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[rust-lightning] / lightning / src / ln / channelmanager.rs
1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
2 // history.
3 //
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
8 // licenses.
9
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
11 //!
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
15 //!
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
19
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::Header;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
23 use bitcoin::key::constants::SECRET_KEY_SIZE;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25
26 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
28 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
29
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
32 use bitcoin::{secp256k1, Sequence};
33
34 use crate::blinded_path::BlindedPath;
35 use crate::blinded_path::payment::{PaymentConstraints, ReceiveTlvs};
36 use crate::chain;
37 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
38 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
39 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, WithChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
40 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
41 use crate::events;
42 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
43 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
44 // construct one themselves.
45 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
46 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, WithChannelContext};
47 use crate::ln::features::{Bolt12InvoiceFeatures, ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
48 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
49 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
50 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
51 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
52 use crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters};
53 use crate::ln::onion_payment::{check_incoming_htlc_cltv, create_recv_pending_htlc_info, create_fwd_pending_htlc_info, decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion, InboundOnionErr, NextPacketDetails};
54 use crate::ln::msgs;
55 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
56 use crate::ln::onion_utils::{HTLCFailReason, INVALID_ONION_BLINDING};
57 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
58 #[cfg(test)]
59 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
60 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{Bolt12PaymentError, OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs, StaleExpiration};
61 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
62 use crate::offers::invoice::{BlindedPayInfo, Bolt12Invoice, DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY, DerivedSigningPubkey, InvoiceBuilder};
63 use crate::offers::invoice_error::InvoiceError;
64 use crate::offers::merkle::SignError;
65 use crate::offers::offer::{DerivedMetadata, Offer, OfferBuilder};
66 use crate::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
67 use crate::offers::refund::{Refund, RefundBuilder};
68 use crate::onion_message::{Destination, OffersMessage, OffersMessageHandler, PendingOnionMessage, new_pending_onion_message};
69 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider};
70 use crate::sign::ecdsa::WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner;
71 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
72 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
73 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
74 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
75 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
76 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger, WithContext};
77 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
78
79 use alloc::collections::{btree_map, BTreeMap};
80
81 use crate::io;
82 use crate::prelude::*;
83 use core::{cmp, mem};
84 use core::cell::RefCell;
85 use crate::io::Read;
86 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
87 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
88 use core::time::Duration;
89 use core::ops::Deref;
90
91 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
92 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, ProbeSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
93 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
94
95 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
96 //
97 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
98 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
99 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
100 //
101 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
102 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
103 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
104 // before we forward it.
105 //
106 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
107 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
108 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
109 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
110 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
111
112 /// Information about where a received HTLC('s onion) has indicated the HTLC should go.
113 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
114 pub enum PendingHTLCRouting {
115         /// An HTLC which should be forwarded on to another node.
116         Forward {
117                 /// The onion which should be included in the forwarded HTLC, telling the next hop what to
118                 /// do with the HTLC.
119                 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
120                 /// The short channel ID of the channel which we were instructed to forward this HTLC to.
121                 ///
122                 /// This could be a real on-chain SCID, an SCID alias, or some other SCID which has meaning
123                 /// to the receiving node, such as one returned from
124                 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] or [`ChannelManager::get_phantom_scid`].
125                 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
126                 /// Set if this HTLC is being forwarded within a blinded path.
127                 blinded: Option<BlindedForward>,
128         },
129         /// The onion indicates that this is a payment for an invoice (supposedly) generated by us.
130         ///
131         /// Note that at this point, we have not checked that the invoice being paid was actually
132         /// generated by us, but rather it's claiming to pay an invoice of ours.
133         Receive {
134                 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and (potential) proof that this
135                 /// is a payment for an invoice we generated. This proof of payment is is also used for
136                 /// linking MPP parts of a larger payment.
137                 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
138                 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
139                 ///
140                 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
141                 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
142                 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
143                 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
144                 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
145                 ///
146                 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
147                 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
148                 /// If the onion had forwarding instructions to one of our phantom node SCIDs, this will
149                 /// provide the onion shared secret used to decrypt the next level of forwarding
150                 /// instructions.
151                 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
152                 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
153                 ///
154                 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
155                 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
156                 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
157                 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
158         },
159         /// The onion indicates that this is for payment to us but which contains the preimage for
160         /// claiming included, and is unrelated to any invoice we'd previously generated (aka a
161         /// "keysend" or "spontaneous" payment).
162         ReceiveKeysend {
163                 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and possibly a token to
164                 /// associate MPP parts of a larger payment.
165                 ///
166                 /// This will only be filled in if receiving MPP keysend payments is enabled, and it being
167                 /// present will cause deserialization to fail on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.116.
168                 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
169                 /// Preimage for this onion payment. This preimage is provided by the sender and will be
170                 /// used to settle the spontaneous payment.
171                 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
172                 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
173                 ///
174                 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately bubble back up as
175                 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
176                 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
177                 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
178                 ///
179                 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
180                 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
181                 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
182                 ///
183                 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, these will ultimately bubble back up as
184                 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
185                 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
186         },
187 }
188
189 /// Information used to forward or fail this HTLC that is being forwarded within a blinded path.
190 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
191 pub struct BlindedForward {
192         /// The `blinding_point` that was set in the inbound [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC`], or in the inbound
193         /// onion payload if we're the introduction node. Useful for calculating the next hop's
194         /// [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC::blinding_point`].
195         pub inbound_blinding_point: PublicKey,
196         // Another field will be added here when we support forwarding as a non-intro node.
197 }
198
199 impl PendingHTLCRouting {
200         // Used to override the onion failure code and data if the HTLC is blinded.
201         fn blinded_failure(&self) -> Option<BlindedFailure> {
202                 // TODO: needs update when we support receiving to multi-hop blinded paths
203                 if let Self::Forward { blinded: Some(_), .. } = self {
204                         Some(BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode)
205                 } else {
206                         None
207                 }
208         }
209 }
210
211 /// Information about an incoming HTLC, including the [`PendingHTLCRouting`] describing where it
212 /// should go next.
213 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
214 pub struct PendingHTLCInfo {
215         /// Further routing details based on whether the HTLC is being forwarded or received.
216         pub routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
217         /// The onion shared secret we build with the sender used to decrypt the onion.
218         ///
219         /// This is later used to encrypt failure packets in the event that the HTLC is failed.
220         pub incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
221         /// Hash of the payment preimage, to lock the payment until the receiver releases the preimage.
222         pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
223         /// Amount received in the incoming HTLC.
224         ///
225         /// This field was added in LDK 0.0.113 and will be `None` for objects written by prior
226         /// versions.
227         pub incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>,
228         /// The amount the sender indicated should be forwarded on to the next hop or amount the sender
229         /// intended for us to receive for received payments.
230         ///
231         /// If the received amount is less than this for received payments, an intermediary hop has
232         /// attempted to steal some of our funds and we should fail the HTLC (the sender should retry
233         /// it along another path).
234         ///
235         /// Because nodes can take less than their required fees, and because senders may wish to
236         /// improve their own privacy, this amount may be less than [`Self::incoming_amt_msat`] for
237         /// received payments. In such cases, recipients must handle this HTLC as if it had received
238         /// [`Self::outgoing_amt_msat`].
239         pub outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
240         /// The CLTV the sender has indicated we should set on the forwarded HTLC (or has indicated
241         /// should have been set on the received HTLC for received payments).
242         pub outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
243         /// The fee taken for this HTLC in addition to the standard protocol HTLC fees.
244         ///
245         /// If this is a payment for forwarding, this is the fee we are taking before forwarding the
246         /// HTLC.
247         ///
248         /// If this is a received payment, this is the fee that our counterparty took.
249         ///
250         /// This is used to allow LSPs to take fees as a part of payments, without the sender having to
251         /// shoulder them.
252         pub skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
253 }
254
255 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
256 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
257         Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
258         Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
259 }
260
261 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
262 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
263 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
264         Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
265         Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
266 }
267
268 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
269         pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
270
271         // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
272         // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
273         // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
274         // HTLCs.
275         //
276         // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
277         prev_short_channel_id: u64,
278         prev_htlc_id: u64,
279         prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
280         prev_user_channel_id: u128,
281 }
282
283 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
284         AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
285         FailHTLC {
286                 htlc_id: u64,
287                 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
288         },
289 }
290
291 // Used for failing blinded HTLCs backwards correctly.
292 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
293 enum BlindedFailure {
294         FromIntroductionNode,
295         // Another variant will be added here for non-intro nodes.
296 }
297
298 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
299 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
300 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
301         // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
302         short_channel_id: u64,
303         user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
304         htlc_id: u64,
305         incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
306         phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
307         blinded_failure: Option<BlindedFailure>,
308
309         // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
310         // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
311         outpoint: OutPoint,
312 }
313
314 enum OnionPayload {
315         /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
316         Invoice {
317                 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
318                 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
319                 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
320         },
321         /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
322         Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
323 }
324
325 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
326 struct ClaimableHTLC {
327         prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
328         cltv_expiry: u32,
329         /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
330         value: u64,
331         /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
332         /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
333         sender_intended_value: u64,
334         onion_payload: OnionPayload,
335         timer_ticks: u8,
336         /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
337         /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
338         total_value_received: Option<u64>,
339         /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
340         total_msat: u64,
341         /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
342         counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
343 }
344
345 impl From<&ClaimableHTLC> for events::ClaimedHTLC {
346         fn from(val: &ClaimableHTLC) -> Self {
347                 events::ClaimedHTLC {
348                         channel_id: val.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
349                         user_channel_id: val.prev_hop.user_channel_id.unwrap_or(0),
350                         cltv_expiry: val.cltv_expiry,
351                         value_msat: val.value,
352                         counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: val.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0),
353                 }
354         }
355 }
356
357 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
358 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
359 ///
360 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
361 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
362 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; Self::LENGTH]);
363
364 impl PaymentId {
365         /// Number of bytes in the id.
366         pub const LENGTH: usize = 32;
367 }
368
369 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
370         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
371                 self.0.write(w)
372         }
373 }
374
375 impl Readable for PaymentId {
376         fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
377                 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
378                 Ok(PaymentId(buf))
379         }
380 }
381
382 impl core::fmt::Display for PaymentId {
383         fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> core::fmt::Result {
384                 crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
385         }
386 }
387
388 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
389 ///
390 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
391 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
392 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
393
394 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
395         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
396                 self.0.write(w)
397         }
398 }
399
400 impl Readable for InterceptId {
401         fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
402                 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
403                 Ok(InterceptId(buf))
404         }
405 }
406
407 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
408 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
409 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
410         PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
411         OutboundRoute { session_priv: [u8; SECRET_KEY_SIZE] },
412 }
413 impl SentHTLCId {
414         pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
415                 match source {
416                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
417                                 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
418                                 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
419                         },
420                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
421                                 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: session_priv.secret_bytes() },
422                 }
423         }
424 }
425 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
426         (0, PreviousHopData) => {
427                 (0, short_channel_id, required),
428                 (2, htlc_id, required),
429         },
430         (2, OutboundRoute) => {
431                 (0, session_priv, required),
432         };
433 );
434
435
436 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
437 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
438 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
439 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
440         PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
441         OutboundRoute {
442                 path: Path,
443                 session_priv: SecretKey,
444                 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
445                 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
446                 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
447                 payment_id: PaymentId,
448         },
449 }
450 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
451 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
452         fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
453                 match self {
454                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
455                                 0u8.hash(hasher);
456                                 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
457                         },
458                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
459                                 1u8.hash(hasher);
460                                 path.hash(hasher);
461                                 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
462                                 payment_id.hash(hasher);
463                                 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
464                         },
465                 }
466         }
467 }
468 impl HTLCSource {
469         #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
470         #[cfg(test)]
471         pub fn dummy() -> Self {
472                 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
473                         path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
474                         session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
475                         first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
476                         payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
477                 }
478         }
479
480         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
481         /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
482         /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
483         pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
484                 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
485                         *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
486                 } else {
487                         // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
488                         true
489                 }
490         }
491 }
492
493 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
494 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
495 ///
496 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
497 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
498 pub enum FailureCode {
499         /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
500         /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
501         TemporaryNodeFailure,
502         /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
503         /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
504         RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
505         /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
506         /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
507         /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
508         /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
509         IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
510         /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
511         /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
512         ///
513         /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
514         /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
515         InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
516 }
517
518 impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
519     fn into(self) -> u16 {
520                 match self {
521                         FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
522                         FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
523                         FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
524                         FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
525                 }
526         }
527 }
528
529 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
530 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
531 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
532 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
533 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
534
535 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
536         err: msgs::LightningError,
537         chan_id: Option<(ChannelId, u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
538         shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
539         channel_capacity: Option<u64>,
540 }
541 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
542         #[inline]
543         fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
544                 Self {
545                         err: LightningError {
546                                 err: err.clone(),
547                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
548                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
549                                                 channel_id,
550                                                 data: err
551                                         },
552                                 },
553                         },
554                         chan_id: None,
555                         shutdown_finish: None,
556                         channel_capacity: None,
557                 }
558         }
559         #[inline]
560         fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
561                 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None, channel_capacity: None }
562         }
563         #[inline]
564         fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId, user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>, channel_capacity: u64) -> Self {
565                 let err_msg = msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: err.clone() };
566                 let action = if shutdown_res.monitor_update.is_some() {
567                         // We have a closing `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, which means the channel was funded and we
568                         // should disconnect our peer such that we force them to broadcast their latest
569                         // commitment upon reconnecting.
570                         msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(err_msg) }
571                 } else {
572                         msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: err_msg }
573                 };
574                 Self {
575                         err: LightningError { err, action },
576                         chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
577                         shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
578                         channel_capacity: Some(channel_capacity)
579                 }
580         }
581         #[inline]
582         fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
583                 Self {
584                         err: match err {
585                                 ChannelError::Warn(msg) =>  LightningError {
586                                         err: msg.clone(),
587                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
588                                                 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
589                                                         channel_id,
590                                                         data: msg
591                                                 },
592                                                 log_level: Level::Warn,
593                                         },
594                                 },
595                                 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
596                                         err: msg,
597                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
598                                 },
599                                 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
600                                         err: msg.clone(),
601                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
602                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
603                                                         channel_id,
604                                                         data: msg
605                                                 },
606                                         },
607                                 },
608                         },
609                         chan_id: None,
610                         shutdown_finish: None,
611                         channel_capacity: None,
612                 }
613         }
614
615         fn closes_channel(&self) -> bool {
616                 self.chan_id.is_some()
617         }
618 }
619
620 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
621 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
622 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
623 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
624 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
625
626 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
627 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
628 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
629 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
630 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
631 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
632         /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
633         CommitmentFirst,
634         /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
635         RevokeAndACKFirst,
636 }
637
638 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
639 struct ClaimingPayment {
640         amount_msat: u64,
641         payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
642         receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
643         htlcs: Vec<events::ClaimedHTLC>,
644         sender_intended_value: Option<u64>,
645 }
646 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
647         (0, amount_msat, required),
648         (2, payment_purpose, required),
649         (4, receiver_node_id, required),
650         (5, htlcs, optional_vec),
651         (7, sender_intended_value, option),
652 });
653
654 struct ClaimablePayment {
655         purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
656         onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
657         htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
658 }
659
660 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
661 struct ClaimablePayments {
662         /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
663         /// failed/claimed by the user.
664         ///
665         /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
666         /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
667         ///
668         /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
669         /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
670         claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
671
672         /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
673         /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
674         /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
675         pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
676 }
677
678 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
679 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
680 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
681 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
682 #[derive(Debug)]
683 enum BackgroundEvent {
684         /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
685         /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
686         /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
687         /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
688         ///
689         /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
690         /// are regenerated on startup.
691         ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
692         /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
693         /// channel to continue normal operation.
694         ///
695         /// In general this should be used rather than
696         /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
697         /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
698         /// error the other variant is acceptable.
699         ///
700         /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
701         /// are regenerated on startup.
702         MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
703                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
704                 funding_txo: OutPoint,
705                 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
706         },
707         /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
708         /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
709         /// on a channel.
710         MonitorUpdatesComplete {
711                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
712                 channel_id: ChannelId,
713         },
714 }
715
716 #[derive(Debug)]
717 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
718         /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
719         /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
720         /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
721         /// event can be generated.
722         PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
723         /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
724         /// operation of another channel.
725         ///
726         /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
727         /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
728         /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
729         /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
730         /// outbound edge.
731         EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
732                 event: events::Event,
733                 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
734         },
735         /// Indicates we should immediately resume the operation of another channel, unless there is
736         /// some other reason why the channel is blocked. In practice this simply means immediately
737         /// removing the [`RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction`] provided from the blocking set.
738         ///
739         /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
740         /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
741         /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. However, we use this variant
742         /// instead of [`Self::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel`] when we discover that the claim was in
743         /// fact duplicative and we simply want to resume the outbound edge channel immediately.
744         ///
745         /// This variant should thus never be written to disk, as it is processed inline rather than
746         /// stored for later processing.
747         FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
748                 downstream_counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
749                 downstream_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
750                 blocking_action: RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
751         },
752 }
753
754 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
755         (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
756         // Note that FreeOtherChannelImmediately should never be written - we were supposed to free
757         // *immediately*. However, for simplicity we implement read/write here.
758         (1, FreeOtherChannelImmediately) => {
759                 (0, downstream_counterparty_node_id, required),
760                 (2, downstream_funding_outpoint, required),
761                 (4, blocking_action, required),
762         },
763         (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
764                 (0, event, upgradable_required),
765                 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
766                 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
767                 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
768                 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
769                 // downgrades to prior versions.
770                 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
771         },
772 );
773
774 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
775 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
776         ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
777                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
778                 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
779         },
780 }
781 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
782         (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
783                 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
784                 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
785         };
786 );
787
788 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
789 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
790 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
791 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
792         /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
793         /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
794         /// durably to disk.
795         ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
796                 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
797                 channel_id: ChannelId,
798                 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
799                 htlc_id: u64,
800         },
801 }
802
803 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
804         fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
805                 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
806                         channel_id: prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
807                         htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
808                 }
809         }
810 }
811
812 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
813         (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
814 ;);
815
816
817 /// State we hold per-peer.
818 pub(super) struct PeerState<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
819         /// `channel_id` -> `ChannelPhase`
820         ///
821         /// Holds all channels within corresponding `ChannelPhase`s where the peer is the counterparty.
822         pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>,
823         /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundChannelRequest`.
824         ///
825         /// When manual channel acceptance is enabled, this holds all unaccepted inbound channels where
826         /// the peer is the counterparty. If the channel is accepted, then the entry in this table is
827         /// removed, and an InboundV1Channel is created and placed in the `inbound_v1_channel_by_id` table. If
828         /// the channel is rejected, then the entry is simply removed.
829         pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, InboundChannelRequest>,
830         /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
831         latest_features: InitFeatures,
832         /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
833         /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
834         pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
835         /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
836         /// user but which have not yet completed.
837         ///
838         /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
839         /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
840         /// for a missing channel.
841         in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
842         /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
843         /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
844         ///
845         /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
846         /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
847         /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
848         /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
849         ///
850         /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
851         /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
852         /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
853         /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
854         /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
855         /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
856         monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
857         /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
858         /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
859         /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
860         /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
861         actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
862         /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
863         /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
864         /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
865         is_connected: bool,
866 }
867
868 impl <SP: Deref> PeerState<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
869         /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
870         /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
871         /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
872         fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
873                 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
874                         return false
875                 }
876                 self.channel_by_id.iter().filter(|(_, phase)| matches!(phase, ChannelPhase::Funded(_))).count() == 0
877                         && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
878                         && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
879         }
880
881         // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
882         fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
883                 self.channel_by_id.len() + self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
884         }
885
886         // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
887         fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId) -> bool {
888                 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
889                         self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
890         }
891 }
892
893 /// A not-yet-accepted inbound (from counterparty) channel. Once
894 /// accepted, the parameters will be used to construct a channel.
895 pub(super) struct InboundChannelRequest {
896         /// The original OpenChannel message.
897         pub open_channel_msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
898         /// The number of ticks remaining before the request expires.
899         pub ticks_remaining: i32,
900 }
901
902 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unaccepted inbound channel to be
903 /// accepted. An unaccepted channel that exceeds this limit will be abandoned.
904 const UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: i32 = 2;
905
906 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
907 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
908 ///
909 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
910 /// here.
911 ///
912 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
913 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
914 struct PendingInboundPayment {
915         /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
916         payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
917         /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
918         /// this payment being removed.
919         expiry_time: u64,
920         /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
921         user_payment_id: u64,
922         // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
923         payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
924         min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
925 }
926
927 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
928 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
929 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
930 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
931 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
932 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
933 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
934 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
935 ///
936 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
937 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
938 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
939         Arc<M>,
940         Arc<T>,
941         Arc<KeysManager>,
942         Arc<KeysManager>,
943         Arc<KeysManager>,
944         Arc<F>,
945         Arc<DefaultRouter<
946                 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
947                 Arc<L>,
948                 Arc<RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
949                 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
950                 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
951         >>,
952         Arc<L>
953 >;
954
955 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
956 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
957 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
958 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
959 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
960 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
961 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
962 /// or, respectively, [`Router`]  for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
963 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
964 ///
965 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
966 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
967 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
968         ChannelManager<
969                 &'a M,
970                 &'b T,
971                 &'c KeysManager,
972                 &'c KeysManager,
973                 &'c KeysManager,
974                 &'d F,
975                 &'e DefaultRouter<
976                         &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
977                         &'g L,
978                         &'h RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
979                         ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
980                         ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
981                 >,
982                 &'g L
983         >;
984
985 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`].
986 ///
987 /// This is not exported to bindings users as general cover traits aren't useful in other
988 /// languages.
989 pub trait AChannelManager {
990         /// A type implementing [`chain::Watch`].
991         type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
992         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Watch`].
993         type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
994         /// A type implementing [`BroadcasterInterface`].
995         type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
996         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Broadcaster`].
997         type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
998         /// A type implementing [`EntropySource`].
999         type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
1000         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::EntropySource`].
1001         type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
1002         /// A type implementing [`NodeSigner`].
1003         type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
1004         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::NodeSigner`].
1005         type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
1006         /// A type implementing [`WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner`].
1007         type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
1008         /// A type implementing [`SignerProvider`] for [`Self::Signer`].
1009         type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<EcdsaSigner= Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
1010         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::SignerProvider`].
1011         type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
1012         /// A type implementing [`FeeEstimator`].
1013         type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
1014         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::FeeEstimator`].
1015         type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
1016         /// A type implementing [`Router`].
1017         type Router: Router + ?Sized;
1018         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Router`].
1019         type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
1020         /// A type implementing [`Logger`].
1021         type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
1022         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Logger`].
1023         type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
1024         /// Returns a reference to the actual [`ChannelManager`] object.
1025         fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
1026 }
1027
1028 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
1029 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1030 where
1031         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1032         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1033         ES::Target: EntropySource,
1034         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1035         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1036         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1037         R::Target: Router,
1038         L::Target: Logger,
1039 {
1040         type Watch = M::Target;
1041         type M = M;
1042         type Broadcaster = T::Target;
1043         type T = T;
1044         type EntropySource = ES::Target;
1045         type ES = ES;
1046         type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
1047         type NS = NS;
1048         type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner;
1049         type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
1050         type SP = SP;
1051         type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
1052         type F = F;
1053         type Router = R::Target;
1054         type R = R;
1055         type Logger = L::Target;
1056         type L = L;
1057         fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
1058 }
1059
1060 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
1061 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
1062 ///
1063 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
1064 /// to individual Channels.
1065 ///
1066 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
1067 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
1068 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
1069 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
1070 ///
1071 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
1072 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST durably write each
1073 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] before returning from
1074 /// [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`] or before completing async writes. With
1075 /// `ChannelManager`s, writing updates happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other
1076 /// `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during the serialization process). If the
1077 /// deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to
1078 /// [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds
1079 /// will be lost (modulo on-chain transaction fees).
1080 ///
1081 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
1082 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
1083 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
1084 ///
1085 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
1086 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
1087 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
1088 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
1089 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
1090 ///
1091 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
1092 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
1093 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
1094 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
1095 ///
1096 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
1097 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
1098 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
1099 ///
1100 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
1101 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
1102 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
1103 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
1104 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
1105 ///
1106 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
1107 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
1108 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
1109 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
1110 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
1111 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
1112 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
1113 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
1114 //
1115 // Lock order:
1116 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
1117 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
1118 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
1119 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
1120 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
1121 //
1122 // Lock order tree:
1123 //
1124 // `pending_offers_messages`
1125 //
1126 // `total_consistency_lock`
1127 //  |
1128 //  |__`forward_htlcs`
1129 //  |   |
1130 //  |   |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
1131 //  |
1132 //  |__`per_peer_state`
1133 //      |
1134 //      |__`pending_inbound_payments`
1135 //          |
1136 //          |__`claimable_payments`
1137 //          |
1138 //          |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
1139 //              |
1140 //              |__`peer_state`
1141 //                  |
1142 //                  |__`outpoint_to_peer`
1143 //                  |
1144 //                  |__`short_to_chan_info`
1145 //                  |
1146 //                  |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
1147 //                  |
1148 //                  |__`best_block`
1149 //                  |
1150 //                  |__`pending_events`
1151 //                      |
1152 //                      |__`pending_background_events`
1153 //
1154 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
1155 where
1156         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1157         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1158         ES::Target: EntropySource,
1159         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1160         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1161         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1162         R::Target: Router,
1163         L::Target: Logger,
1164 {
1165         default_configuration: UserConfig,
1166         chain_hash: ChainHash,
1167         fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1168         chain_monitor: M,
1169         tx_broadcaster: T,
1170         #[allow(unused)]
1171         router: R,
1172
1173         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1174         #[cfg(test)]
1175         pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1176         #[cfg(not(test))]
1177         best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1178         secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1179
1180         /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
1181         /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
1182         /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
1183         /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
1184         ///
1185         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1186         pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
1187
1188         /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
1189         /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
1190         /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
1191         /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
1192         /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
1193         /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
1194         /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
1195         /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
1196         ///
1197         /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
1198         ///
1199         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1200         pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
1201
1202         /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
1203         ///
1204         /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1205         /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1206         /// and via the classic SCID.
1207         ///
1208         /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1209         /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
1210         ///
1211         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1212         #[cfg(test)]
1213         pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1214         #[cfg(not(test))]
1215         forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1216         /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
1217         /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
1218         ///
1219         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1220         pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
1221
1222         /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
1223         /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1224         ///
1225         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1226         claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1227
1228         /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1229         /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1230         /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1231         /// active channel list on load.
1232         ///
1233         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1234         outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1235
1236         /// Channel funding outpoint -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1237         ///
1238         /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1239         /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1240         /// the handling of the events.
1241         ///
1242         /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1243         /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1244         ///
1245         /// TODO:
1246         /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1247         /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1248         /// would break backwards compatability.
1249         /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1250         /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1251         /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1252         ///
1253         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1254         outpoint_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, PublicKey>>,
1255
1256         /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1257         ///
1258         /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1259         /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1260         /// confirmation depth.
1261         ///
1262         /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1263         /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1264         /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1265         ///
1266         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1267         #[cfg(test)]
1268         pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1269         #[cfg(not(test))]
1270         short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1271
1272         our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
1273
1274         inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
1275
1276         /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
1277         /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
1278         /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
1279         ///
1280         /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
1281         fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1282
1283         /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
1284         /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
1285         /// keeping additional state.
1286         probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
1287
1288         /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1289         /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1290         /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1291         highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1292
1293         /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
1294         /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
1295         ///
1296         /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1297         /// are currently open with that peer.
1298         ///
1299         /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1300         /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
1301         /// channels.
1302         ///
1303         /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
1304         ///
1305         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1306         #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1307         per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1308         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1309         pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1310
1311         /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
1312         /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
1313         /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
1314         /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
1315         /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
1316         ///
1317         /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
1318         /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
1319         ///
1320         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1321         #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1322         pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1323         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1324         pub(crate) pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1325
1326         /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
1327         pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
1328
1329         /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
1330         /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
1331         /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
1332         /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
1333         /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
1334         ///
1335         /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
1336         ///
1337         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1338         ///
1339         /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1340         pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1341         /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1342         /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1343         /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1344         /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1345         /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1346         /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1347         total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1348         /// Tracks the progress of channels going through batch funding by whether funding_signed was
1349         /// received and the monitor has been persisted.
1350         ///
1351         /// This information does not need to be persisted as funding nodes can forget
1352         /// unfunded channels upon disconnection.
1353         funding_batch_states: Mutex<BTreeMap<Txid, Vec<(ChannelId, PublicKey, bool)>>>,
1354
1355         background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
1356
1357         event_persist_notifier: Notifier,
1358         needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool,
1359
1360         pending_offers_messages: Mutex<Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>>>,
1361
1362         entropy_source: ES,
1363         node_signer: NS,
1364         signer_provider: SP,
1365
1366         logger: L,
1367 }
1368
1369 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1370 ///
1371 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1372 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1373 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1374 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1375 pub struct ChainParameters {
1376         /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1377         pub network: Network,
1378
1379         /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1380         ///
1381         /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1382         pub best_block: BestBlock,
1383 }
1384
1385 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1386 #[must_use]
1387 enum NotifyOption {
1388         DoPersist,
1389         SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1390         SkipPersistNoEvents,
1391 }
1392
1393 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1394 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1395 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1396 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1397 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1398 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1399 ///
1400 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1401 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1402 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1403 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1404         event_persist_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1405         needs_persist_flag: &'a AtomicBool,
1406         should_persist: F,
1407         // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1408         _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1409 }
1410
1411 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1412         /// Notifies any waiters and indicates that we need to persist, in addition to possibly having
1413         /// events to handle.
1414         ///
1415         /// This must always be called if the changes included a `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, as well as in
1416         /// other cases where losing the changes on restart may result in a force-close or otherwise
1417         /// isn't ideal.
1418         fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1419                 Self::optionally_notify(cm, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
1420         }
1421
1422         fn optionally_notify<F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C, mut persist_check: F)
1423         -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1424                 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1425                 let force_notify = cm.get_cm().process_background_events();
1426
1427                 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1428                         event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1429                         needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1430                         should_persist: move || {
1431                                 // Pick the "most" action between `persist_check` and the background events
1432                                 // processing and return that.
1433                                 let notify = persist_check();
1434                                 match (notify, force_notify) {
1435                                         (NotifyOption::DoPersist, _) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1436                                         (_, NotifyOption::DoPersist) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1437                                         (NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents, _) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1438                                         (_, NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1439                                         _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
1440                                 }
1441                         },
1442                         _read_guard: read_guard,
1443                 }
1444         }
1445
1446         /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
1447         /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first (or
1448         /// [`Self::optionally_notify`] used).
1449         fn optionally_notify_skipping_background_events<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>
1450         (cm: &'a C, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1451                 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1452
1453                 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1454                         event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1455                         needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1456                         should_persist: persist_check,
1457                         _read_guard: read_guard,
1458                 }
1459         }
1460 }
1461
1462 impl<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1463         fn drop(&mut self) {
1464                 match (self.should_persist)() {
1465                         NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
1466                                 self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
1467                                 self.event_persist_notifier.notify()
1468                         },
1469                         NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
1470                                 self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
1471                         NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
1472                 }
1473         }
1474 }
1475
1476 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1477 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1478 ///
1479 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1480 ///
1481 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1482 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1483 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1484 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1485 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1486
1487 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1488 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1489 ///
1490 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1491 ///
1492 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1493 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1494 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1495 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1496 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1497 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1498 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1499 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1500 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1501 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1502 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1503 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1504 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1505
1506 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1507 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1508 /// this value.
1509 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1510 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1511 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1512 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1513
1514 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1515 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1516 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1517 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1518 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1519 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1520 #[allow(dead_code)]
1521 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1522
1523 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1524 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1525 #[allow(dead_code)]
1526 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1527
1528 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1529 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1530
1531 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1532 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1533 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1534
1535 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1536 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1537 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1538
1539 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1540 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1541 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1542 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1543
1544 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1545 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1546 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1547
1548 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1549 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1550 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1551
1552 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1553 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1554 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1555         /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1556         pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1557         /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1558         pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1559         /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1560         /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1561         /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1562         pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1563 }
1564
1565 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1566 /// to better separate parameters.
