1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see routing::router::get_route for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
27 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
29 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
37 use chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, Watch, BestBlock};
38 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator};
39 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
40 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
41 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
42 // construct one themselves.
43 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
44 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
45 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
46 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RoutePath, RouteParameters};
48 use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
50 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT, OptionalField};
51 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner, Recipient};
52 use util::config::UserConfig;
53 use util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
54 use util::{byte_utils, events};
55 use util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
56 use util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer};
57 use util::logger::{Level, Logger};
58 use util::errors::APIError;
63 use core::cell::RefCell;
65 use sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
66 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
67 use core::time::Duration;
70 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
71 use std::time::Instant;
74 use alloc::string::ToString;
75 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
76 use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
77 use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
78 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
79 use chain::keysinterface::{KeyMaterial, KeysInterface, Sign};
80 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
81 use ln::channelmanager::APIError;
83 use ln::msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
84 use util::chacha20::ChaCha20;
85 use util::crypto::hkdf_extract_expand_thrice;
86 use util::logger::Logger;
88 use core::convert::TryInto;
91 const IV_LEN: usize = 16;
92 const METADATA_LEN: usize = 16;
93 const METADATA_KEY_LEN: usize = 32;
94 const AMT_MSAT_LEN: usize = 8;
95 // Used to shift the payment type bits to take up the top 3 bits of the metadata bytes, or to
96 // retrieve said payment type bits.
97 const METHOD_TYPE_OFFSET: usize = 5;
99 /// A set of keys that were HKDF-expanded from an initial call to
100 /// [`KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material`].
102 /// [`KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material`]: crate::chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material
103 pub(super) struct ExpandedKey {
104 /// The key used to encrypt the bytes containing the payment metadata (i.e. the amount and
105 /// expiry, included for payment verification on decryption).
106 metadata_key: [u8; 32],
107 /// The key used to authenticate an LDK-provided payment hash and metadata as previously
108 /// registered with LDK.
109 ldk_pmt_hash_key: [u8; 32],
110 /// The key used to authenticate a user-provided payment hash and metadata as previously
111 /// registered with LDK.
112 user_pmt_hash_key: [u8; 32],
116 pub(super) fn new(key_material: &KeyMaterial) -> ExpandedKey {
117 let (metadata_key, ldk_pmt_hash_key, user_pmt_hash_key) =
118 hkdf_extract_expand_thrice(b"LDK Inbound Payment Key Expansion", &key_material.0);
133 fn from_bits(bits: u8) -> Result<Method, u8> {
135 bits if bits == Method::LdkPaymentHash as u8 => Ok(Method::LdkPaymentHash),
136 bits if bits == Method::UserPaymentHash as u8 => Ok(Method::UserPaymentHash),
137 unknown => Err(unknown),
142 pub(super) fn create<Signer: Sign, K: Deref>(keys: &ExpandedKey, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, keys_manager: &K, highest_seen_timestamp: u64) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()>
143 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>
145 let metadata_bytes = construct_metadata_bytes(min_value_msat, Method::LdkPaymentHash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, highest_seen_timestamp)?;
147 let mut iv_bytes = [0 as u8; IV_LEN];
148 let rand_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
149 iv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&rand_bytes[..IV_LEN]);
151 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&keys.ldk_pmt_hash_key);
152 hmac.input(&iv_bytes);
153 hmac.input(&metadata_bytes);
154 let payment_preimage_bytes = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
156 let ldk_pmt_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_bytes).into_inner());
157 let payment_secret = construct_payment_secret(&iv_bytes, &metadata_bytes, &keys.metadata_key);
158 Ok((ldk_pmt_hash, payment_secret))
161 pub(super) fn create_from_hash(keys: &ExpandedKey, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, payment_hash: PaymentHash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, highest_seen_timestamp: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
162 let metadata_bytes = construct_metadata_bytes(min_value_msat, Method::UserPaymentHash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, highest_seen_timestamp)?;
164 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&keys.user_pmt_hash_key);
165 hmac.input(&metadata_bytes);
166 hmac.input(&payment_hash.0);
167 let hmac_bytes = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
169 let mut iv_bytes = [0 as u8; IV_LEN];
170 iv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&hmac_bytes[..IV_LEN]);
172 Ok(construct_payment_secret(&iv_bytes, &metadata_bytes, &keys.metadata_key))
175 fn construct_metadata_bytes(min_value_msat: Option<u64>, payment_type: Method, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, highest_seen_timestamp: u64) -> Result<[u8; METADATA_LEN], ()> {
176 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
180 let mut min_amt_msat_bytes: [u8; AMT_MSAT_LEN] = match min_value_msat {
181 Some(amt) => amt.to_be_bytes(),
182 None => [0; AMT_MSAT_LEN],
184 min_amt_msat_bytes[0] |= (payment_type as u8) << METHOD_TYPE_OFFSET;
186 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time - it's updated when
187 // we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in a header. It should never be more
188 // than two hours in the future. Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we
189 // absolutely never fail a payment too early.
190 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date timestamps.
191 let expiry_bytes = (highest_seen_timestamp + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200).to_be_bytes();
193 let mut metadata_bytes: [u8; METADATA_LEN] = [0; METADATA_LEN];
194 metadata_bytes[..AMT_MSAT_LEN].copy_from_slice(&min_amt_msat_bytes);
195 metadata_bytes[AMT_MSAT_LEN..].copy_from_slice(&expiry_bytes);
200 fn construct_payment_secret(iv_bytes: &[u8; IV_LEN], metadata_bytes: &[u8; METADATA_LEN], metadata_key: &[u8; METADATA_KEY_LEN]) -> PaymentSecret {
201 let mut payment_secret_bytes: [u8; 32] = [0; 32];
202 let (iv_slice, encrypted_metadata_slice) = payment_secret_bytes.split_at_mut(IV_LEN);
203 iv_slice.copy_from_slice(iv_bytes);
205 let chacha_block = ChaCha20::get_single_block(metadata_key, iv_bytes);
206 for i in 0..METADATA_LEN {
207 encrypted_metadata_slice[i] = chacha_block[i] ^ metadata_bytes[i];
209 PaymentSecret(payment_secret_bytes)
212 /// Check that an inbound payment's `payment_data` field is sane.
214 /// LDK does not store any data for pending inbound payments. Instead, we construct our payment
215 /// secret (and, if supplied by LDK, our payment preimage) to include encrypted metadata about the
218 /// The metadata is constructed as:
219 /// payment method (3 bits) || payment amount (8 bytes - 3 bits) || expiry (8 bytes)
220 /// and encrypted using a key derived from [`KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material`].
222 /// Then on payment receipt, we verify in this method that the payment preimage and payment secret
223 /// match what was constructed.
225 /// [`create_inbound_payment`] and [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] are called by the user to
226 /// construct the payment secret and/or payment hash that this method is verifying. If the former
227 /// method is called, then the payment method bits mentioned above are represented internally as
228 /// [`Method::LdkPaymentHash`]. If the latter, [`Method::UserPaymentHash`].
230 /// For the former method, the payment preimage is constructed as an HMAC of payment metadata and
231 /// random bytes. Because the payment secret is also encoded with these random bytes and metadata
232 /// (with the metadata encrypted with a block cipher), we're able to authenticate the preimage on
235 /// For the latter, the payment secret instead contains an HMAC of the user-provided payment hash
236 /// and payment metadata (encrypted with a block cipher), allowing us to authenticate the payment
237 /// hash and metadata on payment receipt.
239 /// See [`ExpandedKey`] docs for more info on the individual keys used.
241 /// [`KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material`]: crate::chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material
242 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_inbound_payment
243 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
244 pub(super) fn verify<L: Deref>(payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData, highest_seen_timestamp: u64, keys: &ExpandedKey, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<PaymentPreimage>, ()>
245 where L::Target: Logger
247 let (iv_bytes, metadata_bytes) = decrypt_metadata(payment_data.payment_secret, keys);
249 let payment_type_res = Method::from_bits((metadata_bytes[0] & 0b1110_0000) >> METHOD_TYPE_OFFSET);
250 let mut amt_msat_bytes = [0; AMT_MSAT_LEN];
251 amt_msat_bytes.copy_from_slice(&metadata_bytes[..AMT_MSAT_LEN]);
252 // Zero out the bits reserved to indicate the payment type.
253 amt_msat_bytes[0] &= 0b00011111;
254 let min_amt_msat: u64 = u64::from_be_bytes(amt_msat_bytes.into());
255 let expiry = u64::from_be_bytes(metadata_bytes[AMT_MSAT_LEN..].try_into().unwrap());
257 // Make sure to check to check the HMAC before doing the other checks below, to mitigate timing
259 let mut payment_preimage = None;
260 match payment_type_res {
261 Ok(Method::UserPaymentHash) => {
262 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&keys.user_pmt_hash_key);
263 hmac.input(&metadata_bytes[..]);
264 hmac.input(&payment_hash.0);
265 if !fixed_time_eq(&iv_bytes, &Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner().split_at_mut(IV_LEN).0) {
266 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash {}: unexpected payment_secret", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
270 Ok(Method::LdkPaymentHash) => {
271 match derive_ldk_payment_preimage(payment_hash, &iv_bytes, &metadata_bytes, keys) {
272 Ok(preimage) => payment_preimage = Some(preimage),
273 Err(bad_preimage_bytes) => {
274 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} due to mismatching preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(bad_preimage_bytes));
279 Err(unknown_bits) => {
280 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment hash {} due to unknown payment type {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), unknown_bits);
285 if payment_data.total_msat < min_amt_msat {
286 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} due to total_msat {} being less than the minimum amount of {} msat", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, min_amt_msat);
290 if expiry < highest_seen_timestamp {
291 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {}: expired payment", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
298 pub(super) fn get_payment_preimage(payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret, keys: &ExpandedKey) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
299 let (iv_bytes, metadata_bytes) = decrypt_metadata(payment_secret, keys);
301 match Method::from_bits((metadata_bytes[0] & 0b1110_0000) >> METHOD_TYPE_OFFSET) {
302 Ok(Method::LdkPaymentHash) => {
303 derive_ldk_payment_preimage(payment_hash, &iv_bytes, &metadata_bytes, keys)
304 .map_err(|bad_preimage_bytes| APIError::APIMisuseError {
305 err: format!("Payment hash {} did not match decoded preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(bad_preimage_bytes))
308 Ok(Method::UserPaymentHash) => Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
309 err: "Expected payment type to be LdkPaymentHash, instead got UserPaymentHash".to_string()
311 Err(other) => Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Unknown payment type: {}", other) }),
315 fn decrypt_metadata(payment_secret: PaymentSecret, keys: &ExpandedKey) -> ([u8; IV_LEN], [u8; METADATA_LEN]) {
316 let mut iv_bytes = [0; IV_LEN];
317 let (iv_slice, encrypted_metadata_bytes) = payment_secret.0.split_at(IV_LEN);
318 iv_bytes.copy_from_slice(iv_slice);
320 let chacha_block = ChaCha20::get_single_block(&keys.metadata_key, &iv_bytes);
321 let mut metadata_bytes: [u8; METADATA_LEN] = [0; METADATA_LEN];
322 for i in 0..METADATA_LEN {
323 metadata_bytes[i] = chacha_block[i] ^ encrypted_metadata_bytes[i];
326 (iv_bytes, metadata_bytes)
329 // Errors if the payment preimage doesn't match `payment_hash`. Returns the bad preimage bytes in
331 fn derive_ldk_payment_preimage(payment_hash: PaymentHash, iv_bytes: &[u8; IV_LEN], metadata_bytes: &[u8; METADATA_LEN], keys: &ExpandedKey) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, [u8; 32]> {
332 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&keys.ldk_pmt_hash_key);
333 hmac.input(iv_bytes);
334 hmac.input(metadata_bytes);
335 let decoded_payment_preimage = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
336 if !fixed_time_eq(&payment_hash.0, &Sha256::hash(&decoded_payment_preimage).into_inner()) {
337 return Err(decoded_payment_preimage);
339 return Ok(PaymentPreimage(decoded_payment_preimage))
343 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
345 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
346 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
347 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
349 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
350 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
351 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
352 // before we forward it.
