1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`find_route`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 //! [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
24 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
25 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
33 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
36 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
37 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
38 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
39 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
40 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
41 // construct one themselves.
42 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
43 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
44 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
45 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
46 use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
47 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
48 use crate::routing::router::{DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, RoutePath, Router};
49 use crate::routing::scoring::ProbabilisticScorer;
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
53 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
55 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
56 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment};
57 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
58 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, ChannelSigner};
59 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig};
60 use crate::util::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
61 use crate::util::events;
62 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
63 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
64 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
65 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
66 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
68 use alloc::collections::BTreeMap;
71 use crate::prelude::*;
73 use core::cell::RefCell;
75 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
76 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
77 use core::time::Duration;
80 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
81 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, Retry};
83 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
85 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
86 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
87 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
89 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
90 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
91 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
92 // before we forward it.
94 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
95 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
96 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
97 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
98 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
100 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
101 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
103 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
104 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
105 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
106 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
109 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
110 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
111 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
114 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
115 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
119 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
120 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
121 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
122 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
123 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
124 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
125 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
126 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
129 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
130 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
131 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
132 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
135 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
136 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
137 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
138 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
139 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
142 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
143 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
145 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
146 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
147 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
150 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
151 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
153 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
154 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
157 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
158 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
161 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
165 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
166 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
167 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
168 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
169 short_channel_id: u64,
171 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
172 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
174 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
175 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
180 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
182 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
183 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
184 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
186 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
187 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
190 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
191 struct ClaimableHTLC {
192 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
194 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
196 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
198 /// The sum total of all MPP parts
202 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
203 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
204 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
205 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
207 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
208 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
213 impl Readable for PaymentId {
214 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
215 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
220 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
221 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
222 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
223 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
225 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
226 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
231 impl Readable for InterceptId {
232 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
233 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
237 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
238 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
239 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
240 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
241 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
244 session_priv: SecretKey,
245 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
246 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
247 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
248 payment_id: PaymentId,
249 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
250 /// Note that this is now "deprecated" - we write it for forwards (and read it for
251 /// backwards) compatibility reasons, but prefer to use the data in the
252 /// [`super::outbound_payment`] module, which stores per-payment data once instead of in
254 payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters>,
257 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
258 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
259 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
261 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
263 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
265 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat, payment_params } => {
268 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
269 payment_id.hash(hasher);
270 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
271 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
272 payment_params.hash(hasher);
277 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
280 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
281 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
283 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
284 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
285 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
286 payment_secret: None,
287 payment_params: None,
292 struct ReceiveError {
298 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
299 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
301 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
302 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
303 pub enum FailureCode {
304 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
305 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
306 TemporaryNodeFailure = 0x2000 | 2,
307 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
308 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
309 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing = 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
310 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
311 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
312 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
313 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
314 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails = 0x4000 | 15,
317 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>);
319 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
320 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
321 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
322 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
323 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
325 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
326 err: msgs::LightningError,
327 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
328 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
330 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
332 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
334 err: LightningError {
336 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
337 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
344 shutdown_finish: None,
348 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
350 err: LightningError {
352 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
355 shutdown_finish: None,
359 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
360 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
363 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
365 err: LightningError {
367 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
368 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
374 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
375 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
379 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
382 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
384 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
385 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
389 log_level: Level::Warn,
392 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
394 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
396 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
398 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
399 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
407 shutdown_finish: None,
412 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
413 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
414 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
415 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
416 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
418 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
419 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
420 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
421 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
422 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
423 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
424 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
426 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
430 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
431 struct ClaimingPayment {
433 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
434 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
436 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
437 (0, amount_msat, required),
438 (2, payment_purpose, required),
439 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
442 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
443 struct ClaimablePayments {
444 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
445 /// failed/claimed by the user.
447 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
448 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
450 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
451 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
452 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, (events::PaymentPurpose, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>)>,
454 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
455 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
456 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
457 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
460 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
461 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
462 /// quite some time lag.
463 enum BackgroundEvent {
464 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
465 /// commitment transaction.
466 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
469 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
470 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
471 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
472 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
473 /// event can be generated.
474 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
475 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user.
476 EmitEvent { event: events::Event },
479 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
480 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
481 (2, EmitEvent) => { (0, event, ignorable) },
484 /// State we hold per-peer.
485 pub(super) struct PeerState<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
486 /// `temporary_channel_id` or `channel_id` -> `channel`.
488 /// Holds all channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once a channel has been assigned a
489 /// `channel_id`, the `temporary_channel_id` key in the map is updated and is replaced by the
491 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
492 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
493 latest_features: InitFeatures,
494 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
495 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
496 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
497 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
498 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
500 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
501 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
502 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
503 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
505 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
506 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
507 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
508 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
509 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
510 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
511 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
512 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
513 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
514 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
518 impl <Signer: ChannelSigner> PeerState<Signer> {
519 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
520 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
521 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
522 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
523 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
526 self.channel_by_id.is_empty() && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
530 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
531 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
533 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
536 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
537 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
538 struct PendingInboundPayment {
539 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
540 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
541 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
542 /// this payment being removed.
544 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
545 user_payment_id: u64,
546 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
547 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
548 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
551 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
552 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
553 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
554 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
555 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
556 /// that implements KeysInterface or Router for its keys manager and router, respectively, but this
557 /// type alias chooses the concrete types of KeysManager and DefaultRouter.
559 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
560 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
568 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
570 Arc<Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>
575 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
576 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
577 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
578 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
579 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
580 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
581 /// that implements KeysInterface or Router for its keys manager and router, respectively, but this
582 /// type alias chooses the concrete types of KeysManager and DefaultRouter.
584 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
585 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<&'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e DefaultRouter<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L, &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>>, &'g L>;
587 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
588 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
590 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
591 /// to individual Channels.
593 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
594 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
595 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
596 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
598 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
599 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
600 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
601 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
602 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
603 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
604 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
606 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
607 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
608 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
609 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
612 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
613 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
614 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
615 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
616 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
618 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
619 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
620 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
621 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
622 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
625 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
626 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
627 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
628 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
629 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
633 // `total_consistency_lock`
635 // |__`forward_htlcs`
637 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
639 // |__`per_peer_state`
641 // | |__`pending_inbound_payments`
643 // | |__`claimable_payments`
645 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
651 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
653 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
657 // | |__`pending_events`
659 // | |__`pending_background_events`
661 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
663 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
664 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
665 ES::Target: EntropySource,
666 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
667 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
668 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
672 default_configuration: UserConfig,
673 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
674 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
680 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
682 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
684 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
685 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
687 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
688 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
689 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
690 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
692 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
693 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
695 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
696 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
697 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
698 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
699 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
700 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
701 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
702 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
704 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
706 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
707 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
709 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
711 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
712 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
713 /// and via the classic SCID.
715 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
716 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
718 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
720 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
722 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
723 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
724 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
726 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
727 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
729 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
730 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
732 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
733 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
735 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
736 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
737 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
738 /// active channel list on load.
740 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
741 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
743 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
745 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
746 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
747 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
749 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
750 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
751 /// the handling of the events.
753 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
754 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
757 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
758 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
759 /// would break backwards compatability.
760 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
761 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
762 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
764 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
765 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
767 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
769 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
770 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
771 /// confirmation depth.
773 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
774 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
775 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
777 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
779 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
781 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
783 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
785 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
787 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
788 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
789 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
791 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
792 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
794 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
795 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
796 /// keeping additional state.
797 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
799 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
800 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
801 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
802 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
804 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
805 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
807 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
808 /// are currently open with that peer.
810 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
811 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
814 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
816 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
817 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
818 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
819 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
820 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
822 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
823 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
824 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
825 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
826 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
827 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
828 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
829 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
830 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
831 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
832 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
834 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
843 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
845 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
846 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
847 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
848 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
849 pub struct ChainParameters {
850 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
851 pub network: Network,
853 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
855 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
856 pub best_block: BestBlock,
859 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
865 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
866 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
867 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
868 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
869 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
870 /// updates are ready for persistence).
872 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
873 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
874 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
875 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
876 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
878 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
879 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
882 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
883 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
884 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
887 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
888 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
890 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
891 persistence_notifier: notifier,
892 should_persist: persist_check,
893 _read_guard: read_guard,
898 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
900 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
901 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
906 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
907 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
909 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
911 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
912 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
913 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
914 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
915 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
917 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
918 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
920 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
922 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
923 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
924 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
925 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
926 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
927 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
928 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
929 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
930 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
931 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
932 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
933 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
934 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
936 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
937 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
939 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
940 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
941 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
942 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
944 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
945 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
946 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
947 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
948 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
949 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
952 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
954 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
955 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
958 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
960 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
961 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
963 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
964 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
965 /// [`OutboundPayments::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
966 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
968 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
969 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
970 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
971 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
972 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
973 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
974 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
975 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
976 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
977 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
978 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
981 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
982 /// to better separate parameters.
983 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
984 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
985 /// The node_id of our counterparty
986 pub node_id: PublicKey,
987 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
988 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
989 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
990 pub features: InitFeatures,
991 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
992 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
993 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
995 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
997 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
998 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
999 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1000 /// payments to us through this channel.
1001 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1002 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1003 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1004 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1005 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1006 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1007 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1010 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
1011 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1012 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1013 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1014 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1015 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1016 /// lifetime of the channel.
1017 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1018 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1019 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1020 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1021 /// our counterparty already.
1023 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1024 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1025 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1026 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1028 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1029 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1030 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1031 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1033 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1034 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1036 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1037 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1039 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1040 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1041 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1042 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1043 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1044 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1045 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1046 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1047 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1050 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1052 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1053 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1054 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1055 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1056 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1057 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1058 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1060 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1061 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1063 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1064 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1065 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1066 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1067 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1068 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1069 /// this value on chain.
