1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see routing::router::get_route for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
27 use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
30 use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
31 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
35 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
36 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
39 use chain::{Confirm, Watch, BestBlock};
40 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator};
41 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
42 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
43 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
44 // construct one themselves.
45 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
46 pub use ln::channel::CounterpartyForwardingInfo;
47 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
48 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
49 use routing::router::{Route, RouteHop};
51 use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
53 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, OptionalField};
54 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
55 use util::config::UserConfig;
56 use util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
57 use util::{byte_utils, events};
58 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer};
59 use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader};
60 use util::logger::{Logger, Level};
61 use util::errors::APIError;
66 use core::cell::RefCell;
67 use io::{Cursor, Read};
68 use sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
69 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
70 use core::time::Duration;
71 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
72 use std::time::Instant;
75 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
77 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
78 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
79 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
81 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
82 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
83 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
84 // before we forward it.
86 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
87 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
88 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
89 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
90 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
92 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
93 enum PendingHTLCRouting {
95 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
96 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
99 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
100 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
103 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
104 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
108 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
109 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
110 routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
111 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
112 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
113 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
114 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
117 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
118 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
119 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
120 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
123 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
124 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
125 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
126 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
127 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
130 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
132 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
134 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
135 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
136 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
138 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
140 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
144 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
148 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
149 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
150 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
151 short_channel_id: u64,
153 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
155 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
156 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
161 /// Contains a total_msat (which may differ from value if this is a Multi-Path Payment) and a
162 /// payment_secret which prevents path-probing attacks and can associate different HTLCs which
163 /// are part of the same payment.
164 Invoice(msgs::FinalOnionHopData),
165 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
166 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
169 struct ClaimableHTLC {
170 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
173 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
176 /// A payment identifier used to correlate an MPP payment's per-path HTLC sources internally.
177 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
178 pub(crate) struct MppId(pub [u8; 32]);
180 impl Writeable for MppId {
181 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
186 impl Readable for MppId {
187 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
188 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
192 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
193 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
194 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
195 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
198 session_priv: SecretKey,
199 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
200 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
201 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
207 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
208 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
210 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
211 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
212 mpp_id: MppId([2; 32]),
217 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
218 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
220 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
228 /// Return value for claim_funds_from_hop
229 enum ClaimFundsFromHop {
231 MonitorUpdateFail(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal, Option<u64>),
236 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
238 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
239 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
240 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
241 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
242 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
244 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
245 err: msgs::LightningError,
246 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
248 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
250 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
252 err: LightningError {
254 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
255 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
261 shutdown_finish: None,
265 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
267 err: LightningError {
269 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
271 shutdown_finish: None,
275 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
276 Self { err, shutdown_finish: None }
279 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
281 err: LightningError {
283 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
284 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
290 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
294 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
297 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
299 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
301 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
303 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
305 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
307 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
308 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
314 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => LightningError {
316 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
317 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
324 shutdown_finish: None,
329 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
330 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
331 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
332 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
333 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
335 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
336 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
337 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
338 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
339 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
340 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
341 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
343 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
347 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
348 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
349 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
350 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
351 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
352 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
353 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
354 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
355 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
356 /// Map from payment hash to any HTLCs which are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user.
357 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
358 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
360 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
361 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
362 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
363 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
366 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
367 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
368 /// quite some time lag.
369 enum BackgroundEvent {
370 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
371 /// commitment transaction.
372 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
375 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
376 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
378 latest_features: InitFeatures,
381 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
382 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
384 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
386 struct PendingInboundPayment {
387 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
388 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
389 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
390 /// this payment being removed.
392 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
393 user_payment_id: u64,
394 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
395 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
396 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
399 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
400 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
401 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
402 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
403 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
404 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
405 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
406 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
408 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
409 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
410 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
411 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
412 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
413 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
414 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
415 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
416 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
418 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
419 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
421 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
422 /// to individual Channels.
424 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
425 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
426 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
427 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
429 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
430 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
431 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
432 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
433 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
434 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
435 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
437 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
438 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
439 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
440 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
443 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
444 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
445 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
446 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
447 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
449 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
450 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
451 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
452 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
453 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
454 pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
455 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
456 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
457 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
458 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
461 default_configuration: UserConfig,
462 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
468 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
470 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
471 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
473 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
474 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
475 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
476 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
478 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
479 /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
480 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
481 /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
482 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
483 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
485 /// The session_priv bytes of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
486 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
487 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
488 /// PaymentSent/PaymentFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
489 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
490 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
491 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
492 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
494 /// Each payment has each of its MPP part's session_priv bytes in the HashSet of the map (even
495 /// payments over a single path).
497 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
498 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<MppId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>>,
500 our_network_key: SecretKey,
501 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
503 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
504 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
505 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
507 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
508 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
509 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
510 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
512 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
513 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
514 /// are currently open with that peer.
515 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
516 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
519 /// If also holding `channel_state` lock, must lock `channel_state` prior to `per_peer_state`.
520 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
522 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
523 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
524 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
525 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
526 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
527 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
528 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
529 /// PersistenceNotifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
530 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
532 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier,
539 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
541 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
542 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
543 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
544 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
545 pub struct ChainParameters {
546 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
547 pub network: Network,
549 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
551 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
552 pub best_block: BestBlock,
555 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
561 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
562 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
563 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
564 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
565 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
566 /// updates are ready for persistence).
568 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
569 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
570 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
571 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
572 persistence_notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier,
574 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
575 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
578 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
579 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
580 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
583 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
584 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
586 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
587 persistence_notifier: notifier,
588 should_persist: persist_check,
589 _read_guard: read_guard,
594 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
596 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
597 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
602 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
603 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
605 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
607 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
608 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
609 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
610 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
611 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
613 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
614 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
616 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
618 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
619 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
620 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
621 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
622 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
623 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
624 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
626 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
627 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
629 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
630 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
631 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
632 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
634 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
635 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
636 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
637 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
638 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
639 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
642 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
644 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
645 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
648 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
650 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
651 /// to better separate parameters.
652 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
653 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
654 /// The node_id of our counterparty
655 pub node_id: PublicKey,
656 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
657 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
658 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
659 pub features: InitFeatures,
660 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
661 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
662 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
664 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
666 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
667 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
668 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
669 /// payments to us through this channel.
670 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
673 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
674 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
675 pub struct ChannelDetails {
676 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
677 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
678 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
679 /// lifetime of the channel.
680 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
681 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
682 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
683 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
684 /// our counterparty already.
686 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
687 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
688 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
689 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
690 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
691 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
692 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
693 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
694 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
695 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
696 /// this value on chain.
698 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
700 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
702 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
703 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
704 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
706 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
707 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
708 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
709 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
711 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
712 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
713 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
714 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
715 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
716 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
717 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
718 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
719 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
721 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
722 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
723 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
724 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
725 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
726 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
727 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
728 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
729 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
731 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
733 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
734 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
735 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
736 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
737 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
738 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
739 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
740 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
741 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
743 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
744 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
745 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
746 pub is_outbound: bool,
747 /// True if the channel is confirmed, funding_locked messages have been exchanged, and the
748 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `funding_locked` message exchange implies the
749 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
750 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
751 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
753 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
754 pub is_funding_locked: bool,
755 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
756 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
758 /// This is a strict superset of `is_funding_locked`.
760 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
764 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
765 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
767 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
768 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
769 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
770 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
771 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
772 ParameterError(APIError),
773 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
774 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
775 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
778 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
780 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
781 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
782 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
783 /// paths than the ones selected).
784 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
785 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
786 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
787 /// in over-/re-payment.
789 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
790 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
791 /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
793 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
794 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
795 /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
796 /// with the latest update_id.
797 PartialFailure(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
800 macro_rules! handle_error {
801 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
804 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish }) => {
805 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
807 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
808 // entering the macro.