354 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
355 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
356 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
357 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
358 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
360 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
361 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
363 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
364 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
367 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
368 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
369 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
372 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
373 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
377 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
378 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
379 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
380 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
381 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
382 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
383 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
386 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
387 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
388 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
389 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
392 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
393 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
394 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
395 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
396 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
399 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
401 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
403 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
404 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
405 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
407 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
409 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
413 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
417 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
418 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
419 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
420 short_channel_id: u64,
422 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
423 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
425 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
426 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
431 /// Contains a total_msat (which may differ from value if this is a Multi-Path Payment) and a
432 /// payment_secret which prevents path-probing attacks and can associate different HTLCs which
433 /// are part of the same payment.
434 Invoice(msgs::FinalOnionHopData),
435 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
436 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
439 struct ClaimableHTLC {
440 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
443 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
446 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
447 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
448 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
449 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
451 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
452 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
457 impl Readable for PaymentId {
458 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
459 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
463 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
464 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
465 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
466 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
467 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
470 session_priv: SecretKey,
471 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
472 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
473 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
474 payment_id: PaymentId,
475 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
476 payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters>,
479 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
480 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
481 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
483 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
485 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
487 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat, payment_params } => {
490 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
491 payment_id.hash(hasher);
492 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
493 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
494 payment_params.hash(hasher);
501 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
502 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
504 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
505 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
506 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
507 payment_secret: None,
508 payment_params: None,
513 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
514 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
516 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
524 struct ReceiveError {
530 /// Return value for claim_funds_from_hop
531 enum ClaimFundsFromHop {
533 MonitorUpdateFail(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal, Option<u64>),
538 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
540 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
541 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
542 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
543 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
544 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
546 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
547 err: msgs::LightningError,
548 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u64)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
549 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
551 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
553 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
555 err: LightningError {
557 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
558 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
565 shutdown_finish: None,
569 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
571 err: LightningError {
573 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
576 shutdown_finish: None,
580 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
581 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
584 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u64, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
586 err: LightningError {
588 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
589 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
595 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
596 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
600 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
603 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
605 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
606 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
610 log_level: Level::Warn,
613 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
615 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
617 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
619 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
620 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
626 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => LightningError {
628 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
629 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
637 shutdown_finish: None,
642 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
643 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
644 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
645 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
646 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
648 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
649 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
650 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
651 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
652 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
653 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
654 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
656 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
660 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
661 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
662 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
663 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
664 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
665 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
666 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
667 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
668 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
669 /// Map from payment hash to any HTLCs which are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user.
670 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
671 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
673 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
674 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
675 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
676 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
679 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
680 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
681 /// quite some time lag.
682 enum BackgroundEvent {
683 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
684 /// commitment transaction.
685 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
688 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
689 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
691 latest_features: InitFeatures,
694 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
695 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
697 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
700 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
701 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
702 struct PendingInboundPayment {
703 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
704 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
705 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
706 /// this payment being removed.
708 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
709 user_payment_id: u64,
710 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
711 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
712 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
715 /// Stores the session_priv for each part of a payment that is still pending. For versions 0.0.102
716 /// and later, also stores information for retrying the payment.
717 pub(crate) enum PendingOutboundPayment {
719 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
722 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
723 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
724 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
725 pending_amt_msat: u64,
726 /// Used to track the fee paid. Only present if the payment was serialized on 0.0.103+.
727 pending_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
728 /// The total payment amount across all paths, used to verify that a retry is not overpaying.
730 /// Our best known block height at the time this payment was initiated.
731 starting_block_height: u32,
733 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
734 /// been resolved. This ensures we don't look up pending payments in ChannelMonitors on restart
735 /// and add a pending payment that was already fulfilled.
737 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
738 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
740 /// When a payer gives up trying to retry a payment, they inform us, letting us generate a
741 /// `PaymentFailed` event when all HTLCs have irrevocably failed. This avoids a number of race
742 /// conditions in MPP-aware payment retriers (1), where the possibility of multiple
743 /// `PaymentPathFailed` events with `all_paths_failed` can be pending at once, confusing a
744 /// downstream event handler as to when a payment has actually failed.
746 /// (1) https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1164
748 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
749 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
753 impl PendingOutboundPayment {
754 fn is_retryable(&self) -> bool {
756 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { .. } => true,
760 fn is_fulfilled(&self) -> bool {
762 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => true,
766 fn abandoned(&self) -> bool {
768 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => true,
772 fn get_pending_fee_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
774 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { pending_fee_msat, .. } => pending_fee_msat.clone(),
779 fn payment_hash(&self) -> Option<PaymentHash> {
781 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None,
782 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
783 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => *payment_hash,
784 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
788 fn mark_fulfilled(&mut self) {
789 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
790 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
791 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
792 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
793 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
794 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. }
797 let payment_hash = self.payment_hash();
798 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, payment_hash };
801 fn mark_abandoned(&mut self) -> Result<(), ()> {
802 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
803 let our_payment_hash;
804 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
805 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } |
806 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } =>
808 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } |
809 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } => {
810 our_payment_hash = *payment_hash;
814 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash: our_payment_hash };
818 /// panics if path is None and !self.is_fulfilled
819 fn remove(&mut self, session_priv: &[u8; 32], path: Option<&Vec<RouteHop>>) -> bool {
820 let remove_res = match self {
821 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
822 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
823 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
824 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
825 session_privs.remove(session_priv)
829 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
830 let path = path.expect("Fulfilling a payment should always come with a path");
831 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
832 *pending_amt_msat -= path_last_hop.fee_msat;
833 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
834 *fee_msat -= path.get_path_fees();
841 fn insert(&mut self, session_priv: [u8; 32], path: &Vec<RouteHop>) -> bool {
842 let insert_res = match self {
843 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
844 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
845 session_privs.insert(session_priv)
847 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => false,
848 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => false,
851 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
852 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
853 *pending_amt_msat += path_last_hop.fee_msat;
854 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
855 *fee_msat += path.get_path_fees();
862 fn remaining_parts(&self) -> usize {
864 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
865 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
866 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
867 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
874 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
875 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
876 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
877 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
878 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
879 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
880 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
881 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
883 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
884 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
885 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
886 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
887 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
888 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
889 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
890 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
891 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
893 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
894 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
896 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
897 /// to individual Channels.
899 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
900 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
901 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
902 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
904 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
905 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
906 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
907 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
908 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
909 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
910 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
912 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
913 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
914 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
915 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
918 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
919 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
920 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
921 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
922 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
924 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
925 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
926 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
927 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
928 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
929 pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
930 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
931 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
932 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
933 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
936 default_configuration: UserConfig,
937 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
943 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
945 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
946 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
948 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
949 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
950 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
951 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
953 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
954 /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
955 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
956 /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
957 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
958 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
960 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
961 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
962 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
963 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
964 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
965 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
966 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
967 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
969 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
971 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
972 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment>>,
974 our_network_key: SecretKey,
975 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
977 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
979 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
980 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
981 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
983 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
984 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
986 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
987 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
988 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
990 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
991 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
992 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
993 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
995 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
996 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
997 /// are currently open with that peer.
998 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
999 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
1002 /// If also holding `channel_state` lock, must lock `channel_state` prior to `per_peer_state`.
1003 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
1005 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
1006 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1007 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1008 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1009 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1010 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1011 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1012 /// PersistenceNotifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1013 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1015 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier,
1022 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1024 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1025 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1026 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1027 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1028 pub struct ChainParameters {
1029 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1030 pub network: Network,
1032 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1034 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1035 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1038 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1044 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1045 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1046 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1047 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1048 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1049 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1051 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1052 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1053 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1054 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1055 persistence_notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier,
1057 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1058 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1061 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1062 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1063 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
1066 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1067 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
1069 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1070 persistence_notifier: notifier,
1071 should_persist: persist_check,
1072 _read_guard: read_guard,
1077 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1078 fn drop(&mut self) {
1079 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
1080 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
1085 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1086 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1088 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1090 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1091 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1092 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1093 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1094 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1096 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1097 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1099 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1101 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1102 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1103 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1104 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1105 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1106 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1107 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
1109 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1110 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
1112 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1113 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1114 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1115 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
1117 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1118 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1119 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1120 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1121 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1122 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1125 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1127 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1128 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1131 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1133 /// The number of blocks before we consider an outbound payment for expiry if it doesn't have any
1134 /// pending HTLCs in flight.
1135 pub(crate) const PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
1137 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1138 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1139 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1140 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1141 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1142 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1143 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1144 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1145 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1146 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1147 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1150 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1151 /// to better separate parameters.
1152 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1153 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1154 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1155 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1156 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1157 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1158 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1159 pub features: InitFeatures,
1160 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1161 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1162 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1164 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1166 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1167 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1168 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1169 /// payments to us through this channel.
1170 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1173 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
1174 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1175 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1176 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1177 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1178 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1179 /// lifetime of the channel.
1180 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1181 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1182 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1183 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1184 /// our counterparty already.
1186 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1187 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1188 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1189 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1190 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1191 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1192 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1193 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1194 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1195 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1196 /// this value on chain.
1198 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1200 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1202 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1203 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1204 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
1205 pub user_channel_id: u64,
1206 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1207 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1208 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1210 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1211 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1212 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1213 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1215 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1216 pub balance_msat: u64,
1217 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1218 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1219 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1220 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1222 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1224 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1225 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1226 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1227 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1228 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1229 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1230 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1231 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1232 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1234 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1235 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1236 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1237 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1238 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1239 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1240 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1241 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1242 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1244 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1246 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1247 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1248 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1249 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1250 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1251 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1252 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1253 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1254 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1256 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1257 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1258 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1259 pub is_outbound: bool,
1260 /// True if the channel is confirmed, funding_locked messages have been exchanged, and the
1261 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `funding_locked` message exchange implies the
1262 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1263 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1264 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1266 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1267 pub is_funding_locked: bool,
1268 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
1269 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1271 /// This is a strict superset of `is_funding_locked`.
1272 pub is_usable: bool,
1273 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1274 pub is_public: bool,
1277 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
1278 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
1279 /// states for more.
1280 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
1281 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
1282 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
1283 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
1284 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
1285 ParameterError(APIError),
1286 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
1287 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
1288 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
1289 /// payment in full.
1291 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1293 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
1294 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
1295 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
1296 /// paths than the ones selected).
1297 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
1298 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
1299 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
1300 /// in over-/re-payment.
1302 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1303 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
1304 /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
1306 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
1307 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
1308 /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
1309 /// with the latest update_id.
1311 /// The errors themselves, in the same order as the route hops.
1312 results: Vec<Result<(), APIError>>,
1313 /// If some paths failed without irrevocably committing to the new HTLC(s), this will
1314 /// contain a [`RouteParameters`] object which can be used to calculate a new route that
1315 /// will pay all remaining unpaid balance.
1316 failed_paths_retry: Option<RouteParameters>,
1317 /// The payment id for the payment, which is now at least partially pending.
1318 payment_id: PaymentId,
1322 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1324 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
1326 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1327 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1328 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1329 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1331 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1332 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1333 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1336 macro_rules! handle_error {
1337 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
1340 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1341 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1343 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1344 // entering the macro.