1071 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1073 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1075 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1076 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1077 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or a random value if the channel was
1078 /// inbound. This may be zero for inbound channels serialized with LDK versions prior to
1080 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1081 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1082 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1083 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1085 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1086 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1087 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1088 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1090 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1091 pub balance_msat: u64,
1092 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1093 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1094 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1095 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1097 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1099 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1100 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1101 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1102 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1103 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1104 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1105 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1106 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1108 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1109 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1110 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1111 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1112 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1113 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1114 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1116 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1117 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1118 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1119 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1120 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1121 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1122 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1123 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1124 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1126 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1128 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1129 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1130 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1131 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1132 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1134 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1135 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1136 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1137 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1138 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1139 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1140 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1142 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1143 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1144 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1145 pub is_outbound: bool,
1146 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1147 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1148 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1149 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1150 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1152 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1153 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1154 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1155 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1157 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1158 pub is_usable: bool,
1159 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1160 pub is_public: bool,
1161 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1162 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1163 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1164 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1165 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1166 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1168 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1169 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1172 impl ChannelDetails {
1173 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1174 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1175 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1177 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1178 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1179 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1180 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1183 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1184 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1185 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1187 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1188 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1189 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1190 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1194 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1195 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1196 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1197 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1198 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1200 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1202 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1203 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1204 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1207 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1208 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1209 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1211 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1212 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1213 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1215 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1216 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1217 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1219 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1220 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1224 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1226 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
1228 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1229 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1230 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1231 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1233 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1234 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1235 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1238 macro_rules! handle_error {
1239 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
1242 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1243 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1244 // entering the macro.
1245 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1246 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1248 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1250 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1251 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1252 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1253 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1257 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1258 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1259 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1260 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1265 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1266 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1268 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1269 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1270 action: err.action.clone()
1274 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1275 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1276 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1277 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1278 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1282 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1289 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1290 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {{
1291 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.channel_id());
1292 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1293 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1294 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1296 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1297 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1298 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1299 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1300 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1302 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1303 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1305 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1309 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1310 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1311 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1313 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1314 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1316 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1317 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1319 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1320 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1321 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel);
1322 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1323 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1324 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1330 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1331 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1335 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1337 $entry.remove_entry();
1345 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1346 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1350 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1352 $entry.remove_entry();
1360 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1361 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1363 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1364 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, channel);
1370 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_res {
1371 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
1373 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1374 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
1375 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $chan);
1376 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
1377 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
1378 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
1379 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
1380 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
1381 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
1382 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
1383 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
1384 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
1385 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.get_user_id(),
1386 $chan.force_shutdown(false), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
1389 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1390 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update in progress. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations",
1391 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
1392 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
1393 match $action_type {
1394 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
1395 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
1397 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
1398 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
1400 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
1401 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len(),
1402 (&$failed_finalized_fulfills as &Vec<HTLCSource>).len());
1403 if !$resend_commitment {
1404 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
1407 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
1409 $chan.monitor_updating_paused($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
1410 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
1412 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
1417 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
1418 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
1420 $entry.remove_entry();
1424 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY) => { {
1425 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
1426 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1428 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, NO_UPDATE) => {
1429 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1431 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_channel_ready: expr, OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED) => {
1432 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, false, $resend_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1434 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1435 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1437 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1438 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new())
1442 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1443 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1444 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1445 node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1446 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1448 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1449 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1450 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1451 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1452 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1453 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1454 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1455 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1456 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1457 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1462 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1463 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1464 if $channel.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1466 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1467 pending_events.push(events::Event::ChannelReady {
1468 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1469 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1470 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1471 channel_type: $channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
1474 $channel.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1479 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1481 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
1482 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1483 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1484 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1485 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1486 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1490 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1492 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1493 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1495 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1497 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1498 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1499 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1500 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1501 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1502 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1503 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1504 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1506 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1507 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1508 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
1513 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1515 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1516 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1517 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
1518 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1519 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
1520 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1521 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1522 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1524 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1527 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1528 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1530 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1532 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1534 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1536 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1537 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1538 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1539 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
1549 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
1550 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1551 &self.default_configuration
1554 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1555 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1556 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1559 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1560 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1562 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
1564 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1568 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1573 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1575 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1576 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1577 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
1578 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
1579 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
1581 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1582 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1584 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1585 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1586 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1588 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1589 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1590 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1591 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1592 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1593 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1595 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1596 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1597 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1598 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1599 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1600 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1603 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1604 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1605 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1607 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1609 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
1610 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
1612 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1614 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
1615 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1616 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1617 match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
1618 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
1619 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
1623 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
1628 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1630 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1631 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1632 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1634 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1636 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1639 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1642 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1643 node_id: their_network_key,
1646 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1649 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1650 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
1651 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
1652 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
1653 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
1654 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
1655 // the same channel.
1656 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
1658 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1659 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1660 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
1661 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1662 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1663 for (channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1664 let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
1665 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1666 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1667 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1668 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1669 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1670 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1671 features: peer_state.latest_features.clone(),
1672 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1673 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1674 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1675 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1676 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1677 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1678 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1679 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
1680 Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1681 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1683 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1684 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1685 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1686 channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1687 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1688 outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1689 inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1690 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1691 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1692 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1693 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1694 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1695 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1696 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1697 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1698 confirmations: Some(channel.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1699 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1700 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1701 is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(),
1702 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1703 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1704 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1705 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1706 config: Some(channel.config()),
1714 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1715 /// more information.
1716 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1717 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1720 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to [`find_route`]
1721 /// to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1723 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1724 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1727 /// [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
1728 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1729 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1730 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1731 // really wanted anyway.
1732 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1735 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
1736 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1738 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
1739 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
1740 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
1742 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
1743 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
1744 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
1745 .filter_map(|(_, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
1746 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
1747 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
1748 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
1749 total_msat: *total_msat,
1752 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
1753 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
1755 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
1756 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
1758 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
1763 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1764 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1765 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1766 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1767 Some(transaction) => {
1768 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1772 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1773 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1774 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1775 reason: closure_reason
1779 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1780 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1782 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1783 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1784 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1786 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
1787 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
1789 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1790 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1791 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1792 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1793 let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?;
1794 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1796 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1797 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1798 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &monitor_update);
1799 let (result, is_permanent) =
1800 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
1802 remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
1807 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1808 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
1812 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1813 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
1814 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1815 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1819 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1823 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id) })
1827 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1828 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
1829 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
1830 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
1833 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
1837 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1838 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1839 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1841 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1842 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1844 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1845 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1846 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1847 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1849 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1851 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1852 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1853 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1854 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1855 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None)
1858 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1859 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1860 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1862 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1863 /// the channel being closed or not:
1864 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1865 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1866 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1867 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1868 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1869 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1870 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1872 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1874 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1875 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1876 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1877 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1878 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1882 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1883 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1884 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1885 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1886 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
1887 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
1888 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1889 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
1891 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1892 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1893 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1894 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1895 // ignore the result here.
1896 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
1900 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
1901 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
1902 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
1903 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1904 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1905 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
1906 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
1908 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1909 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1910 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1911 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
1912 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
1914 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1916 remove_channel!(self, chan)
1918 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), peer_node_id) });
1921 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1922 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(broadcast));
1923 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
1924 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1925 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1930 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
1933 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1934 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1935 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
1936 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
1937 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1938 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
1939 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1940 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
1941 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1942 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1943 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
1944 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
1955 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
1956 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
1957 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
1959 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
1960 -> Result<(), APIError> {
1961 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
1964 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
1965 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
1966 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
1968 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
1969 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
1970 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
1971 -> Result<(), APIError> {
1972 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
1975 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
1976 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
1977 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
1978 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1979 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
1983 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
1984 /// local transaction(s).
1985 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
1986 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1987 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
1991 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
1992 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
1994 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1995 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != cltv_expiry {
1996 return Err(ReceiveError {
1997 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value",
1999 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2002 // final_expiry_too_soon
2003 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2004 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2006 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2007 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2008 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2009 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2010 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2011 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
2012 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
2013 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
2014 return Err(ReceiveError {
2015 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
2016 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2019 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
2020 return Err(ReceiveError {
2022 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
2023 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2027 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2028 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2029 return Err(ReceiveError {
2030 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2031 err_data: Vec::new(),
2032 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2035 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
2036 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2037 return Err(ReceiveError {
2038 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2039 err_data: Vec::new(),
2040 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2042 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2043 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2045 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2046 phantom_shared_secret,
2048 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2049 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2050 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2051 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2052 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2053 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2054 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2055 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2056 return Err(ReceiveError {
2057 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2058 err_data: Vec::new(),
2059 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2063 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2065 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2068 return Err(ReceiveError {
2069 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2070 err_data: Vec::new(),
2071 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2076 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2079 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2080 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2081 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_msat,
2082 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2086 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
2087 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2088 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2090 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2091 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2092 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2093 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2094 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2095 failure_code: $err_code,
2101 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2102 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2105 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
2106 Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
2107 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
2109 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2110 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2111 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2112 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2113 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2114 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2115 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2116 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2118 macro_rules! return_err {
2119 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2121 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2122 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2123 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2124 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2125 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2126 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2132 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2134 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2135 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2137 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2138 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2142 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2143 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2145 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2147 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2148 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2149 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2150 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2151 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2153 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2156 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2157 let new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2158 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2160 public_key: onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx, new_pubkey, &shared_secret),
2161 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2162 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2165 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2166 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2167 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2168 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2172 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2173 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2174 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2177 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2178 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2179 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2180 outgoing_amt_msat: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2181 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2186 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref outgoing_amt_msat, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2187 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2188 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2189 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2190 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2191 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
2192 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(short_channel_id).cloned();
2193 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
2194 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2195 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2196 // phantom or an intercept.
2197 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2198 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
2199 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)
2203 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2206 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
2208 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
2209 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2210 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
2211 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
2212 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2214 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2215 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2216 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2218 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
2219 // have no consistency guarantees.
2220 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2224 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2225 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2226 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2227 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2228 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2230 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2231 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2232 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2233 // we don't have the channel here.
