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[rust-lightning] / lightning / src / ln / channelmanager.rs
1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
2 // history.
3 //
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
8 // licenses.
9
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
11 //!
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
15 //!
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
19
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
24
25 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
27 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
28
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
31 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
32
33 use crate::chain;
34 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
38 use crate::events;
39 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
40 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
41 // construct one themselves.
42 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
43 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
44 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
45 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
46 use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
47 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
48 use crate::routing::router::{DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, RoutePath, Router};
49 use crate::routing::scoring::ProbabilisticScorer;
50 use crate::ln::msgs;
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
53 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
54 #[cfg(test)]
55 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
56 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment};
57 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
58 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, ChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
59 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig};
60 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
61 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
62 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
63 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
64 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
65 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
66
67 use alloc::collections::BTreeMap;
68
69 use crate::io;
70 use crate::prelude::*;
71 use core::{cmp, mem};
72 use core::cell::RefCell;
73 use crate::io::Read;
74 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
75 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
76 use core::time::Duration;
77 use core::ops::Deref;
78
79 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
80 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
81
82 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
83 //
84 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
85 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
86 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
87 //
88 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
89 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
90 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
91 // before we forward it.
92 //
93 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
94 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
95 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
96 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
97 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
98
99 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
100 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
101         Forward {
102                 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
103                 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
104                 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
105                 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
106         },
107         Receive {
108                 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
109                 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
110                 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
111                 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
112         },
113         ReceiveKeysend {
114                 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
115                 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
116                 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
117         },
118 }
119
120 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
121 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
122         pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
123         pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
124         payment_hash: PaymentHash,
125         /// Amount received
126         pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
127         /// Sender intended amount to forward or receive (actual amount received
128         /// may overshoot this in either case)
129         pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
130         pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
131 }
132
133 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
134 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
135         Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
136         Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
137 }
138
139 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
140 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
141 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
142         Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
143         Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
144 }
145
146 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
147         pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
148
149         // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
150         // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
151         // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
152         // HTLCs.
153         //
154         // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
155         prev_short_channel_id: u64,
156         prev_htlc_id: u64,
157         prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
158         prev_user_channel_id: u128,
159 }
160
161 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
162         AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
163         FailHTLC {
164                 htlc_id: u64,
165                 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
166         },
167 }
168
169 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
170 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
171 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
172         // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
173         short_channel_id: u64,
174         htlc_id: u64,
175         incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
176         phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
177
178         // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
179         // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
180         outpoint: OutPoint,
181 }
182
183 enum OnionPayload {
184         /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
185         Invoice {
186                 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
187                 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
188                 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
189         },
190         /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
191         Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
192 }
193
194 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
195 struct ClaimableHTLC {
196         prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
197         cltv_expiry: u32,
198         /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
199         value: u64,
200         /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
201         /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
202         sender_intended_value: u64,
203         onion_payload: OnionPayload,
204         timer_ticks: u8,
205         /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
206         /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
207         total_value_received: Option<u64>,
208         /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
209         total_msat: u64,
210 }
211
212 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
213 ///
214 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
215 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
216 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
217
218 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
219         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
220                 self.0.write(w)
221         }
222 }
223
224 impl Readable for PaymentId {
225         fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
226                 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
227                 Ok(PaymentId(buf))
228         }
229 }
230
231 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
232 ///
233 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
234 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
235 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
236
237 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
238         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
239                 self.0.write(w)
240         }
241 }
242
243 impl Readable for InterceptId {
244         fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
245                 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
246                 Ok(InterceptId(buf))
247         }
248 }
249
250 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
251 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
252 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
253         PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
254         OutboundRoute { session_priv: SecretKey },
255 }
256 impl SentHTLCId {
257         pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
258                 match source {
259                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
260                                 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
261                                 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
262                         },
263                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
264                                 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: *session_priv },
265                 }
266         }
267 }
268 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
269         (0, PreviousHopData) => {
270                 (0, short_channel_id, required),
271                 (2, htlc_id, required),
272         },
273         (2, OutboundRoute) => {
274                 (0, session_priv, required),
275         };
276 );
277
278
279 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
280 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
281 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
282 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
283         PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
284         OutboundRoute {
285                 path: Vec<RouteHop>,
286                 session_priv: SecretKey,
287                 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
288                 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
289                 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
290                 payment_id: PaymentId,
291         },
292 }
293 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
294 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
295         fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
296                 match self {
297                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
298                                 0u8.hash(hasher);
299                                 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
300                         },
301                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
302                                 1u8.hash(hasher);
303                                 path.hash(hasher);
304                                 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
305                                 payment_id.hash(hasher);
306                                 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
307                         },
308                 }
309         }
310 }
311 impl HTLCSource {
312         #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
313         #[cfg(test)]
314         pub fn dummy() -> Self {
315                 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
316                         path: Vec::new(),
317                         session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
318                         first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
319                         payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
320                 }
321         }
322
323         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
324         /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
325         /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
326         pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
327                 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
328                         *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
329                 } else {
330                         // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
331                         true
332                 }
333         }
334 }
335
336 struct ReceiveError {
337         err_code: u16,
338         err_data: Vec<u8>,
339         msg: &'static str,
340 }
341
342 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
343 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
344 ///
345 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
346 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
347 pub enum FailureCode {
348         /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
349         /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
350         TemporaryNodeFailure             = 0x2000 | 2,
351         /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
352         /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
353         RequiredNodeFeatureMissing       = 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
354         /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
355         /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
356         /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
357         /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
358         IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails = 0x4000 | 15,
359 }
360
361 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>);
362
363 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
364 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
365 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
366 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
367 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
368
369 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
370         err: msgs::LightningError,
371         chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
372         shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
373 }
374 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
375         #[inline]
376         fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
377                 Self {
378                         err: LightningError {
379                                 err: err.clone(),
380                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
381                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
382                                                 channel_id,
383                                                 data: err
384                                         },
385                                 },
386                         },
387                         chan_id: None,
388                         shutdown_finish: None,
389                 }
390         }
391         #[inline]
392         fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
393                 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
394         }
395         #[inline]
396         fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
397                 Self {
398                         err: LightningError {
399                                 err: err.clone(),
400                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
401                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
402                                                 channel_id,
403                                                 data: err
404                                         },
405                                 },
406                         },
407                         chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
408                         shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
409                 }
410         }
411         #[inline]
412         fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
413                 Self {
414                         err: match err {
415                                 ChannelError::Warn(msg) =>  LightningError {
416                                         err: msg.clone(),
417                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
418                                                 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
419                                                         channel_id,
420                                                         data: msg
421                                                 },
422                                                 log_level: Level::Warn,
423                                         },
424                                 },
425                                 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
426                                         err: msg,
427                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
428                                 },
429                                 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
430                                         err: msg.clone(),
431                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
432                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
433                                                         channel_id,
434                                                         data: msg
435                                                 },
436                                         },
437                                 },
438                         },
439                         chan_id: None,
440                         shutdown_finish: None,
441                 }
442         }
443 }
444
445 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
446 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
447 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
448 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
449 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
450
451 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
452 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
453 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
454 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
455 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
456 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
457         /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
458         CommitmentFirst,
459         /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
460         RevokeAndACKFirst,
461 }
462
463 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
464 struct ClaimingPayment {
465         amount_msat: u64,
466         payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
467         receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
468 }
469 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
470         (0, amount_msat, required),
471         (2, payment_purpose, required),
472         (4, receiver_node_id, required),
473 });
474
475 struct ClaimablePayment {
476         purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
477         onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
478         htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
479 }
480
481 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
482 struct ClaimablePayments {
483         /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
484         /// failed/claimed by the user.
485         ///
486         /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
487         /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
488         ///
489         /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
490         /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
491         claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
492
493         /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
494         /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
495         /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
496         pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
497 }
498
499 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
500 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
501 /// quite some time lag.
502 enum BackgroundEvent {
503         /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
504         /// commitment transaction.
505         ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
506 }
507
508 #[derive(Debug)]
509 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
510         /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
511         /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
512         /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
513         /// event can be generated.
514         PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
515         /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user.
516         EmitEvent { event: events::Event },
517 }
518
519 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
520         (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
521         (2, EmitEvent) => { (0, event, upgradable_required) },
522 );
523
524 /// State we hold per-peer.
525 pub(super) struct PeerState<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
526         /// `temporary_channel_id` or `channel_id` -> `channel`.
527         ///
528         /// Holds all channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once a channel has been assigned a
529         /// `channel_id`, the `temporary_channel_id` key in the map is updated and is replaced by the
530         /// `channel_id`.
531         pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
532         /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
533         latest_features: InitFeatures,
534         /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
535         /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
536         pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
537         /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
538         /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
539         ///
540         /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
541         /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
542         /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
543         /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
544         ///
545         /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
546         /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
547         /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
548         /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
549         /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
550         /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
551         monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
552         /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
553         /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
554         /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
555         is_connected: bool,
556 }
557
558 impl <Signer: ChannelSigner> PeerState<Signer> {
559         /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
560         /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
561         /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
562         fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
563                 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
564                         return false
565                 }
566                 self.channel_by_id.is_empty() && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
567         }
568 }
569
570 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
571 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
572 ///
573 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
574 /// here.
575 ///
576 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
577 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
578 struct PendingInboundPayment {
579         /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
580         payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
581         /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
582         /// this payment being removed.
583         expiry_time: u64,
584         /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
585         user_payment_id: u64,
586         // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
587         payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
588         min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
589 }
590
591 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
592 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
593 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
594 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
595 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
596 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
597 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
598 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
599 ///
600 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
601 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
602         Arc<M>,
603         Arc<T>,
604         Arc<KeysManager>,
605         Arc<KeysManager>,
606         Arc<KeysManager>,
607         Arc<F>,
608         Arc<DefaultRouter<
609                 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
610                 Arc<L>,
611                 Arc<Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>
612         >>,
613         Arc<L>
614 >;
615
616 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
617 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
618 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
619 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
620 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
621 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
622 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
623 /// or, respectively, [`Router`]  for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
624 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
625 ///
626 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
627 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<&'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e DefaultRouter<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L, &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>>, &'g L>;
628
629 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
630 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
631 ///
632 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
633 /// to individual Channels.
634 ///
635 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
636 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
637 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
638 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
639 ///
640 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
641 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
642 /// returning from [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`], with ChannelManagers, writing updates
643 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during
644 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
645 /// [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the
646 /// `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
647 ///
648 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
649 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
650 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
651 ///
652 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
653 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
654 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
655 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
656 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
657 ///
658 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
659 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
660 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
661 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
662 ///
663 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
664 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
665 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
666 ///
667 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
668 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
669 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
670 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
671 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
672 ///
673 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
674 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
675 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
676 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
677 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
678 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
679 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
680 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
681 //
682 // Lock order:
683 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
684 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
685 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
686 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
687 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
688 //
689 // Lock order tree:
690 //
691 // `total_consistency_lock`
692 //  |
693 //  |__`forward_htlcs`
694 //  |   |
695 //  |   |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
696 //  |
697 //  |__`per_peer_state`
698 //  |   |
699 //  |   |__`pending_inbound_payments`
700 //  |       |
701 //  |       |__`claimable_payments`
702 //  |       |
703 //  |       |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
704 //  |           |
705 //  |           |__`peer_state`
706 //  |               |
707 //  |               |__`id_to_peer`
708 //  |               |
709 //  |               |__`short_to_chan_info`
710 //  |               |
711 //  |               |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
712 //  |               |
713 //  |               |__`best_block`
714 //  |               |
715 //  |               |__`pending_events`
716 //  |                   |
717 //  |                   |__`pending_background_events`
718 //
719 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
720 where
721         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
722         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
723         ES::Target: EntropySource,
724         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
725         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
726         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
727         R::Target: Router,
728         L::Target: Logger,
729 {
730         default_configuration: UserConfig,
731         genesis_hash: BlockHash,
732         fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
733         chain_monitor: M,
734         tx_broadcaster: T,
735         #[allow(unused)]
736         router: R,
737
738         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
739         #[cfg(test)]
740         pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
741         #[cfg(not(test))]
742         best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
743         secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
744
745         /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
746         /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
747         /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
748         /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
749         ///
750         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
751         pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
752
753         /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
754         /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
755         /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
756         /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
757         /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
758         /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
759         /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
760         /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
761         ///
762         /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
763         ///
764         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
765         pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
766
767         /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
768         ///
769         /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
770         /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
771         /// and via the classic SCID.
772         ///
773         /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
774         /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
775         ///
776         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
777         #[cfg(test)]
778         pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
779         #[cfg(not(test))]
780         forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
781         /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
782         /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
783         ///
784         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
785         pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
786
787         /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
788         /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
789         ///
790         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
791         claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
792
793         /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
794         /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
795         /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
796         /// active channel list on load.
797         ///
798         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
799         outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
800
801         /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
802         ///
803         /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
804         /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
805         /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
806         ///
807         /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
808         /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
809         /// the handling of the events.
810         ///
811         /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
812         /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
813         ///
814         /// TODO:
815         /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
816         /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
817         /// would break backwards compatability.
818         /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
819         /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
820         /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
821         ///
822         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
823         id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
824
825         /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
826         ///
827         /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
828         /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
829         /// confirmation depth.
830         ///
831         /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
832         /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
833         /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
834         ///
835         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
836         #[cfg(test)]
837         pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
838         #[cfg(not(test))]
839         short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
840
841         our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
842
843         inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
844
845         /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
846         /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
847         /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
848         ///
849         /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
850         fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
851
852         /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
853         /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
854         /// keeping additional state.
855         probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
856
857         /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
858         /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
859         /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
860         highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
861
862         /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
863         /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
864         ///
865         /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
866         /// are currently open with that peer.
867         ///
868         /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
869         /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
870         /// channels.
871         ///
872         /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
873         ///
874         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
875         #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
876         per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
877         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
878         pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
879
880         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
881         pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
882         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
883         pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
884         /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
885         /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
886         /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
887         /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
888         /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
889         /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
890         total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
891
892         persistence_notifier: Notifier,
893
894         entropy_source: ES,
895         node_signer: NS,
896         signer_provider: SP,
897
898         logger: L,
899 }
900
901 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
902 ///
903 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
904 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
905 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
906 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
907 pub struct ChainParameters {
908         /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
909         pub network: Network,
910
911         /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
912         ///
913         /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
914         pub best_block: BestBlock,
915 }
916
917 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
918 enum NotifyOption {
919         DoPersist,
920         SkipPersist,
921 }
922
923 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
924 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
925 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
926 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
927 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
928 /// updates are ready for persistence).
929 ///
930 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
931 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
932 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
933 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
934         persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
935         should_persist: F,
936         // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
937         _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
938 }
939
940 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
941         fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
942                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
943         }
944
945         fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
946                 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
947
948                 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
949                         persistence_notifier: notifier,
950                         should_persist: persist_check,
951                         _read_guard: read_guard,
952                 }
953         }
954 }
955
956 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
957         fn drop(&mut self) {
958                 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
959                         self.persistence_notifier.notify();
960                 }
961         }
962 }
963
964 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
965 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
966 ///
967 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
968 ///
969 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
970 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
971 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
972 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
973 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
974
975 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
976 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
977 ///
978 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
979 ///
980 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
981 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
982 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
983 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
984 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
985 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
986 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
987 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
988 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
989 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
990 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
991 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
992 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
993
994 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
995 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
996 /// this value.
997 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
998 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
999 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1000 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1001
1002 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1003 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1004 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1005 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1006 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1007 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1008 #[deny(const_err)]
1009 #[allow(dead_code)]
1010 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1011
1012 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1013 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1014 #[deny(const_err)]
1015 #[allow(dead_code)]
1016 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1017
1018 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1019 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1020
1021 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
1022 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
1023 /// [`OutboundPayments::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
1024 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
1025
1026 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1027 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1028 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1029 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1030
1031 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1032 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1033 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1034
1035 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1036 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1037 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1038
1039 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1040 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1041 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1042         /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1043         pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1044         /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1045         pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1046         /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1047         /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1048         /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1049         pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1050 }
1051
1052 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1053 /// to better separate parameters.
1054 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1055 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1056         /// The node_id of our counterparty
1057         pub node_id: PublicKey,
1058         /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1059         /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1060         /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1061         pub features: InitFeatures,
1062         /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1063         /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1064         /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1065         ///
1066         /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1067         ///
1068         /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1069         pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1070         /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1071         /// payments to us through this channel.
1072         pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1073         /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1074         /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1075         /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1076         pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1077         /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1078         pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1079 }
1080
1081 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1082 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1083 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1084         /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1085         /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1086         /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1087         /// lifetime of the channel.
1088         pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1089         /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1090         pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1091         /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1092         /// our counterparty already.
1093         ///
1094         /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1095         /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1096         pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1097         /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1098         ///
1099         /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1100         pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1101         /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1102         /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1103         ///
1104         /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1105         /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1106         ///
1107         /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1108         /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1109         ///
1110         /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1111         /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1112         /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1113         /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1114         /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1115         pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1116         /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1117         /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1118         /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1119         /// `Some(0)`).
1120         ///
1121         /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1122         ///
1123         /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1124         /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1125         pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1126         /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1127         /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1128         /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1129         /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1130         ///
1131         /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1132         /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1133         ///
1134         /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1135         pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1136         /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1137         pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1138         /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1139         /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1140         /// this value on chain.
1141         ///
1142         /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1143         ///
1144         /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1145         ///
1146         /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1147         pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1148         /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or a random value if the channel was
1149         /// inbound. This may be zero for inbound channels serialized with LDK versions prior to
1150         /// 0.0.113.
1151         pub user_channel_id: u128,
1152         /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1153         /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1154         ///
1155         /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1156         pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1157         /// Our total balance.  This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1158         /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1159         /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1160         ///
1161         /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1162         /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1163         /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1164         /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1165         ///
1166         /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1167         pub balance_msat: u64,
1168         /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1169         /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1170         /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1171         /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1172         ///
1173         /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1174         ///
1175         /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1176         /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1177         /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1178         pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1179         /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1180         /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1181         /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1182         /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1183         ///
1184         /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1185         pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1186         /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1187         /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1188         /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1189         /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1190         /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1191         ///
1192         /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1193         /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1194         /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1195         pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1196         /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1197         /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1198         /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1199         /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1200         /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1201         ///
1202         /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1203         ///
1204         /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1205         /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1206         /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1207         pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1208         /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1209         ///
1210         /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1211         pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1212         /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1213         /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1214         /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1215         /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1216         /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1217         ///
1218         /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1219         pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1220         /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1221         pub is_outbound: bool,
1222         /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1223         /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1224         /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1225         /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1226         /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1227         ///
1228         /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1229         pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1230         /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1231         /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1232         ///
1233         /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1234         pub is_usable: bool,
1235         /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1236         pub is_public: bool,
1237         /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1238         /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1239         pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1240         /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1241         pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1242         /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1243         ///
1244         /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1245         pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1246 }
1247
1248 impl ChannelDetails {
1249         /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1250         /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1251         /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1252         ///
1253         /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1254         /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1255         pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1256                 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1257         }
1258
1259         /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1260         /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1261         /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1262         ///
1263         /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1264         /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1265         pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1266                 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1267         }
1268
1269         fn from_channel<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner>(channel: &Channel<Signer>,
1270                 best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures) -> Self {
1271
1272                 let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
1273                 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1274                         channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1275                 ChannelDetails {
1276                         channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1277                         counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1278                                 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1279                                 features: latest_features,
1280                                 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1281                                 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1282                                 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1283                                 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1284                                 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1285                                 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1286                                 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1287                                 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
1288                                         Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1289                                 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1290                         },
1291                         funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1292                         // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1293                         // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1294                         channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1295                         short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1296                         outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1297                         inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1298                         channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1299                         feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(channel.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1300                         unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1301                         balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1302                         inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1303                         outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1304                         next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1305                         user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1306                         confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1307                         confirmations: Some(channel.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1308                         force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1309                         is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1310                         is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(),
1311                         is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1312                         is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1313                         inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1314                         inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1315                         config: Some(channel.config()),
1316                 }
1317         }
1318 }
1319
1320 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1321 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1322 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1323 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1324         /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1325         Pending {
1326                 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1327                 /// abandoned.
