1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`find_route`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 //! [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
24 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
25 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
30 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
35 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
38 use chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, Watch, BestBlock};
39 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator};
40 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
41 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
42 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
43 // construct one themselves.
44 use ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
45 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
46 use ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
47 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RoutePath, RouteParameters};
49 use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
51 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT, OptionalField};
53 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner, Recipient};
54 use util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig};
55 use util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
56 use util::{byte_utils, events};
57 use util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
58 use util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
59 use util::logger::{Level, Logger};
60 use util::errors::APIError;
65 use core::cell::RefCell;
67 use sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
68 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
69 use core::time::Duration;
72 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
73 use std::time::Instant;
74 use util::crypto::sign;
76 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
78 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
79 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
80 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
82 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
83 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
84 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
85 // before we forward it.
87 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
88 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
89 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
90 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
91 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
93 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
94 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
96 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
97 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a "real" SCID, an
98 /// outbound SCID alias, or a phantom node SCID.
99 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
102 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
103 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
104 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
107 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
108 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
112 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
113 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
114 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
115 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
116 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
117 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
118 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
121 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
122 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
123 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
124 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
127 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
128 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
129 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
130 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
131 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
134 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
136 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
138 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
139 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
140 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
143 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
144 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
146 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
150 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
154 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
155 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
156 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
157 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
158 short_channel_id: u64,
160 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
161 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
163 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
164 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
169 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
171 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
172 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
173 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
175 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
176 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
179 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
180 struct ClaimableHTLC {
181 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
183 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
185 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
187 /// The sum total of all MPP parts
191 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
192 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
193 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
194 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
196 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
197 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
202 impl Readable for PaymentId {
203 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
204 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
208 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
209 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
210 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
211 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
212 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
215 session_priv: SecretKey,
216 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
217 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
218 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
219 payment_id: PaymentId,
220 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
221 payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters>,
224 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
225 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
226 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
228 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
230 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
232 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat, payment_params } => {
235 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
236 payment_id.hash(hasher);
237 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
238 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
239 payment_params.hash(hasher);
244 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
247 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
248 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
250 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
251 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
252 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
253 payment_secret: None,
254 payment_params: None,
259 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
260 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
262 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
270 struct ReceiveError {
276 /// Return value for claim_funds_from_hop
277 enum ClaimFundsFromHop {
279 MonitorUpdateFail(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal, Option<u64>),
284 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
286 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
287 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
288 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
289 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
290 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
292 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
293 err: msgs::LightningError,
294 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u64)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
295 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
297 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
299 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
301 err: LightningError {
303 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
304 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
311 shutdown_finish: None,
315 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
317 err: LightningError {
319 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
322 shutdown_finish: None,
326 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
327 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
330 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u64, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
332 err: LightningError {
334 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
335 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
341 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
342 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
346 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
349 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
351 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
352 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
356 log_level: Level::Warn,
359 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
361 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
363 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
365 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
366 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
372 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => LightningError {
374 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
375 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
383 shutdown_finish: None,
388 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
389 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
390 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
391 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
392 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
394 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
395 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
396 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
397 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
398 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
399 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
400 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
402 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
406 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
407 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
408 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
409 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) to the real channel id. Outbound SCID aliases are added
410 /// here once the channel is available for normal use, with SCIDs being added once the funding
411 /// transaction is confirmed at the channel's required confirmation depth.
412 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
413 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
415 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
416 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
417 /// and via the classic SCID.
419 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
420 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
421 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
422 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
423 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
424 /// failed/claimed by the user.
426 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
427 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
429 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, (events::PaymentPurpose, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>)>,
430 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
431 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
432 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
435 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
436 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
437 /// quite some time lag.
438 enum BackgroundEvent {
439 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
440 /// commitment transaction.
441 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
444 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
445 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
447 latest_features: InitFeatures,
450 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
451 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
453 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
456 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
457 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
458 struct PendingInboundPayment {
459 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
460 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
461 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
462 /// this payment being removed.
464 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
465 user_payment_id: u64,
466 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
467 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
468 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
471 /// Stores the session_priv for each part of a payment that is still pending. For versions 0.0.102
472 /// and later, also stores information for retrying the payment.
473 pub(crate) enum PendingOutboundPayment {
475 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
478 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
479 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
480 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
481 pending_amt_msat: u64,
482 /// Used to track the fee paid. Only present if the payment was serialized on 0.0.103+.
483 pending_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
484 /// The total payment amount across all paths, used to verify that a retry is not overpaying.
486 /// Our best known block height at the time this payment was initiated.
487 starting_block_height: u32,
489 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
490 /// been resolved. This ensures we don't look up pending payments in ChannelMonitors on restart
491 /// and add a pending payment that was already fulfilled.
493 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
494 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
496 /// When a payer gives up trying to retry a payment, they inform us, letting us generate a
497 /// `PaymentFailed` event when all HTLCs have irrevocably failed. This avoids a number of race
498 /// conditions in MPP-aware payment retriers (1), where the possibility of multiple
499 /// `PaymentPathFailed` events with `all_paths_failed` can be pending at once, confusing a
500 /// downstream event handler as to when a payment has actually failed.
502 /// (1) https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1164
504 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
505 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
509 impl PendingOutboundPayment {
510 fn is_retryable(&self) -> bool {
512 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { .. } => true,
516 fn is_fulfilled(&self) -> bool {
518 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => true,
522 fn abandoned(&self) -> bool {
524 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => true,
528 fn get_pending_fee_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
530 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { pending_fee_msat, .. } => pending_fee_msat.clone(),
535 fn payment_hash(&self) -> Option<PaymentHash> {
537 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None,
538 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
539 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => *payment_hash,
540 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
544 fn mark_fulfilled(&mut self) {
545 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
546 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
547 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
548 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
549 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
550 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. }
553 let payment_hash = self.payment_hash();
554 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, payment_hash };
557 fn mark_abandoned(&mut self) -> Result<(), ()> {
558 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
559 let our_payment_hash;
560 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
561 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } |
562 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } =>
564 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } |
565 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } => {
566 our_payment_hash = *payment_hash;
570 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash: our_payment_hash };
574 /// panics if path is None and !self.is_fulfilled
575 fn remove(&mut self, session_priv: &[u8; 32], path: Option<&Vec<RouteHop>>) -> bool {
576 let remove_res = match self {
577 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
578 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
579 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
580 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
581 session_privs.remove(session_priv)
585 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
586 let path = path.expect("Fulfilling a payment should always come with a path");
587 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
588 *pending_amt_msat -= path_last_hop.fee_msat;
589 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
590 *fee_msat -= path.get_path_fees();
597 fn insert(&mut self, session_priv: [u8; 32], path: &Vec<RouteHop>) -> bool {
598 let insert_res = match self {
599 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
600 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
601 session_privs.insert(session_priv)
603 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => false,
604 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => false,
607 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
608 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
609 *pending_amt_msat += path_last_hop.fee_msat;
610 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
611 *fee_msat += path.get_path_fees();
618 fn remaining_parts(&self) -> usize {
620 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
621 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
622 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
623 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
630 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
631 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
632 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
633 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
634 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
635 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
636 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
638 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
639 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
641 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
642 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
643 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
644 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
645 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
646 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
647 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
648 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
650 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
651 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
653 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
654 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
656 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
657 /// to individual Channels.
659 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
660 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
661 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
662 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
664 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
665 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
666 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
667 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
668 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
669 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
670 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
672 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
673 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
674 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
675 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
678 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
679 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
680 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
681 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
682 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
684 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
685 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
686 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
687 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
688 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
689 pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
690 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
691 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
692 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
693 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
696 default_configuration: UserConfig,
697 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
703 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
705 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
706 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
708 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
709 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
710 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
711 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
713 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
714 /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
715 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
716 /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
717 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
718 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
720 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
721 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
722 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
723 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
724 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
725 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
726 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
727 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
729 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
731 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
732 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment>>,
734 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
735 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
736 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
737 /// active channel list on load.
738 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
740 our_network_key: SecretKey,
741 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
743 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
745 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
746 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
747 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
749 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
750 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
752 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
753 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
754 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
756 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
757 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
758 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
759 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
761 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
762 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
763 /// are currently open with that peer.
764 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
765 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
768 /// If also holding `channel_state` lock, must lock `channel_state` prior to `per_peer_state`.
769 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
771 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
772 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
773 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
774 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
775 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
776 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
777 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
778 /// PersistenceNotifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
779 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
781 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier,
788 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
790 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
791 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
792 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
793 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
794 pub struct ChainParameters {
795 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
796 pub network: Network,
798 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
800 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
801 pub best_block: BestBlock,
804 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
810 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
811 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
812 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
813 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
814 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
815 /// updates are ready for persistence).
817 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
818 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
819 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
820 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
821 persistence_notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier,
823 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
824 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
827 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
828 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
829 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
832 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
833 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
835 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
836 persistence_notifier: notifier,
837 should_persist: persist_check,
838 _read_guard: read_guard,
843 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
845 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
846 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
851 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
852 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
854 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
856 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
857 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
858 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
859 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
860 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
862 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
863 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
865 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
867 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
868 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
869 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
870 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
871 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
872 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
873 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
874 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
875 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
876 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
877 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
878 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
879 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
881 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
882 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
884 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
885 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
886 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
887 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
889 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
890 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
891 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
892 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
893 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
894 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
897 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
899 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
900 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
903 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
905 /// The number of blocks before we consider an outbound payment for expiry if it doesn't have any
906 /// pending HTLCs in flight.
907 pub(crate) const PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
909 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
910 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
912 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
913 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
914 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
915 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
916 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
917 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
918 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
919 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
920 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
921 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
922 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
925 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
926 /// to better separate parameters.
927 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
928 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
929 /// The node_id of our counterparty
930 pub node_id: PublicKey,
931 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
932 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
933 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
934 pub features: InitFeatures,
935 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
936 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
937 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
939 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
941 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
942 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
943 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
944 /// payments to us through this channel.
945 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
946 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
947 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
948 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
949 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
950 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
951 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
954 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
955 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
956 pub struct ChannelDetails {
957 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
958 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
959 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
960 /// lifetime of the channel.
961 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
962 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
963 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
964 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
965 /// our counterparty already.
967 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
968 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
969 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
970 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
972 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
973 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
974 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
975 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
977 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
978 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
980 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
981 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
983 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
984 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
985 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
986 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
987 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
988 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
989 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
990 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
991 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
994 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
996 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
997 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
998 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
999 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1000 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1001 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1002 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1004 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1005 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1007 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1008 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1009 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1010 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1011 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1012 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1013 /// this value on chain.
