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[rust-lightning] / lightning / src / ln / channelmanager.rs
1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
2 // history.
3 //
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
8 // licenses.
9
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
11 //!
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
15 //!
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
19
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::{genesis_block, ChainHash};
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
24
25 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
27 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
28
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
31 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
32
33 use crate::chain;
34 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
38 use crate::events;
39 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
40 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
41 // construct one themselves.
42 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
43 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel};
44 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
45 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
46 use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
47 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
48 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, Router};
49 use crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters};
50 use crate::ln::msgs;
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
53 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
54 #[cfg(test)]
55 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
56 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment};
57 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
58 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, ChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
59 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
60 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
61 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
62 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
63 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
64 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
65 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
66
67 use alloc::collections::BTreeMap;
68
69 use crate::io;
70 use crate::prelude::*;
71 use core::{cmp, mem};
72 use core::cell::RefCell;
73 use crate::io::Read;
74 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
75 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
76 use core::time::Duration;
77 use core::ops::Deref;
78
79 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
80 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
81 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
82
83 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
84 //
85 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
86 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
87 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
88 //
89 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
90 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
91 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
92 // before we forward it.
93 //
94 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
95 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
96 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
97 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
98 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
99
100 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
101 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
102         Forward {
103                 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
104                 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
105                 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
106                 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
107         },
108         Receive {
109                 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
110                 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
111                 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
112                 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
113         },
114         ReceiveKeysend {
115                 /// This was added in 0.0.116 and will break deserialization on downgrades.
116                 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
117                 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
118                 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
119                 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
120         },
121 }
122
123 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
124 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
125         pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
126         pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
127         payment_hash: PaymentHash,
128         /// Amount received
129         pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
130         /// Sender intended amount to forward or receive (actual amount received
131         /// may overshoot this in either case)
132         pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
133         pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
134         /// The fee being skimmed off the top of this HTLC. If this is a forward, it'll be the fee we are
135         /// skimming. If we're receiving this HTLC, it's the fee that our counterparty skimmed.
136         pub(super) skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
137 }
138
139 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
140 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
141         Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
142         Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
143 }
144
145 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
146 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
147 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
148         Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
149         Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
150 }
151
152 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
153         pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
154
155         // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
156         // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
157         // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
158         // HTLCs.
159         //
160         // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
161         prev_short_channel_id: u64,
162         prev_htlc_id: u64,
163         prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
164         prev_user_channel_id: u128,
165 }
166
167 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
168         AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
169         FailHTLC {
170                 htlc_id: u64,
171                 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
172         },
173 }
174
175 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
176 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
177 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
178         // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
179         short_channel_id: u64,
180         htlc_id: u64,
181         incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
182         phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
183
184         // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
185         // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
186         outpoint: OutPoint,
187 }
188
189 enum OnionPayload {
190         /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
191         Invoice {
192                 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
193                 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
194                 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
195         },
196         /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
197         Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
198 }
199
200 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
201 struct ClaimableHTLC {
202         prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
203         cltv_expiry: u32,
204         /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
205         value: u64,
206         /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
207         /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
208         sender_intended_value: u64,
209         onion_payload: OnionPayload,
210         timer_ticks: u8,
211         /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
212         /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
213         total_value_received: Option<u64>,
214         /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
215         total_msat: u64,
216         /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
217         counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
218 }
219
220 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
221 ///
222 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
223 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
224 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
225
226 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
227         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
228                 self.0.write(w)
229         }
230 }
231
232 impl Readable for PaymentId {
233         fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
234                 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
235                 Ok(PaymentId(buf))
236         }
237 }
238
239 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
240 ///
241 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
242 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
243 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
244
245 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
246         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
247                 self.0.write(w)
248         }
249 }
250
251 impl Readable for InterceptId {
252         fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
253                 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
254                 Ok(InterceptId(buf))
255         }
256 }
257
258 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
259 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
260 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
261         PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
262         OutboundRoute { session_priv: SecretKey },
263 }
264 impl SentHTLCId {
265         pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
266                 match source {
267                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
268                                 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
269                                 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
270                         },
271                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
272                                 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: *session_priv },
273                 }
274         }
275 }
276 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
277         (0, PreviousHopData) => {
278                 (0, short_channel_id, required),
279                 (2, htlc_id, required),
280         },
281         (2, OutboundRoute) => {
282                 (0, session_priv, required),
283         };
284 );
285
286
287 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
288 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
289 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
290 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
291         PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
292         OutboundRoute {