1328                 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1329                 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1330                 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1331                 total_msat: u64,
1332         },
1333         /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1334         /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1335         /// payment is removed from tracking.
1336         Fulfilled {
1337                 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1338                 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1339                 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1340         },
1341         /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1342         /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1343         /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1344         Abandoned {
1345                 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1346                 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1347         },
1348 }
1349
1350 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1351 ///
1352 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
1353 #[derive(Clone)]
1354 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1355         /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1356         pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1357         /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1358         /// route hints.
1359         pub phantom_scid: u64,
1360         /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1361         pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1362 }
1363
1364 macro_rules! handle_error {
1365         ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
1366                 match $internal {
1367                         Ok(msg) => Ok(msg),
1368                         Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1369                                 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1370                                 // entering the macro.
1371                                 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1372                                 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1373
1374                                 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1375
1376                                 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1377                                         $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1378                                         if let Some(update) = update_option {
1379                                                 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1380                                                         msg: update
1381                                                 });
1382                                         }
1383                                         if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1384                                                 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1385                                                         channel_id, user_channel_id,
1386                                                         reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1387                                                 });
1388                                         }
1389                                 }
1390
1391                                 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1392                                 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1393                                 } else {
1394                                         msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1395                                                 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1396                                                 action: err.action.clone()
1397                                         });
1398                                 }
1399
1400                                 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1401                                         let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1402                                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1403                                                 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1404                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1405                                         }
1406                                 }
1407
1408                                 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1409                                 Err(err)
1410                         },
1411                 }
1412         }
1413 }
1414
1415 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1416         ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {{
1417                 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.channel_id());
1418                 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1419                 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1420                         short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1421                 } else {
1422                         // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1423                         // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1424                         // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1425                         // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1426                         // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1427                         // stage.
1428                         let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1429                         debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1430                 }
1431                 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1432         }}
1433 }
1434
1435 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1436 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1437         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1438                 match $err {
1439                         ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1440                                 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1441                         },
1442                         ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1443                                 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1444                         },
1445                         ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1446                                 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1447                                 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel);
1448                                 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1449                                 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1450                                         shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1451                         },
1452                 }
1453         }
1454 }
1455
1456 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1457         ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1458                 match $res {
1459                         Ok(res) => res,
1460                         Err(e) => {
1461                                 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1462                                 if drop {
1463                                         $entry.remove_entry();
1464                                 }
1465                                 break Err(res);
1466                         }
1467                 }
1468         }
1469 }
1470
1471 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1472         ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1473                 match $res {
1474                         Ok(res) => res,
1475                         Err(e) => {
1476                                 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1477                                 if drop {
1478                                         $entry.remove_entry();
1479                                 }
1480                                 return Err(res);
1481                         }
1482                 }
1483         }
1484 }
1485
1486 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1487         ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1488                 {
1489                         let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1490                         update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, channel);
1491                         channel
1492                 }
1493         }
1494 }
1495
1496 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1497         ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1498                 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1499                         node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1500                         msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1501                 });
1502                 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1503                 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1504                 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1505                 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1506                 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1507                         "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1508                 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1509                         let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1510                         assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1511                                 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1512                 }
1513         }}
1514 }
1515
1516 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
1517         ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1518                 if $channel.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
1519                         $locked_events.push(events::Event::ChannelPending {
1520                                 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1521                                 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.temporary_channel_id(),
1522                                 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1523                                 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1524                                 funding_txo: $channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1525                         });
1526                         $channel.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
1527                 }
1528         }
1529 }
1530
1531 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1532         ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1533                 if $channel.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1534                         debug_assert!($channel.channel_pending_event_emitted());
1535                         $locked_events.push(events::Event::ChannelReady {
1536                                 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1537                                 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1538                                 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1539                                 channel_type: $channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
1540                         });
1541                         $channel.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1542                 }
1543         }
1544 }
1545
1546 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
1547         ($self: ident, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
1548                 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
1549                         &$self.node_signer, $self.genesis_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
1550                         $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
1551                 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1552                 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.is_usable() {
1553                         // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
1554                         // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
1555                         // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
1556                         // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
1557                         // now.
1558                         if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
1559                                 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
1560                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1561                                         msg,
1562                                 })
1563                         } else { None }
1564                 } else { None };
1565
1566                 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
1567                         .remove(&$chan.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
1568
1569                 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
1570                         &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
1571                         updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
1572                         updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
1573                         updates.announcement_sigs);
1574                 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
1575                         $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
1576                 }
1577
1578                 let channel_id = $chan.channel_id();
1579                 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
1580                 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
1581
1582                 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
1583
1584                 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1585                         $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1586                 }
1587                 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
1588                 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1589                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1590                         $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
1591                 }
1592         } }
1593 }
1594
1595 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
1596         ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING, $remove: expr) => { {
1597                 // update_maps_on_chan_removal needs to be able to take id_to_peer, so make sure we can in
1598                 // any case so that it won't deadlock.
1599                 debug_assert!($self.id_to_peer.try_lock().is_ok());
1600                 match $update_res {
1601                         ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1602                                 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
1603                                         log_bytes!($chan.channel_id()[..]));
1604                                 Ok(())
1605                         },
1606                         ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1607                                 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure",
1608                                         log_bytes!($chan.channel_id()[..]));
1609                                 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $chan);
1610                                 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(
1611                                         "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), $chan.channel_id(),
1612                                         $chan.get_user_id(), $chan.force_shutdown(false),
1613                                         $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok()));
1614                                 $remove;
1615                                 res
1616                         },
1617                         ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
1618                                 if ($update_id == 0 || $chan.get_next_monitor_update()
1619                                         .expect("We can't be processing a monitor update if it isn't queued")
1620                                         .update_id == $update_id) &&
1621                                         $chan.get_latest_monitor_update_id() == $update_id
1622                                 {
1623                                         handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
1624                                 }
1625                                 Ok(())
1626                         },
1627                 }
1628         } };
1629         ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr) => {
1630                 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan_entry.get_mut(), MANUALLY_REMOVING, $chan_entry.remove_entry())
1631         }
1632 }
1633
1634 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1635 where
1636         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
1637         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1638         ES::Target: EntropySource,
1639         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1640         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1641         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1642         R::Target: Router,
1643         L::Target: Logger,
1644 {
1645         /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
1646         ///
1647         /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1648         /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
1649         ///
1650         /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1651         ///
1652         /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
1653         /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
1654         /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
1655         /// more details.
1656         ///
1657         /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
1658         /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
1659         /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
1660         pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1661                 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1662                 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1663                 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1664                 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1665                 ChannelManager {
1666                         default_configuration: config.clone(),
1667                         genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1668                         fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
1669                         chain_monitor,
1670                         tx_broadcaster,
1671                         router,
1672
1673                         best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1674
1675                         outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1676                         pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1677                         pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
1678                         forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1679                         claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
1680                         pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1681                         id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1682                         short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1683
1684                         our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1685                         secp_ctx,
1686
1687                         inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1688                         fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1689
1690                         probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1691
1692                         highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1693
1694                         per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1695
1696                         pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1697                         pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1698                         total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1699                         persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
1700
1701                         entropy_source,
1702                         node_signer,
1703                         signer_provider,
1704
1705                         logger,
1706                 }
1707         }
1708
1709         /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
1710         pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1711                 &self.default_configuration
1712         }
1713
1714         fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1715                 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1716                 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1717                 let mut i = 0;
1718                 loop {
1719                         if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1720                                 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1721                         } else {
1722                                 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
1723                         }
1724                         if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1725                                 break;
1726                         }
1727                         i += 1;
1728                         if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1729                 }
1730                 outbound_scid_alias
1731         }
1732
1733         /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1734         ///
1735         /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1736         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1737         /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
1738         /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
1739         /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
1740         ///
1741         /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1742         /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1743         ///
1744         /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1745         /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1746         /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1747         ///
1748         /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1749         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1750         /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1751         /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1752         /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1753         /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1754         ///
1755         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1756         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1757         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1758         pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1759                 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1760                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1761                 }
1762
1763                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1764                 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1765                 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1766
1767                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1768
1769                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
1770                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
1771
1772                 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1773                 let channel = {
1774                         let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
1775                         let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1776                         let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1777                         match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
1778                                 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
1779                                 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
1780                         {
1781                                 Ok(res) => res,
1782                                 Err(e) => {
1783                                         self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
1784                                         return Err(e);
1785                                 },
1786                         }
1787                 };
1788                 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1789
1790                 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1791                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1792                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1793                                 if cfg!(fuzzing) {
1794                                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1795                                 } else {
1796                                         panic!("RNG is bad???");
1797                                 }
1798                         },
1799                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1800                 }
1801
1802                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1803                         node_id: their_network_key,
1804                         msg: res,
1805                 });
1806                 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1807         }
1808
1809         fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1810                 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
1811                 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
1812                 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
1813                 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
1814                 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
1815                 // the same channel.
1816                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
1817                 {
1818                         let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1819                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1820                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
1821                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1822                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1823                                 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1824                                         let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel(channel, best_block_height,
1825                                                 peer_state.latest_features.clone());
1826                                         res.push(details);
1827                                 }
1828                         }
1829                 }
1830                 res
1831         }
1832
1833         /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
1834         /// more information.
1835         pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1836                 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1837         }
1838
1839         /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1840         /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1841         ///
1842         /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1843         /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1844         /// are.
1845         pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1846                 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1847                 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1848                 // really wanted anyway.
1849                 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1850         }
1851
1852         /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
1853         pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1854                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1855                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1856
1857                 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
1858                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1859                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1860                         let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1861                         return peer_state.channel_by_id
1862                                 .iter()
1863                                 .map(|(_, channel)|
1864                                         ChannelDetails::from_channel(channel, best_block_height, features.clone()))
1865                                 .collect();
1866                 }
1867                 vec![]
1868         }
1869
1870         /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
1871         /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1872         ///
1873         /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
1874         /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
1875         /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
1876         ///
1877         /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
1878         pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
1879                 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
1880                         .filter_map(|(_, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
1881                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
1882                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
1883                                                 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
1884                                                 total_msat: *total_msat,
1885                                         })
1886                                 },
1887                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
1888                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
1889                                 },
1890                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
1891                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
1892                                 },
1893                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
1894                         })
1895                         .collect()
1896         }
1897
1898         /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1899         fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1900                 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1901                 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1902                         Some(transaction) => {
1903                                 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1904                         },
1905                         None => {},
1906                 }
1907                 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1908                         channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1909                         user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1910                         reason: closure_reason
1911                 });
1912         }
1913
1914         fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1915                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1916
1917                 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1918                 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1919                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1920
1921                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
1922                                 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
1923
1924                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1925                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1926                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1927                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1928                                         let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo();
1929                                         let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1930                                         let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut()
1931                                                 .get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?;
1932                                         failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1933
1934                                         // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
1935                                         // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
1936                                         // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
1937                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1938                                                 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
1939                                                 msg: shutdown_msg,
1940                                         });
1941
1942                                         // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1943                                         if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
1944                                                 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1945                                                 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
1946                                                 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry);
1947                                         }
1948
1949                                         if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1950                                                 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
1951                                                 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1952                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1953                                                                 msg: channel_update
1954                                                         });
1955                                                 }
1956                                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1957                                         }
1958                                         break Ok(());
1959                                 },
1960                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id) })
1961                         }
1962                 };
1963
1964                 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1965                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
1966                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
1967                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
1968                 }
1969
1970                 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
1971                 Ok(())
1972         }
1973
1974         /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1975         /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1976         /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1977         ///
1978         ///  * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1979         ///    [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1980         ///    estimate.
1981         ///  * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1982         ///    transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1983         ///    would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1984         ///    counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1985         ///
1986         /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
1987         ///
1988         /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1989         /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1990         /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1991         /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
1992         pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1993                 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None)
1994         }
1995
1996         /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1997         /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1998         /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1999         ///
2000         /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2001         /// the channel being closed or not:
2002         ///  * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2003         ///    transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2004         ///    [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2005         ///    estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2006         ///  * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2007         ///    transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2008         ///    will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2009         ///
2010         /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2011         ///
2012         /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2013         /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2014         /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2015         /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2016         pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2017                 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
2018         }
2019
2020         #[inline]
2021         fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2022                 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
2023                 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
2024                 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2025                         let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2026                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2027                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2028                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2029                 }
2030                 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
2031                         // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2032                         // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2033                         // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2034                         // ignore the result here.
2035                         let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2036                 }
2037         }
2038
2039         /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2040         /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2041         fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2042         -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2043                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2044                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2045                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2046                 let mut chan = {
2047                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2048                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2049                         if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2050                                 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2051                                         self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) });
2052                                 } else {
2053                                         self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2054                                 }
2055                                 remove_channel!(self, chan)
2056                         } else {
2057                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), peer_node_id) });
2058                         }
2059                 };
2060                 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2061                 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2062                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2063                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2064                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2065                                 msg: update
2066                         });
2067                 }
2068
2069                 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
2070         }
2071
2072         fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2073                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2074                 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2075                         Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2076                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2077                                 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2078                                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2079                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2080                                                 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2081                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2082                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2083                                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2084                                                         },
2085                                                 }
2086                                         );
2087                                 }
2088                                 Ok(())
2089                         },
2090                         Err(e) => Err(e)
2091                 }
2092         }
2093
2094         /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2095         /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2096         /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2097         /// channel.
2098         pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2099         -> Result<(), APIError> {
2100                 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2101         }
2102
2103         /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2104         /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2105         /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2106         ///
2107         /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2108         /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2109         pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2110         -> Result<(), APIError> {
2111                 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2112         }
2113
2114         /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2115         /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2116         pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2117                 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2118                         let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2119                 }
2120         }
2121
2122         /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2123         /// local transaction(s).
2124         pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2125                 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2126                         let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2127                 }
2128         }
2129
2130         fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2131                 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
2132         {
2133                 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2134                 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry {
2135                         return Err(ReceiveError {
2136                                 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender",
2137                                 err_code: 18,
2138                                 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2139                         })
2140                 }
2141                 // final_expiry_too_soon
2142                 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2143                 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2144                 //
2145                 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2146                 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2147                 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2148                 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2149                 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2150                         let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
2151                         err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
2152                         err_data.extend_from_slice(&current_height.to_be_bytes());
2153                         return Err(ReceiveError {
2154                                 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
2155                                 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2156                         });
2157                 }
2158                 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
2159                         return Err(ReceiveError {
2160                                 err_code: 19,
2161                                 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
2162                                 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2163                         });
2164                 }
2165
2166                 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2167                         msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2168                                 return Err(ReceiveError {
2169                                         err_code: 0x4000|22,
2170                                         err_data: Vec::new(),
2171                                         msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2172                                 });
2173                         },
2174                         msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage, payment_metadata } => {
2175                                 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2176                                         return Err(ReceiveError {
2177                                                 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2178                                                 err_data: Vec::new(),
2179                                                 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2180                                         });
2181                                 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2182                                         PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2183                                                 payment_data: data,
2184                                                 payment_metadata,
2185                                                 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2186                                                 phantom_shared_secret,
2187                                         }
2188                                 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2189                                         // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2190                                         // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2191                                         // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2192                                         // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2193                                         // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2194                                         let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2195                                         if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2196                                                 return Err(ReceiveError {
2197                                                         err_code: 0x4000|22,
2198                                                         err_data: Vec::new(),
2199                                                         msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2200                                                 });
2201                                         }
2202
2203                                         PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2204                                                 payment_preimage,
2205                                                 payment_metadata,
2206                                                 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2207                                         }
2208                                 } else {
2209                                         return Err(ReceiveError {
2210                                                 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2211                                                 err_data: Vec::new(),
2212                                                 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2213                                         });
2214                                 }
2215                         },
2216                 };
2217                 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2218                         routing,
2219                         payment_hash,
2220                         incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2221                         incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2222                         outgoing_amt_msat: hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2223                         outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2224                 })
2225         }
2226
2227         fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
2228                 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2229                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2230                                 {
2231                                         log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2232                                         return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2233                                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2234                                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2235                                                 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2236                                                 failure_code: $err_code,
2237                                         }));
2238                                 }
2239                         }
2240                 }
2241
2242                 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2243                         return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2244                 }
2245
2246                 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
2247                         Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
2248                 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
2249
2250                 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2251                         //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2252                         //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2253                         //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2254                         //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2255                         //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2256                         //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2257                         return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2258                 }
2259                 macro_rules! return_err {
2260                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2261                                 {
2262                                         log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2263                                         return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2264                                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2265                                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2266                                                 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2267                                                         .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2268                                         }));
2269                                 }
2270                         }
2271                 }
2272
2273                 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2274                         Ok(res) => res,
2275                         Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2276                                 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2277                         },
2278                         Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2279                                 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2280                         },
2281                 };
2282
2283                 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2284                         onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2285                                 // OUR PAYMENT!
2286                                 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2287                                         Ok(info) => {
2288                                                 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2289                                                 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2290                                                 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2291                                                 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2292                                                 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2293                                         },
2294                                         Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2295                                 }
2296                         },
2297                         onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2298                                 let new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2299                                 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2300                                         version: 0,
2301                                         public_key: onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx, new_pubkey, &shared_secret),
2302                                         hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2303                                         hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2304                                 };
2305
2306                                 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2307                                         msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2308                                         msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2309                                                 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2310                                         },
2311                                 };
2312
2313                                 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2314                                         routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2315                                                 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2316                                                 short_channel_id,
2317                                         },
2318                                         payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2319                                         incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2320                                         incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2321                                         outgoing_amt_msat: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2322                                         outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2323                                 })
2324                         }
2325                 };
2326
2327                 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref outgoing_amt_msat, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2328                         // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2329                         // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2330                         // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2331                         if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2332                                 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
2333                                         let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(short_channel_id).cloned();
2334                                         let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
2335                                                 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2336                                                         // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2337                                                         // phantom or an intercept.
2338                                                         if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2339                                                            fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
2340                                                            fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)
2341                                                         {
2342                                                                 None
2343                                                         } else {
2344                                                                 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2345                                                         }
2346                                                 },
2347                                                 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
2348                                         };
2349                                         let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
2350                                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2351                                                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
2352                                                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
2353                                                         break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2354                                                 }
2355                                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2356                                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2357                                                 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2358                                                         None => {
2359                                                                 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
2360                                                                 // have no consistency guarantees.
2361                                                                 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2362                                                         },
2363                                                         Some(chan) => chan
2364                                                 };
2365                                                 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2366                                                         // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2367                                                         // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2368                                                         // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2369                                                         break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2370                                                 }
2371                                                 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2372                                                         // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2373                                                         // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2374                                                         // we don't have the channel here.
