitor_event {
7071 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
7072 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
7073 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", preimage);
7074 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, false, counterparty_node_id, funding_outpoint);
7076 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash);
7077 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
7078 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7079 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7082 MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(funding_outpoint) => {
7083 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
7084 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
7086 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
7087 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
7088 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7089 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
7092 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
7093 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7094 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7095 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7096 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7097 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7098 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
7099 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
7100 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
7101 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7102 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7106 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
7107 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7108 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7109 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
7110 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
7118 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
7119 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
7125 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7126 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7129 has_pending_monitor_events
7132 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
7133 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
7134 /// update events as a separate process method here.
7136 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
7137 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7138 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
7141 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
7142 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
7143 /// update was applied.
7144 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
7145 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
7146 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7148 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
7149 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
7150 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
7151 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
7153 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7154 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7156 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7157 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7158 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
7159 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
7161 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
7162 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7163 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
7164 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
7165 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
7166 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
7168 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
7169 has_monitor_update = true;
7171 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
7172 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7173 continue 'peer_loop;
7182 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty();
7183 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7184 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
7190 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
7191 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
7192 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
7193 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
7194 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
7195 let mut has_update = false;
7196 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
7198 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7200 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7201 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7202 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7203 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7204 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, phase| {
7206 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7207 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
7208 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
7209 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
7210 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
7212 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
7213 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
7216 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
7217 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
7218 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
7219 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7220 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7225 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
7227 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
7228 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
7229 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7230 shutdown_results.push((None, Vec::new(), unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid));
7236 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
7237 handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
7242 _ => true, // Retain unfunded channels if present.
7248 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
7249 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
7252 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
7253 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
7259 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
7260 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
7262 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
7263 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7264 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
7265 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
7266 // reorganized out of the main chain.
7267 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
7268 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
7269 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
7270 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
7271 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
7272 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
7273 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
7274 assert!(should_broadcast);
7275 } else { unreachable!(); }
7276 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
7277 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
7278 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
7281 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7285 /// Creates an [`OfferBuilder`] such that the [`Offer`] it builds is recognized by the
7286 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`InvoiceRequest`] messages for the offer. The offer will
7287 /// not have an expiration unless otherwise set on the builder.
7289 /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the offer with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the
7290 /// introduction node and a derived signing pubkey for recipient privacy. As such, currently,
7291 /// the node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction
7292 /// node in order to send the [`InvoiceRequest`].
7294 /// [`Offer`]: crate::offers::offer::Offer
7295 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
7296 pub fn create_offer_builder(
7297 &self, description: String
7298 ) -> OfferBuilder<DerivedMetadata, secp256k1::All> {
7299 let node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7300 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7301 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7302 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7303 let path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7305 OfferBuilder::deriving_signing_pubkey(description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx)
7306 .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)
7310 /// Creates a [`RefundBuilder`] such that the [`Refund`] it builds is recognized by the
7311 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`Bolt12Invoice`] messages for the refund. The builder will
7312 /// have the provided expiration set. Any changes to the expiration on the returned builder will
7313 /// not be honored by [`ChannelManager`].
7315 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the refund.
7317 /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the refund with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as
7318 /// the introduction node and a derived payer id for sender privacy. As such, currently, the
7319 /// node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node
7320 /// in order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
7322 /// [`Refund`]: crate::offers::refund::Refund
7323 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7324 pub fn create_refund_builder(
7325 &self, description: String, amount_msats: u64, absolute_expiry: Duration,
7326 payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
7327 ) -> Result<RefundBuilder<secp256k1::All>, Bolt12SemanticError> {
7328 let node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7329 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7330 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7331 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7332 let path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7334 let builder = RefundBuilder::deriving_payer_id(
7335 description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, amount_msats, payment_id
7337 .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)
7338 .absolute_expiry(absolute_expiry)
7341 self.pending_outbound_payments
7342 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
7343 payment_id, absolute_expiry, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat,
7345 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
7350 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
7353 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
7354 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
7356 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
7357 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
7358 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
7359 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
7361 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
7363 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
7364 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
7368 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
7369 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
7371 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
7373 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
7374 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
7376 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
7377 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
7378 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
7379 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
7380 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
7381 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
7382 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
7383 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
7384 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
7385 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
7386 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
7389 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
7390 /// stored external to LDK.
7392 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
7393 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
7394 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
7396 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
7397 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
7400 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
7401 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
7402 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
7403 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
7405 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
7406 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
7407 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
7408 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
7409 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
7411 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
7412 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
7413 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
7414 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
7415 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
7417 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
7418 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
7420 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
7421 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
7425 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
7426 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
7428 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
7430 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
7431 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
7433 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
7434 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
7435 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
7436 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
7437 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
7438 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
7439 min_final_cltv_expiry)
7442 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
7443 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
7445 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
7446 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
7447 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
7450 /// Creates a one-hop blinded path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction
7452 fn create_one_hop_blinded_path(&self) -> BlindedPath {
7453 let entropy_source = self.entropy_source.deref();
7454 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7455 BlindedPath::one_hop_for_message(self.get_our_node_id(), entropy_source, secp_ctx).unwrap()
7458 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
7459 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
7461 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
7462 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
7463 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7464 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
7466 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
7467 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
7468 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
7469 Some(_) => continue,
7470 None => return scid_candidate
7475 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
7477 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
7478 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
7480 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
7481 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
7482 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
7486 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
7487 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
7488 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
7490 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
7491 /// times to get a unique scid.
7492 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
7493 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7494 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
7496 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
7497 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
7498 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
7499 return scid_candidate
7503 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
7504 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
7505 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
7506 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
7508 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7509 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7510 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7511 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7512 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(
7513 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
7515 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7516 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
7517 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
7526 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7527 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
7528 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
7529 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
7530 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
7534 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
7535 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
7536 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7537 events.push_back((event, None));
7541 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
7542 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7543 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
7547 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
7548 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
7552 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
7553 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
7556 /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
7557 /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
7558 /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
7559 /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
7560 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
7562 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7563 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7564 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
7565 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
7567 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
7568 // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
7569 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
7570 .get_mut(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
7572 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
7576 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
7577 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id) {
7578 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
7579 // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
7580 // update(s) when those blockers complete.
7581 log_trace!(self.logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
7582 &channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7586 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
7587 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7588 debug_assert_eq!(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
7589 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
7590 log_debug!(self.logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
7591 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7592 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
7593 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7594 if further_update_exists {
7595 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
7600 log_trace!(self.logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
7601 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7606 log_debug!(self.logger,
7607 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
7608 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7614 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
7615 for action in actions {
7617 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
7618 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
7620 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, None);
7626 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
7627 /// using the given event handler.