1567 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1568 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1569         /// The node_id of our counterparty
1570         pub node_id: PublicKey,
1571         /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1572         /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1573         /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1574         pub features: InitFeatures,
1575         /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1576         /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1577         /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1578         ///
1579         /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1580         ///
1581         /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1582         pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1583         /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1584         /// payments to us through this channel.
1585         pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1586         /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1587         /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1588         /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1589         pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1590         /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1591         pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1592 }
1593
1594 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1595 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1596 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1597         /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1598         /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1599         /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1600         /// lifetime of the channel.
1601         pub channel_id: ChannelId,
1602         /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1603         pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1604         /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1605         /// our counterparty already.
1606         ///
1607         /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1608         /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1609         pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1610         /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1611         ///
1612         /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1613         pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1614         /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1615         /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1616         ///
1617         /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1618         /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1619         ///
1620         /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1621         /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1622         ///
1623         /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1624         /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1625         /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1626         /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1627         /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1628         pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1629         /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1630         /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1631         /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1632         /// `Some(0)`).
1633         ///
1634         /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1635         ///
1636         /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1637         /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1638         pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1639         /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1640         /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1641         /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1642         /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1643         ///
1644         /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1645         /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1646         ///
1647         /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1648         pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1649         /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1650         pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1651         /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1652         /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1653         /// this value on chain.
1654         ///
1655         /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1656         ///
1657         /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1658         ///
1659         /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1660         pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1661         /// The `user_channel_id` value passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound
1662         /// channels, or to [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
1663         /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] config flag is set to true. Otherwise
1664         /// `user_channel_id` will be randomized for an inbound channel.  This may be zero for objects
1665         /// serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1666         ///
1667         /// [`ChannelManager::create_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_channel
1668         /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
1669         /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels
1670         pub user_channel_id: u128,
1671         /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1672         /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1673         ///
1674         /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1675         pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1676         /// Our total balance.  This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1677         /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1678         /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1679         ///
1680         /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1681         /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1682         /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1683         /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1684         ///
1685         /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1686         pub balance_msat: u64,
1687         /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1688         /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1689         /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1690         /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1691         ///
1692         /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1693         ///
1694         /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1695         /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1696         /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1697         pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1698         /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1699         /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1700         /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1701         /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1702         ///
1703         /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`],
1704         /// [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`], and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1705         pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1706         /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
1707         /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
1708         /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
1709         /// route which is valid.
1710         pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1711         /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1712         /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1713         /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1714         /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1715         /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1716         ///
1717         /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1718         /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1719         /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1720         pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1721         /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1722         /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1723         /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1724         /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1725         /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1726         ///
1727         /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1728         ///
1729         /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1730         /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1731         /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1732         pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1733         /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1734         ///
1735         /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1736         pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1737         /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1738         /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1739         /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1740         /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1741         /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1742         ///
1743         /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1744         pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1745         /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1746         pub is_outbound: bool,
1747         /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1748         /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1749         /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1750         /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1751         /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1752         ///
1753         /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1754         pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1755         /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
1756         /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
1757         pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
1758         /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1759         /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1760         ///
1761         /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1762         pub is_usable: bool,
1763         /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1764         pub is_public: bool,
1765         /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1766         /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1767         pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1768         /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1769         pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1770         /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1771         ///
1772         /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1773         pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1774 }
1775
1776 impl ChannelDetails {
1777         /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1778         /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1779         /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1780         ///
1781         /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1782         /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1783         pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1784                 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1785         }
1786
1787         /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1788         /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1789         /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1790         ///
1791         /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1792         /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1793         pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1794                 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1795         }
1796
1797         fn from_channel_context<SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
1798                 context: &ChannelContext<SP>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
1799                 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
1800         ) -> Self
1801         where
1802                 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1803                 F::Target: FeeEstimator
1804         {
1805                 let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
1806                 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1807                         context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1808                 ChannelDetails {
1809                         channel_id: context.channel_id(),
1810                         counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1811                                 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1812                                 features: latest_features,
1813                                 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1814                                 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1815                                 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1816                                 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1817                                 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1818                                 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1819                                 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1820                                 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
1821                                         Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1822                                 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1823                         },
1824                         funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
1825                         // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1826                         // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1827                         channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1828                         short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
1829                         outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1830                         inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1831                         channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
1832                         feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1833                         unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1834                         balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1835                         inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1836                         outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1837                         next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1838                         next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1839                         user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
1840                         confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
1841                         confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1842                         force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1843                         is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
1844                         is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
1845                         is_usable: context.is_live(),
1846                         is_public: context.should_announce(),
1847                         inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1848                         inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1849                         config: Some(context.config()),
1850                         channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
1851                 }
1852         }
1853 }
1854
1855 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1856 /// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
1857 /// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
1858 /// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
1859 /// the channel will be removed shortly.
1860 /// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
1861 /// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
1862 pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
1863         /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
1864         NotShuttingDown,
1865         /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
1866         ShutdownInitiated,
1867         /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
1868         /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
1869         ResolvingHTLCs,
1870         /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
1871         NegotiatingClosingFee,
1872         /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
1873         /// to drop the channel.
1874         ShutdownComplete,
1875 }
1876
1877 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1878 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1879 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1880 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1881         /// When an invoice was requested and thus a payment has not yet been sent.
1882         AwaitingInvoice {
1883                 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1884                 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1885                 payment_id: PaymentId,
1886         },
1887         /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1888         Pending {
1889                 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1890                 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1891                 payment_id: PaymentId,
1892                 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1893                 /// abandoned.
1894                 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1895                 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1896                 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1897                 total_msat: u64,
1898         },
1899         /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1900         /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1901         /// payment is removed from tracking.
1902         Fulfilled {
1903                 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1904                 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1905                 payment_id: PaymentId,
1906                 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1907                 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1908                 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1909         },
1910         /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1911         /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1912         /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1913         Abandoned {
1914                 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1915                 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1916                 payment_id: PaymentId,
1917                 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1918                 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1919         },
1920 }
1921
1922 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1923 ///
1924 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
1925 #[derive(Clone)]
1926 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1927         /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1928         pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1929         /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1930         /// route hints.
1931         pub phantom_scid: u64,
1932         /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1933         pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1934 }
1935
1936 macro_rules! handle_error {
1937         ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1938                 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1939                 // entering the macro.
1940                 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1941                 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1942
1943                 match $internal {
1944                         Ok(msg) => Ok(msg),
1945                         Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish, channel_capacity }) => {
1946                                 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1947
1948                                 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1949                                         $self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1950                                         if let Some(update) = update_option {
1951                                                 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1952                                                         msg: update
1953                                                 });
1954                                         }
1955                                         if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1956                                                 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1957                                                         channel_id, user_channel_id,
1958                                                         reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() },
1959                                                         counterparty_node_id: Some($counterparty_node_id),
1960                                                         channel_capacity_sats: channel_capacity,
1961                                                 }, None));
1962                                         }
1963                                 }
1964
1965                                 let logger = WithContext::from(
1966                                         &$self.logger, Some($counterparty_node_id), chan_id.map(|(chan_id, _)| chan_id)
1967                                 );
1968                                 log_error!(logger, "{}", err.err);
1969                                 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1970                                 } else {
1971                                         msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1972                                                 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1973                                                 action: err.action.clone()
1974                                         });
1975                                 }
1976
1977                                 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1978                                         let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1979                                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1980                                                 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1981                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1982                                         }
1983                                 }
1984
1985                                 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1986                                 Err(err)
1987                         },
1988                 }
1989         } };
1990 }
1991
1992 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1993         ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
1994                 if let Some(outpoint) = $channel_context.get_funding_txo() {
1995                         $self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&outpoint);
1996                 }
1997                 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1998                 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
1999                         short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
2000                 } else {
2001                         // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
2002                         // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
2003                         // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
2004                         // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
2005                         // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
2006                         // stage.
2007                         let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
2008                         debug_assert!(alias_removed);
2009                 }
2010                 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
2011         }}
2012 }
2013
2014 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
2015 macro_rules! convert_chan_phase_err {
2016         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, $channel_update: expr) => {
2017                 match $err {
2018                         ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
2019                                 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), *$channel_id))
2020                         },
2021                         ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
2022                                 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), *$channel_id))
2023                         },
2024                         ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
2025                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$channel.context);
2026                                 log_error!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", $channel_id, msg);
2027                                 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel.context);
2028                                 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
2029                                 let user_id = $channel.context.get_user_id();
2030                                 let channel_capacity_satoshis = $channel.context.get_value_satoshis();
2031
2032                                 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, user_id,
2033                                         shutdown_res, $channel_update, channel_capacity_satoshis))
2034                         },
2035                 }
2036         };
2037         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, FUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2038                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, { $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast($channel).ok() })
2039         };
2040         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2041                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, None)
2042         };
2043         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_phase: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
2044                 match $channel_phase {
2045                         ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
2046                                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL)
2047                         },
2048                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel) => {
2049                                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2050                         },
2051                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel) => {
2052                                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2053                         },
2054                 }
2055         };
2056 }
2057
2058 macro_rules! break_chan_phase_entry {
2059         ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2060                 match $res {
2061                         Ok(res) => res,
2062                         Err(e) => {
2063                                 let key = *$entry.key();
2064                                 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2065                                 if drop {
2066                                         $entry.remove_entry();
2067                                 }
2068                                 break Err(res);
2069                         }
2070                 }
2071         }
2072 }
2073
2074 macro_rules! try_chan_phase_entry {
2075         ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2076                 match $res {
2077                         Ok(res) => res,
2078                         Err(e) => {
2079                                 let key = *$entry.key();
2080                                 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2081                                 if drop {
2082                                         $entry.remove_entry();
2083                                 }
2084                                 return Err(res);
2085                         }
2086                 }
2087         }
2088 }
2089
2090 macro_rules! remove_channel_phase {
2091         ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2092                 {
2093                         let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
2094                         update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context());
2095                         channel
2096                 }
2097         }
2098 }
2099
2100 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
2101         ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
2102                 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
2103                         node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2104                         msg: $channel_ready_msg,
2105                 });
2106                 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
2107                 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
2108                 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2109                 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2110                 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2111                         "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2112                 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
2113                         let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2114                         assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2115                                 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2116                 }
2117         }}
2118 }
2119
2120 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
2121         ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2122                 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
2123                         $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
2124                                 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2125                                 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
2126                                 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2127                                 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2128                                 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
2129                         }, None));
2130                         $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
2131                 }
2132         }
2133 }
2134
2135 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
2136         ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2137                 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
2138                         debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
2139                         $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
2140                                 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2141                                 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2142                                 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2143                                 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
2144                         }, None));
2145                         $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
2146                 }
2147         }
2148 }
2149
2150 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
2151         ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2152                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context);
2153                 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&&logger,
2154                         &$self.node_signer, $self.chain_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
2155                         $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
2156                 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
2157                 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
2158                         // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
2159                         // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
2160                         // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
2161                         // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
2162                         // now.
2163                         if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
2164                                 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2165                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2166                                         msg,
2167                                 })
2168                         } else { None }
2169                 } else { None };
2170
2171                 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
2172                         .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
2173
2174                 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
2175                         &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
2176                         updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
2177                         updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
2178                         updates.announcement_sigs);
2179                 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
2180                         $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
2181                 }
2182
2183                 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
2184                 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = $chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2185                 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
2186                 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
2187
2188                 // If the channel belongs to a batch funding transaction, the progress of the batch
2189                 // should be updated as we have received funding_signed and persisted the monitor.
2190                 if let Some(txid) = unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2191                         let mut funding_batch_states = $self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2192                         let mut batch_completed = false;
2193                         if let Some(batch_state) = funding_batch_states.get_mut(&txid) {
2194                                 let channel_state = batch_state.iter_mut().find(|(chan_id, pubkey, _)| (
2195                                         *chan_id == channel_id &&
2196                                         *pubkey == counterparty_node_id
2197                                 ));
2198                                 if let Some(channel_state) = channel_state {
2199                                         channel_state.2 = true;
2200                                 } else {
2201                                         debug_assert!(false, "Missing channel batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2202                                 }
2203                                 batch_completed = batch_state.iter().all(|(_, _, completed)| *completed);
2204                         } else {
2205                                 debug_assert!(false, "Missing batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2206                         }
2207
2208                         // When all channels in a batched funding transaction have become ready, it is not necessary
2209                         // to track the progress of the batch anymore and the state of the channels can be updated.
2210                         if batch_completed {
2211                                 let removed_batch_state = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2212                                 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2213                                 let mut batch_funding_tx = None;
2214                                 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, _) in removed_batch_state {
2215                                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2216                                                 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2217                                                 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2218                                                         batch_funding_tx = batch_funding_tx.or_else(|| chan.context.unbroadcasted_funding());
2219                                                         chan.set_batch_ready();
2220                                                         let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2221                                                         emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, chan);
2222                                                 }
2223                                         }
2224                                 }
2225                                 if let Some(tx) = batch_funding_tx {
2226                                         log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting batch funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
2227                                         $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
2228                                 }
2229                         }
2230                 }
2231
2232                 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
2233
2234                 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
2235                         $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
2236                 }
2237                 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
2238                 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2239                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2240                         $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
2241                 }
2242         } }
2243 }
2244
2245 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
2246         ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $completed: expr) => { {
2247                 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
2248                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context);
2249                 match $update_res {
2250                         ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::UnrecoverableError => {
2251                                 let err_str = "ChannelMonitor[Update] persistence failed unrecoverably. This indicates we cannot continue normal operation and must shut down.";
2252                                 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
2253                                 panic!("{}", err_str);
2254                         },
2255                         ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
2256                                 log_debug!(logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
2257                                         &$chan.context.channel_id());
2258                                 false
2259                         },
2260                         ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
2261                                 $completed;
2262                                 true
2263                         },
2264                 }
2265         } };
2266         ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
2267                 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $chan, _internal,
2268                         handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
2269         };
2270         ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2271                 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
2272                         .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
2273                 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
2274                 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
2275                 // filter for uniqueness here.
2276                 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
2277                         .unwrap_or_else(|| {
2278                                 in_flight_updates.push($update);
2279                                 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
2280                         });
2281                 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
2282                 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $chan, _internal,
2283                         {
2284                                 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
2285                                 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
2286                                         handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
2287                                 }
2288                         })
2289         } };
2290 }
2291
2292 macro_rules! process_events_body {
2293         ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
2294                 let mut processed_all_events = false;
2295                 while !processed_all_events {
2296                         if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
2297                                 return;
2298                         }
2299
2300                         let mut result;
2301
2302                         {
2303                                 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
2304                                 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
2305                                 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2306
2307                                 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
2308                                 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
2309                                 result = $self.process_background_events();
2310
2311                                 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
2312                                 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
2313                                 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
2314                                         result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2315                                 }
2316                         }
2317
2318                         let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
2319                         let num_events = pending_events.len();
2320                         if !pending_events.is_empty() {
2321                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2322                         }
2323
2324                         let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
2325
2326                         for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
2327                                 $event_to_handle = event;
2328                                 $handle_event;
2329                                 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
2330                                         post_event_actions.push(action);
2331                                 }
2332                         }
2333
2334                         {
2335                                 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2336                                 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
2337                                 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
2338                                 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
2339                                 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
2340                                 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
2341                         }
2342
2343                         if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
2344                                 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
2345                                 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
2346                                 processed_all_events = false;
2347                         }
2348
2349                         match result {
2350                                 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
2351                                         $self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
2352                                         $self.event_persist_notifier.notify();
2353                                 },
2354                                 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
2355                                         $self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
2356                                 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
2357                         }
2358                 }
2359         }
2360 }
2361
2362 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
2363 where
2364         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
2365         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2366         ES::Target: EntropySource,
2367         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2368         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2369         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2370         R::Target: Router,
2371         L::Target: Logger,
2372 {
2373         /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
2374         ///
2375         /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
2376         ///
2377         /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
2378         /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
2379         ///
2380         /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
2381         ///
2382         /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
2383         /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
2384         /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
2385         /// more details.
2386         ///
2387         /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
2388         /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
2389         /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
2390         pub fn new(
2391                 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
2392                 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
2393                 current_timestamp: u32,
2394         ) -> Self {
2395                 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2396                 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
2397                 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
2398                 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
2399                 ChannelManager {
2400                         default_configuration: config.clone(),
2401                         chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(params.network),
2402                         fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
2403                         chain_monitor,
2404                         tx_broadcaster,
2405                         router,
2406
2407                         best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
2408
2409                         outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
2410                         pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2411                         pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
2412                         forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2413                         claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
2414                         pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2415                         outpoint_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2416                         short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2417
2418                         our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
2419                         secp_ctx,
2420
2421                         inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
2422                         fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2423
2424                         probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2425
2426                         highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
2427
2428                         per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2429
2430                         pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2431                         pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
2432                         pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2433                         total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2434                         background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
2435                         event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
2436                         needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
2437                         funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
2438
2439                         pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2440
2441                         entropy_source,
2442                         node_signer,
2443                         signer_provider,
2444
2445                         logger,
2446                 }
2447         }
2448
2449         /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
2450         pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
2451                 &self.default_configuration
2452         }
2453
2454         fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2455                 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2456                 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
2457                 let mut i = 0;
2458                 loop {
2459                         if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
2460                                 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
2461                         } else {
2462                                 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
2463                         }
2464                         if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
2465                                 break;
2466                         }
2467                         i += 1;
2468                         if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
2469                 }
2470                 outbound_scid_alias
2471         }
2472
2473         /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2474         ///
2475         /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2476         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2477         /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2478         /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2479         /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2480         ///
2481         /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2482         /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2483         ///
2484         /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2485         /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2486         /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2487         ///
2488         /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2489         /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2490         /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2491         ///
2492         /// If `temporary_channel_id` is specified, it will be used as the temporary channel ID of the
2493         /// channel. Otherwise, a random one will be generated for you.
2494         ///
2495         /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2496         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2497         /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2498         /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2499         /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2500         /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2501         ///
2502         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2503         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2504         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2505         pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<ChannelId, APIError> {
2506                 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2507                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2508                 }
2509
2510                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2511                 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2512                 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2513
2514                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2515
2516                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2517                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2518
2519                 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2520
2521                 if let Some(temporary_channel_id) = temporary_channel_id {
2522                         if peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(&temporary_channel_id) {
2523                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Channel with temporary channel ID {} already exists!", temporary_channel_id)});
2524                         }
2525                 }
2526
2527                 let channel = {
2528                         let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2529                         let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2530                         let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2531                         match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2532                                 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2533                                 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias, temporary_channel_id)
2534                         {
2535                                 Ok(res) => res,
2536                                 Err(e) => {
2537                                         self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
2538                                         return Err(e);
2539                                 },
2540                         }
2541                 };
2542                 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash);
2543
2544                 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
2545                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
2546                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2547                                 if cfg!(fuzzing) {
2548                                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
2549                                 } else {
2550                                         panic!("RNG is bad???");
2551                                 }
2552                         },
2553                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel)); }
2554                 }
2555
2556                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
2557                         node_id: their_network_key,
2558                         msg: res,
2559                 });
2560                 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
2561         }
2562
2563         fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&ChannelId, &Channel<SP>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2564                 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2565                 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2566                 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `outpoint_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2567                 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2568                 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2569                 // the same channel.
2570                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2571                 {
2572                         let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2573                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2574                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2575                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2576                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2577                                 res.extend(peer_state.channel_by_id.iter()
2578                                         .filter_map(|(chan_id, phase)| match phase {
2579                                                 // Only `Channels` in the `ChannelPhase::Funded` phase can be considered funded.
2580                                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => Some((chan_id, chan)),
2581                                                 _ => None,
2582                                         })
2583                                         .filter(f)
2584                                         .map(|(_channel_id, channel)| {
2585                                                 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2586                                                         peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2587                                         })
2588                                 );
2589                         }
2590                 }
2591                 res
2592         }
2593
2594         /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
2595         /// more information.
2596         pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2597                 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2598                 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2599                 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `outpoint_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2600                 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2601                 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2602                 // the same channel.
2603                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2604                 {
2605                         let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2606                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2607                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2608                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2609                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2610                                 for context in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, phase)| phase.context()) {
2611                                         let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height,
2612                                                 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2613                                         res.push(details);
2614                                 }
2615                         }
2616                 }
2617                 res
2618         }
2619
2620         /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
2621         /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
2622         ///
2623         /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
2624         /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
2625         /// are.
2626         pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2627                 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2628                 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2629                 // really wanted anyway.
2630                 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
2631         }
2632
2633         /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2634         pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2635                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2636                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2637
2638                 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2639                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2640                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2641                         let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2642                         let context_to_details = |context| {
2643                                 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2644                         };
2645                         return peer_state.channel_by_id
2646                                 .iter()
2647                                 .map(|(_, phase)| phase.context())
2648                                 .map(context_to_details)
2649                                 .collect();
2650                 }
2651                 vec![]
2652         }
2653
2654         /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2655         /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2656         ///
2657         /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2658         /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2659         /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2660         ///
2661         /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2662         pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2663                 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2664                         .filter_map(|(payment_id, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2665                                 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {
2666                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2667                                 },
2668                                 // InvoiceReceived is an intermediate state and doesn't need to be exposed
2669                                 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {
2670                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2671                                 },
2672                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2673                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2674                                                 payment_id: *payment_id,
2675                                                 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2676                                                 total_msat: *total_msat,
2677                                         })
2678                                 },
2679                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2680                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2681                                 },
2682                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2683                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2684                                 },
2685                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2686                         })
2687                         .collect()
2688         }
2689
2690         /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
2691         fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, context: &ChannelContext<SP>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
2692                 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2693                 match context.unbroadcasted_funding() {
2694                         Some(transaction) => {
2695                                 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2696                                         channel_id: context.channel_id(), transaction
2697                                 }, None));
2698                         },
2699                         None => {},
2700                 }
2701                 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2702                         channel_id: context.channel_id(),
2703                         user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
2704                         reason: closure_reason,
2705                         counterparty_node_id: Some(context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
2706                         channel_capacity_sats: Some(context.get_value_satoshis()),
2707                 }, None));
2708         }
2709
2710         fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2711                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2712
2713                 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
2714                 let mut shutdown_result = None;
2715
2716                 {
2717                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2718
2719                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2720                                 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2721
2722                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2723                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2724
2725                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2726                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
2727                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
2728                                                 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
2729                                                 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2730                                                 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) =
2731                                                         chan.get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2732                                                 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2733
2734                                                 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2735                                                 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2736                                                 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2737                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2738                                                         node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2739                                                         msg: shutdown_msg,
2740                                                 });
2741
2742                                                 debug_assert!(monitor_update_opt.is_none() || !chan.is_shutdown(),
2743                                                         "We can't both complete shutdown and generate a monitor update");
2744
2745                                                 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2746                                                 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2747                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
2748                                                                 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
2749                                                 }
2750                                         } else {
2751                                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan_phase_entry.get().context(), ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2752                                                 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
2753                                                 shutdown_result = Some(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
2754                                         }
2755                                 },
2756                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2757                                         return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2758                                                 err: format!(
2759                                                         "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
2760                                                         channel_id, counterparty_node_id,
2761                                                 )
2762                                         });
2763                                 },
2764                         }
2765                 }
2766
2767                 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2768                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2769                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2770                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2771                 }
2772
2773                 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
2774                         self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2775                 }
2776
2777                 Ok(())
2778         }
2779
2780         /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2781         /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2782         /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2783         ///
2784         ///  * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] and
2785         ///    [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
2786         ///    fee estimate.
2787         ///  * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2788         ///    transaction feerate of at least our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] feerate or the feerate which
2789         ///    would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2790         ///    counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2791         ///
2792         /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2793         ///
2794         /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2795         /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2796         /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2797         /// channel.
2798         ///
2799         /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2800         /// [`ChannelCloseMinimum`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum
2801         /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
2802         /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2803         pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2804                 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2805         }
2806
2807         /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2808         /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2809         /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2810         ///
2811         /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2812         /// the channel being closed or not:
2813         ///  * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2814         ///    transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2815         ///    [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
2816         ///    fee estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2817         ///  * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2818         ///    transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2819         ///    will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2820         ///
2821         /// The `shutdown_script` provided  will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2822         /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2823         /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2824         /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2825         ///
2826         /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2827         ///
2828         /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2829         /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2830         /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2831         /// channel.
2832         ///
2833         /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2834         /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
2835         /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2836         pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2837                 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2838         }
2839
2840         fn finish_close_channel(&self, mut shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2841                 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2842                 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2843                 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
2844                         debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2845                 }
2846
2847                 let logger = WithContext::from(
2848                         &self.logger, Some(shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id), Some(shutdown_res.channel_id),
2849                 );
2850                 log_debug!(logger, "Finishing closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.len());
2851                 for htlc_source in shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.drain(..) {
2852                         let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2853                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2854                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2855                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2856                 }
2857                 if let Some((_, funding_txo, monitor_update)) = shutdown_res.monitor_update {
2858                         // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2859                         // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2860                         // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2861                         // ignore the result here.
2862                         let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2863                 }
2864                 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
2865                 if let Some(txid) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2866                         let mut funding_batch_states = self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2867                         let affected_channels = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2868                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2869                         let mut has_uncompleted_channel = None;
2870                         for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, state) in affected_channels {
2871                                 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2872                                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2873                                         if let Some(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id) {
2874                                                 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
2875                                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context(), ClosureReason::FundingBatchClosure);
2876                                                 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
2877                                         }
2878                                 }
2879                                 has_uncompleted_channel = Some(has_uncompleted_channel.map_or(!state, |v| v || !state));
2880                         }
2881                         debug_assert!(
2882                                 has_uncompleted_channel.unwrap_or(true),
2883                                 "Closing a batch where all channels have completed initial monitor update",
2884                         );
2885                 }
2886                 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
2887                         self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2888                 }
2889         }
2890
2891         /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2892         /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2893         fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2894         -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2895                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2896                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2897                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2898                 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
2899                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2900                         let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2901                                 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
2902                         } else {
2903                                 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
2904                         };
2905                         let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*peer_node_id), Some(*channel_id));
2906                         if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2907                                 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", channel_id);
2908                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan_phase_entry.get().context(), closure_reason);
2909                                 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
2910                                 mem::drop(peer_state);
2911                                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
2912                                 match chan_phase {
2913                                         ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) => {
2914                                                 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2915                                                 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2916                                         },
2917                                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
2918                                                 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
2919                                                 // Unfunded channel has no update
2920                                                 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
2921                                         },
2922                                 }
2923                         } else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
2924                                 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
2925                                 // N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
2926                                 // don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
2927                                 // events anyway.
2928                                 (None, *peer_node_id)
2929                         } else {
2930                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, peer_node_id) });
2931                         }
2932                 };
2933                 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
2934                         // Try to send the `BroadcastChannelUpdate` to the peer we just force-closed on, but if
2935                         // not try to broadcast it via whatever peer we have.
2936                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2937                         let a_peer_state_opt = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2938                                 .ok_or(per_peer_state.values().next());
2939                         if let Ok(a_peer_state_mutex) = a_peer_state_opt {
2940                                 let mut a_peer_state = a_peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2941                                 a_peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2942                                         msg: update
2943                                 });
2944                         }
2945                 }
2946
2947                 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
2948         }
2949
2950         fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2951                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2952                 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2953                         Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2954                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2955                                 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2956                                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2957                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2958                                                 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2959                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2960                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
2961                                                                 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
2962                                                         },
2963                                                 }
2964                                         );
2965                                 }
2966                                 Ok(())
2967                         },
2968                         Err(e) => Err(e)
2969                 }
2970         }
2971
2972         /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2973         /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2974         /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2975         /// channel.
2976         pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2977         -> Result<(), APIError> {
2978                 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2979         }
2980
2981         /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2982         /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2983         /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2984         ///
2985         /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2986         /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2987         pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2988         -> Result<(), APIError> {
2989                 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2990         }
2991
2992         /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2993         /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2994         pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2995                 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2996                         let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2997                 }
2998         }
2999
3000         /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
3001         /// local transaction(s).
3002         pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
3003                 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3004                         let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
3005                 }
3006         }
3007
3008         fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
3009                 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey,
3010         ) -> Result<
3011                 (onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg
3012         > {
3013                 let (next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_details_opt) = decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion(
3014                         msg, &self.node_signer, &self.logger, &self.secp_ctx
3015                 )?;
3016
3017                 let is_blinded = match next_hop {
3018                         onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
3019                                 next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedForward { .. }, ..
3020                         } => true,
3021                         _ => false, // TODO: update this when we support receiving to multi-hop blinded paths
3022                 };
3023
3024                 macro_rules! return_err {
3025                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3026                                 {
3027                                         log_info!(
3028                                                 WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id)),
3029                                                 "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg
3030                                         );
3031                                         let (err_code, err_data) = if is_blinded {
3032                                                 (INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, &[0; 32][..])
3033                                         } else { ($err_code, $data) };
3034                                         return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3035                                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3036                                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3037                                                 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason(err_code, err_data.to_vec())
3038                                                         .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3039                                         }));
3040                                 }
3041                         }
3042                 }
3043
3044                 let NextPacketDetails {
3045                         next_packet_pubkey, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_scid, outgoing_cltv_value
3046                 } = match next_packet_details_opt {
3047                         Some(next_packet_details) => next_packet_details,
3048                         // it is a receive, so no need for outbound checks
3049                         None => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
3050                 };
3051
3052                 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
3053                 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
3054                 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
3055                         let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid).cloned();
3056                         let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
3057                                 None => { // unknown_next_peer
3058                                         // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
3059                                         // phantom or an intercept.
3060                                         if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
3061                                                 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)) ||
3062                                                 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)
3063                                         {
3064                                                 None
3065                                         } else {
3066                                                 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3067                                         }
3068                                 },
3069                                 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
3070                         };
3071                         let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
3072                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3073                                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3074                                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3075                                         break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3076                                 }
3077                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3078                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3079                                 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).map(
3080                                         |chan_phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
3081                                 ).flatten() {
3082                                         None => {
3083                                                 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
3084                                                 // have no consistency guarantees.
3085                                                 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3086                                         },
3087                                         Some(chan) => chan
3088                                 };
3089                                 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
3090                                         // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
3091                                         // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
3092                                         // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
3093                                         break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3094                                 }
3095                                 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
3096                                         // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
3097                                         // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
3098                                         // we don't have the channel here.
3099                                         break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3100                                 }
3101                                 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3102
3103                                 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
3104                                 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
3105                                 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
3106                                 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
3107                                 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
3108                                 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
3109                                         // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
3110                                         // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
3111                                         // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
3112                                         if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
3113                                                 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
3114                                         } else {
3115                                                 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
3116                                         }
3117                                 }
3118                                 if outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
3119                                         break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
3120                                 }
3121                                 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value) {
3122                                         break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
3123                                 }
3124                                 chan_update_opt
3125                         } else {
3126                                 None
3127                         };
3128
3129                         let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3130
3131                         if let Err((err_msg, code)) = check_incoming_htlc_cltv(
3132                                 cur_height, outgoing_cltv_value, msg.cltv_expiry
3133                         ) {
3134                                 if code & 0x1000 != 0 && chan_update_opt.is_none() {
3135                                         // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
3136                                         // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
3137                                         // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
3138                                         break Some((err_msg, 0x2000 | 2, None))
3139                                 }
3140                                 let chan_update_opt = if code & 0x1000 != 0 { chan_update_opt } else { None };
3141                                 break Some((err_msg, code, chan_update_opt));
3142                         }
3143
3144                         break None;
3145                 }
3146                 {
3147                         let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
3148                         if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
3149                                 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
3150                                         msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3151                                 }
3152                                 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
3153                                         msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3154                                 }
3155                                 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3156                                         // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3157                                         0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3158                                 }
3159                                 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3160                                 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3161                                 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3162                         } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3163                                 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
3164                                 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
3165                                 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
3166                                 // instead.
3167                                 code = 0x2000 | 2;
3168                         }
3169                         return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
3170                 }
3171                 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, Some(next_packet_pubkey)))
3172         }
3173
3174         fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
3175                 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
3176                 decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop, allow_underpay: bool,
3177                 next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>,
3178         ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
3179                 macro_rules! return_err {
3180                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3181                                 {
3182                                         let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id));
3183                                         log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3184                                         return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3185                                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3186                                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3187                                                 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3188                                                         .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3189                                         }));
3190                                 }
3191                         }
3192                 }
3193                 match decoded_hop {
3194                         onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
3195                                 // OUR PAYMENT!