2375                                                         break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2376                                                 }
2377                                                 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2378
2379                                                 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2380                                                 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2381                                                 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2382                                                 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2383                                                 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2384                                                 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2385                                                         break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2386                                                 }
2387                                                 if *outgoing_amt_msat < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2388                                                         break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2389                                                 }
2390                                                 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, *outgoing_amt_msat, *outgoing_cltv_value) {
2391                                                         break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2392                                                 }
2393                                                 chan_update_opt
2394                                         } else {
2395                                                 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
2396                                                         // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
2397                                                         // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
2398                                                         // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
2399                                                         break Some((
2400                                                                 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2401                                                                 0x2000 | 2, None,
2402                                                         ));
2403                                                 }
2404                                                 None
2405                                         };
2406
2407                                         let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2408                                         // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2409                                         // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2410                                         // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2411                                         if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2412                                                 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2413                                         }
2414                                         if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2415                                                 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2416                                         }
2417                                         // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2418                                         // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2419                                         // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2420                                         // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2421                                         // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2422                                         // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2423                                         // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2424                                         // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2425                                         if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2426                                                 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2427                                         }
2428
2429                                         break None;
2430                                 }
2431                                 {
2432                                         let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2433                                         if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2434                                                 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2435                                                         msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2436                                                 }
2437                                                 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2438                                                         msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2439                                                 }
2440                                                 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2441                                                         // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2442                                                         0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2443                                                 }
2444                                                 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2445                                                 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2446                                                 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2447                                         } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
2448                                                 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
2449                                                 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
2450                                                 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
2451                                                 // instead.
2452                                                 code = 0x2000 | 2;
2453                                         }
2454                                         return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2455                                 }
2456                         }
2457                 }
2458
2459                 pending_forward_info
2460         }
2461
2462         /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2463         /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2464         /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2465         ///
2466         /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
2467         /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
2468         /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2469         ///
2470         /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2471         /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
2472         fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2473                 if !chan.should_announce() {
2474                         return Err(LightningError {
2475                                 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2476                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2477                         });
2478                 }
2479                 if chan.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2480                         return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2481                 }
2482                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2483                 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2484         }
2485
2486         /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2487         /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
2488         /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2489         /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2490         ///
2491         /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
2492         /// `peer_state`  corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
2493         /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2494         ///
2495         /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2496         /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
2497         fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2498                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2499                 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
2500                         None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2501                         Some(id) => id,
2502                 };
2503
2504                 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2505         }
2506         fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2507                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2508                 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2509
2510                 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2511                         chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2512                         short_channel_id,
2513                         timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2514                         flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2515                         cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2516                         htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2517                         htlc_maximum_msat: chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
2518                         fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2519                         fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2520                         excess_data: Vec::new(),
2521                 };
2522                 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
2523                 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
2524                 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
2525                 // channel.
2526                 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
2527
2528                 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2529                         signature: sig,
2530                         contents: unsigned
2531                 })
2532         }
2533
2534         #[cfg(test)]
2535         pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2536                 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2537                 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv_bytes)
2538         }
2539
2540         fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2541                 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
2542                 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2543
2544                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2545                 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
2546                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2547
2548                 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2549                         .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected".to_owned()})?;
2550                 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2551                 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2552                         return Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Route size too large considering onion data".to_owned()});
2553                 }
2554                 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2555
2556                 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2557                         let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2558                                 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2559                                 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
2560                         };
2561
2562                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2563                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
2564                                 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
2565                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2566                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2567                         if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
2568                                 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2569                                         return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
2570                                 }
2571                                 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2572                                 let send_res = chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
2573                                         htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2574                                                 path: path.clone(),
2575                                                 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2576                                                 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2577                                                 payment_id,
2578                                         }, onion_packet, &self.logger);
2579                                 match break_chan_entry!(self, send_res, chan) {
2580                                         Some(monitor_update) => {
2581                                                 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2582                                                 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
2583                                                 if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
2584                                                         break Err(e);
2585                                                 }
2586                                                 if update_res == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress {
2587                                                         // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
2588                                                         // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
2589                                                         // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
2590                                                         // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
2591                                                         // which we do in the send_payment check for
2592                                                         // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
2593                                                         return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
2594                                                 }
2595                                         },
2596                                         None => { },
2597                                 }
2598                         } else {
2599                                 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
2600                                 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
2601                                 // `channel_by_id` map.
2602                                 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
2603                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
2604                         }
2605                         return Ok(());
2606                 };
2607
2608                 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2609                         Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2610                         Err(e) => {
2611                                 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2612                         },
2613                 }
2614         }
2615
2616         /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2617         ///
2618         /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
2619         /// fields for more info.
2620         ///
2621         /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
2622         /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
2623         ///
2624         /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
2625         ///
2626         /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
2627         /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
2628         /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
2629         /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
2630         /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
2631         ///
2632         /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
2633         /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
2634         /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
2635         /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
2636         /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
2637         ///
2638         /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
2639         /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
2640         /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
2641         /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
2642         ///
2643         /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
2644         ///
2645         /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
2646         /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2647         /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
2648         ///
2649         /// In general, a path may raise:
2650         ///  * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2651         ///    node public key) is specified.
2652         ///  * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2653         ///    (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2654         ///    failure).
2655         ///  * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2656         ///    relevant updates.
2657         ///
2658         /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
2659         /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2660         /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2661         ///
2662         /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2663         /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2664         /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
2665         /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
2666         /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
2667         pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2668                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2669                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2670                 self.pending_outbound_payments
2671                         .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2672                                 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2673                                 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2674         }
2675
2676         /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment`], but will automatically find a route based on
2677         /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
2678         pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
2679                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2680                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2681                 self.pending_outbound_payments
2682                         .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
2683                                 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
2684                                 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
2685                                 &self.pending_events,
2686                                 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2687                                 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2688         }
2689
2690         #[cfg(test)]
2691         pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2692                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2693                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2694                 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2695                         |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2696                         self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2697         }
2698
2699         #[cfg(test)]
2700         pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
2701                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2702                 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
2703         }
2704
2705
2706         /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
2707         /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
2708         /// retries are exhausted.
2709         ///
2710         /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
2711         /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
2712         ///
2713         /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2714         /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2715         /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2716         ///
2717         /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event is generated and we restart without this
2718         /// [`ChannelManager`] having been persisted, another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated.
2719         ///
2720         /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2721         /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2722         pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2723                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2724                 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, &self.pending_events);
2725         }
2726
2727         /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2728         /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2729         /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2730         /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2731         /// never reach the recipient.
2732         ///
2733         /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
2734         /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
2735         ///
2736         /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2737         /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2738         ///
2739         /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2740         ///
2741         /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2742         pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
2743                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2744                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2745                 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
2746                         route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
2747                         &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2748                         |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2749                         self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2750         }
2751
2752         /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
2753         /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
2754         ///
2755         /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
2756         /// payments.
2757         ///
2758         /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
2759         pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
2760                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2761                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2762                 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
2763                         payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
2764                         || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),  &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2765                         &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
2766                         |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2767                         self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2768         }
2769
2770         /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
2771         /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
2772         /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
2773         pub fn send_probe(&self, hops: Vec<RouteHop>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2774                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2775                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2776                 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(hops, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2777                         |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2778                         self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2779         }
2780
2781         /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
2782         /// payment probe.
2783         #[cfg(test)]
2784         pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
2785                 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
2786         }
2787
2788         /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2789         /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2790         fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
2791                 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
2792         ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2793                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2794                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2795                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2796
2797                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2798                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2799                 let (chan, msg) = {
2800                         let (res, chan) = {
2801                                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2802                                         Some(mut chan) => {
2803                                                 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2804
2805                                                 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2806                                                         .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2807                                                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2808                                                         } else { unreachable!(); })
2809                                                 , chan)
2810                                         },
2811                                         None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) }) },
2812                                 }
2813                         };
2814                         match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2815                                 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2816                                         (chan, funding_msg)
2817                                 },
2818                                 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2819                                         err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
2820                                 }) },
2821                         }
2822                 };
2823
2824                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2825                         node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2826                         msg,
2827                 });
2828                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2829                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2830                                 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2831                         },
2832                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2833                                 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
2834                                 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
2835                                         panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
2836                                 }
2837                                 e.insert(chan);
2838                         }
2839                 }
2840                 Ok(())
2841         }
2842
2843         #[cfg(test)]
2844         pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2845                 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2846                         Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2847                 })
2848         }
2849
2850         /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2851         ///
2852         /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2853         /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2854         ///
2855         /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
2856         /// across the p2p network.
2857         ///
2858         /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2859         /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2860         ///
2861         /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2862         /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2863         /// keys per-channel).
2864         ///
2865         /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2866         /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2867         /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2868         ///
2869         /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2870         /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2871         /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2872         ///
2873         /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
2874         /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
2875         /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
2876         /// for more details.
2877         ///
2878         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2879         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2880         pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2881                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2882
2883                 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2884                         if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2885                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2886                                         err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2887                                 });
2888                         }
2889                 }
2890                 {
2891                         let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2892                         // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools at the next block. However, the modules
2893                         // constituting our Lightning node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if
2894                         // the wallet module is in advance on the LDK view, allow one more block of headroom.
2895                         if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 2 {
2896                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2897                                         err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
2898                                 });
2899                         }
2900                 }
2901                 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2902                         let mut output_index = None;
2903                         let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2904                         for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2905                                 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2906                                         if output_index.is_some() {
2907                                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2908                                                         err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2909                                                 });
2910                                         }
2911                                         if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2912                                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2913                                                         err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2914                                                 });
2915                                         }
2916                                         output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2917                                 }
2918                         }
2919                         if output_index.is_none() {
2920                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2921                                         err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2922                                 });
2923                         }
2924                         Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2925                 })
2926         }
2927
2928         /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
2929         ///
2930         /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
2931         /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
2932         /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
2933         /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
2934         ///
2935         /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
2936         /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
2937         ///
2938         /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
2939         /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
2940         ///
2941         /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
2942         ///
2943         /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
2944         /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
2945         /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
2946         /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
2947         /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2948         /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
2949         /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
2950         pub fn update_channel_config(
2951                 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
2952         ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2953                 if config.cltv_expiry_delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA {
2954                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2955                                 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
2956                         });
2957                 }
2958
2959                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(
2960                         &self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier,
2961                 );
2962                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2963                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2964                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2965                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2966                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2967                 for channel_id in channel_ids {
2968                         if !peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) {
2969                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2970                                         err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
2971                                 });
2972                         }
2973                 }
2974                 for channel_id in channel_ids {
2975                         let channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
2976                         if !channel.update_config(config) {
2977                                 continue;
2978                         }
2979                         if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
2980                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
2981                         } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
2982                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2983                                         node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2984                                         msg,
2985                                 });
2986                         }
2987                 }
2988                 Ok(())
2989         }
2990
2991         /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
2992         /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
2993         ///
2994         /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
2995         /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
2996         ///
2997         /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
2998         /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
2999         /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
3000         /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
3001         /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
3002         ///
3003         /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
3004         /// you from forwarding more than you received.
3005         ///
3006         /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3007         /// backwards.
3008         ///
3009         /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
3010         /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3011         // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
3012         // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
3013         pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3014                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3015
3016                 let next_hop_scid = {
3017                         let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3018                         let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
3019                                 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
3020                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3021                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3022                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
3023                                 Some(chan) => {
3024                                         if !chan.is_usable() {
3025                                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3026                                                         err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
3027                                                 })
3028                                         }
3029                                         chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.outbound_scid_alias())
3030                                 },
3031                                 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3032                                         err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id), next_node_id)
3033                                 })
3034                         }
3035                 };
3036
3037                 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3038                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3039                                 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3040                         })?;
3041
3042                 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
3043                         PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
3044                                 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
3045                         },
3046                         _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3047                 };
3048                 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
3049                         outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
3050                 };
3051
3052                 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
3053                         payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3054                         payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3055                         payment.prev_user_channel_id,
3056                         vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
3057                 )];
3058                 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
3059                 Ok(())
3060         }
3061
3062         /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
3063         /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
3064         ///
3065         /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3066         /// backwards.
3067         ///
3068         /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3069         pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3070                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3071
3072                 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3073                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3074                                 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3075                         })?;
3076
3077                 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
3078                         let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3079                                 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3080                                 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3081                                 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
3082                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
3083                                 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3084                         });
3085
3086                         let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
3087                         let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
3088                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3089                 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3090
3091                 Ok(())
3092         }
3093
3094         /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3095         ///
3096         /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3097         /// Will likely generate further events.
3098         pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3099                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3100
3101                 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
3102                 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3103                 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3104                 {
3105                         let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
3106                         mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
3107
3108                         for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
3109                                 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3110                                         macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
3111                                                 () => {
3112                                                         for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3113                                                                 match forward_info {
3114                                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3115                                                                                 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3116                                                                                 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3117                                                                                         routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3118                                                                                         outgoing_cltv_value, incoming_amt_msat: _
3119                                                                                 }
3120                                                                         }) => {
3121                                                                                 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3122                                                                                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3123                                                                                                 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3124
3125                                                                                                 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3126                                                                                                         short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3127                                                                                                         outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3128                                                                                                         htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3129                                                                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3130                                                                                                         phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3131                                                                                                 });
3132
3133                                                                                                 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3134                                                                                                         HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3135                                                                                                 } else {
3136                                                                                                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3137                                                                                                 };
3138
3139                                                                                                 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3140                                                                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
3141                                                                                                         reason
3142                                                                                                 ));
3143                                                                                                 continue;
3144                                                                                         }
3145                                                                                 }
3146                                                                                 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3147                                                                                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3148                                                                                                 {
3149                                                                                                         failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3150                                                                                                 }
3151                                                                                         }
3152                                                                                 }
3153                                                                                 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3154                                                                                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3155                                                                                                 {
3156                                                                                                         failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3157                                                                                                 }
3158                                                                                         }
3159                                                                                 }
3160                                                                                 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3161                                                                                         let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3162                                                                                         if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
3163                                                                                                 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
3164                                                                                                 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3165                                                                                                         Ok(res) => res,
3166                                                                                                         Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3167                                                                                                                 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3168                                                                                                                 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3169                                                                                                                 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3170                                                                                                                 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3171                                                                                                                 // of the onion.
3172                                                                                                                 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3173                                                                                                         },
3174                                                                                                         Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3175                                                                                                                 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3176                                                                                                         },
3177                                                                                                 };
3178                                                                                                 match next_hop {
3179                                                                                                         onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3180                                                                                                                 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
3181                                                                                                                         Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3182                                                                                                                         Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3183                                                                                                                 }
3184                                                                                                         },
3185                                                                                                         _ => panic!(),
3186                                                                                                 }
3187                                                                                         } else {
3188                                                                                                 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3189                                                                                         }
3190                                                                                 } else {
3191                                                                                         fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3192                                                                                 }
3193                                                                         },
3194                                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3195                                                                                 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3196                                                                                 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3197                                                                                 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3198                                                                                 // problem, not ours.
3199                                                                         }
3200                                                                 }
3201                                                         }
3202                                                 }
3203                                         }
3204                                         let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
3205                                                 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3206                                                 None => {
3207                                                         forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3208                                                         continue;
3209                                                 }
3210                                         };
3211                                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3212                                         let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3213                                         if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3214                                                 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3215                                                 continue;
3216                                         }
3217                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3218                                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3219                                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3220                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3221                                                         forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3222                                                         continue;
3223                                                 },
3224                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3225                                                         for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3226                                                                 match forward_info {
3227                                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3228                                                                                 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id: _,
3229                                                                                 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3230                                                                                         incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
3231                                                                                         routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, incoming_amt_msat: _,
3232                                                                                 },
3233                                                                         }) => {
3234                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3235                                                                                 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3236                                                                                         short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3237                                                                                         outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3238                                                                                         htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3239                                                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3240                                                                                         // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3241                                                                                         phantom_shared_secret: None,
3242                                                                                 });
3243                                                                                 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
3244                                                                                         payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
3245                                                                                         onion_packet, &self.logger)
3246                                                                                 {
3247                                                                                         if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3248                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3249                                                                                         } else {
3250                                                                                                 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3251                                                                                         }
3252                                                                                         let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3253                                                                                         failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3254                                                                                                 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
3255                                                                                                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3256                                                                                         ));
3257                                                                                         continue;
3258                                                                                 }
3259                                                                         },
3260                                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3261                                                                                 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3262                                                                         },
3263                                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3264                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3265                                                                                 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_fail_htlc(
3266                                                                                         htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
3267                                                                                 ) {
3268                                                                                         if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3269                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3270                                                                                         } else {
3271                                                                                                 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
3272                                                                                         }
3273                                                                                         // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3274                                                                                         // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3275                                                                                         // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3276                                                                                         continue;
3277                                                                                 }
3278                                                                         },
3279                                                                 }
3280                                                         }
3281                                                 }
3282                                         }
3283                                 } else {
3284                                         'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3285                                                 match forward_info {
3286                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3287                                                                 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3288                                                                 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3289                                                                         routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat, ..
3290                                                                 }
3291                                                         }) => {
3292                                                                 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
3293                                                                         PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3294                                                                                 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3295                                                                                 let onion_fields =
3296                                                                                         RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret), payment_metadata };
3297                                                                                 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
3298                                                                                         Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
3299                                                                         },
3300                                                                         PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry } => {
3301                                                                                 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: None, payment_metadata };
3302                                                                                 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
3303                                                                                         None, None, onion_fields)
3304                                                                         },
3305                                                                         _ => {
3306                                                                                 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3307                                                                         }
3308                                                                 };
3309                                                                 let mut claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3310                                                                         prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3311                                                                                 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3312                                                                                 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3313                                                                                 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3314                                                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3315                                                                                 phantom_shared_secret,
3316                                                                         },
3317                                                                         // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
3318                                                                         // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
3319                                                                         // if routing nodes overpay
3320                                                                         value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
3321                                                                         sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
3322                                                                         timer_ticks: 0,
3323                                                                         total_value_received: None,
3324                                                                         total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
3325                                                                         cltv_expiry,
3326                                                                         onion_payload,
3327                                                                 };
3328
3329                                                                 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
3330
3331                                                                 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3332                                                                         ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
3333                                                                                 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
3334                                                                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3335                                                                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3336                                                                                         &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
3337                                                                                 );
3338                                                                                 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3339                                                                                                 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3340                                                                                                 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3341                                                                                                 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3342                                                                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3343                                                                                                 phantom_shared_secret,
3344                                                                                         }), payment_hash,
3345                                                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
3346                                                                                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
3347                                                                                 ));
3348                                                                                 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
3349                                                                         }
3350                                                                 }
3351                                                                 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
3352                                                                 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3353                                                                 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3354                                                                         receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3355                                                                                 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3356                                                                 }
3357
3358                                                                 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3359                                                                         ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3360                                                                                 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
3361                                                                                 let purpose = || {
3362                                                                                         events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3363                                                                                                 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3364                                                                                                 payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
3365                                                                                         }
3366                                                                                 };
3367                                                                                 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3368                                                                                 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3369                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3370                                                                                 }
3371                                                                                 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
3372                                                                                         .entry(payment_hash)
3373                                                                                         // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
3374                                                                                         .or_insert_with(|| {
3375                                                                                                 committed_to_claimable = true;
3376                                                                                                 ClaimablePayment {
3377                                                                                                         purpose: purpose(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
3378                                                                                                 }
3379                                                                                         });
3380                                                                                 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
3381                                                                                         if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
3382                                                                                                 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3383                                                                                         }
3384                                                                                 } else {
3385                                                                                         claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
3386                                                                                 }
3387                                                                                 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
3388                                                                                 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3389                                                                                         if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3390                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3391                                                                                                 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3392                                                                                         }
3393                                                                                 }
3394                                                                                 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
3395                                                                                 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
3396                                                                                 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3397                                                                                         total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
3398                                                                                         earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
3399                                                                                         match &htlc.onion_payload {
3400                                                                                                 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3401                                                                                                         if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat {
3402                                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3403                                                                                                                         log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3404                                                                                                                 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3405                                                                                                         }
3406                                                                                                         if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3407                                                                                                 },
3408                                                                                                 _ => unreachable!(),
3409                                                                                         }
3410                                                                                 }
3411                                                                                 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
3412                                                                                 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
3413                                                                                 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
3414                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3415                                                                                 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= $payment_data.total_msat {
3416                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
3417                                                                                                 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3418                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3419                                                                                 } else if total_value >= $payment_data.total_msat {
3420                                                                                         #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
3421                                                                                                 committed_to_claimable = true;
3422                                                                                         }
3423                                                                                         let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3424                                                                                         htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3425                                                                                         let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
3426                                                                                         htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
3427                                                                                         new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3428                                                                                                 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3429                                                                                                 payment_hash,
3430                                                                                                 purpose: purpose(),
3431                                                                                                 amount_msat,
3432                                                                                                 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3433                                                                                                 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3434                                                                                                 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
3435                                                                                         });
3436                                                                                         payment_claimable_generated = true;
3437                                                                                 } else {
3438                                                                                         // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3439                                                                                         // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3440                                                                                         // MPP parts.