1345 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
1346 assert!($self.pending_events.try_lock().is_ok());
1349 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1351 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1352 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1353 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1354 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1358 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1359 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1360 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1361 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1366 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1367 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1369 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1370 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1371 action: err.action.clone()
1375 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1376 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1379 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1386 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1387 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1388 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1390 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1391 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1393 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1394 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1396 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1397 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1398 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1399 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1401 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1402 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1403 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1405 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => {
1406 log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1407 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1408 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1410 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(false);
1411 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1412 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1418 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1419 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1423 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1425 $entry.remove_entry();
1433 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1434 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1438 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1440 $entry.remove_entry();
1448 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1449 ($channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1451 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1452 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1453 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1460 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
1461 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1462 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1464 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
1466 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1467 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
1468 if let Some(short_id) = $chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1469 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1471 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
1472 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
1473 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
1474 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
1475 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
1476 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
1477 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
1478 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
1479 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
1480 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.get_user_id(),
1481 $chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
1484 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
1485 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations",
1486 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
1487 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
1488 match $action_type {
1489 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
1490 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
1492 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
1493 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
1495 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
1496 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len(),
1497 (&$failed_finalized_fulfills as &Vec<HTLCSource>).len());
1498 if !$resend_commitment {
1499 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
1502 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
1504 $chan.monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
1505 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
1509 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
1510 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
1512 $entry.remove_entry();
1516 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1517 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new())
1521 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
1522 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1523 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
1525 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1526 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
1530 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
1531 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
1532 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1533 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
1534 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
1537 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
1542 macro_rules! handle_chan_restoration_locked {
1543 ($self: ident, $channel_lock: expr, $channel_state: expr, $channel_entry: expr,
1544 $raa: expr, $commitment_update: expr, $order: expr, $chanmon_update: expr,
1545 $pending_forwards: expr, $funding_broadcastable: expr, $funding_locked: expr, $announcement_sigs: expr) => { {
1546 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
1547 let counterparty_node_id = $channel_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1549 let chanmon_update: Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> = $chanmon_update; // Force type-checking to resolve
1550 let chanmon_update_is_none = chanmon_update.is_none();
1552 let forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)> = $pending_forwards; // Force type-checking to resolve
1553 if !forwards.is_empty() {
1554 htlc_forwards = Some(($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"),
1555 $channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), forwards));
1558 if chanmon_update.is_some() {
1559 // On reconnect, we, by definition, only resend a funding_locked if there have been
1560 // no commitment updates, so the only channel monitor update which could also be
1561 // associated with a funding_locked would be the funding_created/funding_signed
1562 // monitor update. That monitor update failing implies that we won't send
1563 // funding_locked until it's been updated, so we can't have a funding_locked and a
1564 // monitor update here (so we don't bother to handle it correctly below).
1565 assert!($funding_locked.is_none());
1566 // A channel monitor update makes no sense without either a funding_locked or a
1567 // commitment update to process after it. Since we can't have a funding_locked, we
1568 // only bother to handle the monitor-update + commitment_update case below.
1569 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1572 if let Some(msg) = $funding_locked {
1573 // Similar to the above, this implies that we're letting the funding_locked fly
1574 // before it should be allowed to.
1575 assert!(chanmon_update.is_none());
1576 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
1577 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1580 $channel_state.short_to_id.insert($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), $channel_entry.get().channel_id());
1582 if let Some(msg) = $announcement_sigs {
1583 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1584 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1589 let funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction> = $funding_broadcastable; // Force type-checking to resolve
1590 if let Some(monitor_update) = chanmon_update {
1591 // We only ever broadcast a funding transaction in response to a funding_signed
1592 // message and the resulting monitor update. Thus, on channel_reestablish
1593 // message handling we can't have a funding transaction to broadcast. When
1594 // processing a monitor update finishing resulting in a funding broadcast, we
1595 // cannot have a second monitor update, thus this case would indicate a bug.
1596 assert!(funding_broadcastable.is_none());
1597 // Given we were just reconnected or finished updating a channel monitor, the
1598 // only case where we can get a new ChannelMonitorUpdate would be if we also
1599 // have some commitment updates to send as well.
1600 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1601 if let Err(e) = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1602 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
1603 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
1604 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
1605 let mut order = $order;
1607 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
1609 break handle_monitor_err!($self, e, $channel_state, $channel_entry, order, $raa.is_some(), true);
1613 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1614 if let Some(update) = $commitment_update {
1615 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1616 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1621 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1622 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = $raa {
1623 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1624 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1625 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1630 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1634 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1639 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
1640 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
1641 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1646 if chanmon_update_is_none {
1647 // If there was no ChannelMonitorUpdate, we should never generate an Err in the res loop
1648 // above. Doing so would imply calling handle_err!() from channel_monitor_updated() which
1649 // should *never* end up calling back to `chain_monitor.update_channel()`.
1650 assert!(res.is_ok());
1653 (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id)
1657 macro_rules! post_handle_chan_restoration {
1658 ($self: ident, $locked_res: expr) => { {
1659 let (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id) = $locked_res;
1661 let _ = handle_error!($self, res, counterparty_node_id);
1663 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1664 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1669 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
1670 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
1671 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1672 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1673 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1676 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1678 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1679 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1681 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1683 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
1685 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1686 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1687 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1688 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1689 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1690 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1691 let inbound_pmt_key_material = keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1692 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1694 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1695 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1696 fee_estimator: fee_est,
1700 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1702 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1703 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1704 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
1705 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1706 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1707 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1709 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1710 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1712 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1713 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap()),
1716 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1717 fake_scid_rand_bytes: keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1719 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1720 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1722 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1724 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1725 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1726 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1727 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
1735 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels, as
1736 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1737 &self.default_configuration
1740 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1742 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1743 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1744 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to 0
1745 /// for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for `user_channel_id` here.
1746 /// `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and otherwise
1749 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1750 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1752 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1753 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1754 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1756 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1757 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1758 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1759 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1760 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1761 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1763 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1764 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1765 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1766 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1767 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1768 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1772 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1773 match per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) {
1774 Some(peer_state) => {
1775 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1776 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1777 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1778 Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, their_features,
1779 channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height())?
1781 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }),
1784 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1786 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1787 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1788 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1790 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1791 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1792 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1793 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1795 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1797 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1800 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1802 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1803 node_id: their_network_key,
1806 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1809 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1810 let mut res = Vec::new();
1812 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1813 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1814 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1815 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
1816 let balance_msat = channel.get_balance_msat();
1817 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1818 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1819 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1820 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1821 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1822 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1823 features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1824 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1825 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1827 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1828 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1829 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1830 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1832 inbound_capacity_msat,
1833 outbound_capacity_msat,
1834 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1835 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1836 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1837 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1838 is_funding_locked: channel.is_usable(),
1839 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1840 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1844 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1845 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1846 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
1847 chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1853 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1854 /// more information.
1855 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1856 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1859 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1860 /// get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1862 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1863 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1865 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1866 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1867 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1868 // really wanted anyway.
1869 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1872 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1873 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1874 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1875 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1876 Some(transaction) => {
1877 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1881 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1882 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1883 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1884 reason: closure_reason
1888 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1889 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1891 let counterparty_node_id;
1892 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1893 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1894 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1895 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1896 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1897 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1898 counterparty_node_id = chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1899 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1900 let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = match per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
1901 Some(peer_state) => {
1902 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1903 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1904 chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?
1906 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", counterparty_node_id) }),
1908 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1910 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1911 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1912 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1913 let (result, is_permanent) =
1914 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_entry.key());
1916 remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
1922 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1923 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1927 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1928 let channel = remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
1929 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1930 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1934 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1938 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1942 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1943 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1946 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, counterparty_node_id);
1950 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1951 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1952 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1954 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1955 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1957 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1958 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1959 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1960 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1962 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1964 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1965 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1966 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1967 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1968 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, None)
1971 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1972 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1973 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1975 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1976 /// the channel being closed or not:
1977 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1978 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1979 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1980 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1981 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1982 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1983 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1985 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1987 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1988 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1989 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1990 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1991 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1995 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1996 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1997 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1998 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1999 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2001 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
2002 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2003 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2004 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2005 // ignore the result here.
2006 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
2010 /// `peer_node_id` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2011 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2012 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>, peer_msg: Option<&String>) -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2014 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2015 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2016 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2017 if let Some(node_id) = peer_node_id {
2018 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *node_id {
2019 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
2022 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2023 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2025 if peer_node_id.is_some() {
2026 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2027 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
2030 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2032 chan.remove_entry().1
2034 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
2037 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2038 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
2039 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2040 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2041 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2046 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
2049 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
2050 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if channel_id is unknown to the manager.
2051 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2052 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2053 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, None, None) {
2054 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2055 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
2056 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2057 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2058 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2059 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2069 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2070 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2071 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
2072 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2073 let _ = self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
2077 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2078 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
2080 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2081 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != cltv_expiry {
2082 return Err(ReceiveError {
2083 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value",
2085 err_data: byte_utils::be32_to_array(cltv_expiry).to_vec()
2088 // final_expiry_too_soon
2089 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2090 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2091 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2092 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2093 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2094 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2095 return Err(ReceiveError {
2097 err_data: Vec::new(),
2098 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2101 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
2102 return Err(ReceiveError {
2104 err_data: byte_utils::be64_to_array(amt_msat).to_vec(),
2105 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2109 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2110 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => {
2111 return Err(ReceiveError {
2112 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2113 err_data: Vec::new(),
2114 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2117 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2118 return Err(ReceiveError {
2119 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2120 err_data: Vec::new(),
2121 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2124 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
2125 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2126 return Err(ReceiveError {
2127 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2128 err_data: Vec::new(),
2129 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2131 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2132 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2134 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2135 phantom_shared_secret,
2137 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2138 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2139 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2140 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2141 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2142 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2143 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2144 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2145 return Err(ReceiveError {
2146 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2147 err_data: Vec::new(),
2148 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2152 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2154 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2157 return Err(ReceiveError {
2158 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2159 err_data: Vec::new(),
2160 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2165 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2168 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2169 amt_to_forward: amt_msat,
2170 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2174 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>) {
2175 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2176 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2178 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2179 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2180 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2181 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2182 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2183 failure_code: $err_code,
2184 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2189 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2190 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2193 let shared_secret = {
2194 let mut arr = [0; 32];
2195 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
2199 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2200 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2201 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2202 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2203 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2204 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2205 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2206 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2209 let mut channel_state = None;
2210 macro_rules! return_err {
2211 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2213 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2214 if channel_state.is_none() {
2215 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2217 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2218 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2219 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2220 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
2221 })), channel_state.unwrap());
2226 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2228 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2229 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2231 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2232 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2236 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2237 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2239 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2241 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2242 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2243 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2244 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2245 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2247 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2250 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2251 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2253 let blinding_factor = {
2254 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
2255 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
2256 sha.input(&shared_secret);
2257 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
2260 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
2262 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
2264 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2267 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2268 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2271 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2272 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2273 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2274 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2275 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2279 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2280 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2281 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2284 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2285 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2286 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2287 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2292 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2293 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2294 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2295 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2296 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2297 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2298 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
2299 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
2300 let forwarding_id_opt = match id_option {
2301 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2302 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2304 if fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id) {
2307 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2310 Some(id) => Some(id.clone()),
2312 let (chan_update_opt, forwardee_cltv_expiry_delta) = if let Some(forwarding_id) = forwarding_id_opt {
2313 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
2314 // Leave channel updates as None for private channels.