7629 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
7630 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
7634 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
7638 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7640 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7641 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7642 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7643 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7644 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7645 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7649 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
7650 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
7651 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
7652 /// is always placed next to each other.
7654 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
7655 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
7656 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
7657 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
7659 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
7660 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
7661 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
7662 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
7663 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
7664 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7665 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
7667 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
7668 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
7669 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
7670 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7673 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
7674 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7676 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
7677 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7680 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
7681 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7682 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7683 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7684 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7685 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
7686 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7690 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
7691 events.replace(pending_events);
7700 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7702 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7703 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7704 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7705 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7706 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7707 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7711 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
7713 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
7714 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
7715 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
7717 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
7721 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7723 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7724 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7725 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7726 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7727 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7728 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7732 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
7734 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7735 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
7736 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
7737 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
7738 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
7741 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
7742 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
7745 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
7746 let _persistence_guard =
7747 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
7748 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
7749 let new_height = height - 1;
7751 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
7752 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
7753 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
7754 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
7755 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
7756 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
7759 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
7763 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7765 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7766 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7767 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7768 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7769 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7770 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7774 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
7775 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
7776 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
7777 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
7779 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
7780 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
7782 let _persistence_guard =
7783 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
7784 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
7785 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
7786 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
7788 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7789 if height < last_best_block_height {
7790 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
7791 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
7795 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
7796 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
7797 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
7798 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
7800 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
7801 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
7803 let _persistence_guard =
7804 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
7805 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
7806 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
7808 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
7810 macro_rules! max_time {
7811 ($timestamp: expr) => {
7813 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
7814 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
7815 // having an explicit local time source.
7816 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
7817 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
7818 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
7819 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
7820 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
7826 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
7827 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7828 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
7829 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
7833 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
7834 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
7835 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
7836 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7837 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7838 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(|phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }) {
7839 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.context.get_funding_txo(), chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
7840 res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
7847 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
7848 let _persistence_guard =
7849 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
7850 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
7851 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
7852 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
7853 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
7854 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
7855 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
7856 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
7861 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7863 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7864 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7865 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7866 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7867 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7868 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7872 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
7873 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
7875 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
7876 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
7877 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
7878 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
7879 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
7881 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7882 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
7884 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7885 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7886 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7887 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7888 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7889 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
7891 // Retain unfunded channels.
7892 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => true,
7893 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
7894 let res = f(channel);
7895 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
7896 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
7897 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
7898 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
7899 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
7901 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
7902 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
7903 if channel.context.is_usable() {
7904 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
7905 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
7906 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
7907 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7912 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", channel.context.channel_id());
7917 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7918 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
7921 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
7922 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
7923 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
7924 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7925 msg: announcement_sigs,
7927 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
7928 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
7929 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
7931 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
7932 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
7933 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
7938 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
7939 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
7940 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
7941 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
7942 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
7943 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
7944 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
7945 // is always consistent.
7946 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
7947 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
7948 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
7949 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
7950 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
7953 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
7954 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
7955 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
7956 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
7957 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true));
7958 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
7959 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7963 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
7964 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, reason);
7965 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7966 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7967 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
7968 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage {
7969 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
7970 data: reason_message,
7983 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
7984 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
7985 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
7986 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
7987 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
7988 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
7989 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
7990 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
7991 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
7992 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
7994 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
7995 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
7996 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
8000 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
8003 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8004 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
8005 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8006 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
8007 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
8008 user_channel_id: Some(htlc.prev_user_channel_id),
8009 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
8010 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
8011 phantom_shared_secret: None,
8012 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
8015 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
8016 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
8017 _ => unreachable!(),
8019 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
8020 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
8021 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
8022 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
8028 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
8030 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
8031 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
8035 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] may need to be persisted or
8036 /// may have events that need processing.
8038 /// In order to check if this [`ChannelManager`] needs persisting, call
8039 /// [`Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence`].
8041 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
8042 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
8043 pub fn get_event_or_persistence_needed_future(&self) -> Future {
8044 self.event_persist_notifier.get_future()
8047 /// Returns true if this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
8048 pub fn get_and_clear_needs_persistence(&self) -> bool {
8049 self.needs_persist_flag.swap(false, Ordering::AcqRel)
8052 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
8053 pub fn get_event_or_persist_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
8054 self.event_persist_notifier.notify_pending()
8057 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
8058 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
8059 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
8060 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
8063 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
8064 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8065 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
8066 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
8069 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
8070 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8072 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
8073 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
8074 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
8075 pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
8076 provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
8079 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
8080 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8081 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
8082 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
8085 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
8086 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8087 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
8088 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
8091 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
8092 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8093 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
8094 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
8098 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8099 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8101 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8102 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8103 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8104 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8105 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8106 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8110 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
8111 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8112 // open_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
8113 // change to the contents.
8114 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8115 let res = self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8116 let persist = match &res {
8117 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => {
8118 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't close a new channel");
8119 NotifyOption::DoPersist
8121 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8123 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8128 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
8129 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8130 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8131 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8134 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
8135 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8136 // accept_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
8137 // change to the contents.
8138 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8139 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8140 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents
8144 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
8145 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8146 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8147 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8150 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
8151 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8152 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8155 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
8156 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8157 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8160 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
8161 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8162 // channel_ready message - while the channel's state will change, any channel_ready message
8163 // will ultimately be re-sent on startup and the `ChannelMonitor` won't be updated so we
8164 // will not force-close the channel on startup.
8165 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8166 let res = self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8167 let persist = match &res {
8168 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8169 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8171 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8176 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
8177 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8178 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8181 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
8182 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8183 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8186 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
8187 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8188 // update_add_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8189 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8190 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8191 let res = self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8192 let persist = match &res {
8193 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8194 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8195 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8197 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8202 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
8203 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8204 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8207 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
8208 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8209 // update_fail_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8210 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8211 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8212 let res = self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8213 let persist = match &res {
8214 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8215 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8216 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8218 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8223 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
8224 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8225 // update_fail_malformed_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state
8226 // only the `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8227 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8228 let res = self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8229 let persist = match &res {
8230 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8231 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8232 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8234 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8239 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
8240 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8241 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8244 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
8245 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8246 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8249 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
8250 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8251 // update_fee message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8252 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8253 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8254 let res = self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8255 let persist = match &res {
8256 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8257 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8258 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8260 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8265 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
8266 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8267 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8270 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
8271 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8272 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
8275 NotifyOption::DoPersist
8280 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
8281 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8282 let res = self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8283 let persist = match &res {
8284 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8285 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8286 Ok(persist) => *persist,
8288 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8293 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
8294 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
8295 self, || NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents);
8296 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8297 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8299 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
8300 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8301 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
8302 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8303 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8304 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8305 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
8306 let context = match phase {
8307 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
8308 if chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger).is_ok() {
8309 // We only retain funded channels that are not shutdown.