2234 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2236 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2238 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2239 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2240 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2241 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2242 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2243 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2244 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2246 if *outgoing_amt_msat < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2247 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2249 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, *outgoing_amt_msat, *outgoing_cltv_value) {
2250 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2254 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
2255 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
2256 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
2257 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
2259 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2266 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2267 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2268 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2269 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2270 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2271 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2273 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2274 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2276 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2277 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2278 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2279 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2280 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2281 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2282 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2283 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2284 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2285 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2291 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2292 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2293 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2294 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2296 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2297 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2299 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2300 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2301 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2303 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2304 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2305 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2306 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
2307 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
2308 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
2309 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
2313 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2318 pending_forward_info
2321 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2322 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2323 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2325 /// Note that in `internal_closing_signed`, this function is called without the `peer_state`
2326 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
2327 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2328 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2329 if !chan.should_announce() {
2330 return Err(LightningError {
2331 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2332 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2335 if chan.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2336 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2338 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2339 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2342 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2343 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
2344 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2345 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2347 /// Note that through `internal_closing_signed`, this function is called without the
2348 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
2349 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2350 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2351 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2352 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
2353 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2357 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2359 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2360 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2361 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2363 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2364 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2366 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2367 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2368 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2369 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2370 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
2371 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2372 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2373 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2375 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
2376 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
2377 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
2379 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
2381 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2387 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
2388 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_params: &Option<PaymentParameters>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2389 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2390 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
2391 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2393 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2394 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
2395 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2396 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2397 return Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
2399 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2401 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2403 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2404 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2405 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2406 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
2409 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2410 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
2411 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!" })?;
2412 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2413 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2414 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
2415 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2416 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
2419 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(
2420 htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2422 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2423 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2425 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2426 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2427 }, onion_packet, &self.logger),
2430 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
2431 let update_err = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &monitor_update);
2432 let chan_id = chan.get().channel_id();
2434 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_err, chan,
2435 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true))
2437 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure, Err(e)) => break Err(e),
2438 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed, Ok(())) => {},
2439 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress, Err(_)) => {
2440 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
2441 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
2442 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
2443 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
2444 // which we do in the send_payment check for
2445 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
2446 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
2448 _ => unreachable!(),
2451 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan_id));
2452 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2453 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
2454 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2455 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
2456 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2457 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2458 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2467 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
2468 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
2469 // `channel_by_id` map.
2470 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
2471 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
2476 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2477 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2479 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2484 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2486 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
2487 /// fields for more info.
2489 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
2490 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
2492 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
2494 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
2495 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
2496 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
2497 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
2498 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
2500 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
2501 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
2502 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
2503 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
2504 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
2506 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
2507 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
2508 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
2509 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
2511 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
2513 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2514 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2515 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
2517 /// In general, a path may raise:
2518 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2519 /// node public key) is specified.
2520 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2521 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2523 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2524 /// relevant updates.
2526 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2527 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2528 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2530 /// # A caution on `payment_secret`
2532 /// `payment_secret` is unrelated to `payment_hash` (or [`PaymentPreimage`]) and exists to
2533 /// authenticate the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization)
2534 /// attacks. For newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one,
2535 /// the [`Route`] must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a
2536 /// recipient-provided `payment_secret`.
2538 /// If a `payment_secret` *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret
2539 /// feature bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the
2540 /// [`Route`], we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2542 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2543 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2544 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
2545 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
2546 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2547 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2548 self.pending_outbound_payments
2549 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2550 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2551 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2554 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment`], but will automatically find a route based on
2555 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
2556 pub fn send_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2557 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2558 self.pending_outbound_payments
2559 .send_payment(payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
2560 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
2561 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
2562 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2563 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2567 fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2568 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2569 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2570 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2571 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2575 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
2576 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2577 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
2581 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
2582 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
2583 /// retries are exhausted.
2585 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
2586 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
2588 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2589 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2590 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2592 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event is generated and we restart without this
2593 /// [`ChannelManager`] having been persisted, another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated.
2595 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2596 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2597 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2598 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2599 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, &self.pending_events);
2602 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2603 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2604 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2605 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2606 /// never reach the recipient.
2608 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
2609 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
2611 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2612 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2614 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2616 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2617 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
2618 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2619 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
2620 route, payment_preimage, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer,
2622 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2623 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2626 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
2627 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
2629 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
2632 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
2633 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
2634 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2635 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, payment_id,
2636 retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
2637 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2639 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2640 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2643 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
2644 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
2645 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
2646 pub fn send_probe(&self, hops: Vec<RouteHop>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2647 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2648 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(hops, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2649 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2650 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2653 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
2656 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
2657 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
2660 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2661 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2662 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
2663 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
2664 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2665 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2666 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2667 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2669 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2670 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2673 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2675 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2677 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2678 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2679 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2680 } else { unreachable!(); })
2683 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) }) },
2686 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2687 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2690 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2691 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2696 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2697 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2700 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2701 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2702 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2704 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2705 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
2706 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
2707 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
2716 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2717 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2718 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2722 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2724 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2725 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2727 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
2728 /// across the p2p network.
2730 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2731 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2733 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2734 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2735 /// keys per-channel).
2737 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2738 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2739 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2741 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2742 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2743 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2745 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
2746 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
2747 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
2748 /// for more details.
2750 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2751 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2752 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2753 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2755 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2756 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2757 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2758 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2763 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2764 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools at the next block. However, the modules
2765 // constituting our Lightning node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if
2766 // the wallet module is in advance on the LDK view, allow one more block of headroom.
2767 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 2 {
2768 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2769 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
2773 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2774 let mut output_index = None;
2775 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2776 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2777 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2778 if output_index.is_some() {
2779 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2780 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2783 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2784 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2785 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2788 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2791 if output_index.is_none() {
2792 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2793 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2796 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2800 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
2802 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
2803 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
2804 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
2805 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
2807 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
2808 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
2810 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
2811 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
2813 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
2815 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
2816 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
2817 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
2818 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
2819 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2820 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
2821 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
2822 pub fn update_channel_config(
2823 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
2824 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2825 if config.cltv_expiry_delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA {
2826 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2827 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
2831 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(
2832 &self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier,
2834 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2835 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2836 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2837 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2838 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2839 for channel_id in channel_ids {
2840 if !peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) {
2841 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2842 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
2846 for channel_id in channel_ids {
2847 let channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
2848 if !channel.update_config(config) {
2851 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
2852 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
2853 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
2854 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2855 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2863 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
2864 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
2866 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
2867 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
2869 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
2870 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
2871 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
2872 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
2873 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
2875 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
2876 /// you from forwarding more than you received.
2878 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
2881 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
2882 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
2883 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
2884 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
2885 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2886 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2888 let next_hop_scid = {
2889 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2890 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
2891 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
2892 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2893 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2894 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
2896 if !chan.is_usable() {
2897 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2898 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
2901 chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.outbound_scid_alias())
2903 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2904 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id), next_node_id)
2909 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
2910 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
2911 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
2914 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
2915 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
2916 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
2918 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
2920 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
2921 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
2924 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
2925 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
2926 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
2927 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
2928 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
2930 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
2934 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
2935 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
2937 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
2940 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
2941 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2942 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2944 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
2945 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
2946 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
2949 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
2950 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2951 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
2952 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
2953 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
2954 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
2955 phantom_shared_secret: None,
2958 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
2959 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
2960 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
2961 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
2966 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
2968 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
2969 /// Will likely generate further events.
2970 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
2971 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2973 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2974 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
2975 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
2977 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
2978 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
2980 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
2981 if short_chan_id != 0 {
2982 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
2984 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2985 match forward_info {
2986 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
2987 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
2988 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2989 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
2990 outgoing_cltv_value, incoming_amt_msat: _
2993 macro_rules! failure_handler {
2994 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
2995 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2997 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2998 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2999 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3000 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3001 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3002 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3005 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3006 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3008 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3011 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3012 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
3018 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3019 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3021 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3025 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3026 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3028 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3032 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3033 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3034 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
3035 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
3036 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3038 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3039 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3040 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3041 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3042 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3044 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3046 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3047 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3051 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3052 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
3053 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3054 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3060 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3063 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3066 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3067 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3068 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3069 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3070 // problem, not ours.
3076 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
3077 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3079 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3083 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3084 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3085 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3086 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3089 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3090 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3091 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3092 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3093 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3096 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3097 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3098 match forward_info {
3099 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3100 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id: _,
3101 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3102 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
3103 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, incoming_amt_msat: _,
3106 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3107 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3108 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3109 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3110 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3111 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3112 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3113 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3115 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
3116 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
3117 onion_packet, &self.logger)
3119 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3120 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3122 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3124 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3125 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3126 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
3127 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3132 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3133 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3135 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3136 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3137 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_fail_htlc(
3138 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
3140 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3141 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3143 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
3145 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3146 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3147 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3156 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3157 match forward_info {
3158 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3159 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3160 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3161 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, ..
3164 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret) = match routing {
3165 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3166 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3167 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data }, Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret)
3169 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3170 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage), None, None),
3172 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3175 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3176 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3177 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3178 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3179 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3180 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3181 phantom_shared_secret,
3183 value: outgoing_amt_msat,
3185 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
3190 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3191 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
3192 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3193 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3194 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
3196 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3197 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3198 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3199 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3200 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3201 phantom_shared_secret,
3203 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
3204 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
3208 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
3209 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3210 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3211 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3212 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3215 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3216 ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3217 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
3219 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3220 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3221 payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
3224 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3225 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3226 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3229 let (_, htlcs) = claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
3230 .or_insert_with(|| (purpose(), Vec::new()));
3231 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3232 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3233 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3234 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3238 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.value;
3239 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3240 total_value += htlc.value;
3241 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3242 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3243 if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat {
3244 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3245 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3246 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3248 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3250 _ => unreachable!(),
3253 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > $payment_data.total_msat {
3254 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
3255 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, $payment_data.total_msat);
3256 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3257 } else if total_value == $payment_data.total_msat {
3258 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3259 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3260 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3261 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3264 amount_msat: total_value,
3265 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3266 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3268 payment_claimable_generated = true;
3270 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3271 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3273 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3275 payment_claimable_generated
3279 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3280 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3281 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3282 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3283 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3284 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3285 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3286 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3287 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3288 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3289 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3290 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3291 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3292 Ok(result) => result,
3294 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3295 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3299 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
3300 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
3301 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
3302 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
3303 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
3304 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3308 check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
3310 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3311 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3312 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3313 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3316 match claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
3317 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3318 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
3319 e.insert((purpose.clone(), vec![claimable_htlc]));
3320 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3321 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3322 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3324 amount_msat: outgoing_amt_msat,
3326 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3327 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3330 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3331 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3332 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3338 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3339 if payment_data.is_none() {
3340 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3341 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3344 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3345 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3346 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3347 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3348 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3349 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3350 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3351 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3353 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3354 if payment_claimable_generated {
3355 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3361 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3362 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3370 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3371 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
3372 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3373 &self.pending_events, &self.logger,
3374 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3375 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv));
3377 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3378 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3380 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3382 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
3383 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
3384 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
3386 self.check_free_holding_cells();
3388 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3389 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3390 events.append(&mut new_events);
3393 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3395 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3396 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3398 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3399 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3400 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3401 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3402 if background_events.is_empty() {
3406 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3408 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3409 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3410 // monitor updating completing.