2315 let chan_update_opt = if chan.should_announce() {
2316 Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap()) } else { None };
2317 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2318 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2319 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2320 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2321 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2324 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2325 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2326 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2327 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2328 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2329 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2330 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2332 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2333 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2335 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64)
2336 .and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000)
2337 .checked_add(chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat() as u64) });
2338 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
2339 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, chan_update_opt));
2341 (chan_update_opt, chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta())
2342 } else { (None, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA) };
2344 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + forwardee_cltv_expiry_delta as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2345 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, chan_update_opt));
2347 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2348 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2349 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2350 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2351 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2352 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2354 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2355 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2357 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2358 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2359 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2360 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2361 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2362 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2363 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2364 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2365 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2366 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2372 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
2373 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2374 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2375 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
2377 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2378 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
2380 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2381 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
2382 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
2384 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
2386 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
2391 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
2394 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2395 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2396 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2398 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2399 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2400 if !chan.should_announce() {
2401 return Err(LightningError {
2402 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2403 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2406 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2407 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2410 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2411 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
2412 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2413 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2414 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2415 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2416 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2417 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2418 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2422 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2424 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2425 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2427 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2428 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2429 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2430 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2431 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()),
2432 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2433 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2434 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2437 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
2438 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
2440 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2446 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
2447 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_params: &Option<PaymentParameters>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2448 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2449 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2450 let session_priv_bytes = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2451 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2453 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2454 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
2455 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2456 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2457 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
2459 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2461 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2463 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2464 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2466 let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2467 let payment_entry = pending_outbounds.entry(payment_id);
2468 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(payment) = &payment_entry {
2469 if !payment.get().is_retryable() {
2470 return Err(APIError::RouteError {
2471 err: "Payment already completed"
2476 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2477 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2478 Some(id) => id.clone(),
2481 macro_rules! insert_outbound_payment {
2483 let payment = payment_entry.or_insert_with(|| PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2484 session_privs: HashSet::new(),
2485 pending_amt_msat: 0,
2486 pending_fee_msat: Some(0),
2487 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2488 payment_secret: *payment_secret,
2489 starting_block_height: self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
2490 total_msat: total_value,
2492 assert!(payment.insert(session_priv_bytes, path));
2496 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2497 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
2499 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
2500 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
2502 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2503 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
2505 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(
2506 htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2508 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2509 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2511 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2512 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2513 }, onion_packet, &self.logger),
2514 channel_state, chan)
2516 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
2517 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2518 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
2519 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
2520 // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
2521 // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
2522 // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
2523 // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
2524 insert_outbound_payment!(); // Only do this after possibly break'ing on Perm failure above.
2525 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2527 insert_outbound_payment!();
2529 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2530 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2531 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
2532 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2533 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
2534 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2535 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2536 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2542 None => { insert_outbound_payment!(); },
2544 } else { unreachable!(); }
2548 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2549 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2551 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2556 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2558 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
2559 /// fields for more info.
2561 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
2562 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
2563 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
2564 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
2565 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
2566 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
2568 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
2570 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2571 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2572 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
2574 /// In general, a path may raise:
2575 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2576 /// node public key) is specified.
2577 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2578 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2580 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2581 /// relevant updates.
2583 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2584 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2585 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2587 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
2588 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
2589 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
2590 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
2592 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
2593 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
2594 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2595 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2596 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None, None, None)
2599 fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: Option<PaymentId>, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2600 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
2601 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
2603 if route.paths.len() > 10 {
2604 // This limit is completely arbitrary - there aren't any real fundamental path-count
2605 // limits. After we support retrying individual paths we should likely bump this, but
2606 // for now more than 10 paths likely carries too much one-path failure.
2607 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Sending over more than 10 paths is not currently supported"}));
2609 if payment_secret.is_none() && route.paths.len() > 1 {
2610 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Payment secret is required for multi-path payments".to_string()}));
2612 let mut total_value = 0;
2613 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2614 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2615 let payment_id = if let Some(id) = payment_id { id } else { PaymentId(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()) };
2616 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
2617 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
2618 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
2619 continue 'path_check;
2621 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
2622 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
2623 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
2624 continue 'path_check;
2627 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2628 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
2630 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
2631 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
2633 if let Some(amt_msat) = recv_value_msat {
2634 debug_assert!(amt_msat >= total_value);
2635 total_value = amt_msat;
2638 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2639 let mut results = Vec::new();
2640 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2641 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &route.payment_params, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, &keysend_preimage));
2643 let mut has_ok = false;
2644 let mut has_err = false;
2645 let mut pending_amt_unsent = 0;
2646 let mut max_unsent_cltv_delta = 0;
2647 for (res, path) in results.iter().zip(route.paths.iter()) {
2648 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
2649 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
2650 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
2651 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
2655 } else if res.is_err() {
2656 pending_amt_unsent += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2657 max_unsent_cltv_delta = cmp::max(max_unsent_cltv_delta, path.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta);
2660 if has_err && has_ok {
2661 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure {
2664 failed_paths_retry: if pending_amt_unsent != 0 {
2665 if let Some(payment_params) = &route.payment_params {
2666 Some(RouteParameters {
2667 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2668 final_value_msat: pending_amt_unsent,
2669 final_cltv_expiry_delta: max_unsent_cltv_delta,
2675 // If we failed to send any paths, we shouldn't have inserted the new PaymentId into
2676 // our `pending_outbound_payments` map at all.
2677 debug_assert!(self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().get(&payment_id).is_none());
2678 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
2684 /// Retries a payment along the given [`Route`].
2686 /// Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see
2687 /// [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the
2688 /// retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, if the payment
2689 /// for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success), or if
2690 /// further retries have been disabled with [`abandon_payment`].
2692 /// [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]
2693 /// [`abandon_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`]
2694 pub fn retry_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2695 const RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE: u64 = 10;
2696 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2697 if path.len() == 0 {
2698 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2699 err: "length-0 path in route".to_string()
2704 let (total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret) = {
2705 let outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2706 if let Some(payment) = outbounds.get(&payment_id) {
2708 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2709 total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret, pending_amt_msat, ..
2711 let retry_amt_msat: u64 = route.paths.iter().map(|path| path.last().unwrap().fee_msat).sum();
2712 if retry_amt_msat + *pending_amt_msat > *total_msat * (100 + RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE) / 100 {
2713 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2714 err: format!("retry_amt_msat of {} will put pending_amt_msat (currently: {}) more than 10% over total_payment_amt_msat of {}", retry_amt_msat, pending_amt_msat, total_msat).to_string()
2717 (*total_msat, *payment_hash, *payment_secret)
2719 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => {
2720 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2721 err: "Unable to retry payments that were initially sent on LDK versions prior to 0.0.102".to_string()
2724 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {
2725 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2726 err: "Payment already completed".to_owned()
2729 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {
2730 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2731 err: "Payment already abandoned (with some HTLCs still pending)".to_owned()
2736 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2737 err: format!("Payment with ID {} not found", log_bytes!(payment_id.0)),
2741 return self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &payment_secret, None, Some(payment_id), Some(total_msat)).map(|_| ())
2744 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment will occur.
2746 /// After this method returns, any future calls to [`retry_payment`] for the given `payment_id`
2747 /// will fail with [`PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError`]. If no such event has been generated,
2748 /// an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event will be generated as soon as there are no remaining
2749 /// pending HTLCs for this payment.
2751 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2752 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2753 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2755 /// [`retry_payment`]: Self::retry_payment
2756 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2757 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2758 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2759 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2761 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2762 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
2763 if let Ok(()) = payment.get_mut().mark_abandoned() {
2764 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
2765 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2767 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
2775 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2776 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2777 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2778 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2779 /// never reach the recipient.
2781 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function.
2783 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2784 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2786 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2788 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2789 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2790 let preimage = match payment_preimage {
2792 None => PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()),
2794 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0).into_inner());
2795 match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, Some(preimage), None, None) {
2796 Ok(payment_id) => Ok((payment_hash, payment_id)),
2801 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2802 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2803 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>
2804 (&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2806 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2808 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2810 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2811 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2812 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2813 } else { unreachable!(); })
2816 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
2818 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2819 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2822 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2823 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2828 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2829 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2830 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2833 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2834 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2835 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2837 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2845 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2846 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2847 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2851 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2853 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2854 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2856 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2857 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2859 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2860 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2861 /// keys per-channel).
2863 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2864 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2865 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2867 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2868 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2869 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2871 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2872 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2873 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2874 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2876 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2877 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2878 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2879 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2883 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2884 let mut output_index = None;
2885 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2886 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2887 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2888 if output_index.is_some() {
2889 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2890 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2893 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2894 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2895 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2898 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2901 if output_index.is_none() {
2902 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2903 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2906 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2911 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
2912 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
2913 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
2915 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::core::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
2918 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
2919 // smaller than 500:
2920 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
2922 /// Regenerates channel_announcements and generates a signed node_announcement from the given
2923 /// arguments, providing them in corresponding events via
2924 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`], if at least one public channel has been confirmed
2925 /// on-chain. This effectively re-broadcasts all channel announcements and sends our node
2926 /// announcement to ensure that the lightning P2P network is aware of the channels we have and
2927 /// our network addresses.
2929 /// `rgb` is a node "color" and `alias` is a printable human-readable string to describe this
2930 /// node to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
2932 /// `addresses` represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node
2933 /// accepts incoming connections. These will be included in the node_announcement, publicly
2934 /// tying these addresses together and to this node. If you wish to preserve user privacy,
2935 /// addresses should likely contain only Tor Onion addresses.
2937 /// Panics if `addresses` is absurdly large (more than 500).
2939 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
2940 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], mut addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
2941 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2943 if addresses.len() > 500 {
2944 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
2947 // While all existing nodes handle unsorted addresses just fine, the spec requires that
2948 // addresses be sorted for future compatibility.
2949 addresses.sort_by_key(|addr| addr.get_id());
2951 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2952 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
2953 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
2954 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
2955 rgb, alias, addresses,
2956 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
2957 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2959 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2960 let node_announce_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2962 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2963 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2965 let mut announced_chans = false;
2966 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2967 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()) {
2968 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2970 update_msg: match self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
2975 announced_chans = true;
2977 // If the channel is not public or has not yet reached funding_locked, check the
2978 // next channel. If we don't yet have any public channels, we'll skip the broadcast
2979 // below as peers may not accept it without channels on chain first.
2983 if announced_chans {
2984 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
2985 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
2986 signature: node_announce_sig,
2987 contents: announcement
2993 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
2995 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
2996 /// Will likely generate further events.
2997 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
2998 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3000 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
3001 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3002 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3003 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3005 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3006 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3008 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
3009 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3010 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
3011 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3013 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3014 match forward_info {
3015 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3016 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
3017 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3018 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3019 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3021 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3022 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3023 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3024 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3025 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3026 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3027 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3029 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3030 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: $err_code, data: $err_data }
3036 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3037 let phantom_secret_res = self.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3038 if phantom_secret_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id) {
3039 let phantom_shared_secret = {
3040 let mut arr = [0; 32];
3041 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &phantom_secret_res.unwrap())[..]);
3044 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3046 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3047 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3048 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3049 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3050 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3052 fail_forward!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3054 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3055 fail_forward!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3059 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3060 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
3061 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3062 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => fail_forward!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3068 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3071 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3074 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3075 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3076 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3077 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3078 // problem, not ours.
3085 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3086 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
3087 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
3088 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3089 match forward_info {
3090 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3091 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
3093 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
3094 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3095 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3096 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3097 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3098 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3099 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3100 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3101 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3102 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3104 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet, &self.logger) {
3106 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3107 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3109 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3111 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap();
3112 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3113 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }
3119 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3121 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3122 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
3123 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
3124 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
3125 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
3126 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
3127 // this channel currently :/.