809 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
812 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
814 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
815 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
816 if let Some(update) = update_option {
817 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
823 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
824 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
826 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
827 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
828 action: err.action.clone()
832 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
833 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
836 // Return error in case higher-API need one
843 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
844 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
845 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
847 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
848 //TODO: Once warning messages are merged, we should send a `warning` message to our
850 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
852 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
853 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
855 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
856 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
857 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
858 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
860 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
861 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
863 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => {
864 log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
865 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
866 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
868 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(false);
869 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
875 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
876 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
880 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
882 $entry.remove_entry();
890 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
891 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
895 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
897 $entry.remove_entry();
905 macro_rules! remove_channel {
906 ($channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
908 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
909 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
910 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
917 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
918 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
919 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
921 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
923 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
924 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
925 if let Some(short_id) = $chan.get_short_channel_id() {
926 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
928 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
929 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
930 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
931 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
932 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
933 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
934 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
935 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
936 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
937 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id,
938 $chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
941 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
942 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards and {} fails",
943 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
944 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
946 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
947 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
949 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
950 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
952 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
953 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len());
954 if !$resend_commitment {
955 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
958 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
960 $chan.monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
961 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
965 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => { {
966 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $entry.key());
968 $entry.remove_entry();
974 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
975 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
976 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
978 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
979 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
983 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
984 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
985 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
986 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
987 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
990 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
995 macro_rules! handle_chan_restoration_locked {
996 ($self: ident, $channel_lock: expr, $channel_state: expr, $channel_entry: expr,
997 $raa: expr, $commitment_update: expr, $order: expr, $chanmon_update: expr,
998 $pending_forwards: expr, $funding_broadcastable: expr, $funding_locked: expr) => { {
999 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
1000 let counterparty_node_id = $channel_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1002 let chanmon_update: Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> = $chanmon_update; // Force type-checking to resolve
1003 let chanmon_update_is_none = chanmon_update.is_none();
1005 let forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)> = $pending_forwards; // Force type-checking to resolve
1006 if !forwards.is_empty() {
1007 htlc_forwards = Some(($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"),
1008 $channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), forwards));
1011 if chanmon_update.is_some() {
1012 // On reconnect, we, by definition, only resend a funding_locked if there have been
1013 // no commitment updates, so the only channel monitor update which could also be
1014 // associated with a funding_locked would be the funding_created/funding_signed
1015 // monitor update. That monitor update failing implies that we won't send
1016 // funding_locked until it's been updated, so we can't have a funding_locked and a
1017 // monitor update here (so we don't bother to handle it correctly below).
1018 assert!($funding_locked.is_none());
1019 // A channel monitor update makes no sense without either a funding_locked or a
1020 // commitment update to process after it. Since we can't have a funding_locked, we
1021 // only bother to handle the monitor-update + commitment_update case below.
1022 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1025 if let Some(msg) = $funding_locked {
1026 // Similar to the above, this implies that we're letting the funding_locked fly
1027 // before it should be allowed to.
1028 assert!(chanmon_update.is_none());
1029 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
1030 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1033 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = $self.get_announcement_sigs($channel_entry.get()) {
1034 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1035 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1036 msg: announcement_sigs,
1039 $channel_state.short_to_id.insert($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), $channel_entry.get().channel_id());
1042 let funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction> = $funding_broadcastable; // Force type-checking to resolve
1043 if let Some(monitor_update) = chanmon_update {
1044 // We only ever broadcast a funding transaction in response to a funding_signed
1045 // message and the resulting monitor update. Thus, on channel_reestablish
1046 // message handling we can't have a funding transaction to broadcast. When
1047 // processing a monitor update finishing resulting in a funding broadcast, we
1048 // cannot have a second monitor update, thus this case would indicate a bug.
1049 assert!(funding_broadcastable.is_none());
1050 // Given we were just reconnected or finished updating a channel monitor, the
1051 // only case where we can get a new ChannelMonitorUpdate would be if we also
1052 // have some commitment updates to send as well.
1053 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1054 if let Err(e) = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1055 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
1056 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
1057 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
1058 let mut order = $order;
1060 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
1062 break handle_monitor_err!($self, e, $channel_state, $channel_entry, order, $raa.is_some(), true);
1066 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1067 if let Some(update) = $commitment_update {
1068 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1069 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1074 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1075 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = $raa {
1076 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1077 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1078 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1083 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1087 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1092 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
1093 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
1094 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1099 if chanmon_update_is_none {
1100 // If there was no ChannelMonitorUpdate, we should never generate an Err in the res loop
1101 // above. Doing so would imply calling handle_err!() from channel_monitor_updated() which
1102 // should *never* end up calling back to `chain_monitor.update_channel()`.
1103 assert!(res.is_ok());
1106 (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id)
1110 macro_rules! post_handle_chan_restoration {
1111 ($self: ident, $locked_res: expr) => { {
1112 let (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id) = $locked_res;
1114 let _ = handle_error!($self, res, counterparty_node_id);
1116 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1117 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1122 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
1123 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
1124 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1125 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1126 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1129 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1131 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1132 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1134 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1136 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
1138 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1139 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1140 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1141 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1142 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1143 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1146 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1147 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1148 fee_estimator: fee_est,
1152 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1154 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1155 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1156 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
1157 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1158 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1159 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1161 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1162 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1164 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
1165 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
1168 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1169 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1171 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1173 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1174 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1175 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1176 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
1184 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels, as
1185 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1186 &self.default_configuration
1189 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1191 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady events to allow
1192 /// tracking of which events correspond with which create_channel call. Note that the
1193 /// user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for
1194 /// user_id here. user_id has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and
1195 /// otherwise ignored.
1197 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
1198 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
1200 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
1201 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
1203 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1204 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1205 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten.
1206 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1207 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1208 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1212 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1213 match per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) {
1214 Some(peer_state) => {
1215 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1216 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1217 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1218 Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, config)?
1220 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }),
1223 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1225 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1226 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1227 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1229 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1230 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
1231 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1232 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
1233 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1235 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1238 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1240 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1241 node_id: their_network_key,
1247 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1248 let mut res = Vec::new();
1250 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1251 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1252 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1253 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
1254 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1255 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1256 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1257 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1258 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1259 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1260 features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1261 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1262 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1264 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1265 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1266 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1267 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1268 inbound_capacity_msat,
1269 outbound_capacity_msat,
1270 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1271 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1272 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1273 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1274 is_funding_locked: channel.is_usable(),
1275 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1276 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1280 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1281 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1282 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
1283 chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1289 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1290 /// more information.
1291 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1292 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1295 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1296 /// get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1298 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1299 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1301 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1302 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1303 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1304 // really wanted anyway.
1305 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1308 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1309 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1311 let counterparty_node_id;
1312 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1313 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1314 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1315 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1316 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1317 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1318 counterparty_node_id = chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1319 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1320 let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = match per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
1321 Some(peer_state) => {
1322 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1323 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1324 chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?
1326 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", counterparty_node_id) }),
1328 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1330 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1331 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1332 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1333 let (result, is_permanent) =
1334 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_entry.key());
1336 remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
1342 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1343 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1347 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1348 let channel = remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
1349 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1350 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1357 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1361 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1362 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1365 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, counterparty_node_id);
1369 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1370 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1371 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1373 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1374 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1376 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1377 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1378 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1379 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1381 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1383 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1384 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1385 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1386 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1387 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, None)
1390 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1391 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1392 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1394 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1395 /// the channel being closed or not:
1396 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1397 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1398 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1399 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1400 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1401 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1402 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1404 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1406 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1407 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1408 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1409 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1410 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1414 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1415 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1416 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1417 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1418 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1420 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1421 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1422 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1423 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1424 // ignore the result here.
1425 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
1429 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1431 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1432 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1433 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1434 if let Some(node_id) = peer_node_id {
1435 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *node_id {
1436 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1439 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1440 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1442 chan.remove_entry().1
1444 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1447 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1448 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
1449 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
1450 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1451 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1456 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
1459 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
1460 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if channel_id is unknown to the manager.
1461 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1462 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1463 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, None) {
1464 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
1465 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1466 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1467 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1468 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
1469 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
1479 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
1480 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
1481 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
1482 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1483 let _ = self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
1487 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>) {
1488 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
1489 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
1491 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1492 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
1493 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1494 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1495 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
1496 failure_code: $err_code,
1497 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1502 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
1503 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
1506 let shared_secret = {
1507 let mut arr = [0; 32];
1508 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
1511 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1513 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
1514 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
1515 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
1516 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
1517 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
1518 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
1519 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
1520 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
1523 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
1524 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
1525 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
1526 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
1527 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
1530 let mut channel_state = None;
1531 macro_rules! return_err {
1532 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
1534 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1535 if channel_state.is_none() {
1536 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1538 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1539 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1540 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1541 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
1542 })), channel_state.unwrap());
1547 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
1548 let mut chacha_stream = ChaChaReader { chacha: &mut chacha, read: Cursor::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..]) };
1549 let (next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac): (msgs::OnionHopData, _) = {
1550 match <msgs::OnionHopData as Readable>::read(&mut chacha_stream) {
1552 let error_code = match err {
1553 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
1554 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature|
1555 msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue|
1556 msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead => 0x4000 | 22, // invalid_onion_payload
1557 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
1559 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
1562 let mut hmac = [0; 32];
1563 if let Err(_) = chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut hmac[..]) {
1564 return_err!("Unable to decode hop data", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1571 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_hmac == [0; 32] {
1574 // In tests, make sure that the initial onion pcket data is, at least, non-0.
1575 // We could do some fancy randomness test here, but, ehh, whatever.
1576 // This checks for the issue where you can calculate the path length given the
1577 // onion data as all the path entries that the originator sent will be here
1578 // as-is (and were originally 0s).