3411 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
3418 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3419 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3420 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3421 self.process_background_events();
3424 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
3425 if !chan.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; }
3426 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3427 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
3428 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3429 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3430 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3432 if !chan.is_live() {
3433 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3434 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3435 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3437 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3438 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3440 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.logger);
3441 NotifyOption::DoPersist
3445 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3446 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3447 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3448 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3449 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3450 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3451 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3453 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3455 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3456 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3457 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3458 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3459 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
3460 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3461 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3469 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3471 /// This currently includes:
3472 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3473 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3474 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3476 /// * Expiring a channel's previous `ChannelConfig` if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
3477 /// with the current `ChannelConfig`.
3478 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
3480 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
3481 /// estimate fetches.
3482 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3483 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3484 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3485 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3487 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3489 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
3490 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
3491 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
3493 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3494 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3495 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3496 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3497 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
3498 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
3499 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3500 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3501 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3503 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3504 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
3505 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
3506 if needs_close { return false; }
3509 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3510 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3511 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3512 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3513 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3514 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3515 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3516 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3520 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3521 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3523 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3524 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3525 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3529 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3530 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3535 chan.maybe_expire_prev_config();
3539 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
3540 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
3545 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
3546 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
3547 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
3548 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
3549 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
3550 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
3551 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
3552 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
3553 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3554 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
3555 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
3556 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
3557 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
3558 // have no channels to the peer.
3559 let remove_entry = {
3560 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
3561 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
3564 entry.remove_entry();
3567 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
3572 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
3573 if htlcs.is_empty() {
3574 // This should be unreachable
3575 debug_assert!(false);
3578 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3579 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
3580 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
3581 if htlcs[0].total_msat == htlcs.iter().fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.value) {
3583 } else if htlcs.into_iter().any(|htlc| {
3584 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
3585 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3587 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(htlcs.drain(..).map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
3594 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
3595 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
3596 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
3597 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
3598 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
3601 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3602 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3605 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self.pending_events);
3607 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
3608 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
3609 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
3610 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
3611 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3618 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3619 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3620 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3622 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
3623 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
3624 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
3625 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
3627 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
3628 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
3629 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
3630 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
3631 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
3632 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, &FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
3635 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
3636 /// reason for the failure.
3638 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
3639 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: &FailureCode) {
3640 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3642 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
3643 if let Some((_, mut sources)) = removed_source {
3644 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3645 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
3646 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
3647 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
3648 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3653 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
3654 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: &FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
3655 match failure_code {
3656 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(*failure_code as u16),
3657 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(*failure_code as u16),
3658 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
3659 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3660 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
3661 HTLCFailReason::reason(*failure_code as u16, htlc_msat_height_data)
3666 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3667 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3669 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
3671 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3672 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
3673 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
3674 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
3675 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
3676 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
3677 chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
3679 chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
3681 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
3682 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
3684 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3689 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3690 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3691 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3692 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
3693 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
3694 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
3695 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3696 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
3697 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
3698 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3700 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3701 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3702 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3703 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
3705 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
3706 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
3707 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
3708 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
3709 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3713 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3714 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3715 // be surfaced to the user.
3716 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
3717 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
3718 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
3720 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
3721 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3722 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
3723 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3724 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3725 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3726 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3727 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
3729 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3731 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
3734 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3735 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
3736 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
3737 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3741 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3742 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
3743 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
3744 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
3745 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
3746 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
3747 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
3748 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
3749 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
3752 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3753 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3754 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3757 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3758 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3759 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3761 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, ref payment_params, .. } => {
3762 self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_params, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx, &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
3764 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint }) => {
3765 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), onion_error);
3766 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
3768 let mut forward_event = None;
3769 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
3770 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3771 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
3773 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
3774 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3775 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
3777 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3778 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
3781 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
3782 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3783 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
3784 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3785 time_forwardable: time
3788 pending_events.push(events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
3789 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
3790 failed_next_destination: destination,
3796 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
3797 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
3799 /// Note that calling this method does *not* guarantee that the payment has been claimed. You
3800 /// *must* wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] event which upon a successful claim will be
3801 /// provided to your [`EventHandler`] when [`process_pending_events`] is next called.
3803 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
3804 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
3805 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
3806 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
3808 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
3809 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
3810 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
3811 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3812 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3813 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
3814 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3816 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3819 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3820 if let Some((payment_purpose, sources)) = claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
3821 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3822 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3823 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3824 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3825 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3826 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
3831 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
3832 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: sources.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
3833 payment_purpose, receiver_node_id,
3835 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
3836 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
3837 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
3838 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3843 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
3845 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we check that all channels which contain a claimable
3846 // HTLC still exist. While this isn't guaranteed to remain true if a channel closes while
3847 // we're claiming (or even after we claim, before the commitment update dance completes),
3848 // it should be a relatively rare race, and we'd rather not claim HTLCs that require us to
3849 // go on-chain (and lose the on-chain fee to do so) than just reject the payment.
3851 // Note that we'll still always get our funds - as long as the generated
3852 // `ChannelMonitorUpdate` makes it out to the relevant monitor we can claim on-chain.
3854 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
3855 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
3856 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
3857 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
3858 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
3860 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
3861 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
3862 let mut valid_mpp = true;
3863 let mut errs = Vec::new();
3864 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3865 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3866 let (counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3867 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3874 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3875 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3880 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3881 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3883 if peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&chan_id).is_none() {
3888 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
3889 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
3890 debug_assert!(false);
3895 expected_amt_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
3896 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload {
3897 // We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check
3898 // that there's one payment here and move on.
3899 if sources.len() != 1 {
3900 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP spontaneous payment - this should not be reachable!");
3901 debug_assert!(false);
3907 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
3909 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3910 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
3911 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
3912 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
3915 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
3916 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
3917 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
3918 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
3922 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3923 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
3924 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
3925 |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
3927 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
3928 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
3929 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
3930 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
3931 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
3936 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3937 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3938 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
3939 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
3940 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
3941 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
3942 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3944 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
3947 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
3948 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
3949 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3950 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
3954 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
3955 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
3956 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
3957 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
3959 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3960 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
3962 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3963 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
3967 let mut peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
3968 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id).map(
3969 |peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap()
3973 if let Some(hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan)) = peer_state_opt.as_mut().map(|peer_state| peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id))
3975 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3976 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
3977 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
3978 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
3979 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &monitor_update) {
3980 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
3982 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
3983 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3984 payment_preimage, e);
3985 let err = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err();
3986 mem::drop(peer_state_opt);
3987 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3988 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)));
3989 return Err((counterparty_node_id, err));
3992 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
3993 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
3994 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3995 peer_state_opt.as_mut().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3996 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
3997 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3998 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3999 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
4000 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4001 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4007 mem::drop(peer_state_opt);
4008 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4009 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)));
4015 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
4016 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &monitor_update) {
4017 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4019 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
4020 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
4021 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same update and try
4022 // again on restart.
4023 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
4024 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
4025 payment_preimage, e);
4028 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
4030 chan.remove_entry();
4032 mem::drop(peer_state_opt);
4033 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4034 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
4035 Err((counterparty_node_id, res))
4039 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4040 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4041 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4045 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4046 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
4047 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
4048 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
4049 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
4050 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
4051 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
4052 // again on restart.
4053 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4054 payment_preimage, update_res);
4056 mem::drop(peer_state_opt);
4057 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4058 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
4059 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
4060 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
4061 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
4062 // `PaymentForwarded`).
4063 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
4068 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4069 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
4072 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
4074 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4075 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage, session_priv, path, from_onchain, &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
4077 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4078 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4079 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
4080 |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
4081 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4082 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4083 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4086 let prev_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
4087 let next_channel_id = Some(next_channel_id);
4089 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4091 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4097 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
4098 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4099 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4105 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4106 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4107 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4110 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
4111 for action in actions.into_iter() {
4113 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
4114 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4115 if let Some(ClaimingPayment { amount_msat, payment_purpose: purpose, receiver_node_id }) = payment {
4116 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
4117 payment_hash, purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4121 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event } => {
4122 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(event);
4128 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
4129 /// update completion.
4130 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4131 channel: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
4132 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
4133 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
4134 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
4135 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
4136 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
4138 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get_counterparty_node_id();
4139 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4140 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.outbound_scid_alias()),
4141 channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
4144 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4145 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
4147 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
4148 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4149 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4154 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel);
4156 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
4157 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
4158 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4159 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4164 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
4165 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
4166 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4167 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4168 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4173 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
4177 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
4183 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
4184 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
4185 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4191 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
4192 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4195 let (mut pending_failures, finalized_claims, counterparty_node_id) = {
4196 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
4197 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4199 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
4200 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
4201 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4202 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4203 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4208 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4209 let mut peer_state_lock;
4210 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4211 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
4212 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4213 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4215 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()){
4216 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4217 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4220 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4224 let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, &self.default_configuration, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
4225 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() {
4226 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
4227 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
4228 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
4229 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
4231 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()) {
4232 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4233 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4238 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, channel.get_mut(), updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready, updates.announcement_sigs);
4239 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4240 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4243 (updates.failed_htlcs, updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs, counterparty_node_id)
4245 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
4246 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
4248 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claims);
4249 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4250 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id: funding_txo.to_channel_id() };
4251 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
4255 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4257 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4258 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4261 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4262 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4263 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4265 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
4266 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
4267 /// used to accept such channels.
4269 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4270 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4271 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4272 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4275 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4276 /// it as confirmed immediately.