1015 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1017 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1019 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1020 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1021 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
1022 pub user_channel_id: u64,
1023 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1024 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1025 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1027 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1028 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1029 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1030 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1032 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1033 pub balance_msat: u64,
1034 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1035 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1036 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1037 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1039 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1041 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1042 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1043 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1044 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1045 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1046 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1047 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1048 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1050 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1051 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1052 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1053 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1054 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1055 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1056 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1058 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1059 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1060 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1061 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1062 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1063 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1064 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1065 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1066 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1068 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1070 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1071 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1072 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1073 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1074 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1075 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1076 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1077 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1078 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1080 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1081 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1082 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1083 pub is_outbound: bool,
1084 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1085 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1086 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1087 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1088 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1090 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1091 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1092 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1093 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1095 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1096 pub is_usable: bool,
1097 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1098 pub is_public: bool,
1099 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1100 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1101 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1102 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1103 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1104 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1106 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1107 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1110 impl ChannelDetails {
1111 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1112 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1113 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1115 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1116 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1117 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1118 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1121 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1122 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1123 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1125 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1126 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1127 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1128 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1132 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
1133 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
1134 /// states for more.
1135 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
1136 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
1137 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
1138 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
1139 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
1140 ParameterError(APIError),
1141 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
1142 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
1143 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
1144 /// payment in full.
1146 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1148 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
1149 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
1150 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
1151 /// paths than the ones selected).
1152 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
1153 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
1154 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
1155 /// in over-/re-payment.
1157 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1158 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
1159 /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
1161 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
1162 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
1163 /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
1164 /// with the latest update_id.
1166 /// The errors themselves, in the same order as the route hops.
1167 results: Vec<Result<(), APIError>>,
1168 /// If some paths failed without irrevocably committing to the new HTLC(s), this will
1169 /// contain a [`RouteParameters`] object which can be used to calculate a new route that
1170 /// will pay all remaining unpaid balance.
1171 failed_paths_retry: Option<RouteParameters>,
1172 /// The payment id for the payment, which is now at least partially pending.
1173 payment_id: PaymentId,
1177 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1179 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
1181 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1182 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1183 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1184 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1186 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1187 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1188 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1191 macro_rules! handle_error {
1192 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
1195 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1196 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1198 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1199 // entering the macro.
1200 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
1201 assert!($self.pending_events.try_lock().is_ok());
1204 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1206 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1207 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1208 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1209 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1213 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1214 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1215 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1216 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1221 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1222 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1224 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1225 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1226 action: err.action.clone()
1230 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1231 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1234 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1241 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1242 ($self: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1243 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1244 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1246 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1247 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1248 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1249 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1250 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1252 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1253 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1255 $short_to_id.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1259 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1260 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1261 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1263 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1264 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1266 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1267 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1269 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1270 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1271 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $short_to_id, $channel);
1272 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1273 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1274 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1276 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => {
1277 log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1278 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $short_to_id, $channel);
1279 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(false);
1280 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1281 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1287 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1288 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1292 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1294 $entry.remove_entry();
1302 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1303 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1307 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1309 $entry.remove_entry();
1317 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1318 ($self: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1320 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1321 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel_state.short_to_id, channel);
1327 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
1328 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
1330 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1331 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
1332 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $short_to_id, $chan);
1333 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
1334 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
1335 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
1336 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
1337 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
1338 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
1339 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
1340 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
1341 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
1342 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.get_user_id(),
1343 $chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
1346 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
1347 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations",
1348 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
1349 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
1350 match $action_type {
1351 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
1352 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
1354 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
1355 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
1357 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
1358 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len(),
1359 (&$failed_finalized_fulfills as &Vec<HTLCSource>).len());
1360 if !$resend_commitment {
1361 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
1364 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
1366 $chan.monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
1367 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
1371 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
1372 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
1374 $entry.remove_entry();
1378 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY) => { {
1379 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
1380 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1382 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, NO_UPDATE) => {
1383 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1385 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_channel_ready: expr, OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED) => {
1386 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, false, false, $resend_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1388 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1389 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1391 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1392 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new())
1396 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
1397 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1398 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
1400 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1401 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
1405 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
1406 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
1407 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1408 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
1409 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
1412 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
1417 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1418 ($short_to_id: expr, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {
1419 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1420 node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1421 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1423 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1424 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1425 let outbound_alias_insert = $short_to_id.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), $channel.channel_id());
1426 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == $channel.channel_id(),
1427 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1428 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1429 let scid_insert = $short_to_id.insert(real_scid, $channel.channel_id());
1430 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == $channel.channel_id(),
1431 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1436 macro_rules! handle_chan_restoration_locked {
1437 ($self: ident, $channel_lock: expr, $channel_state: expr, $channel_entry: expr,
1438 $raa: expr, $commitment_update: expr, $order: expr, $chanmon_update: expr,
1439 $pending_forwards: expr, $funding_broadcastable: expr, $channel_ready: expr, $announcement_sigs: expr) => { {
1440 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
1442 let chanmon_update: Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> = $chanmon_update; // Force type-checking to resolve
1443 let chanmon_update_is_none = chanmon_update.is_none();
1444 let counterparty_node_id = $channel_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1446 let forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)> = $pending_forwards; // Force type-checking to resolve
1447 if !forwards.is_empty() {
1448 htlc_forwards = Some(($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or($channel_entry.get().outbound_scid_alias()),
1449 $channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), forwards));
1452 if chanmon_update.is_some() {
1453 // On reconnect, we, by definition, only resend a channel_ready if there have been
1454 // no commitment updates, so the only channel monitor update which could also be
1455 // associated with a channel_ready would be the funding_created/funding_signed
1456 // monitor update. That monitor update failing implies that we won't send
1457 // channel_ready until it's been updated, so we can't have a channel_ready and a
1458 // monitor update here (so we don't bother to handle it correctly below).
1459 assert!($channel_ready.is_none());
1460 // A channel monitor update makes no sense without either a channel_ready or a
1461 // commitment update to process after it. Since we can't have a channel_ready, we
1462 // only bother to handle the monitor-update + commitment_update case below.
1463 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1466 if let Some(msg) = $channel_ready {
1467 // Similar to the above, this implies that we're letting the channel_ready fly
1468 // before it should be allowed to.
1469 assert!(chanmon_update.is_none());
1470 send_channel_ready!($channel_state.short_to_id, $channel_state.pending_msg_events, $channel_entry.get(), msg);
1472 if let Some(msg) = $announcement_sigs {
1473 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1474 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1479 let funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction> = $funding_broadcastable; // Force type-checking to resolve
1480 if let Some(monitor_update) = chanmon_update {
1481 // We only ever broadcast a funding transaction in response to a funding_signed
1482 // message and the resulting monitor update. Thus, on channel_reestablish
1483 // message handling we can't have a funding transaction to broadcast. When
1484 // processing a monitor update finishing resulting in a funding broadcast, we
1485 // cannot have a second monitor update, thus this case would indicate a bug.
1486 assert!(funding_broadcastable.is_none());
1487 // Given we were just reconnected or finished updating a channel monitor, the
1488 // only case where we can get a new ChannelMonitorUpdate would be if we also
1489 // have some commitment updates to send as well.
1490 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1491 if let Err(e) = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1492 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
1493 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
1494 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
1495 let mut order = $order;
1497 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
1499 break handle_monitor_err!($self, e, $channel_state, $channel_entry, order, $raa.is_some(), true);
1503 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1504 if let Some(update) = $commitment_update {
1505 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1506 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1511 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1512 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = $raa {
1513 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1514 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1515 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1520 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1524 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1529 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
1530 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
1531 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1536 if chanmon_update_is_none {
1537 // If there was no ChannelMonitorUpdate, we should never generate an Err in the res loop
1538 // above. Doing so would imply calling handle_err!() from channel_monitor_updated() which
1539 // should *never* end up calling back to `chain_monitor.update_channel()`.
1540 assert!(res.is_ok());
1543 (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id)
1547 macro_rules! post_handle_chan_restoration {
1548 ($self: ident, $locked_res: expr) => { {
1549 let (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id) = $locked_res;
1551 let _ = handle_error!($self, res, counterparty_node_id);
1553 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1554 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1559 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
1560 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
1561 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1562 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1563 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1566 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1568 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1569 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1571 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1573 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1574 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1575 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1576 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1577 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1578 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1579 let inbound_pmt_key_material = keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1580 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1582 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1583 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1584 fee_estimator: fee_est,
1588 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1590 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1591 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1592 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
1593 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1594 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1595 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1597 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1598 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1599 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1601 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1602 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap()),
1605 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1606 fake_scid_rand_bytes: keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1608 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1609 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1611 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1613 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1614 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1615 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1616 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
1624 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels, as
1625 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1626 &self.default_configuration
1629 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1630 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1631 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1634 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1635 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1637 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
1639 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1643 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1648 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1650 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1651 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1652 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to 0
1653 /// for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for `user_channel_id` here.
1654 /// `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and otherwise
1657 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1658 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1660 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1661 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1662 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1664 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1665 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1666 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1667 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1668 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1669 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1671 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1672 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1673 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1674 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1675 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1676 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1680 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1681 match per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) {
1682 Some(peer_state) => {
1683 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
1684 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1685 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1686 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1687 match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key,
1688 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
1689 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
1693 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
1698 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }),
1701 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1703 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1704 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1705 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1707 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1708 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1709 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1710 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1712 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1714 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1717 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1719 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1720 node_id: their_network_key,
1723 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1726 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1727 let mut res = Vec::new();
1729 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1730 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1731 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1732 let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
1733 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1734 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1735 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1736 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1737 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1738 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1739 features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1740 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1741 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1742 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1743 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1744 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1745 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1746 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1747 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
1748 Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1749 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1751 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1752 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1753 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1754 channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1755 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1756 outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1757 inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1758 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1759 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1760 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1761 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1762 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1763 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1764 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1765 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1766 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1767 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1768 is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(),
1769 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1770 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1771 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1772 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1773 config: Some(channel.config()),
1777 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1778 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1779 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
1780 chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1786 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1787 /// more information.
1788 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1789 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1792 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to [`find_route`]
1793 /// to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1795 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1796 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1799 /// [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
1800 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1801 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1802 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1803 // really wanted anyway.
1804 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1807 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1808 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1809 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1810 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1811 Some(transaction) => {
1812 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1816 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1817 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1818 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1819 reason: closure_reason
1823 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1824 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1826 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1827 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1828 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1829 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1830 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1831 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1832 if *counterparty_node_id != chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id(){
1833 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The passed counterparty_node_id doesn't match the channel's counterparty node_id".to_owned() });
1835 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1836 let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = match per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
1837 Some(peer_state) => {
1838 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1839 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1840 chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?
1842 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", counterparty_node_id) }),
1844 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1846 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1847 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1848 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1849 let (result, is_permanent) =
1850 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
1852 remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
1858 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1859 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
1863 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1864 let channel = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
1865 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1866 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1870 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1874 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1878 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1879 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1882 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
1886 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1887 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1888 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1890 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1891 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1893 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1894 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1895 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1896 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1898 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1900 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1901 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1902 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1903 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1904 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None)
1907 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1908 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1909 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1911 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1912 /// the channel being closed or not:
1913 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1914 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1915 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1916 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1917 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1918 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1919 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1921 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1923 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1924 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1925 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1926 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1927 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1931 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1932 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1933 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1934 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1935 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1937 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1938 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1939 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1940 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1941 // ignore the result here.