1579 // Of course reverse path calculation is still pretty easy given naive routing
1580 // algorithms, but this fixes the most-obvious case.
1581 let mut next_bytes = [0; 32];
1582 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1583 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1584 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1585 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1589 // final_expiry_too_soon
1590 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
1591 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
1592 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
1593 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
1594 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
1595 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
1596 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
1598 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
1599 if next_hop_data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
1600 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1602 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1603 if next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1604 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1607 let routing = match next_hop_data.format {
1608 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]),
1609 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => return_err!("Got non final data with an HMAC of 0", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]),
1610 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
1611 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
1612 return_err!("We don't support MPP keysend payments", 0x4000|22, &[0;0]);
1613 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
1614 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
1616 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1618 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
1619 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
1620 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
1621 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
1622 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
1623 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
1624 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
1625 if hashed_preimage != msg.payment_hash {
1626 return_err!("Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 0x4000|22, &[0;0]);
1629 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
1631 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1634 return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]);
1639 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1640 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1641 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1642 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1644 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1646 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1647 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1648 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1649 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1652 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1653 let read_pos = chacha_stream.read(&mut new_packet_data).unwrap();
1654 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1656 // Check two things:
1657 // a) that the behavior of our stream here will return Ok(0) even if the TLV
1658 // read above emptied out our buffer and the unwrap() wont needlessly panic
1659 // b) that we didn't somehow magically end up with extra data.
1661 debug_assert!(chacha_stream.read(&mut t).unwrap() == 0);
1663 // Once we've emptied the set of bytes our peer gave us, encrypt 0 bytes until we
1664 // fill the onion hop data we'll forward to our next-hop peer.
1665 chacha_stream.chacha.process_in_place(&mut new_packet_data[read_pos..]);
1667 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1669 let blinding_factor = {
1670 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
1671 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1672 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1673 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
1676 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
1678 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
1680 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1683 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1684 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
1687 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
1688 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1689 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1690 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
1691 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1695 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1696 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
1697 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
1700 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1701 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1702 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1703 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1707 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1708 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1709 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
1710 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
1711 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
1712 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
1713 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1714 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1715 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1716 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1717 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
1719 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1722 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1724 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
1725 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
1726 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
1727 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
1728 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
1731 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1732 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1733 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1734 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1735 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1736 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1737 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1739 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1740 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1742 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64)
1743 .and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000)
1744 .checked_add(chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat() as u64) });
1745 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1746 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1748 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta() as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1749 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1751 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1752 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now, but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty
1753 // packet sanitization (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational)
1754 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1755 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1757 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1758 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1760 // In theory, we would be safe against unintentional channel-closure, if we only required a margin of LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1761 // But, to be safe against policy reception, we use a longer delay.
1762 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER) as u64 {
1763 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1769 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1770 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1771 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1772 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1774 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1775 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1777 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
1778 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
1779 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
1781 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1783 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1788 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1791 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
1792 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
1793 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
1795 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1796 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1797 if !chan.should_announce() {
1798 return Err(LightningError {
1799 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
1800 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
1803 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
1804 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
1807 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
1808 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
1809 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
1810 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
1811 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1812 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1813 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
1814 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1815 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1819 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
1821 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1822 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1824 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
1825 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
1826 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
1827 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1828 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()),
1829 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
1830 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
1831 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1834 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1835 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
1837 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1843 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
1844 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, mpp_id: MppId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1845 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
1846 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
1847 let session_priv_bytes = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
1848 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
1850 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
1851 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
1852 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
1853 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
1854 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
1856 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
1858 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1859 let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
1860 let sessions = pending_outbounds.entry(mpp_id).or_insert(HashSet::new());
1861 assert!(sessions.insert(session_priv_bytes));
1863 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
1864 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1865 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1866 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
1867 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1870 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1871 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
1873 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1874 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1876 if !chan.get().is_live() {
1877 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
1879 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1881 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1882 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1884 }, onion_packet, &self.logger), channel_state, chan)
1886 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
1887 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1888 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
1889 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
1890 // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
1891 // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
1892 // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
1893 // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
1894 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1897 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
1898 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1899 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1900 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1901 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1902 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1903 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1904 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1912 } else { unreachable!(); }
1916 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
1917 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1919 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
1924 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1926 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1927 /// fields for more info.
1929 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1930 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1931 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1932 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1933 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1934 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1936 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
1938 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
1939 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
1940 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
1942 /// In general, a path may raise:
1943 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
1944 /// node public key) is specified.
1945 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
1946 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
1948 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
1949 /// relevant updates.
1951 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
1952 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
1953 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
1955 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
1956 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
1957 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
1958 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
1960 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
1961 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
1962 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
1963 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
1964 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None)
1967 fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
1968 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
1969 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
1971 if route.paths.len() > 10 {
1972 // This limit is completely arbitrary - there aren't any real fundamental path-count
1973 // limits. After we support retrying individual paths we should likely bump this, but
1974 // for now more than 10 paths likely carries too much one-path failure.
1975 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Sending over more than 10 paths is not currently supported"}));
1977 if payment_secret.is_none() && route.paths.len() > 1 {
1978 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Payment secret is required for multi-path payments".to_string()}));
1980 let mut total_value = 0;
1981 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1982 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
1983 let mpp_id = MppId(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1984 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
1985 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
1986 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
1987 continue 'path_check;
1989 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
1990 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1991 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
1992 continue 'path_check;
1995 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
1996 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
1998 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
1999 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
2002 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2003 let mut results = Vec::new();
2004 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2005 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, mpp_id, &keysend_preimage));
2007 let mut has_ok = false;
2008 let mut has_err = false;
2009 for res in results.iter() {
2010 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
2011 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
2012 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
2013 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
2020 if has_err && has_ok {
2021 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure(results))
2023 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
2029 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2030 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2031 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2032 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2033 /// never reach the recipient.
2035 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function.
2037 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2038 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2040 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2042 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2043 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
2044 let preimage = match payment_preimage {
2046 None => PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()),
2048 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0).into_inner());
2049 match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, Some(preimage)) {
2050 Ok(()) => Ok(payment_hash),
2055 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2056 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2057 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>
2058 (&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2060 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2062 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2064 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2065 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2066 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2067 } else { unreachable!(); })
2070 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
2072 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2073 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2076 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2077 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2082 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2083 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2084 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2087 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2088 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2089 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2091 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2099 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2100 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2101 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2105 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2107 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2108 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2110 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
2112 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2113 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2114 /// keys per-channel).
2116 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2117 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2118 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2120 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2121 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2122 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2124 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2125 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2126 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2128 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2129 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2130 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2131 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2135 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2136 let mut output_index = None;
2137 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2138 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2139 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2140 if output_index.is_some() {
2141 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2142 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2145 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2146 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2147 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2150 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2153 if output_index.is_none() {
2154 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2155 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2158 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2162 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
2163 if !chan.should_announce() {
2164 log_trace!(self.logger, "Can't send announcement_signatures for private channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2168 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
2170 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
2172 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2173 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2175 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
2176 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
2177 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
2178 node_signature: our_node_sig,
2179 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
2184 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
2185 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
2186 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
2188 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::core::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
2191 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
2192 // smaller than 500:
2193 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
2195 /// Regenerates channel_announcements and generates a signed node_announcement from the given
2196 /// arguments, providing them in corresponding events via
2197 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`], if at least one public channel has been confirmed
2198 /// on-chain. This effectively re-broadcasts all channel announcements and sends our node
2199 /// announcement to ensure that the lightning P2P network is aware of the channels we have and
2200 /// our network addresses.
2202 /// `rgb` is a node "color" and `alias` is a printable human-readable string to describe this
2203 /// node to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
2205 /// `addresses` represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node
2206 /// accepts incoming connections. These will be included in the node_announcement, publicly
2207 /// tying these addresses together and to this node. If you wish to preserve user privacy,
2208 /// addresses should likely contain only Tor Onion addresses.
2210 /// Panics if `addresses` is absurdly large (more than 500).
2212 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
2213 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], mut addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
2214 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2216 if addresses.len() > 500 {
2217 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
2220 // While all existing nodes handle unsorted addresses just fine, the spec requires that
2221 // addresses be sorted for future compatibility.
2222 addresses.sort_by_key(|addr| addr.get_id());
2224 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2225 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
2226 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
2227 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
2228 rgb, alias, addresses,
2229 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
2230 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2232 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2233 let node_announce_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2235 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2236 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2238 let mut announced_chans = false;
2239 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2240 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
2241 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2243 update_msg: match self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
2248 announced_chans = true;
2250 // If the channel is not public or has not yet reached funding_locked, check the
2251 // next channel. If we don't yet have any public channels, we'll skip the broadcast
2252 // below as peers may not accept it without channels on chain first.