8314 // Unfunded channels will always be removed.
8315 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
8318 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
8322 // Clean up for removal.
8323 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
8324 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
8325 failed_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false));
8328 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
8329 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
8330 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
8331 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
8333 // V1 Channel Establishment
8334 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
8335 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
8336 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
8337 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
8338 // V2 Channel Establishment
8339 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
8340 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
8341 // Common Channel Establishment
8342 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
8343 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
8344 // Interactive Transaction Construction
8345 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
8346 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
8347 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
8348 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
8349 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
8350 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
8351 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
8352 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
8353 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
8354 // Channel Operations
8355 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
8356 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
8357 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
8358 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
8359 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
8360 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
8362 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
8363 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
8364 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
8365 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
8366 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
8367 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
8368 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
8369 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
8370 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
8373 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
8374 peer_state.is_connected = false;
8375 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
8376 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
8379 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
8381 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
8383 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
8384 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
8388 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
8389 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
8390 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8394 let mut res = Ok(());
8396 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8397 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
8398 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
8399 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
8400 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
8401 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
8402 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
8405 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8406 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
8407 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
8408 if inbound_peer_limited {
8410 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8412 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
8413 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8414 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8415 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
8416 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
8417 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8418 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
8419 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8423 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
8424 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
8425 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
8427 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
8428 if inbound_peer_limited &&
8429 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
8430 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
8433 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8436 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
8437 peer_state.is_connected = true;
8442 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8444 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8445 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
8446 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8447 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8448 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8450 peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(|(_, phase)|
8451 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else {
8452 // Since unfunded channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer, and they're not persisted
8453 // (so won't be recovered after a crash), they shouldn't exist here and we would never need to
8454 // worry about closing and removing them.
8455 debug_assert!(false);
8459 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
8460 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8461 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
8466 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
8467 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
8472 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
8473 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8475 match &msg.data as &str {
8476 "cannot co-op close channel w/ active htlcs"|
8477 "link failed to shutdown" =>
8479 // LND hasn't properly handled shutdown messages ever, and force-closes any time we
8480 // send one while HTLCs are still present. The issue is tracked at
8481 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/6039 and has had multiple patches
8482 // to fix it but none so far have managed to land upstream. The issue appears to be
8483 // very low priority for the LND team despite being marked "P1".
8484 // We're not going to bother handling this in a sensible way, instead simply
8485 // repeating the Shutdown message on repeat until morale improves.
8486 if !msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
8487 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8488 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
8489 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
8490 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8491 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&msg.channel_id) {
8492 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_outbound_shutdown() {
8493 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
8494 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8498 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
8499 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8500 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
8501 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
8502 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
8503 data: "You appear to be exhibiting LND bug 6039, we'll keep sending you shutdown messages until you handle them correctly".to_owned()
8505 log_level: Level::Trace,
8515 if msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
8516 let channel_ids: Vec<ChannelId> = {
8517 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8518 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
8519 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
8520 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8521 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8522 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
8523 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
8524 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
8525 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
8527 for channel_id in channel_ids {
8528 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
8529 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
8533 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
8534 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8535 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
8536 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
8537 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8538 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8539 if let Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
8540 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
8541 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
8542 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8550 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
8551 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
8555 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
8556 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
8559 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
8560 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
8563 fn get_chain_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
8564 Some(vec![self.chain_hash])
8567 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
8568 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8569 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8570 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8573 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
8574 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8575 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8576 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8579 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
8580 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8581 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8582 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8585 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
8586 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8587 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8588 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8591 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
8592 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8593 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8594 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8597 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
8598 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8599 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8600 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8603 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
8604 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8605 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8606 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8609 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
8610 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8611 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8612 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8615 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
8616 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8617 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8618 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8622 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
8623 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8624 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
8625 let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
8626 node_features.set_keysend_optional();
8630 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
8631 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8633 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
8634 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
8635 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
8636 pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
8637 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
8640 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
8641 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8642 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
8643 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
8646 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
8647 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8648 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
8649 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
8652 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
8653 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8654 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
8655 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
8656 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
8657 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
8658 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
8659 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
8660 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
8661 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
8662 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
8663 features.set_payment_secret_required();
8664 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
8665 features.set_wumbo_optional();
8666 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
8667 features.set_channel_type_optional();
8668 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
8669 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
8670 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
8671 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
8676 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
8677 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
8679 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
8680 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
8681 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
8682 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
8685 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
8686 (2, node_id, required),
8687 (4, features, required),
8688 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
8689 (8, forwarding_info, option),
8690 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
8691 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
8694 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
8695 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8696 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
8697 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
8698 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
8699 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
8700 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8701 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
8702 (2, self.channel_id, required),
8703 (3, self.channel_type, option),
8704 (4, self.counterparty, required),
8705 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
8706 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
8707 (7, self.config, option),
8708 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
8709 (9, self.confirmations, option),
8710 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
8711 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
8712 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
8713 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
8714 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
8715 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
8716 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
8717 (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
8718 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
8719 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
8720 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
8721 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
8722 (30, self.is_usable, required),
8723 (32, self.is_public, required),
8724 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
8725 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
8726 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
8727 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
8728 (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
8734 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
8735 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8736 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8737 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
8738 (2, channel_id, required),
8739 (3, channel_type, option),
8740 (4, counterparty, required),
8741 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
8742 (6, funding_txo, option),
8743 (7, config, option),
8744 (8, short_channel_id, option),
8745 (9, confirmations, option),
8746 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
8747 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
8748 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
8749 (16, balance_msat, required),
8750 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
8751 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
8752 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
8753 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
8754 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
8755 (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
8756 (22, confirmations_required, option),
8757 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
8758 (26, is_outbound, required),
8759 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
8760 (30, is_usable, required),
8761 (32, is_public, required),
8762 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
8763 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
8764 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
8765 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
8766 (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
8769 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
8770 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
8771 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
8772 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
8773 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
8777 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
8779 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
8780 outbound_scid_alias,
8784 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
8785 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
8787 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
8788 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
8789 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
8790 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
8791 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
8792 confirmations_required,
8794 force_close_spend_delay,
8795 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
8796 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
8797 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
8798 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
8799 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
8800 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
8801 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
8802 channel_shutdown_state,
8807 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
8808 (2, channels, required_vec),
8809 (4, phantom_scid, required),
8810 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
8813 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
8815 (0, onion_packet, required),
8816 (2, short_channel_id, required),
8819 (0, payment_data, required),
8820 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
8821 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
8822 (3, payment_metadata, option),
8823 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
8825 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
8826 (0, payment_preimage, required),
8827 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
8828 (3, payment_metadata, option),
8829 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
8830 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
8834 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
8835 (0, routing, required),
8836 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
8837 (4, payment_hash, required),
8838 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
8839 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
8840 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
8841 (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
8845 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
8846 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8848 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
8850 channel_id.write(writer)?;
8851 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8852 reason.write(writer)?;
8854 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
8855 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
8858 channel_id.write(writer)?;
8859 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8860 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
8861 failure_code.write(writer)?;
8868 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
8869 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8870 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8873 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
8874 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8875 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8876 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
8880 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
8881 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8882 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8883 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
8884 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
8887 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
8888 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
8889 // messages contained in the variants.