3441                                                                                         htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3442                                                                                         #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
3443                                                                                                 committed_to_claimable = true;
3444                                                                                         }
3445                                                                                 }
3446                                                                                 payment_claimable_generated
3447                                                                         }}
3448                                                                 }
3449
3450                                                                 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3451                                                                 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3452                                                                 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3453                                                                 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3454                                                                 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3455                                                                 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3456                                                                 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3457                                                                 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3458                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3459                                                                                 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3460                                                                                         OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3461                                                                                                 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3462                                                                                                 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3463                                                                                                         Ok(result) => result,
3464                                                                                                         Err(()) => {
3465                                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3466                                                                                                                 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3467                                                                                                         }
3468                                                                                                 };
3469                                                                                                 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
3470                                                                                                         let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
3471                                                                                                         if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
3472                                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
3473                                                                                                                         log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
3474                                                                                                                 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3475                                                                                                         }
3476                                                                                                 }
3477                                                                                                 check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
3478                                                                                         },
3479                                                                                         OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3480                                                                                                 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3481                                                                                                 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3482                                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3483                                                                                                 }
3484                                                                                                 match claimable_payments.claimable_payments.entry(payment_hash) {
3485                                                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3486                                                                                                                 let amount_msat = claimable_htlc.value;
3487                                                                                                                 claimable_htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat);
3488                                                                                                                 let claim_deadline = Some(claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER);
3489                                                                                                                 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
3490                                                                                                                 e.insert(ClaimablePayment {
3491                                                                                                                         purpose: purpose.clone(),
3492                                                                                                                         onion_fields: Some(onion_fields.clone()),
3493                                                                                                                         htlcs: vec![claimable_htlc],
3494                                                                                                                 });
3495                                                                                                                 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3496                                                                                                                 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3497                                                                                                                         receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3498                                                                                                                         payment_hash,
3499                                                                                                                         amount_msat,
3500                                                                                                                         purpose,
3501                                                                                                                         via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3502                                                                                                                         via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3503                                                                                                                         claim_deadline,
3504                                                                                                                 });
3505                                                                                                         },
3506                                                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3507                                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3508                                                                                                                 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3509                                                                                                         }
3510                                                                                                 }
3511                                                                                         }
3512                                                                                 }
3513                                                                         },
3514                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3515                                                                                 if payment_data.is_none() {
3516                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3517                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3518                                                                                 };
3519                                                                                 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3520                                                                                 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3521                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3522                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3523                                                                                 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3524                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3525                                                                                                 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3526                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3527                                                                                 } else {
3528                                                                                         let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3529                                                                                         if payment_claimable_generated {
3530                                                                                                 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3531                                                                                         }
3532                                                                                 }
3533                                                                         },
3534                                                                 };
3535                                                         },
3536                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3537                                                                 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3538                                                         }
3539                                                 }
3540                                         }
3541                                 }
3542                         }
3543                 }
3544
3545                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3546                 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
3547                         || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3548                         &self.pending_events, &self.logger,
3549                         |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3550                         self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv));
3551
3552                 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3553                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3554                 }
3555                 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3556
3557                 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
3558                 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
3559                 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
3560                 // network stack.
3561                 self.check_free_holding_cells();
3562
3563                 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3564                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3565                 events.append(&mut new_events);
3566         }
3567
3568         /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3569         ///
3570         /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3571         /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3572         ///
3573         /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3574         fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3575                 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3576                 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3577                 if background_events.is_empty() {
3578                         return false;
3579                 }
3580
3581                 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3582                         match event {
3583                                 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3584                                         // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3585                                         // monitor updating completing.
3586                                         let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
3587                                 },
3588                         }
3589                 }
3590                 true
3591         }
3592
3593         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3594         /// Process background events, for functional testing
3595         pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3596                 self.process_background_events();
3597         }
3598
3599         fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
3600                 if !chan.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; }
3601                 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3602                 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
3603                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3604                                 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3605                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3606                 }
3607                 if !chan.is_live() {
3608                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3609                                 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3610                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3611                 }
3612                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3613                         log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3614
3615                 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.logger);
3616                 NotifyOption::DoPersist
3617         }
3618
3619         #[cfg(fuzzing)]
3620         /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3621         /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3622         /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3623         /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3624         pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3625                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3626                         let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3627
3628                         let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3629
3630                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3631                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3632                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3633                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3634                                 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
3635                                         let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3636                                         if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3637                                 }
3638                         }
3639
3640                         should_persist
3641                 });
3642         }
3643
3644         /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3645         ///
3646         /// This currently includes:
3647         ///  * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3648         ///  * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3649         ///    than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3650         ///    the channel.
3651         ///  * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
3652         ///    with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
3653         ///  * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
3654         ///
3655         /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
3656         /// estimate fetches.
3657         ///
3658         /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3659         /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
3660         pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3661                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3662                         let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3663                         if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3664
3665                         let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3666
3667                         let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
3668                         let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
3669                         let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
3670                         {
3671                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3672                                 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3673                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3674                                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3675                                         let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
3676                                         let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
3677                                         peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3678                                                 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3679                                                 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3680
3681                                                 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3682                                                         let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
3683                                                         handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
3684                                                         if needs_close { return false; }
3685                                                 }
3686
3687                                                 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3688                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3689                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3690                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3691                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3692                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3693                                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3694                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3695                                                                                 msg: update
3696                                                                         });
3697                                                                 }
3698                                                                 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3699                                                                 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3700                                                         },
3701                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3702                                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3703                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3704                                                                                 msg: update
3705                                                                         });
3706                                                                 }
3707                                                                 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3708                                                                 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3709                                                         },
3710                                                         _ => {},
3711                                                 }
3712
3713                                                 chan.maybe_expire_prev_config();
3714
3715                                                 true
3716                                         });
3717                                         if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
3718                                                 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
3719                                         }
3720                                 }
3721                         }
3722
3723                         // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
3724                         // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
3725                         // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
3726                         // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
3727                         // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
3728                         // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
3729                         // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
3730                         if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
3731                                 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3732                                 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
3733                                         match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
3734                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
3735                                                         // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
3736                                                         // have no channels to the peer.
3737                                                         let remove_entry = {
3738                                                                 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
3739                                                                 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
3740                                                         };
3741                                                         if remove_entry {
3742                                                                 entry.remove_entry();
3743                                                         }
3744                                                 },
3745                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
3746                                         }
3747                                 }
3748                         }
3749
3750                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
3751                                 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
3752                                         // This should be unreachable
3753                                         debug_assert!(false);
3754                                         return false;
3755                                 }
3756                                 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3757                                         // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
3758                                         // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
3759                                         // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
3760                                         // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
3761                                         if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
3762                                                 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
3763                                         {
3764                                                 return true;
3765                                         } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
3766                                                 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
3767                                                 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3768                                         }) {
3769                                                 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
3770                                                         .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
3771                                                 return false;
3772                                         }
3773                                 }
3774                                 true
3775                         });
3776
3777                         for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
3778                                 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
3779                                 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
3780                                 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
3781                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
3782                         }
3783
3784                         for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3785                                 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3786                         }
3787
3788                         self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self.pending_events);
3789
3790                         // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
3791                         // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
3792                         // than block the message queueing pipeline.
3793                         if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
3794                                 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3795                         }
3796
3797                         should_persist
3798                 });
3799         }
3800
3801         /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3802         /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3803         /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3804         ///
3805         /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
3806         /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
3807         /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
3808         /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
3809         ///
3810         /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
3811         /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
3812         /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
3813         /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
3814         pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
3815                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
3816         }
3817
3818         /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
3819         /// reason for the failure.
3820         ///
3821         /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
3822         pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
3823                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3824
3825                 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
3826                 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
3827                         for htlc in payment.htlcs {
3828                                 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
3829                                 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
3830                                 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
3831                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3832                         }
3833                 }
3834         }
3835
3836         /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
3837         fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
3838                 match failure_code {
3839                         FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
3840                         FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
3841                         FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
3842                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3843                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
3844                                 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code as u16, htlc_msat_height_data)
3845                         }
3846                 }
3847         }
3848
3849         /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3850         /// that we want to return and a channel.
3851         ///
3852         /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
3853         /// forwarding
3854         fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3855                 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
3856                 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
3857                 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
3858                 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
3859                 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
3860                         chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
3861                 } else {
3862                         chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
3863                 };
3864                 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
3865                         self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
3866                 } else {
3867                         (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3868                 }
3869         }
3870
3871
3872         /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3873         /// that we want to return and a channel.
3874         fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3875                 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
3876                 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
3877                         let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
3878                         if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3879                                 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
3880                                 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
3881                                 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3882                         }
3883                         (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3884                         msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3885                         upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3886                         (desired_err_code, enc.0)
3887                 } else {
3888                         // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
3889                         // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
3890                         // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
3891                         // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
3892                         (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3893                 }
3894         }
3895
3896         // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3897         // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3898         // be surfaced to the user.
3899         fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
3900                 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
3901                 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
3902         ) {
3903                 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
3904                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3905                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
3906                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3907                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3908                                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3909                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3910                                                 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
3911                                         },
3912                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3913                                 }
3914                         } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
3915                 };
3916
3917                 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3918                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
3919                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
3920                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3921                 }
3922         }
3923
3924         /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3925         /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
3926         fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
3927                 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
3928                 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
3929                 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
3930                 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
3931                 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
3932                         debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
3933                 }
3934
3935                 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3936                 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3937                 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3938                 //timer handling.
3939
3940                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3941                 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3942                 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3943                 match source {
3944                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
3945                                 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
3946                                         session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
3947                                         &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
3948                                 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
3949                         },
3950                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint }) => {
3951                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), onion_error);
3952                                 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
3953
3954                                 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
3955                                 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
3956                                 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3957                                         push_forward_ev = true;
3958                                 }
3959                                 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
3960                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3961                                                 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
3962                                         },
3963                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3964                                                 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
3965                                         }
3966                                 }
3967                                 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
3968                                 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
3969                                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3970                                 pending_events.push(events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
3971                                         prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
3972                                         failed_next_destination: destination,
3973                                 });
3974                         },
3975                 }
3976         }
3977
3978         /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
3979         /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
3980         ///
3981         /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
3982         /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
3983         /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
3984         /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
3985         ///
3986         /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
3987         /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
3988         /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
3989         /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
3990         ///
3991         /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
3992         /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
3993         /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
3994         /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
3995         /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3996         /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3997         pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
3998                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3999
4000                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4001
4002                 let mut sources = {
4003                         let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4004                         if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
4005                                 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4006                                 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
4007                                         if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4008                                                 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4009                                                         .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4010                                                 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
4011                                                 break;
4012                                         }
4013                                 }
4014
4015                                 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
4016                                         ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
4017                                         payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id,
4018                                 });
4019                                 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
4020                                         debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
4021                                         log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
4022                                                 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4023                                 }
4024                                 payment.htlcs
4025                         } else { return; }
4026                 };
4027                 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
4028
4029                 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
4030                 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
4031                 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
4032                 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
4033                 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
4034                 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
4035                 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
4036                 let mut valid_mpp = true;
4037                 let mut errs = Vec::new();
4038                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4039                 for htlc in sources.iter() {
4040                         if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
4041                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4042                                 debug_assert!(false);
4043                                 valid_mpp = false;
4044                                 break;
4045                         }
4046                         prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
4047
4048                         if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
4049                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4050                                 debug_assert!(false);
4051                                 valid_mpp = false;
4052                                 break;
4053                         }
4054                         expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
4055
4056                         if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload {
4057                                 // We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check
4058                                 // that there's one payment here and move on.
4059                                 if sources.len() != 1 {
4060                                         log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP spontaneous payment - this should not be reachable!");
4061                                         debug_assert!(false);
4062                                         valid_mpp = false;
4063                                         break;
4064                                 }
4065                         }
4066
4067                         claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
4068                 }
4069                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4070                 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
4071                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4072                         log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
4073                         return;
4074                 }
4075                 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
4076                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4077                         log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
4078                                 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
4079                         return;
4080                 }
4081                 if valid_mpp {
4082                         for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4083                                 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
4084                                         htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
4085                                         |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
4086                                 {
4087                                         if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
4088                                                 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
4089                                                 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
4090                                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
4091                                         } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
4092                                 }
4093                         }
4094                 }
4095                 if !valid_mpp {
4096                         for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4097                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4098                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4099                                 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4100                                 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
4101                                 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
4102                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4103                         }
4104                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4105                 }
4106
4107                 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
4108                 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
4109                         let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4110                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4111                 }
4112         }
4113
4114         fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
4115                 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
4116         -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
4117                 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
4118
4119                 {
4120                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4121                         let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
4122                         let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4123                                 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
4124                                 None => None
4125                         };
4126
4127                         let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
4128                                 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4129                                         .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
4130                         ).unwrap_or(None);
4131
4132                         if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
4133                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
4134                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4135                                 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4136                                         let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4137                                         let fulfill_res = chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
4138
4139                                         if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = fulfill_res {
4140                                                 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)) {
4141                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
4142                                                                 log_bytes!(chan_id), action);
4143                                                         peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
4144                                                 }
4145                                                 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4146                                                 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update);
4147                                                 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
4148                                                         peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4149                                                 if let Err(e) = res {
4150                                                         // TODO: This is a *critical* error - we probably updated the outbound edge
4151                                                         // of the HTLC's monitor with a preimage. We should retry this monitor
4152                                                         // update over and over again until morale improves.
4153                                                         log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}", payment_preimage);
4154                                                         return Err((counterparty_node_id, e));
4155                                                 }
4156                                         }
4157                                         return Ok(());
4158                                 }
4159                         }
4160                 }
4161                 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4162                         update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4163                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4164                                 payment_preimage,
4165                         }],
4166                 };
4167                 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4168                 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
4169                 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
4170                 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
4171                         // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
4172                         // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
4173                         // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
4174                         // again on restart.
4175                         log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4176                                 payment_preimage, update_res);
4177                 }
4178                 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
4179                 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
4180                 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
4181                 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
4182                 // `PaymentForwarded`).
4183                 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
4184                 Ok(())
4185         }
4186
4187         fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4188                 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
4189         }
4190
4191         fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
4192                 match source {
4193                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4194                                 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage, session_priv, path, from_onchain, &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
4195                         },
4196                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4197                                 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4198                                 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
4199                                         |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
4200                                                 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4201                                                         let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4202                                                                 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4203                                                         } else { None };
4204
4205                                                         let prev_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
4206                                                         let next_channel_id = Some(next_channel_id);
4207
4208                                                         Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4209                                                                 fee_earned_msat,
4210                                                                 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4211                                                                 prev_channel_id,
4212                                                                 next_channel_id,
4213                                                                 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
4214                                                         }})
4215                                                 } else { None }
4216                                         });
4217                                 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
4218                                         let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4219                                         let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4220                                 }
4221                         },
4222                 }
4223         }
4224
4225         /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4226         pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4227                 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4228         }
4229
4230         fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
4231                 for action in actions.into_iter() {
4232                         match action {
4233                                 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
4234                                         let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4235                                         if let Some(ClaimingPayment { amount_msat, payment_purpose: purpose, receiver_node_id }) = payment {
4236                                                 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
4237                                                         payment_hash, purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4238                                                 });
4239                                         }
4240                                 },
4241                                 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event } => {
4242                                         self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(event);
4243                                 },
4244                         }
4245                 }
4246         }
4247
4248         /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
4249         /// update completion.
4250         fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4251                 channel: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
4252                 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
4253                 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
4254                 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
4255         -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
4256                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
4257                         log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()),
4258                         if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
4259                         if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
4260                         if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
4261                         if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
4262                         if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
4263
4264                 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
4265
4266                 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get_counterparty_node_id();
4267                 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4268                         htlc_forwards = Some((channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.outbound_scid_alias()),
4269                                 channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
4270                 }
4271
4272                 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4273                         send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
4274                 }
4275                 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
4276                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4277                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4278                                 msg,
4279                         });
4280                 }
4281
4282                 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
4283                         if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
4284                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4285                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4286                                         updates: update,
4287                                 });
4288                         }
4289                 } }
4290                 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
4291                         if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
4292                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4293                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4294                                         msg: revoke_and_ack,
4295                                 });
4296                         }
4297                 } }
4298                 match order {
4299                         RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
4300                                 handle_cs!();
4301                                 handle_raa!();
4302                         },
4303                         RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
4304                                 handle_raa!();
4305                                 handle_cs!();
4306                         },
4307                 }
4308
4309                 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
4310                         log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
4311                         self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4312                 }
4313
4314                 {
4315                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4316                         emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
4317                         emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
4318                 }
4319
4320                 htlc_forwards
4321         }
4322
4323         fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
4324                 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
4325
4326                 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
4327                         Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4328                         None => {
4329                                 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
4330                                 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
4331                                 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4332                                 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4333                                         Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4334                                         None => return,
4335                                 }
4336                         }
4337                 };
4338                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4339                 let mut peer_state_lock;
4340                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4341                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
4342                 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4343                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4344                 let mut channel = {
4345                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()){
4346                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4347                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4348                         }
4349                 };
4350                 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}",
4351                         highest_applied_update_id, channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id());
4352                 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4353                         return;
4354                 }
4355                 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, highest_applied_update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel.get_mut());
4356         }
4357
4358         /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4359         ///
4360         /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4361         /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4362         /// the channel.
4363         ///
4364         /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4365         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4366         /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4367         ///
4368         /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
4369         /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
4370         /// used to accept such channels.
4371         ///
4372         /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4373         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4374         pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4375                 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4376         }
4377
4378         /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4379         /// it as confirmed immediately.
4380         ///
4381         /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4382         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4383         /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4384         ///
4385         /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4386         /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
4387         ///
4388         /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
4389         /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
4390         ///
4391         /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
4392         /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
4393         ///
4394         /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4395         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4396         pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4397                 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
4398         }
4399
4400         fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4401                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4402
4403                 let peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| !peer.channel_by_id.is_empty());
4404                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4405                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4406                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4407                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4408                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4409                 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.len() == 1;
4410                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4411                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4412                                 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4413                                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4414                                 }
4415                                 if accept_0conf {
4416                                         channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
4417                                 } else if channel.get().get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4418                                         let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4419                                                 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4420                                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4421                                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
4422                                                 }
4423                                         };
4424                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4425                                         let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4426                                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
4427                                 } else {
4428                                         // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
4429                                         // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
4430                                         // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
4431                                         if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
4432                                                 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4433                                                         node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4434                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4435                                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
4436                                                         }
4437                                                 };
4438                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4439                                                 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4440                                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
4441                                         }
4442                                 }
4443
4444                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4445                                         node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4446                                         msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4447                                 });
4448                         }
4449                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4450                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) });
4451                         }
4452                 }
4453                 Ok(())
4454         }
4455
4456         /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
4457         /// or 0-conf channels.