3196                                 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3197                                 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
3198                                         msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat,
3199                                         current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
3200                                 {
3201                                         Ok(info) => {
3202                                                 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
3203                                                 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
3204                                                 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
3205                                                 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
3206                                                 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
3207                                         },
3208                                         Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3209                                 }
3210                         },
3211                         onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
3212                                 match create_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
3213                                         new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
3214                                         Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
3215                                         Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3216                                 }
3217                         }
3218                 }
3219         }
3220
3221         /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
3222         /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
3223         /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
3224         ///
3225         /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
3226         /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
3227         /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3228         ///
3229         /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3230         /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3231         fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3232                 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
3233                         return Err(LightningError {
3234                                 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
3235                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
3236                         });
3237                 }
3238                 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
3239                         return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
3240                 }
3241                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3242                 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3243                 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
3244         }
3245
3246         /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
3247         /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
3248         /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
3249         /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
3250         ///
3251         /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
3252         /// `peer_state`  corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
3253         /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3254         ///
3255         /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3256         /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3257         fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3258                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3259                 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
3260                 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
3261                         None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
3262                         Some(id) => id,
3263                 };
3264
3265                 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
3266         }
3267
3268         fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3269                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3270                 log_trace!(logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
3271                 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3272
3273                 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
3274                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
3275                         ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
3276                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
3277                         ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
3278                 };
3279
3280                 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
3281                         chain_hash: self.chain_hash,
3282                         short_channel_id,
3283                         timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
3284                         flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
3285                         cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
3286                         htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
3287                         htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
3288                         fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
3289                         fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
3290                         excess_data: Vec::new(),
3291                 };
3292                 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
3293                 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
3294                 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
3295                 // channel.
3296                 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
3297
3298                 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
3299                         signature: sig,
3300                         contents: unsigned
3301                 })
3302         }
3303
3304         #[cfg(test)]
3305         pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3306                 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3307                 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
3308                         path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3309                         session_priv_bytes
3310                 })
3311         }
3312
3313         fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3314                 let SendAlongPathArgs {
3315                         path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3316                         session_priv_bytes
3317                 } = args;
3318                 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
3319                 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3320                 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
3321                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
3322
3323                 let (onion_packet, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::create_payment_onion(
3324                         &self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height,
3325                         payment_hash, keysend_preimage, prng_seed
3326                 ).map_err(|e| {
3327                         let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None);
3328                         log_error!(logger, "Failed to build an onion for path for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
3329                         e
3330                 })?;
3331
3332                 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3333                         let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
3334                                 None => {
3335                                         let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None);
3336                                         log_error!(logger, "Failed to find first-hop for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
3337                                         return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()})
3338                                 },
3339                                 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3340                         };
3341
3342                         let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(id));
3343                         log_trace!(logger,
3344                                 "Attempting to send payment with payment hash {} along path with next hop {}",
3345                                 payment_hash, path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
3346
3347                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3348                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3349                                 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
3350                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3351                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3352                         if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
3353                                 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
3354                                         ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
3355                                                 if !chan.context.is_live() {
3356                                                         return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3357                                                 }
3358                                                 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3359                                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3360                                                 let send_res = chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
3361                                                         htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3362                                                                 path: path.clone(),
3363                                                                 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
3364                                                                 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
3365                                                                 payment_id,
3366                                                         }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
3367                                                 match break_chan_phase_entry!(self, send_res, chan_phase_entry) {
3368                                                         Some(monitor_update) => {
3369                                                                 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
3370                                                                         false => {
3371                                                                                 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
3372                                                                                 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
3373                                                                                 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
3374                                                                                 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
3375                                                                                 // which we do in the send_payment check for
3376                                                                                 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
3377                                                                                 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
3378                                                                         },
3379                                                                         true => {},
3380                                                                 }
3381                                                         },
3382                                                         None => {},
3383                                                 }
3384                                         },
3385                                         _ => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel to first hop is unfunded".to_owned()}),
3386                                 };
3387                         } else {
3388                                 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
3389                                 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
3390                                 // `channel_by_id` map.
3391                                 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
3392                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
3393                         }
3394                         return Ok(());
3395                 };
3396                 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
3397                         Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3398                         Err(e) => {
3399                                 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
3400                         },
3401                 }
3402         }
3403
3404         /// Sends a payment along a given route.
3405         ///
3406         /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
3407         /// fields for more info.
3408         ///
3409         /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
3410         /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
3411         ///
3412         /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
3413         ///
3414         /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
3415         /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
3416         /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
3417         /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
3418         /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
3419         ///
3420         /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
3421         /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
3422         /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
3423         /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
3424         /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
3425         ///
3426         /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
3427         /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
3428         /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
3429         /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
3430         ///
3431         /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
3432         ///
3433         /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
3434         /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
3435         /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
3436         ///
3437         /// In general, a path may raise:
3438         ///  * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
3439         ///    node public key) is specified.
3440         ///  * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available as it has been
3441         ///    closed, doesn't exist, or the peer is currently disconnected.
3442         ///  * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
3443         ///    relevant updates.
3444         ///
3445         /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
3446         /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
3447         /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
3448         ///
3449         /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
3450         /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3451         /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3452         /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
3453         /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
3454         /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3455         pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3456                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3457                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3458                 self.pending_outbound_payments
3459                         .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
3460                                 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3461                                 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3462         }
3463
3464         /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
3465         /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3466         pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
3467                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3468                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3469                 self.pending_outbound_payments
3470                         .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
3471                                 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
3472                                 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3473                                 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3474         }
3475
3476         #[cfg(test)]
3477         pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3478                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3479                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3480                 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
3481                         keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
3482                         best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3483         }
3484
3485         #[cfg(test)]
3486         pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
3487                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3488                 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3489         }
3490
3491         #[cfg(test)]
3492         pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3493                 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3494         }
3495
3496         pub(super) fn send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&self, invoice: &Bolt12Invoice, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), Bolt12PaymentError> {
3497                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3498                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3499                 self.pending_outbound_payments
3500                         .send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(
3501                                 invoice, payment_id, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3502                                 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer,
3503                                 best_block_height, &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
3504                                 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args)
3505                         )
3506         }
3507
3508         /// Signals that no further attempts for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
3509         /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
3510         /// retries are exhausted.
3511         ///
3512         /// # Event Generation
3513         ///
3514         /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
3515         /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
3516         ///
3517         /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
3518         /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
3519         /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
3520         ///
3521         /// # Requested Invoices
3522         ///
3523         /// In the case of paying a [`Bolt12Invoice`] via [`ChannelManager::pay_for_offer`], abandoning
3524         /// the payment prior to receiving the invoice will result in an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`]
3525         /// and prevent any attempts at paying it once received. The other events may only be generated
3526         /// once the invoice has been received.
3527         ///
3528         /// # Restart Behavior
3529         ///
3530         /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated and we restart without first persisting the
3531         /// [`ChannelManager`], another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated; likewise for
3532         /// [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
3533         ///
3534         /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
3535         pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
3536                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3537                 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
3538         }
3539
3540         /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
3541         /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
3542         /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
3543         /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
3544         /// never reach the recipient.
3545         ///
3546         /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
3547         /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
3548         ///
3549         /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
3550         /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
3551         ///
3552         /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
3553         pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
3554                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3555                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3556                 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
3557                         route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
3558                         &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3559         }
3560
3561         /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
3562         /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3563         ///
3564         /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
3565         /// payments.
3566         ///
3567         /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
3568         pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
3569                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3570                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3571                 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
3572                         payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3573                         || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),  &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3574                         &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3575         }
3576
3577         /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
3578         /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
3579         /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
3580         pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
3581                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3582                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3583                 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
3584                         &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3585                         |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3586         }
3587
3588         /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
3589         /// payment probe.
3590         #[cfg(test)]
3591         pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
3592                 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
3593         }
3594
3595         /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay the given
3596         /// amount to the given `node_id`.
3597         ///
3598         /// See [`ChannelManager::send_preflight_probes`] for more information.
3599         pub fn send_spontaneous_preflight_probes(
3600                 &self, node_id: PublicKey, amount_msat: u64, final_cltv_expiry_delta: u32,
3601                 liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3602         ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3603                 let payment_params =
3604                         PaymentParameters::from_node_id(node_id, final_cltv_expiry_delta);
3605
3606                 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, amount_msat);
3607
3608                 self.send_preflight_probes(route_params, liquidity_limit_multiplier)
3609         }
3610
3611         /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay a route found
3612         /// according to the given [`RouteParameters`].
3613         ///
3614         /// This may be used to send "pre-flight" probes, i.e., to train our scorer before conducting
3615         /// the actual payment. Note this is only useful if there likely is sufficient time for the
3616         /// probe to settle before sending out the actual payment, e.g., when waiting for user
3617         /// confirmation in a wallet UI.
3618         ///
3619         /// Otherwise, there is a chance the probe could take up some liquidity needed to complete the
3620         /// actual payment. Users should therefore be cautious and might avoid sending probes if
3621         /// liquidity is scarce and/or they don't expect the probe to return before they send the
3622         /// payment. To mitigate this issue, channels with available liquidity less than the required
3623         /// amount times the given `liquidity_limit_multiplier` won't be used to send pre-flight
3624         /// probes. If `None` is given as `liquidity_limit_multiplier`, it defaults to `3`.
3625         pub fn send_preflight_probes(
3626                 &self, route_params: RouteParameters, liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3627         ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3628                 let liquidity_limit_multiplier = liquidity_limit_multiplier.unwrap_or(3);
3629
3630                 let payer = self.get_our_node_id();
3631                 let usable_channels = self.list_usable_channels();
3632                 let first_hops = usable_channels.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>();
3633                 let inflight_htlcs = self.compute_inflight_htlcs();
3634
3635                 let route = self
3636                         .router
3637                         .find_route(&payer, &route_params, Some(&first_hops), inflight_htlcs)
3638                         .map_err(|e| {
3639                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to find path for payment probe: {:?}", e);
3640                                 ProbeSendFailure::RouteNotFound
3641                         })?;
3642
3643                 let mut used_liquidity_map = HashMap::with_capacity(first_hops.len());
3644
3645                 let mut res = Vec::new();
3646
3647                 for mut path in route.paths {
3648                         // If the last hop is probably an unannounced channel we refrain from probing all the
3649                         // way through to the end and instead probe up to the second-to-last channel.
3650                         while let Some(last_path_hop) = path.hops.last() {
3651                                 if last_path_hop.maybe_announced_channel {
3652                                         // We found a potentially announced last hop.
3653                                         break;
3654                                 } else {
3655                                         // Drop the last hop, as it's likely unannounced.
3656                                         log_debug!(
3657                                                 self.logger,
3658                                                 "Avoided sending payment probe all the way to last hop {} as it is likely unannounced.",
3659                                                 last_path_hop.short_channel_id
3660                                         );
3661                                         let final_value_msat = path.final_value_msat();
3662                                         path.hops.pop();
3663                                         if let Some(new_last) = path.hops.last_mut() {
3664                                                 new_last.fee_msat += final_value_msat;
3665                                         }
3666                                 }
3667                         }
3668
3669                         if path.hops.len() < 2 {
3670                                 log_debug!(
3671                                         self.logger,
3672                                         "Skipped sending payment probe over path with less than two hops."
3673                                 );
3674                                 continue;
3675                         }
3676
3677                         if let Some(first_path_hop) = path.hops.first() {
3678                                 if let Some(first_hop) = first_hops.iter().find(|h| {
3679                                         h.get_outbound_payment_scid() == Some(first_path_hop.short_channel_id)
3680                                 }) {
3681                                         let path_value = path.final_value_msat() + path.fee_msat();
3682                                         let used_liquidity =
3683                                                 used_liquidity_map.entry(first_path_hop.short_channel_id).or_insert(0);
3684
3685                                         if first_hop.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat
3686                                                 < (*used_liquidity + path_value) * liquidity_limit_multiplier
3687                                         {
3688                                                 log_debug!(self.logger, "Skipped sending payment probe to avoid putting channel {} under the liquidity limit.", first_path_hop.short_channel_id);
3689                                                 continue;
3690                                         } else {
3691                                                 *used_liquidity += path_value;
3692                                         }
3693                                 }
3694                         }
3695
3696                         res.push(self.send_probe(path).map_err(|e| {
3697                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to send pre-flight probe: {:?}", e);
3698                                 ProbeSendFailure::SendingFailed(e)
3699                         })?);
3700                 }
3701
3702                 Ok(res)
3703         }
3704
3705         /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
3706         /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
3707         fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: FnMut(&OutboundV1Channel<SP>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
3708                 &self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, is_batch_funding: bool,
3709                 mut find_funding_output: FundingOutput,
3710         ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3711                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3712                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3713                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3714
3715                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3716                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3717                 let funding_txo;
3718                 let (chan, msg_opt) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
3719                         Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(mut chan)) => {
3720                                 funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
3721
3722                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3723                                 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, is_batch_funding, &&logger)
3724                                         .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
3725                                                 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
3726                                                 let user_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
3727                                                 let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
3728                                                 let channel_capacity = chan.context.get_value_satoshis();
3729                                                 (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, channel_capacity))
3730                                         } else { unreachable!(); });
3731                                 match funding_res {
3732                                         Ok(funding_msg) => (chan, funding_msg),
3733                                         Err((chan, err)) => {
3734                                                 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3735                                                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3736                                                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
3737                                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3738                                                         err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3739                                                 });
3740                                         },
3741                                 }
3742                         },
3743                         Some(phase) => {
3744                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(*temporary_channel_id, phase);
3745                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3746                                         err: format!(
3747                                                 "Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is not an unfunded, outbound V1 channel",
3748                                                 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3749                                 })
3750                         },
3751                         None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {err: format!(
3752                                 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3753                                 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3754                                 }),
3755                 };
3756
3757                 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
3758                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3759                                 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3760                                 msg,
3761                         });
3762                 }
3763                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
3764                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3765                                 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3766                         },
3767                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3768                                 let mut outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3769                                 if outpoint_to_peer.insert(funding_txo, chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
3770                                         panic!("outpoint_to_peer map already contained funding outpoint, which shouldn't be possible");
3771                                 }
3772                                 e.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan));
3773                         }
3774                 }
3775                 Ok(())
3776         }
3777
3778         #[cfg(test)]
3779         pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3780                 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, false, |_, tx| {
3781                         Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3782                 })
3783         }
3784
3785         /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3786         ///
3787         /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3788         /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3789         ///
3790         /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3791         /// across the p2p network.
3792         ///
3793         /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3794         /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3795         ///
3796         /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3797         /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3798         /// keys per-channel).
3799         ///
3800         /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3801         /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3802         /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3803         ///
3804         /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3805         /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3806         /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3807         ///
3808         /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3809         /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3810         /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3811         /// for more details.
3812         ///
3813         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3814         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3815         pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3816                 self.batch_funding_transaction_generated(&[(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id)], funding_transaction)
3817         }
3818
3819         /// Call this upon creation of a batch funding transaction for the given channels.
3820         ///
3821         /// Return values are identical to [`Self::funding_transaction_generated`], respective to
3822         /// each individual channel and transaction output.
3823         ///
3824         /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. This batch funding transaction
3825         /// will only be broadcast when we have safely received and persisted the counterparty's
3826         /// signature for each channel.
3827         ///
3828         /// If there is an error, all channels in the batch are to be considered closed.
3829         pub fn batch_funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channels: &[(&ChannelId, &PublicKey)], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3830                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3831                 let mut result = Ok(());
3832
3833                 if !funding_transaction.is_coin_base() {
3834                         for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3835                                 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3836                                         result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3837                                                 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3838                                         }));
3839                                 }
3840                         }
3841                 }
3842                 if funding_transaction.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
3843                         result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3844                                 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3845                         }));
3846                 }
3847                 {
3848                         let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3849                         // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3850                         // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3851                         // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3852                         // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3853                         if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) &&
3854                                 funding_transaction.lock_time.is_block_height() &&
3855                                 funding_transaction.lock_time.to_consensus_u32() > height + 1
3856                         {
3857                                 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3858                                         err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3859                                 }));
3860                         }
3861                 }
3862
3863                 let txid = funding_transaction.txid();
3864                 let is_batch_funding = temporary_channels.len() > 1;
3865                 let mut funding_batch_states = if is_batch_funding {
3866                         Some(self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap())
3867                 } else {
3868                         None
3869                 };
3870                 let mut funding_batch_state = funding_batch_states.as_mut().and_then(|states| {
3871                         match states.entry(txid) {
3872                                 btree_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3873                                         result = result.clone().and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3874                                                 err: "Batch funding transaction with the same txid already exists".to_owned()
3875                                         }));
3876                                         None
3877                                 },
3878                                 btree_map::Entry::Vacant(vacant) => Some(vacant.insert(Vec::new())),
3879                         }
3880                 });
3881                 for &(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in temporary_channels {
3882                         result = result.and_then(|_| self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(
3883                                 temporary_channel_id,
3884                                 counterparty_node_id,
3885                                 funding_transaction.clone(),
3886                                 is_batch_funding,
3887                                 |chan, tx| {
3888                                         let mut output_index = None;
3889                                         let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3890                                         for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3891                                                 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
3892                                                         if output_index.is_some() {
3893                                                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3894                                                                         err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3895                                                                 });
3896                                                         }
3897                                                         output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3898                                                 }
3899                                         }
3900                                         if output_index.is_none() {
3901                                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3902                                                         err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3903                                                 });
3904                                         }
3905                                         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() };
3906                                         if let Some(funding_batch_state) = funding_batch_state.as_mut() {
3907                                                 funding_batch_state.push((outpoint.to_channel_id(), *counterparty_node_id, false));
3908                                         }
3909                                         Ok(outpoint)
3910                                 })
3911                         );
3912                 }
3913                 if let Err(ref e) = result {
3914                         // Remaining channels need to be removed on any error.
3915                         let e = format!("Error in transaction funding: {:?}", e);
3916                         let mut channels_to_remove = Vec::new();
3917                         channels_to_remove.extend(funding_batch_states.as_mut()
3918                                 .and_then(|states| states.remove(&txid))
3919                                 .into_iter().flatten()
3920                                 .map(|(chan_id, node_id, _state)| (chan_id, node_id))
3921                         );
3922                         channels_to_remove.extend(temporary_channels.iter()
3923                                 .map(|(&chan_id, &node_id)| (chan_id, node_id))
3924                         );
3925                         let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
3926                         {
3927                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3928                                 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in channels_to_remove {
3929                                         per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3930                                                 .map(|peer_state_mutex| peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap())
3931                                                 .and_then(|mut peer_state| peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id))
3932                                                 .map(|mut chan| {
3933                                                         update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
3934                                                         self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context(), ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: e.clone() });
3935                                                         shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
3936                                                 });
3937                                 }
3938                         }
3939                         for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
3940                                 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
3941                         }
3942                 }
3943                 result
3944         }
3945
3946         /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
3947         ///
3948         /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3949         /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3950         /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3951         /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3952         ///
3953         /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3954         /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3955         ///
3956         /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3957         /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3958         ///
3959         /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3960         ///
3961         /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3962         /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3963         /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3964         /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3965         /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3966         /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3967         /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3968         pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
3969                 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
3970         ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3971                 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
3972                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3973                                 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
3974                         });
3975                 }
3976
3977                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3978                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3979                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3980                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3981                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3982                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3983                 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3984                         if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
3985                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3986                                         err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3987                                 });
3988                         };
3989                 }
3990                 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3991                         if let Some(channel_phase) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
3992                                 let mut config = channel_phase.context().config();
3993                                 config.apply(config_update);
3994                                 if !channel_phase.context_mut().update_config(&config) {
3995                                         continue;
3996                                 }
3997                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = channel_phase {
3998                                         if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
3999                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
4000                                         } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
4001                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4002                                                         node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4003                                                         msg,
4004                                                 });
4005                                         }
4006                                 }
4007                                 continue;
4008                         } else {
4009                                 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
4010                                 debug_assert!(false);
4011                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4012                                         err: format!(
4013                                                 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
4014                                                 channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4015                                 });
4016                         };
4017                 }
4018                 Ok(())
4019         }
4020
4021         /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
4022         ///
4023         /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4024         /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4025         /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4026         /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4027         ///
4028         /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4029         /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4030         ///
4031         /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4032         /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4033         ///
4034         /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4035         ///
4036         /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4037         /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4038         /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4039         /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4040         /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4041         /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4042         /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4043         pub fn update_channel_config(
4044                 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config: &ChannelConfig,
4045         ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4046                 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
4047         }
4048
4049         /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
4050         /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
4051         ///
4052         /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
4053         /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
4054         ///
4055         /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
4056         /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
4057         /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
4058         /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
4059         /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
4060         ///
4061         /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
4062         /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
4063         /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
4064         /// than expected.
4065         ///
4066         /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4067         /// backwards.
4068         ///
4069         /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
4070         /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4071         /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
4072         // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
4073         // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
4074         pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &ChannelId, next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4075                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4076
4077                 let next_hop_scid = {
4078                         let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4079                         let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
4080                                 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
4081                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4082                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4083                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
4084                                 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) => {
4085                                         if !chan.context.is_usable() {
4086                                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4087                                                         err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", next_hop_channel_id)
4088                                                 })
4089                                         }
4090                                         chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
4091                                 },
4092                                 Some(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4093                                         err: format!("Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is still opening.",
4094                                                 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
4095                                 }),
4096                                 None => {
4097                                         let error = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
4098                                                 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id);
4099                                         let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(next_node_id), Some(*next_hop_channel_id));
4100                                         log_error!(logger, "{} when attempting to forward intercepted HTLC", error);
4101                                         return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4102                                                 err: error
4103                                         })
4104                                 }
4105                         }
4106                 };
4107
4108                 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4109                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4110                                 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4111                         })?;
4112
4113                 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
4114                         PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, blinded, .. } => {
4115                                 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4116                                         onion_packet, blinded, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid
4117                                 }
4118                         },
4119                         _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4120                 };
4121                 let skimmed_fee_msat =
4122                         payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
4123                 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
4124                         skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
4125                         outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
4126                 };
4127
4128                 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
4129                         payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4130                         payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4131                         payment.prev_user_channel_id,
4132                         vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
4133                 )];
4134                 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
4135                 Ok(())
4136         }
4137
4138         /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
4139         /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
4140         ///
4141         /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4142         /// backwards.
4143         ///
4144         /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4145         pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4146                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4147
4148                 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4149                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4150                                 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4151                         })?;
4152
4153                 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
4154                         let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4155                                 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4156                                 user_channel_id: Some(payment.prev_user_channel_id),
4157                                 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4158                                 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
4159                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4160                                 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4161                                 blinded_failure: payment.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
4162                         });
4163
4164                         let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
4165                         let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
4166                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4167                 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4168
4169                 Ok(())
4170         }
4171
4172         /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
4173         ///
4174         /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
4175         /// Will likely generate further events.
4176         pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
4177                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4178
4179                 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
4180                 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
4181                 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
4182                 {
4183                         let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
4184                         mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
4185
4186                         for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
4187                                 if short_chan_id != 0 {
4188                                         let mut forwarding_counterparty = None;
4189                                         macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
4190                                                 () => {
4191                                                         for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4192                                                                 match forward_info {
4193                                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4194                                                                                 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4195                                                                                 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4196                                                                                         routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4197                                                                                         outgoing_cltv_value, ..
4198                                                                                 }
4199                                                                         }) => {
4200                                                                                 macro_rules! failure_handler {
4201                                                                                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
4202                                                                                                 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, forwarding_counterparty, Some(prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()));
4203                                                                                                 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
4204
4205                                                                                                 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4206                                                                                                         short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4207                                                                                                         user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4208                                                                                                         outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4209                                                                                                         htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4210                                                                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4211                                                                                                         phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
4212                                                                                                         blinded_failure: routing.blinded_failure(),
4213                                                                                                 });
4214
4215                                                                                                 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
4216                                                                                                         HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
4217                                                                                                 } else {
4218                                                                                                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
4219                                                                                                 };
4220
4221                                                                                                 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4222                                                                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
4223                                                                                                         reason
4224                                                                                                 ));
4225                                                                                                 continue;
4226                                                                                         }
4227                                                                                 }
4228                                                                                 macro_rules! fail_forward {
4229                                                                                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4230                                                                                                 {
4231                                                                                                         failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
4232                                                                                                 }
4233                                                                                         }
4234                                                                                 }
4235                                                                                 macro_rules! failed_payment {
4236                                                                                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4237                                                                                                 {
4238                                                                                                         failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
4239                                                                                                 }
4240                                                                                         }
4241                                                                                 }
4242                                                                                 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref onion_packet, .. } = routing {
4243                                                                                         let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
4244                                                                                         if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.chain_hash) {
4245                                                                                                 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4246                                                                                                 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
4247                                                                                                         phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac,
4248                                                                                                         payment_hash, &self.node_signer
4249                                                                                                 ) {
4250                                                                                                         Ok(res) => res,
4251                                                                                                         Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4252                                                                                                                 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).to_byte_array();
4253                                                                                                                 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
4254                                                                                                                 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
4255                                                                                                                 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
4256                                                                                                                 // of the onion.
4257                                                                                                                 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
4258                                                                                                         },
4259                                                                                                         Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4260                                                                                                                 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
4261                                                                                                         },
4262                                                                                                 };
4263                                                                                                 match next_hop {
4264                                                                                                         onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
4265                                                                                                                 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4266                                                                                                                 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
4267                                                                                                                         incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4268                                                                                                                         outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None,
4269                                                                                                                         current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
4270                                                                                                                 {
4271                                                                                                                         Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
4272                                                                                                                         Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
4273                                                                                                                 }
4274                                                                                                         },
4275                                                                                                         _ => panic!(),
4276                                                                                                 }
4277                                                                                         } else {
4278                                                                                                 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4279                                                                                         }
4280                                                                                 } else {
4281                                                                                         fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4282                                                                                 }
4283                                                                         },
4284                                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4285                                                                                 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
4286                                                                                 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
4287                                                                                 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
4288                                                                                 // problem, not ours.
4289                                                                         }
4290                                                                 }
4291                                                         }
4292                                                 }
4293                                         }
4294                                         let chan_info_opt = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id).cloned();
4295                                         let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match chan_info_opt {
4296                                                 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id, chan_id),
4297                                                 None => {
4298                                                         forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4299                                                         continue;
4300                                                 }
4301                                         };
4302                                         forwarding_counterparty = Some(counterparty_node_id);
4303                                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4304                                         let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4305                                         if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
4306                                                 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4307                                                 continue;
4308                                         }
4309                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4310                                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4311                                         if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
4312                                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4313                                                 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4314                                                         match forward_info {
4315                                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4316                                                                         prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4317                                                                         forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4318                                                                                 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
4319                                                                                 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4320                                                                                         onion_packet, blinded, ..
4321                                                                                 }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4322                                                                         },
4323                                                                 }) => {
4324                                                                         log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id);
4325                                                                         let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4326                                                                                 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4327                                                                                 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4328                                                                                 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4329                                                                                 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4330                                                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4331                                                                                 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
4332                                                                                 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4333                                                                                 blinded_failure: blinded.map(|_| BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode),
4334                                                                         });
4335                                                                         let next_blinding_point = blinded.and_then(|b| {
4336                                                                                 let encrypted_tlvs_ss = self.node_signer.ecdh(
4337                                                                                         Recipient::Node, &b.inbound_blinding_point, None
4338                                                                                 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4339                                                                                 onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(
4340                                                                                         &self.secp_ctx, b.inbound_blinding_point, &encrypted_tlvs_ss
4341                                                                                 ).ok()
4342                                                                         });
4343                                                                         if let Err(e) = chan.queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
4344                                                                                 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
4345                                                                                 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, next_blinding_point, &self.fee_estimator,
4346                                                                                 &&logger)
4347                                                                         {
4348                                                                                 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4349                                                                                         log_trace!(logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", &payment_hash, msg);
4350                                                                                 } else {
4351                                                                                         panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
4352                                                                                 }
4353                                                                                 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan);
4354                                                                                 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4355                                                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
4356                                                                                         HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
4357                                                                                 ));
4358                                                                                 continue;
4359                                                                         }
4360                                                                 },
4361                                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
4362                                                                         panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
4363                                                                 },
4364                                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
4365                                                                         log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4366                                                                         if let Err(e) = chan.queue_fail_htlc(
4367                                                                                 htlc_id, err_packet, &&logger
4368                                                                         ) {
4369                                                                                 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4370                                                                                         log_trace!(logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
4371                                                                                 } else {
4372                                                                                         panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
4373                                                                                 }
4374                                                                                 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
4375                                                                                 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
4376                                                                                 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
4377                                                                                 continue;
4378                                                                         }
4379                                                                 },
4380                                                         }
4381                                                 }
4382                                         } else {
4383                                                 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4384                                                 continue;
4385                                         }
4386                                 } else {
4387                                         'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4388                                                 match forward_info {
4389                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4390                                                                 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4391                                                                 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4392                                                                         routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
4393                                                                         skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4394                                                                 }
4395                                                         }) => {
4396                                                                 let blinded_failure = routing.blinded_failure();
4397                                                                 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
4398                                                                         PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret, custom_tlvs } => {
4399                                                                                 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
4400                                                                                 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
4401                                                                                                 payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
4402                                                                                 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
4403                                                                                         Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
4404                                                                         },
4405                                                                         PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs } => {
4406                                                                                 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
4407                                                                                         payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
4408                                                                                         payment_metadata,
4409                                                                                         custom_tlvs,
4410                                                                                 };
4411                                                                                 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
4412                                                                                         payment_data, None, onion_fields)
4413                                                                         },
4414                                                                         _ => {
4415                                                                                 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
4416                                                                         }
4417                                                                 };
4418                                                                 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
4419                                                                         prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
4420                                                                                 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4421                                                                                 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4422                                                                                 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4423                                                                                 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4424                                                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4425                                                                                 phantom_shared_secret,
4426                                                                                 blinded_failure,
4427                                                                         },
4428                                                                         // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
4429                                                                         // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
4430                                                                         // if routing nodes overpay
4431                                                                         value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
4432                                                                         sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
4433                                                                         timer_ticks: 0,
4434                                                                         total_value_received: None,
4435                                                                         total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
4436                                                                         cltv_expiry,
4437                                                                         onion_payload,
4438                                                                         counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
4439                                                                 };
4440
4441                                                                 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
4442
4443                                                                 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
4444                                                                         ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
4445                                                                                 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
4446                                                                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4447                                                                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
4448                                                                                         &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
4449                                                                                 );
4450                                                                                 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4451                                                                                                 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
4452                                                                                                 user_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.user_channel_id,
4453                                                                                                 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4454                                                                                                 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
4455                                                                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
4456                                                                                                 phantom_shared_secret,
4457                                                                                                 blinded_failure: None,
4458                                                                                         }), payment_hash,
4459                                                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
4460                                                                                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
4461                                                                                 ));
4462                                                                                 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
4463                                                                         }
4464                                                                 }
4465                                                                 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
4466                                                                 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4467                                                                 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4468                                                                         receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4469                                                                                 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4470                                                                 }
4471
4472                                                                 macro_rules! check_total_value {
4473                                                                         ($purpose: expr) => {{
4474                                                                                 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
4475                                                                                 let is_keysend = match $purpose {
4476                                                                                         events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(_) => true,
4477                                                                                         events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { .. } => false,
4478                                                                                 };
4479                                                                                 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4480                                                                                 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
4481                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4482                                                                                 }
4483                                                                                 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
4484                                                                                         .entry(payment_hash)
4485                                                                                         // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
4486                                                                                         .or_insert_with(|| {
4487                                                                                                 committed_to_claimable = true;
4488                                                                                                 ClaimablePayment {
4489                                                                                                         purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
4490                                                                                                 }
4491                                                                                         });
4492                                                                                 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
4493                                                                                         let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
4494                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), &payment_hash, log_keysend(!is_keysend));
4495                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4496                                                                                 }
4497                                                                                 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4498                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", &payment_hash);
4499                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4500                                                                                 }
4501                                                                                 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
4502                                                                                         if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
4503                                                                                                 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4504                                                                                         }
4505                                                                                 } else {
4506                                                                                         claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
4507                                                                                 }
4508                                                                                 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
4509                                                                                 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
4510                                                                                 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
4511                                                                                 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
4512                                                                                         total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
4513                                                                                         earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
4514                                                                                         if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4515                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
4516                                                                                                         &payment_hash, claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
4517                                                                                                 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
4518                                                                                         }
4519                                                                                         if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
4520                                                                                 }
4521                                                                                 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
4522                                                                                 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
4523                                                                                 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
4524                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4525                                                                                 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4526                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
4527                                                                                                 &payment_hash);
4528                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4529                                                                                 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4530                                                                                         #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4531                                                                                                 committed_to_claimable = true;
4532                                                                                         }
4533                                                                                         let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
4534                                                                                         htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4535                                                                                         let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
4536                                                                                         htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
4537                                                                                         let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
4538                                                                                                 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
4539                                                                                         debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
4540                                                                                                 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
4541                                                                                         new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
4542                                                                                                 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4543                                                                                                 payment_hash,
4544                                                                                                 purpose: $purpose,
4545                                                                                                 amount_msat,
4546                                                                                                 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
4547                                                                                                 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
4548                                                                                                 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4549                                                                                                 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
4550                                                                                                 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
4551                                                                                         }, None));
4552                                                                                         payment_claimable_generated = true;
4553                                                                                 } else {
4554                                                                                         // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
4555                                                                                         // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
4556                                                                                         // MPP parts.