8890 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
8891 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
8892 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
8894 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
8895 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
8896 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
8897 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
8898 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
8901 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
8902 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
8903 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
8904 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
8905 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
8907 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
8912 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
8917 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
8918 (0, short_channel_id, required),
8919 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
8920 (2, outpoint, required),
8921 (4, htlc_id, required),
8922 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required),
8923 (7, user_channel_id, option),
8926 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
8927 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8928 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
8929 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
8930 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
8932 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8933 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
8934 (1, self.total_msat, required),
8935 (2, self.value, required),
8936 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
8937 (4, payment_data, option),
8938 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
8939 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
8940 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
8941 (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
8947 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
8948 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8949 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8950 (0, prev_hop, required),
8951 (1, total_msat, option),
8952 (2, value_ser, required),
8953 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
8954 (4, payment_data_opt, option),
8955 (5, total_value_received, option),
8956 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
8957 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
8958 (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
8960 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
8961 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
8962 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
8964 if payment_data.is_some() {
8965 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8967 if total_msat.is_none() {
8968 total_msat = Some(value);
8970 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
8973 if total_msat.is_none() {
8974 if payment_data.is_none() {
8975 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8977 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
8979 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
8983 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
8986 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
8987 total_value_received,
8988 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
8990 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
8991 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
8996 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
8997 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8998 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9001 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
9002 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
9003 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
9004 let mut payment_id = None;
9005 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
9006 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
9007 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9008 (0, session_priv, required),
9009 (1, payment_id, option),
9010 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
9011 (4, path_hops, required_vec),
9012 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
9013 (6, blinded_tail, option),
9015 if payment_id.is_none() {
9016 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
9018 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
9020 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
9021 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
9022 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9024 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
9025 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
9026 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
9027 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9031 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
9032 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
9033 first_hop_htlc_msat,
9035 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
9038 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
9039 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
9044 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
9045 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
9047 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
9049 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
9050 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9051 (0, session_priv, required),
9052 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
9053 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
9054 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
9055 (4, path.hops, required_vec),
9056 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
9057 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
9060 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
9062 field.write(writer)?;
9069 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
9070 (0, forward_info, required),
9071 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
9072 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
9073 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
9074 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
9077 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
9079 (0, htlc_id, required),
9080 (2, err_packet, required),
9085 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
9086 (0, payment_secret, required),
9087 (2, expiry_time, required),
9088 (4, user_payment_id, required),
9089 (6, payment_preimage, required),
9090 (8, min_value_msat, required),
9093 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9095 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
9096 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9097 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9098 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9099 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9100 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9104 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9105 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
9107 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
9109 self.chain_hash.write(writer)?;
9111 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
9112 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
9113 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
9116 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
9118 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9119 let mut number_of_funded_channels = 0;
9120 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9121 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9122 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9123 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
9124 serializable_peer_count += 1;
9127 number_of_funded_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(
9128 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { chan.context.is_funding_broadcast() } else { false }
9132 (number_of_funded_channels as u64).write(writer)?;
9134 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9135 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9136 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9137 for channel in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter_map(
9138 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = phase {
9139 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() { Some(channel) } else { None }
9142 channel.write(writer)?;
9148 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
9149 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9150 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
9151 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
9152 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9153 for forward in pending_forwards {
9154 forward.write(writer)?;
9159 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
9161 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
9162 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
9163 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
9165 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
9166 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
9167 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9168 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
9169 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
9170 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9171 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
9172 htlc.write(writer)?;
9174 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
9175 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
9178 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
9179 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
9180 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9181 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
9182 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
9183 // per_peer_state lock at all.
9184 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
9187 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
9188 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
9189 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
9190 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
9191 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
9193 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
9194 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
9195 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
9196 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
9197 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
9198 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
9199 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
9204 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
9205 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
9206 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
9207 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
9208 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
9209 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
9210 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
9211 // well save the space and not write any events here.
9212 0u64.write(writer)?;
9214 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9215 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
9216 event.write(writer)?;
9220 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
9221 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
9222 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
9223 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
9224 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
9225 0u64.write(writer)?;
9227 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
9228 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
9229 // likely to be identical.
9230 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
9231 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
9233 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9234 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
9235 hash.write(writer)?;
9236 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
9239 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
9240 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
9241 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
9242 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
9243 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
9246 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
9247 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
9249 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
9250 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
9251 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
9252 session_priv.write(writer)?;
9255 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {},
9256 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {},
9257 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
9258 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
9262 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
9263 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
9264 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
9266 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
9267 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
9268 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
9274 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
9275 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
9276 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
9277 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
9280 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
9281 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
9282 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
9283 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
9284 pending_claiming_payments = None;
9287 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
9288 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
9289 for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
9290 if !updates.is_empty() {
9291 if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(HashMap::new()); }
9292 in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
9297 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9298 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
9299 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
9300 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
9301 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
9302 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
9303 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
9304 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
9305 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
9306 (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
9307 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
9308 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
9309 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
9316 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
9317 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9318 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
9319 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
9322 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
9323 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
9324 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
9325 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
9326 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
9327 // check that the event is sane here.
9328 let event_encoded = event.encode();
9329 let event_read: Option<Event> =
9330 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
9331 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
9337 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
9338 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9339 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9340 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
9341 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
9342 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
9345 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
9346 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
9347 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
9348 events.push_back((ev, action));
9349 } else if action.is_some() {
9350 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9357 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
9358 (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
9359 (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
9360 (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
9361 (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
9362 (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
9365 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
9367 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
9369 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
9370 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
9371 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
9372 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
9373 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
9374 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
9375 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
9376 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
9377 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
9378 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
9379 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
9380 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
9381 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
9383 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
9384 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
9386 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
9387 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
9389 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
9390 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
9391 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
9392 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
9393 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
9394 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
9396 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
9397 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9399 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
9400 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9401 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9402 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9403 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9404 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9408 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
9409 pub entropy_source: ES,
9411 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
9412 pub node_signer: NS,
9414 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
9415 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
9417 pub signer_provider: SP,
9419 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
9421 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
9422 pub fee_estimator: F,
9423 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
9425 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
9426 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
9427 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
9428 pub chain_monitor: M,
9430 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
9431 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
9432 /// force-closed during deserialization.
9433 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
9434 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
9435 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
9437 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
9439 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
9440 /// deserialization.