1942 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
1946 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
1947 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
1948 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>) -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1950 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1951 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1952 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1953 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *peer_node_id {
1954 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1956 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
1957 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
1959 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1961 remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan)
1963 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1966 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1967 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
1968 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
1969 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1970 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1975 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
1978 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
1979 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
1980 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
1982 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1983 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1984 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None) {
1985 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
1986 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1987 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1988 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1989 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
1990 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2000 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2001 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2002 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
2003 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2004 let _ = self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2008 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2009 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
2011 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2012 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != cltv_expiry {
2013 return Err(ReceiveError {
2014 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value",
2016 err_data: byte_utils::be32_to_array(cltv_expiry).to_vec()
2019 // final_expiry_too_soon
2020 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2021 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2022 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2023 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2024 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2025 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2026 return Err(ReceiveError {
2028 err_data: Vec::new(),
2029 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2032 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
2033 return Err(ReceiveError {
2035 err_data: byte_utils::be64_to_array(amt_msat).to_vec(),
2036 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2040 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2041 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => {
2042 return Err(ReceiveError {
2043 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2044 err_data: Vec::new(),
2045 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2048 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2049 return Err(ReceiveError {
2050 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2051 err_data: Vec::new(),
2052 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2055 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
2056 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2057 return Err(ReceiveError {
2058 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2059 err_data: Vec::new(),
2060 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2062 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2063 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2065 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2066 phantom_shared_secret,
2068 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2069 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2070 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2071 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2072 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2073 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2074 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2075 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2076 return Err(ReceiveError {
2077 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2078 err_data: Vec::new(),
2079 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2083 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2085 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2088 return Err(ReceiveError {
2089 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2090 err_data: Vec::new(),
2091 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2096 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2099 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2100 amt_to_forward: amt_msat,
2101 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2105 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>) {
2106 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2107 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2109 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2110 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2111 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2112 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2113 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2114 failure_code: $err_code,
2115 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2120 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2121 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2124 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key).secret_bytes();
2126 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2127 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2128 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2129 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2130 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2131 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2132 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2133 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2136 let mut channel_state = None;
2137 macro_rules! return_err {
2138 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2140 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2141 if channel_state.is_none() {
2142 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2144 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2145 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2146 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2147 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
2148 })), channel_state.unwrap());
2153 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2155 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2156 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2158 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2159 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2163 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2164 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2166 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2168 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2169 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2170 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2171 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2172 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2174 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2177 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2178 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2180 let blinding_factor = {
2181 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
2182 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
2183 sha.input(&shared_secret);
2184 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
2187 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
2189 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
2191 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2194 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2195 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2198 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2199 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2200 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2201 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2202 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2206 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2207 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2208 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2211 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2212 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2213 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2214 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2219 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2220 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2221 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2222 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2223 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2224 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2225 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
2226 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
2227 let forwarding_id_opt = match id_option {
2228 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2229 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2231 if fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id) {
2234 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2237 Some(id) => Some(id.clone()),
2239 let chan_update_opt = if let Some(forwarding_id) = forwarding_id_opt {
2240 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
2241 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2242 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2243 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2244 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2245 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2247 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2248 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2249 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2250 // we don't have the channel here.
2251 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2253 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2255 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2256 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2257 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2258 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2259 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2260 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2261 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2263 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2264 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2266 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, *amt_to_forward, *outgoing_cltv_value) {
2267 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2271 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2273 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2280 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2281 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2282 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2283 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2284 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2285 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2287 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2288 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2290 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2291 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2292 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2293 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2294 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2295 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2296 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2297 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2298 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2299 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2305 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2306 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2307 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2308 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2310 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2311 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2313 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2314 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2315 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2317 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2318 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2319 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2321 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2326 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
2329 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2330 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2331 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2333 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2334 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2335 if !chan.should_announce() {
2336 return Err(LightningError {
2337 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2338 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2341 if chan.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2342 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2344 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2345 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2348 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2349 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
2350 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2351 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2352 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2353 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2354 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2355 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
2356 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2360 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2362 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2363 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2364 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2366 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2367 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2369 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2370 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2371 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2372 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2373 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()),
2374 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2375 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2376 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2379 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
2380 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
2382 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2388 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
2389 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_params: &Option<PaymentParameters>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2390 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2391 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2392 let session_priv_bytes = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2393 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2395 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2396 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
2397 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2398 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2399 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
2401 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2403 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2405 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2406 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2408 let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2409 let payment_entry = pending_outbounds.entry(payment_id);
2410 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(payment) = &payment_entry {
2411 if !payment.get().is_retryable() {
2412 return Err(APIError::RouteError {
2413 err: "Payment already completed"
2418 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2419 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2420 Some(id) => id.clone(),
2423 macro_rules! insert_outbound_payment {
2425 let payment = payment_entry.or_insert_with(|| PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2426 session_privs: HashSet::new(),
2427 pending_amt_msat: 0,
2428 pending_fee_msat: Some(0),
2429 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2430 payment_secret: *payment_secret,
2431 starting_block_height: self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
2432 total_msat: total_value,
2434 assert!(payment.insert(session_priv_bytes, path));
2438 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2439 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
2441 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
2442 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
2444 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2445 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
2447 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(
2448 htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2450 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2451 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2453 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2454 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2455 }, onion_packet, &self.logger),
2456 channel_state, chan)
2458 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
2459 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2460 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
2461 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
2462 // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
2463 // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
2464 // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
2465 // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
2466 insert_outbound_payment!(); // Only do this after possibly break'ing on Perm failure above.
2467 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2469 insert_outbound_payment!();
2471 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2472 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2473 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
2474 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2475 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
2476 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2477 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2478 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2484 None => { insert_outbound_payment!(); },
2486 } else { unreachable!(); }
2490 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2491 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2493 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2498 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2500 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
2501 /// fields for more info.
2503 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
2504 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
2505 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
2506 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
2507 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
2508 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
2510 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
2512 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2513 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2514 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
2516 /// In general, a path may raise:
2517 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2518 /// node public key) is specified.
2519 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2520 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2522 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2523 /// relevant updates.
2525 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2526 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2527 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2529 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
2530 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
2531 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
2532 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
2534 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
2535 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
2536 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2537 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2538 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None, None, None)
2541 fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: Option<PaymentId>, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2542 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
2543 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
2545 if payment_secret.is_none() && route.paths.len() > 1 {
2546 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Payment secret is required for multi-path payments".to_string()}));
2548 let mut total_value = 0;
2549 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2550 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2551 let payment_id = if let Some(id) = payment_id { id } else { PaymentId(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()) };
2552 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
2553 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
2554 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
2555 continue 'path_check;
2557 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
2558 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
2559 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
2560 continue 'path_check;
2563 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2564 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
2566 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
2567 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
2569 if let Some(amt_msat) = recv_value_msat {
2570 debug_assert!(amt_msat >= total_value);
2571 total_value = amt_msat;
2574 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2575 let mut results = Vec::new();
2576 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2577 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &route.payment_params, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, &keysend_preimage));
2579 let mut has_ok = false;
2580 let mut has_err = false;
2581 let mut pending_amt_unsent = 0;
2582 let mut max_unsent_cltv_delta = 0;
2583 for (res, path) in results.iter().zip(route.paths.iter()) {
2584 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
2585 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
2586 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
2587 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
2591 } else if res.is_err() {
2592 pending_amt_unsent += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2593 max_unsent_cltv_delta = cmp::max(max_unsent_cltv_delta, path.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta);
2596 if has_err && has_ok {
2597 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure {
2600 failed_paths_retry: if pending_amt_unsent != 0 {
2601 if let Some(payment_params) = &route.payment_params {
2602 Some(RouteParameters {
2603 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2604 final_value_msat: pending_amt_unsent,
2605 final_cltv_expiry_delta: max_unsent_cltv_delta,
2611 // If we failed to send any paths, we shouldn't have inserted the new PaymentId into
2612 // our `pending_outbound_payments` map at all.
2613 debug_assert!(self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().get(&payment_id).is_none());
2614 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
2620 /// Retries a payment along the given [`Route`].
2622 /// Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see
2623 /// [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the
2624 /// retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, if the payment
2625 /// for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success), or if
2626 /// further retries have been disabled with [`abandon_payment`].
2628 /// [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]
2629 /// [`abandon_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`]
2630 pub fn retry_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2631 const RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE: u64 = 10;
2632 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2633 if path.len() == 0 {
2634 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2635 err: "length-0 path in route".to_string()
2640 let (total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret) = {
2641 let outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2642 if let Some(payment) = outbounds.get(&payment_id) {
2644 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2645 total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret, pending_amt_msat, ..
2647 let retry_amt_msat: u64 = route.paths.iter().map(|path| path.last().unwrap().fee_msat).sum();
2648 if retry_amt_msat + *pending_amt_msat > *total_msat * (100 + RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE) / 100 {
2649 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2650 err: format!("retry_amt_msat of {} will put pending_amt_msat (currently: {}) more than 10% over total_payment_amt_msat of {}", retry_amt_msat, pending_amt_msat, total_msat).to_string()
2653 (*total_msat, *payment_hash, *payment_secret)
2655 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => {
2656 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2657 err: "Unable to retry payments that were initially sent on LDK versions prior to 0.0.102".to_string()
2660 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {
2661 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2662 err: "Payment already completed".to_owned()
2665 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {
2666 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2667 err: "Payment already abandoned (with some HTLCs still pending)".to_owned()
2672 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2673 err: format!("Payment with ID {} not found", log_bytes!(payment_id.0)),
2677 return self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &payment_secret, None, Some(payment_id), Some(total_msat)).map(|_| ())
2680 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment will occur.
2682 /// After this method returns, any future calls to [`retry_payment`] for the given `payment_id`
2683 /// will fail with [`PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError`]. If no such event has been generated,
2684 /// an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event will be generated as soon as there are no remaining
2685 /// pending HTLCs for this payment.
2687 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2688 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2689 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2691 /// [`retry_payment`]: Self::retry_payment
2692 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2693 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2694 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2695 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2697 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2698 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
2699 if let Ok(()) = payment.get_mut().mark_abandoned() {
2700 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
2701 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2703 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
2711 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2712 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2713 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2714 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2715 /// never reach the recipient.
2717 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function.
2719 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2720 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2722 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2724 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2725 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2726 let preimage = match payment_preimage {
2728 None => PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()),
2730 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0).into_inner());
2731 match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, Some(preimage), None, None) {
2732 Ok(payment_id) => Ok((payment_hash, payment_id)),
2737 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2738 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2739 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
2740 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], _counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
2741 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2743 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2745 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2747 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2748 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2749 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2750 } else { unreachable!(); })
2753 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
2755 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2756 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2759 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2760 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2765 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2766 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2767 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2770 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2771 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2772 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2774 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2782 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2783 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2784 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2788 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2790 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2791 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2793 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
2794 /// across the p2p network.