293                 path: Path,
294                 session_priv: SecretKey,
295                 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
296                 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
297                 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
298                 payment_id: PaymentId,
299         },
300 }
301 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
302 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
303         fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
304                 match self {
305                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
306                                 0u8.hash(hasher);
307                                 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
308                         },
309                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
310                                 1u8.hash(hasher);
311                                 path.hash(hasher);
312                                 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
313                                 payment_id.hash(hasher);
314                                 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
315                         },
316                 }
317         }
318 }
319 impl HTLCSource {
320         #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
321         #[cfg(test)]
322         pub fn dummy() -> Self {
323                 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
324                         path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
325                         session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
326                         first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
327                         payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
328                 }
329         }
330
331         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
332         /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
333         /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
334         pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
335                 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
336                         *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
337                 } else {
338                         // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
339                         true
340                 }
341         }
342 }
343
344 struct ReceiveError {
345         err_code: u16,
346         err_data: Vec<u8>,
347         msg: &'static str,
348 }
349
350 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
351 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
352 ///
353 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
354 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
355 pub enum FailureCode {
356         /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
357         /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
358         TemporaryNodeFailure             = 0x2000 | 2,
359         /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
360         /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
361         RequiredNodeFeatureMissing       = 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
362         /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
363         /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
364         /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
365         /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
366         IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails = 0x4000 | 15,
367 }
368
369 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
370 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
371 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
372 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
373 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
374
375 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
376         err: msgs::LightningError,
377         chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
378         shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
379 }
380 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
381         #[inline]
382         fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
383                 Self {
384                         err: LightningError {
385                                 err: err.clone(),
386                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
387                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
388                                                 channel_id,
389                                                 data: err
390                                         },
391                                 },
392                         },
393                         chan_id: None,
394                         shutdown_finish: None,
395                 }
396         }
397         #[inline]
398         fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
399                 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
400         }
401         #[inline]
402         fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
403                 Self {
404                         err: LightningError {
405                                 err: err.clone(),
406                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
407                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
408                                                 channel_id,
409                                                 data: err
410                                         },
411                                 },
412                         },
413                         chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
414                         shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
415                 }
416         }
417         #[inline]
418         fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
419                 Self {
420                         err: match err {
421                                 ChannelError::Warn(msg) =>  LightningError {
422                                         err: msg.clone(),
423                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
424                                                 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
425                                                         channel_id,
426                                                         data: msg
427                                                 },
428                                                 log_level: Level::Warn,
429                                         },
430                                 },
431                                 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
432                                         err: msg,
433                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
434                                 },
435                                 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
436                                         err: msg.clone(),
437                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
438                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
439                                                         channel_id,
440                                                         data: msg
441                                                 },
442                                         },
443                                 },
444                         },
445                         chan_id: None,
446                         shutdown_finish: None,
447                 }
448         }
449 }
450
451 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
452 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
453 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
454 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
455 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
456
457 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
458 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
459 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
460 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
461 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
462 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
463         /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
464         CommitmentFirst,
465         /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
466         RevokeAndACKFirst,
467 }
468
469 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
470 struct ClaimingPayment {
471         amount_msat: u64,
472         payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
473         receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
474 }
475 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
476         (0, amount_msat, required),
477         (2, payment_purpose, required),
478         (4, receiver_node_id, required),
479 });
480
481 struct ClaimablePayment {
482         purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
483         onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
484         htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
485 }
486
487 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
488 struct ClaimablePayments {
489         /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
490         /// failed/claimed by the user.
491         ///
492         /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
493         /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
494         ///
495         /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
496         /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
497         claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
498
499         /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
500         /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
501         /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
502         pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
503 }
504
505 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
506 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
507 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
508 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
509 enum BackgroundEvent {
510         /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel. This is only separated from
511         /// [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the maybe-non-closing variant needs a public
512         /// key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the channel has been force-closed we do not
513         /// need the counterparty node_id.
514         ///
515         /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
516         /// are regenerated on startup.
517         ClosingMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
518         /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
519         /// channel to continue normal operation.
520         ///
521         /// In general this should be used rather than
522         /// [`Self::ClosingMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
523         /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
524         /// error the other variant is acceptable.
525         ///
526         /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
527         /// are regenerated on startup.
528         MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
529                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
530                 funding_txo: OutPoint,
531                 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
532         },
533 }
534
535 #[derive(Debug)]
536 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
537         /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
538         /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
539         /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
540         /// event can be generated.