4557                                                                                         htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4558                                                                                         #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4559                                                                                                 committed_to_claimable = true;
4560                                                                                         }
4561                                                                                 }
4562                                                                                 payment_claimable_generated
4563                                                                         }}
4564                                                                 }
4565
4566                                                                 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
4567                                                                 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
4568                                                                 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
4569                                                                 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
4570                                                                 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
4571                                                                 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
4572                                                                 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4573                                                                 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4574                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4575                                                                                 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4576                                                                                         OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
4577                                                                                                 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4578                                                                                                 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
4579                                                                                                         Ok(result) => result,
4580                                                                                                         Err(()) => {
4581                                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", &payment_hash);
4582                                                                                                                 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4583                                                                                                         }
4584                                                                                                 };
4585                                                                                                 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
4586                                                                                                         let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
4587                                                                                                         if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
4588                                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
4589                                                                                                                         &payment_hash, cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
4590                                                                                                                 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4591                                                                                                         }
4592                                                                                                 }
4593                                                                                                 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4594                                                                                                         payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4595                                                                                                         payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4596                                                                                                 };
4597                                                                                                 check_total_value!(purpose);
4598                                                                                         },
4599                                                                                         OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
4600                                                                                                 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
4601                                                                                                 check_total_value!(purpose);
4602                                                                                         }
4603                                                                                 }
4604                                                                         },
4605                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
4606                                                                                 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4607                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", &payment_hash);
4608                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4609                                                                                 }
4610                                                                                 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4611                                                                                 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
4612                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", &payment_hash);
4613                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4614                                                                                 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
4615                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
4616                                                                                                 &payment_hash, payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
4617                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4618                                                                                 } else {
4619                                                                                         let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4620                                                                                                 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
4621                                                                                                 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4622                                                                                         };
4623                                                                                         let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
4624                                                                                         if payment_claimable_generated {
4625                                                                                                 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
4626                                                                                         }
4627                                                                                 }
4628                                                                         },
4629                                                                 };
4630                                                         },
4631                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4632                                                                 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
4633                                                         }
4634                                                 }
4635                                         }
4636                                 }
4637                         }
4638                 }
4639
4640                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4641                 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
4642                         || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4643                         &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
4644
4645                 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
4646                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4647                 }
4648                 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
4649
4650                 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
4651                 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
4652                 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
4653                 // network stack.
4654                 self.check_free_holding_cells();
4655
4656                 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
4657                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4658                 events.append(&mut new_events);
4659         }
4660
4661         /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
4662         ///
4663         /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
4664         fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
4665                 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
4666
4667                 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
4668
4669                 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
4670                 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
4671                 if background_events.is_empty() {
4672                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4673                 }
4674
4675                 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
4676                         match event {
4677                                 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, update)) => {
4678                                         // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
4679                                         // monitor updating completing.
4680                                         let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4681                                 },
4682                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update } => {
4683                                         let mut updated_chan = false;
4684                                         {
4685                                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4686                                                 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4687                                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4688                                                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4689                                                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4690                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase) => {
4691                                                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase.get_mut() {
4692                                                                                 updated_chan = true;
4693                                                                                 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
4694                                                                                         peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4695                                                                         } else {
4696                                                                                 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't have an update for a non-funded channel");
4697                                                                         }
4698                                                                 },
4699                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {},
4700                                                         }
4701                                                 }
4702                                         }
4703                                         if !updated_chan {
4704                                                 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
4705                                                 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4706                                         }
4707                                 },
4708                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
4709                                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4710                                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4711                                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4712                                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4713                                                 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
4714                                                         handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4715                                                 } else {
4716                                                         let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
4717                                                                 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
4718                                                         mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4719                                                         mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4720                                                         self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
4721                                                 }
4722                                         }
4723                                 },
4724                         }
4725                 }
4726                 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4727         }
4728
4729         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4730         /// Process background events, for functional testing
4731         pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
4732                 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
4733                 let _ = self.process_background_events();
4734         }
4735
4736         fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &ChannelId, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
4737                 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
4738
4739                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4740
4741                 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
4742                 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4743                         if new_feerate != chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4744                                 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4745                                 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4746                         }
4747                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4748                 }
4749                 if !chan.context.is_live() {
4750                         log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
4751                                 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4752                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4753                 }
4754                 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4755                         &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4756
4757                 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
4758                 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4759         }
4760
4761         #[cfg(fuzzing)]
4762         /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
4763         /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
4764         /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
4765         /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
4766         pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
4767                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4768                         let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4769
4770                         let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4771                         let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
4772
4773                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4774                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4775                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4776                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4777                                 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
4778                                         |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
4779                                 ) {
4780                                         let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4781                                                 anchor_feerate
4782                                         } else {
4783                                                 non_anchor_feerate
4784                                         };
4785                                         let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4786                                         if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4787                                 }
4788                         }
4789
4790                         should_persist
4791                 });
4792         }
4793
4794         /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
4795         ///
4796         /// This currently includes:
4797         ///  * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
4798         ///  * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
4799         ///    than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
4800         ///    the channel.
4801         ///  * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
4802         ///    with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
4803         ///  * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
4804         ///  * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
4805         ///  * Forgetting about stale outbound payments, either those that have already been fulfilled
4806         ///    or those awaiting an invoice that hasn't been delivered in the necessary amount of time.
4807         ///    The latter is determined using the system clock in `std` and the highest seen block time
4808         ///    minus two hours in `no-std`.
4809         ///
4810         /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
4811         /// estimate fetches.
4812         ///
4813         /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4814         /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
4815         pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
4816                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4817                         let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4818
4819                         let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4820                         let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
4821
4822                         let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
4823                         let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
4824                         let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
4825                         let mut shutdown_channels = Vec::new();
4826
4827                         let mut process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
4828                                 chan_id: &ChannelId,
4829                                 context: &mut ChannelContext<SP>,
4830                                 unfunded_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
4831                                 pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4832                                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
4833                         | {
4834                                 context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4835                                 if unfunded_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
4836                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context);
4837                                         log_error!(logger,
4838                                                 "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner", chan_id);
4839                                         update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
4840                                         self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4841                                         shutdown_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false));
4842                                         pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4843                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4844                                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4845                                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
4846                                                                 channel_id: *chan_id,
4847                                                                 data: "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake".to_owned(),
4848                                                         },
4849                                                 },
4850                                         });
4851                                         false
4852                                 } else {
4853                                         true
4854                                 }
4855                         };
4856
4857                         {
4858                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4859                                 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4860                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4861                                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4862                                         let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
4863                                         let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
4864                                         peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, phase| {
4865                                                 match phase {
4866                                                         ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
4867                                                                 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4868                                                                         anchor_feerate
4869                                                                 } else {
4870                                                                         non_anchor_feerate
4871                                                                 };
4872                                                                 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4873                                                                 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4874
4875                                                                 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
4876                                                                         let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
4877                                                                         handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
4878                                                                         if needs_close { return false; }
4879                                                                 }
4880
4881                                                                 match chan.channel_update_status() {
4882                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
4883                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
4884                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
4885                                                                                 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
4886                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
4887                                                                                 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
4888                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
4889                                                                                 n += 1;
4890                                                                                 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4891                                                                                         chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
4892                                                                                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4893                                                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4894                                                                                                         msg: update
4895                                                                                                 });
4896                                                                                         }
4897                                                                                         should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4898                                                                                 } else {
4899                                                                                         chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
4900                                                                                 }
4901                                                                         },
4902                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
4903                                                                                 n += 1;
4904                                                                                 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4905                                                                                         chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
4906                                                                                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4907                                                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4908                                                                                                         msg: update
4909                                                                                                 });
4910                                                                                         }
4911                                                                                         should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4912                                                                                 } else {
4913                                                                                         chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
4914                                                                                 }
4915                                                                         },
4916                                                                         _ => {},
4917                                                                 }
4918
4919                                                                 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4920
4921                                                                 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
4922                                                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4923                                                                         log_debug!(logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
4924                                                                                         counterparty_node_id, chan_id);
4925                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4926                                                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4927                                                                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
4928                                                                                         msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
4929                                                                                                 channel_id: *chan_id,
4930                                                                                                 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
4931                                                                                         },
4932                                                                                 },
4933                                                                         });
4934                                                                 }
4935
4936                                                                 true
4937                                                         },
4938                                                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
4939                                                                 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
4940                                                                         pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
4941                                                         },
4942                                                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
4943                                                                 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
4944                                                                         pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
4945                                                         },
4946                                                 }
4947                                         });
4948
4949                                         for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
4950                                                 if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
4951                                                         let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(*chan_id));
4952                                                         log_error!(logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", &chan_id);
4953                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
4954                                                                 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4955                                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4956                                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4957                                                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_id.clone(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
4958                                                                         },
4959                                                                 }
4960                                                         );
4961                                                 }
4962                                         }
4963                                         peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.retain(|_, req| req.ticks_remaining > 0);
4964
4965                                         if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
4966                                                 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
4967                                         }
4968                                 }
4969                         }
4970
4971                         // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
4972                         // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
4973                         // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
4974                         // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
4975                         // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
4976                         // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
4977                         // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
4978                         if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
4979                                 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4980                                 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
4981                                         match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
4982                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
4983                                                         // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
4984                                                         // have no channels to the peer.
4985                                                         let remove_entry = {
4986                                                                 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
4987                                                                 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
4988                                                         };
4989                                                         if remove_entry {
4990                                                                 entry.remove_entry();
4991                                                         }
4992                                                 },
4993                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
4994                                         }
4995                                 }
4996                         }
4997
4998                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
4999                                 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
5000                                         // This should be unreachable
5001                                         debug_assert!(false);
5002                                         return false;
5003                                 }
5004                                 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
5005                                         // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
5006                                         // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
5007                                         // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
5008                                         // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
5009                                         if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
5010                                                 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
5011                                         {
5012                                                 return true;
5013                                         } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
5014                                                 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
5015                                                 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
5016                                         }) {
5017                                                 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
5018                                                         .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
5019                                                 return false;
5020                                         }
5021                                 }
5022                                 true
5023                         });
5024
5025                         for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
5026                                 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
5027                                 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
5028                                 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
5029                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5030                         }
5031
5032                         for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5033                                 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5034                         }
5035
5036                         for shutdown_res in shutdown_channels {
5037                                 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
5038                         }
5039
5040                         #[cfg(feature = "std")]
5041                         let duration_since_epoch = std::time::SystemTime::now()
5042                                 .duration_since(std::time::SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH)
5043                                 .expect("SystemTime::now() should come after SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH");
5044                         #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
5045                         let duration_since_epoch = Duration::from_secs(
5046                                 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire).saturating_sub(7200) as u64
5047                         );
5048
5049                         self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_payments(
5050                                 duration_since_epoch, &self.pending_events
5051                         );
5052
5053                         // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
5054                         // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
5055                         // than block the message queueing pipeline.
5056                         if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5057                                 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5058                         }
5059
5060                         should_persist
5061                 });
5062         }
5063
5064         /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
5065         /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
5066         /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
5067         ///
5068         /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
5069         /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
5070         /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
5071         /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
5072         ///
5073         /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
5074         /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
5075         /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
5076         /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
5077         pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
5078                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
5079         }
5080
5081         /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
5082         /// reason for the failure.
5083         ///
5084         /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
5085         pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
5086                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5087
5088                 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
5089                 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
5090                         for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5091                                 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
5092                                 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5093                                 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
5094                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5095                         }
5096                 }
5097         }
5098
5099         /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
5100         fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
5101                 match failure_code {
5102                         FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5103                         FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5104                         FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
5105                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5106                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
5107                                 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
5108                         },
5109                         FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
5110                                 let fail_data = match data {
5111                                         Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
5112                                         None => Vec::new(),
5113                                 };
5114                                 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
5115                         }
5116                 }
5117         }
5118
5119         /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5120         /// that we want to return and a channel.
5121         ///
5122         /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
5123         /// forwarding
5124         fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5125                 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
5126                 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
5127                 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
5128                 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
5129                 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
5130                         chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
5131                 } else {
5132                         chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
5133                 };
5134                 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
5135                         self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
5136                 } else {
5137                         (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5138                 }
5139         }
5140
5141
5142         /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5143         /// that we want to return and a channel.
5144         fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5145                 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
5146                 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
5147                         let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
5148                         if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
5149                                 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
5150                                 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
5151                                 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5152                         }
5153                         (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5154                         msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5155                         upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5156                         (desired_err_code, enc.0)
5157                 } else {
5158                         // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
5159                         // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
5160                         // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
5161                         // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
5162                         (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5163                 }
5164         }
5165
5166         // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
5167         // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
5168         // be surfaced to the user.
5169         fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
5170                 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: ChannelId,
5171                 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
5172         ) {
5173                 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
5174                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5175                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
5176                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5177                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5178                                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
5179                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
5180                                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get() {
5181                                                         self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan)
5182                                                 } else {
5183                                                         // We shouldn't be trying to fail holding cell HTLCs on an unfunded channel.
5184                                                         debug_assert!(false);
5185                                                         (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5186                                                 }
5187                                         },
5188                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5189                                 }
5190                         } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
5191                 };
5192
5193                 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
5194                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
5195                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
5196                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5197                 }
5198         }
5199
5200         /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
5201         /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
5202         fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
5203                 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
5204                 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
5205                 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
5206                 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
5207                 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5208                 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5209                         debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5210                 }
5211
5212                 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
5213                 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
5214                 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
5215                 //timer handling.
5216
5217                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5218                 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
5219                 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5220                 match source {
5221                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
5222                                 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
5223                                         session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
5224                                         &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
5225                                 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5226                         },
5227                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5228                                 ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret,
5229                                 ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint, ref blinded_failure, ..
5230                         }) => {
5231                                 log_trace!(
5232                                         WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(outpoint.to_channel_id())),
5233                                         "Failing {}HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us: {:?}",
5234                                         if blinded_failure.is_some() { "blinded " } else { "" }, &payment_hash, onion_error
5235                                 );
5236                                 let err_packet = match blinded_failure {
5237                                         Some(BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode) => {
5238                                                 let blinded_onion_error = HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32]);
5239                                                 blinded_onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
5240                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
5241                                                 )
5242                                         },
5243                                         None => {
5244                                                 onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret)
5245                                         }
5246                                 };
5247
5248                                 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
5249                                 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5250                                 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
5251                                         push_forward_ev = true;
5252                                 }
5253                                 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
5254                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5255                                                 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
5256                                         },
5257                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5258                                                 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
5259                                         }
5260                                 }
5261                                 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
5262                                 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5263                                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5264                                 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
5265                                         prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
5266                                         failed_next_destination: destination,
5267                                 }, None));
5268                         },
5269                 }
5270         }
5271
5272         /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
5273         /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
5274         ///
5275         /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
5276         /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
5277         /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
5278         /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
5279         ///
5280         /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
5281         /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
5282         /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
5283         /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
5284         ///
5285         /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
5286         /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
5287         /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
5288         ///
5289         /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5290         /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
5291         /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
5292         /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
5293         /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5294         /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5295         /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
5296         pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5297                 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
5298         }
5299
5300         /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
5301         /// even type numbers.
5302         ///
5303         /// # Note
5304         ///
5305         /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
5306         /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
5307         ///
5308         /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5309         pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5310                 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
5311         }
5312
5313         fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
5314                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
5315
5316                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5317
5318                 let mut sources = {
5319                         let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
5320                         if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
5321                                 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
5322                                 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
5323                                         if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
5324                                                 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
5325                                                         .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
5326                                                 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
5327                                                 break;
5328                                         }
5329                                 }
5330
5331                                 let htlcs = payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect();
5332                                 let sender_intended_value = payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat);
5333                                 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
5334                                         ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
5335                                         payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id, htlcs, sender_intended_value
5336                                 });
5337                                 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
5338                                         debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
5339                                         log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
5340                                                 &payment_hash);
5341                                 }
5342
5343                                 if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = payment.onion_fields {
5344                                         if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
5345                                                 log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
5346                                                         &payment_hash, log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
5347                                                 claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5348                                                 mem::drop(claimable_payments);
5349                                                 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5350                                                         let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
5351                                                         let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5352                                                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5353                                                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5354                                                 }
5355                                                 return;
5356                                         }
5357                                 }
5358
5359                                 payment.htlcs
5360                         } else { return; }
5361                 };
5362                 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
5363
5364                 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
5365                 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
5366                 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
5367                 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
5368                 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
5369                 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
5370                 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
5371                 let mut valid_mpp = true;
5372                 let mut errs = Vec::new();
5373                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5374                 for htlc in sources.iter() {
5375                         if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
5376                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5377                                 debug_assert!(false);
5378                                 valid_mpp = false;
5379                                 break;
5380                         }
5381                         prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
5382
5383                         if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
5384                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5385                                 debug_assert!(false);
5386                                 valid_mpp = false;
5387                                 break;
5388                         }
5389                         expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
5390                         claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
5391                 }
5392                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5393                 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
5394                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5395                         log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
5396                         return;
5397                 }
5398                 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
5399                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5400                         log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
5401                                 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
5402                         return;
5403                 }
5404                 if valid_mpp {
5405                         for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5406                                 let prev_hop_chan_id = htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
5407                                 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
5408                                         htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
5409                                         |_, definitely_duplicate| {
5410                                                 debug_assert!(!definitely_duplicate, "We shouldn't claim duplicatively from a payment");
5411                                                 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash })
5412                                         }
5413                                 ) {
5414                                         if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
5415                                                 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
5416                                                 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
5417                                                 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop_chan_id));
5418                                                 log_error!(logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
5419                                         } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
5420                                 }
5421                         }
5422                 }
5423                 if !valid_mpp {
5424                         for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5425                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5426                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
5427                                 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5428                                 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
5429                                 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5430                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5431                         }
5432                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5433                 }
5434
5435                 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
5436                 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
5437                         let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5438                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
5439                 }
5440         }
5441
5442         fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>, bool) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
5443                 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
5444         -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
5445                 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
5446
5447                 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
5448                 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
5449                 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
5450                 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5451
5452                 // As we may call handle_monitor_update_completion_actions in rather rare cases, check that
5453                 // the required mutexes are not held before we start.
5454                 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5455                 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5456
5457                 {
5458                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5459                         let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
5460                         let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
5461                                 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
5462                                 None => None
5463                         };
5464
5465                         let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
5466                                 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5467                                         .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
5468                         ).unwrap_or(None);
5469
5470                         if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
5471                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
5472                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5473                                 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5474                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
5475                                                 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5476                                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
5477                                                 let fulfill_res = chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
5478
5479                                                 match fulfill_res {
5480                                                         UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } => {
5481                                                                 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat), false) {
5482                                                                         log_trace!(logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
5483                                                                                 chan_id, action);
5484                                                                         peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
5485                                                                 }
5486                                                                 if !during_init {
5487                                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
5488                                                                                 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5489                                                                 } else {
5490                                                                         // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
5491                                                                         // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
5492                                                                         // monitor update as a background event.
5493                                                                         self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5494                                                                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5495                                                                                         counterparty_node_id,
5496                                                                                         funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
5497                                                                                         update: monitor_update.clone(),
5498                                                                                 });
5499                                                                 }
5500                                                         }
5501                                                         UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => {
5502                                                                 let action = if let Some(action) = completion_action(None, true) {
5503                                                                         action
5504                                                                 } else {
5505                                                                         return Ok(());
5506                                                                 };
5507                                                                 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5508
5509                                                                 log_trace!(logger, "Completing monitor update completion action for channel {} as claim was redundant: {:?}",
5510                                                                         chan_id, action);
5511                                                                 let (node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker) =
5512                                                                 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5513                                                                         downstream_counterparty_node_id: node_id,
5514                                                                         downstream_funding_outpoint: funding_outpoint,
5515                                                                         blocking_action: blocker,
5516                                                                 } = action {
5517                                                                         (node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)
5518                                                                 } else {
5519                                                                         debug_assert!(false,
5520                                                                                 "Duplicate claims should always free another channel immediately");
5521                                                                         return Ok(());
5522                                                                 };
5523                                                                 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
5524                                                                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5525                                                                         if let Some(blockers) = peer_state
5526                                                                                 .actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
5527                                                                                 .get_mut(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
5528                                                                         {
5529                                                                                 let mut found_blocker = false;
5530                                                                                 blockers.retain(|iter| {
5531                                                                                         // Note that we could actually be blocked, in
5532                                                                                         // which case we need to only remove the one
5533                                                                                         // blocker which was added duplicatively.
5534                                                                                         let first_blocker = !found_blocker;
5535                                                                                         if *iter == blocker { found_blocker = true; }
5536                                                                                         *iter != blocker || !first_blocker
5537                                                                                 });
5538                                                                                 debug_assert!(found_blocker);
5539                                                                         }
5540                                                                 } else {
5541                                                                         debug_assert!(false);
5542                                                                 }
5543                                                         }
5544                                                 }
5545                                         }
5546                                         return Ok(());
5547                                 }
5548                         }
5549                 }
5550                 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5551                         update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
5552                         counterparty_node_id: None,
5553                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5554                                 payment_preimage,
5555                         }],
5556                 };
5557
5558                 if !during_init {
5559                         // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
5560                         // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
5561                         let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
5562                         if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
5563                                 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
5564                                 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
5565                                 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
5566                                 // again on restart.
5567                                 log_error!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id())), "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
5568                                         payment_preimage, update_res);
5569                         }
5570                 } else {
5571                         // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
5572                         // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
5573                         // event.
5574                         // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
5575                         // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
5576                         // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
5577                         // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
5578                         // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
5579                         // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
5580                         // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
5581                         self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5582                                 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
5583                                         prev_hop.outpoint, preimage_update,
5584                                 )));
5585                 }
5586                 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
5587                 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
5588                 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
5589                 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
5590                 // `PaymentForwarded`).
5591                 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None, false));
5592                 Ok(())
5593         }
5594
5595         fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
5596                 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
5597         }
5598
5599         fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
5600                 forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, startup_replay: bool,
5601                 next_channel_counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>, next_channel_outpoint: OutPoint
5602         ) {
5603                 match source {
5604                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
5605                                 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
5606                                         "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
5607                                 if let Some(pubkey) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5608                                         debug_assert_eq!(pubkey, path.hops[0].pubkey);
5609                                 }
5610                                 let ev_completion_action = EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
5611                                         channel_funding_outpoint: next_channel_outpoint,
5612                                         counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
5613                                 };
5614                                 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage,
5615                                         session_priv, path, from_onchain, ev_completion_action, &self.pending_events,
5616                                         &self.logger);
5617                         },
5618                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
5619                                 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5620                                 let completed_blocker = RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&hop_data);
5621                                 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5622                                 let claiming_chan_funding_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5623                                 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
5624                                         |htlc_claim_value_msat, definitely_duplicate| {
5625                                                 let chan_to_release =
5626                                                         if let Some(node_id) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5627                                                                 Some((node_id, next_channel_outpoint, completed_blocker))
5628                                                         } else {
5629                                                                 // We can only get `None` here if we are processing a
5630                                                                 // `ChannelMonitor`-originated event, in which case we
5631                                                                 // don't care about ensuring we wake the downstream
5632                                                                 // channel's monitor updating - the channel is already
5633                                                                 // closed.
5634                                                                 None
5635                                                         };
5636
5637                                                 if definitely_duplicate && startup_replay {
5638                                                         // On startup we may get redundant claims which are related to
5639                                                         // monitor updates still in flight. In that case, we shouldn't
5640                                                         // immediately free, but instead let that monitor update complete
5641                                                         // in the background.
5642                                                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
5643                                                                 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
5644                                                                 // There should be a `BackgroundEvent` pending...
5645                                                                 assert!(background_events.iter().any(|ev| {
5646                                                                         match ev {
5647                                                                                 // to apply a monitor update that blocked the claiming channel,
5648                                                                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5649                                                                                         funding_txo, update, ..
5650                                                                                 } => {
5651                                                                                         if *funding_txo == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint {
5652                                                                                                 assert!(update.updates.iter().any(|upd|
5653                                                                                                         if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5654                                                                                                                 payment_preimage: update_preimage
5655                                                                                                         } = upd {
5656                                                                                                                 payment_preimage == *update_preimage
5657                                                                                                         } else { false }
5658                                                                                                 ), "{:?}", update);
5659                                                                                                 true
5660                                                                                         } else { false }
5661                                                                                 },
5662                                                                                 // or the channel we'd unblock is already closed,
5663                                                                                 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup(
5664                                                                                         (funding_txo, monitor_update)
5665                                                                                 ) => {
5666                                                                                         if *funding_txo == next_channel_outpoint {
5667                                                                                                 assert_eq!(monitor_update.updates.len(), 1);
5668                                                                                                 assert!(matches!(
5669                                                                                                         monitor_update.updates[0],
5670                                                                                                         ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. }
5671                                                                                                 ));
5672                                                                                                 true
5673                                                                                         } else { false }
5674                                                                                 },
5675                                                                                 // or the monitor update has completed and will unblock
5676                                                                                 // immediately once we get going.
5677                                                                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
5678                                                                                         channel_id, ..
5679                                                                                 } =>
5680                                                                                         *channel_id == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(),
5681                                                                         }
5682                                                                 }), "{:?}", *background_events);
5683                                                         }
5684                                                         None
5685                                                 } else if definitely_duplicate {
5686                                                         if let Some(other_chan) = chan_to_release {
5687                                                                 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5688                                                                         downstream_counterparty_node_id: other_chan.0,
5689                                                                         downstream_funding_outpoint: other_chan.1,
5690                                                                         blocking_action: other_chan.2,
5691                                                                 })
5692                                                         } else { None }
5693                                                 } else {
5694                                                         let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
5695                                                                 if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
5696                                                                         Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
5697                                                                 } else { None }
5698                                                         } else { None };
5699                                                         Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5700                                                                 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
5701                                                                         fee_earned_msat,
5702                                                                         claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
5703                                                                         prev_channel_id: Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5704                                                                         next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5705                                                                         outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
5706                                                                 },
5707                                                                 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: chan_to_release,
5708                                                         })
5709                                                 }
5710                                         });
5711                                 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
5712                                         let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5713                                         let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
5714                                 }
5715                         },
5716                 }
5717         }
5718
5719         /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
5720         pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
5721                 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
5722         }
5723
5724         fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
5725                 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5726                 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5727                 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5728
5729                 for action in actions.into_iter() {
5730                         match action {
5731                                 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
5732                                         let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5733                                         if let Some(ClaimingPayment {
5734                                                 amount_msat,
5735                                                 payment_purpose: purpose,
5736                                                 receiver_node_id,
5737                                                 htlcs,
5738                                                 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_total_msat,
5739                                         }) = payment {
5740                                                 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
5741                                                         payment_hash,
5742                                                         purpose,
5743                                                         amount_msat,
5744                                                         receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
5745                                                         htlcs,
5746                                                         sender_intended_total_msat,
5747                                                 }, None));
5748                                         }
5749                                 },
5750                                 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5751                                         event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
5752                                 } => {
5753                                         self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
5754                                         if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
5755                                                 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, Some(blocker));
5756                                         }
5757                                 },
5758                                 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5759                                         downstream_counterparty_node_id, downstream_funding_outpoint, blocking_action,
5760                                 } => {
5761                                         self.handle_monitor_update_release(
5762                                                 downstream_counterparty_node_id,
5763                                                 downstream_funding_outpoint,
5764                                                 Some(blocking_action),
5765                                         );
5766                                 },
5767                         }
5768                 }
5769         }
5770
5771         /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
5772         /// update completion.
5773         fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5774                 channel: &mut Channel<SP>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
5775                 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
5776                 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
5777                 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
5778         -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
5779                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
5780                 log_trace!(logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
5781                         &channel.context.channel_id(),
5782                         if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
5783                         if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
5784                         if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
5785                         if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
5786                         if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
5787
5788                 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
5789
5790                 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5791                 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5792                         htlc_forwards = Some((channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias()),
5793                                 channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
5794                 }
5795
5796                 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
5797                         send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
5798                 }
5799                 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
5800                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5801                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5802                                 msg,
5803                         });
5804                 }
5805
5806                 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
5807                         if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
5808                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5809                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5810                                         updates: update,
5811                                 });
5812                         }
5813                 } }
5814                 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
5815                         if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
5816                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
5817                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5818                                         msg: revoke_and_ack,
5819                                 });
5820                         }
5821                 } }
5822                 match order {
5823                         RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
5824                                 handle_cs!();
5825                                 handle_raa!();
5826                         },
5827                         RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
5828                                 handle_raa!();
5829                                 handle_cs!();
5830                         },
5831                 }
5832
5833                 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
5834                         log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
5835                         self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
5836                 }
5837
5838                 {
5839                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5840                         emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
5841                         emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
5842                 }
5843
5844                 htlc_forwards
5845         }
5846
5847         fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
5848                 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5849
5850                 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
5851                         Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5852                         None => {
5853                                 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5854                                 // monitor event, this and the outpoint_to_peer map should be removed.
5855                                 let outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5856                                 match outpoint_to_peer.get(&funding_txo) {
5857                                         Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5858                                         None => return,
5859                                 }
5860                         }
5861                 };
5862                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5863                 let mut peer_state_lock;
5864                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
5865                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
5866                 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5867                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5868                 let channel =
5869                         if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5870                                 chan
5871                         } else {
5872                                 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
5873                                         .remove(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
5874                                 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5875                                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5876                                 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
5877                                 return;
5878                         };
5879                 let remaining_in_flight =
5880                         if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
5881                                 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
5882                                 pending.len()
5883                         } else { 0 };
5884                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
5885                 log_trace!(logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
5886                         highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
5887                         remaining_in_flight);
5888                 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
5889                         return;
5890                 }
5891                 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
5892         }
5893
5894         /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
5895         ///
5896         /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
5897         /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
5898         /// the channel.
5899         ///
5900         /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5901         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5902         /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5903         ///
5904         /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
5905         /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
5906         /// used to accept such channels.
5907         ///
5908         /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5909         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5910         pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5911                 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
5912         }
5913
5914         /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
5915         /// it as confirmed immediately.
5916         ///
5917         /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5918         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5919         /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5920         ///
5921         /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
5922         /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
5923         ///
5924         /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
5925         /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
5926         ///
5927         /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
5928         /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
5929         ///
5930         /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5931         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5932         pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5933                 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
5934         }
5935
5936         fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5937                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5938
5939                 let peers_without_funded_channels =
5940                         self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
5941                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5942                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5943                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
5944                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5945                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5946                 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
5947
5948                 // Find (and remove) the channel in the unaccepted table. If it's not there, something weird is
5949                 // happening and return an error. N.B. that we create channel with an outbound SCID of zero so
5950                 // that we can delay allocating the SCID until after we're sure that the checks below will
5951                 // succeed.
5952                 let mut channel = match peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
5953                         Some(unaccepted_channel) => {
5954                                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5955                                 InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
5956                                         counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
5957                                         &unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
5958                                         &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|e| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.to_string() })
5959                         }
5960                         _ => Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() })
5961                 }?;
5962
5963                 if accept_0conf {
5964                         // This should have been correctly configured by the call to InboundV1Channel::new.