4458         ///
4459         /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
4460         /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
4461         fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
4462         where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> bool {
4463                 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
4464                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4465                 {
4466                         let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4467                         for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
4468                                 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
4469                                 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
4470                                 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
4471                                 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.channel_by_id.len() {
4472                                         peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
4473                                 }
4474                         }
4475                 }
4476                 return peers_without_funded_channels;
4477         }
4478
4479         fn unfunded_channel_count(
4480                 peer: &PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, best_block_height: u32
4481         ) -> usize {
4482                 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
4483                 for (_, chan) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
4484                         if !chan.is_outbound() && chan.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
4485                                 chan.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
4486                         {
4487                                 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
4488                         }
4489                 }
4490                 num_unfunded_channels
4491         }
4492
4493         fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4494                 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4495                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4496                 }
4497
4498                 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4499                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4500                 }
4501
4502                 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
4503                 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
4504                 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
4505                 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4506
4507                 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
4508                 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
4509                 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
4510                 let channeled_peers_without_funding = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| !node.channel_by_id.is_empty());
4511
4512                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4513                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4514                     .ok_or_else(|| {
4515                                 debug_assert!(false);
4516                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
4517                         })?;
4518                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4519                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4520
4521                 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
4522                 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
4523                 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
4524                 if peer_state.channel_by_id.is_empty() &&
4525                         channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
4526                         !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
4527                 {
4528                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4529                                 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
4530                                 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4531                 }
4532
4533                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4534                 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
4535                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4536                                 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
4537                                 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4538                 }
4539
4540                 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
4541                         counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
4542                         &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4543                 {
4544                         Err(e) => {
4545                                 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4546                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4547                         },
4548                         Ok(res) => res
4549                 };
4550                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4551                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4552                                 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4553                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4554                         },
4555                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4556                                 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4557                                         if channel.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4558                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4559                                         }
4560                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4561                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4562                                                 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4563                                         });
4564                                 } else {
4565                                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4566                                         pending_events.push(
4567                                                 events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4568                                                         temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4569                                                         counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4570                                                         funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4571                                                         push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4572                                                         channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4573                                                 }
4574                                         );
4575                                 }
4576
4577                                 entry.insert(channel);
4578                         }
4579                 }
4580                 Ok(())
4581         }
4582
4583         fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4584                 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4585                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4586                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4587                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
4588                                         debug_assert!(false);
4589                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
4590                                 })?;
4591                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4592                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4593                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4594                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4595                                         try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), chan);
4596                                         (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4597                                 },
4598                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4599                         }
4600                 };
4601                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4602                 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4603                         temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4604                         counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4605                         channel_value_satoshis: value,
4606                         output_script,
4607                         user_channel_id: user_id,
4608                 });
4609                 Ok(())
4610         }
4611
4612         fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4613                 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4614
4615                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4616                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4617                         .ok_or_else(|| {
4618                                 debug_assert!(false);
4619                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
4620                         })?;
4621
4622                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4623                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4624                 let ((funding_msg, monitor), chan) =
4625                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4626                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4627                                         (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan), chan.remove())
4628                                 },
4629                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4630                         };
4631
4632                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4633                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4634                                 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4635                         },
4636                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4637                                 match self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().entry(chan.channel_id()) {
4638                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4639                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4640                                                         "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
4641                                                         funding_msg.channel_id))
4642                                         },
4643                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
4644                                                 i_e.insert(chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
4645                                         }
4646                                 }
4647
4648                                 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4649                                 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4650                                 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
4651                                 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4652                                 let new_channel_id = funding_msg.channel_id;
4653                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4654                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4655                                         msg: funding_msg,
4656                                 });
4657
4658                                 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
4659
4660                                 let chan = e.insert(chan);
4661                                 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, monitor_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
4662                                         per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING, { peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&new_channel_id) });
4663
4664                                 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4665                                 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4666                                 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4667                                 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4668                                 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
4669                                 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
4670                                 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4671                                 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { shutdown_finish: Some((res, _)), .. }) = &mut res {
4672                                         res.0 = None;
4673                                 }
4674                                 res
4675                         }
4676                 }
4677         }
4678
4679         fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4680                 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4681                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4682                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4683                         .ok_or_else(|| {
4684                                 debug_assert!(false);
4685                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4686                         })?;
4687
4688                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4689                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4690                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4691                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4692                                 let monitor = try_chan_entry!(self,
4693                                         chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan);
4694                                 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor);
4695                                 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4696                                 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4697                                         // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4698                                         // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4699                                         // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4700                                         if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4701                                                 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4702                                         }
4703                                 }
4704                                 res
4705                         },
4706                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4707                 }
4708         }
4709
4710         fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4711                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4712                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4713                         .ok_or_else(|| {
4714                                 debug_assert!(false);
4715                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4716                         })?;
4717                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4718                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4719                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4720                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4721                                 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
4722                                         self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
4723                                 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4724                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4725                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4726                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4727                                                 msg: announcement_sigs,
4728                                         });
4729                                 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4730                                         // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4731                                         // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4732                                         // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4733                                         // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4734                                         // announcement_signatures.
4735                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4736                                         if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4737                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4738                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4739                                                         msg,
4740                                                 });
4741                                         }
4742                                 }
4743
4744                                 {
4745                                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4746                                         emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan.get_mut());
4747                                 }
4748
4749                                 Ok(())
4750                         },
4751                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4752                 }
4753         }
4754
4755         fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4756                 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4757                 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4758                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4759                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4760                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
4761                                         debug_assert!(false);
4762                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4763                                 })?;
4764                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4765                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4766                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4767                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4768
4769                                         if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4770                                                 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4771                                                         log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4772                                                         if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4773                                         }
4774
4775                                         let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo();
4776                                         let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self,
4777                                                 chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_entry);
4778                                         dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4779
4780                                         if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4781                                                 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
4782                                                 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
4783                                                 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
4784                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4785                                                         node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4786                                                         msg,
4787                                                 });
4788                                         }
4789
4790                                         // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4791                                         if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
4792                                                 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4793                                                 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
4794                                                 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry);
4795                                         }
4796                                         break Ok(());
4797                                 },
4798                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4799                         }
4800                 };
4801                 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4802                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
4803                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
4804                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
4805                 }
4806
4807                 result
4808         }
4809
4810         fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4811                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4812                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4813                         .ok_or_else(|| {
4814                                 debug_assert!(false);
4815                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4816                         })?;
4817                 let (tx, chan_option) = {
4818                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4819                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4820                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4821                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4822                                         let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
4823                                         if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
4824                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4825                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4826                                                         msg,
4827                                                 });
4828                                         }
4829                                         if tx.is_some() {
4830                                                 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
4831                                                 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
4832                                                 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
4833                                                 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
4834                                                 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
4835                                                 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
4836                                         } else { (tx, None) }
4837                                 },
4838                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4839                         }
4840                 };
4841                 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
4842                         log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
4843                         self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
4844                 }
4845                 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
4846                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4847                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4848                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4849                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4850                                         msg: update
4851                                 });
4852                         }
4853                         self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4854                 }
4855                 Ok(())
4856         }
4857
4858         fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4859                 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
4860                 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
4861                 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
4862                 //
4863                 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
4864                 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
4865                 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
4866                 //but we should prevent it anyway.
4867
4868                 let pending_forward_info = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
4869                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4870                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4871                         .ok_or_else(|| {
4872                                 debug_assert!(false);
4873                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4874                         })?;
4875                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4876                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4877                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4878                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4879
4880                                 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
4881                                         // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
4882                                         // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
4883                                         // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
4884                                         match pending_forward_info {
4885                                                 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
4886                                                         let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
4887                                                                 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
4888                                                                 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
4889                                                         } else {
4890                                                                 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
4891                                                         }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
4892                                                         let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4893                                                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
4894                                                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4895                                                                 reason
4896                                                         };
4897                                                         PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
4898                                                 },
4899                                                 _ => pending_forward_info
4900                                         }
4901                                 };
4902                                 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), chan);
4903                         },
4904                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4905                 }
4906                 Ok(())
4907         }
4908
4909         fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4910                 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
4911                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4912                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4913                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
4914                                         debug_assert!(false);
4915                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4916                                 })?;
4917                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4918                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4919                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4920                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4921                                         try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan)
4922                                 },
4923                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4924                         }
4925                 };
4926                 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
4927                 Ok(())
4928         }
4929
4930         fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4931                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4932                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4933                         .ok_or_else(|| {
4934                                 debug_assert!(false);
4935                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4936                         })?;
4937                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4938                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4939                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4940                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4941                                 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan);
4942                         },
4943                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4944                 }
4945                 Ok(())
4946         }
4947
4948         fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4949                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4950                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4951                         .ok_or_else(|| {
4952                                 debug_assert!(false);
4953                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4954                         })?;
4955                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4956                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4957                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4958                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4959                                 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
4960                                         let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
4961                                         try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
4962                                 }
4963                                 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan);
4964                                 Ok(())
4965                         },
4966                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4967                 }
4968         }
4969
4970         fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4971                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4972                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4973                         .ok_or_else(|| {
4974                                 debug_assert!(false);
4975                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4976                         })?;
4977                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4978                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4979                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4980                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4981                                 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo();
4982                                 let monitor_update = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
4983                                 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
4984                                 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4985                                 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
4986                                         peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
4987                         },
4988                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4989                 }
4990         }
4991
4992         #[inline]
4993         fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
4994                 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
4995                         let mut push_forward_event = false;
4996                         let mut new_intercept_events = Vec::new();
4997                         let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
4998                         if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4999                                 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
5000                                         let scid = match forward_info.routing {
5001                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
5002                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
5003                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
5004                                         };
5005                                         // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
5006                                         let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
5007
5008                                         let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5009                                         let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
5010                                         match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
5011                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5012                                                         entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5013                                                                 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
5014                                                 },
5015                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5016                                                         if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
5017                                                            fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
5018                                                         {
5019                                                                 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
5020                                                                 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5021                                                                 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
5022                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5023                                                                                 new_intercept_events.push(events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
5024                                                                                         requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
5025                                                                                         payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
5026                                                                                         inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
5027                                                                                         expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
5028                                                                                         intercept_id
5029                                                                                 });
5030                                                                                 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5031                                                                                         prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
5032                                                                         },
5033                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5034                                                                                 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
5035                                                                                 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5036                                                                                         short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
5037                                                                                         outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5038                                                                                         htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
5039                                                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
5040                                                                                         phantom_shared_secret: None,
5041                                                                                 });
5042
5043                                                                                 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
5044                                                                                                 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
5045                                                                                                 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
5046                                                                                 ));
5047                                                                         }
5048                                                                 }
5049                                                         } else {
5050                                                                 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
5051                                                                 // payments are being processed.
5052                                                                 if forward_htlcs_empty {
5053                                                                         push_forward_event = true;
5054                                                                 }
5055                                                                 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5056                                                                         prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
5057                                                         }
5058                                                 }
5059                                         }
5060                                 }
5061                         }
5062
5063                         for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
5064                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
5065                         }
5066
5067                         if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
5068                                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5069                                 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
5070                         }
5071                         if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
5072                 }
5073         }
5074
5075         // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued.
5076         fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
5077                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5078                 let forward_ev_exists = pending_events.iter()
5079                         .find(|ev| if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false })
5080                         .is_some();
5081                 if !forward_ev_exists {
5082                         pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
5083                                 time_forwardable:
5084                                         Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
5085                         });
5086                 }
5087         }
5088
5089         fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5090                 let (htlcs_to_fail, res) = {
5091                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5092                         let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5093                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
5094                                         debug_assert!(false);
5095                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5096                                 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
5097                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5098                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5099                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5100                                         let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo();
5101                                         let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5102                                         let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
5103                                         let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5104                                         let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
5105                                                 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5106                                         (htlcs_to_fail, res)
5107                                 },
5108                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5109                         }
5110                 };
5111                 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
5112                 res
5113         }
5114
5115         fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5116                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5117                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5118                         .ok_or_else(|| {
5119                                 debug_assert!(false);
5120                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5121                         })?;
5122                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5123                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5124                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5125                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5126                                 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
5127                         },
5128                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5129                 }
5130                 Ok(())
5131         }
5132
5133         fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5134                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5135                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5136                         .ok_or_else(|| {
5137                                 debug_assert!(false);
5138                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5139                         })?;
5140                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5141                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5142                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5143                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5144                                 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
5145                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
5146                                 }
5147
5148                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5149                                         msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
5150                                                 &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
5151                                                 msg, &self.default_configuration
5152                                         ), chan),
5153                                         // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5154                                         // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5155                                         update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap()),
5156                                 });
5157                         },
5158                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5159                 }
5160                 Ok(())
5161         }
5162
5163         /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
5164         fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5165                 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
5166                         Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
5167                         None => {
5168                                 // It's not a local channel
5169                                 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5170                         }
5171                 };
5172                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5173                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
5174                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
5175                         return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5176                 }
5177                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5178                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5179                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5180                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5181                                 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5182                                         if chan.get().should_announce() {
5183                                                 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
5184                                                 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
5185                                                 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
5186                                                 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5187                                         }
5188                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
5189                                 }
5190                                 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
5191                                 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
5192                                 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
5193                                         return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5194                                 } else {
5195                                         log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
5196                                         try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
5197                                 }
5198                         },
5199                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5200                 }
5201                 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
5202         }
5203
5204         fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5205                 let htlc_forwards;
5206                 let need_lnd_workaround = {
5207                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5208
5209                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5210                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
5211                                         debug_assert!(false);
5212                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5213                                 })?;
5214                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5215                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5216                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5217                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5218                                         // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
5219                                         // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
5220                                         // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
5221                                         // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
5222                                         let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
5223                                                 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash,
5224                                                 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
5225                                         let mut channel_update = None;
5226                                         if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
5227                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5228                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5229                                                         msg,
5230                                                 });
5231                                         } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
5232                                                 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
5233                                                 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
5234                                                 // they have the latest channel parameters.
5235                                                 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5236                                                         channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5237                                                                 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
5238                                                                 msg,
5239                                                         });
5240                                                 }
5241                                         }
5242                                         let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
5243                                         htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
5244                                                 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
5245                                                 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
5246                                         if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
5247                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
5248                                         }
5249                                         need_lnd_workaround
5250                                 },
5251                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5252                         }
5253                 };
5254
5255                 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
5256                         self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
5257                 }
5258
5259                 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
5260                         self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
5261                 }
5262                 Ok(())
5263         }
5264
5265         /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
5266         fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
5267                 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5268
5269                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5270                 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5271                 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5272                 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5273                         for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
5274                                 match monitor_event {
5275                                         MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5276                                                 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5277                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5278                                                         self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
5279                                                 } else {
5280                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5281                                                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5282                                                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5283                                                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5284                                                 }
5285                                         },
5286                                         MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5287                                         MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5288                                                 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
5289                                                         Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
5290                                                         None => {
5291                                                                 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5292                                                                 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5293                                                                 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5294                                                                 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
5295                                                         }
5296                                                 };
5297                                                 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
5298                                                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5299                                                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5300                                                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5301                                                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5302                                                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5303                                                                 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5304                                                                         let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5305                                                                         failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
5306                                                                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5307                                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5308                                                                                         msg: update
5309                                                                                 });
5310                                                                         }
5311                                                                         let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5312                                                                                 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5313                                                                         } else {
5314                                                                                 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5315                                                                         };
5316                                                                         self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
5317                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5318                                                                                 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5319                                                                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5320                                                                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5321                                                                                 },
5322                                                                         });
5323                                                                 }
5324                                                         }
5325                                                 }
5326                                         },
5327                                         MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5328                                                 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
5329                                         },
5330                                 }
5331                         }
5332                 }
5333
5334                 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5335                         self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5336                 }
5337
5338                 has_pending_monitor_events
5339         }
5340
5341         /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5342         /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5343         /// update events as a separate process method here.
5344         #[cfg(fuzzing)]
5345         pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5346                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5347                         if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5348                                 NotifyOption::DoPersist
5349                         } else {
5350                                 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
5351                         }
5352                 });
5353         }
5354
5355         /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5356         /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5357         /// update was applied.
5358         fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5359                 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5360                 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5361                 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5362
5363                 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
5364                 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
5365                 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
5366                 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
5367                 'peer_loop: loop {
5368                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5369                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5370                                 'chan_loop: loop {
5371                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5372                                         let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5373                                         for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
5374                                                 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
5375                                                 let funding_txo = chan.get_funding_txo();
5376                                                 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
5377                                                         chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger);
5378                                                 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5379                                                         failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
5380                                                 }
5381                                                 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
5382                                                         has_monitor_update = true;
5383
5384                                                         let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(
5385                                                                 funding_txo.expect("channel is live"), monitor_update);
5386                                                         let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5387                                                         let channel_id: [u8; 32] = *channel_id;
5388                                                         let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
5389                                                                 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING,
5390                                                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id));
5391                                                         if res.is_err() {
5392                                                                 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, res));
5393                                                         }
5394                                                         continue 'peer_loop;
5395                                                 }
5396                                         }
5397                                         break 'chan_loop;
5398                                 }
5399                         }
5400                         break 'peer_loop;
5401                 }
5402
5403                 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5404                 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5405                         self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
5406                 }
5407
5408                 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5409                         let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5410                 }
5411
5412                 has_update
5413         }
5414
5415         /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5416         /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5417         /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5418         fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5419                 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5420                 let mut has_update = false;
5421                 {
5422                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5423
5424                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5425                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5426                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5427                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5428                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5429                                         match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5430                                                 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5431                                                         if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5432                                                                 has_update = true;
5433                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5434                                                                         node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5435                                                                 });
5436                                                         }
5437                                                         if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5438                                                                 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5439                                                                 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5440                                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5441                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5442                                                                                 msg: update
5443                                                                         });
5444                                                                 }
5445
5446                                                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5447
5448                                                                 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5449                                                                 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
5450                                                                 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
5451                                                                 false
5452                                                         } else { true }
5453                                                 },
5454                                                 Err(e) => {
5455                                                         has_update = true;
5456                                                         let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5457                                                         handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5458                                                         !close_channel
5459                                                 }
5460                                         }
5461                                 });
5462                         }
5463                 }
5464
5465                 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5466                         let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5467                 }
5468
5469                 has_update
5470         }
5471
5472         /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5473         /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5474         /// Channel object.
5475         fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5476                 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5477                         // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5478                         // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5479                         // reorganized out of the main chain.
5480                         // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5481                         // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5482                         // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5483                         // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5484                         if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5485                                 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5486                                 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5487                                         assert!(should_broadcast);
5488                                 } else { unreachable!(); }
5489                                 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
5490                         }
5491                         self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5492                 }
5493         }
5494
5495         fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5496                 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5497
5498                 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5499                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5500                 }
5501
5502                 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5503
5504                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5505                 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5506                 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5507                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5508                                 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5509                                         payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5510                                         user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5511                                         // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5512                                         // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5513                                         // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5514                                         // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5515                                         // never fail a payment too early.
5516                                         // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5517                                         // timestamps.
5518                                         expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5519                                 });
5520                         },
5521                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5522                 }
5523                 Ok(payment_secret)
5524         }
5525
5526         /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5527         /// to pay us.