2256 if announced_chans {
2257 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
2258 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
2259 signature: node_announce_sig,
2260 contents: announcement
2266 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
2268 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
2269 /// Will likely generate further events.
2270 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
2271 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2273 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2274 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
2275 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
2277 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2278 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2280 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
2281 if short_chan_id != 0 {
2282 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
2283 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
2285 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
2286 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2287 match forward_info {
2288 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info,
2289 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2290 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2291 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2292 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2293 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2294 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
2296 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
2297 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() }
2300 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2301 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
2302 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
2303 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
2304 // problem, not ours.
2311 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
2312 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2313 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2314 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2315 match forward_info {
2316 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2317 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2319 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
2320 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2321 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
2322 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2323 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2324 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2325 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2326 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2328 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet) {
2330 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
2331 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
2333 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
2335 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap();
2336 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
2337 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }
2343 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
2345 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
2346 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
2347 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
2348 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
2349 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
2350 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
2351 // this channel currently :/.
2357 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
2358 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
2360 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
2361 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
2362 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
2364 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
2365 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
2367 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
2369 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
2370 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
2371 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
2374 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
2376 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
2377 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
2378 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
2379 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
2380 // messages when we can.
2381 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
2382 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
2383 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
2390 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
2391 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
2394 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
2395 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
2396 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
2397 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
2398 ChannelError::Ignore(_) | ChannelError::Warn(_) => {
2399 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
2401 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
2402 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
2403 let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
2404 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2405 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2407 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
2409 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
2411 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
2415 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2416 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
2419 log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
2420 add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2421 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2422 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
2423 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2424 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
2425 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2426 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
2427 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2429 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
2437 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2438 match forward_info {
2439 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2440 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
2441 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2442 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload) = match routing {
2443 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
2444 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data)),
2445 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
2446 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage)),
2448 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
2451 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
2452 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
2453 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2454 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2455 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2456 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2458 value: amt_to_forward,
2463 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
2465 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
2466 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
2467 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
2469 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2470 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
2471 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2472 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
2473 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
2475 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
2480 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
2481 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
2482 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
2483 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
2484 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
2485 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
2486 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2487 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
2488 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2489 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
2490 OnionPayload::Invoice(_) => {
2491 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we didn't have a corresponding inbound payment.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2492 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2494 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
2495 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
2496 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2497 e.insert(vec![claimable_htlc]);
2498 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
2500 amt: amt_to_forward,
2501 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage),
2504 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2505 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2506 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2512 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
2514 if let OnionPayload::Invoice(ref data) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
2517 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2518 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2521 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
2522 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2523 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2524 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
2525 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
2526 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
2527 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2529 let mut total_value = 0;
2530 let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
2531 .or_insert(Vec::new());
2532 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
2533 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
2534 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2535 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2539 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
2540 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
2541 total_value += htlc.value;
2542 match &htlc.onion_payload {
2543 OnionPayload::Invoice(htlc_payment_data) => {
2544 if htlc_payment_data.total_msat != payment_data.total_msat {
2545 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
2546 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, htlc_payment_data.total_msat);
2547 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
2549 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
2551 _ => unreachable!(),
2554 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > payment_data.total_msat {
2555 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
2556 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, payment_data.total_msat);
2557 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
2560 } else if total_value == payment_data.total_msat {
2561 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
2563 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
2564 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
2565 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
2566 user_payment_id: inbound_payment.get().user_payment_id,
2570 // Only ever generate at most one PaymentReceived
2571 // per registered payment_hash, even if it isn't
2573 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
2575 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
2576 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
2583 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2584 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
2592 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
2593 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
2596 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
2597 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
2600 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
2601 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2602 events.append(&mut new_events);
2605 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
2607 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
2608 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
2610 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
2611 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
2612 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
2613 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
2614 if background_events.is_empty() {
2618 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
2620 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
2621 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
2622 // monitor updating completing.
2623 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
2630 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
2631 /// Process background events, for functional testing
2632 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
2633 self.process_background_events();
2636 fn update_channel_fee(&self, short_to_id: &mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> (bool, NotifyOption, Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>) {
2637 if !chan.is_outbound() { return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(())); }
2638 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
2639 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
2640 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
2641 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
2642 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
2644 if !chan.is_live() {
2645 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
2646 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
2647 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
2649 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
2650 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
2652 let mut retain_channel = true;
2653 let res = match chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(new_feerate, &self.logger) {
2656 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
2657 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
2661 let ret_err = match res {
2662 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update))) => {
2663 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2664 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_id);
2665 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
2668 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2669 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2670 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2671 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2672 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2673 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2674 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2675 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2685 (retain_channel, NotifyOption::DoPersist, ret_err)
2689 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
2690 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
2691 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
2692 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
2693 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
2694 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
2695 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
2697 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
2699 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
2701 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2702 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2703 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2704 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2705 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
2706 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
2707 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
2709 handle_errors.push(err);
2719 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
2721 /// This currently includes:
2722 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
2723 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
2724 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
2727 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
2728 /// estimate fetches.
2729 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
2730 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
2731 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
2732 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
2734 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
2736 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
2738 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2739 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2740 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2741 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2742 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
2743 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
2744 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
2745 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
2747 handle_errors.push((err, counterparty_node_id));
2749 if !retain_channel { return false; }
2751 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
2752 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
2753 handle_errors.push((Err(err), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()));
2754 if needs_close { return false; }
2757 match chan.channel_update_status() {
2758 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
2759 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
2760 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
2761 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
2762 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
2763 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2764 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2768 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2769 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
2771 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
2772 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2773 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2777 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2778 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
2787 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
2788 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
2794 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
2795 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
2796 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
2797 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
2798 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
2799 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
2800 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2802 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2803 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
2804 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
2805 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
2806 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
2807 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
2808 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
2809 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
2810 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
2811 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
2812 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
2818 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
2819 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
2820 // be surfaced to the user.
2821 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(&self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
2822 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
2824 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
2825 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
2826 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
2827 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
2828 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&chan_entry.get()) {
2829 (0x1000|7, upd.encode_with_len())
2831 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
2834 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
2836 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2837 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
2838 htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
2840 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, mpp_id, .. } => {
2841 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
2842 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
2843 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2844 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut sessions) = outbounds.entry(mpp_id) {
2845 if sessions.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes) {
2846 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2847 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2849 rejected_by_dest: false,
2850 network_update: None,
2857 if sessions.get().len() == 0 {
2862 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2869 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
2870 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
2871 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
2872 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
2873 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
2874 /// still-available channels.
2875 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
2876 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
2877 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
2878 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
2881 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
2882 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
2883 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
2885 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, mpp_id, .. } => {
2886 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
2887 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
2888 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2889 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut sessions) = outbounds.entry(mpp_id) {
2890 if !sessions.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes) {
2891 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2894 if sessions.get().len() == 0 {
2898 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2901 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2902 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2903 match &onion_error {
2904 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
2906 let (network_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
2908 let (network_update, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
2909 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
2910 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
2911 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
2912 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2913 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2914 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
2915 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
2918 error_code: onion_error_code,
2920 error_data: onion_error_data
2924 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
2930 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
2931 // TODO: We'd like to generate a NetworkUpdate for temporary
2932 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as get_route
2933 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
2935 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
2936 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
2937 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2938 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2939 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
2940 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
2941 network_update: None,
2943 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
2945 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
2951 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, .. }) => {
2952 let err_packet = match onion_error {
2953 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
2954 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
2955 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
2956 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
2958 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
2959 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2960 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
2964 let mut forward_event = None;
2965 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2966 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
2968 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
2969 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2970 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
2972 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2973 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
2976 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2977 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
2978 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2979 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2980 time_forwardable: time
2987 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
2988 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
2989 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
2991 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
2992 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
2993 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
2994 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
2996 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
2998 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
2999 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3000 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
3001 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3003 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3005 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3006 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
3007 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
3008 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
3010 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
3011 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
3012 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
3013 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
3015 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
3016 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
3017 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
3018 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
3019 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
3021 let mut valid_mpp = true;
3022 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3023 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3029 let mut errs = Vec::new();
3030 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
3031 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3033 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3034 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3035 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3036 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3037 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3038 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
3039 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
3041 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
3042 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) => {
3043 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
3044 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
3045 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
3046 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
3047 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
3048 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
3050 ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
3051 ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim => {
3052 // While we should never get here in most cases, if we do, it likely
3053 // indicates that the HTLC was timed out some time ago and is no longer
3054 // available to be claimed. Thus, it does not make sense to set
3055 // `claimed_any_htlcs`.
3057 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(_) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
3062 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
3063 // which were generated.