5965                         debug_assert!(channel.context.minimum_depth().unwrap() == 0);
5966                 } else if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
5967                         let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5968                                 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5969                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5970                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
5971                                 }
5972                         };
5973                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5974                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
5975                 } else {
5976                         // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
5977                         // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
5978                         // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
5979                         if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
5980                                 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5981                                         node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5982                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5983                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
5984                                         }
5985                                 };
5986                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5987                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
5988                         }
5989                 }
5990
5991                 // Now that we know we have a channel, assign an outbound SCID alias.
5992                 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
5993                 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
5994
5995                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
5996                         node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5997                         msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
5998                 });
5999
6000                 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(temporary_channel_id.clone(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6001
6002                 Ok(())
6003         }
6004
6005         /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
6006         /// or 0-conf channels.
6007         ///
6008         /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
6009         /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
6010         fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
6011         where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<SP>) -> bool {
6012                 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
6013                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6014                 {
6015                         let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6016                         for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
6017                                 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6018                                 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
6019                                 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
6020                                 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
6021                                         peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
6022                                 }
6023                         }
6024                 }
6025                 return peers_without_funded_channels;
6026         }
6027
6028         fn unfunded_channel_count(
6029                 peer: &PeerState<SP>, best_block_height: u32
6030         ) -> usize {
6031                 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
6032                 for (_, phase) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
6033                         match phase {
6034                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6035                                         // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
6036                                         // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
6037                                         if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
6038                                                 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
6039                                         {
6040                                                 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6041                                         }
6042                                 },
6043                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
6044                                         if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
6045                                                 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6046                                         }
6047                                 },
6048                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6049                                         // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
6050                                         continue;
6051                                 }
6052                         }
6053                 }
6054                 num_unfunded_channels + peer.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
6055         }
6056
6057         fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6058                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6059                 // likely to be lost on restart!
6060                 if msg.chain_hash != self.chain_hash {
6061                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6062                 }
6063
6064                 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
6065                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6066                 }
6067
6068                 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
6069                 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
6070                 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
6071                 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
6072                         self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
6073
6074                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6075                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6076                     .ok_or_else(|| {
6077                                 debug_assert!(false);
6078                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
6079                         })?;
6080                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6081                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6082
6083                 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6084                 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
6085                 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6086                 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
6087                         channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
6088                         !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
6089                 {
6090                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6091                                 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
6092                                 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6093                 }
6094
6095                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6096                 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
6097                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6098                                 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
6099                                 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6100                 }
6101
6102                 let channel_id = msg.temporary_channel_id;
6103                 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
6104                 if channel_exists {
6105                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6106                 }
6107
6108                 // If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
6109                 if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
6110                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6111                         pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
6112                                 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
6113                                 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6114                                 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
6115                                 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
6116                                 channel_type: msg.channel_type.clone().unwrap(),
6117                         }, None));
6118                         peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
6119                                 open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
6120                                 ticks_remaining: UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS,
6121                         });
6122                         return Ok(());
6123                 }
6124
6125                 // Otherwise create the channel right now.
6126                 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
6127                 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
6128                 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
6129                 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6130                         counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
6131                         &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
6132                 {
6133                         Err(e) => {
6134                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
6135                         },
6136                         Ok(res) => res
6137                 };
6138
6139                 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
6140                 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
6141                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6142                 }
6143                 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6144                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6145                 }
6146
6147                 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6148                 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6149
6150                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6151                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6152                         msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6153                 });
6154                 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6155                 Ok(())
6156         }
6157
6158         fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6159                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6160                 // likely to be lost on restart!
6161                 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
6162                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6163                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6164                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
6165                                         debug_assert!(false);
6166                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6167                                 })?;
6168                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6169                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6170                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6171                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut phase) => {
6172                                         match phase.get_mut() {
6173                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
6174                                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), phase);
6175                                                         (chan.context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.context.get_user_id())
6176                                                 },
6177                                                 _ => {
6178                                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected accept_channel message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id));
6179                                                 }
6180                                         }
6181                                 },
6182                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6183                         }
6184                 };
6185                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6186                 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
6187                         temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6188                         counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6189                         channel_value_satoshis: value,
6190                         output_script,
6191                         user_channel_id: user_id,
6192                 }, None));
6193                 Ok(())
6194         }
6195
6196         fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6197                 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6198
6199                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6200                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6201                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6202                                 debug_assert!(false);
6203                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6204                         })?;
6205
6206                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6207                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6208                 let (chan, funding_msg_opt, monitor) =
6209                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6210                                 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan)) => {
6211                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &inbound_chan.context);
6212                                         match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger) {
6213                                                 Ok(res) => res,
6214                                                 Err((mut inbound_chan, err)) => {
6215                                                         // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
6216                                                         // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
6217                                                         // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
6218                                                         update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &inbound_chan.context);
6219                                                         let user_id = inbound_chan.context.get_user_id();
6220                                                         let shutdown_res = inbound_chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
6221                                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(format!("{}", err),
6222                                                                 msg.temporary_channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, inbound_chan.context.get_value_satoshis()));
6223                                                 },
6224                                         }
6225                                 },
6226                                 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(_)) | Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_)) => {
6227                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected funding_created message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id));
6228                                 },
6229                                 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6230                         };
6231
6232                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
6233                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6234                                 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6235                                         "Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(),
6236                                         chan.context.channel_id()
6237                                 ))
6238                         },
6239                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6240                                 let mut outpoint_to_peer_lock = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6241                                 match outpoint_to_peer_lock.entry(monitor.get_funding_txo().0) {
6242                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6243                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6244                                                         "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
6245                                                         chan.context.channel_id()))
6246                                         },
6247                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
6248                                                 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
6249                                                 if let Ok(persist_state) = monitor_res {
6250                                                         i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
6251                                                         mem::drop(outpoint_to_peer_lock);
6252
6253                                                         // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
6254                                                         // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
6255                                                         // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
6256                                                         // until we have persisted our monitor.
6257                                                         if let Some(msg) = funding_msg_opt {
6258                                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
6259                                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6260                                                                         msg,
6261                                                                 });
6262                                                         }
6263
6264                                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) {
6265                                                                 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_state, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
6266                                                                         per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6267                                                         } else {
6268                                                                 unreachable!("This must be a funded channel as we just inserted it.");
6269                                                         }
6270                                                         Ok(())
6271                                                 } else {
6272                                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6273                                                         log_error!(logger, "Persisting initial ChannelMonitor failed, implying the funding outpoint was duplicated");
6274                                                         let channel_id = match funding_msg_opt {
6275                                                                 Some(msg) => msg.channel_id,
6276                                                                 None => chan.context.channel_id(),
6277                                                         };
6278                                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6279                                                                 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
6280                                                                 channel_id));
6281                                                 }
6282                                         }
6283                                 }
6284                         }
6285                 }
6286         }
6287
6288         fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6289                 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6290                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6291                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6292                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6293                                 debug_assert!(false);
6294                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6295                         })?;
6296
6297                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6298                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6299                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6300                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
6301                                 if matches!(chan_phase_entry.get(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_)) {
6302                                         let chan = if let ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) = chan_phase_entry.remove() { chan } else { unreachable!() };
6303                                         let logger = WithContext::from(
6304                                                 &self.logger,
6305                                                 Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
6306                                                 Some(chan.context.channel_id())
6307                                         );
6308                                         let res =
6309                                                 chan.funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger);
6310                                         match res {
6311                                                 Ok((chan, monitor)) => {
6312                                                         if let Ok(persist_status) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
6313                                                                 // We really should be able to insert here without doing a second
6314                                                                 // lookup, but sadly rust stdlib doesn't currently allow keeping
6315                                                                 // the original Entry around with the value removed.
6316                                                                 let mut chan = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id).or_insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan));
6317                                                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) = &mut chan {
6318                                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_status, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6319                                                                 } else { unreachable!(); }
6320                                                                 Ok(())
6321                                                         } else {
6322                                                                 let e = ChannelError::Close("Channel funding outpoint was a duplicate".to_owned());
6323                                                                 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::Funded(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
6324                                                         }
6325                                                 },
6326                                                 Err((chan, e)) => {
6327                                                         debug_assert!(matches!(e, ChannelError::Close(_)),
6328                                                                 "We don't have a channel anymore, so the error better have expected close");
6329                                                         // We've already removed this outbound channel from the map in
6330                                                         // `PeerState` above so at this point we just need to clean up any
6331                                                         // lingering entries concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
6332                                                         return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
6333                                                 }
6334                                         }
6335                                 } else {
6336                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
6337                                 }
6338                         },
6339                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
6340                 }
6341         }
6342
6343         fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6344                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6345                 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6346                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6347                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6348                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6349                                 debug_assert!(false);
6350                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6351                         })?;
6352                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6353                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6354                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6355                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6356                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6357                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6358                                         let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
6359                                                 self.chain_hash, &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6360                                         if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
6361                                                 log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6362                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6363                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6364                                                         msg: announcement_sigs,
6365                                                 });
6366                                         } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
6367                                                 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
6368                                                 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
6369                                                 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
6370                                                 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
6371                                                 // announcement_signatures.
6372                                                 log_trace!(logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6373                                                 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
6374                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6375                                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6376                                                                 msg,
6377                                                         });
6378                                                 }
6379                                         }
6380
6381                                         {
6382                                                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6383                                                 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan);
6384                                         }
6385
6386                                         Ok(())
6387                                 } else {
6388                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6389                                                 "Got a channel_ready message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry)
6390                                 }
6391                         },
6392                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
6393                                 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6394                         }
6395                 }
6396         }
6397
6398         fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6399                 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
6400                 let mut finish_shutdown = None;
6401                 {
6402                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6403                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6404                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
6405                                         debug_assert!(false);
6406                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6407                                 })?;
6408                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6409                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6410                         if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6411                                 let phase = chan_phase_entry.get_mut();
6412                                 match phase {
6413                                         ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6414                                                 if !chan.received_shutdown() {
6415                                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6416                                                         log_info!(logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
6417                                                                 msg.channel_id,
6418                                                                 if chan.sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
6419                                                 }
6420
6421                                                 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6422                                                 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6423                                                         chan.shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6424                                                 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
6425
6426                                                 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
6427                                                         // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
6428                                                         // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
6429                                                         // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
6430                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6431                                                                 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6432                                                                 msg,
6433                                                         });
6434                                                 }
6435                                                 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
6436                                                 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6437                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
6438                                                                 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6439                                                 }
6440                                         },
6441                                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6442                                                 let context = phase.context_mut();
6443                                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context);
6444                                                 log_error!(logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
6445                                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel);
6446                                                 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
6447                                                 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
6448                                         },
6449                                 }
6450                         } else {
6451                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6452                         }
6453                 }
6454                 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
6455                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
6456                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
6457                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
6458                 }
6459                 if let Some(shutdown_res) = finish_shutdown {
6460                         self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
6461                 }
6462
6463                 Ok(())
6464         }
6465
6466         fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6467                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6468                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6469                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6470                                 debug_assert!(false);
6471                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6472                         })?;
6473                 let (tx, chan_option, shutdown_result) = {
6474                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6475                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6476                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6477                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6478                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6479                                                 let (closing_signed, tx, shutdown_result) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6480                                                 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
6481                                                 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
6482                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
6483                                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6484                                                                 msg,
6485                                                         });
6486                                                 }
6487                                                 if tx.is_some() {
6488                                                         // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
6489                                                         // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
6490                                                         // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
6491                                                         // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
6492                                                         // watch for old state broadcasts)!
6493                                                         (tx, Some(remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry)), shutdown_result)
6494                                                 } else { (tx, None, shutdown_result) }
6495                                         } else {
6496                                                 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6497                                                         "Got a closing_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6498                                         }
6499                                 },
6500                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6501                         }
6502                 };
6503                 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
6504                         let channel_id = chan_option.as_ref().map(|channel| channel.context().channel_id());
6505                         log_info!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id), "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
6506                         self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
6507                 }
6508                 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = chan_option {
6509                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6510                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6511                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6512                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6513                                         msg: update
6514                                 });
6515                         }
6516                         self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
6517                 }
6518                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6519                 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
6520                         self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
6521                 }
6522                 Ok(())
6523         }
6524
6525         fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6526                 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
6527                 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
6528                 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
6529                 //
6530                 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
6531                 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
6532                 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
6533                 //but we should prevent it anyway.
6534
6535                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6536                 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6537
6538                 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg, counterparty_node_id);
6539                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6540                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6541                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6542                                 debug_assert!(false);
6543                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6544                         })?;
6545                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6546                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6547                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6548                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6549                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6550                                         let pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
6551                                                 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
6552                                                         self.construct_pending_htlc_status(
6553                                                                 msg, counterparty_node_id, shared_secret, next_hop,
6554                                                                 chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt,
6555                                                         ),
6556                                                 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
6557                                         };
6558                                         let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<SP>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
6559                                                 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
6560                                                 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
6561                                                 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
6562                                                 match pending_forward_info {
6563                                                         PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
6564                                                                 ref incoming_shared_secret, ref routing, ..
6565                                                         }) => {
6566                                                                 let reason = if routing.blinded_failure().is_some() {
6567                                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32])
6568                                                                 } else if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
6569                                                                         let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
6570                                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
6571                                                                 } else {
6572                                                                         HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
6573                                                                 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
6574                                                                 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6575                                                                         channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6576                                                                         htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
6577                                                                         reason
6578                                                                 };
6579                                                                 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
6580                                                         },
6581                                                         _ => pending_forward_info
6582                                                 }
6583                                         };
6584                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6585                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6586                                 } else {
6587                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6588                                                 "Got an update_add_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6589                                 }
6590                         },
6591                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6592                 }
6593                 Ok(())
6594         }
6595
6596         fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6597                 let funding_txo;
6598                 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
6599                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6600                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6601                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
6602                                         debug_assert!(false);
6603                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6604                                 })?;
6605                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6606                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6607                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6608                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6609                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6610                                                 let res = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6611                                                 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop) = &res.0 {
6612                                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6613                                                         log_trace!(logger,
6614                                                                 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
6615                                                                 msg.channel_id);
6616                                                         peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates.entry(msg.channel_id)
6617                                                                 .or_insert_with(Vec::new)
6618                                                                 .push(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&prev_hop));
6619                                                 }
6620                                                 // Note that we do not need to push an `actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates`
6621                                                 // entry here, even though we *do* need to block the next RAA monitor update.
6622                                                 // We do this instead in the `claim_funds_internal` by attaching a
6623                                                 // `ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate` action to the event generated when the
6624                                                 // outbound HTLC is claimed. This is guaranteed to all complete before we
6625                                                 // process the RAA as messages are processed from single peers serially.
6626                                                 funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().expect("We won't accept a fulfill until funded");
6627                                                 res
6628                                         } else {
6629                                                 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6630                                                         "Got an update_fulfill_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6631                                         }
6632                                 },
6633                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6634                         }
6635                 };
6636                 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, false, Some(*counterparty_node_id), funding_txo);
6637                 Ok(())
6638         }
6639
6640         fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6641                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6642                 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6643                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6644                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6645                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6646                                 debug_assert!(false);
6647                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6648                         })?;
6649                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6650                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6651                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6652                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6653                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6654                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan_phase_entry);
6655                                 } else {
6656                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6657                                                 "Got an update_fail_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6658                                 }
6659                         },
6660                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6661                 }
6662                 Ok(())
6663         }
6664
6665         fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6666                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6667                 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6668                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6669                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6670                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6671                                 debug_assert!(false);
6672                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6673                         })?;
6674                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6675                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6676                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6677                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6678                                 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
6679                                         let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
6680                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan_phase_entry);
6681                                 }
6682                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6683                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan_phase_entry);
6684                                 } else {
6685                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6686                                                 "Got an update_fail_malformed_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6687                                 }
6688                                 Ok(())
6689                         },
6690                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6691                 }
6692         }
6693
6694         fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6695                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6696                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6697                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6698                                 debug_assert!(false);
6699                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6700                         })?;
6701                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6702                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6703                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6704                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6705                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6706                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6707                                         let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6708                                         let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6709                                         if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6710                                                 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
6711                                                         peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6712                                         }
6713                                         Ok(())
6714                                 } else {
6715                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6716                                                 "Got a commitment_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6717                                 }
6718                         },
6719                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6720                 }
6721         }
6722
6723         #[inline]
6724         fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
6725                 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
6726                         let mut push_forward_event = false;
6727                         let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
6728                         let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
6729                         if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
6730                                 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
6731                                         let scid = match forward_info.routing {
6732                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6733                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
6734                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
6735                                         };
6736                                         // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
6737                                         let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
6738
6739                                         let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6740                                         let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
6741                                         match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
6742                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6743                                                         entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6744                                                                 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
6745                                                 },
6746                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6747                                                         if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
6748                                                            fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.chain_hash)
6749                                                         {
6750                                                                 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).to_byte_array());
6751                                                                 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6752                                                                 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
6753                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6754                                                                                 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
6755                                                                                         requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
6756                                                                                         payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
6757                                                                                         inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
6758                                                                                         expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
6759                                                                                         intercept_id
6760                                                                                 }, None));
6761                                                                                 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6762                                                                                         prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
6763                                                                         },
6764                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6765                                                                                 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()));
6766                                                                                 log_info!(logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
6767                                                                                 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6768                                                                                         short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
6769                                                                                         user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
6770                                                                                         outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
6771                                                                                         htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
6772                                                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6773                                                                                         phantom_shared_secret: None,
6774                                                                                         blinded_failure: forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
6775                                                                                 });
6776
6777                                                                                 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
6778                                                                                                 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
6779                                                                                                 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
6780                                                                                 ));
6781                                                                         }
6782                                                                 }
6783                                                         } else {
6784                                                                 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
6785                                                                 // payments are being processed.
6786                                                                 if forward_htlcs_empty {
6787                                                                         push_forward_event = true;
6788                                                                 }
6789                                                                 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6790                                                                         prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
6791                                                         }
6792                                                 }
6793                                         }
6794                                 }
6795                         }
6796
6797                         for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
6798                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
6799                         }
6800
6801                         if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
6802                                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6803                                 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
6804                         }
6805                         if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
6806                 }
6807         }
6808
6809         fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
6810                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6811                 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6812                 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
6813                         if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
6814                 ).count();
6815                 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
6816                 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
6817                 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
6818                 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
6819                 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
6820                 // real by taking more time.
6821                 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
6822                         pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6823                                 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
6824                         }, None));
6825                 }
6826         }
6827
6828         /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
6829         /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
6830         /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
6831         /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
6832         fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6833                 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
6834                 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
6835         ) -> bool {
6836                 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6837                         .get(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
6838                 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
6839                         action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6840                                 channel_funding_outpoint,
6841                                 counterparty_node_id,
6842                         })
6843                 })
6844         }
6845
6846         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6847         pub(crate) fn test_raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6848                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_id: ChannelId
6849         ) -> bool {
6850                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6851                 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6852                         let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6853                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
6854
6855                         if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id) {
6856                                 return self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
6857                                         chan.context().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), counterparty_node_id);
6858                         }
6859                 }
6860                 false
6861         }
6862
6863         fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6864                 let htlcs_to_fail = {
6865                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6866                         let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6867                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
6868                                         debug_assert!(false);
6869                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6870                                 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
6871                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6872                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6873                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6874                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6875                                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6876                                                 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6877                                                 let mon_update_blocked = if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_opt {
6878                                                         self.raa_monitor_updates_held(
6879                                                                 &peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates, funding_txo,
6880                                                                 *counterparty_node_id)
6881                                                 } else { false };
6882                                                 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6883                                                         chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger, mon_update_blocked), chan_phase_entry);
6884                                                 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6885                                                         let funding_txo = funding_txo_opt
6886                                                                 .expect("Funding outpoint must have been set for RAA handling to succeed");
6887                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update,
6888                                                                 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6889                                                 }
6890                                                 htlcs_to_fail
6891                                         } else {
6892                                                 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6893                                                         "Got a revoke_and_ack message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6894                                         }
6895                                 },
6896                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6897                         }
6898                 };
6899                 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
6900                 Ok(())
6901         }
6902
6903         fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6904                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6905                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6906                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6907                                 debug_assert!(false);
6908                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6909                         })?;
6910                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6911                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6912                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6913                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6914                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6915                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6916                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6917                                 } else {
6918                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6919                                                 "Got an update_fee message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6920                                 }
6921                         },
6922                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6923                 }
6924                 Ok(())
6925         }
6926
6927         fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6928                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6929                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6930                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6931                                 debug_assert!(false);
6932                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6933                         })?;
6934                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6935                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6936                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6937                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6938                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6939                                         if !chan.context.is_usable() {
6940                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
6941                                         }
6942
6943                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6944                                                 msg: try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.announcement_signatures(
6945                                                         &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
6946                                                         msg, &self.default_configuration
6947                                                 ), chan_phase_entry),
6948                                                 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6949                                                 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6950                                                 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan).unwrap()),
6951                                         });
6952                                 } else {
6953                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6954                                                 "Got an announcement_signatures message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6955                                 }
6956                         },
6957                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6958                 }
6959                 Ok(())
6960         }
6961
6962         /// Returns DoPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersistNoEvents or an Err.
6963         fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6964                 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
6965                         Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
6966                         None => {
6967                                 // It's not a local channel
6968                                 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6969                         }
6970                 };
6971                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6972                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
6973                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
6974                         return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6975                 }
6976                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6977                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6978                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
6979                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6980                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6981                                         if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6982                                                 if chan.context.should_announce() {
6983                                                         // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
6984                                                         // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
6985                                                         // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
6986                                                         return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
6987                                                 }
6988                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
6989                                         }
6990                                         let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
6991                                         let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
6992                                         if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
6993                                                 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
6994                                         } else {
6995                                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6996                                                 log_debug!(logger, "Received channel_update {:?} for channel {}.", msg, chan_id);
6997                                                 let did_change = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_update(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6998                                                 // If nothing changed after applying their update, we don't need to bother
6999                                                 // persisting.
7000                                                 if !did_change {
7001                                                         return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7002                                                 }
7003                                         }
7004                                 } else {
7005                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7006                                                 "Got a channel_update for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7007                                 }
7008                         },
7009                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7010                 }
7011                 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
7012         }
7013
7014         fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7015                 let htlc_forwards;
7016                 let need_lnd_workaround = {
7017                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7018
7019                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7020                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
7021                                         debug_assert!(false);
7022                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7023                                                 format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
7024                                                 msg.channel_id
7025                                         )
7026                                 })?;
7027                         let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id));
7028                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7029                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7030                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7031                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7032                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7033                                                 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
7034                                                 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
7035                                                 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
7036                                                 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
7037                                                 let responses = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_reestablish(
7038                                                         msg, &&logger, &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash,
7039                                                         &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan_phase_entry);
7040                                                 let mut channel_update = None;
7041                                                 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
7042                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
7043                                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7044                                                                 msg,
7045                                                         });
7046                                                 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
7047                                                         // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
7048                                                         // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
7049                                                         // they have the latest channel parameters.
7050                                                         if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
7051                                                                 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
7052                                                                         node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7053                                                                         msg,
7054                                                                 });
7055                                                         }
7056                                                 }
7057                                                 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
7058                                                 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
7059                                                         &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
7060                                                         Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
7061                                                 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
7062                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
7063                                                 }
7064                                                 need_lnd_workaround
7065                                         } else {
7066                                                 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7067                                                         "Got a channel_reestablish message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7068                                         }
7069                                 },
7070                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
7071                                         log_debug!(logger, "Sending bogus ChannelReestablish for unknown channel {} to force channel closure",
7072                                                 msg.channel_id);
7073                                         // Unfortunately, lnd doesn't force close on errors
7074                                         // (https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/blob/abb1e3463f3a83bbb843d5c399869dbe930ad94f/htlcswitch/link.go#L2119).
7075                                         // One of the few ways to get an lnd counterparty to force close is by
7076                                         // replicating what they do when restoring static channel backups (SCBs). They
7077                                         // send an invalid `ChannelReestablish` with `0` commitment numbers and an
7078                                         // invalid `your_last_per_commitment_secret`.
7079                                         //
7080                                         // Since we received a `ChannelReestablish` for a channel that doesn't exist, we
7081                                         // can assume it's likely the channel closed from our point of view, but it
7082                                         // remains open on the counterparty's side. By sending this bogus
7083                                         // `ChannelReestablish` message now as a response to theirs, we trigger them to
7084                                         // force close broadcasting their latest state. If the closing transaction from
7085                                         // our point of view remains unconfirmed, it'll enter a race with the
7086                                         // counterparty's to-be-broadcast latest commitment transaction.
7087                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
7088                                                 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7089                                                 msg: msgs::ChannelReestablish {
7090                                                         channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7091                                                         next_local_commitment_number: 0,
7092                                                         next_remote_commitment_number: 0,
7093                                                         your_last_per_commitment_secret: [1u8; 32],
7094                                                         my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_slice(&[2u8; 33]).unwrap(),
7095                                                         next_funding_txid: None,
7096                                                 },
7097                                         });
7098                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7099                                                 format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}",
7100                                                         counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7101                                         )
7102                                 }
7103                         }
7104                 };
7105
7106                 let mut persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
7107                 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
7108                         self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
7109                         persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7110                 }
7111
7112                 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
7113                         self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
7114                 }
7115                 Ok(persist)
7116         }
7117
7118         /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
7119         fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
7120                 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
7121
7122                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7123                 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
7124                 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
7125                 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
7126                         for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
7127                                 match monitor_event {
7128                                         MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
7129                                                 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, counterparty_node_id, Some(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()));
7130                                                 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
7131                                                         log_trace!(logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", preimage);
7132                                                         self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, false, counterparty_node_id, funding_outpoint);
7133                                                 } else {
7134                                                         log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash);
7135                                                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
7136                                                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7137                                                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7138                                                 }
7139                                         },
7140                                         MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(funding_outpoint) => {
7141                                                 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
7142                                                         Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
7143                                                         None => {
7144                                                                 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
7145                                                                 // monitor event, this and the outpoint_to_peer map should be removed.
7146                                                                 let outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7147                                                                 outpoint_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint).cloned()
7148                                                         }
7149                                                 };
7150                                                 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
7151                                                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7152                                                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7153                                                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7154                                                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7155                                                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7156                                                                 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
7157                                                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
7158                                                                                 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
7159                                                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7160                                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7161                                                                                                 msg: update
7162                                                                                         });
7163                                                                                 }
7164                                                                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
7165                                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7166                                                                                         node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7167                                                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
7168                                                                                                 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
7169                                                                                         },
7170                                                                                 });
7171                                                                         }
7172                                                                 }
7173                                                         }
7174                                                 }
7175                                         },
7176                                         MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
7177                                                 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
7178                                         },
7179                                 }
7180                         }
7181                 }
7182
7183                 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7184                         self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7185                 }
7186
7187                 has_pending_monitor_events
7188         }
7189
7190         /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
7191         /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
7192         /// update events as a separate process method here.
7193         #[cfg(fuzzing)]
7194         pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
7195                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7196                 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
7197         }
7198
7199         /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
7200         /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
7201         /// update was applied.
7202         fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
7203                 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
7204                 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7205
7206                 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
7207                 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
7208                 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
7209                 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
7210                 'peer_loop: loop {
7211                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7212                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7213                                 'chan_loop: loop {
7214                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7215                                         let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7216                                         for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
7217                                                 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
7218                                         ) {
7219                                                 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
7220                                                 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7221                                                 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
7222                                                         chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context));
7223                                                 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
7224                                                         failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
7225                                                 }
7226                                                 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
7227                                                         has_monitor_update = true;
7228
7229                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
7230                                                                 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7231                                                         continue 'peer_loop;
7232                                                 }
7233                                         }
7234                                         break 'chan_loop;
7235                                 }
7236                         }
7237                         break 'peer_loop;
7238                 }
7239
7240                 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty();
7241                 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7242                         self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
7243                 }
7244
7245                 has_update
7246         }
7247
7248         /// When a call to a [`ChannelSigner`] method returns an error, this indicates that the signer
7249         /// is (temporarily) unavailable, and the operation should be retried later.
7250         ///
7251         /// This method allows for that retry - either checking for any signer-pending messages to be
7252         /// attempted in every channel, or in the specifically provided channel.
7253         ///
7254         /// [`ChannelSigner`]: crate::sign::ChannelSigner
7255         #[cfg(test)] // This is only implemented for one signer method, and should be private until we
7256                      // actually finish implementing it fully.
7257         pub fn signer_unblocked(&self, channel_opt: Option<(PublicKey, ChannelId)>) {
7258                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7259
7260                 let unblock_chan = |phase: &mut ChannelPhase<SP>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>| {
7261                         let node_id = phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id();
7262                         match phase {
7263                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7264                                         let msgs = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger);
7265                                         if let Some(updates) = msgs.commitment_update {
7266                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
7267                                                         node_id,
7268                                                         updates,
7269                                                 });
7270                                         }
7271                                         if let Some(msg) = msgs.funding_signed {
7272                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
7273                                                         node_id,
7274                                                         msg,
7275                                                 });
7276                                         }
7277                                         if let Some(msg) = msgs.channel_ready {
7278                                                 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
7279                                         }
7280                                 }
7281                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
7282                                         if let Some(msg) = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger) {
7283                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
7284                                                         node_id,
7285                                                         msg,
7286                                                 });
7287                                         }
7288                                 }
7289                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {},
7290                         }
7291                 };
7292
7293                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7294                 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, channel_id)) = channel_opt {
7295                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7296                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7297                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7298                                 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
7299                                         unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7300                                 }
7301                         }
7302                 } else {
7303                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7304                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7305                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7306                                 for (_, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
7307                                         unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7308                                 }
7309                         }
7310                 }
7311         }
7312
7313         /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
7314         /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
7315         /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
7316         fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
7317                 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
7318                 let mut has_update = false;
7319                 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
7320                 {
7321                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7322
7323                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7324                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7325                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7326                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7327                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, phase| {
7328                                         match phase {
7329                                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7330                                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7331                                                         match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &&logger) {
7332                                                                 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt, shutdown_result_opt)) => {
7333                                                                         if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
7334                                                                                 has_update = true;
7335                                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
7336                                                                                         node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
7337                                                                                 });
7338                                                                         }
7339                                                                         debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result_opt.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
7340                                                                         if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result_opt {
7341                                                                                 shutdown_results.push(shutdown_result);
7342                                                                         }
7343                                                                         if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
7344                                                                                 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
7345                                                                                 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
7346                                                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7347                                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7348                                                                                                 msg: update
7349                                                                                         });
7350                                                                                 }
7351
7352                                                                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
7353
7354                                                                                 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
7355                                                                                 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
7356                                                                                 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7357                                                                                 false
7358                                                                         } else { true }
7359                                                                 },
7360                                                                 Err(e) => {
7361                                                                         has_update = true;
7362                                                                         let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
7363                                                                         handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
7364                                                                         !close_channel
7365                                                                 }
7366                                                         }
7367                                                 },
7368                                                 _ => true, // Retain unfunded channels if present.
7369                                         }
7370                                 });
7371                         }
7372                 }
7373
7374                 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
7375                         let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
7376                 }
7377
7378                 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
7379                         self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
7380                 }
7381
7382                 has_update
7383         }
7384
7385         /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
7386         /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
7387         /// Channel object.
7388         fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
7389                 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7390                         // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
7391                         // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
7392                         // reorganized out of the main chain.
7393                         // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
7394                         // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
7395                         // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
7396                         // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
7397                         if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = failure.monitor_update.take() {
7398                                 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
7399                                 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
7400                                         assert!(should_broadcast);
7401                                 } else { unreachable!(); }
7402                                 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
7403                                         BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
7404                                                 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
7405                                         });
7406                         }
7407                         self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7408                 }
7409         }
7410
7411         /// Creates an [`OfferBuilder`] such that the [`Offer`] it builds is recognized by the
7412         /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`InvoiceRequest`] messages for the offer. The offer will
7413         /// not have an expiration unless otherwise set on the builder.
7414         ///
7415         /// # Privacy
7416         ///
7417         /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the offer with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the
7418         /// introduction node and a derived signing pubkey for recipient privacy. As such, currently,
7419         /// the node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction
7420         /// node in order to send the [`InvoiceRequest`].