3133 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3134 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3136 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3137 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3138 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
3140 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3141 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3143 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
3145 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3146 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3147 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3150 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3152 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3153 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
3154 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
3155 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
3156 // messages when we can.
3157 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
3158 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
3159 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
3166 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
3167 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
3170 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
3171 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
3172 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3173 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
3174 ChannelError::Ignore(_) | ChannelError::Warn(_) => {
3175 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
3177 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
3178 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
3179 let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
3180 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3181 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3183 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us.
3184 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.get_user_id(), channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
3186 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
3188 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
3192 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3193 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
3196 log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
3197 add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3198 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3199 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3200 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3201 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
3202 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3203 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
3204 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3206 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
3214 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3215 match forward_info {
3216 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3217 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
3218 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3219 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, phantom_shared_secret) = match routing {
3220 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } =>
3221 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret),
3222 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3223 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage), None),
3225 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3228 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3229 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3230 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3231 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3232 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3233 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3234 phantom_shared_secret,
3236 value: amt_to_forward,
3241 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3243 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
3244 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3245 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
3247 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3248 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3249 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3250 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3251 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3252 phantom_shared_secret,
3254 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
3259 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3260 ($payment_data_total_msat: expr, $payment_secret: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3261 let mut payment_received_generated = false;
3262 let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
3263 .or_insert(Vec::new());
3264 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3265 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3266 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3267 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3271 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.value;
3272 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3273 total_value += htlc.value;
3274 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3275 OnionPayload::Invoice(htlc_payment_data) => {
3276 if htlc_payment_data.total_msat != $payment_data_total_msat {
3277 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3278 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data_total_msat, htlc_payment_data.total_msat);
3279 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3281 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3283 _ => unreachable!(),
3286 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > $payment_data_total_msat {
3287 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
3288 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, $payment_data_total_msat);
3289 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3290 } else if total_value == $payment_data_total_msat {
3291 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3292 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3294 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3295 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3296 payment_secret: $payment_secret,
3300 payment_received_generated = true;
3302 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3303 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3305 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3307 payment_received_generated
3311 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3312 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3313 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3314 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3315 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3316 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3317 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3318 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3319 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3320 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3321 OnionPayload::Invoice(ref payment_data) => {
3322 let payment_preimage = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, payment_data.clone(), self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3323 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
3325 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3329 let payment_data_total_msat = payment_data.total_msat;
3330 let payment_secret = payment_data.payment_secret.clone();
3331 check_total_value!(payment_data_total_msat, payment_secret, payment_preimage);
3333 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3334 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
3335 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3336 e.insert(vec![claimable_htlc]);
3337 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3339 amt: amt_to_forward,
3340 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage),
3343 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3344 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3345 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3351 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3353 if let OnionPayload::Invoice(ref data) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3356 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3357 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3360 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3361 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3362 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3363 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3364 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3365 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3366 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3368 let payment_received_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data.total_msat, payment_data.payment_secret, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3369 if payment_received_generated {
3370 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3376 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3377 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3385 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3386 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
3388 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3390 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3391 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3394 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3395 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3396 events.append(&mut new_events);
3399 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3401 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3402 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3404 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3405 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3406 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3407 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3408 if background_events.is_empty() {
3412 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3414 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3415 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3416 // monitor updating completing.
3417 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
3424 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3425 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3426 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3427 self.process_background_events();
3430 fn update_channel_fee(&self, short_to_id: &mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> (bool, NotifyOption, Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>) {
3431 if !chan.is_outbound() { return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(())); }
3432 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3433 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
3434 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3435 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3436 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3438 if !chan.is_live() {
3439 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3440 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3441 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3443 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3444 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3446 let mut retain_channel = true;
3447 let res = match chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(new_feerate, &self.logger) {
3450 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
3451 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3455 let ret_err = match res {
3456 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update))) => {
3457 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3458 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_id);
3459 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3462 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3463 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3464 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3465 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3466 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3467 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3468 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3469 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
3479 (retain_channel, NotifyOption::DoPersist, ret_err)
3483 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3484 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3485 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3486 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3487 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3488 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3489 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3491 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3493 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3495 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3496 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3497 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3498 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3499 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3500 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3501 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3503 handle_errors.push(err);
3513 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3515 /// This currently includes:
3516 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3517 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3518 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3521 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
3522 /// estimate fetches.
3523 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3524 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3525 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3526 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3528 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3530 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3532 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3533 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3534 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3535 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3536 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3537 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
3538 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3539 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3541 handle_errors.push((err, counterparty_node_id));
3543 if !retain_channel { return false; }
3545 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3546 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
3547 handle_errors.push((Err(err), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()));
3548 if needs_close { return false; }
3551 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3552 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3553 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3554 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3555 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3556 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3557 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3558 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3562 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3563 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3565 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3566 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3567 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3571 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3572 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3581 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3582 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3588 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3589 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3590 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3591 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
3592 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
3593 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
3594 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3596 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3597 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
3598 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
3599 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3600 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3601 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3602 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3603 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3604 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3605 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
3606 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
3612 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3613 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3614 // be surfaced to the user.
3615 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(&self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
3616 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3618 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
3619 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
3620 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3621 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3622 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&chan_entry.get()) {
3623 (0x1000|7, upd.encode_with_len())
3625 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3628 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3630 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3631 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
3632 htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
3634 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, payment_params, .. } => {
3635 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3636 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3637 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3638 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3639 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) && !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3640 let retry = if let Some(payment_params_data) = payment_params {
3641 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3642 Some(RouteParameters {
3643 payment_params: payment_params_data,
3644 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3645 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3648 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3649 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3650 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3652 rejected_by_dest: false,
3653 network_update: None,
3654 all_paths_failed: payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0,
3656 short_channel_id: None,
3663 if payment.get().abandoned() && payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3664 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
3666 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
3672 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3679 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3680 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
3681 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
3682 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
3683 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
3684 /// still-available channels.
3685 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
3686 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3687 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3688 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3691 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3692 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3693 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3695 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, payment_id, ref payment_params, .. } => {
3696 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3697 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3698 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3699 let mut all_paths_failed = false;
3700 let mut full_failure_ev = None;
3701 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3702 if !payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
3703 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3706 if payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3707 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received failure of HTLC with payment_hash {} after payment completion", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3710 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3711 all_paths_failed = true;
3712 if payment.get().abandoned() {
3713 full_failure_ev = Some(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
3715 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
3721 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3724 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3725 let retry = if let Some(payment_params_data) = payment_params {
3726 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3727 Some(RouteParameters {
3728 payment_params: payment_params_data.clone(),
3729 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3730 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3733 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3735 let path_failure = match &onion_error {
3736 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
3738 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3740 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3741 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
3742 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
3743 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
3744 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3745 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3746 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3747 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
3754 error_code: onion_error_code,
3756 error_data: onion_error_data
3759 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3765 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
3766 // TODO: We'd like to generate a NetworkUpdate for temporary
3767 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as get_route
3768 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
3770 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
3771 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
3772 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3773 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3774 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3775 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
3776 network_update: None,
3779 short_channel_id: Some(path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id),
3782 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
3784 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
3788 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3789 pending_events.push(path_failure);
3790 if let Some(ev) = full_failure_ev { pending_events.push(ev); }
3792 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret, .. }) => {
3793 let err_packet = match onion_error {
3794 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
3795 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
3796 if let Some(phantom_ss) = phantom_shared_secret {
3797 let phantom_packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&phantom_ss, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
3798 let encrypted_phantom_packet = onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&phantom_ss, &phantom_packet);
3799 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &encrypted_phantom_packet.data[..])
3801 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
3802 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
3805 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
3806 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3807 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
3811 let mut forward_event = None;
3812 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3813 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
3815 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
3816 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3817 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
3819 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3820 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
3823 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3824 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
3825 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3826 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3827 time_forwardable: time
3834 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentReceived`], generating any
3835 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
3837 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
3838 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
3839 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
3840 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
3842 /// Returns whether any HTLCs were claimed, and thus if any new [`MessageSendEvent`]s are now
3843 /// pending for processing via [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`].
3845 /// [`Event::PaymentReceived`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentReceived
3846 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3847 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3848 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
3849 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
3850 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3852 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3854 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3855 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
3856 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
3857 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
3859 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
3860 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
3861 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
3862 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
3864 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
3865 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
3866 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
3867 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
3868 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
3870 let mut valid_mpp = true;
3871 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3872 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3878 let mut errs = Vec::new();
3879 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
3880 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3882 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3883 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3884 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3885 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3886 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3887 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
3888 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
3890 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
3891 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) => {
3892 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
3893 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
3894 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
3895 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
3896 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
3897 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
3899 ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
3900 ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim => {
3901 // While we should never get here in most cases, if we do, it likely
3902 // indicates that the HTLC was timed out some time ago and is no longer
3903 // available to be claimed. Thus, it does not make sense to set
3904 // `claimed_any_htlcs`.
3906 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(_) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
3911 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
3912 // which were generated.
3913 channel_state.take();
3915 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
3916 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3917 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
3924 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> ClaimFundsFromHop {
3925 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
3926 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
3927 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3928 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3930 return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed
3934 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
3935 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
3936 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
3937 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
3938 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3939 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
3940 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3941 payment_preimage, e);
3942 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(
3943 chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3944 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(),
3945 Some(htlc_value_msat)
3948 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
3949 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
3950 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3951 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3952 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3953 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3954 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3955 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
3956 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3957 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3963 return ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(htlc_value_msat);
3965 return ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim;
3968 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
3969 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3970 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
3971 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
3972 payment_preimage, e);
3974 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3975 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
3977 chan.remove_entry();
3979 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(counterparty_node_id, res, None);
3982 } else { unreachable!(); }
3985 fn finalize_claims(&self, mut sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
3986 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3987 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3988 for source in sources.drain(..) {
3989 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } = source {
3990 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3991 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3992 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3993 assert!(payment.get().is_fulfilled());
3994 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, None) {
3995 pending_events.push(
3996 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
3998 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash(),
4003 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
4011 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool) {
4013 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4014 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4015 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
4016 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
4017 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4018 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
4019 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4020 if !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
4021 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4022 let fee_paid_msat = payment.get().get_pending_fee_msat();
4023 pending_events.push(
4024 events::Event::PaymentSent {
4025 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
4031 payment.get_mut().mark_fulfilled();
4035 // We currently immediately remove HTLCs which were fulfilled on-chain.
4036 // This could potentially lead to removing a pending payment too early,
4037 // with a reorg of one block causing us to re-add the fulfilled payment on
4039 // TODO: We should have a second monitor event that informs us of payments
4040 // irrevocably fulfilled.
4041 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
4042 let payment_hash = Some(PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner()));
4043 pending_events.push(
4044 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
4052 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
4057 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
4060 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4061 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4062 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage);
4063 let claimed_htlc = if let ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim = res { false } else { true };
4064 let htlc_claim_value_msat = match res {
4065 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(_, _, amt_opt) => amt_opt,
4066 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(amt) => Some(amt),
4069 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed = res {
4070 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4071 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4072 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4073 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4076 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4077 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
4078 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
4079 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) {
4080 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4081 payment_preimage, e);
4083 // Note that we do *not* set `claimed_htlc` to false here. In fact, this
4084 // totally could be a duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing
4085 // without interrogating the `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above
4086 // update to. Instead, we simply document in `PaymentForwarded` that this
4089 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4090 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) = res {
4091 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4092 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4096 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4097 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4098 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4101 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4102 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4104 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4112 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4113 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4114 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4117 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
4118 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4120 let chan_restoration_res;
4121 let (mut pending_failures, finalized_claims) = {
4122 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4123 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4124 let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4125 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4126 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4128 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4132 let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
4133 let channel_update = if updates.funding_locked.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() {
4134 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
4135 // funding_locked and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
4136 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
4137 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
4139 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4140 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4141 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()).unwrap(),
4144 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, None, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.funding_locked, updates.announcement_sigs);
4145 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4146 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4148 (updates.failed_htlcs, updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs)
4150 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
4151 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claims);
4152 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4153 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
4157 /// Called to accept a request to open a channel after [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`] has been
4160 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted.