3064 channel_state.take();
3066 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
3067 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3068 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
3075 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> ClaimFundsFromHop {
3076 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
3077 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
3078 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3079 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3081 return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed
3085 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
3086 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
3087 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
3088 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
3089 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3090 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
3091 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3092 payment_preimage, e);
3093 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(
3094 chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3095 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(),
3096 Some(htlc_value_msat)
3099 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
3100 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
3101 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3102 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3103 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3104 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3105 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3106 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
3107 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3108 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3114 return ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(htlc_value_msat);
3116 return ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim;
3119 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
3120 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3121 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
3122 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
3123 payment_preimage, e);
3125 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3126 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
3128 chan.remove_entry();
3130 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(counterparty_node_id, res, None);
3133 } else { unreachable!(); }
3136 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool) {
3138 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, mpp_id, .. } => {
3139 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3140 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3141 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3142 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3143 if let Some(sessions) = outbounds.get_mut(&mpp_id) {
3144 if sessions.remove(&session_priv_bytes) {
3145 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
3146 events::Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage }
3148 if sessions.len() == 0 {
3149 outbounds.remove(&mpp_id);
3152 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
3155 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
3158 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
3159 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
3160 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage);
3161 let claimed_htlc = if let ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim = res { false } else { true };
3162 let htlc_claim_value_msat = match res {
3163 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(_, _, amt_opt) => amt_opt,
3164 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(amt) => Some(amt),
3167 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed = res {
3168 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3169 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
3170 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
3171 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3174 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
3175 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
3176 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
3177 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) {
3178 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3179 payment_preimage, e);
3181 // Note that we do *not* set `claimed_htlc` to false here. In fact, this
3182 // totally could be a duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing
3183 // without interrogating the `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above
3184 // update to. Instead, we simply document in `PaymentForwarded` that this
3187 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3188 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) = res {
3189 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3190 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
3194 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
3195 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
3196 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
3199 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3200 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
3202 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
3210 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
3211 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
3212 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
3215 /// Restores a single, given channel to normal operation after a
3216 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
3219 /// All ChannelMonitor updates up to and including highest_applied_update_id must have been
3220 /// fully committed in every copy of the given channels' ChannelMonitors.
3222 /// Note that there is no effect to calling with a highest_applied_update_id other than the
3223 /// current latest ChannelMonitorUpdate and one call to this function after multiple
3224 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures is fine. The highest_applied_update_id field
3225 /// exists largely only to prevent races between this and concurrent update_monitor calls.
3227 /// Thus, the anticipated use is, at a high level:
3228 /// 1) You register a chain::Watch with this ChannelManager,
3229 /// 2) it stores each update to disk, and begins updating any remote (eg watchtower) copies of
3230 /// said ChannelMonitors as it can, returning ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures
3231 /// any time it cannot do so instantly,
3232 /// 3) update(s) are applied to each remote copy of a ChannelMonitor,
3233 /// 4) once all remote copies are updated, you call this function with the update_id that
3234 /// completed, and once it is the latest the Channel will be re-enabled.
3235 pub fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
3236 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3238 let chan_restoration_res;
3239 let mut pending_failures = {
3240 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3241 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3242 let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
3243 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
3244 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
3246 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
3250 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, pending_failures, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked) = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger);
3251 let channel_update = if funding_locked.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() && !channel.get().should_announce() {
3252 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
3253 // funding_locked and the channel is in a usable state. Further, we rely on the
3254 // normal announcement_signatures process to send a channel_update for public
3255 // channels, only generating a unicast channel_update if this is a private channel.
3256 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3257 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3258 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()).unwrap(),
3261 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, raa, commitment_update, order, None, pending_forwards, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked);
3262 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
3263 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
3267 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
3268 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
3269 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
3273 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3274 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
3275 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
3278 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, counterparty_node_id.clone(), &their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration)
3279 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
3280 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3281 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3282 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
3283 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
3284 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3285 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
3286 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3287 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
3289 entry.insert(channel);
3295 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3296 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
3297 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3298 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3299 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
3300 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3301 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3302 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
3304 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, &their_features), channel_state, chan);
3305 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
3307 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
3310 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3311 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
3312 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
3313 channel_value_satoshis: value,
3315 user_channel_id: user_id,
3320 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3321 let ((funding_msg, monitor), mut chan) = {
3322 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
3323 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3324 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3325 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
3326 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3327 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3328 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
3330 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
3332 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
3335 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
3336 // lock before watch_channel
3337 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
3339 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
3340 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
3341 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
3342 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
3343 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
3344 // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for
3345 // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we
3346 // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
3347 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
3348 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
3349 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
3351 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
3352 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
3353 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
3354 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
3355 // until we have persisted our monitor.
3356 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3360 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3361 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3362 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
3363 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3364 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
3366 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3367 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
3368 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3377 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3379 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
3380 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3381 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3382 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3383 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3384 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3385 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3387 let (monitor, funding_tx) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
3388 Ok(update) => update,
3389 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
3391 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
3392 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
3396 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3399 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
3400 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
3404 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3405 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3406 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3407 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3408 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3409 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3410 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3412 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3413 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
3414 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for {} in response to funding_locked", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3415 // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our
3416 // announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote
3417 // funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking
3418 // block connection. We should guanrantee to broadcast announcement_sigs to our peer whatever
3419 // the order of the events but our peer may not receive it due to disconnection. The specs
3420 // lacking an acknowledgement for announcement_sigs we may have to re-send them at peer
3421 // connection in the future if simultaneous misses by both peers due to network/hardware
3422 // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs
3423 // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network.
3424 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
3425 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3426 msg: announcement_sigs,
3428 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
3429 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3430 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3431 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
3436 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3440 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3441 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
3442 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
3443 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3444 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3446 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
3447 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
3448 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3449 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3452 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
3453 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
3454 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
3455 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
3458 let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
3459 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
3461 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
3462 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
3463 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3464 let (result, is_permanent) =
3465 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_entry.key());
3467 remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
3473 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
3474 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
3475 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
3482 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3485 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
3486 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
3489 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
3493 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3494 let (tx, chan_option) = {
3495 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3496 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3497 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
3498 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
3499 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3500 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3502 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
3503 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
3504 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
3505 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3510 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
3511 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
3512 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
3513 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
3514 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
3515 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
3516 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3518 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
3519 } else { (tx, None) }
3521 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3524 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
3525 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
3526 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
3528 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
3529 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3530 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3531 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3539 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3540 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
3541 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
3542 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
3544 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
3545 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
3546 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
3547 //but we should prevent it anyway.
3549 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
3550 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3552 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3553 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3554 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3555 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3558 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
3559 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
3560 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
3561 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
3562 match pending_forward_info {
3563 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
3564 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
3565 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
3566 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &{
3567 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
3568 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
3569 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
3570 res.extend_from_slice(&upd.encode_with_len()[..]);
3574 // The only case where we'd be unable to
3575 // successfully get a channel update is if the
3576 // channel isn't in the fully-funded state yet,
3577 // implying our counterparty is trying to route
3578 // payments over the channel back to themselves
3579 // (because no one else should know the short_id
3580 // is a lightning channel yet). We should have
3581 // no problem just calling this
3582 // unknown_next_peer (0x4000|10).
3583 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
3586 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &[])
3588 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3589 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3590 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3593 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
3595 _ => pending_forward_info
3598 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3600 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3605 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3606 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3607 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
3608 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3609 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3610 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3611 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3612 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3614 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
3616 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3619 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false);
3623 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3624 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3625 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3626 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3627 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3628 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3629 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3631 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
3633 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3638 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3639 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3640 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3641 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3642 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3643 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3644 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3646 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
3647 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
3648 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
3650 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
3653 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3657 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3658 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3659 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3660 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3661 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3662 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3663 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3665 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
3666 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
3667 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
3668 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
3669 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
3670 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
3671 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
3676 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3677 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
3679 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
3680 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3681 msg: revoke_and_ack,
3683 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
3684 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3685 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3686 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3687 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3688 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3689 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3690 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3692 commitment_signed: msg,
3698 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3703 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
3704 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
3705 let mut forward_event = None;
3706 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
3707 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3708 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3709 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
3711 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3712 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
3713 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
3714 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
3715 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
3717 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3718 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
3719 prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
3721 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3722 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
3723 prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
3728 match forward_event {
3730 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3731 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3732 time_forwardable: time
3740 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3741 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3743 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3744 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3745 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3746 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3747 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3748 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3750 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
3751 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail_in) =
3752 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3753 htlcs_to_fail = htlcs_to_fail_in;
3754 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3755 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
3756 assert!(commitment_update.is_none() && pending_forwards.is_empty() && pending_failures.is_empty());
3757 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
3759 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, commitment_update.is_some(), pending_forwards, pending_failures) {
3761 } else { unreachable!(); }
3764 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
3765 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3766 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3770 break Ok((pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"), chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
3772 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3775 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id);
3777 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) => {
3778 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
3779 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
3781 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
3788 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3789 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3790 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3791 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3792 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3793 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3794 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3796 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
3798 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3803 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3804 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3805 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3807 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3808 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3809 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3810 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3812 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
3813 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
3816 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
3817 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), msg), channel_state, chan),
3818 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
3819 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
3820 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
3823 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3828 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
3829 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3830 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3831 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3832 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
3833 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3835 // It's not a local channel
3836 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
3839 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
3840 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3841 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3842 if chan.get().should_announce() {
3843 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
3844 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
3845 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
3846 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
3848 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
3850 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3851 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
3852 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
3853 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
3855 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
3858 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!()
3860 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
3863 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3864 let chan_restoration_res;
3865 let (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround) = {
3866 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3867 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3869 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3870 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3871 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3872 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3874 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
3875 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
3876 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
3877 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
3878 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, monitor_update_opt, order, htlcs_failed_forward, shutdown) =
3879 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3880 let mut channel_update = None;
3881 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
3882 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
3883 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3886 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
3887 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
3888 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
3889 // they have the latest channel parameters.