7421         ///
7422         /// # Limitations
7423         ///
7424         /// Requires a direct connection to the introduction node in the responding [`InvoiceRequest`]'s
7425         /// reply path.
7426         ///
7427         /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
7428         ///
7429         /// [`Offer`]: crate::offers::offer::Offer
7430         /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
7431         pub fn create_offer_builder(
7432                 &self, description: String
7433         ) -> OfferBuilder<DerivedMetadata, secp256k1::All> {
7434                 let node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7435                 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7436                 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7437                 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7438                 let path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7439
7440                 OfferBuilder::deriving_signing_pubkey(description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx)
7441                         .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)
7442                         .path(path)
7443         }
7444
7445         /// Creates a [`RefundBuilder`] such that the [`Refund`] it builds is recognized by the
7446         /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`Bolt12Invoice`] messages for the refund.
7447         ///
7448         /// # Payment
7449         ///
7450         /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the refund.
7451         /// See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has been sent.
7452         ///
7453         /// The builder will have the provided expiration set. Any changes to the expiration on the
7454         /// returned builder will not be honored by [`ChannelManager`]. For `no-std`, the highest seen
7455         /// block time minus two hours is used for the current time when determining if the refund has
7456         /// expired.
7457         ///
7458         /// To revoke the refund, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
7459         /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received before expiration, the payment will fail
7460         /// with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
7461         ///
7462         /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
7463         /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
7464         ///
7465         /// # Privacy
7466         ///
7467         /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the refund with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as
7468         /// the introduction node and a derived payer id for payer privacy. As such, currently, the
7469         /// node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node
7470         /// in order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
7471         ///
7472         /// # Limitations
7473         ///
7474         /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in the responding
7475         /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
7476         ///
7477         /// # Errors
7478         ///
7479         /// Errors if a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link
7480         /// or if `amount_msats` is invalid.
7481         ///
7482         /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
7483         ///
7484         /// [`Refund`]: crate::offers::refund::Refund
7485         /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7486         /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
7487         pub fn create_refund_builder(
7488                 &self, description: String, amount_msats: u64, absolute_expiry: Duration,
7489                 payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
7490         ) -> Result<RefundBuilder<secp256k1::All>, Bolt12SemanticError> {
7491                 let node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7492                 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7493                 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7494                 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7495                 let path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7496
7497                 let builder = RefundBuilder::deriving_payer_id(
7498                         description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, amount_msats, payment_id
7499                 )?
7500                         .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)
7501                         .absolute_expiry(absolute_expiry)
7502                         .path(path);
7503
7504                 let expiration = StaleExpiration::AbsoluteTimeout(absolute_expiry);
7505                 self.pending_outbound_payments
7506                         .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
7507                                 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat,
7508                         )
7509                         .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
7510
7511                 Ok(builder)
7512         }
7513
7514         /// Pays for an [`Offer`] using the given parameters by creating an [`InvoiceRequest`] and
7515         /// enqueuing it to be sent via an onion message. [`ChannelManager`] will pay the actual
7516         /// [`Bolt12Invoice`] once it is received.
7517         ///
7518         /// Uses [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`] such that the [`InvoiceRequest`] it builds is recognized by
7519         /// the [`ChannelManager`] when handling a [`Bolt12Invoice`] message in response to the request.
7520         /// The optional parameters are used in the builder, if `Some`:
7521         /// - `quantity` for [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`] which must be set if
7522         ///   [`Offer::expects_quantity`] is `true`.
7523         /// - `amount_msats` if overpaying what is required for the given `quantity` is desired, and
7524         /// - `payer_note` for [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`].
7525         ///
7526         /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
7527         /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
7528         ///
7529         /// # Payment
7530         ///
7531         /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the request
7532         /// when received. See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has
7533         /// been sent.
7534         ///
7535         /// To revoke the request, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
7536         /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received in a reasonable amount of time, the
7537         /// payment will fail with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
7538         ///
7539         /// # Privacy
7540         ///
7541         /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the reply path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`]
7542         /// as the introduction node and a derived payer id for payer privacy. As such, currently, the
7543         /// node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node
7544         /// in order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
7545         ///
7546         /// # Limitations
7547         ///
7548         /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Offer::paths`] or to
7549         /// [`Offer::signing_pubkey`], if empty. A similar restriction applies to the responding
7550         /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
7551         ///
7552         /// # Errors
7553         ///
7554         /// Errors if a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link
7555         /// or if the provided parameters are invalid for the offer.
7556         ///
7557         /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
7558         /// [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::quantity
7559         /// [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::payer_note
7560         /// [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequestBuilder
7561         /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7562         /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
7563         /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
7564         pub fn pay_for_offer(
7565                 &self, offer: &Offer, quantity: Option<u64>, amount_msats: Option<u64>,
7566                 payer_note: Option<String>, payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry,
7567                 max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
7568         ) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
7569                 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7570                 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7571                 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7572
7573                 let builder = offer
7574                         .request_invoice_deriving_payer_id(expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, payment_id)?
7575                         .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)?;
7576                 let builder = match quantity {
7577                         None => builder,
7578                         Some(quantity) => builder.quantity(quantity)?,
7579                 };
7580                 let builder = match amount_msats {
7581                         None => builder,
7582                         Some(amount_msats) => builder.amount_msats(amount_msats)?,
7583                 };
7584                 let builder = match payer_note {
7585                         None => builder,
7586                         Some(payer_note) => builder.payer_note(payer_note),
7587                 };
7588
7589                 let invoice_request = builder.build_and_sign()?;
7590                 let reply_path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7591
7592                 let expiration = StaleExpiration::TimerTicks(1);
7593                 self.pending_outbound_payments
7594                         .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
7595                                 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat
7596                         )
7597                         .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
7598
7599                 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
7600                 if offer.paths().is_empty() {
7601                         let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7602                                 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request),
7603                                 Destination::Node(offer.signing_pubkey()),
7604                                 Some(reply_path),
7605                         );
7606                         pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7607                 } else {
7608                         // Send as many invoice requests as there are paths in the offer (with an upper bound).
7609                         // Using only one path could result in a failure if the path no longer exists. But only
7610                         // one invoice for a given payment id will be paid, even if more than one is received.
7611                         const REQUEST_LIMIT: usize = 10;
7612                         for path in offer.paths().into_iter().take(REQUEST_LIMIT) {
7613                                 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7614                                         OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request.clone()),
7615                                         Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
7616                                         Some(reply_path.clone()),
7617                                 );
7618                                 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7619                         }
7620                 }
7621
7622                 Ok(())
7623         }
7624
7625         /// Creates a [`Bolt12Invoice`] for a [`Refund`] and enqueues it to be sent via an onion
7626         /// message.
7627         ///
7628         /// The resulting invoice uses a [`PaymentHash`] recognized by the [`ChannelManager`] and a
7629         /// [`BlindedPath`] containing the [`PaymentSecret`] needed to reconstruct the corresponding
7630         /// [`PaymentPreimage`].
7631         ///
7632         /// # Limitations
7633         ///
7634         /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Refund::paths`] or to
7635         /// [`Refund::payer_id`], if empty. This request is best effort; an invoice will be sent to each
7636         /// node meeting the aforementioned criteria, but there's no guarantee that they will be
7637         /// received and no retries will be made.
7638         ///
7639         /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7640         pub fn request_refund_payment(&self, refund: &Refund) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
7641                 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7642                 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7643                 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7644
7645                 let amount_msats = refund.amount_msats();
7646                 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
7647
7648                 match self.create_inbound_payment(Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None) {
7649                         Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => {
7650                                 let payment_paths = vec![
7651                                         self.create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(payment_secret),
7652                                 ];
7653                                 #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
7654                                 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys(
7655                                         payment_paths, payment_hash, expanded_key, entropy
7656                                 )?;
7657                                 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
7658                                 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
7659                                         self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
7660                                 );
7661                                 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
7662                                 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
7663                                         payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at, expanded_key, entropy
7664                                 )?;
7665                                 let invoice = builder.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)?;
7666                                 let reply_path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7667
7668                                 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
7669                                 if refund.paths().is_empty() {
7670                                         let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7671                                                 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice),
7672                                                 Destination::Node(refund.payer_id()),
7673                                                 Some(reply_path),
7674                                         );
7675                                         pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7676                                 } else {
7677                                         for path in refund.paths() {
7678                                                 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7679                                                         OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice.clone()),
7680                                                         Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
7681                                                         Some(reply_path.clone()),
7682                                                 );
7683                                                 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7684                                         }
7685                                 }
7686
7687                                 Ok(())
7688                         },
7689                         Err(()) => Err(Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount),
7690                 }
7691         }
7692
7693         /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
7694         /// to pay us.
7695         ///
7696         /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
7697         /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
7698         ///
7699         /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
7700         /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
7701         /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
7702         /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
7703         ///
7704         /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
7705         ///
7706         /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
7707         /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
7708         ///
7709         /// # Note
7710         ///
7711         /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
7712         /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
7713         ///
7714         /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
7715         ///
7716         /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
7717         /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
7718         ///
7719         /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
7720         /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
7721         /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
7722         /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
7723         /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
7724         /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
7725         pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
7726                 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
7727                 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
7728                         &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
7729                         min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
7730         }
7731
7732         /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
7733         /// stored external to LDK.
7734         ///
7735         /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
7736         /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
7737         /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
7738         ///
7739         /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
7740         /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
7741         /// payments.
7742         ///
7743         /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
7744         /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
7745         /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
7746         /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
7747         ///
7748         /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
7749         /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
7750         /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
7751         /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
7752         /// invoices when no timeout is set.
7753         ///
7754         /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
7755         /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
7756         /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
7757         /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
7758         /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
7759         ///
7760         /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
7761         /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
7762         ///
7763         /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
7764         /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
7765         ///
7766         /// # Note
7767         ///
7768         /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
7769         /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
7770         ///
7771         /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
7772         ///
7773         /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
7774         /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
7775         ///
7776         /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
7777         /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
7778         pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
7779                 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
7780                 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
7781                         invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
7782                         min_final_cltv_expiry)
7783         }
7784
7785         /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
7786         /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
7787         ///
7788         /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
7789         pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
7790                 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
7791         }
7792
7793         /// Creates a one-hop blinded path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction
7794         /// node.
7795         fn create_one_hop_blinded_path(&self) -> BlindedPath {
7796                 let entropy_source = self.entropy_source.deref();
7797                 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7798                 BlindedPath::one_hop_for_message(self.get_our_node_id(), entropy_source, secp_ctx).unwrap()
7799         }
7800
7801         /// Creates a one-hop blinded path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction
7802         /// node.
7803         fn create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(
7804                 &self, payment_secret: PaymentSecret
7805         ) -> (BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath) {
7806                 let entropy_source = self.entropy_source.deref();
7807                 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7808
7809                 let payee_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7810                 let max_cltv_expiry = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
7811                 let payee_tlvs = ReceiveTlvs {
7812                         payment_secret,
7813                         payment_constraints: PaymentConstraints {
7814                                 max_cltv_expiry,
7815                                 htlc_minimum_msat: 1,
7816                         },
7817                 };
7818                 // TODO: Err for overflow?
7819                 BlindedPath::one_hop_for_payment(
7820                         payee_node_id, payee_tlvs, entropy_source, secp_ctx
7821                 ).unwrap()
7822         }
7823
7824         /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
7825         /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
7826         ///
7827         /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
7828         pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
7829                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7830                 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
7831                 loop {
7832                         let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
7833                         // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
7834                         match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
7835                                 Some(_) => continue,
7836                                 None => return scid_candidate
7837                         }
7838                 }
7839         }
7840
7841         /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
7842         ///
7843         /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
7844         pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
7845                 PhantomRouteHints {
7846                         channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
7847                         phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
7848                         real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
7849                 }
7850         }
7851
7852         /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
7853         /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
7854         /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
7855         ///
7856         /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
7857         /// times to get a unique scid.
7858         pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
7859                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7860                 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
7861                 loop {
7862                         let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
7863                         // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
7864                         if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
7865                         return scid_candidate
7866                 }
7867         }
7868
7869         /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
7870         /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
7871         pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
7872                 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
7873
7874                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7875                 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7876                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7877                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7878                         for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(
7879                                 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
7880                         ) {
7881                                 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7882                                         if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
7883                                                 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
7884                                         }
7885                                 }
7886                         }
7887                 }
7888
7889                 inflight_htlcs
7890         }
7891
7892         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7893         pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
7894                 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
7895                 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
7896                 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
7897                 events.into_inner()
7898         }
7899
7900         #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
7901         pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
7902                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7903                 events.push_back((event, None));
7904         }
7905
7906         #[cfg(test)]
7907         pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
7908                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7909                 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
7910         }
7911
7912         #[cfg(test)]
7913         pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
7914                 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
7915         }
7916
7917         #[cfg(test)]
7918         pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
7919                 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
7920         }
7921
7922         /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
7923         /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
7924         /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
7925         /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
7926         fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
7927                 let logger = WithContext::from(
7928                         &self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
7929                 );
7930                 loop {
7931                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7932                         if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7933                                 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
7934                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
7935                                 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
7936                                         // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
7937                                         if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
7938                                                 .get_mut(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
7939                                         {
7940                                                 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
7941                                         }
7942                                 }
7943
7944                                 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
7945                                         channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id) {
7946                                         // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
7947                                         // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
7948                                         // update(s) when those blockers complete.
7949                                         log_trace!(logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
7950                                                 &channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7951                                         break;
7952                                 }
7953
7954                                 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
7955                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7956                                                 debug_assert_eq!(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
7957                                                 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
7958                                                         log_debug!(logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
7959                                                                 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7960                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
7961                                                                 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7962                                                         if further_update_exists {
7963                                                                 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
7964                                                                 // top of the loop.
7965                                                                 continue;
7966                                                         }
7967                                                 } else {
7968                                                         log_trace!(logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
7969                                                                 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7970                                                 }
7971                                         }
7972                                 }
7973                         } else {
7974                                 log_debug!(logger,
7975                                         "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
7976                                         log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7977                         }
7978                         break;
7979                 }
7980         }
7981
7982         fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
7983                 for action in actions {
7984                         match action {
7985                                 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
7986                                         channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
7987                                 } => {
7988                                         self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, None);
7989                                 }
7990                         }
7991                 }
7992         }
7993
7994         /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
7995         /// using the given event handler.
7996         ///
7997         /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
7998         pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
7999                 &self, handler: H
8000         ) {
8001                 let mut ev;
8002                 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
8003         }
8004 }
8005
8006 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8007 where
8008         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8009         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8010         ES::Target: EntropySource,
8011         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8012         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8013         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8014         R::Target: Router,
8015         L::Target: Logger,
8016 {
8017         /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
8018         /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
8019         /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
8020         /// is always placed next to each other.
8021         ///
8022         /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
8023         /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
8024         /// `MessageSendEvent`s  for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
8025         /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
8026         ///
8027         /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
8028         /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
8029         /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
8030         fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
8031                 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
8032                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8033                         let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8034
8035                         // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
8036                         // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
8037                         if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
8038                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8039                         }
8040
8041                         if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
8042                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8043                         }
8044                         if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
8045                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8046                         }
8047
8048                         let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
8049                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8050                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8051                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8052                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8053                                 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
8054                                         pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
8055                                 }
8056                         }
8057
8058                         if !pending_events.is_empty() {
8059                                 events.replace(pending_events);
8060                         }
8061
8062                         result
8063                 });
8064                 events.into_inner()
8065         }
8066 }
8067
8068 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8069 where
8070         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8071         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8072         ES::Target: EntropySource,
8073         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8074         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8075         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8076         R::Target: Router,
8077         L::Target: Logger,
8078 {
8079         /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
8080         ///
8081         /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
8082         /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
8083         fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
8084                 let mut ev;
8085                 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
8086         }
8087 }
8088
8089 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8090 where
8091         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8092         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8093         ES::Target: EntropySource,
8094         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8095         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8096         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8097         R::Target: Router,
8098         L::Target: Logger,
8099 {
8100         fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
8101                 {
8102                         let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
8103                         assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
8104                                 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
8105                         assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
8106                                 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
8107                 }
8108
8109                 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
8110                 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
8111         }
8112
8113         fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
8114                 let _persistence_guard =
8115                         PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8116                                 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8117                 let new_height = height - 1;
8118                 {
8119                         let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
8120                         assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
8121                                 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
8122                         assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
8123                                 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
8124                         *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
8125                 }
8126
8127                 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8128         }
8129 }
8130
8131 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8132 where
8133         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8134         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8135         ES::Target: EntropySource,
8136         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8137         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8138         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8139         R::Target: Router,
8140         L::Target: Logger,
8141 {
8142         fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
8143                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8144                 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8145                 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8146
8147                 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
8148                 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
8149
8150                 let _persistence_guard =
8151                         PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8152                                 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8153                 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context))
8154                         .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
8155
8156                 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
8157                 if height < last_best_block_height {
8158                         let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
8159                         self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8160                 }
8161         }
8162
8163         fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
8164                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8165                 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8166                 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8167
8168                 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
8169                 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
8170
8171                 let _persistence_guard =
8172                         PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8173                                 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8174                 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
8175
8176                 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8177
8178                 macro_rules! max_time {
8179                         ($timestamp: expr) => {
8180                                 loop {
8181                                         // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
8182                                         // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
8183                                         // having an explicit local time source.
8184                                         // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
8185                                         // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
8186                                         let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
8187                                         if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
8188                                         if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
8189                                                 break;
8190                                         }
8191                                 }
8192                         }
8193                 }
8194                 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
8195                 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8196                 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
8197                         inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
8198                 });
8199         }
8200
8201         fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, u32, Option<BlockHash>)> {
8202                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
8203                 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
8204                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8205                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8206                         for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(|phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }) {
8207                                 let txid_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
8208                                 let height_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmation_height();
8209                                 let hash_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in();
8210                                 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(conf_height), Some(block_hash)) = (txid_opt, height_opt, hash_opt) {
8211                                         res.push((funding_txo.txid, conf_height, Some(block_hash)));
8212                                 }
8213                         }
8214                 }
8215                 res
8216         }
8217
8218         fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
8219                 let _persistence_guard =
8220                         PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8221                                 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8222                 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
8223                         if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
8224                                 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
8225                                         channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
8226                                 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8227                         } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8228                 });
8229         }
8230 }
8231
8232 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8233 where
8234         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8235         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8236         ES::Target: EntropySource,
8237         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8238         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8239         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8240         R::Target: Router,
8241         L::Target: Logger,
8242 {
8243         /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
8244         /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
8245         /// the function.
8246         fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
8247                         (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
8248                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8249                 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8250                 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8251
8252                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8253                 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
8254                 {
8255                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8256                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8257                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8258                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8259                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8260                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
8261                                         match phase {
8262                                                 // Retain unfunded channels.
8263                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => true,
8264                                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
8265                                                         let res = f(channel);
8266                                                         if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
8267                                                                 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
8268                                                                         let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
8269                                                                         timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
8270                                                                                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
8271                                                                 }
8272                                                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
8273                                                                 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
8274                                                                         send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
8275                                                                         if channel.context.is_usable() {
8276                                                                                 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8277                                                                                 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
8278                                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
8279                                                                                                 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8280                                                                                                 msg,
8281                                                                                         });
8282                                                                                 }
8283                                                                         } else {
8284                                                                                 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8285                                                                         }
8286                                                                 }
8287
8288                                                                 {
8289                                                                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8290                                                                         emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
8291                                                                 }
8292
8293                                                                 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
8294                                                                         log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8295                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
8296                                                                                 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8297                                                                                 msg: announcement_sigs,
8298                                                                         });
8299                                                                         if let Some(height) = height_opt {
8300                                                                                 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
8301                                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
8302                                                                                                 msg: announcement,
8303                                                                                                 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
8304                                                                                                 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
8305                                                                                                 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
8306                                                                                         });
8307                                                                                 }
8308                                                                         }
8309                                                                 }
8310                                                                 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
8311                                                                         if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
8312                                                                                 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
8313                                                                                 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
8314                                                                                 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
8315                                                                                 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
8316                                                                                 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
8317                                                                                 // is always consistent.
8318                                                                                 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
8319                                                                                 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8320                                                                                 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
8321                                                                                         "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
8322                                                                                         fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
8323                                                                         }
8324                                                                 }
8325                                                         } else if let Err(reason) = res {
8326                                                                 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
8327                                                                 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
8328                                                                 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
8329                                                                 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true));
8330                                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
8331                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
8332                                                                                 msg: update
8333                                                                         });
8334                                                                 }
8335                                                                 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
8336                                                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, reason);
8337                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
8338                                                                         node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8339                                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
8340                                                                                 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage {
8341                                                                                         channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8342                                                                                         data: reason_message,
8343                                                                                 })
8344                                                                         },
8345                                                                 });
8346                                                                 return false;
8347                                                         }
8348                                                         true
8349                                                 }
8350                                         }
8351                                 });
8352                         }
8353                 }
8354
8355                 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
8356                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
8357                                 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
8358                                         // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
8359                                         // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
8360                                         // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
8361                                         // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
8362                                         if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8363                                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
8364                                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
8365
8366                                                 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
8367                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
8368                                                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
8369                                                 false
8370                                         } else { true }
8371                                 });
8372                                 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
8373                         });
8374
8375                         let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8376                         intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
8377                                 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8378                                         let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
8379                                                 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
8380                                                 user_channel_id: Some(htlc.prev_user_channel_id),
8381                                                 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
8382                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
8383                                                 phantom_shared_secret: None,
8384                                                 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
8385                                                 blinded_failure: htlc.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
8386                                         });
8387
8388                                         let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
8389                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
8390                                                 _ => unreachable!(),
8391                                         };
8392                                         timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
8393                                                         HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
8394                                                         HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
8395                                         let logger = WithContext::from(
8396                                                 &self.logger, None, Some(htlc.prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
8397                                         );
8398                                         log_trace!(logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
8399                                         false
8400                                 } else { true }
8401                         });
8402                 }
8403
8404                 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
8405
8406                 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
8407                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
8408                 }
8409         }
8410
8411         /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] may need to be persisted or
8412         /// may have events that need processing.
8413         ///
8414         /// In order to check if this [`ChannelManager`] needs persisting, call
8415         /// [`Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence`].
8416         ///
8417         /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
8418         /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
8419         pub fn get_event_or_persistence_needed_future(&self) -> Future {
8420                 self.event_persist_notifier.get_future()
8421         }
8422
8423         /// Returns true if this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
8424         pub fn get_and_clear_needs_persistence(&self) -> bool {
8425                 self.needs_persist_flag.swap(false, Ordering::AcqRel)
8426         }
8427
8428         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
8429         pub fn get_event_or_persist_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
8430                 self.event_persist_notifier.notify_pending()
8431         }
8432
8433         /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
8434         /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
8435         pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
8436                 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
8437         }
8438
8439         /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8440         /// [`ChannelManager`].
8441         pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
8442                 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
8443         }
8444
8445         /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8446         /// [`ChannelManager`].
8447         ///
8448         /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
8449         /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
8450         #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
8451         pub fn bolt11_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
8452                 provided_bolt11_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
8453         }
8454
8455         /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8456         /// [`ChannelManager`].
8457         fn bolt12_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
8458                 provided_bolt12_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
8459         }
8460
8461         /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8462         /// [`ChannelManager`].
8463         pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
8464                 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
8465         }
8466
8467         /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8468         /// [`ChannelManager`].
8469         pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
8470                 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
8471         }
8472
8473         /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8474         /// [`ChannelManager`].
8475         pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
8476                 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
8477         }
8478 }
8479
8480 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8481         ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8482 where
8483         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8484         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8485         ES::Target: EntropySource,
8486         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8487         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8488         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8489         R::Target: Router,
8490         L::Target: Logger,
8491 {
8492         fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
8493                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8494                 // open_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
8495                 // change to the contents.
8496                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8497                         let res = self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8498                         let persist = match &res {
8499                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => {
8500                                         debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't close a new channel");
8501                                         NotifyOption::DoPersist
8502                                 },
8503                                 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8504                         };
8505                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8506                         persist
8507                 });
8508         }
8509
8510         fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
8511                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8512                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8513                          msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8514         }
8515
8516         fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
8517                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8518                 // accept_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
8519                 // change to the contents.
8520                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8521                         let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8522                         NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents
8523                 });
8524         }
8525
8526         fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
8527                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8528                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8529                          msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8530         }
8531
8532         fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
8533                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8534                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8535         }
8536
8537         fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
8538                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8539                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8540         }
8541
8542         fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
8543                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8544                 // channel_ready message - while the channel's state will change, any channel_ready message
8545                 // will ultimately be re-sent on startup and the `ChannelMonitor` won't be updated so we
8546                 // will not force-close the channel on startup.
8547                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8548                         let res = self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8549                         let persist = match &res {
8550                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8551                                 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8552                         };
8553                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8554                         persist
8555                 });
8556         }
8557
8558         fn handle_stfu(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Stfu) {
8559                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8560                         "Quiescence not supported".to_owned(),
8561                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8562         }
8563
8564         fn handle_splice(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Splice) {
8565                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8566                         "Splicing not supported".to_owned(),
8567                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8568         }
8569
8570         fn handle_splice_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceAck) {
8571                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8572                         "Splicing not supported (splice_ack)".to_owned(),
8573                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8574         }
8575
8576         fn handle_splice_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceLocked) {
8577                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8578                         "Splicing not supported (splice_locked)".to_owned(),
8579                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8580         }
8581
8582         fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
8583                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8584                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8585         }
8586
8587         fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
8588                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8589                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8590         }
8591
8592         fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
8593                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8594                 // update_add_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8595                 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8596                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8597                         let res = self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8598                         let persist = match &res {
8599                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8600                                 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8601                                 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8602                         };
8603                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8604                         persist
8605                 });
8606         }
8607
8608         fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
8609                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8610                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8611         }
8612
8613         fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
8614                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8615                 // update_fail_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8616                 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8617                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8618                         let res = self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8619                         let persist = match &res {
8620                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8621                                 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8622                                 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8623                         };
8624                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8625                         persist
8626                 });
8627         }
8628
8629         fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
8630                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8631                 // update_fail_malformed_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state
8632                 // only the `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8633                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8634                         let res = self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8635                         let persist = match &res {
8636                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8637                                 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8638                                 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8639                         };
8640                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8641                         persist
8642                 });
8643         }
8644
8645         fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
8646                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8647                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8648         }
8649
8650         fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
8651                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8652                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8653         }
8654
8655         fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
8656                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8657                 // update_fee message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8658                 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8659                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8660                         let res = self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8661                         let persist = match &res {
8662                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8663                                 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8664                                 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8665                         };
8666                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8667                         persist
8668                 });
8669         }
8670
8671         fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
8672                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8673                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8674         }
8675
8676         fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
8677                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8678                         if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
8679                                 persist
8680                         } else {
8681                                 NotifyOption::DoPersist
8682                         }
8683                 });
8684         }
8685
8686         fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
8687                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8688                         let res = self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8689                         let persist = match &res {
8690                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8691                                 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8692                                 Ok(persist) => *persist,
8693                         };
8694                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8695                         persist
8696                 });
8697         }
8698
8699         fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
8700                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
8701                         self, || NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents);
8702                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8703                 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8704                 let remove_peer = {
8705                         log_debug!(
8706                                 WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None),
8707                                 "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
8708                                 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id)
8709                         );
8710                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
8711                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8712                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8713                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8714                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
8715                                         let context = match phase {
8716                                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
8717                                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
8718                                                         if chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok() {
8719                                                                 // We only retain funded channels that are not shutdown.
8720                                                                 return true;
8721                                                         }
8722                                                         &mut chan.context
8723                                                 },
8724                                                 // Unfunded channels will always be removed.
8725                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
8726                                                         &mut chan.context
8727                                                 },
8728                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
8729                                                         &mut chan.context
8730                                                 },
8731                                         };
8732                                         // Clean up for removal.
8733                                         update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
8734                                         self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
8735                                         failed_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false));
8736                                         false
8737                                 });
8738                                 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
8739                                 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
8740                                 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
8741                                 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
8742                                         match msg {
8743                                                 // V1 Channel Establishment
8744                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
8745                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
8746                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
8747                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
8748                                                 // V2 Channel Establishment
8749                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
8750                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
8751                                                 // Common Channel Establishment
8752                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
8753                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
8754                                                 // Quiescence
8755                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendStfu { .. } => false,
8756                                                 // Splicing
8757                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSplice { .. } => false,
8758                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceAck { .. } => false,
8759                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceLocked { .. } => false,
8760                                                 // Interactive Transaction Construction
8761                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
8762                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
8763                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
8764                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
8765                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
8766                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
8767                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
8768                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
8769                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
8770                                                 // Channel Operations
8771                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
8772                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
8773                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
8774                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
8775                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
8776                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
8777                                                 // Gossip
8778                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
8779                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
8780                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
8781                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
8782                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
8783                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
8784                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
8785                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
8786                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
8787                                         }
8788                                 });
8789                                 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
8790                                 peer_state.is_connected = false;
8791                                 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
8792                         } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
8793                 };
8794                 if remove_peer {
8795                         per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
8796                 }
8797                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
8798
8799                 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
8800                         self.finish_close_channel(failure);
8801                 }
8802         }
8803
8804         fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
8805                 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None);
8806                 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
8807                         log_debug!(logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8808                         return Err(());
8809                 }
8810
8811                 let mut res = Ok(());
8812
8813                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8814                         // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
8815                         // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
8816                         // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
8817                         // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
8818                         let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
8819                         let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
8820
8821                         {
8822                                 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8823                                 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
8824                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
8825                                                 if inbound_peer_limited {
8826                                                         res = Err(());
8827                                                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8828                                                 }
8829                                                 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
8830                                                         channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8831                                                         inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8832                                                         latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
8833                                                         pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
8834                                                         in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8835                                                         monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
8836                                                         actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8837                                                         is_connected: true,
8838                                                 }));
8839                                         },
8840                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
8841                                                 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
8842                                                 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
8843
8844                                                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
8845                                                 if inbound_peer_limited &&
8846                                                         Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
8847                                                         peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
8848                                                 {
8849                                                         res = Err(());
8850                                                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8851                                                 }
8852
8853                                                 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
8854                                                 peer_state.is_connected = true;
8855                                         },
8856                                 }
8857                         }
8858
8859                         log_debug!(logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8860
8861                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8862                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
8863                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8864                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8865                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8866
8867                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(|(_, phase)|
8868                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else {
8869                                                 // Since unfunded channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer, and they're not persisted
8870                                                 // (so won't be recovered after a crash), they shouldn't exist here and we would never need to
8871                                                 // worry about closing and removing them.
8872                                                 debug_assert!(false);
8873                                                 None
8874                                         }
8875                                 ).for_each(|chan| {
8876                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
8877                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
8878                                                 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8879                                                 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger),
8880                                         });
8881                                 });
8882                         }
8883
8884                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
8885                         //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
8886                 });
8887                 res
8888         }
8889
8890         fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
8891                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8892
8893                 match &msg.data as &str {
8894                         "cannot co-op close channel w/ active htlcs"|
8895                         "link failed to shutdown" =>
8896                         {
8897                                 // LND hasn't properly handled shutdown messages ever, and force-closes any time we
8898                                 // send one while HTLCs are still present. The issue is tracked at
8899                                 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/6039 and has had multiple patches
8900                                 // to fix it but none so far have managed to land upstream. The issue appears to be
8901                                 // very low priority for the LND team despite being marked "P1".
8902                                 // We're not going to bother handling this in a sensible way, instead simply
8903                                 // repeating the Shutdown message on repeat until morale improves.