4162 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: crate::util::events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4163 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4164 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4166 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4167 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4168 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4169 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4170 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4171 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4173 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4174 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4175 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(),
4178 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4179 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Can't accept a channel that doesn't exist".to_owned() });
4185 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4186 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4187 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4190 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4191 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4194 let mut channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4195 &their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.logger)
4196 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
4197 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4198 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4199 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4200 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
4201 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4202 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4203 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4204 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4205 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
4208 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4209 pending_events.push(
4210 events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4211 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4212 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4213 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4214 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4219 entry.insert(channel);
4225 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4226 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4227 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4228 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4229 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4230 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4231 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4232 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4234 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.peer_channel_config_limits, &their_features), channel_state, chan);
4235 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4237 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4240 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4241 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4242 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4243 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4245 user_channel_id: user_id,
4250 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4251 let ((funding_msg, monitor), mut chan) = {
4252 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4253 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4254 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4255 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4256 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4257 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4258 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4260 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
4262 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4265 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
4266 // lock before watch_channel
4267 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
4269 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
4270 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4271 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4272 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4273 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4274 // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for
4275 // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we
4276 // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4277 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
4278 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4279 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
4281 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
4282 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4283 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4284 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
4285 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4286 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4290 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4291 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4292 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4293 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4294 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4296 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4297 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4298 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4307 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4309 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4310 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4311 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4312 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4313 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4314 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4315 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4317 let (monitor, funding_tx) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
4318 Ok(update) => update,
4319 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
4321 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
4322 let mut res = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
4323 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4324 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4325 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4326 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4327 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4328 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4335 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4338 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
4339 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
4343 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4344 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4345 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4346 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4347 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4348 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4349 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4351 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg, self.get_our_node_id(),
4352 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4353 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4354 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4355 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4356 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4357 msg: announcement_sigs,
4359 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4360 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4361 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4362 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4363 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4364 // announcement_signatures.
4365 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4366 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4367 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4368 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4373 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4377 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4378 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4379 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4380 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4381 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4383 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4384 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4385 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4386 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4389 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4390 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4391 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4392 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4395 let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
4396 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4398 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4399 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
4400 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4401 let (result, is_permanent) =
4402 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_entry.key());
4404 remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
4410 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4411 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4412 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4419 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4422 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4423 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
4426 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
4430 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4431 let (tx, chan_option) = {
4432 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4433 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4434 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4435 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4436 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4437 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4439 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
4440 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
4441 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4442 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4447 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
4448 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
4449 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
4450 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
4451 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
4452 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
4453 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4455 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
4456 } else { (tx, None) }
4458 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4461 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
4462 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
4463 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
4465 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
4466 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4467 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4468 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4472 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4477 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4478 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
4479 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
4480 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
4482 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
4483 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
4484 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
4485 //but we should prevent it anyway.
4487 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
4488 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4490 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4491 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4492 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4493 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4496 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
4497 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
4498 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
4499 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
4500 match pending_forward_info {
4501 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
4502 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
4503 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
4504 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &{
4505 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
4506 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
4507 if error_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
4508 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
4510 res.extend_from_slice(&upd.encode_with_len()[..]);
4514 // The only case where we'd be unable to
4515 // successfully get a channel update is if the
4516 // channel isn't in the fully-funded state yet,
4517 // implying our counterparty is trying to route
4518 // payments over the channel back to themselves
4519 // (because no one else should know the short_id
4520 // is a lightning channel yet). We should have
4521 // no problem just calling this
4522 // unknown_next_peer (0x4000|10).
4523 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
4526 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &[])
4528 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4529 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
4530 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4533 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
4535 _ => pending_forward_info
4538 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4540 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4545 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4546 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4547 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
4548 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4549 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4550 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4551 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4552 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4554 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
4556 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4559 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false);
4563 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4564 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4565 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4566 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4567 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4568 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4569 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4571 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
4573 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4578 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4579 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4580 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4581 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4582 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4583 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4584 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4586 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
4587 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
4588 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
4590 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
4593 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4597 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4598 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4599 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4600 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4601 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4602 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4603 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4605 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
4606 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
4607 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
4608 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
4609 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
4610 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
4611 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
4616 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4617 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
4619 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4620 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4621 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4623 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
4624 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4625 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4626 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4627 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4628 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4629 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4630 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4632 commitment_signed: msg,
4638 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4643 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
4644 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
4645 let mut forward_event = None;
4646 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4647 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4648 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4649 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
4651 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4652 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
4653 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
4654 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
4655 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
4657 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4658 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4659 prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
4661 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4662 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4663 prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
4668 match forward_event {
4670 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4671 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
4672 time_forwardable: time
4680 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4681 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
4683 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4684 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4685 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4686 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4687 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4688 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4690 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
4691 let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self,
4692 chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4693 htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs;
4694 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), raa_updates.monitor_update) {
4695 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
4696 assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none());
4697 assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty());
4698 assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4699 assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty());
4700 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
4702 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan,
4703 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
4704 raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(),
4705 raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4706 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
4708 } else { unreachable!(); }
4711 if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update {
4712 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4713 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4717 break Ok((raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4718 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs,
4719 chan.get().get_short_channel_id()
4720 .expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"),
4721 chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
4723 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4726 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id);
4728 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, finalized_claim_htlcs,
4729 short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) =>
4731 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4732 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
4734 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
4735 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claim_htlcs);
4742 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4743 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4744 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4745 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4746 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4747 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4748 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4750 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
4752 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4757 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4758 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4759 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4761 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4762 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4763 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4764 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4766 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
4767 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
4770 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
4771 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
4772 self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), msg), channel_state, chan),
4773 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
4774 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
4775 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4778 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4783 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
4784 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4785 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4786 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4787 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
4788 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
4790 // It's not a local channel
4791 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
4794 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4795 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4796 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4797 if chan.get().should_announce() {
4798 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
4799 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
4800 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
4801 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4803 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
4805 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
4806 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
4807 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
4808 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4810 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
4813 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!()
4815 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
4818 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4819 let chan_restoration_res;
4820 let (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround) = {
4821 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4822 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4824 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4825 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4826 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4827 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4829 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
4830 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
4831 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
4832 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
4833 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
4834 msg, &self.logger, self.our_network_pubkey.clone(), self.genesis_hash,
4835 &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), channel_state, chan);
4836 let mut channel_update = None;
4837 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
4838 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4839 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4842 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4843 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
4844 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
4845 // they have the latest channel parameters.
4846 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4847 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4848 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4851 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
4852 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(
4853 self, channel_state_lock, channel_state, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
4854 responses.mon_update, Vec::new(), None, responses.funding_locked, responses.announcement_sigs);
4855 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4856 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4858 (responses.holding_cell_failed_htlcs, need_lnd_workaround)
4860 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4863 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
4864 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_failed_forward, msg.channel_id);
4866 if let Some(funding_locked_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
4867 self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, &funding_locked_msg)?;
4872 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
4873 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
4874 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4875 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
4876 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
4877 for monitor_event in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
4878 match monitor_event {
4879 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
4880 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
4881 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
4882 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.onchain_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true);
4884 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
4885 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
4888 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
4889 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
4890 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4891 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4892 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4893 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4894 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4895 if let Some(mut chan) = by_id.remove(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
4896 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4897 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4899 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
4900 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4901 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4905 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
4906 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
4908 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
4910 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
4911 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4912 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4913 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4914 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
4919 MonitorEvent::UpdateCompleted { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
4920 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id);
4925 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4926 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4929 has_pending_monitor_events
4932 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
4933 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
4934 /// update events as a separate process method here.
4936 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
4937 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
4940 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
4941 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
4942 /// update was applied.
4944 /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
4945 /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
4946 /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
4947 /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
4948 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
4949 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
4950 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4951 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
4953 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4954 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4955 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4956 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4957 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4959 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
4960 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
4961 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
4962 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
4963 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id));
4965 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
4966 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4967 has_monitor_update = true;
4968 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), channel_id);
4969 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
4970 if close_channel { return false; }
4972 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4973 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4974 updates: commitment_update,
4981 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
4982 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
4983 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
4990 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
4991 for (failures, channel_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
4992 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id);
4995 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4996 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5002 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5003 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5004 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5005 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5006 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5007 let mut has_update = false;
5009 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5010 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5011 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5012 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5013 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5015 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5016 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5017 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5018 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5020 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5021 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5024 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5025 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5026 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5027 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
5028 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
5031 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5032 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5037 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5039 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5040 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
5046 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
5047 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5054 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5055 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5061 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5062 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5064 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5065 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5066 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5067 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5068 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5069 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5070 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5071 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5072 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5073 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5074 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5075 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5076 assert!(should_broadcast);
5077 } else { unreachable!(); }
5078 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
5080 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5084 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5085 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5087 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5088 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5091 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5093 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5094 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5095 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5096 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5097 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5098 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5099 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5100 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5101 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5102 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5103 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5104 // never fail a payment too early.
5105 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5107 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5110 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5115 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5118 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5119 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5121 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
5122 /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5123 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5125 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5127 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5128 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5132 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5133 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5135 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5137 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5138 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5139 /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
5140 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5141 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5142 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, &self.keys_manager, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5145 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5146 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5148 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5151 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5153 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5155 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5156 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5157 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5158 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5159 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5162 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5163 /// stored external to LDK.
5165 /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5166 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5167 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5169 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5170 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5173 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5174 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5175 /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5176 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5178 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5179 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5180 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5181 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5182 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5184 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5185 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5186 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
5187 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5188 /// [`PaymentReceived`].
5190 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
5191 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
5193 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5194 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5198 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5199 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5201 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5203 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5204 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5205 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5206 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5209 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5210 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5212 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5215 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5217 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5219 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5220 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5223 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5224 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5226 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5227 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5228 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5231 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5232 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5234 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5235 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5236 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5237 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5239 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::get_phantom_scid(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, best_block.height(), &self.genesis_hash, &self.keys_manager);
5240 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5241 match channel_state.short_to_id.entry(scid_candidate) {
5242 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => continue,
5243 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return scid_candidate
5248 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5250 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5251 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5253 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5254 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5255 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5259 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5260 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5261 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5262 let event_handler = |event: &events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event.clone());
5263 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5268 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5269 !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().is_empty()
5273 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5274 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().clear()
5278 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5279 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5280 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5281 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5282 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5285 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5286 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5287 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5288 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5290 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5291 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5292 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5293 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5296 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5297 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5299 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
5300 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5303 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
5304 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5305 mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
5307 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5308 events.replace(pending_events);
5317 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5319 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5320 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5321 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5322 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5325 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
5327 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
5328 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
5330 /// Pending events are persisted as part of [`ChannelManager`]. While these events are cleared
5331 /// when processed, an [`EventHandler`] must be able to handle previously seen events when
5332 /// restarting from an old state.