5528         ///
5529         /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5530         /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5531         ///
5532         /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
5533         /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
5534         /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5535         /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5536         ///
5537         /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5538         ///
5539         /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5540         /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5541         ///
5542         /// # Note
5543         ///
5544         /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5545         /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5546         ///
5547         /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5548         ///
5549         /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5550         /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5551         ///
5552         /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5553         /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5554         /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
5555         /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
5556         /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
5557         /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5558         pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
5559                 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5560                 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
5561                         &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5562                         min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
5563         }
5564
5565         /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5566         /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5567         ///
5568         /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5569         ///
5570         /// # Note
5571         /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5572         ///
5573         /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5574         #[deprecated]
5575         pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5576                 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5577                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5578                 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5579                 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5580         }
5581
5582         /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5583         /// stored external to LDK.
5584         ///
5585         /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5586         /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5587         /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5588         ///
5589         /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5590         /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5591         /// payments.
5592         ///
5593         /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5594         /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5595         /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5596         /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5597         ///
5598         /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5599         /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5600         /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5601         /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5602         /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5603         ///
5604         /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5605         /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5606         /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
5607         /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5608         /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
5609         ///
5610         /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
5611         /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
5612         ///
5613         /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5614         /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5615         ///
5616         /// # Note
5617         ///
5618         /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5619         /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5620         ///
5621         /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5622         ///
5623         /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5624         /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5625         ///
5626         /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5627         /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5628         pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
5629                 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5630                 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
5631                         invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5632                         min_final_cltv_expiry)
5633         }
5634
5635         /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5636         /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5637         ///
5638         /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5639         ///
5640         /// # Note
5641         /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5642         ///
5643         /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5644         #[deprecated]
5645         pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5646                 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5647         }
5648
5649         /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5650         /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5651         ///
5652         /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5653         pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5654                 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5655         }
5656
5657         /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5658         /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5659         ///
5660         /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5661         pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5662                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5663                 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5664                 loop {
5665                         let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5666                         // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5667                         match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
5668                                 Some(_) => continue,
5669                                 None => return scid_candidate
5670                         }
5671                 }
5672         }
5673
5674         /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5675         ///
5676         /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5677         pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5678                 PhantomRouteHints {
5679                         channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5680                         phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5681                         real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5682                 }
5683         }
5684
5685         /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
5686         /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
5687         /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
5688         ///
5689         /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
5690         /// times to get a unique scid.
5691         pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5692                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5693                 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5694                 loop {
5695                         let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5696                         // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5697                         if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
5698                         return scid_candidate
5699                 }
5700         }
5701
5702         /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
5703         /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
5704         pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
5705                 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
5706
5707                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5708                 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5709                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5710                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5711                         for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
5712                                 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
5713                                         if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
5714                                                 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
5715                                         }
5716                                 }
5717                         }
5718                 }
5719
5720                 inflight_htlcs
5721         }
5722
5723         #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5724         pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5725                 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5726                 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
5727                 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5728                 events.into_inner()
5729         }
5730
5731         #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
5732         pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
5733                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5734                 events.push(event);
5735         }
5736
5737         #[cfg(test)]
5738         pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
5739                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5740                 if events.is_empty() { None } else { Some(events.remove(0)) }
5741         }
5742
5743         #[cfg(test)]
5744         pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5745                 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
5746         }
5747
5748         #[cfg(test)]
5749         pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5750                 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
5751         }
5752
5753         /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
5754         /// using the given event handler.
5755         ///
5756         /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
5757         pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
5758                 &self, handler: H
5759         ) {
5760                 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock until the returned future completes so that
5761                 // we can be sure no other persists happen while processing events.
5762                 let _read_guard = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
5763
5764                 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5765
5766                 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5767                 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5768                 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5769                         result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5770                 }
5771
5772                 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5773                 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5774                         result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5775                 }
5776
5777                 for event in pending_events {
5778                         handler(event).await;
5779                 }
5780
5781                 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
5782                         self.persistence_notifier.notify();
5783                 }
5784         }
5785 }
5786
5787 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5788 where
5789         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5790         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5791         ES::Target: EntropySource,
5792         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5793         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5794         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5795         R::Target: Router,
5796         L::Target: Logger,
5797 {
5798         /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
5799         /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
5800         /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
5801         /// is always placed next to each other.
5802         ///
5803         /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
5804         /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
5805         /// `MessageSendEvent`s  for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
5806         /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
5807         ///
5808         /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
5809         /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
5810         /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
5811         fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5812                 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5813                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5814                         let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5815
5816                         // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5817                         // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5818                         if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5819                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5820                         }
5821
5822                         if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5823                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5824                         }
5825                         if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
5826                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5827                         }
5828
5829                         let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
5830                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5831                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5832                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5833                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5834                                 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
5835                                         pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
5836                                 }
5837                         }
5838
5839                         if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5840                                 events.replace(pending_events);
5841                         }
5842
5843                         result
5844                 });
5845                 events.into_inner()
5846         }
5847 }
5848
5849 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5850 where
5851         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5852         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5853         ES::Target: EntropySource,
5854         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5855         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5856         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5857         R::Target: Router,
5858         L::Target: Logger,
5859 {
5860         /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
5861         ///
5862         /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
5863         /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
5864         fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
5865                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5866                         let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5867
5868                         // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5869                         // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5870                         if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5871                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5872                         }
5873
5874                         let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5875                         if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5876                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5877                         }
5878
5879                         for event in pending_events {
5880                                 handler.handle_event(event);
5881                         }
5882
5883                         result
5884                 });
5885         }
5886 }
5887
5888 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5889 where
5890         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5891         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5892         ES::Target: EntropySource,
5893         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5894         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5895         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5896         R::Target: Router,
5897         L::Target: Logger,
5898 {
5899         fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5900                 {
5901                         let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5902                         assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
5903                                 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
5904                         assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
5905                                 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
5906                 }
5907
5908                 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
5909                 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
5910         }
5911
5912         fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5913                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5914                 let new_height = height - 1;
5915                 {
5916                         let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
5917                         assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
5918                                 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
5919                         assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
5920                                 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
5921                         *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
5922                 }
5923
5924                 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5925         }
5926 }
5927
5928 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5929 where
5930         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5931         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5932         ES::Target: EntropySource,
5933         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5934         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5935         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5936         R::Target: Router,
5937         L::Target: Logger,
5938 {
5939         fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5940                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5941                 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5942                 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5943
5944                 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5945                 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
5946
5947                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5948                 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
5949                         .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
5950
5951                 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5952                 if height < last_best_block_height {
5953                         let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5954                         self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5955                 }
5956         }
5957
5958         fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5959                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5960                 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5961                 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5962
5963                 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5964                 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
5965
5966                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5967
5968                 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
5969
5970                 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5971
5972                 macro_rules! max_time {
5973                         ($timestamp: expr) => {
5974                                 loop {
5975                                         // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
5976                                         // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
5977                                         // having an explicit local time source.
5978                                         // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
5979                                         // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
5980                                         let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5981                                         if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
5982                                         if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
5983                                                 break;
5984                                         }
5985                                 }
5986                         }
5987                 }
5988                 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
5989                 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5990                 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
5991                         inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
5992                 });
5993         }
5994
5995         fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
5996                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
5997                 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5998                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5999                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6000                         for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
6001                                 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.get_funding_txo(), chan.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
6002                                         res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
6003                                 }
6004                         }
6005                 }
6006                 res
6007         }
6008
6009         fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
6010                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6011                 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
6012                         if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
6013                                 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
6014                                         channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
6015                                 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6016                         } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6017                 });
6018         }
6019 }
6020
6021 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6022 where
6023         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6024         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6025         ES::Target: EntropySource,
6026         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6027         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6028         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6029         R::Target: Router,
6030         L::Target: Logger,
6031 {
6032         /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
6033         /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
6034         /// the function.
6035         fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
6036                         (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
6037                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6038                 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6039                 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6040
6041                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6042                 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
6043                 {
6044                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6045                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6046                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6047                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6048                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6049                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
6050                                         let res = f(channel);
6051                                         if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
6052                                                 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
6053                                                         let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
6054                                                         timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
6055                                                                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.channel_id() }));
6056                                                 }
6057                                                 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
6058                                                         send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
6059                                                         if channel.is_usable() {
6060                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6061                                                                 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
6062                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6063                                                                                 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6064                                                                                 msg,
6065                                                                         });
6066                                                                 }
6067                                                         } else {
6068                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6069                                                         }
6070                                                 }
6071
6072                                                 {
6073                                                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6074                                                         emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
6075                                                 }
6076
6077                                                 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
6078                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6079                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6080                                                                 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6081                                                                 msg: announcement_sigs,
6082                                                         });
6083                                                         if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6084                                                                 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
6085                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6086                                                                                 msg: announcement,
6087                                                                                 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6088                                                                                 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6089                                                                                 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
6090                                                                         });
6091                                                                 }
6092                                                         }
6093                                                 }
6094                                                 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
6095                                                         if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
6096                                                                 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
6097                                                                 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
6098                                                                 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
6099                                                                 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
6100                                                                 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
6101                                                                 // is always consistent.
6102                                                                 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
6103                                                                 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
6104                                                                 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()),
6105                                                                         "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
6106                                                                         fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
6107                                                         }
6108                                                 }
6109                                         } else if let Err(reason) = res {
6110                                                 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, channel);
6111                                                 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
6112                                                 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
6113                                                 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
6114                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
6115                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6116                                                                 msg: update
6117                                                         });
6118                                                 }
6119                                                 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
6120                                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
6121                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6122                                                         node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6123                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
6124                                                                 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6125                                                                 data: reason_message,
6126                                                         } },
6127                                                 });
6128                                                 return false;
6129                                         }
6130                                         true
6131                                 });
6132                         }
6133                 }
6134
6135                 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6136                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
6137                                 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
6138                                         // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
6139                                         // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
6140                                         // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
6141                                         // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
6142                                         if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6143                                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
6144                                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
6145
6146                                                 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
6147                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
6148                                                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
6149                                                 false
6150                                         } else { true }
6151                                 });
6152                                 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
6153                         });
6154
6155                         let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6156                         intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
6157                                 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6158                                         let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6159                                                 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
6160                                                 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
6161                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6162                                                 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6163                                                 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
6164                                         });
6165
6166                                         let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
6167                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6168                                                 _ => unreachable!(),
6169                                         };
6170                                         timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
6171                                                         HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
6172                                                         HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
6173                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
6174                                         false
6175                                 } else { true }
6176                         });
6177                 }
6178
6179                 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
6180
6181                 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
6182                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
6183                 }
6184         }
6185
6186         /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
6187         ///
6188         /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
6189         /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
6190         ///
6191         pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
6192                 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
6193         }
6194
6195         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6196         pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
6197                 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
6198         }
6199
6200         /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
6201         /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
6202         pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
6203                 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
6204         }
6205
6206         /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6207         /// [`ChannelManager`].
6208         pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6209                 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6210         }
6211
6212         /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6213         /// [`ChannelManager`].
6214         ///
6215         /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6216         /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6217         #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6218         pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6219                 provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
6220         }
6221
6222         /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6223         /// [`ChannelManager`].
6224         pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
6225                 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
6226         }
6227
6228         /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6229         /// [`ChannelManager`].
6230         pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6231                 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
6232         }
6233
6234         /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6235         /// [`ChannelManager`].
6236         pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
6237                 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6238         }
6239 }
6240
6241 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
6242         ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6243 where
6244         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6245         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6246         ES::Target: EntropySource,
6247         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6248         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6249         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6250         R::Target: Router,
6251         L::Target: Logger,
6252 {
6253         fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
6254                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6255                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6256         }
6257
6258         fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
6259                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6260                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6261         }
6262
6263         fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
6264                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6265                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6266         }
6267
6268         fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
6269                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6270                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6271         }
6272
6273         fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
6274                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6275                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6276         }
6277
6278         fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
6279                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6280                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6281         }
6282
6283         fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
6284                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6285                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6286         }
6287
6288         fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
6289                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6290                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6291         }
6292
6293         fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
6294                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6295                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6296         }
6297
6298         fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
6299                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6300                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6301         }
6302
6303         fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
6304                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6305                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6306         }
6307
6308         fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
6309                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6310                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6311         }
6312
6313         fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
6314                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6315                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6316         }
6317
6318         fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
6319                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6320                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6321         }
6322
6323         fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
6324                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6325                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6326         }
6327
6328         fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
6329                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6330                         if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
6331                                 persist
6332                         } else {
6333                                 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
6334                         }
6335                 });
6336         }
6337
6338         fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
6339                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6340                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6341         }
6342
6343         fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
6344                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6345                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6346                 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6347                 let remove_peer = {
6348                         log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
6349                                 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6350                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
6351                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6352                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6353                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6354                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6355                                         chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
6356                                         if chan.is_shutdown() {
6357                                                 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
6358                                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
6359                                                 return false;
6360                                         }
6361                                         true
6362                                 });
6363                                 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
6364                                         match msg {
6365                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
6366                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
6367                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
6368                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
6369                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
6370                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
6371                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
6372                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
6373                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
6374                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
6375                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
6376                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
6377                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6378                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
6379                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6380                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
6381                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
6382                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
6383                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
6384                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
6385                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
6386                                         }
6387                                 });
6388                                 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
6389                                 peer_state.is_connected = false;
6390                                 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
6391                         } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
6392                 };
6393                 if remove_peer {
6394                         per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
6395                 }
6396                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6397
6398                 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6399                         self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6400                 }
6401         }
6402
6403         fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
6404                 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
6405                         log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6406                         return Err(());
6407                 }
6408
6409                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6410
6411                 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
6412                 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
6413                 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
6414                 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
6415                 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
6416                 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
6417
6418                 {
6419                         let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6420                         match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
6421                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6422                                         if inbound_peer_limited {
6423                                                 return Err(());
6424                                         }
6425                                         e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
6426                                                 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
6427                                                 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
6428                                                 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
6429                                                 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
6430                                                 is_connected: true,
6431                                         }));
6432                                 },
6433                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
6434                                         let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
6435                                         peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
6436
6437                                         let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6438                                         if inbound_peer_limited &&
6439                                                 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
6440                                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
6441                                         {
6442                                                 return Err(());
6443                                         }
6444
6445                                         debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
6446                                         peer_state.is_connected = true;
6447                                 },
6448                         }
6449                 }
6450
6451                 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6452
6453                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6454                 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6455                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6456                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6457                         let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6458                         peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6459                                 let retain = if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6460                                         if !chan.have_received_message() {
6461                                                 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
6462                                                 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
6463                                                 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
6464                                                 // drop it.
6465                                                 false
6466                                         } else {
6467                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6468                                                         node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6469                                                         msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
6470                                                 });
6471                                                 true
6472                                         }
6473                                 } else { true };
6474                                 if retain && chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6475                                         if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.default_configuration) {
6476                                                 if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
6477                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
6478                                                                 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6479                                                                 msg, update_msg,
6480                                                         });
6481                                                 }
6482                                         }
6483                                 }
6484                                 retain
6485                         });
6486                 }
6487                 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
6488                 Ok(())
6489         }
6490
6491         fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
6492                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6493
6494                 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
6495                         let channel_ids: Vec<[u8; 32]> = {
6496                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6497                                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6498                                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
6499                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6500                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6501                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
6502                         };
6503                         for channel_id in channel_ids {
6504                                 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6505                                 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6506                         }
6507                 } else {
6508                         {
6509                                 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
6510                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6511                                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6512                                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
6513                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6514                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6515                                 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
6516                                         if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
6517                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
6518                                                         node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6519                                                         msg,
6520                                                 });
6521                                                 return;
6522                                         }
6523                                 }
6524                         }
6525
6526                         // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6527                         let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6528                 }
6529         }
6530
6531         fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6532                 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6533         }
6534
6535         fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
6536                 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6537         }
6538 }
6539
6540 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6541 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6542 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
6543         provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6544 }
6545
6546 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6547 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6548 ///
6549 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6550 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6551 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6552 pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6553         provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6554 }
6555
6556 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6557 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6558 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
6559         provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6560 }
6561
6562 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6563 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6564 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6565         ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
6566 }
6567
6568 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6569 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6570 pub fn provided_init_features(_config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
6571         // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
6572         // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
6573         // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
6574         let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
6575         features.set_data_loss_protect_optional();
6576         features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
6577         features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
6578         features.set_static_remote_key_required();
6579         features.set_payment_secret_required();
6580         features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
6581         features.set_wumbo_optional();
6582         features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
6583         features.set_channel_type_optional();
6584         features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
6585         features.set_zero_conf_optional();
6586         #[cfg(anchors)]
6587         { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
6588                 if _config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
6589                         features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
6590                 }
6591         }
6592         features
6593 }
6594
6595 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6596 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6597
6598 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
6599         (2, fee_base_msat, required),
6600         (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
6601         (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
6602 });
6603
6604 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
6605         (2, node_id, required),
6606         (4, features, required),
6607         (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
6608         (8, forwarding_info, option),
6609         (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6610         (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6611 });
6612
6613 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
6614         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6615                 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6616                 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6617                 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
6618                 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
6619                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6620                         (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
6621                         (2, self.channel_id, required),
6622                         (3, self.channel_type, option),
6623                         (4, self.counterparty, required),
6624                         (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
6625                         (6, self.funding_txo, option),
6626                         (7, self.config, option),
6627                         (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
6628                         (9, self.confirmations, option),
6629                         (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
6630                         (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6631                         (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6632                         (16, self.balance_msat, required),
6633                         (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6634                         // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6635                         // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6636                         (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6637                         (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6638                         (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
6639                         (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
6640                         (26, self.is_outbound, required),
6641                         (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
6642                         (30, self.is_usable, required),
6643                         (32, self.is_public, required),
6644                         (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6645                         (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6646                         (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6647                         (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
6648                 });
6649                 Ok(())
6650         }
6651 }
6652
6653 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
6654         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6655                 _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6656                         (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
6657                         (2, channel_id, required),
6658                         (3, channel_type, option),
6659                         (4, counterparty, required),
6660                         (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6661                         (6, funding_txo, option),
6662                         (7, config, option),
6663                         (8, short_channel_id, option),
6664                         (9, confirmations, option),
6665                         (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
6666                         (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6667                         (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6668                         (16, balance_msat, required),
6669                         (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6670                         // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6671                         // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6672                         (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6673                         (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6674                         (22, confirmations_required, option),
6675                         (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
6676                         (26, is_outbound, required),
6677                         (28, is_channel_ready, required),
6678                         (30, is_usable, required),
6679                         (32, is_public, required),
6680                         (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6681                         (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6682                         (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6683                         (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
6684                 });
6685
6686                 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6687                 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6688                 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
6689                 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
6690                         ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
6691
6692                 Ok(Self {
6693                         inbound_scid_alias,
6694                         channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
6695                         channel_type,
6696                         counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
6697                         outbound_scid_alias,
6698                         funding_txo,
6699                         config,
6700                         short_channel_id,
6701                         channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
6702                         unspendable_punishment_reserve,
6703                         user_channel_id,
6704                         balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
6705                         outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6706                         next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
6707                         inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6708                         confirmations_required,
6709                         confirmations,
6710                         force_close_spend_delay,
6711                         is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
6712                         is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
6713                         is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
6714                         is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
6715                         inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
6716                         inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
6717                         feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
6718                 })
6719         }
6720 }
6721
6722 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
6723         (2, channels, vec_type),
6724         (4, phantom_scid, required),
6725         (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
6726 });
6727
6728 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
6729         (0, Forward) => {
6730                 (0, onion_packet, required),
6731                 (2, short_channel_id, required),
6732         },
6733         (1, Receive) => {
6734                 (0, payment_data, required),
6735                 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6736                 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6737                 (3, payment_metadata, option),
6738         },
6739         (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
6740                 (0, payment_preimage, required),
6741                 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6742                 (3, payment_metadata, option),
6743         },
6744 ;);
6745
6746 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
6747         (0, routing, required),
6748         (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
6749         (4, payment_hash, required),
6750         (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
6751         (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
6752         (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
6753 });
6754
6755
6756 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6757         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6758                 match self {
6759                         HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
6760                                 0u8.write(writer)?;
6761                                 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6762                                 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6763                                 reason.write(writer)?;
6764                         },
6765                         HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6766                                 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
6767                         }) => {
6768                                 1u8.write(writer)?;
6769                                 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6770                                 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6771                                 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
6772                                 failure_code.write(writer)?;
6773                         },
6774                 }
6775                 Ok(())
6776         }
6777 }
6778
6779 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6780         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6781                 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6782                 match id {
6783                         0 => {
6784                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6785                                         channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6786                                         htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6787                                         reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
6788                                 }))
6789                         },
6790                         1 => {
6791                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6792                                         channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6793                                         htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6794                                         sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
6795                                         failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
6796                                 }))
6797                         },
6798                         // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
6799                         // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
6800                         // messages contained in the variants.