4278 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4279 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4280 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4282 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4283 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
4285 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
4286 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
4288 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
4289 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
4291 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4292 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4293 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4294 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
4297 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4298 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4300 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4301 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4302 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4303 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4304 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4305 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4306 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4307 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4308 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4311 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
4312 } else if channel.get().get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4313 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4314 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4315 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4316 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
4319 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4320 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4321 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
4324 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4325 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4326 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4329 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4330 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) });
4336 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4337 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4338 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4341 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4342 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4345 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
4346 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
4347 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
4349 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4350 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4351 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4353 debug_assert!(false);
4354 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
4356 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4357 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4358 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
4359 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration,
4360 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4363 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4364 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4368 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4369 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4370 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4371 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4373 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4374 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4375 if channel.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4376 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4378 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4379 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4380 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4383 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4384 pending_events.push(
4385 events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4386 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4387 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4388 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4389 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4390 channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4395 entry.insert(channel);
4401 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4402 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4403 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4404 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4406 debug_assert!(false);
4407 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
4409 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4410 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4411 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4412 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4413 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), chan);
4414 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4416 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4419 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4420 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4421 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4422 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4423 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4425 user_channel_id: user_id,
4430 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4431 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4432 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4434 debug_assert!(false);
4435 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
4437 let ((funding_msg, monitor, mut channel_ready), mut chan) = {
4438 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4439 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4440 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4441 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4442 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4443 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan), chan.remove())
4445 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4448 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the peer_state
4449 // lock before watch_channel
4450 match self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
4451 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4452 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
4453 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4454 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4455 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4456 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4457 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
4458 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
4459 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4460 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(false);
4461 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4462 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
4464 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
4465 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4466 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4467 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
4468 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4469 chan.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, channel_ready.is_some(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4470 channel_ready = None; // Don't send the channel_ready now
4473 // It's safe to unwrap as we've held the `per_peer_state` read lock since checking that the
4474 // peer exists, despite the inner PeerState potentially having no channels after removing
4475 // the channel above.
4476 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4477 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4478 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4479 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4480 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4482 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4483 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4484 match id_to_peer.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
4485 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4486 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4487 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
4488 funding_msg.channel_id))
4490 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
4491 i_e.insert(chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
4494 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4495 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4498 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4499 send_channel_ready!(self, peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
4507 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4509 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4510 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4511 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4513 debug_assert!(false);
4514 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4517 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4518 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4519 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4520 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4521 let (monitor, funding_tx, channel_ready) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger) {
4522 Ok(update) => update,
4523 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan),
4525 match self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
4526 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4528 let mut res = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, channel_ready.is_some(), OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED);
4529 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4530 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4531 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4532 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4533 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4534 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4540 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4541 send_channel_ready!(self, peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get(), msg);
4545 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4548 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
4549 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
4553 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4554 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4555 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4557 debug_assert!(false);
4558 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4560 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4561 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4562 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4563 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4564 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
4565 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
4566 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4567 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4568 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4569 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4570 msg: announcement_sigs,
4572 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4573 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4574 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4575 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4576 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4577 // announcement_signatures.
4578 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4579 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4580 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4581 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4587 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, chan.get_mut());
4591 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4595 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4596 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4597 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4598 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4599 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4601 debug_assert!(false);
4602 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4604 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4605 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4606 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4607 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4609 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4610 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4611 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4612 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4615 let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_entry);
4616 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4618 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4619 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
4620 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &monitor_update);
4621 let (result, is_permanent) =
4622 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
4624 remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
4629 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4630 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4631 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4638 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4641 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4642 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
4643 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
4644 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
4647 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
4651 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4652 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4653 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4655 debug_assert!(false);
4656 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4658 let (tx, chan_option) = {
4659 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4660 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4661 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4662 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4663 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
4664 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
4665 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4666 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4671 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
4672 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
4673 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
4674 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
4675 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
4676 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
4677 } else { (tx, None) }
4679 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4682 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
4683 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
4684 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
4686 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
4687 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4688 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4689 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4690 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4694 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4699 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4700 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
4701 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
4702 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
4704 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
4705 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
4706 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
4707 //but we should prevent it anyway.
4709 let pending_forward_info = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
4710 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4711 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4713 debug_assert!(false);
4714 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4716 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4717 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4718 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4719 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4721 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
4722 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
4723 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
4724 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
4725 match pending_forward_info {
4726 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
4727 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
4728 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
4729 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
4731 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
4732 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
4733 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4734 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
4735 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4738 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
4740 _ => pending_forward_info
4743 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), chan);
4745 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4750 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4751 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
4752 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4753 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4755 debug_assert!(false);
4756 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4758 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4759 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4760 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4761 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4762 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan)
4764 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4767 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
4771 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4772 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4773 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4775 debug_assert!(false);
4776 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4778 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4779 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4780 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4781 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4782 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan);
4784 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4789 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4790 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4791 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4793 debug_assert!(false);
4794 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4796 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4797 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4798 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4799 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4800 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
4801 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
4802 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
4804 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan);
4807 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4811 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4812 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4813 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4815 debug_assert!(false);
4816 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4818 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4819 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4820 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4821 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4822 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
4823 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
4824 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan),
4825 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
4826 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
4827 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &update);
4828 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan);
4833 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &monitor_update);
4834 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some()) {
4838 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4839 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4840 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4842 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
4843 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4844 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4845 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4846 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4847 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4848 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4849 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4851 commitment_signed: msg,
4857 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4862 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
4863 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
4864 let mut forward_event = None;
4865 let mut new_intercept_events = Vec::new();
4866 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
4867 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4868 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4869 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
4870 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
4871 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
4872 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
4874 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
4875 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
4877 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4878 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
4879 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
4880 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4881 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4882 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
4884 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4885 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
4886 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
4888 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
4889 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4890 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
4891 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4892 new_intercept_events.push(events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
4893 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
4894 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
4895 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
4896 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
4899 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4900 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
4902 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4903 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
4904 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4905 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4906 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4907 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4908 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4909 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4912 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
4913 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
4914 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
4919 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
4920 // payments are being processed.
4921 if forward_htlcs_empty {
4922 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
4924 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4925 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
4932 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
4933 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4936 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
4937 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4938 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
4941 match forward_event {
4943 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4944 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
4945 time_forwardable: time
4953 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4954 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
4956 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4957 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4959 debug_assert!(false);
4960 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4962 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4963 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4964 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4965 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4966 let was_paused_for_mon_update = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
4967 let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self,
4968 chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
4969 htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs;
4970 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &raa_updates.monitor_update);
4971 if was_paused_for_mon_update {
4972 assert!(update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
4973 assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none());
4974 assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty());
4975 assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4976 assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty());
4977 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Existing pending monitor update prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
4979 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
4980 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan,
4981 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
4982 raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(), false,
4983 raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4984 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
4986 } else { unreachable!(); }
4988 if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update {
4989 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4990 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4994 break Ok((raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4995 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs,
4996 chan.get().get_short_channel_id()
4997 .unwrap_or(chan.get().outbound_scid_alias()),
4998 chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(),
4999 chan.get().get_user_id()))
5001 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5004 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
5006 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, finalized_claim_htlcs,
5007 short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, user_channel_id)) =>
5009 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
5010 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: channel_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5011 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
5013 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, user_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
5014 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claim_htlcs);
5021 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5022 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5023 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5025 debug_assert!(false);
5026 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5028 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5029 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5030 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5031 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5032 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
5034 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5039 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5040 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5041 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5043 debug_assert!(false);
5044 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5046 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5047 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5048 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5049 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5050 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
5051 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
5054 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5055 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
5056 &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
5057 msg, &self.default_configuration
5059 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5060 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5061 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap()),
5064 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5069 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
5070 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5071 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
5072 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
5074 // It's not a local channel
5075 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5078 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5079 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
5080 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
5081 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5083 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5084 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5085 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5086 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5087 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5088 if chan.get().should_announce() {
5089 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
5090 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
5091 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
5092 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5094 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
5096 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
5097 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
5098 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
5099 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5101 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
5102 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
5105 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5107 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
5110 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5112 let need_lnd_workaround = {
5113 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5115 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5117 debug_assert!(false);
5118 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5120 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5121 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5122 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5123 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5124 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
5125 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
5126 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
5127 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
5128 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
5129 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash,
5130 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
5131 let mut channel_update = None;
5132 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
5133 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5134 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5137 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
5138 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
5139 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
5140 // they have the latest channel parameters.
5141 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5142 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5143 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
5148 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
5149 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
5150 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
5151 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
5152 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
5153 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
5157 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5161 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
5162 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
5165 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
5166 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
5171 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
5172 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
5173 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5174 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5175 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5176 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5177 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
5178 match monitor_event {
5179 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5180 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5181 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5182 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
5184 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5185 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5186 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5187 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5190 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5191 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5192 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
5193 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
5195 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5196 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5197 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5198 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
5201 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
5202 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5203 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5204 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5205 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5206 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5207 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5208 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5209 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
5210 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5211 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5215 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5216 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5218 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5220 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
5221 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5222 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5223 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5224 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5231 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5232 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
5238 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5239 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5242 has_pending_monitor_events
5245 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5246 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5247 /// update events as a separate process method here.
5249 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5250 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
5253 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5254 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5255 /// update was applied.
5256 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5257 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5258 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5259 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5261 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5263 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5264 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5265 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5266 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5267 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5268 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
5269 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
5270 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5272 holding_cell_failed_htlcs,
5274 chan.get_counterparty_node_id()
5277 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
5278 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &monitor_update) {
5279 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
5280 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5281 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5282 updates: commitment_update,
5286 has_monitor_update = true;
5287 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, channel_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
5288 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
5289 if close_channel { return false; }
5296 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5297 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5298 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
5306 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5307 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5308 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
5311 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5312 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5318 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5319 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5320 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5321 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5322 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5323 let mut has_update = false;
5325 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5327 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5328 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5329 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5330 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5331 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5332 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5333 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5334 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5336 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5337 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5340 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5341 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5342 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5343 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5344 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5349 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5351 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5352 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
5353 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
5359 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5360 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5368 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5369 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5375 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5376 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5378 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5379 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5380 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5381 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5382 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5383 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5384 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5385 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5386 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5387 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5388 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5389 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5390 assert!(should_broadcast);
5391 } else { unreachable!(); }
5392 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
5394 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5398 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5399 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5401 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5402 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5405 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5407 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5408 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5409 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5410 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5411 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5412 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5413 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5414 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5415 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5416 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5417 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5418 // never fail a payment too early.
5419 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5421 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5424 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5429 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5432 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5433 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5435 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
5436 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
5437 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5438 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5440 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5442 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5443 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5447 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5448 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5450 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5452 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5453 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5455 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5456 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5457 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
5458 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
5459 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
5460 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5461 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
5462 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5463 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
5464 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5465 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
5468 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5469 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5471 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5474 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5476 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5478 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5479 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5480 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5481 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5482 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5485 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5486 /// stored external to LDK.