8904                                 if !msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
8905                                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8906                                         let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
8907                                         if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
8908                                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8909                                         if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&msg.channel_id) {
8910                                                 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_outbound_shutdown() {
8911                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
8912                                                                 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8913                                                                 msg,
8914                                                         });
8915                                                 }
8916                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
8917                                                         node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8918                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
8919                                                                 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
8920                                                                         channel_id: msg.channel_id,
8921                                                                         data: "You appear to be exhibiting LND bug 6039, we'll keep sending you shutdown messages until you handle them correctly".to_owned()
8922                                                                 },
8923                                                                 log_level: Level::Trace,
8924                                                         }
8925                                                 });
8926                                         }
8927                                 }
8928                                 return;
8929                         }
8930                         _ => {}
8931                 }
8932
8933                 if msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
8934                         let channel_ids: Vec<ChannelId> = {
8935                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8936                                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
8937                                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
8938                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8939                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8940                                 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
8941                                 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
8942                                 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
8943                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
8944                         };
8945                         for channel_id in channel_ids {
8946                                 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
8947                                 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
8948                         }
8949                 } else {
8950                         {
8951                                 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
8952                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8953                                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
8954                                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
8955                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8956                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8957                                 if let Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
8958                                         if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
8959                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
8960                                                         node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8961                                                         msg,
8962                                                 });
8963                                                 return;
8964                                         }
8965                                 }
8966                         }
8967
8968                         // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
8969                         let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
8970                 }
8971         }
8972
8973         fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
8974                 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
8975         }
8976
8977         fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
8978                 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
8979         }
8980
8981         fn get_chain_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
8982                 Some(vec![self.chain_hash])
8983         }
8984
8985         fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
8986                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8987                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8988                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8989         }
8990
8991         fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
8992                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8993                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8994                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8995         }
8996
8997         fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
8998                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8999                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9000                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9001         }
9002
9003         fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
9004                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9005                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9006                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9007         }
9008
9009         fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
9010                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9011                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9012                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9013         }
9014
9015         fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
9016                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9017                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9018                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9019         }
9020
9021         fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
9022                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9023                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9024                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9025         }
9026
9027         fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
9028                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9029                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9030                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9031         }
9032
9033         fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
9034                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9035                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9036                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9037         }
9038 }
9039
9040 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9041 OffersMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9042 where
9043         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9044         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9045         ES::Target: EntropySource,
9046         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9047         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9048         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9049         R::Target: Router,
9050         L::Target: Logger,
9051 {
9052         fn handle_message(&self, message: OffersMessage) -> Option<OffersMessage> {
9053                 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
9054                 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
9055
9056                 match message {
9057                         OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request) => {
9058                                 let amount_msats = match InvoiceBuilder::<DerivedSigningPubkey>::amount_msats(
9059                                         &invoice_request
9060                                 ) {
9061                                         Ok(amount_msats) => Some(amount_msats),
9062                                         Err(error) => return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
9063                                 };
9064                                 let invoice_request = match invoice_request.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
9065                                         Ok(invoice_request) => invoice_request,
9066                                         Err(()) => {
9067                                                 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidMetadata;
9068                                                 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
9069                                         },
9070                                 };
9071                                 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
9072
9073                                 match self.create_inbound_payment(amount_msats, relative_expiry, None) {
9074                                         Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) if invoice_request.keys.is_some() => {
9075                                                 let payment_paths = vec![
9076                                                         self.create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(payment_secret),
9077                                                 ];
9078                                                 #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
9079                                                 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys(
9080                                                         payment_paths, payment_hash
9081                                                 );
9082                                                 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
9083                                                 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
9084                                                         self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
9085                                                 );
9086                                                 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
9087                                                 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
9088                                                         payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
9089                                                 );
9090                                                 match builder.and_then(|b| b.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)) {
9091                                                         Ok(invoice) => Some(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
9092                                                         Err(error) => Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
9093                                                 }
9094                                         },
9095                                         Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => {
9096                                                 let payment_paths = vec![
9097                                                         self.create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(payment_secret),
9098                                                 ];
9099                                                 #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
9100                                                 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with(payment_paths, payment_hash);
9101                                                 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
9102                                                 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
9103                                                         self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
9104                                                 );
9105                                                 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
9106                                                 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with_no_std(
9107                                                         payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
9108                                                 );
9109                                                 let response = builder.and_then(|builder| builder.allow_mpp().build())
9110                                                         .map_err(|e| OffersMessage::InvoiceError(e.into()))
9111                                                         .and_then(|invoice|
9112                                                                 match invoice.sign(|invoice| self.node_signer.sign_bolt12_invoice(invoice)) {
9113                                                                         Ok(invoice) => Ok(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
9114                                                                         Err(SignError::Signing(())) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
9115                                                                                         InvoiceError::from_string("Failed signing invoice".to_string())
9116                                                                         )),
9117                                                                         Err(SignError::Verification(_)) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
9118                                                                                         InvoiceError::from_string("Failed invoice signature verification".to_string())
9119                                                                         )),
9120                                                                 });
9121                                                 match response {
9122                                                         Ok(invoice) => Some(invoice),
9123                                                         Err(error) => Some(error),
9124                                                 }
9125                                         },
9126                                         Err(()) => {
9127                                                 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount.into()))
9128                                         },
9129                                 }
9130                         },
9131                         OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice) => {
9132                                 match invoice.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
9133                                         Err(()) => {
9134                                                 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string("Unrecognized invoice".to_owned())))
9135                                         },
9136                                         Ok(_) if invoice.invoice_features().requires_unknown_bits_from(&self.bolt12_invoice_features()) => {
9137                                                 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(Bolt12SemanticError::UnknownRequiredFeatures.into()))
9138                                         },
9139                                         Ok(payment_id) => {
9140                                                 if let Err(e) = self.send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&invoice, payment_id) {
9141                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed paying invoice: {:?}", e);
9142                                                         Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string(format!("{:?}", e))))
9143                                                 } else {
9144                                                         None
9145                                                 }
9146                                         },
9147                                 }
9148                         },
9149                         OffersMessage::InvoiceError(invoice_error) => {
9150                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received invoice_error: {}", invoice_error);
9151                                 None
9152                         },
9153                 }
9154         }
9155
9156         fn release_pending_messages(&self) -> Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>> {
9157                 core::mem::take(&mut self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap())
9158         }
9159 }
9160
9161 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9162 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9163 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
9164         let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
9165         node_features.set_keysend_optional();
9166         node_features
9167 }
9168
9169 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9170 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9171 ///
9172 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
9173 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
9174 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
9175 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt11_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
9176         provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9177 }
9178
9179 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9180 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9181 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt12_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
9182         provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9183 }
9184
9185 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9186 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9187 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
9188         provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9189 }
9190
9191 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9192 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9193 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
9194         ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
9195 }
9196
9197 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9198 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9199 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
9200         // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
9201         // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
9202         // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
9203         let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
9204         features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
9205         features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
9206         features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
9207         features.set_static_remote_key_required();
9208         features.set_payment_secret_required();
9209         features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
9210         features.set_wumbo_optional();
9211         features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
9212         features.set_channel_type_optional();
9213         features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
9214         features.set_zero_conf_optional();
9215         if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
9216                 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
9217         }
9218         features
9219 }
9220
9221 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
9222 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
9223
9224 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
9225         (2, fee_base_msat, required),
9226         (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
9227         (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
9228 });
9229
9230 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
9231         (2, node_id, required),
9232         (4, features, required),
9233         (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
9234         (8, forwarding_info, option),
9235         (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9236         (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9237 });
9238
9239 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
9240         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9241                 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
9242                 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
9243                 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
9244                 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
9245                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9246                         (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
9247                         (2, self.channel_id, required),
9248                         (3, self.channel_type, option),
9249                         (4, self.counterparty, required),
9250                         (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
9251                         (6, self.funding_txo, option),
9252                         (7, self.config, option),
9253                         (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
9254                         (9, self.confirmations, option),
9255                         (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
9256                         (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
9257                         (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
9258                         (16, self.balance_msat, required),
9259                         (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
9260                         (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
9261                         (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
9262                         (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
9263                         (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
9264                         (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
9265                         (26, self.is_outbound, required),
9266                         (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
9267                         (30, self.is_usable, required),
9268                         (32, self.is_public, required),
9269                         (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9270                         (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9271                         (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
9272                         (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
9273                         (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
9274                 });
9275                 Ok(())
9276         }
9277 }
9278
9279 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
9280         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9281                 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9282                         (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
9283                         (2, channel_id, required),
9284                         (3, channel_type, option),
9285                         (4, counterparty, required),
9286                         (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
9287                         (6, funding_txo, option),
9288                         (7, config, option),
9289                         (8, short_channel_id, option),
9290                         (9, confirmations, option),
9291                         (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
9292                         (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
9293                         (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
9294                         (16, balance_msat, required),
9295                         (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
9296                         // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
9297                         // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
9298                         (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
9299                         (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
9300                         (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
9301                         (22, confirmations_required, option),
9302                         (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
9303                         (26, is_outbound, required),
9304                         (28, is_channel_ready, required),
9305                         (30, is_usable, required),
9306                         (32, is_public, required),
9307                         (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9308                         (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9309                         (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
9310                         (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
9311                         (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
9312                 });
9313
9314                 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
9315                 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
9316                 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
9317                 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
9318                         ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
9319
9320                 Ok(Self {
9321                         inbound_scid_alias,
9322                         channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
9323                         channel_type,
9324                         counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
9325                         outbound_scid_alias,
9326                         funding_txo,
9327                         config,
9328                         short_channel_id,
9329                         channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
9330                         unspendable_punishment_reserve,
9331                         user_channel_id,
9332                         balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
9333                         outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
9334                         next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
9335                         next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
9336                         inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
9337                         confirmations_required,
9338                         confirmations,
9339                         force_close_spend_delay,
9340                         is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
9341                         is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
9342                         is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
9343                         is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
9344                         inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
9345                         inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
9346                         feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
9347                         channel_shutdown_state,
9348                 })
9349         }
9350 }
9351
9352 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
9353         (2, channels, required_vec),
9354         (4, phantom_scid, required),
9355         (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
9356 });
9357
9358 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(BlindedForward, {
9359         (0, inbound_blinding_point, required),
9360 });
9361
9362 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
9363         (0, Forward) => {
9364                 (0, onion_packet, required),
9365                 (1, blinded, option),
9366                 (2, short_channel_id, required),
9367         },
9368         (1, Receive) => {
9369                 (0, payment_data, required),
9370                 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
9371                 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
9372                 (3, payment_metadata, option),
9373                 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
9374         },
9375         (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
9376                 (0, payment_preimage, required),
9377                 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
9378                 (3, payment_metadata, option),
9379                 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
9380                 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
9381         },
9382 ;);
9383
9384 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
9385         (0, routing, required),
9386         (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
9387         (4, payment_hash, required),
9388         (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
9389         (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
9390         (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
9391         (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9392 });
9393
9394
9395 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
9396         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9397                 match self {
9398                         HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
9399                                 0u8.write(writer)?;
9400                                 channel_id.write(writer)?;
9401                                 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
9402                                 reason.write(writer)?;
9403                         },
9404                         HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
9405                                 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
9406                         }) => {
9407                                 1u8.write(writer)?;
9408                                 channel_id.write(writer)?;
9409                                 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
9410                                 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
9411                                 failure_code.write(writer)?;
9412                         },
9413                 }
9414                 Ok(())
9415         }
9416 }
9417
9418 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
9419         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9420                 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9421                 match id {
9422                         0 => {
9423                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
9424                                         channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9425                                         htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9426                                         reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
9427                                 }))
9428                         },
9429                         1 => {
9430                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
9431                                         channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9432                                         htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9433                                         sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
9434                                         failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
9435                                 }))
9436                         },
9437                         // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
9438                         // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
9439                         // messages contained in the variants.
9440                         // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
9441                         // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
9442                         // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
9443                         2 => {
9444                                 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
9445                                 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
9446                                 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
9447                                 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
9448                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
9449                         },
9450                         3 => {
9451                                 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
9452                                 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
9453                                 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
9454                                 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
9455                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
9456                         },
9457                         _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
9458                 }
9459         }
9460 }
9461
9462 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
9463         (0, Forward),
9464         (1, Fail),
9465 );
9466
9467 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(BlindedFailure,
9468         (0, FromIntroductionNode) => {}, ;
9469 );
9470
9471 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
9472         (0, short_channel_id, required),
9473         (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
9474         (2, outpoint, required),
9475         (3, blinded_failure, option),
9476         (4, htlc_id, required),
9477         (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required),
9478         (7, user_channel_id, option),
9479 });
9480
9481 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
9482         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9483                 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
9484                         OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
9485                         OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
9486                 };
9487                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9488                         (0, self.prev_hop, required),
9489                         (1, self.total_msat, required),
9490                         (2, self.value, required),
9491                         (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
9492                         (4, payment_data, option),
9493                         (5, self.total_value_received, option),
9494                         (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
9495                         (8, keysend_preimage, option),
9496                         (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9497                 });
9498                 Ok(())
9499         }
9500 }
9501
9502 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
9503         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9504                 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9505                         (0, prev_hop, required),
9506                         (1, total_msat, option),
9507                         (2, value_ser, required),
9508                         (3, sender_intended_value, option),
9509                         (4, payment_data_opt, option),
9510                         (5, total_value_received, option),
9511                         (6, cltv_expiry, required),
9512                         (8, keysend_preimage, option),
9513                         (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9514                 });
9515                 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
9516                 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
9517                 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
9518                         Some(p) => {
9519                                 if payment_data.is_some() {
9520                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9521                                 }
9522                                 if total_msat.is_none() {
9523                                         total_msat = Some(value);
9524                                 }
9525                                 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
9526                         },
9527                         None => {
9528                                 if total_msat.is_none() {
9529                                         if payment_data.is_none() {
9530                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9531                                         }
9532                                         total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
9533                                 }
9534                                 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
9535                         },
9536                 };
9537                 Ok(Self {
9538                         prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
9539                         timer_ticks: 0,
9540                         value,
9541                         sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
9542                         total_value_received,
9543                         total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
9544                         onion_payload,
9545                         cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
9546                         counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
9547                 })
9548         }
9549 }
9550
9551 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
9552         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9553                 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9554                 match id {
9555                         0 => {
9556                                 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
9557                                 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
9558                                 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
9559                                 let mut payment_id = None;
9560                                 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
9561                                 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
9562                                 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9563                                         (0, session_priv, required),
9564                                         (1, payment_id, option),
9565                                         (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
9566                                         (4, path_hops, required_vec),
9567                                         (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
9568                                         (6, blinded_tail, option),
9569                                 });
9570                                 if payment_id.is_none() {
9571                                         // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
9572                                         // instead.
9573                                         payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
9574                                 }
9575                                 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
9576                                 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
9577                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9578                                 }
9579                                 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
9580                                         if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
9581                                                 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
9582                                                         *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9583                                                 }
9584                                         }
9585                                 }
9586                                 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
9587                                         session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
9588                                         first_hop_htlc_msat,
9589                                         path,
9590                                         payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
9591                                 })
9592                         }
9593                         1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
9594                         _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
9595                 }
9596         }
9597 }
9598
9599 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
9600         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
9601                 match self {
9602                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
9603                                 0u8.write(writer)?;
9604                                 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
9605                                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9606                                         (0, session_priv, required),
9607                                         (1, payment_id_opt, option),
9608                                         (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
9609                                         // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
9610                                         (4, path.hops, required_vec),
9611                                         (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
9612                                         (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
9613                                  });
9614                         }
9615                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
9616                                 1u8.write(writer)?;
9617                                 field.write(writer)?;
9618                         }
9619                 }
9620                 Ok(())
9621         }
9622 }
9623
9624 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
9625         (0, forward_info, required),
9626         (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
9627         (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
9628         (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
9629         (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
9630 });
9631
9632 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
9633         (1, FailHTLC) => {
9634                 (0, htlc_id, required),
9635                 (2, err_packet, required),
9636         };
9637         (0, AddHTLC)
9638 );
9639
9640 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
9641         (0, payment_secret, required),
9642         (2, expiry_time, required),
9643         (4, user_payment_id, required),
9644         (6, payment_preimage, required),
9645         (8, min_value_msat, required),
9646 });
9647
9648 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9649 where
9650         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9651         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9652         ES::Target: EntropySource,
9653         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9654         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9655         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9656         R::Target: Router,
9657         L::Target: Logger,
9658 {
9659         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9660                 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
9661
9662                 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
9663
9664                 self.chain_hash.write(writer)?;
9665                 {
9666                         let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
9667                         best_block.height().write(writer)?;
9668                         best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
9669                 }
9670
9671                 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
9672                 {
9673                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9674                         let mut number_of_funded_channels = 0;
9675                         for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9676                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9677                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9678                                 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
9679                                         serializable_peer_count += 1;
9680                                 }
9681
9682                                 number_of_funded_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(
9683                                         |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { chan.context.is_funding_broadcast() } else { false }
9684                                 ).count();
9685                         }
9686
9687                         (number_of_funded_channels as u64).write(writer)?;
9688
9689                         for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9690                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9691                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9692                                 for channel in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter_map(
9693                                         |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = phase {
9694                                                 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() { Some(channel) } else { None }
9695                                         } else { None }
9696                                 ) {
9697                                         channel.write(writer)?;
9698                                 }
9699                         }
9700                 }
9701
9702                 {
9703                         let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
9704                         (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9705                         for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
9706                                 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
9707                                 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9708                                 for forward in pending_forwards {
9709                                         forward.write(writer)?;
9710                                 }
9711                         }
9712                 }
9713
9714                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
9715
9716                 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
9717                 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
9718                 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
9719
9720                 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
9721                 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
9722                 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9723                 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
9724                         payment_hash.write(writer)?;
9725                         (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9726                         for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
9727                                 htlc.write(writer)?;
9728                         }
9729                         htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
9730                         htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
9731                 }
9732
9733                 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
9734                 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
9735                 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9736                         // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
9737                         // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
9738                         // per_peer_state lock at all.
9739                         peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
9740                 }
9741
9742                 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
9743                 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
9744                         // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
9745                         // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
9746                         // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
9747                         // no channels.
9748                         if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
9749                                 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
9750                                 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
9751                                 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
9752                                         monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
9753                                                 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
9754                                                 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
9755                                 }
9756                         }
9757                 }
9758
9759                 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
9760                 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
9761                 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
9762                 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
9763                 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
9764                 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
9765                         // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
9766                         // well save the space and not write any events here.
9767                         0u64.write(writer)?;
9768                 } else {
9769                         (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9770                         for (event, _) in events.iter() {
9771                                 event.write(writer)?;
9772                         }
9773                 }
9774
9775                 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
9776                 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
9777                 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
9778                 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
9779                 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
9780                 0u64.write(writer)?;
9781
9782                 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
9783                 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
9784                 // likely to be identical.
9785                 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
9786                 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
9787
9788                 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9789                 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
9790                         hash.write(writer)?;
9791                         pending_payment.write(writer)?;
9792                 }
9793
9794                 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
9795                 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
9796                 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
9797                         if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
9798                                 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
9799                         }
9800                 }
9801                 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
9802                 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
9803                         match outbound {
9804                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
9805                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
9806                                         for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
9807                                                 session_priv.write(writer)?;
9808                                         }
9809                                 }
9810                                 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {},
9811                                 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {},
9812                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
9813                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
9814                         }
9815                 }
9816
9817                 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
9818                 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
9819                 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
9820                         match outbound {
9821                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
9822                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
9823                                         pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
9824                                 },
9825                                 _ => {},
9826                         }
9827                 }
9828
9829                 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
9830                 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
9831                 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
9832                         pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
9833                 }
9834
9835                 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
9836                 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
9837                         // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
9838                         // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
9839                         pending_claiming_payments = None;
9840                 }
9841
9842                 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
9843                 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
9844                         for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
9845                                 if !updates.is_empty() {
9846                                         if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(HashMap::new()); }
9847                                         in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
9848                                 }
9849                         }
9850                 }
9851
9852                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9853                         (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
9854                         (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
9855                         (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
9856                         (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
9857                         (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
9858                         (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
9859                         (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
9860                         (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
9861                         (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
9862                         (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
9863                         (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
9864                         (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
9865                 });
9866
9867                 Ok(())
9868         }
9869 }
9870
9871 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
9872         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9873                 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
9874                 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
9875                         event.write(w)?;
9876                         action.write(w)?;
9877                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
9878                                 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
9879                                 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
9880                                 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
9881                                 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
9882                                 // check that the event is sane here.
9883                                 let event_encoded = event.encode();
9884                                 let event_read: Option<Event> =
9885                                         MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
9886                                 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
9887                         }
9888                 }
9889                 Ok(())
9890         }
9891 }
9892 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
9893         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9894                 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9895                 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
9896                 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
9897                         MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
9898                         len) as usize);
9899                 for _ in 0..len {
9900                         let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
9901                         let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
9902                         if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
9903                                 events.push_back((ev, action));
9904                         } else if action.is_some() {
9905                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9906                         }
9907                 }
9908                 Ok(events)
9909         }
9910 }
9911
9912 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
9913         (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
9914         (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
9915         (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
9916         (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
9917         (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
9918 );
9919
9920 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
9921 ///
9922 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
9923 /// is:
9924 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
9925 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
9926 ///    `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
9927 ///    This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
9928 ///    [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
9929 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
9930 ///    same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
9931 ///    [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
9932 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
9933 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
9934 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
9935 ///    Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
9936 ///    will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
9937 ///    the next step.
9938 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
9939 ///    [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
9940 ///
9941 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
9942 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
9943 ///
9944 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
9945 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
9946 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
9947 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
9948 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
9949 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
9950 ///
9951 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
9952 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9953 where
9954         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9955         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9956         ES::Target: EntropySource,
9957         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9958         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9959         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9960         R::Target: Router,
9961         L::Target: Logger,
9962 {
9963         /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
9964         pub entropy_source: ES,
9965
9966         /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
9967         pub node_signer: NS,
9968
9969         /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
9970         /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
9971         /// signing data.
9972         pub signer_provider: SP,
9973
9974         /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
9975         ///
9976         /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
9977         pub fee_estimator: F,
9978         /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
9979         ///
9980         /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
9981         /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
9982         /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
9983         pub chain_monitor: M,
9984
9985         /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
9986         /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
9987         /// force-closed during deserialization.
9988         pub tx_broadcaster: T,
9989         /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
9990         /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
9991         ///
9992         /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
9993         pub router: R,
9994         /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
9995         /// deserialization.
9996         pub logger: L,
9997         /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
9998         /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
9999         pub default_config: UserConfig,
10000
10001         /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
10002         /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
10003         ///
10004         /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
10005         /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
10006         /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
10007         /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
10008         ///
10009         /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
10010         /// this struct.
10011         ///
10012         /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
10013         pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>,
10014 }
10015
10016 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10017                 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
10018 where
10019         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10020         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10021         ES::Target: EntropySource,
10022         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10023         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10024         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10025         R::Target: Router,
10026         L::Target: Logger,
10027 {
10028         /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
10029         /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
10030         /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
10031         pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
10032                         mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>) -> Self {
10033                 Self {
10034                         entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
10035                         channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
10036                 }
10037         }
10038 }
10039
10040 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
10041 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
10042 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10043         ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
10044 where
10045         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10046         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10047         ES::Target: EntropySource,
10048         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10049         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10050         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10051         R::Target: Router,
10052         L::Target: Logger,
10053 {
10054         fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10055                 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
10056                 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
10057         }
10058 }
10059
10060 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10061         ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
10062 where
10063         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10064         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10065         ES::Target: EntropySource,
10066         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10067         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10068         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10069         R::Target: Router,
10070         L::Target: Logger,
10071 {
10072         fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10073                 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
10074
10075                 let chain_hash: ChainHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10076                 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10077                 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10078
10079                 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
10080
10081                 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10082                 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10083                 let mut funded_peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10084                 let mut outpoint_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10085                 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10086                 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
10087                 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
10088                 for _ in 0..channel_count {
10089                         let mut channel: Channel<SP> = Channel::read(reader, (
10090                                 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
10091                         ))?;
10092                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context);
10093                         let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10094                         funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
10095                         if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
10096                                 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
10097                                                 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
10098                                                 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
10099                                                 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
10100                                         // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
10101                                         log_error!(logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
10102                                         log_error!(logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
10103                                         if channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
10104                                                 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
10105                                                         &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
10106                                         }
10107                                         if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() {
10108                                                 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at holder commitment number {} but the ChannelManager is at holder commitment number {}.",
10109                                                         &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number());
10110                                         }
10111                                         if channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() {
10112                                                 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at revoked counterparty transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at revoked counterparty transaction number {}.",
10113                                                         &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
10114                                         }
10115                                         if channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() {
10116                                                 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at counterparty commitment transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at counterparty commitment transaction number {}.",
10117                                                         &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
10118                                         }
10119                                         let mut shutdown_result = channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
10120                                         if shutdown_result.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid.is_some() {
10121                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10122                                         }
10123                                         if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = shutdown_result.monitor_update {
10124                                                 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
10125                                                         counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
10126                                                 });
10127                                         }
10128                                         failed_htlcs.append(&mut shutdown_result.dropped_outbound_htlcs);
10129                                         channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
10130                                                 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
10131                                                 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
10132                                                 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
10133                                                 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10134                                                 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
10135                                         }, None));
10136                                         for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
10137                                                 let mut found_htlc = false;
10138                                                 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
10139                                                         if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
10140                                                 }
10141                                                 if !found_htlc {
10142                                                         // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
10143                                                         // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
10144                                                         // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
10145                                                         // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
10146                                                         // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
10147                                                         // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
10148                                                         // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
10149                                                         log_info!(logger,
10150                                                                 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
10151                                                                 &channel.context.channel_id(), &payment_hash);
10152                                                         failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
10153                                                 }
10154                                         }
10155                                 } else {
10156                                         log_info!(logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
10157                                                 &channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
10158                                                 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
10159                                         if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
10160                                                 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
10161                                         }
10162                                         if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
10163                                                 outpoint_to_peer.insert(funding_txo, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
10164                                         }
10165                                         match funded_peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
10166                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
10167                                                         let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
10168                                                         by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
10169                                                 },
10170                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
10171                                                         let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
10172                                                         by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
10173                                                         entry.insert(by_id_map);
10174                                                 }
10175                                         }
10176                                 }
10177                         } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
10178                                 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
10179                                 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
10180                                 // safely discard the channel.
10181                                 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false);
10182                                 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
10183                                         channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
10184                                         user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
10185                                         reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
10186                                         counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10187                                         channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
10188                                 }, None));
10189                         } else {
10190                                 log_error!(logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", &channel.context.channel_id());
10191                                 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10192                                 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10193                                 log_error!(logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10194                                 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10195                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10196                         }
10197                 }
10198
10199                 for (funding_txo, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10200                         if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
10201                                 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor);
10202                                 log_info!(logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
10203                                         &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10204                                 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
10205                                         update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
10206                                         counterparty_node_id: None,
10207                                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
10208                                 };
10209                                 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
10210                         }
10211                 }
10212
10213                 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
10214                 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10215                 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
10216                 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
10217                         let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
10218                         let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10219                         let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
10220                         for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
10221                                 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
10222                         }
10223                         forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
10224                 }
10225
10226                 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10227                 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
10228                 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
10229                         let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10230                         let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10231                         let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
10232                         for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
10233                                 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
10234                         }
10235                         claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
10236                 }
10237
10238                 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
10239                         PeerState {
10240                                 channel_by_id,
10241                                 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
10242                                 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
10243                                 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
10244                                 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10245                                 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
10246                                 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10247                                 is_connected: false,
10248                         }
10249                 };
10250
10251                 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10252                 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>)>()));
10253                 for _ in 0..peer_count {
10254                         let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
10255                         let peer_chans = funded_peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new());
10256                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
10257                         peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
10258                         per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
10259                 }
10260
10261                 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10262                 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
10263                         VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
10264                 for _ in 0..event_count {
10265                         match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
10266                                 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
10267                                 None => continue,
10268                         }
10269                 }
10270
10271                 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10272                 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
10273                         match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
10274                                 0 => {
10275                                         // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
10276                                         // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
10277                                         // on-startup monitor updates.
10278                                         let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
10279                                         let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
10280                                 }
10281                                 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
10282                         }
10283                 }
10284
10285                 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
10286                 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10287
10288                 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10289                 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
10290                 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
10291                         if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
10292                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10293                         }
10294                 }
10295
10296                 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10297                 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
10298                         HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
10299                 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
10300                         let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
10301                         let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
10302                                 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
10303                         };
10304                         if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
10305                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10306                         };
10307                 }
10308
10309                 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
10310                 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
10311                 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
10312                 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
10313                 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
10314                 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
10315                 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
10316                 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
10317                 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
10318                 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
10319                 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
10320                 let mut events_override = None;
10321                 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
10322                 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10323                         (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
10324                         (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
10325                         (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
10326                         (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
10327                         (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
10328                         (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
10329                         (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
10330                         (8, events_override, option),
10331                         (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
10332                         (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
10333                         (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
10334                         (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
10335                 });
10336                 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
10337                         fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10338                 }
10339
10340                 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
10341                         probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10342                 }
10343
10344                 if let Some(events) = events_override {
10345                         pending_events_read = events;
10346                 }
10347
10348                 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
10349                         pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
10350                 }
10351
10352                 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
10353                         pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
10354                 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
10355                         let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
10356                         for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
10357                                 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
10358                         }
10359                         pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
10360                 }
10361                 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
10362                         pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
10363                         retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
10364                 };
10365
10366                 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
10367                 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
10368                 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
10369                 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
10370                 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
10371                 //
10372                 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
10373                 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
10374                 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
10375                 //
10376                 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
10377                 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
10378                 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
10379                         ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
10380                          $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $logger: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
10381                         ) => { {
10382                                 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
10383                                 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
10384                                 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
10385                                         log_trace!($logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
10386                                                 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, &$funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10387                                         max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
10388                                         pending_background_events.push(
10389                                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
10390                                                         counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
10391                                                         funding_txo: $funding_txo,
10392                                                         update: update.clone(),
10393                                                 });
10394                                 }
10395                                 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
10396                                         // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
10397                                         // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
10398                                         // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
10399                                         pending_background_events.push(
10400                                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
10401                                                         counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
10402                                                         channel_id: $funding_txo.to_channel_id(),
10403                                                 });
10404                                 }
10405                                 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
10406                                         log_error!($logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
10407                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10408                                 }
10409                                 max_in_flight_update_id
10410                         } }
10411                 }
10412
10413                 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
10414                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
10415                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10416                         for phase in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
10417                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
10418                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context);
10419
10420                                         // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
10421                                         // discarded.
10422                                         let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10423                                         let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
10424                                                 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
10425                                         let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
10426                                         if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
10427                                                 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
10428                                                         max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
10429                                                                 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
10430                                                                         funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, ""));
10431                                                 }
10432                                         }
10433                                         if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
10434                                                 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
10435                                                 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
10436                                                 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
10437                                                         chan.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
10438                                                 log_error!(logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
10439                                                 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10440                                                 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10441                                                 log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10442                                                 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10443                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10444                                         }
10445                                 } else {
10446                                         // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
10447                                         // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
10448                                         debug_assert!(false);
10449                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10450                                 }
10451                         }
10452                 }
10453
10454                 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
10455                         for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
10456                                 let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(counterparty_id), Some(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
10457                                 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
10458                                         // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
10459                                         // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
10460                                         // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
10461                                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
10462                                                 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(HashMap::new()))
10463                                         });
10464                                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10465                                         handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
10466                                                 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, "closed ");
10467                                 } else {
10468                                         log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
10469                                         log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.",
10470                                                 &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10471                                         log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10472                                         log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10473                                         log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10474                                         log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10475                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10476                                 }
10477                         }
10478                 }
10479
10480                 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
10481                 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
10482
10483                 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
10484                 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
10485                 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
10486                 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
10487
10488                 {
10489                         // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
10490                         // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
10491                         // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
10492                         // corresponding `Channel` at all).