9442 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
9443 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
9444 pub default_config: UserConfig,
9446 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
9447 /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
9449 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
9450 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
9451 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
9452 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
9454 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
9457 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
9458 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
9461 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9462 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9464 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
9465 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9466 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9467 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9468 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9469 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9473 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
9474 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
9475 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
9476 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
9477 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
9479 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
9480 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
9485 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
9486 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
9487 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9488 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
9490 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
9491 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9492 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9493 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9494 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9495 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9499 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9500 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
9501 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
9505 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9506 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
9508 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
9509 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9510 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9511 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9512 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9513 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9517 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9518 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
9520 let chain_hash: ChainHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
9521 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9522 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
9524 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
9526 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9527 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
9528 let mut funded_peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
9529 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
9530 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
9531 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
9532 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
9533 for _ in 0..channel_count {
9534 let mut channel: Channel<SP> = Channel::read(reader, (
9535 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
9537 let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9538 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
9539 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
9540 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
9541 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
9542 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
9543 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
9544 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
9545 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
9546 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
9547 if channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
9548 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
9549 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
9551 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() {
9552 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at holder commitment number {} but the ChannelManager is at holder commitment number {}.",
9553 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number());
9555 if channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() {
9556 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at revoked counterparty transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at revoked counterparty transaction number {}.",
9557 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
9559 if channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() {
9560 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at counterparty commitment transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at counterparty commitment transaction number {}.",
9561 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
9563 let (monitor_update, mut new_failed_htlcs, batch_funding_txid) = channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
9564 if batch_funding_txid.is_some() {
9565 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9567 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = monitor_update {
9568 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
9569 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
9572 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
9573 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
9574 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
9575 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
9576 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
9577 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
9578 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
9580 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
9581 let mut found_htlc = false;
9582 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
9583 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
9586 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
9587 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
9588 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
9589 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
9590 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
9591 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
9592 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
9593 log_info!(args.logger,
9594 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
9595 &channel.context.channel_id(), &payment_hash);
9596 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
9600 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
9601 &channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
9602 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
9603 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
9604 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
9606 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() {
9607 id_to_peer.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
9609 match funded_peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
9610 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
9611 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
9612 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
9614 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
9615 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
9616 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
9617 entry.insert(by_id_map);
9621 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
9622 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
9623 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
9624 // safely discard the channel.
9625 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false);
9626 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
9627 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
9628 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
9629 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
9630 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
9631 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
9634 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", &channel.context.channel_id());
9635 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
9636 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
9637 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
9638 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
9639 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9643 for (funding_txo, _) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
9644 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
9645 log_info!(args.logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
9646 &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
9647 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
9648 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
9649 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
9651 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
9655 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
9656 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9657 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
9658 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
9659 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
9660 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9661 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
9662 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
9663 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
9665 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
9668 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9669 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
9670 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
9671 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
9672 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9673 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
9674 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
9675 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
9677 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
9680 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
9683 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
9684 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
9685 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
9686 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
9687 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
9688 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
9689 is_connected: false,
9693 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9694 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>)>()));
9695 for _ in 0..peer_count {
9696 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
9697 let peer_chans = funded_peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new());
9698 let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
9699 peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
9700 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
9703 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9704 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
9705 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
9706 for _ in 0..event_count {
9707 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
9708 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
9713 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9714 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
9715 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
9717 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
9718 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
9719 // on-startup monitor updates.
9720 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
9721 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
9723 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
9727 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
9728 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9730 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9731 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
9732 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
9733 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
9734 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9738 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9739 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
9740 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
9741 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
9742 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
9743 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
9744 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
9746 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
9747 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9751 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
9752 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
9753 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
9754 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
9755 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
9756 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
9757 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
9758 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
9759 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
9760 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
9761 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
9762 let mut events_override = None;
9763 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
9764 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9765 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
9766 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
9767 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
9768 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
9769 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
9770 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
9771 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
9772 (8, events_override, option),
9773 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
9774 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
9775 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
9776 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
9778 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
9779 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
9782 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
9783 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
9786 if let Some(events) = events_override {
9787 pending_events_read = events;
9790 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
9791 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
9794 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
9795 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
9796 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
9797 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
9798 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
9799 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
9801 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
9803 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
9804 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
9805 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
9808 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
9809 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
9810 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
9811 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
9812 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
9814 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
9815 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
9816 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
9818 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
9819 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
9820 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
9821 ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
9822 $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
9824 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
9825 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
9826 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
9827 log_trace!(args.logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
9828 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, &$funding_txo.to_channel_id());
9829 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
9830 pending_background_events.push(
9831 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
9832 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
9833 funding_txo: $funding_txo,
9834 update: update.clone(),
9837 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
9838 // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
9839 // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
9840 // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
9841 pending_background_events.push(
9842 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
9843 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
9844 channel_id: $funding_txo.to_channel_id(),
9847 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
9848 log_error!(args.logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
9849 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9851 max_in_flight_update_id
9855 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
9856 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
9857 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9858 for phase in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
9859 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
9860 // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
9862 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9863 let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
9864 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
9865 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
9866 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
9867 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
9868 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
9869 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
9870 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, ""));
9873 if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
9874 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
9875 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
9876 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
9877 chan.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
9878 log_error!(args.logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
9879 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
9880 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
9881 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
9882 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
9883 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9886 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
9887 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
9888 debug_assert!(false);
9889 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9894 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
9895 for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
9896 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
9897 // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
9898 // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
9899 // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
9900 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
9901 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(HashMap::new()))
9903 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9904 handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
9905 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, "closed ");
9907 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
9908 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.",
9909 &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
9910 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
9911 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
9912 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
9913 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
9914 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9919 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
9920 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
9922 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
9923 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
9924 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
9925 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
9928 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
9929 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
9930 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
9931 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
9932 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
9933 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
9934 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
9936 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
9937 let counterparty_opt = id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
9938 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
9939 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
9940 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
9941 if path.hops.is_empty() {
9942 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
9943 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9946 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
9947 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
9948 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
9949 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
9950 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
9951 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
9952 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
9953 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), &htlc.payment_hash);
9955 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
9956 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
9957 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
9958 retry_strategy: None,
9959 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
9960 payment_params: None,
9961 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
9962 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
9963 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9964 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9965 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9966 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9967 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
9968 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
9969 total_msat: path_amt,
9970 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
9971 remaining_max_total_routing_fee_msat: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9973 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
9974 path_amt, &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
9979 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
9981 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
9982 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
9983 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
9984 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
9986 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
9987 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
9988 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
9989 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
9990 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
9991 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
9992 forwards.retain(|forward| {
9993 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
9994 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
9995 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
9996 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
10001 !forwards.is_empty()
10003 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
10004 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
10005 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
10006 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
10007 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
10008 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
10009 intercepted_id != ev_id
10016 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
10017 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
10018 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
10019 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
10020 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
10021 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
10022 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
10023 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
10024 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
10025 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
10026 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
10028 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
10029 channel_funding_outpoint: monitor.get_funding_txo().0,
10030 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
10032 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv,
10033 path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &args.logger);
10034 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
10041 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
10042 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
10044 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
10046 .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
10047 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
10048 if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
10049 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
10050 // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
10051 // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
10052 // channel_id -> peer map entry).