541         PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
542         /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
543         /// operation of another channel.
544         ///
545         /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
546         /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
547         /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
548         /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
549         /// outbound edge.
550         EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
551                 event: events::Event,
552                 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
553         },
554 }
555
556 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
557         (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
558         (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
559                 (0, event, upgradable_required),
560                 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
561                 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
562                 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
563                 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
564                 // downgrades to prior versions.
565                 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
566         },
567 );
568
569 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
570 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
571         ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
572                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
573                 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
574         },
575 }
576 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
577         (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
578                 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
579                 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
580         };
581 );
582
583 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
584 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
585 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
586 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
587         /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
588         /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
589         /// durably to disk.
590         ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
591                 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
592                 channel_id: [u8; 32],
593                 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
594                 htlc_id: u64,
595         },
596 }
597
598 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
599         #[allow(unused)]
600         fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
601                 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
602                         channel_id: prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
603                         htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
604                 }
605         }
606 }
607
608 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
609         (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
610 ;);
611
612
613 /// State we hold per-peer.
614 pub(super) struct PeerState<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
615         /// `channel_id` -> `Channel`.
616         ///
617         /// Holds all funded channels where the peer is the counterparty.
618         pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
619         /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `OutboundV1Channel`.
620         ///
621         /// Holds all outbound V1 channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once an outbound channel has
622         /// been assigned a `channel_id`, the entry in this map is removed and one is created in
623         /// `channel_by_id`.
624         pub(super) outbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], OutboundV1Channel<Signer>>,
625         /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundV1Channel`.
626         ///
627         /// Holds all inbound V1 channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once an inbound channel has
628         /// been assigned a `channel_id`, the entry in this map is removed and one is created in
629         /// `channel_by_id`.
630         pub(super) inbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], InboundV1Channel<Signer>>,
631         /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
632         latest_features: InitFeatures,
633         /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
634         /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
635         pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
636         /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
637         /// user but which have not yet completed.
638         ///
639         /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
640         /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
641         /// for a missing channel.
642         in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
643         /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
644         /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
645         ///
646         /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
647         /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
648         /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
649         /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
650         ///
651         /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
652         /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
653         /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
654         /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
655         /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
656         /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
657         monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
658         /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
659         /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
660         /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
661         /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
662         actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
663         /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
664         /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
665         /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
666         is_connected: bool,
667 }
668
669 impl <Signer: ChannelSigner> PeerState<Signer> {
670         /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
671         /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
672         /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
673         fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
674                 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
675                         return false
676                 }
677                 self.channel_by_id.is_empty() && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
678                         && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
679         }
680
681         // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including pending channels.
682         fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
683                 self.channel_by_id.len() +
684                         self.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.len() +
685                         self.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.len()
686         }
687
688         // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
689         fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> bool {
690                 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
691                         self.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
692                         self.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
693         }
694 }
695
696 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
697 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
698 ///
699 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
700 /// here.
701 ///
702 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
703 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
704 struct PendingInboundPayment {
705         /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
706         payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
707         /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
708         /// this payment being removed.
709         expiry_time: u64,
710         /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
711         user_payment_id: u64,
712         // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
713         payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
714         min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
715 }
716
717 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
718 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
719 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
720 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
721 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
722 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
723 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
724 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
725 ///
726 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
727 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
728         Arc<M>,
729         Arc<T>,
730         Arc<KeysManager>,
731         Arc<KeysManager>,
732         Arc<KeysManager>,
733         Arc<F>,
734         Arc<DefaultRouter<
735                 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
736                 Arc<L>,
737                 Arc<Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
738                 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
739                 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
740         >>,
741         Arc<L>
742 >;
743
744 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
745 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
746 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
747 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
748 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
749 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
750 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
751 /// or, respectively, [`Router`]  for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
752 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
753 ///
754 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
755 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<&'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e DefaultRouter<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L, &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters, ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>, &'g L>;
756
757 macro_rules! define_test_pub_trait { ($vis: vis) => {
758 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`] used in testing.