10493                         // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
10494                         // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
10495                         // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
10496                         // 0.0.102+
10497                         for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10498                                 let counterparty_opt = outpoint_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0);
10499                                 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
10500                                         let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor);
10501                                         for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
10502                                                 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
10503                                                         if path.hops.is_empty() {
10504                                                                 log_error!(logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
10505                                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10506                                                         }
10507
10508                                                         let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
10509                                                         let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
10510                                                         session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
10511                                                         match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
10512                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
10513                                                                         let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
10514                                                                         log_info!(logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
10515                                                                                 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), htlc.payment_hash);
10516                                                                 },
10517                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
10518                                                                         let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
10519                                                                         entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
10520                                                                                 retry_strategy: None,
10521                                                                                 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
10522                                                                                 payment_params: None,
10523                                                                                 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
10524                                                                                 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
10525                                                                                 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10526                                                                                 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10527                                                                                 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10528                                                                                 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10529                                                                                 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
10530                                                                                 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
10531                                                                                 total_msat: path_amt,
10532                                                                                 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
10533                                                                                 remaining_max_total_routing_fee_msat: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10534                                                                         });
10535                                                                         log_info!(logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
10536                                                                                 path_amt, &htlc.payment_hash,  log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
10537                                                                 }
10538                                                         }
10539                                                 }
10540                                         }
10541                                         for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
10542                                                 match htlc_source {
10543                                                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
10544                                                                 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
10545                                                                         info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
10546                                                                                 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
10547                                                                 };
10548                                                                 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
10549                                                                 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
10550                                                                 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
10551                                                                 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
10552                                                                 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
10553                                                                 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
10554                                                                         forwards.retain(|forward| {
10555                                                                                 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
10556                                                                                         if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
10557                                                                                                 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
10558                                                                                                         &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
10559                                                                                                 false
10560                                                                                         } else { true }
10561                                                                                 } else { true }
10562                                                                         });
10563                                                                         !forwards.is_empty()
10564                                                                 });
10565                                                                 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
10566                                                                         if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
10567                                                                                 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
10568                                                                                         &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
10569                                                                                 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
10570                                                                                         if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
10571                                                                                                 intercepted_id != ev_id
10572                                                                                         } else { true }
10573                                                                                 });
10574                                                                                 false
10575                                                                         } else { true }
10576                                                                 });
10577                                                         },
10578                                                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
10579                                                                 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
10580                                                                         let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
10581                                                                         // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
10582                                                                         // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
10583                                                                         // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
10584                                                                         // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
10585                                                                         // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
10586                                                                         // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
10587                                                                         // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
10588                                                                         // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
10589                                                                         let compl_action =
10590                                                                                 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
10591                                                                                         channel_funding_outpoint: monitor.get_funding_txo().0,
10592                                                                                         counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
10593                                                                                 };
10594                                                                         pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv,
10595                                                                                 path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &&logger);
10596                                                                         pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
10597                                                                 }
10598                                                         },
10599                                                 }
10600                                         }
10601                                 }
10602
10603                                 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
10604                                 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
10605                                 // payments.
10606                                 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
10607                                         .into_iter()
10608                                         .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
10609                                                 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
10610                                                         if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
10611                                                                 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
10612                                                                         // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
10613                                                                         // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
10614                                                                         // channel_id -> peer map entry).
10615                                                                         counterparty_opt.is_none(),
10616                                                                         counterparty_opt.cloned().or(monitor.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10617                                                                         monitor.get_funding_txo().0))
10618                                                         } else { None }
10619                                                 } else {
10620                                                         // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
10621                                                         // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
10622                                                         // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
10623                                                         // channel still live case here.
10624                                                         None
10625                                                 }
10626                                         });
10627                                 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
10628                                         pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
10629                                 }
10630                         }
10631                 }
10632
10633                 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
10634                         // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
10635                         // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
10636                         // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
10637                         // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
10638                         // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
10639                         pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
10640                                 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
10641                         }, None));
10642                 }
10643
10644                 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
10645                 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
10646
10647                 let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
10648                 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
10649                         if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
10650                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10651                         }
10652                         if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
10653                                 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
10654                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10655                                 }
10656                                 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
10657                                         purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
10658                                 {
10659                                         let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10660                                                 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
10661                                         });
10662                                         if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10663                                 }
10664                         } else {
10665                                 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
10666                                         let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10667                                                 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
10668                                         });
10669                                         if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10670                                 }
10671                         }
10672                 } else {
10673                         // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
10674                         // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
10675                         for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
10676                                 if htlcs.is_empty() {
10677                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10678                                 }
10679                                 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
10680                                         OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
10681                                                 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
10682                                                         events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
10683                                                                 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
10684                                                                         Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
10685                                                                         None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
10686                                                                                 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
10687                                                                                 Err(()) => {
10688                                                                                         log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", &payment_hash);
10689                                                                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10690                                                                                 }
10691                                                                         }
10692                                                                 },
10693                                                                 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
10694                                                         }
10695                                                 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10696                                         },
10697                                         OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
10698                                                 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
10699                                 };
10700                                 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10701                                         purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
10702                                 });
10703                         }
10704                 }
10705
10706                 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10707                 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10708
10709                 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
10710                         Ok(key) => key,
10711                         Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10712                 };
10713                 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
10714                         if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
10715                                 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
10716                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10717                         }
10718                 }
10719
10720                 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
10721                 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
10722                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10723                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10724                         for (chan_id, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
10725                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
10726                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context);
10727                                         if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
10728                                                 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
10729                                                 loop {
10730                                                         outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
10731                                                                 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &chain_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
10732                                                         if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
10733                                                 }
10734                                                 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
10735                                         } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
10736                                                 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
10737                                                 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
10738                                                 log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
10739                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10740                                         }
10741                                         if chan.context.is_usable() {
10742                                                 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
10743                                                         // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
10744                                                         // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
10745                                                         log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
10746                                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10747                                                 }
10748                                         }
10749                                 } else {
10750                                         // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
10751                                         // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
10752                                         debug_assert!(false);
10753                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10754                                 }
10755                         }
10756                 }
10757
10758                 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
10759
10760                 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10761                         for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
10762                                 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
10763                                         log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", &payment_hash);
10764                                         let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
10765                                         let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
10766                                         let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
10767                                         if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
10768                                                 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
10769                                                         .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
10770                                                 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
10771                                         }
10772                                         for claimable_htlc in &payment.htlcs {
10773                                                 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
10774
10775                                                 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
10776                                                 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
10777                                                 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
10778                                                 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
10779                                                 //
10780                                                 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
10781                                                 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
10782                                                 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
10783                                                 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
10784                                                 // reason to.
10785                                                 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
10786                                                 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
10787                                                 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
10788                                                 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
10789                                                 // restart.
10790                                                 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
10791                                                 if let Some(peer_node_id) = outpoint_to_peer.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
10792                                                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
10793                                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10794                                                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10795                                                         if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(channel)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
10796                                                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context);
10797                                                                 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
10798                                                         }
10799                                                 }
10800                                                 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
10801                                                         previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
10802                                                 }
10803                                         }
10804                                         pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
10805                                                 receiver_node_id,
10806                                                 payment_hash,
10807                                                 purpose: payment.purpose,
10808                                                 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
10809                                                 htlcs: payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect(),
10810                                                 sender_intended_total_msat: payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat),
10811                                         }, None));
10812                                 }
10813                         }
10814                 }
10815
10816                 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
10817                         if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
10818                                 for (channel_id, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
10819                                         let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), Some(*channel_id));
10820                                         for action in actions.iter() {
10821                                                 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
10822                                                         downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
10823                                                                 Some((blocked_node_id, blocked_channel_outpoint, blocking_action)), ..
10824                                                 } = action {
10825                                                         if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&blocked_node_id) {
10826                                                                 log_trace!(logger,
10827                                                                         "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
10828                                                                         blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id());
10829                                                                 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
10830                                                                         .entry(blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id())
10831                                                                         .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
10832                                                         } else {
10833                                                                 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
10834                                                                 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
10835                                                                 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
10836                                                                 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
10837                                                                 // anymore.
10838                                                         }
10839                                                 }
10840                                                 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately { .. } = action {
10841                                                         debug_assert!(false, "Non-event-generating channel freeing should not appear in our queue");
10842                                                 }
10843                                         }
10844                                 }
10845                                 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
10846                         } else {
10847                                 log_error!(WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), None), "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
10848                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10849                         }
10850                 }
10851
10852                 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
10853                         chain_hash,
10854                         fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
10855                         chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
10856                         tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
10857                         router: args.router,
10858
10859                         best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
10860
10861                         inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
10862                         pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
10863                         pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
10864                         pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
10865
10866                         forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
10867                         claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
10868                         outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
10869                         outpoint_to_peer: Mutex::new(outpoint_to_peer),
10870                         short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
10871                         fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
10872
10873                         probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
10874
10875                         our_network_pubkey,
10876                         secp_ctx,
10877
10878                         highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
10879
10880                         per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
10881
10882                         pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
10883                         pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
10884                         pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
10885                         total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
10886                         background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
10887
10888                         event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
10889                         needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
10890
10891                         funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
10892
10893                         pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
10894
10895                         entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
10896                         node_signer: args.node_signer,
10897                         signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
10898
10899                         logger: args.logger,
10900                         default_configuration: args.default_config,
10901                 };
10902
10903                 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
10904                         let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
10905                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
10906                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
10907                         channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
10908                 }
10909
10910                 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding) in pending_claims_to_replay {
10911                         // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
10912                         // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
10913                         // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
10914                         channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value),
10915                                 downstream_closed, true, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding);
10916                 }
10917
10918                 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
10919                 //connection or two.
10920
10921                 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
10922         }
10923 }
10924
10925 #[cfg(test)]
10926 mod tests {
10927         use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
10928         use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
10929         use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
10930         use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
10931         use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
10932         use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
10933         use crate::ln::ChannelId;
10934         use crate::ln::channelmanager::{create_recv_pending_htlc_info, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
10935         use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
10936         use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
10937         use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
10938         use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
10939         use crate::util::errors::APIError;
10940         use crate::util::test_utils;
10941         use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
10942         use crate::sign::EntropySource;
10943
10944         #[test]
10945         fn test_notify_limits() {
10946                 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
10947                 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
10948                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
10949                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
10950                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
10951                 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10952
10953                 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
10954                 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
10955                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10956                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10957                 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10958
10959                 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10960
10961                 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
10962                 // to connect messages with new values
10963                 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
10964                 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
10965                 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
10966                         &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
10967                 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
10968                         &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
10969
10970                 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
10971                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10972                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10973                 // ... but the last node should not.
10974                 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10975                 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
10976                 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10977                 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10978
10979                 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
10980                 // about the channel.
10981                 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
10982                 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
10983                 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10984
10985                 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
10986                 // parties.
10987                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
10988                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
10989                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
10990                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
10991                 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10992                 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10993
10994                 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
10995                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
10996                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
10997
10998                 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
10999                 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
11000                 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
11001                 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
11002                 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
11003                 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
11004
11005                 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
11006                 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
11007                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
11008                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
11009                 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11010                 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11011                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11012                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11013
11014                 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
11015                 // the channel info has updated.
11016                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
11017                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
11018                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11019                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11020                 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11021                 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11022         }
11023
11024         #[test]
11025         fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
11026                 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
11027                 // expected.
11028                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11029                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11030                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11031                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11032                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11033
11034                 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
11035                 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
11036                 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
11037                 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
11038
11039                 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
11040                 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
11041                 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
11042                 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
11043                 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
11044                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
11045                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
11046                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
11047                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11048                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11049                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11050                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
11051
11052                 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
11053                 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11054                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11055                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11056                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11057                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11058                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11059                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11060                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11061                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11062                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11063                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11064                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
11065                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11066                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11067                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11068                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11069                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11070                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11071                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11072                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11073                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11074                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
11075
11076                 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
11077                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
11078                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
11079                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11080                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11081                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11082                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
11083
11084                 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
11085                 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
11086                 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
11087                 // lightning messages manually.
11088                 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
11089                 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
11090                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
11091
11092                 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11093                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
11094                 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
11095                 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
11096                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11097                 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11098                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
11099                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11100                 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11101                 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
11102                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11103                 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11104                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
11105                 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
11106                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11107                 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11108                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
11109                 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11110                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11111                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
11112                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11113                 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
11114                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11115                 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11116                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
11117                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11118
11119                 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
11120                 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
11121                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11122                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
11123                 match events[0] {
11124                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
11125                                 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
11126                                 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
11127                                 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
11128                         },
11129                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11130                 }
11131                 match events[1] {
11132                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
11133                                 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
11134                                 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
11135                                 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
11136                         },
11137                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11138                 }
11139         }
11140
11141         #[test]
11142         fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
11143                 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
11144                 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
11145         }
11146
11147         fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
11148                 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
11149                 //      outbound regular payment fails as expected.
11150                 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
11151                 //      fails as expected.
11152                 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
11153                 //      payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
11154                 //      reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
11155                 //      secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
11156                 //      `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
11157                 //      payment secrets and reject otherwise.
11158                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11159                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11160                 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11161                 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
11162                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
11163                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11164                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11165                 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11166                 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11167
11168                 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
11169                 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
11170                 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
11171
11172                 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
11173                 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11174                         PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(),
11175                         TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false), 100_000);
11176                 let route = find_route(
11177                         &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11178                         None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11179                 ).unwrap();
11180                 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11181                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11182                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11183                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11184                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11185                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11186                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11187                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11188                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11189                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11190                 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
11191                 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
11192                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11193                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11194                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11195                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11196                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11197                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11198                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11199                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11200                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11201                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11202                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11203                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11204
11205                 // Finally, claim the original payment.
11206                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11207
11208                 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
11209                 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11210                 let route = find_route(
11211                         &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11212                         None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11213                 ).unwrap();
11214                 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11215                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11216                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11217                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11218                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11219                 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
11220                 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
11221                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
11222
11223                 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
11224                 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
11225                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
11226                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
11227                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11228                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11229                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11230                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11231                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11232                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11233                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11234                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11235                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11236                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11237                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11238                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11239                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11240                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11241                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11242                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11243                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11244                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11245                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11246                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11247
11248                 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
11249                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11250
11251                 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
11252                 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
11253                 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11254                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
11255                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11256                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11257                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11258                 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
11259                 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
11260                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
11261
11262                 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
11263                 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11264                         PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
11265                         100_000
11266                 );
11267                 let route = find_route(
11268                         &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11269                         None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11270                 ).unwrap();
11271                 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
11272                 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11273                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
11274                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11275                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11276                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11277                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11278                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11279                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11280                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11281                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11282                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11283                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11284                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11285                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11286                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11287                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11288                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11289                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11290                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11291                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11292                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11293                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11294
11295                 // Finally, claim the original payment.
11296                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11297         }
11298
11299         #[test]
11300         fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
11301                 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
11302                 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
11303                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11304                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11305                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11306                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11307
11308                 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
11309                 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11310
11311                 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
11312                 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11313                         PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
11314                 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
11315                 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
11316                 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11317                 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11318                 let route = find_route(
11319                         &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
11320                         nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11321                 ).unwrap();
11322
11323                 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11324                 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
11325                 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
11326                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
11327                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
11328                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
11329                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11330
11331                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11332                 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
11333                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11334                 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
11335                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11336                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11337                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
11338
11339                 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
11340         }
11341
11342         #[test]
11343         fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
11344                 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
11345                 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
11346                 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11347                 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
11348                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11349                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11350                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
11351                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11352
11353                 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
11354                 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11355
11356                 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
11357                 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11358                         PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
11359                 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
11360                 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
11361                 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11362                 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11363                 let route = find_route(
11364                         &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
11365                         nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11366                 ).unwrap();
11367
11368                 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11369                 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
11370                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
11371                 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
11372                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
11373                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
11374                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
11375                         PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
11376                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11377
11378                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11379                 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
11380                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11381                 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
11382                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11383                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11384                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
11385
11386                 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
11387         }
11388
11389         #[test]
11390         fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
11391                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
11392                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
11393                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
11394                 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11395
11396                 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11397                 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11398                 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11399                 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11400
11401                 // Marshall an MPP route.
11402                 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
11403                 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
11404                 route.paths.push(path);
11405                 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11406                 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
11407                 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
11408                 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
11409                 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
11410                 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
11411
11412                 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
11413                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
11414                 .unwrap_err() {
11415                         PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
11416                                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
11417                         },
11418                         _ => panic!("unexpected error")
11419                 }
11420         }
11421
11422         #[test]
11423         fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
11424                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11425                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11426                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11427                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11428
11429                 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11430
11431                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11432                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11433
11434                 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11435                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
11436                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11437                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
11438
11439                 {
11440                         // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
11441                         // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
11442                         let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
11443                         // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
11444                         assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
11445                         assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
11446                 }
11447
11448                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
11449
11450                 {
11451                         // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
11452                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
11453                 }
11454         }
11455
11456         #[test]
11457         fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
11458                 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
11459                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11460                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11461                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11462                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11463
11464                 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
11465                 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11466                         payment_secret,
11467                         total_msat: 100_000,
11468                 };
11469
11470                 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
11471                 // payment verification fails as expected.
11472                 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
11473                 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
11474                 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
11475                         Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
11476                         Err(()) => {
11477                                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
11478                         }
11479                 }
11480
11481                 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
11482                 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
11483         }
11484
11485         #[test]
11486         fn test_outpoint_to_peer_coverage() {
11487                 // Test that the `ChannelManager:outpoint_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
11488                 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
11489                 // the channel is successfully closed.
11490                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11491                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11492                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11493                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11494
11495                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11496                 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11497                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
11498                 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11499                 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
11500
11501                 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
11502                 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.txid().to_byte_array());
11503                 {
11504                         // Ensure that the `outpoint_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
11505                         // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
11506                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11507                         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11508                 }
11509
11510                 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
11511                 {
11512                         // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
11513                         // as it has the funding transaction.
11514                         let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11515                         assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11516                         assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
11517                 }
11518
11519                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11520
11521                 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11522
11523                 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
11524                 {
11525                         let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11526                         assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11527                         assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
11528                 }
11529                 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11530
11531                 {
11532                         // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as
11533                         // soon as it has the funding transaction.
11534                         let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11535                         assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11536                         assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
11537                 }
11538                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11539                 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11540                 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
11541                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11542                 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11543                 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
11544                 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
11545                 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
11546
11547                 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11548                 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
11549                 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11550                 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
11551
11552                 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11553                 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
11554                 {
11555                         // Assert that the channel is kept in the `outpoint_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
11556                         // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
11557                         // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
11558                         // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
11559                         let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11560                         assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11561                         assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
11562                 }
11563
11564                 {
11565                         // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
11566                         // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
11567                         // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
11568                         // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map.
11569                         let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11570                         assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11571                         assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
11572                 }
11573
11574                 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
11575                 {
11576                         // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
11577                         // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
11578                         // closing transaction).
11579                         // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map as it can be
11580                         // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
11581                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11582
11583                         // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s  `outpoint_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
11584                         // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
11585                         let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11586                         assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11587                         assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
11588                 }
11589
11590                 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11591
11592                 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
11593                 {
11594                         // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `outpoint_to_peer` map once
11595                         // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
11596                         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11597                 }
11598                 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11599
11600                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
11601                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
11602         }
11603
11604         fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
11605                 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
11606                 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11607         }
11608
11609         fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
11610                 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
11611                 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11612         }
11613
11614         fn check_channel_unavailable_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_channel_id: ChannelId, peer_node_id: PublicKey) {
11615                 let expected_message = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_channel_id, peer_node_id);
11616                 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11617         }
11618
11619         fn check_api_misuse_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
11620                 let expected_message = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_string();
11621                 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11622         }
11623
11624         fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
11625                 match res_err {
11626                         Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
11627                                 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
11628                         },
11629                         Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
11630                                 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
11631                         },
11632                         Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
11633                         Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
11634                 }
11635         }
11636
11637         #[test]
11638         fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
11639                 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
11640                 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
11641                 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
11642                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11643                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11644                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
11645                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11646
11647                 // Dummy values
11648                 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
11649                 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
11650                 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
11651
11652                 // Test the API functions.
11653                 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None), unkown_public_key);
11654
11655                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
11656
11657                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11658
11659                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11660
11661                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11662
11663                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
11664
11665                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
11666         }
11667
11668         #[test]
11669         fn test_api_calls_with_unavailable_channel() {
11670                 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` and a `channel_id`
11671                 // as input, behaves as expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is a known peer in the
11672                 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map, but the peer state doesn't contain a channel with
11673                 // the given `channel_id`.
11674                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11675                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11676                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
11677                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11678
11679                 let counterparty_node_id = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11680
11681                 // Dummy values
11682                 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
11683
11684                 // Test the API functions.
11685                 check_api_misuse_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, 42));
11686
11687                 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11688
11689                 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11690
11691                 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11692
11693                 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(InterceptId([0; 32]), &channel_id, counterparty_node_id, 1_000_000), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11694
11695                 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&counterparty_node_id, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11696         }
11697
11698         #[test]
11699         fn test_connection_limiting() {
11700                 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
11701                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11702                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11703                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11704                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11705
11706                 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11707
11708                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11709                 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11710
11711                 let mut funding_tx = None;
11712                 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
11713                         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11714                         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11715
11716                         if idx == 0 {
11717                                 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
11718                                 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
11719                                 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
11720                                 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
11721                                 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11722
11723                                 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
11724                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11725                                 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11726
11727                                 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11728
11729                                 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
11730                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11731                                 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11732                         }
11733                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11734                 }
11735
11736                 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
11737                 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11738                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11739                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11740                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11741
11742                 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
11743                 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
11744                 // limit.
11745                 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
11746                 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
11747                         let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11748                                 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11749                         peer_pks.push(random_pk);
11750                         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11751                                 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11752                         }, true).unwrap();
11753                 }
11754                 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11755                         &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11756                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11757                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11758                 }, true).unwrap_err();
11759
11760                 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
11761                 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
11762                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11763                 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11764                 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
11765                 for ev in chan_closed_events {
11766                         if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
11767                 }
11768                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11769                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11770                 }, true).unwrap();
11771                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11772                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11773                 }, true).unwrap_err();
11774
11775                 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
11776                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11777                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11778                 }, false).unwrap();
11779                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11780
11781                 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
11782                 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
11783                 // open channels.
11784                 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
11785                 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
11786                         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
11787                         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
11788                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11789                 }
11790                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11791                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
11792                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11793
11794                 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
11795                 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11796                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
11797
11798                 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
11799                 // "protected" and can connect again.
11800                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
11801                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11802                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11803                 }, true).unwrap();
11804                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11805
11806                 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
11807                 // last_random_pk.
11808                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11809                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
11810         }
11811
11812         #[test]
11813         fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
11814                 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
11815                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11816                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11817                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11818                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11819
11820                 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11821
11822                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11823                 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11824
11825                 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
11826                         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11827                         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11828                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11829                 }
11830
11831                 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
11832                 // rejected.
11833                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11834                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11835                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11836
11837                 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
11838                 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11839                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11840
11841                 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
11842                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11843                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11844                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11845         }
11846
11847         #[test]
11848         fn test_0conf_limiting() {
11849                 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
11850                 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
11851                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11852                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11853                 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
11854                 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
11855                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
11856                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11857
11858                 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11859
11860                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11861                 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11862
11863                 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
11864                 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
11865                         let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11866                                 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11867                         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11868                                 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11869                         }, true).unwrap();
11870
11871                         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11872                         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11873                         match events[0] {
11874                                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11875                                         nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
11876                                 }
11877                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11878                         }
11879                         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
11880                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11881                 }
11882
11883                 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
11884                 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11885                         &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11886                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11887                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11888                 }, true).unwrap();
11889                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11890                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11891                 match events[0] {
11892                         Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11893                                 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
11894                                         Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
11895                                                 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
11896                                         _ => panic!(),
11897                                 }
11898                         }
11899                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11900                 }
11901                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
11902                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11903
11904                 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
11905                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11906                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11907                 match events[0] {
11908                         Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11909                                 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
11910                         }
11911                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11912                 }
11913                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
11914         }
11915
11916         #[test]
11917         fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
11918                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
11919                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
11920                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
11921                 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11922                 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
11923                 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
11924                 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
11925                         amt_msat: 100,
11926                         outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
11927                         payment_metadata: None,
11928                         keysend_preimage: None,
11929                         payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11930                                 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
11931                         }),
11932                         custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
11933                 };
11934                 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
11935                 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
11936                 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
11937                 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundOnionErr { err_code, .. }) =
11938                         create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
11939                                 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
11940                                 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
11941                 {
11942                         assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
11943                 } else { panic!(); }
11944
11945                 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
11946                 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
11947                         amt_msat: 100,
11948                         outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
11949                         payment_metadata: None,
11950                         keysend_preimage: None,
11951                         payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11952                                 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
11953                         }),
11954                         custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
11955                 };
11956                 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
11957                 assert!(create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
11958                         sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
11959                         current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend).is_ok());
11960         }
11961
11962         #[test]
11963         fn test_final_incorrect_cltv(){
11964                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
11965                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
11966                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
11967                 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11968
11969                 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
11970                 let result = create_recv_pending_htlc_info(msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
11971                         amt_msat: 100,
11972                         outgoing_cltv_value: 22,
11973                         payment_metadata: None,
11974                         keysend_preimage: None,
11975                         payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11976                                 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: 100,
11977                         }),
11978                         custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
11979                 }, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]), 100, 23, None, true, None, current_height,
11980                         node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend);
11981
11982                 // Should not return an error as this condition:
11983                 // https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/4dcc377209509b13cf89a4b91fde7d478f5b46d8/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L334
11984                 // is not satisfied.
11985                 assert!(result.is_ok());
11986         }
11987
11988         #[test]
11989         fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
11990                 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
11991                 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
11992                 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11993                 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
11994
11995                 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
11996                 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
11997
11998                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
11999                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
12000                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
12001                         &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
12002                 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12003
12004                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12005                 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12006
12007                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12008                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
12009                 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12010                 match &msg_events[0] {
12011                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
12012                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12013                                 match action {
12014                                         ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
12015                                                 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
12016                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
12017                                 }
12018                         }
12019                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12020                 }
12021
12022                 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12023                 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12024                 match events[0] {
12025                         Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
12026                                 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
12027                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12028                 }
12029                 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12030         }
12031
12032         #[test]
12033         fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
12034                 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
12035                 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
12036                 // the channel without the anchors feature.
12037                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12038                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12039                 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
12040                 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
12041                 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
12042                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
12043                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12044
12045                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None, None).unwrap();
12046                 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12047                 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
12048
12049                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12050                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12051                 match events[0] {
12052                         Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12053                                 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12054                         }
12055                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12056                 }
12057
12058                 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12059                 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
12060
12061                 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12062                 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
12063
12064                 // Since nodes[1] should not have accepted the channel, it should
12065                 // not have generated any events.
12066                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
12067         }
12068
12069         #[test]
12070         fn test_update_channel_config() {
12071                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12072                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12073                 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
12074                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
12075                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12076                 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12077                 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
12078
12079                 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
12080                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12081                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12082
12083                 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
12084                 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
12085                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
12086                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12087                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12088                 match &events[0] {
12089                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12090                         _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12091                 }
12092
12093                 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
12094                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12095                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12096
12097                 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
12098                 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12099                         cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
12100                         ..Default::default()
12101                 }).unwrap();
12102                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
12103                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12104                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12105                 match &events[0] {
12106                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12107                         _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12108                 }
12109
12110                 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
12111                 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12112                         forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
12113                         ..Default::default()
12114                 }).unwrap();
12115                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
12116                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
12117                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12118                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12119                 match &events[0] {
12120                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12121                         _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12122                 }
12123
12124                 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
12125                 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
12126                 let bad_channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_txid(&[10; 32], 10);
12127                 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
12128                 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
12129                 assert!(
12130                         matches!(
12131                                 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12132                                         forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
12133                                         ..Default::default()
12134                                 }),
12135                                 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
12136                         )
12137                 );
12138                 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
12139                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
12140                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12141                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12142         }
12143
12144         #[test]
12145         fn test_payment_display() {
12146                 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
12147                 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12148                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
12149                 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_hash), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12150                 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12151                 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_preimage), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12152         }
12153
12154         #[test]
12155         fn test_trigger_lnd_force_close() {
12156                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12157                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12158                 let user_config = test_default_channel_config();
12159                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
12160                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12161
12162                 // Open a channel, immediately disconnect each other, and broadcast Alice's latest state.
12163                 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12164                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12165                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12166                 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12167                 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
12168                 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
12169                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12170                 {
12171                         let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
12172                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
12173                         check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
12174                 }
12175
12176                 // Since they're disconnected, Bob won't receive Alice's `Error` message. Reconnect them
12177                 // such that Bob sends a `ChannelReestablish` to Alice since the channel is still open from
12178                 // their side.
12179                 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12180                         features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12181                 }, true).unwrap();
12182                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12183                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12184                 }, false).unwrap();
12185                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
12186                 let channel_reestablish = get_event_msg!(
12187                         nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()
12188                 );
12189                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channel_reestablish);
12190
12191                 // Alice should respond with an error since the channel isn't known, but a bogus
12192                 // `ChannelReestablish` should be sent first, such that we actually trigger Bob to force
12193                 // close even if it was an lnd node.
12194                 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12195                 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
12196                 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { node_id, msg } = &msg_events[0] {
12197                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12198                         assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 0);
12199                         assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
12200                         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
12201                 } else { panic!() };
12202                 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
12203                 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
12204                 let expected_close_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
12205                         err: "Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_string()
12206                 };
12207                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, expected_close_reason, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12208                 {
12209                         let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
12210                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
12211                         check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
12212                 }
12213         }
12214 }
12215
12216 #[cfg(ldk_bench)]
12217 pub mod bench {
12218         use crate::chain::Listen;
12219         use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
12220         use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
12221         use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
12222         use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
12223         use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
12224         use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
12225         use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
12226         use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
12227         use crate::util::test_utils;
12228         use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
12229
12230         use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
12231         use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
12232         use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
12233         use bitcoin::{Block, Transaction, TxOut};
12234
12235         use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
12236
12237         use criterion::Criterion;
12238
12239         type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
12240                 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
12241                         &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
12242                         &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
12243                 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
12244                 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
12245                 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
12246
12247         struct ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
12248                 node: &'node_cfg Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>,
12249         }
12250         impl<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg, P> {
12251                 type CM = Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>;
12252                 #[inline]
12253                 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P> { self.node }
12254                 #[inline]
12255                 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
12256         }
12257
12258         pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
12259                 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
12260         }
12261
12262         pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
12263                 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
12264                 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
12265                 // calls per node.
12266                 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
12267                 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
12268
12269                 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
12270                 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
12271                 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
12272                 let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
12273                 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
12274
12275                 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
12276                 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
12277                 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
12278
12279                 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
12280                 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
12281                 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
12282                 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
12283                         network,
12284                         best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
12285                 }, genesis_block.header.time);
12286                 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
12287
12288                 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
12289                 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
12290                 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
12291                 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
12292                 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
12293                         network,
12294                         best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
12295                 }, genesis_block.header.time);
12296                 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
12297
12298                 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
12299                         features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12300                 }, true).unwrap();
12301                 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
12302                         features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12303                 }, false).unwrap();
12304                 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12305                 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12306                 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12307
12308                 let tx;
12309                 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
12310                         tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
12311                                 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
12312                         }]};
12313                         node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
12314                 } else { panic!(); }
12315
12316                 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12317                 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12318                 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
12319                 match events_b[0] {
12320                         Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12321                                 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12322                         },
12323                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12324                 }
12325
12326                 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12327                 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12328                 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
12329                 match events_a[0] {
12330                         Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12331                                 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
12332                         },
12333                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12334                 }
12335
12336                 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
12337
12338                 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), 42, vec![tx]);
12339                 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
12340                 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
12341
12342                 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12343                 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12344                 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
12345                 match msg_events[0] {
12346                         MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
12347                                 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
12348                                 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12349                         },
12350                         _ => panic!(),
12351                 }
12352                 match msg_events[1] {
12353                         MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12354                         _ => panic!(),
12355                 }
12356
12357                 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12358                 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
12359                 match events_a[0] {
12360                         Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12361                                 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
12362                         },
12363                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12364                 }
12365
12366                 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12367                 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
12368                 match events_b[0] {
12369                         Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12370                                 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12371                         },
12372                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12373                 }
12374
12375                 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
12376                 macro_rules! send_payment {
12377                         ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
12378                                 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
12379                                         .with_bolt11_features($node_b.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
12380                                 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
12381                                 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
12382                                 payment_count += 1;
12383                                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
12384                                 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
12385
12386                                 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
12387                                         PaymentId(payment_hash.0),
12388                                         RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000),
12389                                         Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
12390                                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
12391                                 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12392                                 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
12393                                 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
12394                                 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
12395                                 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
12396                                 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12397
12398                                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
12399                                 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
12400                                 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
12401                                 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
12402
12403                                 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
12404                                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
12405                                                 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
12406                                                 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
12407                                                 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
12408                                         },
12409                                         _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
12410                                 }
12411
12412                                 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
12413                                 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
12414                                 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
12415                                 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12416
12417                                 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
12418                         }
12419                 }
12420
12421                 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
12422                         send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
12423                         send_payment!(node_b, node_a);
12424                 }));
12425         }
12426 }