5488 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5489 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5490 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5492 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5493 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5496 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5497 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5498 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5499 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5501 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5502 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5503 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5504 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5505 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5507 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5508 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5509 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
5510 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5511 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
5513 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
5514 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
5516 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5517 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5521 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5522 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5524 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5526 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5527 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5529 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5530 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5531 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
5532 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5533 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
5534 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5535 min_final_cltv_expiry)
5538 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5539 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5541 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5544 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5546 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5548 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5549 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5552 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5553 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5555 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5556 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5557 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5560 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5561 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5563 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5564 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5565 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5566 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5568 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5569 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5570 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
5571 Some(_) => continue,
5572 None => return scid_candidate
5577 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5579 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5580 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5582 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5583 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5584 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5588 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
5589 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
5590 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
5592 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
5593 /// times to get a unique scid.
5594 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5595 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5596 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5598 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5599 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5600 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
5601 return scid_candidate
5605 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
5606 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
5607 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
5608 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
5610 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5611 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5612 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5613 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5614 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
5615 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
5616 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
5617 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
5626 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5627 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5628 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5629 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
5630 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5634 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
5635 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
5636 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5641 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
5642 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5643 if events.is_empty() { None } else { Some(events.remove(0)) }
5647 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5648 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
5652 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5653 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
5656 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
5657 /// using the given event handler.
5659 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
5660 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
5663 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock until the returned future completes so that
5664 // we can be sure no other persists happen while processing events.
5665 let _read_guard = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
5667 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5669 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5670 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5671 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5672 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5675 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5676 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5677 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5680 for event in pending_events {
5681 handler(event).await;
5684 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
5685 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
5690 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5692 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5693 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5694 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5695 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5696 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5697 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5701 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
5702 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
5703 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
5704 /// is always placed next to each other.
5706 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
5707 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
5708 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
5709 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
5711 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
5712 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
5713 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
5714 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5715 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5716 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5717 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5719 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5720 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5721 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5722 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5725 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5726 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5728 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
5729 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5732 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
5733 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5734 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5735 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5736 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5737 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
5738 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
5742 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5743 events.replace(pending_events);
5752 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5754 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5755 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5756 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5757 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5758 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5759 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5763 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
5765 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
5766 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
5767 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
5768 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5769 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5771 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5772 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5773 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5774 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5777 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5778 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5779 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5782 for event in pending_events {
5783 handler.handle_event(event);
5791 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5793 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5794 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5795 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5796 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5797 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5798 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5802 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5804 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5805 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
5806 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
5807 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
5808 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
5811 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
5812 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
5815 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5816 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5817 let new_height = height - 1;
5819 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
5820 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
5821 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
5822 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
5823 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
5824 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
5827 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5831 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5833 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5834 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5835 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5836 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5837 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5838 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5842 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5843 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5844 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5845 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5847 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5848 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
5850 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5851 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
5852 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
5854 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5855 if height < last_best_block_height {
5856 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5857 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5861 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5862 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5863 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5864 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5866 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5867 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
5869 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5871 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
5873 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5875 macro_rules! max_time {
5876 ($timestamp: expr) => {
5878 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
5879 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
5880 // having an explicit local time source.
5881 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
5882 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
5883 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5884 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
5885 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
5891 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
5892 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5893 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
5894 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
5898 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
5899 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
5900 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5901 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5902 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5903 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
5904 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.get_funding_txo(), chan.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
5905 res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
5912 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
5913 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5914 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
5915 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
5916 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
5917 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
5918 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5919 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5924 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5926 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5927 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5928 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5929 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5930 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5931 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5935 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
5936 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
5938 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
5939 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
5940 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5941 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5942 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5944 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5945 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5947 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5948 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5949 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5950 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5951 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5952 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
5953 let res = f(channel);
5954 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
5955 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
5956 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
5957 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
5958 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.channel_id() }));
5960 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
5961 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
5962 if channel.is_usable() {
5963 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5964 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
5965 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5966 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5971 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5975 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel);
5977 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
5978 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5979 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5980 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5981 msg: announcement_sigs,
5983 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5984 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
5985 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5987 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5988 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5989 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
5994 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
5995 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
5996 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
5997 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
5998 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
5999 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
6000 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
6001 // is always consistent.
6002 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
6003 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
6004 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()),
6005 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
6006 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
6009 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
6010 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, channel);
6011 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
6012 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
6013 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
6014 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
6015 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6019 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
6020 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
6021 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6022 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6023 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
6024 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6025 data: reason_message,
6035 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6036 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
6037 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
6038 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
6039 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
6040 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
6041 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
6042 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6043 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
6044 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
6046 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
6047 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
6048 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
6052 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
6055 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6056 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
6057 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6058 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6059 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
6060 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
6061 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6062 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6063 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
6066 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
6067 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6068 _ => unreachable!(),
6070 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
6071 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
6072 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
6073 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
6079 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
6081 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
6082 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
6086 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
6087 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
6088 /// [`await_persistable_update`], [`await_persistable_update_timeout`], or a future returned by
6089 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`] is guaranteed to be woken up.
6091 /// Note that this method is not available with the `no-std` feature.
6093 /// [`await_persistable_update`]: Self::await_persistable_update
6094 /// [`await_persistable_update_timeout`]: Self::await_persistable_update_timeout
6095 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`]: Self::get_persistable_update_future
6096 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
6097 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
6098 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
6101 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
6102 /// [`await_persistable_update`], `await_persistable_update_timeout`, or a future returned by
6103 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`] is guaranteed to be woken up.
6105 /// [`await_persistable_update`]: Self::await_persistable_update
6106 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`]: Self::get_persistable_update_future
6107 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
6108 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
6111 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when a persistable update is available. Note that
6112 /// callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this [`ChannelManager`] and
6113 /// should instead register actions to be taken later.
6114 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
6115 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
6118 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6119 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
6120 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
6123 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
6124 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
6125 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
6126 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
6129 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6130 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6131 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6132 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6135 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6136 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6138 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6139 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6140 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6141 pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6142 provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
6145 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6146 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6147 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
6148 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
6151 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6152 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6153 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6154 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
6157 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6158 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6159 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
6160 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6164 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
6165 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6167 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6168 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6169 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6170 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6171 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6172 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6176 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
6177 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6178 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6181 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
6182 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6183 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6186 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
6187 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6188 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6191 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
6192 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6193 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6196 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
6197 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6198 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6201 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
6202 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6203 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6206 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
6207 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6208 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6211 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
6212 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6213 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6216 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
6217 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6218 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6221 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
6222 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6223 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6226 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
6227 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6228 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6231 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
6232 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6233 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6236 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
6237 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6238 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6241 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
6242 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6243 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6246 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
6247 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6248 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6251 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
6252 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6253 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
6256 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
6261 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
6262 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6263 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6266 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
6267 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6268 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6269 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6271 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates. We believe we {} make future connections to this peer.",
6272 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id), if no_connection_possible { "cannot" } else { "can" });
6273 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
6274 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6275 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6276 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6277 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6278 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
6279 if chan.is_shutdown() {
6280 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
6281 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
6286 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
6288 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
6289 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
6290 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
6291 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
6292 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
6293 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
6294 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
6295 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
6296 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
6297 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
6298 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
6299 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
6300 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6301 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
6302 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6303 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
6304 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
6305 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
6306 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
6307 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
6308 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
6311 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
6312 peer_state.is_connected = false;
6313 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
6317 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
6319 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6321 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6322 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6326 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) -> Result<(), ()> {
6327 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
6328 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting with no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6332 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6334 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6337 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6338 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
6339 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6340 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
6341 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
6342 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
6343 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
6344 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
6348 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
6349 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
6350 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
6351 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
6352 peer_state.is_connected = true;
6357 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6359 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6360 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6361 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6362 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6363 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6364 let retain = if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6365 if !chan.have_received_message() {
6366 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
6367 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
6368 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
6372 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6373 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6374 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
6379 if retain && chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6380 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.default_configuration) {
6381 if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
6382 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
6383 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6392 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
6396 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
6397 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6399 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
6400 let channel_ids: Vec<[u8; 32]> = {
6401 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6402 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6403 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
6404 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6405 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6406 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
6408 for channel_id in channel_ids {
6409 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6410 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6414 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
6415 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6416 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6417 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
6418 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6419 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6420 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
6421 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
6422 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
6423 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6431 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6432 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6436 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6437 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6440 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
6441 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6445 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6446 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6447 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
6448 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6451 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6452 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6454 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6455 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6456 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6457 pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6458 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6461 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6462 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6463 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
6464 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6467 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6468 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6469 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6470 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
6473 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6474 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6475 pub fn provided_init_features(_config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
6476 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
6477 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the ChannelMessageHandler impl for
6478 // ErroringMessageHandler.
6479 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
6480 features.set_data_loss_protect_optional();
6481 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
6482 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
6483 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
6484 features.set_payment_secret_required();
6485 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
6486 features.set_wumbo_optional();
6487 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
6488 features.set_channel_type_optional();
6489 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
6490 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
6492 { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
6493 if _config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
6494 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
6500 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6501 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6503 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
6504 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
6505 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
6506 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
6509 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
6510 (2, node_id, required),
6511 (4, features, required),
6512 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
6513 (8, forwarding_info, option),
6514 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6515 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6518 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
6519 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6520 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6521 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6522 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
6523 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
6524 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6525 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
6526 (2, self.channel_id, required),
6527 (3, self.channel_type, option),
6528 (4, self.counterparty, required),
6529 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
6530 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
6531 (7, self.config, option),
6532 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
6533 (9, self.confirmations, option),
6534 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
6535 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6536 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6537 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
6538 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6539 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6540 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6541 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6542 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6543 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
6544 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
6545 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
6546 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
6547 (30, self.is_usable, required),
6548 (32, self.is_public, required),
6549 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6550 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6551 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6557 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
6558 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6559 _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6560 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
6561 (2, channel_id, required),
6562 (3, channel_type, option),
6563 (4, counterparty, required),
6564 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6565 (6, funding_txo, option),
6566 (7, config, option),
6567 (8, short_channel_id, option),
6568 (9, confirmations, option),
6569 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
6570 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6571 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6572 (16, balance_msat, required),
6573 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6574 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6575 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6576 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6577 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6578 (22, confirmations_required, option),
6579 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
6580 (26, is_outbound, required),
6581 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
6582 (30, is_usable, required),
6583 (32, is_public, required),
6584 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6585 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6586 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6589 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6590 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6591 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
6592 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
6593 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
6597 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
6599 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
6600 outbound_scid_alias,
6604 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
6605 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
6607 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
6608 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6609 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
6610 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6611 confirmations_required,
6613 force_close_spend_delay,
6614 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
6615 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
6616 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
6617 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
6618 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
6619 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
6624 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
6625 (2, channels, vec_type),
6626 (4, phantom_scid, required),
6627 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
6630 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
6632 (0, onion_packet, required),
6633 (2, short_channel_id, required),
6636 (0, payment_data, required),
6637 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6638 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6640 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
6641 (0, payment_preimage, required),
6642 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6646 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
6647 (0, routing, required),
6648 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
6649 (4, payment_hash, required),
6650 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
6651 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
6652 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
6656 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6657 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6659 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
6661 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6662 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6663 reason.write(writer)?;
6665 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6666 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
6669 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6670 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6671 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
6672 failure_code.write(writer)?;
6679 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6680 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6681 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6684 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6685 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6686 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6687 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
6691 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6692 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6693 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6694 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
6695 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
6698 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
6699 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
6700 // messages contained in the variants.