3890 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3891 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3892 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
3895 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
3896 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_state_lock, channel_state, chan, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, order, monitor_update_opt, Vec::new(), None, funding_locked);
3897 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
3898 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
3900 (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround)
3902 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3905 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
3906 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_failed_forward, msg.channel_id);
3908 if let Some(funding_locked_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
3909 self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, &funding_locked_msg)?;
3914 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
3915 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
3916 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3917 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
3918 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
3919 for monitor_event in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
3920 match monitor_event {
3921 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
3922 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
3923 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
3924 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.onchain_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true);
3926 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
3927 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
3930 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(funding_outpoint) => {
3931 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3932 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3933 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
3934 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3935 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3936 if let Some(mut chan) = by_id.remove(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
3937 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3938 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3940 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
3941 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3942 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3946 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
3947 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3948 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
3949 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
3957 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3958 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3961 has_pending_monitor_events
3964 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
3965 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
3966 /// update was applied.
3968 /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
3969 /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
3970 /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
3971 /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
3972 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
3973 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
3974 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3975 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3977 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3978 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3979 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
3980 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3981 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3983 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
3984 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
3985 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
3986 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
3987 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id));
3989 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
3990 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3991 has_monitor_update = true;
3992 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), channel_id);
3993 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
3994 if close_channel { return false; }
3996 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3997 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3998 updates: commitment_update,
4005 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
4006 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
4013 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
4014 for (failures, channel_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
4015 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id);
4018 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4019 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4025 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
4026 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
4027 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
4028 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
4029 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
4030 let mut has_update = false;
4032 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4033 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4034 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4035 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4036 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4038 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
4039 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
4040 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
4041 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
4043 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4044 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
4047 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
4048 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
4049 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
4050 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4051 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4054 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4055 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4060 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
4061 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4067 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
4068 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
4075 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4076 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4082 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
4083 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
4085 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
4086 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4087 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
4088 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
4089 // reorganized out of the main chain.
4090 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
4091 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
4092 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
4093 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
4094 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
4095 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
4096 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
4097 assert!(should_broadcast);
4098 } else { unreachable!(); }
4099 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
4101 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4105 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
4106 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
4108 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
4110 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4111 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4112 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4113 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4114 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
4115 payment_secret, min_value_msat, user_payment_id, payment_preimage,
4116 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
4117 // its updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
4118 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
4119 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
4120 // never fail a payment too early.
4121 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
4123 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
4126 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
4131 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
4134 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
4135 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you, returning the first and storing the second.
4137 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
4138 /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
4139 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
4141 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
4143 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
4144 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
4145 /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
4146 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4147 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> (PaymentHash, PaymentSecret) {
4148 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
4149 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4152 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, user_payment_id)
4153 .expect("RNG Generated Duplicate PaymentHash"))
4156 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
4157 /// stored external to LDK.
4159 /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
4160 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
4161 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
4163 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) must be globally unique. This
4164 /// method may return an Err if another payment with the same payment_hash is still pending.
4166 /// `user_payment_id` will be provided back in [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id`] events to
4167 /// allow tracking of which events correspond with which calls to this and
4168 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]. `user_payment_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply
4169 /// copied to events and otherwise ignored. It may be used to correlate PaymentReceived events
4170 /// with invoice metadata stored elsewhere.
4172 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
4173 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
4174 /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
4175 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
4177 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
4178 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
4179 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
4180 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
4181 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
4183 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
4184 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
4185 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
4186 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
4187 /// [`PaymentReceived`].
4189 /// Pending inbound payments are stored in memory and in serialized versions of this
4190 /// [`ChannelManager`]. If potentially unbounded numbers of inbound payments may exist and
4191 /// space is limited, you may wish to rate-limit inbound payment creation.
4193 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
4195 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
4196 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
4198 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4199 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
4200 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id
4201 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
4202 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, user_payment_id)
4205 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"))]
4206 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
4207 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
4208 let event_handler = |event: &events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event.clone());
4209 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
4214 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4215 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4216 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4217 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4218 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4221 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
4222 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
4223 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4224 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4226 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
4227 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
4228 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
4229 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4232 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
4233 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4235 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
4236 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4239 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
4240 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4241 mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
4243 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
4244 events.replace(pending_events);
4253 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4255 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4256 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4257 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4258 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4261 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
4263 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
4264 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
4266 /// Pending events are persisted as part of [`ChannelManager`]. While these events are cleared
4267 /// when processed, an [`EventHandler`] must be able to handle previously seen events when
4268 /// restarting from an old state.
4269 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
4270 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4271 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4273 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
4274 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
4275 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
4276 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4279 let mut pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
4280 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
4281 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4284 for event in pending_events.drain(..) {
4285 handler.handle_event(&event);
4293 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4295 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4296 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4297 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4298 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4301 fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
4303 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4304 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), block.header.prev_blockhash,
4305 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
4306 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
4307 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
4310 let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
4311 self.transactions_confirmed(&block.header, &txdata, height);
4312 self.best_block_updated(&block.header, height);
4315 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
4316 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4317 let new_height = height - 1;
4319 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
4320 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
4321 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
4322 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
4323 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
4324 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
4327 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, &self.logger));
4331 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4333 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4334 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4335 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4336 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4339 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
4340 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4341 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4342 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4344 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
4345 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
4347 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4348 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, &self.logger).map(|a| (a, Vec::new())));
4351 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
4352 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4353 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4354 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4356 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
4357 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
4359 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4361 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
4363 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, &self.logger));
4365 macro_rules! max_time {
4366 ($timestamp: expr) => {
4368 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
4369 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
4370 // having an explicit local time source.
4371 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
4372 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
4373 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
4374 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
4375 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
4381 max_time!(self.last_node_announcement_serial);
4382 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
4383 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4384 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
4385 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
4389 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
4390 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4391 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.short_to_id.len());
4392 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
4393 if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() {
4394 res.push(funding_txo.txid);
4400 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
4401 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4402 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
4403 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
4404 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
4405 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|_| (None, Vec::new()))
4406 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
4407 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
4412 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4414 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4415 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4416 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4417 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4420 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
4421 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
4423 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), msgs::ErrorMessage>>
4424 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
4425 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4426 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4427 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4429 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4430 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
4432 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4433 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4434 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4435 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4436 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
4437 let res = f(channel);
4438 if let Ok((chan_res, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs)) = res {
4439 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
4440 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&channel).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
4441 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
4442 failure_code: 0x1000 | 14, // expiry_too_soon, or at least it is now
4446 if let Some(funding_locked) = chan_res {
4447 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
4448 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4449 msg: funding_locked,
4451 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
4452 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked and announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4453 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4454 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4455 msg: announcement_sigs,
4457 } else if channel.is_usable() {
4458 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures but with private channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4459 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4460 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4461 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel).unwrap(),
4464 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4466 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
4468 } else if let Err(e) = res {
4469 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
4470 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4472 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
4473 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
4474 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
4475 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
4476 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4480 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4481 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4482 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e },
4489 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
4490 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, htlcs| {
4491 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4492 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
4493 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
4494 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
4495 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
4496 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
4497 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
4498 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
4499 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
4500 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
4501 data: htlc_msat_height_data
4506 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
4511 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
4513 for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
4514 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
4518 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
4519 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
4520 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
4522 /// Note that the feature `allow_wallclock_use` must be enabled to use this function.