6801                         // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
6802                         // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
6803                         // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
6804                         2 => {
6805                                 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6806                                 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6807                                 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6808                                 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6809                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
6810                         },
6811                         3 => {
6812                                 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6813                                 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6814                                 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6815                                 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6816                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
6817                         },
6818                         _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6819                 }
6820         }
6821 }
6822
6823 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
6824         (0, Forward),
6825         (1, Fail),
6826 );
6827
6828 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
6829         (0, short_channel_id, required),
6830         (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6831         (2, outpoint, required),
6832         (4, htlc_id, required),
6833         (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
6834 });
6835
6836 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
6837         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6838                 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
6839                         OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
6840                         OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
6841                 };
6842                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6843                         (0, self.prev_hop, required),
6844                         (1, self.total_msat, required),
6845                         (2, self.value, required),
6846                         (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
6847                         (4, payment_data, option),
6848                         (5, self.total_value_received, option),
6849                         (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
6850                         (8, keysend_preimage, option),
6851                 });
6852                 Ok(())
6853         }
6854 }
6855
6856 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
6857         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6858                 let mut prev_hop = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
6859                 let mut value = 0;
6860                 let mut sender_intended_value = None;
6861                 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
6862                 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
6863                 let mut total_value_received = None;
6864                 let mut total_msat = None;
6865                 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
6866                 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6867                         (0, prev_hop, required),
6868                         (1, total_msat, option),
6869                         (2, value, required),
6870                         (3, sender_intended_value, option),
6871                         (4, payment_data, option),
6872                         (5, total_value_received, option),
6873                         (6, cltv_expiry, required),
6874                         (8, keysend_preimage, option)
6875                 });
6876                 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
6877                         Some(p) => {
6878                                 if payment_data.is_some() {
6879                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6880                                 }
6881                                 if total_msat.is_none() {
6882                                         total_msat = Some(value);
6883                                 }
6884                                 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
6885                         },
6886                         None => {
6887                                 if total_msat.is_none() {
6888                                         if payment_data.is_none() {
6889                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6890                                         }
6891                                         total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
6892                                 }
6893                                 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
6894                         },
6895                 };
6896                 Ok(Self {
6897                         prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
6898                         timer_ticks: 0,
6899                         value,
6900                         sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
6901                         total_value_received,
6902                         total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
6903                         onion_payload,
6904                         cltv_expiry,
6905                 })
6906         }
6907 }
6908
6909 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
6910         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6911                 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6912                 match id {
6913                         0 => {
6914                                 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
6915                                 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
6916                                 let mut path: Option<Vec<RouteHop>> = Some(Vec::new());
6917                                 let mut payment_id = None;
6918                                 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
6919                                 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6920                                         (0, session_priv, required),
6921                                         (1, payment_id, option),
6922                                         (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6923                                         (4, path, vec_type),
6924                                         (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
6925                                 });
6926                                 if payment_id.is_none() {
6927                                         // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
6928                                         // instead.
6929                                         payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
6930                                 }
6931                                 if path.is_none() || path.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
6932                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6933                                 }
6934                                 let path = path.unwrap();
6935                                 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
6936                                         if params.final_cltv_expiry_delta == 0 {
6937                                                 params.final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta;
6938                                         }
6939                                 }
6940                                 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6941                                         session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
6942                                         first_hop_htlc_msat,
6943                                         path,
6944                                         payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
6945                                 })
6946                         }
6947                         1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6948                         _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6949                 }
6950         }
6951 }
6952
6953 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
6954         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
6955                 match self {
6956                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
6957                                 0u8.write(writer)?;
6958                                 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
6959                                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6960                                         (0, session_priv, required),
6961                                         (1, payment_id_opt, option),
6962                                         (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6963                                         // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
6964                                         (4, *path, vec_type),
6965                                         (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
6966                                  });
6967                         }
6968                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
6969                                 1u8.write(writer)?;
6970                                 field.write(writer)?;
6971                         }
6972                 }
6973                 Ok(())
6974         }
6975 }
6976
6977 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
6978         (0, forward_info, required),
6979         (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
6980         (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
6981         (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
6982         (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
6983 });
6984
6985 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
6986         (1, FailHTLC) => {
6987                 (0, htlc_id, required),
6988                 (2, err_packet, required),
6989         };
6990         (0, AddHTLC)
6991 );
6992
6993 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
6994         (0, payment_secret, required),
6995         (2, expiry_time, required),
6996         (4, user_payment_id, required),
6997         (6, payment_preimage, required),
6998         (8, min_value_msat, required),
6999 });
7000
7001 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7002 where
7003         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7004         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7005         ES::Target: EntropySource,
7006         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7007         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7008         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7009         R::Target: Router,
7010         L::Target: Logger,
7011 {
7012         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7013                 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
7014
7015                 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7016
7017                 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
7018                 {
7019                         let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7020                         best_block.height().write(writer)?;
7021                         best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
7022                 }
7023
7024                 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
7025                 {
7026                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7027                         let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
7028                         let mut number_of_channels = 0;
7029                         for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7030                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7031                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7032                                 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
7033                                         serializable_peer_count += 1;
7034                                 }
7035                                 number_of_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.len();
7036                                 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
7037                                         if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7038                                                 unfunded_channels += 1;
7039                                         }
7040                                 }
7041                         }
7042
7043                         ((number_of_channels - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
7044
7045                         for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7046                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7047                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7048                                 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
7049                                         if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7050                                                 channel.write(writer)?;
7051                                         }
7052                                 }
7053                         }
7054                 }
7055
7056                 {
7057                         let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7058                         (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7059                         for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
7060                                 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
7061                                 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7062                                 for forward in pending_forwards {
7063                                         forward.write(writer)?;
7064                                 }
7065                         }
7066                 }
7067
7068                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7069
7070                 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7071                 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
7072                 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7073
7074                 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
7075                 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
7076                 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7077                 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
7078                         payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7079                         (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7080                         for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
7081                                 htlc.write(writer)?;
7082                         }
7083                         htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
7084                         htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
7085                 }
7086
7087                 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
7088                 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
7089                 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7090                         // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
7091                         // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
7092                         // per_peer_state lock at all.
7093                         peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
7094                 }
7095
7096                 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
7097                 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
7098                         // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
7099                         // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
7100                         // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
7101                         // no channels.
7102                         if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
7103                                 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
7104                                 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
7105                                 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
7106                                         monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
7107                                                 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
7108                                                 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
7109                                 }
7110                         }
7111                 }
7112
7113                 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7114                 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7115                 for event in events.iter() {
7116                         event.write(writer)?;
7117                 }
7118
7119                 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
7120                 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7121                 for event in background_events.iter() {
7122                         match event {
7123                                 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
7124                                         0u8.write(writer)?;
7125                                         funding_txo.write(writer)?;
7126                                         monitor_update.write(writer)?;
7127                                 },
7128                         }
7129                 }
7130
7131                 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
7132                 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
7133                 // likely to be identical.
7134                 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7135                 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7136
7137                 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7138                 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
7139                         hash.write(writer)?;
7140                         pending_payment.write(writer)?;
7141                 }
7142
7143                 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
7144                 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
7145                 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7146                         if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
7147                                 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
7148                         }
7149                 }
7150                 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
7151                 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7152                         match outbound {
7153                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7154                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7155                                         for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
7156                                                 session_priv.write(writer)?;
7157                                         }
7158                                 }
7159                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
7160                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
7161                         }
7162                 }
7163
7164                 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
7165                 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
7166                 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7167                         match outbound {
7168                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7169                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7170                                         pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
7171                                 },
7172                                 _ => {},
7173                         }
7174                 }
7175
7176                 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
7177                 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7178                 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
7179                         pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
7180                 }
7181
7182                 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
7183                 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
7184                         // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
7185                         // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
7186                         pending_claiming_payments = None;
7187                 }
7188
7189                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7190                         (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
7191                         (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7192                         (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
7193                         (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7194                         (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
7195                         (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
7196                         (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
7197                         (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7198                         (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
7199                         (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
7200                 });
7201
7202                 Ok(())
7203         }
7204 }
7205
7206 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
7207 ///
7208 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
7209 /// is:
7210 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7211 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
7212 ///    `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
7213 ///    This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
7214 ///    [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
7215 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
7216 ///    same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
7217 ///    [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
7218 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7219 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
7220 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
7221 ///    Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
7222 ///    will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
7223 ///    the next step.
7224 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
7225 ///    [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
7226 ///
7227 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
7228 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
7229 ///
7230 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
7231 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
7232 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
7233 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
7234 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
7235 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
7236 ///
7237 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
7238 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7239 where
7240         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7241         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7242         ES::Target: EntropySource,
7243         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7244         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7245         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7246         R::Target: Router,
7247         L::Target: Logger,
7248 {
7249         /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
7250         pub entropy_source: ES,
7251
7252         /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
7253         pub node_signer: NS,
7254
7255         /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
7256         /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
7257         /// signing data.
7258         pub signer_provider: SP,
7259
7260         /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7261         ///
7262         /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
7263         pub fee_estimator: F,
7264         /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7265         ///
7266         /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
7267         /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
7268         /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
7269         pub chain_monitor: M,
7270
7271         /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
7272         /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
7273         /// force-closed during deserialization.
7274         pub tx_broadcaster: T,
7275         /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
7276         /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
7277         ///
7278         /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
7279         pub router: R,
7280         /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
7281         /// deserialization.
7282         pub logger: L,
7283         /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
7284         /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
7285         pub default_config: UserConfig,
7286
7287         /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
7288         /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
7289         ///
7290         /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
7291         /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
7292         /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
7293         /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
7294         ///
7295         /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
7296         /// this struct.
7297         ///
7298         /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
7299         pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
7300 }
7301
7302 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7303                 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7304 where
7305         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7306         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7307         ES::Target: EntropySource,
7308         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7309         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7310         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7311         R::Target: Router,
7312         L::Target: Logger,
7313 {
7314         /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
7315         /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
7316         /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
7317         pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
7318                         mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
7319                 Self {
7320                         entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
7321                         channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
7322                 }
7323         }
7324 }
7325
7326 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
7327 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
7328 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7329         ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
7330 where
7331         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7332         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7333         ES::Target: EntropySource,
7334         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7335         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7336         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7337         R::Target: Router,
7338         L::Target: Logger,
7339 {
7340         fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7341                 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
7342                 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
7343         }
7344 }
7345
7346 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7347         ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
7348 where
7349         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7350         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7351         ES::Target: EntropySource,
7352         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7353         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7354         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7355         R::Target: Router,
7356         L::Target: Logger,
7357 {
7358         fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7359                 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7360
7361                 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7362                 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7363                 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7364
7365                 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7366
7367                 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7368                 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7369                 let mut peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7370                 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7371                 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7372                 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
7373                 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
7374                 for _ in 0..channel_count {
7375                         let mut channel: Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (
7376                                 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
7377                         ))?;
7378                         let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7379                         funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
7380                         if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
7381                                 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7382                                                 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7383                                                 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7384                                                 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7385                                         // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
7386                                         log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
7387                                         log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7388                                                 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7389                                         log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7390                                         log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7391                                         log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7392                                         log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7393                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7394                                 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7395                                                 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7396                                                 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7397                                                 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7398                                         // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
7399                                         log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
7400                                         log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
7401                                         log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7402                                                 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7403                                         let (monitor_update, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
7404                                         if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
7405                                                 pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate(monitor_update));
7406                                         }
7407                                         failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
7408                                         channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7409                                                 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7410                                                 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7411                                                 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
7412                                         });
7413                                         for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7414                                                 let mut found_htlc = false;
7415                                                 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7416                                                         if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
7417                                                 }
7418                                                 if !found_htlc {
7419                                                         // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
7420                                                         // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
7421                                                         // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
7422                                                         // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
7423                                                         // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
7424                                                         // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
7425                                                         // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
7426                                                         log_info!(args.logger,
7427                                                                 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
7428                                                                 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7429                                                         failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7430                                                 }
7431                                         }
7432                                 } else {
7433                                         log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7434                                         if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
7435                                                 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7436                                         }
7437                                         if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7438                                                 id_to_peer.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel.get_counterparty_node_id());
7439                                         }
7440                                         match peer_channels.entry(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
7441                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7442                                                         let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
7443                                                         by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7444                                                 },
7445                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7446                                                         let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
7447                                                         by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7448                                                         entry.insert(by_id_map);
7449                                                 }
7450                                         }
7451                                 }
7452                         } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
7453                                 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
7454                                 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
7455                                 // safely discard the channel.
7456                                 let _ = channel.force_shutdown(false);
7457                                 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7458                                         channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7459                                         user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7460                                         reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
7461                                 });
7462                         } else {
7463                                 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7464                                 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7465                                 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7466                                 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7467                                 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7468                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7469                         }
7470                 }
7471
7472                 for (funding_txo, _) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7473                         if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
7474                                 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
7475                                         update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
7476                                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
7477                                 };
7478                                 pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
7479                         }
7480                 }
7481
7482                 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
7483                 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7484                 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7485                 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
7486                         let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7487                         let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7488                         let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
7489                         for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
7490                                 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
7491                         }
7492                         forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
7493                 }
7494
7495                 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7496                 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7497                 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
7498                         let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7499                         let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7500                         let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
7501                         for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
7502                                 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
7503                         }
7504                         claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
7505                 }
7506
7507                 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7508                 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>)>()));
7509                 for _ in 0..peer_count {
7510                         let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7511                         let peer_state = PeerState {
7512                                 channel_by_id: peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new()),
7513                                 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
7514                                 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7515                                 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
7516                                 is_connected: false,
7517                         };
7518                         per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
7519                 }
7520
7521                 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7522                 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
7523                 for _ in 0..event_count {
7524                         match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
7525                                 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
7526                                 None => continue,
7527                         }
7528                 }
7529
7530                 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7531                 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
7532                         match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7533                                 0 => {
7534                                         let (funding_txo, monitor_update): (OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate) = (Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?);
7535                                         if pending_background_events.iter().find(|e| {
7536                                                 let BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((pending_funding_txo, pending_monitor_update)) = e;
7537                                                 *pending_funding_txo == funding_txo && *pending_monitor_update == monitor_update
7538                                         }).is_none() {
7539                                                 pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)));
7540                                         }
7541                                 }
7542                                 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7543                         }
7544                 }
7545
7546                 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
7547                 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7548
7549                 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7550                 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
7551                 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
7552                         if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
7553                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7554                         }
7555                 }
7556
7557                 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7558                 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
7559                         HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
7560                 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
7561                         let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
7562                         let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
7563                                 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
7564                         };
7565                         if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
7566                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7567                         };
7568                 }
7569
7570                 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
7571                 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
7572                 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
7573                 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
7574                 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
7575                 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7576                 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7577                 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
7578                 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
7579                 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
7580                 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = Some(Vec::new());
7581                 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7582                         (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
7583                         (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7584                         (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
7585                         (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7586                         (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
7587                         (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
7588                         (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
7589                         (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7590                         (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
7591                         (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
7592                 });
7593                 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
7594                         fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7595                 }
7596
7597                 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
7598                         probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7599                 }
7600
7601                 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
7602                         pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
7603                 }
7604
7605                 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
7606                         pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
7607                 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
7608                         let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
7609                         for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
7610                                 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
7611                         }
7612                         pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
7613                 }
7614                 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
7615                         pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
7616                         retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
7617                 };
7618
7619                 {
7620                         // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
7621                         // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
7622                         // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
7623                         // corresponding `Channel` at all).
7624                         // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
7625                         // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
7626                         // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
7627                         // 0.0.102+
7628                         for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7629                                 if id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
7630                                         for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
7631                                                 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
7632                                                         if path.is_empty() {
7633                                                                 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
7634                                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7635                                                         }
7636
7637                                                         let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
7638                                                         let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
7639                                                         session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
7640                                                         match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
7641                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7642                                                                         let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
7643                                                                         log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
7644                                                                                 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
7645                                                                 },
7646                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7647                                                                         let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
7648                                                                         entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
7649                                                                                 retry_strategy: None,
7650                                                                                 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
7651                                                                                 payment_params: None,
7652                                                                                 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
7653                                                                                 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
7654                                                                                 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
7655                                                                                 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
7656                                                                                 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
7657                                                                                 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
7658                                                                                 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
7659                                                                                 total_msat: path_amt,
7660                                                                                 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
7661                                                                         });
7662                                                                         log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
7663                                                                                 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0),  log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
7664                                                                 }
7665                                                         }
7666                                                 }
7667                                         }
7668                                         for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7669                                                 match htlc_source {
7670                                                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
7671                                                                 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
7672                                                                         info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
7673                                                                                 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
7674                                                                 };
7675                                                                 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
7676                                                                 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
7677                                                                 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
7678                                                                 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
7679                                                                 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
7680                                                                 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
7681                                                                         forwards.retain(|forward| {
7682                                                                                 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
7683                                                                                         if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
7684                                                                                                 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7685                                                                                                         log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7686                                                                                                 false
7687                                                                                         } else { true }
7688                                                                                 } else { true }
7689                                                                         });
7690                                                                         !forwards.is_empty()
7691                                                                 });
7692                                                                 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
7693                                                                         if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
7694                                                                                 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7695                                                                                         log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7696                                                                                 pending_events_read.retain(|event| {
7697                                                                                         if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
7698                                                                                                 intercepted_id != ev_id
7699                                                                                         } else { true }
7700                                                                                 });
7701                                                                                 false
7702                                                                         } else { true }
7703                                                                 });
7704                                                         },
7705                                                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
7706                                                                 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
7707                                                                         let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
7708                                                                         // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
7709                                                                         // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
7710                                                                         // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
7711                                                                         // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
7712                                                                         // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
7713                                                                         // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
7714                                                                         // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
7715                                                                         // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
7716                                                                         pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv, path, false, &pending_events, &args.logger);
7717                                                                         pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
7718                                                                 }
7719                                                         },
7720                                                 }
7721                                         }
7722                                 }
7723                         }
7724                 }
7725
7726                 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
7727                         // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
7728                         // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
7729                         // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
7730                         // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
7731                         // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
7732                         pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
7733                                 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
7734                         });
7735                 }
7736
7737                 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
7738                 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
7739
7740                 let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
7741                 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
7742                         if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
7743                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7744                         }
7745                         if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
7746                                 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
7747                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7748                                 }
7749                                 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
7750                                         purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
7751                                 {
7752                                         let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
7753                                                 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
7754                                         });
7755                                         if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
7756                                 }
7757                         } else {
7758                                 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
7759                                         let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
7760                                                 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
7761                                         });
7762                                         if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
7763                                 }
7764                         }
7765                 } else {
7766                         // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
7767                         // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
7768                         for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
7769                                 if htlcs.is_empty() {
7770                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7771                                 }
7772                                 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
7773                                         OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
7774                                                 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
7775                                                         events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
7776                                                                 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
7777                                                                         Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
7778                                                                         None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
7779                                                                                 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
7780                                                                                 Err(()) => {
7781                                                                                         log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7782                                                                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7783                                                                                 }
7784                                                                         }
7785                                                                 },
7786                                                                 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
7787                                                         }
7788                                                 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
7789                                         },
7790                                         OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
7791                                                 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
7792                                 };
7793                                 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
7794                                         purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
7795                                 });
7796                         }
7797                 }
7798
7799                 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7800                 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7801
7802                 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
7803                         Ok(key) => key,
7804                         Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7805                 };
7806                 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
7807                         if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
7808                                 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
7809                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7810                         }
7811                 }
7812
7813                 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
7814                 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
7815                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7816                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7817                         for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
7818                                 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
7819                                         let mut outbound_scid_alias;
7820                                         loop {
7821                                                 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
7822                                                         .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
7823                                                 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
7824                                         }
7825                                         chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
7826                                 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
7827                                         // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7828                                         // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7829                                         log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7830                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7831                                 }
7832                                 if chan.is_usable() {
7833                                         if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
7834                                                 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7835                                                 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7836                                                 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7837                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7838                                         }
7839                                 }
7840                         }
7841                 }
7842
7843                 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
7844
7845                 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7846                         for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
7847                                 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
7848                                         log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7849                                         let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
7850                                         let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
7851                                         let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
7852                                         if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
7853                                                 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
7854                                                         .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
7855                                                 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
7856                                         }
7857                                         for claimable_htlc in payment.htlcs {
7858                                                 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
7859
7860                                                 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
7861                                                 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
7862                                                 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
7863                                                 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
7864                                                 //
7865                                                 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
7866                                                 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
7867                                                 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
7868                                                 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
7869                                                 // reason to.