6701 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
6702 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
6703 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
6705 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6706 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6707 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6708 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6709 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
6712 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6713 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6714 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6715 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6716 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
6718 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6723 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
6728 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
6729 (0, short_channel_id, required),
6730 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6731 (2, outpoint, required),
6732 (4, htlc_id, required),
6733 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
6736 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
6737 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6738 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
6739 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
6740 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
6742 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6743 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
6744 (1, self.total_msat, required),
6745 (2, self.value, required),
6746 (4, payment_data, option),
6747 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
6748 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
6754 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
6755 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6756 let mut prev_hop = crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6758 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
6759 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
6760 let mut total_msat = None;
6761 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
6762 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6763 (0, prev_hop, required),
6764 (1, total_msat, option),
6765 (2, value, required),
6766 (4, payment_data, option),
6767 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
6768 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
6770 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
6772 if payment_data.is_some() {
6773 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6775 if total_msat.is_none() {
6776 total_msat = Some(value);
6778 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
6781 if total_msat.is_none() {
6782 if payment_data.is_none() {
6783 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6785 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
6787 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
6791 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
6794 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
6801 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
6802 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6803 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6806 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6807 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
6808 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
6809 let mut payment_id = None;
6810 let mut payment_secret = None;
6811 let mut payment_params = None;
6812 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6813 (0, session_priv, required),
6814 (1, payment_id, option),
6815 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6816 (3, payment_secret, option),
6817 (4, path, vec_type),
6818 (5, payment_params, option),
6820 if payment_id.is_none() {
6821 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
6823 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
6825 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6826 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
6827 first_hop_htlc_msat,
6828 path: path.unwrap(),
6829 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
6834 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6835 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6840 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
6841 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
6843 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payment_params } => {
6845 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
6846 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6847 (0, session_priv, required),
6848 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
6849 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6850 (3, payment_secret, option),
6851 (4, *path, vec_type),
6852 (5, payment_params, option),
6855 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
6857 field.write(writer)?;
6864 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
6865 (0, forward_info, required),
6866 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
6867 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
6868 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
6869 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
6872 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
6874 (0, htlc_id, required),
6875 (2, err_packet, required),
6880 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
6881 (0, payment_secret, required),
6882 (2, expiry_time, required),
6883 (4, user_payment_id, required),
6884 (6, payment_preimage, required),
6885 (8, min_value_msat, required),
6888 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6890 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6891 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6892 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6893 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6894 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6895 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6899 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6900 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
6902 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6904 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
6906 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6907 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
6908 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
6911 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
6913 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6914 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
6915 let mut number_of_channels = 0;
6916 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6917 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6918 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6919 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
6920 serializable_peer_count += 1;
6922 number_of_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.len();
6923 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
6924 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6925 unfunded_channels += 1;
6930 ((number_of_channels - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
6932 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6933 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6934 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6935 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
6936 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6937 channel.write(writer)?;
6944 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6945 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6946 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
6947 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6948 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6949 for forward in pending_forwards {
6950 forward.write(writer)?;
6955 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6957 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6958 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
6959 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6961 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
6962 (claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6963 for (payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops)) in claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
6964 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6965 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6966 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
6967 htlc.write(writer)?;
6969 htlc_purposes.push(purpose);
6972 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
6973 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
6974 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6975 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap());
6978 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
6979 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
6980 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
6981 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
6982 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
6984 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
6985 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
6986 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
6987 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
6988 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
6989 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
6990 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
6995 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6996 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6997 for event in events.iter() {
6998 event.write(writer)?;
7001 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
7002 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7003 for event in background_events.iter() {
7005 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
7007 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
7008 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
7013 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
7014 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
7015 // likely to be identical.
7016 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7017 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7019 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7020 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
7021 hash.write(writer)?;
7022 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
7025 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
7026 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
7027 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7028 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
7029 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
7032 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
7033 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7035 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7036 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7037 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
7038 session_priv.write(writer)?;
7041 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
7042 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
7046 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
7047 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
7048 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7050 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7051 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7052 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
7058 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
7059 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7060 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
7061 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
7064 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
7065 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
7066 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
7067 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
7068 pending_claiming_payments = None;
7070 debug_assert!(false, "While we have code to serialize pending_claiming_payments, the map should always be empty until a later PR");
7073 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7074 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
7075 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7076 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
7077 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7078 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
7079 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
7080 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
7081 (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7082 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
7089 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
7091 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
7093 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7094 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
7095 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
7096 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
7097 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
7098 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
7099 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
7100 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
7101 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7102 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
7103 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
7104 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
7105 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
7107 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
7108 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
7110 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
7111 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
7113 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
7114 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
7115 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
7116 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
7117 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
7118 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
7120 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
7121 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7123 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7124 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7125 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7126 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7127 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7128 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7132 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
7133 pub entropy_source: ES,
7135 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
7136 pub node_signer: NS,
7138 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
7139 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
7141 pub signer_provider: SP,
7143 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7145 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
7146 pub fee_estimator: F,
7147 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7149 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
7150 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
7151 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
7152 pub chain_monitor: M,
7154 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
7155 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
7156 /// force-closed during deserialization.
7157 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
7158 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
7159 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
7161 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
7163 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
7164 /// deserialization.
7166 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
7167 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
7168 pub default_config: UserConfig,
7170 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
7171 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
7173 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
7174 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
7175 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
7176 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
7178 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
7181 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
7182 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
7185 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7186 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7188 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7189 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7190 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7191 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7192 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7193 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7197 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
7198 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
7199 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
7200 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
7201 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
7203 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
7204 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
7209 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
7210 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
7211 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7212 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
7214 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7215 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7216 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7217 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7218 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7219 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7223 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7224 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
7225 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
7229 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7230 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
7232 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7233 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7234 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7235 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7236 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7237 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7241 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7242 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7244 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7245 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7246 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7248 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7250 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7251 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7252 let mut peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7253 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7254 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7255 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
7256 for _ in 0..channel_count {
7257 let mut channel: Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (
7258 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
7260 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7261 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
7262 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
7263 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7264 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7265 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7266 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7267 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
7268 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
7269 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7270 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7271 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7272 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7273 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7274 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7275 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7276 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7277 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7278 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7279 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7280 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
7281 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
7282 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
7283 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7284 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7285 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
7286 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
7287 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
7288 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7289 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7290 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7291 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
7293 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7294 let mut found_htlc = false;
7295 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7296 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
7299 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
7300 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
7301 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
7302 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
7303 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
7304 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
7305 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
7306 log_info!(args.logger,
7307 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
7308 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7309 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7313 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7314 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
7315 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7317 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7318 id_to_peer.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel.get_counterparty_node_id());
7320 match peer_channels.entry(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
7321 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7322 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
7323 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7325 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7326 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
7327 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7328 entry.insert(by_id_map);
7332 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
7333 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
7334 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
7335 // safely discard the channel.
7336 let _ = channel.force_shutdown(false);
7337 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7338 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7339 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7340 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
7343 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7344 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7345 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7346 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7347 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7348 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7352 for (funding_txo, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
7353 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
7354 log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
7355 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
7359 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
7360 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7361 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7362 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
7363 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7364 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7365 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
7366 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
7367 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
7369 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
7372 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7373 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7374 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
7375 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7376 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7377 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
7378 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
7379 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
7381 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
7384 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7385 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>)>()));
7386 for _ in 0..peer_count {
7387 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7388 let peer_state = PeerState {
7389 channel_by_id: peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new()),
7390 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
7391 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7392 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
7393 is_connected: false,
7395 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
7398 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7399 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
7400 for _ in 0..event_count {
7401 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
7402 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
7407 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7408 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
7409 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
7410 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7411 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
7412 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7416 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
7417 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7419 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7420 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
7421 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
7422 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
7423 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7427 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7428 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
7429 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
7430 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
7431 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
7432 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
7433 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
7435 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
7436 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7440 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
7441 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
7442 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
7443 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
7444 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
7445 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7446 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7447 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
7448 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
7449 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = Some(Vec::new());
7450 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7451 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
7452 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7453 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
7454 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7455 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
7456 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
7457 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
7458 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7459 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
7461 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
7462 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7465 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
7466 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7469 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
7470 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
7471 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
7472 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
7473 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
7474 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
7476 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
7478 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
7479 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
7480 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
7481 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
7482 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
7483 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
7484 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
7486 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7487 if id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
7488 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() {
7489 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
7490 if path.is_empty() {
7491 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
7492 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7494 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
7495 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
7496 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
7497 match pending_outbound_payments.as_mut().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
7498 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7499 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
7500 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
7501 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
7503 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7504 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
7505 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
7506 retry_strategy: None,
7507 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
7508 payment_params: None,
7509 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
7510 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
7512 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
7513 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
7514 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
7515 total_msat: path_amt,
7516 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
7518 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
7519 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
7524 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7525 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) = htlc_source {
7526 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
7527 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
7528 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
7530 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
7531 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
7532 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
7533 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
7534 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
7535 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
7536 forwards.retain(|forward| {
7537 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
7538 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
7539 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7540 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7545 !forwards.is_empty()
7547 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
7548 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
7549 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7550 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7551 pending_events_read.retain(|event| {
7552 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
7553 intercepted_id != ev_id
7565 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
7566 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
7567 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
7568 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
7569 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
7570 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
7571 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
7572 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
7576 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
7577 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
7579 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
7580 if let Some(mut purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
7581 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
7582 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7584 for (purpose, (payment_hash, previous_hops)) in purposes.drain(..).zip(claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..)) {
7585 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7588 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
7589 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
7590 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
7591 if previous_hops.is_empty() {
7592 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7594 let purpose = match &previous_hops[0].onion_payload {
7595 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
7596 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
7597 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
7598 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
7599 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
7600 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
7601 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
7603 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7604 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7608 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
7610 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
7612 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
7613 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
7615 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7619 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7620 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7622 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
7623 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
7626 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
7628 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7630 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
7631 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
7632 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
7633 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7637 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
7638 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
7639 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7640 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7641 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
7642 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
7643 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
7645 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
7646 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
7647 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
7649 chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
7650 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
7651 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7652 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7653 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7654 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7656 if chan.is_usable() {
7657 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
7658 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7659 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7660 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7661 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7667 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
7669 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7670 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
7671 if let Some((payment_purpose, claimable_htlcs)) = claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
7672 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7673 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
7674 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
7675 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
7676 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
7677 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
7678 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
7679 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
7681 for claimable_htlc in claimable_htlcs {
7682 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
7684 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
7685 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
7686 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
7687 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
7689 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
7690 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
7691 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
7692 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
7694 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
7695 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
7696 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
7697 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
7699 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
7700 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
7701 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
7702 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7703 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7704 if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
7705 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
7708 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
7709 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
7712 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
7715 purpose: payment_purpose,
7716 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
7722 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
7723 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get_mut(&node_id) {
7724 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
7726 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
7727 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7731 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
7733 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
7734 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
7735 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
7736 router: args.router,
7738 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
7740 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
7741 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
7742 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments { pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()), retry_lock: Mutex::new(()), },
7743 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
7745 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
7746 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_htlcs, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
7747 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
7748 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
7749 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
7750 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
7752 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
7757 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
7759 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
7761 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
7762 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
7763 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
7764 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
7766 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
7767 node_signer: args.node_signer,
7768 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
7770 logger: args.logger,
7771 default_configuration: args.default_config,
7774 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7775 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
7776 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
7777 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7778 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7781 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
7782 //connection or two.