4523 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
4524 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
4525 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
4528 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
4529 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
4531 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
4532 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
4535 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4536 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
4537 let mutcond = &self.persistence_notifier.persistence_lock;
4538 let &(ref mtx, _) = mutcond;
4539 let guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
4543 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
4544 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
4545 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
4546 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
4550 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref , T: Deref , K: Deref , F: Deref , L: Deref >
4551 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4552 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4553 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4554 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4555 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4558 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
4559 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4560 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4563 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
4564 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4565 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4568 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
4569 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4570 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4573 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
4574 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4575 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4578 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
4579 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4580 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4583 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
4584 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4585 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4588 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
4589 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4590 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4593 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
4594 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4595 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4598 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
4599 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4600 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4603 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
4604 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4605 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4608 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
4609 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4610 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4613 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
4614 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4615 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4618 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
4619 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4620 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4623 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
4624 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4625 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4628 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
4629 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4630 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4633 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
4634 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4635 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
4638 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
4643 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
4644 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4645 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4648 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
4649 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4650 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4651 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
4653 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4654 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4655 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4656 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4657 if no_connection_possible {
4658 log_debug!(self.logger, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
4659 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
4660 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
4661 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4662 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4664 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(true));
4665 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4666 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4676 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
4677 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
4678 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
4679 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
4680 if chan.is_shutdown() {
4681 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4682 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4686 no_channels_remain = false;
4692 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
4694 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4695 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4696 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4697 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4698 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4699 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4700 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4701 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4702 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4703 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4704 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4705 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
4706 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
4707 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
4708 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4709 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4710 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
4711 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
4712 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
4716 if no_channels_remain {
4717 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
4720 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4721 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4725 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
4726 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
4728 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4731 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4732 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
4733 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4734 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
4735 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
4738 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
4739 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
4744 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4745 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4746 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4747 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
4748 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
4749 if !chan.have_received_message() {
4750 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
4751 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
4752 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
4756 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
4757 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4758 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
4764 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
4767 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
4768 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4770 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
4771 for chan in self.list_channels() {
4772 if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
4773 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
4774 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id));
4778 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
4779 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id));
4784 /// Used to signal to the ChannelManager persister that the manager needs to be re-persisted to
4785 /// disk/backups, through `await_persistable_update_timeout` and `await_persistable_update`.
4786 struct PersistenceNotifier {
4787 /// Users won't access the persistence_lock directly, but rather wait on its bool using
4788 /// `wait_timeout` and `wait`.
4789 persistence_lock: (Mutex<bool>, Condvar),
4792 impl PersistenceNotifier {
4795 persistence_lock: (Mutex::new(false), Condvar::new()),
4801 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
4802 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
4807 guard = cvar.wait(guard).unwrap();
4808 let result = *guard;
4816 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
4817 fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
4818 let current_time = Instant::now();
4820 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
4821 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
4826 guard = cvar.wait_timeout(guard, max_wait).unwrap().0;
4827 // Due to spurious wakeups that can happen on `wait_timeout`, here we need to check if the
4828 // desired wait time has actually passed, and if not then restart the loop with a reduced wait
4829 // time. Note that this logic can be highly simplified through the use of
4830 // `Condvar::wait_while` and `Condvar::wait_timeout_while`, if and when our MSRV is raised to
4832 let elapsed = current_time.elapsed();
4833 let result = *guard;
4834 if result || elapsed >= max_wait {
4838 match max_wait.checked_sub(elapsed) {
4839 None => return result,
4845 // Signal to the ChannelManager persister that there are updates necessitating persisting to disk.
4847 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &self.persistence_lock;
4848 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
4849 *persistence_lock = true;
4850 mem::drop(persistence_lock);
4855 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4856 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4858 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
4860 (0, onion_packet, required),
4861 (2, short_channel_id, required),
4864 (0, payment_data, required),
4865 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
4867 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
4868 (0, payment_preimage, required),
4869 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
4873 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
4874 (0, routing, required),
4875 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
4876 (4, payment_hash, required),
4877 (6, amt_to_forward, required),
4878 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required)
4881 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailureMsg, ;
4885 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
4890 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
4891 (0, short_channel_id, required),
4892 (2, outpoint, required),
4893 (4, htlc_id, required),
4894 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
4897 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
4898 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
4899 let payment_data = match &self.onion_payload {
4900 OnionPayload::Invoice(data) => Some(data.clone()),
4903 let keysend_preimage = match self.onion_payload {
4904 OnionPayload::Invoice(_) => None,
4905 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => Some(preimage.clone()),
4910 (0, self.prev_hop, required), (2, self.value, required),
4911 (4, payment_data, option), (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
4912 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
4918 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
4919 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4920 let mut prev_hop = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
4922 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
4923 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
4924 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
4928 (0, prev_hop, required), (2, value, required),
4929 (4, payment_data, option), (6, cltv_expiry, required),
4930 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
4932 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
4934 if payment_data.is_some() {
4935 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
4937 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
4940 if payment_data.is_none() {
4941 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
4943 OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data.unwrap())
4947 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
4955 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
4956 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4957 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4960 let mut session_priv: ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
4961 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
4962 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
4963 let mut mpp_id = None;
4964 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
4965 (0, session_priv, required),
4966 (1, mpp_id, option),
4967 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
4968 (4, path, vec_type),
4970 if mpp_id.is_none() {
4971 // For backwards compat, if there was no mpp_id written, use the session_priv bytes
4973 mpp_id = Some(MppId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
4975 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
4976 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
4977 first_hop_htlc_msat: first_hop_htlc_msat,
4978 path: path.unwrap(),
4979 mpp_id: mpp_id.unwrap(),
4982 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
4983 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
4988 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
4989 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::io::Error> {
4991 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, mpp_id } => {
4993 let mpp_id_opt = Some(mpp_id);
4994 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
4995 (0, session_priv, required),
4996 (1, mpp_id_opt, option),
4997 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
4998 (4, path, vec_type),
5001 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
5003 field.write(writer)?;
5010 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason,
5011 (0, LightningError) => {
5015 (0, failure_code, required),
5016 (2, data, vec_type),
5020 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
5022 (0, forward_info, required),
5023 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
5024 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
5025 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
5028 (0, htlc_id, required),
5029 (2, err_packet, required),
5033 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
5034 (0, payment_secret, required),
5035 (2, expiry_time, required),
5036 (4, user_payment_id, required),
5037 (6, payment_preimage, required),
5038 (8, min_value_msat, required),
5041 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5042 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5043 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5044 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5045 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5048 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5049 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
5051 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
5053 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
5055 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5056 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
5057 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
5060 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5061 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
5062 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
5063 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
5064 unfunded_channels += 1;
5067 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
5068 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
5069 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
5070 channel.write(writer)?;
5074 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5075 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
5076 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
5077 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5078 for forward in pending_forwards {
5079 forward.write(writer)?;
5083 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5084 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
5085 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
5086 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5087 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
5088 htlc.write(writer)?;
5092 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5093 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5094 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5095 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
5096 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5097 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
5100 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5101 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5102 for event in events.iter() {
5103 event.write(writer)?;
5106 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
5107 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5108 for event in background_events.iter() {
5110 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
5112 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
5113 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
5118 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
5119 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
5121 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5122 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5123 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
5124 hash.write(writer)?;
5125 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
5128 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5129 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
5130 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
5131 for (_, outbounds) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
5132 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbounds.len() as u64;
5134 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
5135 for (_, outbounds) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
5136 for outbound in outbounds.iter() {
5137 outbound.write(writer)?;
5141 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
5142 (1, pending_outbound_payments, required),
5149 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
5151 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
5153 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
5154 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling:
5155 /// <(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)
5156 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
5157 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
5158 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints the same
5159 /// way you would handle a `chain::Filter` call using ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch() and
5160 /// ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
5161 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
5162 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
5163 /// 6) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local chain::Watch.
5165 /// Note that the ordering of #4-6 is not of importance, however all three must occur before you
5166 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized ChannelManager.
5168 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
5169 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
5170 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
5171 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
5172 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
5173 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
5174 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5175 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5176 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5177 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5178 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5181 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
5182 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
5184 pub keys_manager: K,
5186 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
5188 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
5189 pub fee_estimator: F,
5190 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
5192 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
5193 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
5194 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
5195 pub chain_monitor: M,
5197 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
5198 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
5199 /// force-closed during deserialization.
5200 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
5201 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
5202 /// deserialization.