2796 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2797 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2799 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2800 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2801 /// keys per-channel).
2803 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2804 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2805 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2807 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2808 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2809 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2811 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
2812 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
2813 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
2814 /// for more details.
2816 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2817 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2818 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2819 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2821 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2822 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2823 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2824 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2829 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2830 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools at the next block. However, the modules
2831 // constituting our Lightning node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if
2832 // the wallet module is in advance on the LDK view, allow one more block of headroom.
2833 // TODO: updated if/when https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-bitcoin/pull/994 landed and rust-bitcoin bumped.
2834 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == 0xffffffff) && funding_transaction.lock_time < 500_000_000 && funding_transaction.lock_time > height + 2 {
2835 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2836 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
2840 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2841 let mut output_index = None;
2842 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2843 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2844 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2845 if output_index.is_some() {
2846 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2847 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2850 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2851 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2852 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2855 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2858 if output_index.is_none() {
2859 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2860 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2863 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2868 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
2869 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
2870 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
2872 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::core::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
2875 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
2876 // smaller than 500:
2877 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
2879 /// Regenerates channel_announcements and generates a signed node_announcement from the given
2880 /// arguments, providing them in corresponding events via
2881 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`], if at least one public channel has been confirmed
2882 /// on-chain. This effectively re-broadcasts all channel announcements and sends our node
2883 /// announcement to ensure that the lightning P2P network is aware of the channels we have and
2884 /// our network addresses.
2886 /// `rgb` is a node "color" and `alias` is a printable human-readable string to describe this
2887 /// node to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
2889 /// `addresses` represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node
2890 /// accepts incoming connections. These will be included in the node_announcement, publicly
2891 /// tying these addresses together and to this node. If you wish to preserve user privacy,
2892 /// addresses should likely contain only Tor Onion addresses.
2894 /// Panics if `addresses` is absurdly large (more than 500).
2896 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
2897 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], mut addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
2898 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2900 if addresses.len() > 500 {
2901 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
2904 // While all existing nodes handle unsorted addresses just fine, the spec requires that
2905 // addresses be sorted for future compatibility.
2906 addresses.sort_by_key(|addr| addr.get_id());
2908 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2909 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
2910 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
2911 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
2912 rgb, alias, addresses,
2913 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
2914 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2916 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2917 let node_announce_sig = sign(&self.secp_ctx, &msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2919 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2920 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2922 let mut announced_chans = false;
2923 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2924 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()) {
2925 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2927 update_msg: match self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
2932 announced_chans = true;
2934 // If the channel is not public or has not yet reached channel_ready, check the
2935 // next channel. If we don't yet have any public channels, we'll skip the broadcast
2936 // below as peers may not accept it without channels on chain first.
2940 if announced_chans {
2941 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
2942 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
2943 signature: node_announce_sig,
2944 contents: announcement
2950 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
2952 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
2953 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
2954 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
2955 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
2957 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
2958 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
2960 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
2961 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
2963 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
2965 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
2966 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
2967 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
2968 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
2969 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2970 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
2971 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
2972 pub fn update_channel_config(
2973 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
2974 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2975 if config.cltv_expiry_delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA {
2976 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2977 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
2981 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(
2982 &self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier,
2985 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2986 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2987 for channel_id in channel_ids {
2988 let channel_counterparty_node_id = channel_state.by_id.get(channel_id)
2989 .ok_or(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2990 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found", log_bytes!(*channel_id)),
2992 .get_counterparty_node_id();
2993 if channel_counterparty_node_id != *counterparty_node_id {
2994 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2995 err: "counterparty node id mismatch".to_owned(),
2999 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3000 let channel = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
3001 if !channel.update_config(config) {
3004 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
3005 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
3006 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
3007 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3008 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3017 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3019 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3020 /// Will likely generate further events.
3021 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3022 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3024 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
3025 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3026 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3027 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3029 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3030 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3032 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
3033 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3034 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
3035 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3037 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3038 match forward_info {
3039 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3040 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
3041 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3042 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3043 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3045 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3046 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3047 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3048 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3049 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3050 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3051 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3053 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3054 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: $err_code, data: $err_data }
3060 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3061 let phantom_secret_res = self.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3062 if phantom_secret_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id) {
3063 let phantom_shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &phantom_secret_res.unwrap()).secret_bytes();
3064 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3066 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3067 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3068 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3069 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3070 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3072 fail_forward!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3074 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3075 fail_forward!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3079 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3080 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
3081 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3082 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => fail_forward!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3088 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3091 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3094 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3095 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3096 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3097 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3098 // problem, not ours.
3105 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3106 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
3107 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
3108 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3109 match forward_info {
3110 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3111 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
3113 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
3114 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3115 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3116 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3117 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3118 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3119 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3120 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3121 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3122 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3124 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet, &self.logger) {
3126 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3127 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3129 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3131 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3132 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3133 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data }
3139 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3141 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3142 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
3143 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
3144 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
3145 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
3146 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
3147 // this channel currently :/.
3153 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3154 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3156 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3157 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3158 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
3160 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3161 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3163 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
3165 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3166 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3167 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3170 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3172 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3173 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
3174 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
3175 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
3176 // messages when we can.
3177 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
3178 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
3179 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
3186 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
3187 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
3190 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
3191 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
3192 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3193 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
3194 ChannelError::Ignore(_) | ChannelError::Warn(_) => {
3195 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
3197 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
3198 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
3199 let mut channel = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan);
3200 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us.
3201 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel.channel_id(), channel.get_user_id(), channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
3203 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
3205 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
3209 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3210 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
3213 log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
3214 add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3215 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3216 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3217 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3218 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
3219 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3220 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
3221 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3223 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
3231 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3232 match forward_info {
3233 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3234 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
3235 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3236 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret) = match routing {
3237 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3238 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3239 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data }, Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret)
3241 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3242 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage), None, None),
3244 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3247 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3248 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3249 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3250 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3251 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3252 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3253 phantom_shared_secret,
3255 value: amt_to_forward,
3257 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { amt_to_forward },
3262 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3264 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
3265 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3266 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
3268 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3269 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3270 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3271 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3272 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3273 phantom_shared_secret,
3275 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
3280 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3281 ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3282 let mut payment_received_generated = false;
3284 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3285 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3286 payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
3289 let (_, htlcs) = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
3290 .or_insert_with(|| (purpose(), Vec::new()));
3291 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3292 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3293 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3294 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3298 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.value;
3299 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3300 total_value += htlc.value;
3301 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3302 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3303 if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat {
3304 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3305 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3306 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3308 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3310 _ => unreachable!(),
3313 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > $payment_data.total_msat {
3314 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
3315 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, $payment_data.total_msat);
3316 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3317 } else if total_value == $payment_data.total_msat {
3318 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3319 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3322 amount_msat: total_value,
3324 payment_received_generated = true;
3326 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3327 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3329 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3331 payment_received_generated
3335 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3336 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3337 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3338 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3339 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3340 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3341 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3342 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3343 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3344 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3345 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3346 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3347 let payment_preimage = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3348 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
3350 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3354 check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
3356 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3357 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
3358 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3359 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
3360 e.insert((purpose.clone(), vec![claimable_htlc]));
3361 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3363 amount_msat: amt_to_forward,
3367 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3368 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3369 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3375 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3376 if payment_data.is_none() {
3377 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3378 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3381 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3382 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3383 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3384 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3385 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3386 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3387 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3388 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3390 let payment_received_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3391 if payment_received_generated {
3392 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3398 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3399 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3407 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3408 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
3410 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3412 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3413 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3416 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3417 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3418 events.append(&mut new_events);
3421 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3423 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3424 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3426 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3427 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3428 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3429 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3430 if background_events.is_empty() {
3434 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3436 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3437 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3438 // monitor updating completing.
3439 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
3446 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3447 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3448 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3449 self.process_background_events();
3452 fn update_channel_fee(&self, short_to_id: &mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> (bool, NotifyOption, Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>) {
3453 if !chan.is_outbound() { return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(())); }
3454 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3455 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
3456 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3457 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3458 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3460 if !chan.is_live() {
3461 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3462 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3463 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3465 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3466 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3468 let mut retain_channel = true;
3469 let res = match chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(new_feerate, &self.logger) {
3472 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
3473 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3477 let ret_err = match res {
3478 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update))) => {
3479 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3480 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
3481 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3484 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3485 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3486 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3487 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3488 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3489 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3490 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3491 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
3501 (retain_channel, NotifyOption::DoPersist, ret_err)
3505 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3506 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3507 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3508 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3509 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3510 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3511 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3513 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3515 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3517 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3518 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3519 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3520 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3521 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3522 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3523 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3525 handle_errors.push(err);
3535 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3537 /// This currently includes:
3538 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3539 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3540 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3542 /// * Expiring a channel's previous `ChannelConfig` if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
3543 /// with the current `ChannelConfig`.
3545 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
3546 /// estimate fetches.
3547 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3548 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3549 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3550 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3552 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3554 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3555 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
3557 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3558 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3559 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3560 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3561 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3562 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
3563 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3564 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3566 handle_errors.push((err, counterparty_node_id));
3568 if !retain_channel { return false; }
3570 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3571 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
3572 handle_errors.push((Err(err), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()));
3573 if needs_close { return false; }
3576 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3577 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3578 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3579 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3580 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3581 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3582 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3583 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3587 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3588 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3590 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3591 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3592 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3596 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3597 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3602 chan.maybe_expire_prev_config();
3607 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
3608 if htlcs.is_empty() {
3609 // This should be unreachable
3610 debug_assert!(false);
3613 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3614 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
3615 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
3616 if htlcs[0].total_msat == htlcs.iter().fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.value) {
3618 } else if htlcs.into_iter().any(|htlc| {
3619 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
3620 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3622 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(htlcs.into_iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.prev_hop.clone(), payment_hash.clone())));
3630 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
3631 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0), &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 23, data: Vec::new() });
3634 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3635 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3641 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3642 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3643 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3645 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
3646 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
3647 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentReceived`] event. Alternatively, the payment
3648 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
3650 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
3651 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
3652 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
3653 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
3654 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
3655 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3657 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3658 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
3659 if let Some((_, mut sources)) = removed_source {
3660 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3661 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3662 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3663 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3664 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3665 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3666 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
3667 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
3672 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3673 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3675 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
3677 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3678 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
3679 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
3680 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
3681 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
3682 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
3683 chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
3685 chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
3687 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
3688 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
3690 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3695 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3696 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3697 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3698 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
3699 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
3700 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
3701 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3702 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3703 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3705 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3706 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3707 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3708 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
3710 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
3711 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
3712 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
3713 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
3714 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3718 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3719 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3720 // be surfaced to the user.