10053 counterparty_opt.is_none(),
10054 counterparty_opt.cloned().or(monitor.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10055 monitor.get_funding_txo().0))
10058 // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
10059 // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
10060 // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
10061 // channel still live case here.
10065 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
10066 pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
10071 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
10072 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
10073 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
10074 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
10075 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
10076 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
10077 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
10078 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
10082 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
10083 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
10085 let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
10086 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
10087 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
10088 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10090 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
10091 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
10092 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10094 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
10095 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
10097 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10098 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
10100 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10103 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
10104 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10105 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
10107 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10111 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
10112 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
10113 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
10114 if htlcs.is_empty() {
10115 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10117 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
10118 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
10119 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
10120 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
10121 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
10122 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
10123 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
10124 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
10126 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", &payment_hash);
10127 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10131 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
10133 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10135 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
10136 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
10138 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10139 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
10144 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10145 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10147 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
10149 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10151 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
10152 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
10153 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
10154 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10158 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
10159 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
10160 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10161 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10162 for (chan_id, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
10163 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
10164 if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
10165 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
10167 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
10168 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &chain_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
10169 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
10171 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
10172 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
10173 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
10174 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
10175 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
10176 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10178 if chan.context.is_usable() {
10179 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
10180 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
10181 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
10182 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
10183 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10187 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
10188 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
10189 debug_assert!(false);
10190 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10195 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
10197 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10198 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
10199 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
10200 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", &payment_hash);
10201 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
10202 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
10203 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
10204 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
10205 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
10206 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
10207 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
10209 for claimable_htlc in &payment.htlcs {
10210 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
10212 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
10213 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
10214 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
10215 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
10217 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
10218 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
10219 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
10220 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
10222 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
10223 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
10224 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
10225 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
10227 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
10228 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
10229 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
10230 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10231 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10232 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(channel)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
10233 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
10236 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
10237 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
10240 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
10243 purpose: payment.purpose,
10244 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
10245 htlcs: payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect(),
10246 sender_intended_total_msat: payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat),
10252 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
10253 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
10254 for (_, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
10255 for action in actions.iter() {
10256 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
10257 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
10258 Some((blocked_node_id, blocked_channel_outpoint, blocking_action)), ..
10260 if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&blocked_node_id) {
10261 log_trace!(args.logger,
10262 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
10263 blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id());
10264 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
10265 .entry(blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id())
10266 .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
10268 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
10269 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
10270 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
10271 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
10275 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately { .. } = action {
10276 debug_assert!(false, "Non-event-generating channel freeing should not appear in our queue");
10280 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
10282 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
10283 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10287 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
10289 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
10290 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
10291 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
10292 router: args.router,
10294 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
10296 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
10297 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
10298 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
10299 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
10301 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
10302 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
10303 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
10304 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
10305 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
10306 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
10308 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
10310 our_network_pubkey,
10313 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
10315 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
10317 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
10318 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
10319 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
10320 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
10321 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
10323 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
10324 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
10326 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
10328 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
10329 node_signer: args.node_signer,
10330 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
10332 logger: args.logger,
10333 default_configuration: args.default_config,
10336 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
10337 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
10338 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
10339 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
10340 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
10343 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding) in pending_claims_to_replay {
10344 // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
10345 // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
10346 // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
10347 channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value),
10348 downstream_closed, true, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding);
10351 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
10352 //connection or two.
10354 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
10360 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
10361 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
10362 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
10363 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
10364 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
10365 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
10366 use crate::ln::ChannelId;
10367 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
10368 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
10369 use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
10370 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
10371 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
10372 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
10373 use crate::util::test_utils;
10374 use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
10375 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
10378 fn test_notify_limits() {
10379 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
10380 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
10381 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
10382 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
10383 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
10384 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10386 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
10387 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
10388 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10389 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10390 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10392 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10394 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
10395 // to connect messages with new values
10396 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
10397 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
10398 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
10399 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
10400 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
10401 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
10403 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
10404 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10405 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10406 // ... but the last node should not.
10407 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10408 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
10409 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10410 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10412 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
10413 // about the channel.
10414 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
10415 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
10416 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10418 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
10420 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
10421 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
10422 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
10423 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
10424 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10425 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10427 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
10428 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
10429 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
10431 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
10432 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
10433 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
10434 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
10435 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
10436 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
10438 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
10439 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
10440 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
10441 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
10442 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10443 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10444 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
10445 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
10447 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
10448 // the channel info has updated.
10449 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
10450 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
10451 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10452 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10453 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
10454 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
10458 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
10459 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
10461 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10462 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10463 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10464 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10465 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10467 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
10468 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
10469 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
10470 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
10472 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
10473 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
10474 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
10475 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
10476 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
10477 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
10478 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
10479 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
10480 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10481 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10482 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10483 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
10485 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
10486 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
10487 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
10488 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10489 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10490 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10491 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
10492 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
10493 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10494 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
10495 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
10496 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
10497 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
10498 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10499 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10500 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
10501 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10502 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
10503 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10504 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10505 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
10506 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
10507 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
10509 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
10510 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
10511 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
10512 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10513 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10514 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10515 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
10517 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
10518 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
10519 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
10520 // lightning messages manually.
10521 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
10522 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
10523 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
10525 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10526 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10527 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
10528 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
10529 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10530 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10531 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
10532 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10533 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10534 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
10535 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10536 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10537 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10538 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
10539 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10540 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10541 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
10542 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10543 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10544 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
10545 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10546 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
10547 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10548 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10549 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
10550 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10552 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
10553 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
10554 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10555 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
10557 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
10558 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
10559 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
10560 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
10562 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10565 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
10566 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
10567 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
10568 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
10570 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10575 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
10576 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
10577 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
10580 fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
10581 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
10582 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
10583 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
10584 // fails as expected.
10585 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
10586 // payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
10587 // reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
10588 // secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
10589 // `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
10590 // payment secrets and reject otherwise.
10591 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10592 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10593 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
10594 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
10595 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
10596 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10597 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10598 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
10599 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10601 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
10602 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
10603 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
10605 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
10606 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
10607 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(),
10608 TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false), 100_000);
10609 let route = find_route(
10610 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
10611 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
10613 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
10614 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
10615 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10616 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10617 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10618 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
10619 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
10620 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10621 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
10622 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
10623 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
10624 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
10625 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
10626 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
10627 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10628 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10629 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
10630 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10631 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
10632 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10633 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10634 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
10635 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
10636 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
10638 // Finally, claim the original payment.