5204 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
5205 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
5206 pub default_config: UserConfig,
5208 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
5209 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
5211 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
5212 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
5213 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
5214 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
5216 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
5219 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
5220 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
5223 impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5224 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5225 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5226 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5227 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5228 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5231 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
5232 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
5233 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
5234 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
5235 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
5237 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
5238 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
5243 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
5244 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
5245 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5246 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
5247 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5248 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5249 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5250 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5253 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5254 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
5255 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
5259 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5260 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
5261 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5262 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5263 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5264 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5267 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5268 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
5270 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
5271 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5272 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
5274 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5276 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5277 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
5278 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
5279 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
5280 for _ in 0..channel_count {
5281 let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, &args.keys_manager)?;
5282 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
5283 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
5284 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
5285 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
5286 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
5287 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
5288 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
5289 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
5290 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
5291 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
5292 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
5293 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
5294 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
5295 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
5296 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-lightning");
5297 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5298 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
5299 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
5300 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
5301 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
5302 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
5303 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
5304 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
5305 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
5306 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
5307 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
5308 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
5309 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
5311 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
5312 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
5314 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
5317 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5318 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
5319 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
5320 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
5321 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-lightning");
5322 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5326 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
5327 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
5328 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
5332 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
5333 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5334 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
5335 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
5336 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
5337 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5338 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
5339 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
5340 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
5342 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
5345 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5346 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
5347 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
5348 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
5349 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5350 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
5351 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
5352 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
5354 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
5357 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5358 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
5359 for _ in 0..peer_count {
5360 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
5361 let peer_state = PeerState {
5362 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
5364 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
5367 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5368 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
5369 for _ in 0..event_count {
5370 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
5371 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
5376 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5377 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
5378 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
5379 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5380 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
5381 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5385 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5386 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5388 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5389 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
5390 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
5391 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
5392 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5396 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5397 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<MppId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> =
5398 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
5399 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
5400 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
5401 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(MppId(session_priv), [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()).is_some() {
5402 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
5406 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
5407 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
5408 (1, pending_outbound_payments, option),
5410 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
5411 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
5414 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5415 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5417 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
5419 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
5420 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
5421 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
5423 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
5425 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
5430 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
5432 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
5433 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
5435 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
5436 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &args.keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
5439 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
5440 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
5442 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
5444 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
5445 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
5446 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
5447 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
5449 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
5450 logger: args.logger,
5451 default_configuration: args.default_config,
5454 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5455 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
5458 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
5459 //connection or two.
5461 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
5467 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
5468 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
5469 use core::time::Duration;
5470 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
5471 use ln::channelmanager::{MppId, PaymentSendFailure};
5472 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
5473 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
5475 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
5476 use routing::router::{get_keysend_route, get_route};
5477 use util::errors::APIError;
5478 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
5479 use util::test_utils;
5481 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
5483 fn test_wait_timeout() {
5484 use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier;
5486 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering};
5489 let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new());
5490 let thread_notifier = Arc::clone(&persistence_notifier);
5492 let exit_thread = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
5493 let exit_thread_clone = exit_thread.clone();
5494 thread::spawn(move || {
5496 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &thread_notifier.persistence_lock;
5497 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5498 *persistence_lock = true;
5501 if exit_thread_clone.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
5507 // Check that we can block indefinitely until updates are available.
5508 let _ = persistence_notifier.wait();
5510 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration if updates are
5513 if persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
5518 exit_thread.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
5520 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration even if no updates
5523 if !persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
5530 fn test_notify_limits() {
5531 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
5532 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
5533 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5534 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5535 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5536 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5538 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
5539 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
5540 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5541 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5542 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5544 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5546 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
5547 // to connect messages with new values
5548 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
5549 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
5550 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
5551 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
5553 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
5554 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5555 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5556 // ... but the last node should not.
5557 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5558 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
5559 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5560 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5562 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
5563 // about the channel.
5564 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
5565 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
5566 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5568 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
5570 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
5571 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
5572 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
5573 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
5574 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5575 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5577 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
5578 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
5579 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
5581 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
5582 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
5583 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
5584 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
5585 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
5586 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
5588 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
5589 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
5590 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
5591 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
5592 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5593 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5594 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
5595 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
5597 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
5598 // the channel info has updated.
5599 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
5600 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
5601 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5602 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5603 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
5604 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
5608 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
5609 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
5611 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5612 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5613 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5614 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5615 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5616 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
5618 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
5619 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
5620 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 100_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
5621 let (payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[1]);
5622 let mpp_id = MppId([42; 32]);
5623 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
5624 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
5625 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
5626 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, mpp_id, &None).unwrap();
5627 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5628 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5629 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5630 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
5632 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
5633 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
5634 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5635 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5636 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5637 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
5638 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
5639 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5640 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
5641 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5642 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5643 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5644 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5645 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5646 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5647 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5648 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5649 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5650 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5651 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5652 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
5653 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5655 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
5656 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, mpp_id, &None).unwrap();
5657 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5658 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5659 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5660 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
5662 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
5663 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
5664 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
5665 // lightning messages manually.
5666 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
5667 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
5668 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5669 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5670 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
5671 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5672 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5673 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
5674 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5675 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5676 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
5677 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5678 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5679 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5680 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
5681 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5682 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5683 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
5684 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5685 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5686 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
5687 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5688 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
5689 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5690 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5691 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
5692 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5694 // There's an existing bug that generates a PaymentSent event for each MPP path, so handle that here.
5695 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5697 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage: ref preimage } => {
5698 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
5700 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5703 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage: ref preimage } => {
5704 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
5706 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5711 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
5712 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
5713 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
5714 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
5715 // fails as expected.
5716 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5717 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5718 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5719 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5720 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5721 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
5723 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
5724 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
5725 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
5727 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
5728 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 100_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
5729 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
5730 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5731 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5732 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5733 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
5734 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
5735 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5736 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
5737 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5738 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5739 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5740 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5741 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5742 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5743 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5744 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5745 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5746 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5747 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5748 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
5749 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
5751 // Finally, claim the original payment.
5752 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
5754 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
5755 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
5756 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 100_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
5757 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
5758 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5759 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5760 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5761 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
5762 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
5763 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
5765 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
5766 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
5767 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
5768 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5769 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5770 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5771 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
5772 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
5773 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5774 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
5775 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5776 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5777 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5778 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5779 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5780 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5781 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5782 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5783 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5784 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5785 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5786 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
5787 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
5789 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
5790 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
5794 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
5795 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
5796 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
5797 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5798 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5799 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5800 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5802 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
5803 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
5804 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
5805 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
5807 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5808 let network_graph = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph;
5809 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
5810 let route = get_keysend_route(&payer_pubkey, network_graph, &payee_pubkey,
5811 Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()), &vec![], 10000, 40,
5812 nodes[0].logger).unwrap();
5814 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
5815 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
5816 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
5817 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5819 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5820 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
5821 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5822 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5823 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5824 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5825 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
5827 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
5831 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
5832 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
5833 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5834 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5835 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5836 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5838 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
5839 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
5840 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
5841 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
5843 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5844 let network_graph = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph;
5845 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
5846 let route = get_keysend_route(&payer_pubkey, network_graph, &payee_pubkey,
5847 Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()), &vec![], 10000, 40,
5848 nodes[0].logger).unwrap();
5850 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
5851 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
5852 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
5853 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
5854 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5856 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5857 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
5858 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5859 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5860 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5861 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5862 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
5864 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
5868 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
5869 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
5870 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
5871 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
5872 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5874 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
5875 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
5876 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
5877 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
5878 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
5880 // Marshall an MPP route.
5881 let (_, payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[3]);
5882 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
5883 let mut route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
5884 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
5885 route.paths.push(path);
5886 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
5887 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
5888 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
5889 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
5890 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
5891 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
5893 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None).unwrap_err() {
5894 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
5895 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
5896 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
5901 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "unstable"))]
5904 use chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor;
5905 use chain::channelmonitor::Persist;
5906 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
5907 use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
5908 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
5909 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
5910 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
5911 use routing::network_graph::NetworkGraph;
5912 use routing::router::get_route;
5913 use util::test_utils;
5914 use util::config::UserConfig;
5915 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
5917 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
5918 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
5919 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, Transaction, TxOut};
5921 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
5925 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
5926 node: &'a ChannelManager<InMemorySigner,
5927 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
5928 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
5929 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
5930 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
5931 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>
5936 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
5937 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
5940 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
5941 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
5942 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
5944 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
5945 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
5947 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
5948 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
5950 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
5951 config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
5953 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
5954 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
5955 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
5956 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
5957 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
5959 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
5961 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
5963 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
5964 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
5965 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
5966 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
5967 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
5969 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
5971 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
5973 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
5974 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
5975 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
5976 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
5977 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
5980 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
5981 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
5982 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
5984 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
5985 } else { panic!(); }
5987 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
5988 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
5990 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
5993 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5996 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
5997 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
5999 node_a.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
6000 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6001 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
6002 match msg_events[0] {
6003 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref msg, .. } => {
6004 node_b.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
6005 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
6009 match msg_events[1] {
6010 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
6014 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
6016 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
6017 macro_rules! send_payment {
6018 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
6019 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
6020 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &dummy_graph, &$node_b.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()),
6021 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), &[], 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a).unwrap();
6023 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
6024 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
6026 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
6027 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, 0).unwrap();
6029 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
6030 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
6031 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6032 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
6033 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
6034 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6035 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
6036 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
6038 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
6039 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
6040 assert!($node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
6042 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
6043 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
6044 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
6045 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6046 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6048 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
6051 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
6052 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6053 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
6054 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
6056 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
6061 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
6062 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);