3721 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
3722 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
3723 _counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
3725 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3727 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
3728 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
3729 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3730 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3731 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
3733 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3735 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3736 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
3737 htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
3739 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, payment_params, .. } => {
3740 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3741 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3742 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3743 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3744 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) && !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3745 let retry = if let Some(payment_params_data) = payment_params {
3746 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3747 Some(RouteParameters {
3748 payment_params: payment_params_data,
3749 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3750 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3753 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3754 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3755 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3757 rejected_by_dest: false,
3758 network_update: None,
3759 all_paths_failed: payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0,
3761 short_channel_id: None,
3768 if payment.get().abandoned() && payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3769 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
3771 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
3777 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3784 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3785 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
3786 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
3787 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
3788 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
3789 /// still-available channels.
3790 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
3791 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3792 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3793 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3796 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3797 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3798 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3800 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, payment_id, ref payment_params, .. } => {
3801 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3802 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3803 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3804 let mut all_paths_failed = false;
3805 let mut full_failure_ev = None;
3806 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3807 if !payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
3808 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3811 if payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3812 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received failure of HTLC with payment_hash {} after payment completion", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3815 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3816 all_paths_failed = true;
3817 if payment.get().abandoned() {
3818 full_failure_ev = Some(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
3820 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
3826 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3829 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3830 let retry = if let Some(payment_params_data) = payment_params {
3831 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3832 Some(RouteParameters {
3833 payment_params: payment_params_data.clone(),
3834 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3835 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3838 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3840 let path_failure = match &onion_error {
3841 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
3843 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3845 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3846 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
3847 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
3848 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
3849 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3850 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3851 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3852 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
3859 error_code: onion_error_code,
3861 error_data: onion_error_data
3864 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3870 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
3871 // TODO: We'd like to generate a NetworkUpdate for temporary
3872 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as find_route
3873 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
3875 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
3876 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
3877 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3878 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3879 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3880 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
3881 network_update: None,
3884 short_channel_id: Some(path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id),
3887 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
3889 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
3893 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3894 pending_events.push(path_failure);
3895 if let Some(ev) = full_failure_ev { pending_events.push(ev); }
3897 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret, .. }) => {
3898 let err_packet = match onion_error {
3899 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
3900 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
3901 if let Some(phantom_ss) = phantom_shared_secret {
3902 let phantom_packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&phantom_ss, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
3903 let encrypted_phantom_packet = onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&phantom_ss, &phantom_packet);
3904 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &encrypted_phantom_packet.data[..])
3906 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
3907 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
3910 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
3911 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3912 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
3916 let mut forward_event = None;
3917 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3918 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
3920 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
3921 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3922 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
3924 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3925 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
3928 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3929 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
3930 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3931 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3932 time_forwardable: time
3939 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentReceived`], generating any
3940 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
3942 /// Note that calling this method does *not* guarantee that the payment has been claimed. You
3943 /// *must* wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] event which upon a successful claim will be
3944 /// provided to your [`EventHandler`] when [`process_pending_events`] is next called.
3946 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
3947 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
3948 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
3949 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
3951 /// [`Event::PaymentReceived`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentReceived
3952 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
3953 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
3954 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3955 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3956 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
3957 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
3958 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3960 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3962 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3963 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
3964 if let Some((payment_purpose, mut sources)) = removed_source {
3965 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
3967 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
3968 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
3969 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
3970 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
3972 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
3973 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
3974 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
3975 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
3976 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
3978 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
3979 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
3980 let mut valid_mpp = true;
3981 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3982 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3986 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
3987 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
3988 debug_assert!(false);
3992 expected_amt_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
3993 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload {
3994 // We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check
3995 // that there's one payment here and move on.
3996 if sources.len() != 1 {
3997 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP spontaneous payment - this should not be reachable!");
3998 debug_assert!(false);
4004 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
4006 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
4007 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
4010 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
4011 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
4012 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
4016 let mut errs = Vec::new();
4017 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
4018 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4020 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
4021 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
4022 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
4023 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
4024 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
4025 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
4026 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
4028 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
4029 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) => {
4030 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
4031 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
4032 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
4033 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
4034 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
4035 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
4037 ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
4038 ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim => {
4039 // While we should never get here in most cases, if we do, it likely
4040 // indicates that the HTLC was timed out some time ago and is no longer
4041 // available to be claimed. Thus, it does not make sense to set
4042 // `claimed_any_htlcs`.
4044 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(_) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
4049 if claimed_any_htlcs {
4050 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
4052 purpose: payment_purpose,
4053 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
4057 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
4058 // which were generated.
4059 channel_state.take();
4061 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
4062 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4063 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4068 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> ClaimFundsFromHop {
4069 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
4070 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
4071 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4072 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
4074 return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed
4078 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4079 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
4080 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
4081 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
4082 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4083 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
4084 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4085 payment_preimage, e);
4086 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(
4087 chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4088 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(),
4089 Some(htlc_value_msat)
4092 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
4093 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
4094 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4095 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4096 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4097 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4098 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4099 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
4100 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4101 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4107 return ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(htlc_value_msat);
4109 return ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim;
4112 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
4113 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4114 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
4115 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
4116 payment_preimage, e);
4118 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4119 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
4121 chan.remove_entry();
4123 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(counterparty_node_id, res, None);
4126 } else { unreachable!(); }
4129 fn finalize_claims(&self, mut sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4130 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4131 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4132 for source in sources.drain(..) {
4133 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } = source {
4134 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
4135 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
4136 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
4137 assert!(payment.get().is_fulfilled());
4138 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, None) {
4139 pending_events.push(
4140 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
4142 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash(),
4147 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
4155 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
4157 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4158 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4159 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
4160 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
4161 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4162 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
4163 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4164 if !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
4165 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4166 let fee_paid_msat = payment.get().get_pending_fee_msat();
4167 pending_events.push(
4168 events::Event::PaymentSent {
4169 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
4175 payment.get_mut().mark_fulfilled();
4179 // We currently immediately remove HTLCs which were fulfilled on-chain.
4180 // This could potentially lead to removing a pending payment too early,
4181 // with a reorg of one block causing us to re-add the fulfilled payment on
4183 // TODO: We should have a second monitor event that informs us of payments
4184 // irrevocably fulfilled.
4185 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
4186 let payment_hash = Some(PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner()));
4187 pending_events.push(
4188 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
4196 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
4201 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
4204 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4205 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4206 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage);
4207 let claimed_htlc = if let ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim = res { false } else { true };
4208 let htlc_claim_value_msat = match res {
4209 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(_, _, amt_opt) => amt_opt,
4210 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(amt) => Some(amt),
4213 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed = res {
4214 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4215 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4216 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4217 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4220 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4221 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
4222 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
4223 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) {
4224 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4225 payment_preimage, e);
4227 // Note that we do *not* set `claimed_htlc` to false here. In fact, this
4228 // totally could be a duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing
4229 // without interrogating the `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above
4230 // update to. Instead, we simply document in `PaymentForwarded` that this
4233 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4234 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) = res {
4235 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4236 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4240 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4241 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4242 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4245 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4246 let prev_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
4247 let next_channel_id = Some(next_channel_id);
4249 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4251 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4261 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4262 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4263 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4266 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
4267 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4269 let chan_restoration_res;
4270 let (mut pending_failures, finalized_claims) = {
4271 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4272 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4273 let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4274 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4275 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4277 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4281 let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
4282 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() {
4283 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
4284 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
4285 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
4286 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
4288 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()) {
4289 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4290 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4295 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, None, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready, updates.announcement_sigs);
4296 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4297 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4299 (updates.failed_htlcs, updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs)
4301 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
4302 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claims);
4303 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4304 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
4308 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4310 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4311 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4314 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4315 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4316 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4318 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
4319 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
4320 /// used to accept such channels.
4322 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4323 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4324 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4325 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4328 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4329 /// it as confirmed immediately.
4331 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4332 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4333 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4335 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4336 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
4338 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
4339 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
4341 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
4342 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
4344 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4345 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4346 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4347 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
4350 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4351 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4353 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4354 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4355 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4356 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4357 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4358 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4360 if *counterparty_node_id != channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id() {
4361 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The passed counterparty_node_id doesn't match the channel's counterparty node_id".to_owned() });
4364 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
4365 } else if channel.get().get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4366 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4367 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4368 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4369 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
4372 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4373 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, channel);
4374 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
4377 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4378 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4379 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4382 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4383 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Can't accept a channel that doesn't exist".to_owned() });
4389 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4390 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4391 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4394 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4395 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4398 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4399 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager,
4400 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration,
4401 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4404 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4405 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4409 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4410 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4411 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4412 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4413 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4414 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4416 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4417 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4418 if channel.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4419 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4421 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4422 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4423 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(0),
4426 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4427 pending_events.push(
4428 events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4429 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4430 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4431 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4432 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4433 channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4438 entry.insert(channel);
4444 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4445 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4446 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4447 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4448 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4449 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4450 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4451 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4453 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &their_features), channel_state, chan);
4454 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4456 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4459 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4460 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4461 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4462 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4463 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4465 user_channel_id: user_id,
4470 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4471 let ((funding_msg, monitor, mut channel_ready), mut chan) = {
4472 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4473 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4474 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4475 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4476 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4477 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4478 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4480 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
4482 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4485 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
4486 // lock before watch_channel
4487 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
4489 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
4490 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4491 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4492 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4493 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4494 // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for
4495 // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we
4496 // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4497 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
4498 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4499 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
4501 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
4502 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4503 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4504 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
4505 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4506 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, channel_ready.is_some(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4507 channel_ready = None; // Don't send the channel_ready now
4511 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4512 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4513 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4514 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4515 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4517 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4518 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4519 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4522 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4523 send_channel_ready!(channel_state.short_to_id, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
4531 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4533 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4534 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4535 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4536 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4537 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4538 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4539 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4541 let (monitor, funding_tx, channel_ready) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
4542 Ok(update) => update,
4543 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
4545 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
4546 let mut res = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, channel_ready.is_some(), OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED);
4547 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4548 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4549 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4550 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4551 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4552 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4557 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4558 send_channel_ready!(channel_state.short_to_id, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get(), msg);
4562 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4565 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
4566 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
4570 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4571 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4572 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4573 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4574 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4575 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4576 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4578 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, self.get_our_node_id(),
4579 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4580 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4581 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4582 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4583 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4584 msg: announcement_sigs,
4586 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4587 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4588 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4589 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4590 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4591 // announcement_signatures.
4592 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4593 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4594 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4595 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4602 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4606 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4607 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4608 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4609 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4610 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4612 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4613 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4614 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4615 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4618 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4619 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4620 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4621 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4624 let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
4625 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4627 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4628 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
4629 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4630 let (result, is_permanent) =
4631 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
4633 remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
4639 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4640 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4641 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4648 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4651 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4652 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
4655 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
4659 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4660 let (tx, chan_option) = {
4661 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4662 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4663 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4664 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4665 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4666 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4668 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
4669 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
4670 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4671 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4676 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
4677 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
4678 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
4679 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
4680 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
4681 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry)))
4682 } else { (tx, None) }
4684 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4687 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
4688 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
4689 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
4691 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
4692 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4693 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4694 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4698 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4703 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4704 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
4705 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
4706 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
4708 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
4709 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
4710 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
4711 //but we should prevent it anyway.