10639 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
10641 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
10642 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
10643 let route = find_route(
10644 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
10645 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
10647 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
10648 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
10649 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10650 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10651 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10652 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
10653 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
10654 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
10656 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
10657 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
10658 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
10659 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
10660 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10661 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10662 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10663 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
10664 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
10665 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10666 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
10667 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
10668 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
10669 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
10670 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10671 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10672 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
10673 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10674 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
10675 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10676 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10677 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
10678 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
10679 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
10681 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
10682 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
10684 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
10685 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
10686 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
10687 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
10688 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10689 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10690 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10691 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
10692 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
10693 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
10695 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
10696 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
10697 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
10700 let route = find_route(
10701 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
10702 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
10704 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
10705 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
10706 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
10707 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10708 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10709 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10710 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
10711 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
10712 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10713 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
10714 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
10715 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
10716 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
10717 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10718 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10719 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
10720 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10721 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
10722 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10723 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10724 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
10725 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
10726 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
10728 // Finally, claim the original payment.
10729 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
10733 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
10734 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
10735 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
10736 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10737 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10738 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10739 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10741 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
10742 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
10744 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
10745 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
10746 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
10747 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
10748 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
10749 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
10750 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10751 let route = find_route(
10752 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
10753 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
10756 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
10757 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
10758 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
10759 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
10760 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
10761 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
10762 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10764 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10765 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
10766 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10767 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
10768 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10769 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10770 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
10772 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
10776 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
10777 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
10778 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
10779 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
10780 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
10781 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10782 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10783 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
10784 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10786 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
10787 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
10789 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
10790 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
10791 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
10792 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
10793 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
10794 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
10795 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10796 let route = find_route(
10797 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
10798 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
10801 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
10802 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
10803 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
10804 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
10805 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
10806 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
10807 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
10808 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
10809 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10811 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10812 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
10813 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10814 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
10815 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10816 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10817 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
10819 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
10823 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
10824 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
10825 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
10826 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
10827 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10829 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
10830 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
10831 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
10832 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
10834 // Marshall an MPP route.
10835 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
10836 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
10837 route.paths.push(path);
10838 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
10839 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
10840 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
10841 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
10842 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
10843 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
10845 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
10846 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
10848 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
10849 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
10851 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
10856 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
10857 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10858 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10859 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10860 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10862 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10864 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10865 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10867 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
10868 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
10869 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10870 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
10873 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
10874 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
10875 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10876 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
10877 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
10878 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
10881 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10884 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
10885 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
10890 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
10891 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
10892 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10893 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10894 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10895 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10897 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
10898 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
10900 total_msat: 100_000,
10903 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
10904 // payment verification fails as expected.
10905 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
10906 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
10907 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
10908 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
10910 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
10914 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
10915 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
10919 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
10920 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
10921 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
10922 // the channel is successfully closed.
10923 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10924 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10925 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10926 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10928 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
10929 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10930 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
10931 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10932 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
10934 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
10935 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.txid().into_inner());
10937 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
10938 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
10939 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10940 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10943 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
10945 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
10946 // as it has the funding transaction.
10947 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10948 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
10949 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10952 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10954 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10956 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
10958 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10959 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
10960 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10962 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10965 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
10966 // as it has the funding transaction.
10967 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10968 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
10969 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10971 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10972 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10973 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
10974 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10975 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10976 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
10977 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
10978 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
10980 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
10981 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
10982 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10983 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
10985 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10986 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
10988 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
10989 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
10990 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
10991 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
10992 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10993 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
10994 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10998 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
10999 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
11000 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
11001 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
11002 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11003 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11004 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11007 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
11009 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
11010 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
11011 // closing transaction).
11012 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
11013 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
11014 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11016 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
11017 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
11018 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11019 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11020 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11023 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11025 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
11027 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
11028 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
11029 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11031 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11033 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
11034 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
11037 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
11038 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
11039 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11042 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
11043 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
11044 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11047 fn check_channel_unavailable_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_channel_id: ChannelId, peer_node_id: PublicKey) {
11048 let expected_message = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_channel_id, peer_node_id);
11049 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11052 fn check_api_misuse_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
11053 let expected_message = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_string();
11054 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11057 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
11059 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
11060 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
11062 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
11063 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
11065 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
11066 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
11071 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
11072 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
11073 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
11074 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
11075 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11076 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11077 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
11078 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11081 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
11082 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
11083 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
11085 // Test the API functions.
11086 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
11088 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
11090 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11092 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11094 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11096 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
11098 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
11102 fn test_api_calls_with_unavailable_channel() {
11103 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` and a `channel_id`
11104 // as input, behaves as expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is a known peer in the
11105 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map, but the peer state doesn't contain a channel with
11106 // the given `channel_id`.
11107 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11108 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11109 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
11110 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11112 let counterparty_node_id = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11115 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
11117 // Test the API functions.
11118 check_api_misuse_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, 42));
11120 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11122 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11124 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11126 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(InterceptId([0; 32]), &channel_id, counterparty_node_id, 1_000_000), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11128 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&counterparty_node_id, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11132 fn test_connection_limiting() {
11133 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
11134 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11135 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11136 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11137 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11139 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11141 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
11142 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11144 let mut funding_tx = None;
11145 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
11146 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11147 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11150 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
11151 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
11152 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
11153 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
11154 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11156 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
11157 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11158 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11160 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11162 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
11163 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11164 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11166 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11169 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
11170 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11171 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11172 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11173 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11175 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
11176 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
11178 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
11179 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
11180 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11181 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11182 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
11183 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11184 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11187 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11188 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11189 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11190 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11191 }, true).unwrap_err();
11193 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
11194 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
11195 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11196 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11197 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
11198 for ev in chan_closed_events {
11199 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
11201 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11202 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11204 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11205 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11206 }, true).unwrap_err();
11208 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
11209 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11210 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11211 }, false).unwrap();
11212 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11214 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
11215 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
11217 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
11218 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
11219 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
11220 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
11221 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11223 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11224 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
11225 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11227 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
11228 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
11229 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
11231 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
11232 // "protected" and can connect again.