7870                                                 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
7871                                                 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
7872                                                 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
7873                                                 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
7874                                                 // restart.
7875                                                 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
7876                                                 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
7877                                                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
7878                                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7879                                                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7880                                                         if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
7881                                                                 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
7882                                                         }
7883                                                 }
7884                                                 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
7885                                                         previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
7886                                                 }
7887                                         }
7888                                         pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
7889                                                 receiver_node_id,
7890                                                 payment_hash,
7891                                                 purpose: payment.purpose,
7892                                                 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
7893                                         });
7894                                 }
7895                         }
7896                 }
7897
7898                 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
7899                         if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get_mut(&node_id) {
7900                                 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
7901                         } else {
7902                                 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
7903                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7904                         }
7905                 }
7906
7907                 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
7908                         genesis_hash,
7909                         fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
7910                         chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
7911                         tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
7912                         router: args.router,
7913
7914                         best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
7915
7916                         inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
7917                         pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
7918                         pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
7919                         pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
7920
7921                         forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
7922                         claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
7923                         outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
7924                         id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
7925                         short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
7926                         fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
7927
7928                         probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
7929
7930                         our_network_pubkey,
7931                         secp_ctx,
7932
7933                         highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
7934
7935                         per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
7936
7937                         pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
7938                         pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
7939                         total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
7940                         persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
7941
7942                         entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
7943                         node_signer: args.node_signer,
7944                         signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
7945
7946                         logger: args.logger,
7947                         default_configuration: args.default_config,
7948                 };
7949
7950                 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7951                         let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
7952                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
7953                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7954                         channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7955                 }
7956
7957                 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
7958                 //connection or two.
7959
7960                 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
7961         }
7962 }
7963
7964 #[cfg(test)]
7965 mod tests {
7966         use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7967         use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7968         use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
7969         #[cfg(feature = "std")]
7970         use core::time::Duration;
7971         use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
7972         use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
7973         use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
7974         use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
7975         use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7976         use crate::ln::msgs;
7977         use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
7978         use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
7979         use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7980         use crate::util::test_utils;
7981         use crate::util::config::ChannelConfig;
7982         use crate::chain::keysinterface::EntropySource;
7983
7984         #[test]
7985         fn test_notify_limits() {
7986                 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
7987                 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
7988                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7989                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7990                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7991                 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7992
7993                 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
7994                 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
7995                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7996                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7997                 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7998
7999                 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8000
8001                 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
8002                 // to connect messages with new values
8003                 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
8004                 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
8005                 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
8006                         &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
8007                 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
8008                         &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
8009
8010                 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
8011                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8012                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8013                 // ... but the last node should not.
8014                 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8015                 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
8016                 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8017                 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8018
8019                 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
8020                 // about the channel.
8021                 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
8022                 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
8023                 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8024
8025                 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
8026                 // parties.
8027                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
8028                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
8029                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
8030                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
8031                 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8032                 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8033
8034                 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
8035                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8036                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8037
8038                 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
8039                 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
8040                 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
8041                 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
8042                 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
8043                 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
8044
8045                 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
8046                 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
8047                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
8048                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
8049                 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8050                 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8051                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8052                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8053
8054                 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
8055                 // the channel info has updated.
8056                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
8057                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
8058                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8059                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8060                 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8061                 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8062         }
8063
8064         #[test]
8065         fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
8066                 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
8067                 // expected.
8068                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8069                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8070                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8071                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8072                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8073
8074                 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
8075                 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8076                 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
8077                 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
8078
8079                 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
8080                 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
8081                 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
8082                 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
8083                 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
8084                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
8085                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
8086                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
8087                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8088                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8089                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8090                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
8091
8092                 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
8093                 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
8094                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8095                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8096                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8097                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8098                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8099                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8100                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8101                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8102                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8103                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8104                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
8105                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8106                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8107                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8108                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8109                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8110                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8111                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8112                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8113                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8114                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
8115
8116                 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
8117                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
8118                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
8119                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8120                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8121                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8122                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
8123
8124                 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
8125                 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
8126                 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
8127                 // lightning messages manually.
8128                 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8129                 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
8130                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8131
8132                 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8133                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8134                 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
8135                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8136                 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8137                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
8138                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8139                 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8140                 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
8141                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8142                 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8143                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8144                 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8145                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8146                 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8147                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
8148                 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8149                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8150                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
8151                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8152                 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8153                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8154                 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8155                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
8156                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8157
8158                 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
8159                 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
8160                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8161                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
8162                 match events[0] {
8163                         Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
8164                                 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
8165                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
8166                                 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
8167                         },
8168                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8169                 }
8170                 match events[1] {
8171                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8172                                 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8173                                 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8174                                 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8175                         },
8176                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8177                 }
8178                 match events[2] {
8179                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8180                                 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8181                                 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8182                                 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8183                         },
8184                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8185                 }
8186         }
8187
8188         #[test]
8189         fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
8190                 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
8191                 //      outbound regular payment fails as expected.
8192                 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
8193                 //      fails as expected.
8194                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8195                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8196                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8197                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8198                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8199                 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8200                 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8201
8202                 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
8203                 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
8204                 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
8205
8206                 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
8207                 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8208                         payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV),
8209                         final_value_msat: 100_000,
8210                 };
8211                 let route = find_route(
8212                         &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8213                         None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8214                 ).unwrap();
8215                 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
8216                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8217                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8218                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8219                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8220                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8221                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8222                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8223                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8224                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8225                 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
8226                 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
8227                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8228                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8229                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8230                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8231                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8232                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8233                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8234                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8235                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8236                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8237                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8238                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8239
8240                 // Finally, claim the original payment.
8241                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8242
8243                 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
8244                 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8245                 let route = find_route(
8246                         &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8247                         None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8248                 ).unwrap();
8249                 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
8250                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8251                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8252                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8253                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8254                 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
8255                 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
8256                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
8257
8258                 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
8259                 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8260                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
8261                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8262                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8263                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8264                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8265                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8266                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8267                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8268                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8269                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8270                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8271                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8272                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8273                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8274                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8275                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8276                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8277                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8278                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8279                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8280                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8281                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8282
8283                 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
8284                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8285         }
8286
8287         #[test]
8288         fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
8289                 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
8290                 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
8291                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8292                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8293                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8294                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8295
8296                 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8297                 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8298
8299                 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8300                 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8301                         payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
8302                         final_value_msat: 10_000,
8303                 };
8304                 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
8305                 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8306                 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8307                 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8308                 let route = find_route(
8309                         &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8310                         nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8311                 ).unwrap();
8312
8313                 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8314                 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
8315                 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
8316                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8317                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
8318                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8319                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8320
8321                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8322                 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8323                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8324                 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8325                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8326                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8327                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8328
8329                 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
8330         }
8331
8332         #[test]
8333         fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
8334                 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
8335                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8336                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8337                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8338                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8339
8340                 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8341                 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8342
8343                 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8344                 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8345                         payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
8346                         final_value_msat: 10_000,
8347                 };
8348                 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
8349                 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8350                 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8351                 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8352                 let route = find_route(
8353                         &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8354                         nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8355                 ).unwrap();
8356
8357                 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8358                 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8359                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
8360                 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
8361                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8362                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
8363                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
8364                         PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8365                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8366
8367                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8368                 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8369                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8370                 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8371                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8372                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8373                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8374
8375                 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
8376         }
8377
8378         #[test]
8379         fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
8380                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8381                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8382                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8383                 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8384
8385                 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8386                 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8387                 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8388                 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8389
8390                 // Marshall an MPP route.
8391                 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8392                 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8393                 route.paths.push(path);
8394                 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8395                 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8396                 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8397                 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8398                 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8399                 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8400
8401                 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
8402                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
8403                 .unwrap_err() {
8404                         PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
8405                                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
8406                         },
8407                         _ => panic!("unexpected error")
8408                 }
8409         }
8410
8411         #[test]
8412         fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
8413                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8414                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8415                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8416                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8417
8418                 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8419
8420                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8421                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8422
8423                 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8424                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8425                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8426                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8427
8428                 {
8429                         // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
8430                         // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
8431                         let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8432                         // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
8433                         assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
8434                         assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
8435                 }
8436
8437                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
8438
8439                 {
8440                         // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
8441                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
8442                 }
8443         }
8444
8445         #[test]
8446         fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
8447                 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
8448                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8449                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8450                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8451                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8452
8453                 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
8454                 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
8455                         payment_secret,
8456                         total_msat: 100_000,
8457                 };
8458
8459                 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
8460                 // payment verification fails as expected.
8461                 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
8462                 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
8463                 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
8464                         Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
8465                         Err(()) => {
8466                                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
8467                         }
8468                 }
8469
8470                 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
8471                 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
8472         }
8473
8474         #[test]
8475         fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
8476                 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
8477                 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
8478                 // the channel is successfully closed.
8479                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8480                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8481                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8482                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8483
8484                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8485                 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8486                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
8487                 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8488                 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
8489
8490                 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
8491                 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
8492                 {
8493                         // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
8494                         // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
8495                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8496                         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8497                 }
8498
8499                 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8500                 {
8501                         // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8502                         // as it has the funding transaction.
8503                         let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8504                         assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8505                         assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8506                 }
8507
8508                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8509
8510                 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8511
8512                 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8513                 {
8514                         let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8515                         assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8516                         assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8517                 }
8518                 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8519
8520                 {
8521                         // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8522                         // as it has the funding transaction.
8523                         let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8524                         assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8525                         assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8526                 }
8527                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8528                 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8529                 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
8530                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8531                 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8532                 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8533                 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
8534                 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
8535
8536                 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8537                 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8538                 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8539                 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
8540
8541                 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8542                 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
8543                 {
8544                         // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
8545                         // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
8546                         // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
8547                         // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
8548                         let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8549                         assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8550                         assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8551                 }
8552
8553                 {
8554                         // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
8555                         // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
8556                         // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
8557                         // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
8558                         let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8559                         assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8560                         assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8561                 }
8562
8563                 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8564                 {
8565                         // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
8566                         // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
8567                         // closing transaction).
8568                         // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
8569                         // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
8570                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8571
8572                         // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s  `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
8573                         // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
8574                         let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8575                         assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8576                         assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8577                 }
8578
8579                 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8580
8581                 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
8582                 {
8583                         // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
8584                         // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
8585                         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8586                 }
8587                 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8588
8589                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8590                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8591         }
8592
8593         fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
8594                 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
8595                 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
8596         }
8597
8598         fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
8599                 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
8600                 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
8601         }
8602
8603         fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
8604                 match res_err {
8605                         Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
8606                                 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
8607                         },
8608                         Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
8609                                 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
8610                         },
8611                         Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
8612                         Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8613                 }
8614         }
8615
8616         #[test]
8617         fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
8618                 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
8619                 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
8620                 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
8621                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8622                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
8623                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
8624                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
8625
8626                 // Dummy values
8627                 let channel_id = [4; 32];
8628                 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8629                 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
8630
8631                 // Test the API functions.
8632                 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
8633
8634                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
8635
8636                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8637
8638                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8639
8640                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8641
8642                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
8643
8644                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
8645         }
8646
8647         #[test]
8648         fn test_connection_limiting() {
8649                 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
8650                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8651                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8652                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8653                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8654
8655                 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
8656
8657                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8658                 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8659
8660                 let mut funding_tx = None;
8661                 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
8662                         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8663                         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8664
8665                         if idx == 0 {
8666                                 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
8667                                 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
8668                                 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
8669                                 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
8670                                 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8671
8672                                 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8673                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8674                                 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8675
8676                                 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8677
8678                                 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
8679                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8680                                 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8681                         }
8682                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8683                 }
8684
8685                 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
8686                 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8687                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8688                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
8689                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8690
8691                 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
8692                 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
8693                 // limit.
8694                 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
8695                 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
8696                         let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8697                                 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8698                         peer_pks.push(random_pk);
8699                         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8700                                 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8701                 }
8702                 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8703                         &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8704                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8705                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap_err();
8706
8707                 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
8708                 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
8709                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8710                 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8711                 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
8712                 for ev in chan_closed_events {
8713                         if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
8714                 }
8715                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8716                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8717                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
8718                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap_err();
8719
8720                 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
8721                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
8722                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
8723                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8724
8725                 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
8726                 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
8727                 // open channels.
8728                 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
8729                 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
8730                         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
8731                         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
8732                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8733                 }
8734                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8735                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
8736                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8737
8738                 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
8739                 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8740                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
8741
8742                 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
8743                 // "protected" and can connect again.
8744                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
8745                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
8746                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8747                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8748
8749                 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
8750                 // last_random_pk.
8751                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8752                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
8753         }
8754
8755         #[test]
8756         fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
8757                 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
8758                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8759                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8760                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8761                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8762
8763                 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
8764
8765                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8766                 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8767
8768                 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
8769                         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8770                         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8771                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8772                 }
8773
8774                 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
8775                 // rejected.
8776                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8777                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
8778                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8779
8780                 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
8781                 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8782                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8783
8784                 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
8785                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8786                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
8787                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8788         }
8789
8790         #[test]
8791         fn test_0conf_limiting() {
8792                 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
8793                 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
8794                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8795                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8796                 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
8797                 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8798                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
8799                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8800
8801                 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
8802
8803                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8804                 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8805
8806                 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
8807                 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
8808                         let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8809                                 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8810                         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8811                                 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8812
8813                         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8814                         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8815                         match events[0] {
8816                                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8817                                         nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
8818                                 }
8819                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8820                         }
8821                         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
8822                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8823                 }
8824
8825                 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
8826                 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8827                         &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8828                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8829                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8830                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8831                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8832                 match events[0] {
8833                         Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8834                                 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
8835                                         Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
8836                                                 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
8837                                         _ => panic!(),
8838                                 }
8839                         }
8840                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8841                 }
8842                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
8843                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8844
8845                 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
8846                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8847                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8848                 match events[0] {
8849                         Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8850                                 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
8851                         }
8852                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8853                 }
8854                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
8855         }
8856
8857         #[cfg(anchors)]
8858         #[test]
8859         fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
8860                 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
8861                 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
8862                 // the channel without the anchors feature.
8863                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8864                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8865                 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
8866                 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8867                 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8868                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
8869                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8870
8871                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
8872                 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8873                 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8874
8875                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8876                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8877                 match events[0] {
8878                         Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8879                                 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8880                         }
8881                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8882                 }
8883
8884                 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8885                 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
8886
8887                 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8888                 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8889
8890                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8891         }
8892 }
8893
8894 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
8895 pub mod bench {
8896         use crate::chain::Listen;
8897         use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
8898         use crate::chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
8899         use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
8900         use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
8901         use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
8902         use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
8903         use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
8904         use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
8905         use crate::util::test_utils;
8906         use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
8907
8908         use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8909         use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8910         use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
8911
8912         use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
8913
8914         use test::Bencher;
8915
8916         struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
8917                 node: &'a ChannelManager<
8918                         &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
8919                                 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
8920                                 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
8921                         &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
8922                         &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
8923                         &'a test_utils::TestLogger>,
8924         }
8925
8926         #[cfg(test)]
8927         #[bench]
8928         fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
8929                 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
8930         }
8931
8932         pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
8933                 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
8934                 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
8935                 // calls per node.
8936                 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
8937
8938                 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
8939                 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
8940                 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8941                 let scorer = Mutex::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
8942                 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
8943
8944                 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
8945                 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
8946
8947                 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
8948                 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
8949                 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
8950                 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8951                         network,
8952                         best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
8953                 });
8954                 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
8955
8956                 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8957                 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
8958                 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
8959                 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
8960                 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8961                         network,
8962                         best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
8963                 });
8964                 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
8965
8966                 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_b.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8967                 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_a.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
8968                 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8969                 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8970                 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8971
8972                 let tx;
8973                 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
8974                         tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8975                                 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
8976                         }]};
8977                         node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8978                 } else { panic!(); }
8979
8980                 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8981                 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8982                 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
8983                 match events_b[0] {
8984                         Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8985                                 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8986                         },
8987                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8988                 }
8989
8990                 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8991                 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8992                 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
8993                 match events_a[0] {
8994                         Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8995                                 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
8996                         },
8997                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8998                 }
8999
9000                 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
9001
9002                 let block = Block {
9003                         header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
9004                         txdata: vec![tx],
9005                 };
9006                 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
9007                 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
9008
9009                 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9010                 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9011                 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
9012                 match msg_events[0] {
9013                         MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
9014                                 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
9015                                 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
9016                         },
9017                         _ => panic!(),
9018                 }
9019                 match msg_events[1] {
9020                         MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9021                         _ => panic!(),
9022                 }
9023
9024                 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9025                 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
9026                 match events_a[0] {
9027                         Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
9028                                 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
9029                         },
9030                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9031                 }
9032
9033                 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9034                 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
9035                 match events_b[0] {
9036                         Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
9037                                 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
9038                         },
9039                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9040                 }
9041
9042                 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
9043                 macro_rules! send_payment {
9044                         ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
9045                                 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
9046                                         .with_features($node_b.invoice_features());
9047                                 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
9048                                 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
9049                                 payment_count += 1;
9050                                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
9051                                 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
9052
9053                                 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
9054                                         PaymentId(payment_hash.0), RouteParameters {
9055                                                 payment_params, final_value_msat: 10_000,
9056                                         }, Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
9057                                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
9058                                 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9059                                 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
9060                                 let (raa, cs) = do_get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
9061                                 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
9062                                 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
9063                                 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
9064
9065                                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
9066                                 expect_payment_claimable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
9067                                 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9068                                 expect_payment_claimed!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
9069
9070                                 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
9071                                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
9072                                                 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
9073                                                 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9074                                                 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
9075                                         },
9076                                         _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
9077                                 }
9078
9079                                 let (raa, cs) = do_get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
9080                                 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
9081                                 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
9082                                 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9083
9084                                 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
9085                         }
9086                 }
9087
9088                 bench.iter(|| {
9089                         send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
9090                         send_payment!(node_b, node_a);
9091                 });
9092         }
9093 }