4713 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
4714 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4716 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4717 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4718 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4719 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4722 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
4723 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
4724 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
4725 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
4726 match pending_forward_info {
4727 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
4728 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
4729 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
4730 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, real_code, &error_data)
4732 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &[])
4734 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4735 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
4736 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4739 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
4741 _ => pending_forward_info
4744 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4746 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4751 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4752 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4753 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
4754 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4755 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4756 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4757 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4758 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4760 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
4762 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4765 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
4769 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4770 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4771 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4772 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4773 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4774 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4775 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4777 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
4779 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4784 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4785 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4786 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4787 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4788 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4789 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4790 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4792 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
4793 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
4794 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
4796 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
4799 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4803 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4804 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4805 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4806 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4807 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4808 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4809 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4811 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
4812 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
4813 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
4814 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
4815 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
4816 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
4817 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
4822 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4823 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
4825 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4826 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4827 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4829 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
4830 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4831 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4832 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4833 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4834 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4835 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4836 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4838 commitment_signed: msg,
4844 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4849 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
4850 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
4851 let mut forward_event = None;
4852 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4853 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4854 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4855 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
4857 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4858 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
4859 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
4860 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
4861 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
4863 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4864 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4865 prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
4867 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4868 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4869 prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
4874 match forward_event {
4876 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4877 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
4878 time_forwardable: time
4886 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4887 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
4889 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4890 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4891 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4892 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4893 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4894 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4896 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
4897 let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self,
4898 chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4899 htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs;
4900 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), raa_updates.monitor_update) {
4901 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
4902 assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none());
4903 assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty());
4904 assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4905 assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty());
4906 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
4908 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan,
4909 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
4910 raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(), false,
4911 raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4912 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
4914 } else { unreachable!(); }
4917 if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update {
4918 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4919 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4923 break Ok((raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4924 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs,
4925 chan.get().get_short_channel_id()
4926 .unwrap_or(chan.get().outbound_scid_alias()),
4927 chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
4929 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4932 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
4934 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, finalized_claim_htlcs,
4935 short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) =>
4937 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4938 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
4940 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
4941 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claim_htlcs);
4948 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4949 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4950 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4951 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4952 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4953 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4954 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4956 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
4958 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4963 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4964 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4965 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4967 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4968 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4969 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4970 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4972 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
4973 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
4976 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
4977 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
4978 self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), msg), channel_state, chan),
4979 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
4980 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
4981 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4984 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4989 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
4990 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4991 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4992 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4993 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
4994 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
4996 // It's not a local channel
4997 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5000 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5001 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5002 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5003 if chan.get().should_announce() {
5004 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
5005 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
5006 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
5007 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5009 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
5011 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
5012 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
5013 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
5014 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5016 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
5019 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!()
5021 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
5024 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5025 let chan_restoration_res;
5026 let (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround) = {
5027 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5028 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5030 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5031 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5032 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5033 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5035 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
5036 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
5037 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
5038 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
5039 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
5040 msg, &self.logger, self.our_network_pubkey.clone(), self.genesis_hash,
5041 &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), channel_state, chan);
5042 let mut channel_update = None;
5043 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
5044 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5045 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5048 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
5049 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
5050 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
5051 // they have the latest channel parameters.
5052 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5053 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5054 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
5059 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
5060 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(
5061 self, channel_state_lock, channel_state, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
5062 responses.mon_update, Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
5063 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
5064 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
5066 (responses.holding_cell_failed_htlcs, need_lnd_workaround)
5068 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5071 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
5072 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_failed_forward, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
5074 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
5075 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
5080 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
5081 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
5082 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5083 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5084 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5085 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5086 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
5087 match monitor_event {
5088 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5089 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5090 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5091 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
5093 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5094 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
5097 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5098 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5099 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5100 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5101 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5102 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5103 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5104 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
5105 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
5106 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5107 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5111 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5112 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5114 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5116 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
5117 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5118 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5119 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5120 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5125 MonitorEvent::UpdateCompleted { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5126 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id);
5132 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5133 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5136 has_pending_monitor_events
5139 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5140 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5141 /// update events as a separate process method here.
5143 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5144 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
5147 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5148 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5149 /// update was applied.
5151 /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
5152 /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
5153 /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
5154 /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
5155 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5156 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5157 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5158 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5160 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5161 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5162 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5163 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5164 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5166 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5167 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
5168 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
5169 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5171 holding_cell_failed_htlcs,
5173 chan.get_counterparty_node_id()
5176 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
5177 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
5178 has_monitor_update = true;
5179 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, channel_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
5180 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
5181 if close_channel { return false; }
5183 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5184 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5185 updates: commitment_update,
5192 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
5193 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5194 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
5201 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5202 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5203 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
5206 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5207 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5213 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5214 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5215 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5216 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5217 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5218 let mut has_update = false;
5220 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5221 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5222 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5223 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5224 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5226 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5227 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5228 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5229 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5231 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5232 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5235 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5236 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5237 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5238 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5239 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5244 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5246 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5247 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
5248 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_id, chan);
5254 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
5255 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5262 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5263 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5269 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5270 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5272 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5273 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5274 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5275 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5276 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5277 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5278 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5279 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5280 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5281 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5282 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5283 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5284 assert!(should_broadcast);
5285 } else { unreachable!(); }
5286 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
5288 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5292 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5293 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5295 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5296 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5299 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5301 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5302 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5303 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5304 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5305 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5306 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5307 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5308 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5309 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5310 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5311 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5312 // never fail a payment too early.
5313 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5315 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5318 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5323 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5326 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5327 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5329 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
5330 /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5331 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5333 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5335 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5336 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5340 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5341 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5343 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5345 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5346 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5347 /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
5348 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5349 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5350 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, &self.keys_manager, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5353 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5354 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5356 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5359 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5361 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5363 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5364 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5365 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5366 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5367 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5370 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5371 /// stored external to LDK.
5373 /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5374 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5375 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5377 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5378 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5381 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5382 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5383 /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5384 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5386 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5387 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5388 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5389 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5390 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5392 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5393 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5394 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
5395 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5396 /// [`PaymentReceived`].
5398 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
5399 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
5401 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5402 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5406 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5407 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5409 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5411 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5412 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5413 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5414 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5417 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5418 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5420 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5423 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5425 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5427 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5428 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5431 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5432 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5434 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5435 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5436 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5439 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5440 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5442 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5443 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5444 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5445 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5447 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block.height(), &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
5448 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5449 match channel_state.short_to_id.entry(scid_candidate) {
5450 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => continue,
5451 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return scid_candidate
5456 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5458 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5459 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5461 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5462 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5463 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5467 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5468 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5469 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5470 let event_handler = |event: &events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event.clone());
5471 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5476 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5477 !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().is_empty()
5481 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5482 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().clear()
5486 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5487 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5488 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5489 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5490 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5493 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5494 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5495 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5496 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5498 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5499 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5500 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5501 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5504 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5505 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5507 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
5508 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5511 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
5512 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5513 mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
5515 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5516 events.replace(pending_events);
5525 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5527 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5528 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5529 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5530 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5533 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
5535 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
5536 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
5538 /// Pending events are persisted as part of [`ChannelManager`]. While these events are cleared
5539 /// when processed, an [`EventHandler`] must be able to handle previously seen events when
5540 /// restarting from an old state.
5541 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
5542 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5543 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5545 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5546 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5547 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5548 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5551 let mut pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5552 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5553 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5556 for event in pending_events.drain(..) {
5557 handler.handle_event(&event);
5565 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5567 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5568 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5569 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5570 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5573 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5575 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5576 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
5577 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
5578 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
5579 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
5582 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
5583 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
5586 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5587 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5588 let new_height = height - 1;
5590 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
5591 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
5592 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
5593 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
5594 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
5595 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
5598 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5602 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5604 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5605 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5606 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5607 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5610 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5611 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5612 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5613 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5615 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5616 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
5618 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5619 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger)
5620 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
5622 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5623 if height < last_best_block_height {
5624 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5625 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5629 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5630 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5631 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5632 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5634 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5635 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
5637 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5639 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
5641 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5643 macro_rules! max_time {
5644 ($timestamp: expr) => {
5646 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
5647 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
5648 // having an explicit local time source.
5649 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
5650 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
5651 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5652 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
5653 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
5659 max_time!(self.last_node_announcement_serial);
5660 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
5661 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5662 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
5663 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
5666 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5667 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5668 outbounds.retain(|payment_id, payment| {
5669 if payment.remaining_parts() != 0 { return true }
5670 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { starting_block_height, payment_hash, .. } = payment {
5671 if *starting_block_height + PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS <= height {
5672 log_info!(self.logger, "Timing out payment with id {} and hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_id.0), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
5673 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
5674 payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash,
5682 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
5683 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5684 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.short_to_id.len());
5685 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
5686 if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() {
5687 res.push(funding_txo.txid);
5693 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
5694 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5695 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
5696 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
5697 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
5698 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
5699 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5700 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5705 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5707 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5708 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5709 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5710 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5713 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
5714 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
5716 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
5717 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
5718 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5719 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5720 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5722 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5723 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5725 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5726 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5727 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5728 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5729 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
5730 let res = f(channel);
5731 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
5732 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
5733 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
5734 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
5738 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
5739 send_channel_ready!(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
5740 if channel.is_usable() {
5741 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5742 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
5743 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5744 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5749 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5752 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
5753 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5754 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5755 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5756 msg: announcement_sigs,
5758 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5759 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, height) {
5760 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5762 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5763 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5764 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap(),
5769 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
5770 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
5771 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
5772 // to the short_to_id map here. Note that we check whether we can relay
5773 // using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e. enforce option_scid_alias
5774 // then), and if the funding tx is ever un-confirmed we force-close the
5775 // channel, ensuring short_to_id is always consistent.
5776 let scid_insert = short_to_id.insert(real_scid, channel.channel_id());
5777 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == channel.channel_id(),
5778 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
5779 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
5782 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
5783 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_id, channel);
5784 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
5785 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
5786 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
5787 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
5788 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5792 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
5793 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
5794 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5795 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5796 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
5797 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
5798 data: reason_message,
5806 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5807 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
5808 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
5809 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
5810 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
5811 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
5812 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
5813 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
5814 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
5815 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
5816 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
5817 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
5818 data: htlc_msat_height_data
5823 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
5828 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
5830 for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
5831 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
5835 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
5836 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
5837 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
5840 /// Note that this method is not available with the `no-std` feature.