5333 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
5334 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5335 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5337 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5338 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5339 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5340 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5343 let mut pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5344 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5345 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5348 for event in pending_events.drain(..) {
5349 handler.handle_event(&event);
5357 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5359 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5360 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5361 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5362 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5365 fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
5367 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5368 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), block.header.prev_blockhash,
5369 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
5370 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
5371 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
5374 let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
5375 self.transactions_confirmed(&block.header, &txdata, height);
5376 self.best_block_updated(&block.header, height);
5379 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5380 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5381 let new_height = height - 1;
5383 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
5384 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
5385 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
5386 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
5387 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
5388 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
5391 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5395 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5397 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5398 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5399 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5400 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5403 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5404 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5405 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5406 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5408 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5409 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
5411 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5412 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger)
5413 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
5416 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5417 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5418 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5419 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5421 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5422 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
5424 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5426 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
5428 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5430 macro_rules! max_time {
5431 ($timestamp: expr) => {
5433 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
5434 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
5435 // having an explicit local time source.
5436 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
5437 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
5438 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5439 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
5440 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
5446 max_time!(self.last_node_announcement_serial);
5447 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
5448 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5449 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
5450 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
5453 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5454 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5455 outbounds.retain(|payment_id, payment| {
5456 if payment.remaining_parts() != 0 { return true }
5457 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { starting_block_height, payment_hash, .. } = payment {
5458 if *starting_block_height + PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS <= height {
5459 log_info!(self.logger, "Timing out payment with id {} and hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_id.0), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
5460 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
5461 payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash,
5469 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
5470 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5471 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.short_to_id.len());
5472 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
5473 if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() {
5474 res.push(funding_txo.txid);
5480 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
5481 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5482 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
5483 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
5484 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
5485 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
5486 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5487 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5492 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5494 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5495 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5496 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5497 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5500 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
5501 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
5503 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
5504 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
5505 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5506 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5507 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5509 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5510 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5512 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5513 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5514 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5515 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5516 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
5517 let res = f(channel);
5518 if let Ok((funding_locked_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
5519 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
5520 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&channel).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
5521 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
5522 failure_code: 0x1000 | 14, // expiry_too_soon, or at least it is now
5526 if let Some(funding_locked) = funding_locked_opt {
5527 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
5528 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5529 msg: funding_locked,
5531 if channel.is_usable() {
5532 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5533 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5534 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5535 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel).unwrap(),
5538 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5540 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
5542 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
5543 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5544 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5545 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5546 msg: announcement_sigs,
5548 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5549 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, height) {
5550 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5552 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5553 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5554 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap(),
5559 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
5560 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
5561 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
5563 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
5564 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
5565 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
5566 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
5567 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5571 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
5572 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
5573 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5574 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5575 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
5576 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
5577 data: reason_message,
5585 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5586 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, htlcs| {
5587 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
5588 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
5589 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
5590 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
5591 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
5592 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
5593 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
5594 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
5595 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
5596 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
5597 data: htlc_msat_height_data
5602 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
5607 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
5609 for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
5610 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
5614 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
5615 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
5616 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
5619 /// Note that this method is not available with the `no-std` feature.
5620 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
5621 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
5622 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
5625 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
5626 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
5628 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
5629 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
5632 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5633 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
5634 let mutcond = &self.persistence_notifier.persistence_lock;
5635 let &(ref mtx, _) = mutcond;
5636 let guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5640 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
5641 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
5642 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
5643 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
5647 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref , T: Deref , K: Deref , F: Deref , L: Deref >
5648 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5649 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5650 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5651 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5652 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5655 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
5656 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5657 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5660 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
5661 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5662 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5665 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
5666 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5667 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5670 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
5671 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5672 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5675 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
5676 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5677 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5680 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
5681 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5682 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5685 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
5686 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5687 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5690 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
5691 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5692 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5695 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
5696 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5697 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5700 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
5701 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5702 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5705 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
5706 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5707 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5710 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
5711 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5712 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5715 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
5716 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5717 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5720 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
5721 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5722 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5725 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
5726 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5727 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5730 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
5731 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5732 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
5735 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
5740 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
5741 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5742 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5745 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
5746 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5747 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5748 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
5750 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5751 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5752 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5753 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5754 if no_connection_possible {
5755 log_debug!(self.logger, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5756 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5757 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5758 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
5759 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
5761 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(true));
5762 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5763 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5767 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
5774 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5775 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5776 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5777 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
5778 if chan.is_shutdown() {
5779 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
5780 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
5782 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
5785 no_channels_remain = false;
5791 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
5793 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5794 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5795 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5796 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5797 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5798 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5799 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5800 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5801 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5802 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5803 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5804 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
5805 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
5806 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
5807 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5808 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5809 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
5810 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
5811 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
5815 if no_channels_remain {
5816 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
5819 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5820 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5824 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
5825 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5827 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5830 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5831 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
5832 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5833 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
5834 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
5837 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
5838 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
5843 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5844 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5845 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5846 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5847 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5848 if !chan.have_received_message() {
5849 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
5850 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
5851 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
5855 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
5856 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5857 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
5863 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
5866 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
5867 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5869 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
5870 for chan in self.list_channels() {
5871 if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
5872 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
5873 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(&msg.data));
5877 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
5878 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(&msg.data));
5883 /// Used to signal to the ChannelManager persister that the manager needs to be re-persisted to
5884 /// disk/backups, through `await_persistable_update_timeout` and `await_persistable_update`.
5885 struct PersistenceNotifier {
5886 /// Users won't access the persistence_lock directly, but rather wait on its bool using
5887 /// `wait_timeout` and `wait`.
5888 persistence_lock: (Mutex<bool>, Condvar),
5891 impl PersistenceNotifier {
5894 persistence_lock: (Mutex::new(false), Condvar::new()),
5900 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
5901 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5906 guard = cvar.wait(guard).unwrap();
5907 let result = *guard;
5915 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
5916 fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
5917 let current_time = Instant::now();
5919 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
5920 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5925 guard = cvar.wait_timeout(guard, max_wait).unwrap().0;
5926 // Due to spurious wakeups that can happen on `wait_timeout`, here we need to check if the
5927 // desired wait time has actually passed, and if not then restart the loop with a reduced wait
5928 // time. Note that this logic can be highly simplified through the use of
5929 // `Condvar::wait_while` and `Condvar::wait_timeout_while`, if and when our MSRV is raised to
5931 let elapsed = current_time.elapsed();
5932 let result = *guard;
5933 if result || elapsed >= max_wait {
5937 match max_wait.checked_sub(elapsed) {
5938 None => return result,
5944 // Signal to the ChannelManager persister that there are updates necessitating persisting to disk.
5946 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &self.persistence_lock;
5947 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5948 *persistence_lock = true;
5949 mem::drop(persistence_lock);
5954 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
5955 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
5957 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
5958 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
5959 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
5960 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
5963 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
5964 (2, node_id, required),
5965 (4, features, required),
5966 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
5967 (8, forwarding_info, option),
5970 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelDetails, {
5971 (2, channel_id, required),
5972 (4, counterparty, required),
5973 (6, funding_txo, option),
5974 (8, short_channel_id, option),
5975 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
5976 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
5977 (14, user_channel_id, required),
5978 (16, balance_msat, required),
5979 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
5980 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
5981 (22, confirmations_required, option),
5982 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
5983 (26, is_outbound, required),
5984 (28, is_funding_locked, required),
5985 (30, is_usable, required),
5986 (32, is_public, required),
5989 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
5990 (2, channels, vec_type),
5991 (4, phantom_scid, required),
5992 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
5995 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
5997 (0, onion_packet, required),
5998 (2, short_channel_id, required),
6001 (0, payment_data, required),
6002 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6003 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6005 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
6006 (0, payment_preimage, required),
6007 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6011 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
6012 (0, routing, required),
6013 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
6014 (4, payment_hash, required),
6015 (6, amt_to_forward, required),
6016 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required)
6020 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6021 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6023 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
6025 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6026 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6027 reason.write(writer)?;
6029 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6030 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
6033 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6034 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6035 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
6036 failure_code.write(writer)?;
6043 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6044 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6045 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6048 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6049 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6050 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6051 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
6055 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6056 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6057 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6058 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
6059 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
6062 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
6063 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
6064 // messages contained in the variants.
6065 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
6066 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
6067 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
6069 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6070 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6071 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6072 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6073 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
6076 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6077 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6078 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6079 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6080 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
6082 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6087 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
6092 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
6093 (0, short_channel_id, required),
6094 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6095 (2, outpoint, required),
6096 (4, htlc_id, required),
6097 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
6100 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
6101 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6102 let payment_data = match &self.onion_payload {
6103 OnionPayload::Invoice(data) => Some(data.clone()),
6106 let keysend_preimage = match self.onion_payload {
6107 OnionPayload::Invoice(_) => None,
6108 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => Some(preimage.clone()),
6113 (0, self.prev_hop, required), (2, self.value, required),
6114 (4, payment_data, option), (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
6115 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
6121 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
6122 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6123 let mut prev_hop = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6125 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
6126 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
6127 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
6131 (0, prev_hop, required), (2, value, required),
6132 (4, payment_data, option), (6, cltv_expiry, required),
6133 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
6135 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
6137 if payment_data.is_some() {
6138 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6140 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
6143 if payment_data.is_none() {
6144 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6146 OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data.unwrap())
6150 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
6158 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
6159 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6160 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6163 let mut session_priv: ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6164 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
6165 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
6166 let mut payment_id = None;
6167 let mut payment_secret = None;
6168 let mut payment_params = None;
6169 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6170 (0, session_priv, required),
6171 (1, payment_id, option),
6172 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6173 (3, payment_secret, option),
6174 (4, path, vec_type),
6175 (5, payment_params, option),
6177 if payment_id.is_none() {
6178 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
6180 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
6182 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6183 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
6184 first_hop_htlc_msat: first_hop_htlc_msat,
6185 path: path.unwrap(),
6186 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
6191 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6192 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6197 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
6198 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::io::Error> {
6200 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payment_params } => {
6202 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
6203 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6204 (0, session_priv, required),
6205 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
6206 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6207 (3, payment_secret, option),
6208 (4, path, vec_type),
6209 (5, payment_params, option),
6212 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
6214 field.write(writer)?;
6221 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason,
6222 (0, LightningError) => {
6226 (0, failure_code, required),
6227 (2, data, vec_type),
6231 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
6233 (0, forward_info, required),
6234 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
6235 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
6236 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
6239 (0, htlc_id, required),
6240 (2, err_packet, required),
6244 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
6245 (0, payment_secret, required),
6246 (2, expiry_time, required),
6247 (4, user_payment_id, required),
6248 (6, payment_preimage, required),
6249 (8, min_value_msat, required),
6252 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(PendingOutboundPayment,
6254 (0, session_privs, required),
6257 (0, session_privs, required),
6258 (1, payment_hash, option),
6261 (0, session_privs, required),
6262 (1, pending_fee_msat, option),
6263 (2, payment_hash, required),
6264 (4, payment_secret, option),
6265 (6, total_msat, required),
6266 (8, pending_amt_msat, required),
6267 (10, starting_block_height, required),
6270 (0, session_privs, required),
6271 (2, payment_hash, required),
6275 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
6276 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6277 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6278 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6279 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6282 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6283 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
6285 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6287 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
6289 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6290 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
6291 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
6294 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6295 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
6296 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6297 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6298 unfunded_channels += 1;
6301 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
6302 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6303 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6304 channel.write(writer)?;
6308 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6309 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
6310 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6311 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6312 for forward in pending_forwards {
6313 forward.write(writer)?;
6317 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6318 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
6319 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6320 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6321 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
6322 htlc.write(writer)?;
6326 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6327 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6328 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6329 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
6330 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6331 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
6334 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6335 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6336 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6337 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6338 for event in events.iter() {
6339 event.write(writer)?;
6342 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
6343 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6344 for event in background_events.iter() {
6346 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
6348 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
6349 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
6354 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6355 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6357 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6358 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
6359 hash.write(writer)?;
6360 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
6363 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
6364 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
6365 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6366 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
6367 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
6370 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
6371 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6373 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6374 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6375 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
6376 session_priv.write(writer)?;
6379 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
6380 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
6384 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
6385 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
6386 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6388 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6389 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6390 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
6395 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6396 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
6397 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
6398 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
6399 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
6406 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
6408 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
6410 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6411 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
6412 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
6413 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
6414 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
6415 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
6416 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
6417 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
6418 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6419 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
6420 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
6421 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
6422 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
6424 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
6425 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
6427 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
6428 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
6430 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
6431 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
6432 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
6433 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
6434 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
6435 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
6437 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
6438 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6439 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6440 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6441 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6442 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6445 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
6446 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
6448 pub keys_manager: K,
6450 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6452 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
6453 pub fee_estimator: F,
6454 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6456 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
6457 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
6458 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
6459 pub chain_monitor: M,
6461 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
6462 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
6463 /// force-closed during deserialization.