11233 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
11234 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11235 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11237 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11239 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
11241 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11242 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
11246 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
11247 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
11248 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11249 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11250 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11251 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11253 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11255 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
11256 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11258 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
11259 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11260 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11261 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11264 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
11266 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11267 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11268 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11270 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
11271 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
11272 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11274 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
11275 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11276 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11277 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11281 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
11282 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
11283 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
11284 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11285 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11286 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
11287 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
11288 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
11289 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11291 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11293 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
11294 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11296 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
11297 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
11298 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11299 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11300 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11301 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11304 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11305 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11307 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11308 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
11310 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11312 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
11313 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11316 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
11317 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11318 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11319 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11320 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11322 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11323 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11325 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11326 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
11327 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
11328 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
11332 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11334 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
11335 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11337 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
11338 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11339 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11341 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11342 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
11344 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11346 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
11350 fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
11351 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
11352 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
11353 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
11354 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11355 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
11356 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
11357 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
11359 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
11360 payment_metadata: None,
11361 keysend_preimage: None,
11362 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11363 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
11365 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
11367 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
11368 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
11369 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundOnionErr { err_code, .. }) =
11370 node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
11371 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat))
11373 assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
11374 } else { panic!(); }
11376 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
11377 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
11379 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
11380 payment_metadata: None,
11381 keysend_preimage: None,
11382 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11383 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
11385 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
11387 assert!(node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
11388 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat)).is_ok());
11392 fn test_final_incorrect_cltv(){
11393 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
11394 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
11395 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
11396 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11398 let result = node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
11400 outgoing_cltv_value: 22,
11401 payment_metadata: None,
11402 keysend_preimage: None,
11403 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11404 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: 100,
11406 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
11407 }, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]), 100, 23, None, true, None);
11409 // Should not return an error as this condition:
11410 // https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/4dcc377209509b13cf89a4b91fde7d478f5b46d8/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L334
11411 // is not satisfied.
11412 assert!(result.is_ok());
11416 fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
11417 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
11418 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
11419 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11420 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
11422 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
11423 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
11425 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
11426 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
11427 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
11428 &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
11429 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11431 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
11432 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11434 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11435 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
11436 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11437 match &msg_events[0] {
11438 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
11439 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11441 ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
11442 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
11443 _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
11446 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11449 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11450 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11452 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
11453 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
11454 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11456 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11460 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
11461 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
11462 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
11463 // the channel without the anchors feature.
11464 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11465 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11466 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
11467 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
11468 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
11469 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
11470 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11472 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
11473 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11474 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
11476 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11477 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11479 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11480 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11482 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11485 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11486 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
11488 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11489 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
11491 // Since nodes[1] should not have accepted the channel, it should
11492 // not have generated any events.
11493 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
11497 fn test_update_channel_config() {
11498 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11499 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11500 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
11501 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
11502 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11503 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11504 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
11506 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
11507 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11508 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
11510 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
11511 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
11512 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
11513 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11514 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11516 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
11517 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
11520 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
11521 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11522 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
11524 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
11525 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
11526 cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
11527 ..Default::default()
11529 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
11530 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11531 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11533 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
11534 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
11537 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
11538 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
11539 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
11540 ..Default::default()
11542 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
11543 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
11544 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11545 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11547 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
11548 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
11551 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
11552 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
11553 let bad_channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_txid(&[10; 32], 10);
11554 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
11555 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
11558 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
11559 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
11560 ..Default::default()
11562 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
11565 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
11566 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
11567 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11568 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
11572 fn test_payment_display() {
11573 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
11574 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
11575 let payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
11576 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_hash), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
11577 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11578 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_preimage), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
11582 fn test_trigger_lnd_force_close() {
11583 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11584 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11585 let user_config = test_default_channel_config();
11586 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
11587 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11589 // Open a channel, immediately disconnect each other, and broadcast Alice's latest state.
11590 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11591 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11592 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11593 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11594 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
11595 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
11596 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
11598 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
11599 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
11600 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
11603 // Since they're disconnected, Bob won't receive Alice's `Error` message. Reconnect them
11604 // such that Bob sends a `ChannelReestablish` to Alice since the channel is still open from
11606 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11607 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11609 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11610 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11611 }, false).unwrap();
11612 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
11613 let channel_reestablish = get_event_msg!(
11614 nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()
11616 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channel_reestablish);
11618 // Alice should respond with an error since the channel isn't known, but a bogus
11619 // `ChannelReestablish` should be sent first, such that we actually trigger Bob to force
11620 // close even if it was an lnd node.
11621 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11622 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
11623 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { node_id, msg } = &msg_events[0] {
11624 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11625 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 0);
11626 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
11627 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
11628 } else { panic!() };
11629 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
11630 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
11631 let expected_close_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
11632 err: "Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_string()
11634 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, expected_close_reason, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
11636 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
11637 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
11638 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
11645 use crate::chain::Listen;
11646 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
11647 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
11648 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
11649 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
11650 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
11651 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
11652 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
11653 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
11654 use crate::util::test_utils;
11655 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
11657 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
11658 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
11659 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
11661 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
11663 use criterion::Criterion;
11665 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
11666 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
11667 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
11668 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
11669 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
11670 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
11671 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
11673 struct ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
11674 node: &'node_cfg Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>,
11676 impl<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg, P> {
11677 type CM = Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>;
11679 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P> { self.node }
11681 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
11684 pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
11685 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
11688 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
11689 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
11690 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
11692 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
11693 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
11695 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
11696 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
11697 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
11698 let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
11699 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
11701 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
11702 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
11703 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
11705 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
11706 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
11707 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
11708 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
11710 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
11711 }, genesis_block.header.time);
11712 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
11714 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
11715 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
11716 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
11717 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
11718 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
11720 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
11721 }, genesis_block.header.time);
11722 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
11724 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
11725 features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11727 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
11728 features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11729 }, false).unwrap();
11730 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
11731 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
11732 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
11735 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
11736 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
11737 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
11739 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
11740 } else { panic!(); }
11742 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
11743 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11744 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
11745 match events_b[0] {
11746 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
11747 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
11749 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11752 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
11753 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11754 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
11755 match events_a[0] {
11756 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
11757 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
11759 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11762 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
11764 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), 42, vec![tx]);
11765 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
11766 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
11768 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
11769 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11770 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
11771 match msg_events[0] {
11772 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
11773 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
11774 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
11778 match msg_events[1] {
11779 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
11783 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11784 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
11785 match events_a[0] {
11786 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
11787 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
11789 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11792 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11793 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
11794 match events_b[0] {
11795 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
11796 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
11798 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11801 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
11802 macro_rules! send_payment {
11803 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
11804 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
11805 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.invoice_features()).unwrap();
11806 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
11807 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
11808 payment_count += 1;
11809 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
11810 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
11812 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
11813 PaymentId(payment_hash.0),
11814 RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000),
11815 Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
11816 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
11817 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11818 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
11819 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
11820 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
11821 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
11822 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
11824 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
11825 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
11826 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
11827 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
11829 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
11830 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
11831 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
11832 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
11833 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
11835 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
11838 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
11839 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
11840 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
11841 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
11843 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
11847 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
11848 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
11849 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);