5841 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
5842 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
5843 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
5846 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
5847 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
5849 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
5850 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
5853 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5854 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
5855 let mutcond = &self.persistence_notifier.persistence_lock;
5856 let &(ref mtx, _) = mutcond;
5857 let guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5861 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
5862 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
5863 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
5864 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
5868 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref , T: Deref , K: Deref , F: Deref , L: Deref >
5869 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5870 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5871 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5872 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5873 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5876 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
5877 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5878 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5881 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
5882 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5883 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5886 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
5887 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5888 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5891 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
5892 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5893 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5896 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
5897 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5898 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5901 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
5902 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5903 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5906 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
5907 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5908 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5911 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
5912 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5913 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5916 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
5917 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5918 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5921 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
5922 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5923 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5926 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
5927 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5928 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5931 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
5932 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5933 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5936 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
5937 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5938 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5941 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
5942 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5943 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5946 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
5947 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5948 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5951 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
5952 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5953 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
5956 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
5961 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
5962 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5963 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5966 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
5967 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5968 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5969 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
5971 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5972 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5973 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5974 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5975 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates. We believe we {} make future connections to this peer.",
5976 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id), if no_connection_possible { "cannot" } else { "can" });
5977 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5978 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5979 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
5980 if chan.is_shutdown() {
5981 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_id, chan);
5982 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
5985 no_channels_remain = false;
5990 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
5992 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5993 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5994 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5995 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5996 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5997 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5998 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5999 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6000 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6001 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6002 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6003 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6004 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6005 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
6006 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6007 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6008 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
6009 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
6010 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
6011 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
6015 if no_channels_remain {
6016 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
6019 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6020 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6024 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
6025 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6027 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6030 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6031 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
6032 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6033 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
6034 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
6037 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
6038 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
6043 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6044 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
6045 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
6046 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6047 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6048 if !chan.have_received_message() {
6049 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
6050 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
6051 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
6055 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6056 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6057 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
6063 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
6066 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
6067 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6069 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
6070 for chan in self.list_channels() {
6071 if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
6072 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6073 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data));
6078 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
6079 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6080 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
6081 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6084 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
6085 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
6086 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6094 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6095 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data));
6100 /// Used to signal to the ChannelManager persister that the manager needs to be re-persisted to
6101 /// disk/backups, through `await_persistable_update_timeout` and `await_persistable_update`.
6102 struct PersistenceNotifier {
6103 /// Users won't access the persistence_lock directly, but rather wait on its bool using
6104 /// `wait_timeout` and `wait`.
6105 persistence_lock: (Mutex<bool>, Condvar),
6108 impl PersistenceNotifier {
6111 persistence_lock: (Mutex::new(false), Condvar::new()),
6117 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
6118 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
6123 guard = cvar.wait(guard).unwrap();
6124 let result = *guard;
6132 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
6133 fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
6134 let current_time = Instant::now();
6136 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
6137 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
6142 guard = cvar.wait_timeout(guard, max_wait).unwrap().0;
6143 // Due to spurious wakeups that can happen on `wait_timeout`, here we need to check if the
6144 // desired wait time has actually passed, and if not then restart the loop with a reduced wait
6145 // time. Note that this logic can be highly simplified through the use of
6146 // `Condvar::wait_while` and `Condvar::wait_timeout_while`, if and when our MSRV is raised to
6148 let elapsed = current_time.elapsed();
6149 let result = *guard;
6150 if result || elapsed >= max_wait {
6154 match max_wait.checked_sub(elapsed) {
6155 None => return result,
6161 // Signal to the ChannelManager persister that there are updates necessitating persisting to disk.
6163 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &self.persistence_lock;
6164 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6165 *persistence_lock = true;
6166 mem::drop(persistence_lock);
6171 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6172 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6174 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
6175 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
6176 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
6177 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
6180 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
6181 (2, node_id, required),
6182 (4, features, required),
6183 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
6184 (8, forwarding_info, option),
6185 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6186 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6189 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelDetails, {
6190 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
6191 (2, channel_id, required),
6192 (3, channel_type, option),
6193 (4, counterparty, required),
6194 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6195 (6, funding_txo, option),
6196 (7, config, option),
6197 (8, short_channel_id, option),
6198 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
6199 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6200 (14, user_channel_id, required),
6201 (16, balance_msat, required),
6202 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6203 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6204 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6205 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap())),
6206 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6207 (22, confirmations_required, option),
6208 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
6209 (26, is_outbound, required),
6210 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
6211 (30, is_usable, required),
6212 (32, is_public, required),
6213 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6214 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6217 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
6218 (2, channels, vec_type),
6219 (4, phantom_scid, required),
6220 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
6223 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
6225 (0, onion_packet, required),
6226 (2, short_channel_id, required),
6229 (0, payment_data, required),
6230 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6231 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6233 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
6234 (0, payment_preimage, required),
6235 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6239 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
6240 (0, routing, required),
6241 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
6242 (4, payment_hash, required),
6243 (6, amt_to_forward, required),
6244 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required)
6248 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6249 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6251 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
6253 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6254 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6255 reason.write(writer)?;
6257 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6258 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
6261 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6262 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6263 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
6264 failure_code.write(writer)?;
6271 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6272 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6273 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6276 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6277 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6278 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6279 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
6283 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6284 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6285 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6286 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
6287 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
6290 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
6291 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
6292 // messages contained in the variants.
6293 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
6294 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
6295 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
6297 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6298 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6299 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6300 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6301 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
6304 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6305 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6306 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6307 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6308 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
6310 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6315 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
6320 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
6321 (0, short_channel_id, required),
6322 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6323 (2, outpoint, required),
6324 (4, htlc_id, required),
6325 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
6328 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
6329 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6330 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
6331 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
6332 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
6334 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6335 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
6336 (1, self.total_msat, required),
6337 (2, self.value, required),
6338 (4, payment_data, option),
6339 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
6340 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
6346 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
6347 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6348 let mut prev_hop = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6350 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
6351 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
6352 let mut total_msat = None;
6353 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
6354 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6355 (0, prev_hop, required),
6356 (1, total_msat, option),
6357 (2, value, required),
6358 (4, payment_data, option),
6359 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
6360 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
6362 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
6364 if payment_data.is_some() {
6365 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6367 if total_msat.is_none() {
6368 total_msat = Some(value);
6370 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
6373 if total_msat.is_none() {
6374 if payment_data.is_none() {
6375 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6377 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
6379 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
6383 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
6386 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
6393 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
6394 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6395 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6398 let mut session_priv: ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6399 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
6400 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
6401 let mut payment_id = None;
6402 let mut payment_secret = None;
6403 let mut payment_params = None;
6404 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6405 (0, session_priv, required),
6406 (1, payment_id, option),
6407 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6408 (3, payment_secret, option),
6409 (4, path, vec_type),
6410 (5, payment_params, option),
6412 if payment_id.is_none() {
6413 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
6415 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
6417 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6418 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
6419 first_hop_htlc_msat: first_hop_htlc_msat,
6420 path: path.unwrap(),
6421 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
6426 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6427 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6432 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
6433 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::io::Error> {
6435 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payment_params } => {
6437 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
6438 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6439 (0, session_priv, required),
6440 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
6441 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6442 (3, payment_secret, option),
6443 (4, path, vec_type),
6444 (5, payment_params, option),
6447 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
6449 field.write(writer)?;
6456 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason,
6457 (0, LightningError) => {
6461 (0, failure_code, required),
6462 (2, data, vec_type),
6466 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
6468 (0, forward_info, required),
6469 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
6470 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
6471 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
6474 (0, htlc_id, required),
6475 (2, err_packet, required),
6479 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
6480 (0, payment_secret, required),
6481 (2, expiry_time, required),
6482 (4, user_payment_id, required),
6483 (6, payment_preimage, required),
6484 (8, min_value_msat, required),
6487 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(PendingOutboundPayment,
6489 (0, session_privs, required),
6492 (0, session_privs, required),
6493 (1, payment_hash, option),
6496 (0, session_privs, required),
6497 (1, pending_fee_msat, option),
6498 (2, payment_hash, required),
6499 (4, payment_secret, option),
6500 (6, total_msat, required),
6501 (8, pending_amt_msat, required),
6502 (10, starting_block_height, required),
6505 (0, session_privs, required),
6506 (2, payment_hash, required),
6510 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
6511 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6512 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6513 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6514 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6517 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6518 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
6520 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6522 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
6524 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6525 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
6526 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
6529 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6530 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
6531 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6532 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6533 unfunded_channels += 1;
6536 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
6537 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6538 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6539 channel.write(writer)?;
6543 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6544 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
6545 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6546 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6547 for forward in pending_forwards {
6548 forward.write(writer)?;
6552 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
6553 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6554 for (payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops)) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
6555 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6556 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6557 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
6558 htlc.write(writer)?;
6560 htlc_purposes.push(purpose);
6563 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6564 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6565 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6566 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
6567 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6568 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
6571 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6572 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6573 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6574 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6575 for event in events.iter() {
6576 event.write(writer)?;
6579 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
6580 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6581 for event in background_events.iter() {
6583 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
6585 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
6586 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
6591 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6592 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6594 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6595 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
6596 hash.write(writer)?;
6597 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
6600 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
6601 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
6602 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6603 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
6604 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
6607 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
6608 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6610 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6611 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6612 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
6613 session_priv.write(writer)?;
6616 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
6617 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
6621 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
6622 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
6623 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6625 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6626 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6627 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
6632 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6633 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
6634 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
6635 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
6636 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
6637 (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
6644 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
6646 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
6648 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6649 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
6650 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
6651 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
6652 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
6653 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
6654 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
6655 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
6656 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6657 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
6658 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
6659 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
6660 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
6662 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
6663 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
6665 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
6666 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
6668 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
6669 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
6670 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
6671 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
6672 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
6673 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
6675 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
6676 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6677 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6678 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6679 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6680 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6683 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
6684 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
6686 pub keys_manager: K,
6688 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6690 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
6691 pub fee_estimator: F,
6692 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6694 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
6695 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
6696 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
6697 pub chain_monitor: M,
6699 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
6700 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
6701 /// force-closed during deserialization.
6702 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
6703 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
6704 /// deserialization.