7784 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
7790 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7791 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7792 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
7793 use core::time::Duration;
7794 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
7795 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
7796 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, InterceptId};
7797 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7798 use crate::ln::msgs;
7799 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
7800 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
7801 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7802 use crate::util::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
7803 use crate::util::test_utils;
7804 use crate::util::config::ChannelConfig;
7805 use crate::chain::keysinterface::EntropySource;
7808 fn test_notify_limits() {
7809 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
7810 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
7811 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7812 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7813 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7814 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7816 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
7817 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
7818 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7819 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7820 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7822 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7824 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
7825 // to connect messages with new values
7826 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7827 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7828 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7829 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7831 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
7832 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7833 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7834 // ... but the last node should not.
7835 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7836 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
7837 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7838 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7840 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
7841 // about the channel.
7842 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7843 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7844 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7846 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
7848 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7849 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7850 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7851 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7852 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7853 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7855 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
7856 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7857 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7859 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
7860 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
7861 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
7862 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
7863 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
7864 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
7866 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
7867 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
7868 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7869 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7870 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7871 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7872 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7873 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7875 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
7876 // the channel info has updated.
7877 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7878 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7879 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7880 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7881 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7882 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7886 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
7887 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
7889 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7890 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7891 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7892 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7893 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7895 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
7896 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
7897 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
7898 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
7900 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
7901 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
7902 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
7903 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
7904 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
7905 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
7906 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7907 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7908 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7909 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
7911 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
7912 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
7913 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7914 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7915 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7916 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7917 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7918 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7919 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7920 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7921 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7922 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
7923 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7924 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7925 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7926 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7927 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7928 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7929 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7930 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7931 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7932 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
7934 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
7935 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
7936 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7937 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7938 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7939 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
7941 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
7942 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
7943 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
7944 // lightning messages manually.
7945 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7946 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
7947 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7949 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7950 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7951 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
7952 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7953 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7954 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
7955 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7956 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7957 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
7958 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7959 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7960 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7961 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7962 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7963 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7964 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
7965 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7966 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7967 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
7968 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7969 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7970 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7971 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7972 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
7973 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7975 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
7976 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
7977 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7978 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
7980 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
7981 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
7982 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
7983 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
7985 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7988 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7989 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7990 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7991 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7993 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7996 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7997 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7998 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7999 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8001 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8006 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
8007 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
8008 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
8009 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
8010 // fails as expected.
8011 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8012 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8013 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8014 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8015 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8016 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8017 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8019 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
8020 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
8021 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
8023 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
8024 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8025 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV),
8026 final_value_msat: 100_000,
8027 final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
8029 let route = find_route(
8030 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8031 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8033 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8034 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8035 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8036 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8037 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8038 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8039 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8040 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8041 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8042 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
8043 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
8044 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8045 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8046 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8047 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8048 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8049 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8050 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8051 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8052 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8053 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8054 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8055 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8057 // Finally, claim the original payment.
8058 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8060 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
8061 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8062 let route = find_route(
8063 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8064 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8066 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8067 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8068 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8069 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8070 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
8071 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
8072 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
8074 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
8075 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8076 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8077 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8078 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8079 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8080 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8081 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8082 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8083 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8084 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8085 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8086 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8087 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8088 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8089 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8090 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8091 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8092 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8093 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8094 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8095 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8096 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8098 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
8099 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8103 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
8104 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
8105 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
8106 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8107 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8108 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8109 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8111 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8112 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8114 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8115 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8116 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
8117 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8118 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
8120 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
8121 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8122 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8123 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8124 let route = find_route(
8125 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8126 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8129 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8130 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
8131 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash, None, PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8132 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8133 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8135 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8136 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8137 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8138 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8139 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8140 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8141 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8143 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
8147 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
8148 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
8149 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8150 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8151 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8152 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8154 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8155 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8157 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8158 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8159 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
8160 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8161 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
8163 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
8164 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8165 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8166 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8167 let route = find_route(
8168 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8169 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8172 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8173 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8174 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
8175 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, Some(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8176 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8177 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8179 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8180 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8181 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8182 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8183 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8184 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8185 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8187 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
8191 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
8192 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8193 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8194 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8195 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8197 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8198 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8199 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8200 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8202 // Marshall an MPP route.
8203 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8204 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8205 route.paths.push(path);
8206 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8207 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8208 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8209 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8210 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8211 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8213 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None, PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap_err() {
8214 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
8215 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
8216 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
8221 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
8222 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8223 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8224 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8225 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8227 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8229 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8230 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8232 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8233 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8234 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8235 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8238 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
8239 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
8240 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8241 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
8242 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
8243 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
8246 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
8249 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
8250 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
8255 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
8256 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
8257 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8258 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8259 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8260 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8262 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
8263 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
8265 total_msat: 100_000,
8268 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
8269 // payment verification fails as expected.
8270 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
8271 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
8272 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
8273 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
8275 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment".to_string(), "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash".to_string(), 1);
8279 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
8280 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
8284 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
8285 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
8286 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
8287 // the channel is successfully closed.
8288 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8289 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8290 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8291 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8293 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8294 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8295 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
8296 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8297 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
8299 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
8300 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
8302 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
8303 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
8304 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8305 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8308 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8310 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8311 // as it has the funding transaction.
8312 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8313 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8314 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8316 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8319 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8321 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8323 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8324 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8325 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8327 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8328 // as it has the funding transaction.
8329 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8330 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8331 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8333 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8334 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8335 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
8336 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8337 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8338 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
8339 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
8341 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8342 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8343 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8344 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
8346 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8347 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
8349 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
8350 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
8351 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
8352 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
8353 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8354 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8355 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8357 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
8358 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
8359 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
8360 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
8361 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8362 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8363 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8366 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8368 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
8369 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
8370 // closing transaction).
8371 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
8372 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
8373 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8375 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
8376 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
8377 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8378 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8379 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8382 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8384 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
8386 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
8387 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
8388 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8390 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8392 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8393 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8396 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
8397 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
8398 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
8401 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
8402 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
8403 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
8406 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
8408 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
8409 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
8411 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
8412 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
8414 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
8415 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8420 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
8421 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
8422 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
8423 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
8424 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8425 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
8426 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
8427 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
8430 let channel_id = [4; 32];
8431 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8432 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
8434 // Test the API functions.
8435 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
8437 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
8439 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8441 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8443 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8445 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
8447 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
8452 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
8453 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
8454 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
8455 // the channel without the anchors feature.
8456 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8457 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8458 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
8459 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8460 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8461 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
8462 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8464 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
8465 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8466 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8468 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8469 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8471 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8472 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8474 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8477 let error_msg = get_err_msg!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8478 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
8480 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8481 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8483 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8487 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
8489 use crate::chain::Listen;
8490 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
8491 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
8492 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId};
8493 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
8494 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
8495 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
8496 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, get_route};
8497 use crate::util::test_utils;
8498 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
8499 use crate::util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
8501 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8502 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8503 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
8505 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
8509 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
8510 node: &'a ChannelManager<
8511 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
8512 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
8513 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
8514 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
8515 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
8516 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>,
8521 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
8522 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
8525 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
8526 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
8527 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
8529 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
8530 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
8532 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
8533 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
8534 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8535 let scorer = Mutex::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
8536 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger_a)), &scorer);
8538 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
8539 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
8541 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
8542 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
8543 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
8544 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8546 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
8548 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
8550 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8551 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
8552 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
8553 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
8554 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8556 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
8558 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
8560 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_b.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8561 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_a.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8562 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8563 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8564 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8567 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
8568 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8569 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
8571 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8572 } else { panic!(); }
8574 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8575 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8577 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
8580 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8583 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
8584 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
8586 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8587 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8588 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
8589 match msg_events[0] {
8590 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
8591 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
8592 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8596 match msg_events[1] {
8597 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8601 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8602 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
8604 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8605 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
8607 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8610 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8611 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
8613 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8614 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8616 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8619 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger_a);
8621 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
8622 macro_rules! send_payment {
8623 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
8624 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
8625 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
8626 .with_features($node_b.invoice_features());
8627 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8628 let seed = [3u8; 32];
8629 let keys_manager = KeysManager::new(&seed, 42, 42);
8630 let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8631 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &dummy_graph.read_only(),
8632 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
8634 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
8635 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
8637 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
8638 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
8640 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8641 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
8642 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8643 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
8644 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
8645 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8646 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8647 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8649 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
8650 expect_payment_claimable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
8651 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8652 expect_payment_claimed!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
8654 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
8655 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
8656 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
8657 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8658 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
8660 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
8663 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
8664 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8665 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8666 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8668 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
8673 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
8674 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);