6464 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
6465 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
6466 /// deserialization.
6468 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
6469 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
6470 pub default_config: UserConfig,
6472 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
6473 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
6475 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
6476 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
6477 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
6478 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
6480 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
6483 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
6484 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
6487 impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6488 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
6489 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6490 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6491 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6492 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6495 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
6496 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
6497 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
6498 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
6499 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
6501 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
6502 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
6507 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
6508 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
6509 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6510 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
6511 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6512 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6513 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6514 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6517 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6518 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
6519 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
6523 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6524 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
6525 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6526 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6527 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6528 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6531 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6532 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6534 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6535 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6536 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6538 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
6540 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6541 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6542 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6543 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6544 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
6545 for _ in 0..channel_count {
6546 let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (&args.keys_manager, best_block_height))?;
6547 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
6548 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
6549 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
6550 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
6551 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
6552 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
6553 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
6554 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
6555 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
6556 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
6557 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
6558 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
6559 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
6560 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
6561 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
6562 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6563 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
6564 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
6565 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
6566 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
6567 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
6568 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
6569 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
6570 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
6571 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
6572 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
6573 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
6574 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
6575 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
6576 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6577 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
6578 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
6581 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6582 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
6583 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
6585 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
6588 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6589 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
6590 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
6591 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
6592 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
6593 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6597 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
6598 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
6599 log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
6600 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
6604 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
6605 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6606 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
6607 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
6608 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6609 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6610 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
6611 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
6612 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
6614 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
6617 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6618 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
6619 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
6620 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6621 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6622 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
6623 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
6624 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
6626 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
6629 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6630 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
6631 for _ in 0..peer_count {
6632 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6633 let peer_state = PeerState {
6634 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
6636 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
6639 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6640 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
6641 for _ in 0..event_count {
6642 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
6643 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
6647 if forward_htlcs_count > 0 {
6648 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
6649 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
6650 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
6651 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
6652 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
6653 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6654 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
6658 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6659 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
6660 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
6661 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6662 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
6663 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6667 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6668 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6670 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6671 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
6672 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
6673 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
6674 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6678 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6679 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
6680 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
6681 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
6682 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
6683 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
6684 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
6686 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
6687 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6691 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
6692 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
6693 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
6694 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
6695 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
6696 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6697 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
6698 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
6699 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
6700 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
6702 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
6703 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
6706 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
6707 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
6708 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
6709 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
6710 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
6711 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
6713 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
6715 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
6716 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
6717 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
6718 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
6719 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
6720 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
6721 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
6723 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors {
6724 if by_id.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
6725 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() {
6726 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
6727 if path.is_empty() {
6728 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
6729 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6731 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
6732 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
6733 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
6734 match pending_outbound_payments.as_mut().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
6735 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6736 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
6737 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
6738 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
6740 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6741 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
6742 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
6743 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
6744 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
6746 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
6747 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
6748 total_msat: path_amt,
6749 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
6751 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
6752 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
6761 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6762 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
6764 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
6765 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
6768 let our_network_key = match args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node) {
6770 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6772 let our_network_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &our_network_key);
6773 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
6774 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
6775 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
6776 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6780 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
6781 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
6782 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
6784 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
6785 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
6786 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
6788 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
6790 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
6795 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
6797 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
6798 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
6799 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
6800 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
6806 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
6807 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
6809 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
6811 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
6812 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
6813 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
6814 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
6816 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
6817 logger: args.logger,
6818 default_configuration: args.default_config,
6821 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
6822 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
6825 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
6826 //connection or two.
6828 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
6834 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
6835 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
6836 use core::time::Duration;
6837 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
6838 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
6839 use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure};
6840 use ln::channelmanager::inbound_payment;
6841 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
6842 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
6844 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
6845 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
6846 use util::errors::APIError;
6847 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
6848 use util::test_utils;
6849 use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
6851 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
6853 fn test_wait_timeout() {
6854 use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier;
6856 use core::sync::atomic::AtomicBool;
6859 let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new());
6860 let thread_notifier = Arc::clone(&persistence_notifier);
6862 let exit_thread = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
6863 let exit_thread_clone = exit_thread.clone();
6864 thread::spawn(move || {
6866 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &thread_notifier.persistence_lock;
6867 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6868 *persistence_lock = true;
6871 if exit_thread_clone.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
6877 // Check that we can block indefinitely until updates are available.
6878 let _ = persistence_notifier.wait();
6880 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration if updates are
6883 if persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
6888 exit_thread.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
6890 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration even if no updates
6893 if !persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
6900 fn test_notify_limits() {
6901 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
6902 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
6903 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6904 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6905 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6906 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6908 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
6909 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
6910 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6911 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6912 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6914 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6916 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
6917 // to connect messages with new values
6918 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
6919 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
6920 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
6921 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
6923 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
6924 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6925 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6926 // ... but the last node should not.
6927 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6928 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
6929 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6930 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6932 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
6933 // about the channel.
6934 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6935 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6936 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6938 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
6940 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6941 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6942 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6943 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6944 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6945 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6947 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
6948 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6949 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6951 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
6952 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
6953 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
6954 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
6955 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
6956 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
6958 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
6959 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
6960 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
6961 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
6962 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6963 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6964 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6965 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6967 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
6968 // the channel info has updated.
6969 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
6970 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
6971 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6972 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6973 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6974 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6978 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
6979 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
6981 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6982 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6983 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6984 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6985 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6987 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
6988 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
6989 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
6990 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
6991 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
6992 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
6993 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
6994 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6995 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6996 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6997 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
6999 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
7000 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
7001 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7002 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7003 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7004 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7005 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7006 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7007 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7008 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7009 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7010 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7011 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7012 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7013 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7014 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7015 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7016 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7017 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7018 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7019 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7020 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
7022 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
7023 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
7024 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7025 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7026 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7027 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
7029 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
7030 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
7031 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
7032 // lightning messages manually.
7033 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
7034 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7035 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7036 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7037 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
7038 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7039 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7040 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
7041 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7042 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7043 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
7044 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7045 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7046 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7047 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7048 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7049 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7050 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
7051 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7052 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7053 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
7054 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7055 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7056 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7057 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7058 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
7059 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7061 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
7062 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
7063 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7064 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
7066 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
7067 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
7068 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
7069 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
7071 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7074 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7075 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7076 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7077 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7079 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7082 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7083 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7084 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7085 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7087 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7092 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
7093 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
7094 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
7095 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
7096 // fails as expected.
7097 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7098 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7099 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7100 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7101 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7102 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7103 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7105 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
7106 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
7107 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
7109 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
7110 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7111 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id()),
7112 final_value_msat: 100_000,
7113 final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
7115 let route = find_route(
7116 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, nodes[0].network_graph, None,
7117 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7119 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
7120 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7121 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7122 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7123 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7124 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7125 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7126 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7127 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7128 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7129 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7130 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7131 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7132 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7133 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7134 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7135 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7136 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7137 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7138 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7139 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7141 // Finally, claim the original payment.
7142 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7144 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
7145 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7146 let route = find_route(
7147 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, nodes[0].network_graph, None,
7148 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7150 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
7151 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7152 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7153 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7154 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
7155 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
7156 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
7158 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
7159 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7160 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
7161 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7162 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7163 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7164 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7165 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7166 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7167 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7168 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7169 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7170 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7171 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7172 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7173 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7174 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7175 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7176 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7177 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7178 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7179 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7180 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7182 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
7183 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7187 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
7188 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
7189 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
7190 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7191 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7192 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7193 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7195 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7196 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7197 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7198 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7200 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7201 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7202 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7203 final_value_msat: 10000,
7204 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7206 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
7207 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7208 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7209 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7210 let route = find_route(
7211 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7212 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7215 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7216 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
7217 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
7218 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7220 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7221 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7222 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7223 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7224 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7225 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7226 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7228 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
7232 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
7233 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
7234 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7235 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7236 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7237 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7239 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7240 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7241 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7242 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7244 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7245 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7246 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7247 final_value_msat: 10000,
7248 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7250 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
7251 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7252 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7253 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7254 let route = find_route(
7255 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7256 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7259 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7260 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7261 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
7262 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
7263 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7265 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7266 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7267 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7268 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7269 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7270 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7271 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7273 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
7277 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
7278 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
7279 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
7280 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
7281 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7283 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7284 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7285 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7286 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7288 // Marshall an MPP route.
7289 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
7290 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
7291 route.paths.push(path);
7292 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7293 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
7294 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
7295 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
7296 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
7297 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
7299 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None).unwrap_err() {
7300 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
7301 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
7302 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
7307 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
7308 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
7309 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7310 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7311 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7312 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7314 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
7315 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
7317 total_msat: 100_000,
7320 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
7321 // payment verification fails as expected.
7322 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
7323 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
7324 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, payment_data.clone(), nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
7325 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
7327 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager::inbound_payment".to_string(), "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash".to_string(), 1);
7331 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
7332 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
7336 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
7339 use chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
7340 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, KeysInterface, InMemorySigner};
7341 use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
7342 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
7343 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7344 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
7345 use routing::network_graph::NetworkGraph;
7346 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, get_route};
7347 use util::test_utils;
7348 use util::config::UserConfig;
7349 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
7351 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7352 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7353 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, Transaction, TxOut};
7355 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
7359 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
7360 node: &'a ChannelManager<InMemorySigner,
7361 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
7362 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
7363 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
7364 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
7365 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>
7370 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
7371 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
7374 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
7375 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
7376 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
7378 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
7379 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7381 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
7382 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
7384 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
7385 config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
7387 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
7388 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
7389 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
7390 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
7391 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
7393 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
7395 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
7397 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
7398 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
7399 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
7400 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
7401 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
7403 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
7405 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
7407 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7408 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7409 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
7410 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7411 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7414 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
7415 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7416 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
7418 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
7419 } else { panic!(); }
7421 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7422 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7424 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
7427 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
7430 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
7431 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
7433 node_a.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7434 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7435 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
7436 match msg_events[0] {
7437 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref msg, .. } => {
7438 node_b.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
7439 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
7443 match msg_events[1] {
7444 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7448 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
7450 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
7451 macro_rules! send_payment {
7452 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
7453 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
7454 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id())
7455 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7456 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7457 let seed = [3u8; 32];
7458 let keys_manager = KeysManager::new(&seed, 42, 42);
7459 let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7460 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &dummy_graph.read_only(),
7461 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7463 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
7464 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
7466 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
7467 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
7469 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
7470 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
7471 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7472 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
7473 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
7474 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
7475 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
7476 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7478 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
7479 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
7480 assert!($node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
7482 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
7483 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
7484 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
7485 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7486 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
7488 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
7491 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
7492 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
7493 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
7494 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7496 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
7501 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
7502 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);