6706 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
6707 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
6708 pub default_config: UserConfig,
6710 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
6711 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
6713 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
6714 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
6715 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
6716 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
6718 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
6721 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
6722 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
6725 impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6726 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
6727 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6728 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6729 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6730 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6733 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
6734 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
6735 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
6736 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
6737 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
6739 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
6740 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
6745 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
6746 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
6747 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6748 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
6749 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6750 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6751 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6752 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6755 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6756 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
6757 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
6761 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6762 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
6763 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6764 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6765 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6766 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6769 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6770 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6772 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6773 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6774 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6776 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
6778 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6779 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6780 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6781 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6782 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
6783 for _ in 0..channel_count {
6784 let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (&args.keys_manager, best_block_height))?;
6785 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
6786 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
6787 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
6788 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
6789 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
6790 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
6791 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
6792 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
6793 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
6794 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
6795 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
6796 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
6797 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
6798 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
6799 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
6800 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6801 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
6802 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
6803 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
6804 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
6805 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
6806 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
6807 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
6808 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
6809 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
6810 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
6811 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
6812 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
6813 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
6814 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6815 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
6816 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
6819 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6820 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
6821 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
6823 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
6826 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6827 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
6828 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
6829 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
6830 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
6831 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6835 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
6836 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
6837 log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
6838 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
6842 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
6843 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6844 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
6845 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
6846 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6847 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6848 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
6849 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
6850 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
6852 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
6855 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6856 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
6857 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
6858 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6859 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6860 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
6861 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
6862 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
6864 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
6867 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6868 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
6869 for _ in 0..peer_count {
6870 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6871 let peer_state = PeerState {
6872 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
6874 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
6877 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6878 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
6879 for _ in 0..event_count {
6880 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
6881 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
6885 if forward_htlcs_count > 0 {
6886 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
6887 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
6888 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
6889 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
6890 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
6891 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6892 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
6896 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6897 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
6898 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
6899 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6900 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
6901 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6905 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6906 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6908 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6909 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
6910 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
6911 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
6912 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6916 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6917 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
6918 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
6919 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
6920 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
6921 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
6922 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
6924 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
6925 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6929 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
6930 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
6931 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
6932 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
6933 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
6934 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
6935 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6936 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
6937 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
6938 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
6939 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
6940 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
6942 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
6943 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
6946 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
6947 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
6948 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
6949 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
6950 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
6951 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
6953 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
6955 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
6956 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
6957 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
6958 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
6959 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
6960 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
6961 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
6963 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
6964 if by_id.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
6965 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() {
6966 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
6967 if path.is_empty() {
6968 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
6969 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6971 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
6972 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
6973 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
6974 match pending_outbound_payments.as_mut().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
6975 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6976 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
6977 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
6978 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
6980 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6981 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
6982 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
6983 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
6984 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
6986 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
6987 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
6988 total_msat: path_amt,
6989 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
6991 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
6992 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
7001 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
7002 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
7004 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
7005 if let Some(mut purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
7006 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
7007 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7009 for (purpose, (payment_hash, previous_hops)) in purposes.drain(..).zip(claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..)) {
7010 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7013 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
7014 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
7015 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
7016 if previous_hops.is_empty() {
7017 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7019 let purpose = match &previous_hops[0].onion_payload {
7020 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
7021 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
7022 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
7023 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
7024 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
7025 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
7026 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
7028 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7029 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7033 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
7035 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
7037 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
7038 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
7040 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7044 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7045 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
7047 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
7048 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
7051 let our_network_key = match args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node) {
7053 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7055 let our_network_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &our_network_key);
7056 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
7057 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
7058 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
7059 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7063 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
7064 for (chan_id, chan) in by_id.iter_mut() {
7065 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
7066 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
7068 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
7069 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.keys_manager);
7070 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
7072 chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
7073 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
7074 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7075 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7076 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7077 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7079 if chan.is_usable() {
7080 if short_to_id.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), *chan_id).is_some() {
7081 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7082 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7083 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7084 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7089 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7090 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
7091 if let Some((payment_purpose, claimable_htlcs)) = claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
7092 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7093 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
7094 for claimable_htlc in claimable_htlcs {
7095 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
7097 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
7098 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
7099 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
7100 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
7102 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
7103 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
7104 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
7105 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
7107 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
7108 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
7109 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
7110 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
7112 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
7113 if let Some(channel) = by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
7114 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
7116 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
7117 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &args.fee_estimator, &args.logger);
7120 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
7122 purpose: payment_purpose,
7123 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
7129 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
7131 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
7132 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
7133 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
7135 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
7137 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
7142 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7144 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
7145 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
7146 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
7148 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
7149 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
7155 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
7156 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
7158 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
7160 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
7161 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
7162 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
7163 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
7165 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
7166 logger: args.logger,
7167 default_configuration: args.default_config,
7170 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7171 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
7174 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
7175 //connection or two.
7177 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
7183 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7184 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7185 use core::time::Duration;
7186 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
7187 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
7188 use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure};
7189 use ln::channelmanager::inbound_payment;
7190 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
7191 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7193 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
7194 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
7195 use util::errors::APIError;
7196 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
7197 use util::test_utils;
7198 use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
7200 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
7202 fn test_wait_timeout() {
7203 use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier;
7205 use core::sync::atomic::AtomicBool;
7208 let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new());
7209 let thread_notifier = Arc::clone(&persistence_notifier);
7211 let exit_thread = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
7212 let exit_thread_clone = exit_thread.clone();
7213 thread::spawn(move || {
7215 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &thread_notifier.persistence_lock;
7216 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
7217 *persistence_lock = true;
7220 if exit_thread_clone.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
7226 // Check that we can block indefinitely until updates are available.
7227 let _ = persistence_notifier.wait();
7229 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration if updates are
7232 if persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
7237 exit_thread.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
7239 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration even if no updates
7242 if !persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
7249 fn test_notify_limits() {
7250 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
7251 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
7252 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7253 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7254 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7255 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7257 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
7258 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
7259 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7260 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7261 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7263 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7265 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
7266 // to connect messages with new values
7267 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7268 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7269 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7270 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7272 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
7273 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7274 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7275 // ... but the last node should not.
7276 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7277 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
7278 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7279 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7281 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
7282 // about the channel.
7283 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7284 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7285 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7287 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
7289 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7290 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7291 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7292 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7293 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7294 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7296 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
7297 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7298 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7300 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
7301 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
7302 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
7303 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
7304 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
7305 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
7307 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
7308 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
7309 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7310 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7311 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7312 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7313 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7314 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7316 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
7317 // the channel info has updated.
7318 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7319 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7320 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7321 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7322 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7323 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7327 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
7328 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
7330 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7331 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7332 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7333 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7334 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7336 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
7337 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
7338 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
7339 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
7340 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
7341 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
7342 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
7343 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7344 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7345 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7346 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
7348 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
7349 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
7350 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7351 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7352 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7353 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7354 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7355 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7356 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7357 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7358 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7359 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7360 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7361 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7362 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7363 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7364 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7365 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7366 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7367 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7368 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7369 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
7371 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
7372 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
7373 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7374 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7375 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7376 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
7378 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
7379 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
7380 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
7381 // lightning messages manually.
7382 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7383 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
7384 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7386 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7387 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7388 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
7389 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7390 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7391 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
7392 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7393 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7394 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
7395 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7396 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7397 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7398 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7399 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7400 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7401 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
7402 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7403 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7404 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
7405 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7406 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7407 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7408 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7409 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
7410 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7412 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
7413 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
7414 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7415 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
7417 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
7418 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
7419 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
7420 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
7422 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7425 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7426 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7427 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7428 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7430 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7433 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7434 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7435 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7436 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7438 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7443 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
7444 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
7445 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
7446 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
7447 // fails as expected.
7448 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7449 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7450 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7451 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7452 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7453 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7454 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7456 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
7457 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
7458 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
7460 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
7461 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7462 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id()),
7463 final_value_msat: 100_000,
7464 final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
7466 let route = find_route(
7467 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(),
7468 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7470 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
7471 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7472 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7473 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7474 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7475 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7476 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7477 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7478 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7479 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7480 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7481 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7482 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7483 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7484 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7485 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7486 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7487 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7488 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7489 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7490 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7492 // Finally, claim the original payment.
7493 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7495 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
7496 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7497 let route = find_route(
7498 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(),
7499 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7501 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
7502 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7503 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7504 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7505 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
7506 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
7507 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
7509 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
7510 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7511 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
7512 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7513 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7514 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7515 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7516 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7517 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7518 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7519 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7520 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7521 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7522 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7523 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7524 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7525 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7526 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7527 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7528 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7529 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7530 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7531 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7533 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
7534 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7538 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
7539 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
7540 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
7541 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7542 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7543 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7544 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7546 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7547 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7548 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7549 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7551 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7552 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7553 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7554 final_value_msat: 10000,
7555 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7557 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
7558 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7559 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7560 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7561 let route = find_route(
7562 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph.read_only(),
7563 Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()), nodes[0].logger, &scorer,
7567 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7568 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
7569 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
7570 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7572 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7573 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7574 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7575 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7576 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7577 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7578 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7580 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
7584 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
7585 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
7586 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7587 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7588 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7589 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7591 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7592 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7593 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7594 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7596 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7597 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7598 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7599 final_value_msat: 10000,
7600 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7602 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
7603 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7604 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7605 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7606 let route = find_route(
7607 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph.read_only(),
7608 Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()), nodes[0].logger, &scorer,
7612 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7613 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7614 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
7615 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
7616 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7618 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7619 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7620 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7621 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7622 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7623 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7624 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7626 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
7630 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
7631 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
7632 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
7633 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
7634 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7636 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7637 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7638 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7639 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7641 // Marshall an MPP route.
7642 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
7643 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
7644 route.paths.push(path);
7645 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7646 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
7647 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
7648 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
7649 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
7650 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
7652 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None).unwrap_err() {
7653 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
7654 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
7655 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
7660 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
7661 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
7662 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7663 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7664 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7665 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7667 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
7668 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
7670 total_msat: 100_000,
7673 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
7674 // payment verification fails as expected.
7675 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
7676 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
7677 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
7678 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
7680 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment".to_string(), "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash".to_string(), 1);
7684 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
7685 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
7689 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
7692 use chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
7693 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, KeysInterface, InMemorySigner};
7694 use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
7695 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
7696 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7697 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
7698 use routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
7699 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, get_route};
7700 use util::test_utils;
7701 use util::config::UserConfig;
7702 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
7704 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7705 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7706 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, Transaction, TxOut};
7708 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
7712 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
7713 node: &'a ChannelManager<InMemorySigner,
7714 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
7715 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
7716 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
7717 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
7718 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>
7723 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
7724 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
7727 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
7728 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
7729 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
7731 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
7732 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7734 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
7735 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
7737 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
7738 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
7740 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
7741 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
7742 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
7743 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
7744 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
7746 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
7748 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
7750 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
7751 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
7752 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
7753 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
7754 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
7756 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
7758 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
7760 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7761 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7762 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
7763 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7764 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7767 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
7768 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7769 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
7771 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
7772 } else { panic!(); }
7774 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7775 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7777 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
7780 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
7783 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
7784 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
7786 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7787 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7788 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
7789 match msg_events[0] {
7790 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
7791 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
7792 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
7796 match msg_events[1] {
7797 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7801 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger_a);
7803 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
7804 macro_rules! send_payment {
7805 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
7806 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
7807 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id())
7808 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7809 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7810 let seed = [3u8; 32];
7811 let keys_manager = KeysManager::new(&seed, 42, 42);
7812 let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7813 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &dummy_graph.read_only(),
7814 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7816 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
7817 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
7819 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
7820 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
7822 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
7823 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
7824 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7825 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
7826 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
7827 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
7828 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
7829 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7831 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
7832 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
7833 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7834 expect_payment_claimed!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
7836 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
7837 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
7838 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
7839 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7840 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
7842 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
7845 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
7846 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
7847 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
7848 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7850 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
7855 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
7856 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);