759 $vis trait AChannelManager {
760         type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
761         type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
762         type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
763         type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
764         type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
765         type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
766         type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
767         type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
768         type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
769         type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<Signer = Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
770         type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
771         type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
772         type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
773         type Router: Router + ?Sized;
774         type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
775         type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
776         type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
777         fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
778 }
779 } }
780 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
781 define_test_pub_trait!(pub);
782 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
783 define_test_pub_trait!(pub(crate));
784 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
785 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
786 where
787         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
788         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
789         ES::Target: EntropySource,
790         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
791         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
792         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
793         R::Target: Router,
794         L::Target: Logger,
795 {
796         type Watch = M::Target;
797         type M = M;
798         type Broadcaster = T::Target;
799         type T = T;
800         type EntropySource = ES::Target;
801         type ES = ES;
802         type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
803         type NS = NS;
804         type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer;
805         type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
806         type SP = SP;
807         type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
808         type F = F;
809         type Router = R::Target;
810         type R = R;
811         type Logger = L::Target;
812         type L = L;
813         fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
814 }
815
816 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
817 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
818 ///
819 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
820 /// to individual Channels.
821 ///
822 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
823 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
824 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
825 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
826 ///
827 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
828 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
829 /// returning from [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`], with ChannelManagers, writing updates
830 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during
831 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
832 /// [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the
833 /// `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
834 ///
835 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
836 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
837 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
838 ///
839 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
840 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
841 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
842 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
843 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
844 ///
845 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
846 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
847 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
848 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
849 ///
850 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
851 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
852 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
853 ///
854 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
855 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
856 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
857 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
858 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
859 ///
860 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
861 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
862 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
863 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
864 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
865 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
866 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
867 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
868 //
869 // Lock order:
870 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
871 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
872 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
873 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
874 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
875 //
876 // Lock order tree:
877 //
878 // `total_consistency_lock`
879 //  |
880 //  |__`forward_htlcs`
881 //  |   |
882 //  |   |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
883 //  |
884 //  |__`per_peer_state`
885 //  |   |
886 //  |   |__`pending_inbound_payments`
887 //  |       |
888 //  |       |__`claimable_payments`
889 //  |       |
890 //  |       |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
891 //  |           |
892 //  |           |__`peer_state`
893 //  |               |
894 //  |               |__`id_to_peer`
895 //  |               |
896 //  |               |__`short_to_chan_info`
897 //  |               |
898 //  |               |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
899 //  |               |
900 //  |               |__`best_block`
901 //  |               |
902 //  |               |__`pending_events`
903 //  |                   |
904 //  |                   |__`pending_background_events`
905 //
906 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
907 where
908         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
909         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
910         ES::Target: EntropySource,
911         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
912         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
913         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
914         R::Target: Router,
915         L::Target: Logger,
916 {
917         default_configuration: UserConfig,
918         genesis_hash: BlockHash,
919         fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
920         chain_monitor: M,
921         tx_broadcaster: T,
922         #[allow(unused)]
923         router: R,
924
925         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
926         #[cfg(test)]
927         pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
928         #[cfg(not(test))]
929         best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
930         secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
931
932         /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
933         /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
934         /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
935         /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
936         ///
937         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
938         pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
939
940         /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
941         /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
942         /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
943         /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
944         /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
945         /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
946         /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
947         /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
948         ///
949         /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
950         ///
951         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
952         pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
953
954         /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
955         ///
956         /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
957         /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
958         /// and via the classic SCID.
959         ///
960         /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
961         /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
962         ///
963         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
964         #[cfg(test)]
965         pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
966         #[cfg(not(test))]
967         forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
968         /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
969         /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
970         ///
971         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
972         pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
973
974         /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
975         /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
976         ///
977         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
978         claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
979
980         /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
981         /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
982         /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
983         /// active channel list on load.
984         ///
985         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
986         outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
987
988         /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
989         ///
990         /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
991         /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
992         /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
993         ///
994         /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
995         /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
996         /// the handling of the events.
997         ///
998         /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
999         /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1000         ///
1001         /// TODO:
1002         /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1003         /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1004         /// would break backwards compatability.
1005         /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1006         /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1007         /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1008         ///
1009         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1010         id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
1011
1012         /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1013         ///
1014         /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1015         /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1016         /// confirmation depth.
1017         ///
1018         /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1019         /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1020         /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1021         ///
1022         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1023         #[cfg(test)]
1024         pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
1025         #[cfg(not(test))]
1026         short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
1027
1028         our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
1029
1030         inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
1031
1032         /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
1033         /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
1034         /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
1035         ///
1036         /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
1037         fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1038
1039         /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
1040         /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
1041         /// keeping additional state.
1042         probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
1043
1044         /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1045         /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1046         /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1047         highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1048
1049         /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
1050         /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
1051         ///
1052         /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1053         /// are currently open with that peer.
1054         ///
1055         /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1056         /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
1057         /// channels.
1058         ///
1059         /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
1060         ///
1061         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1062         #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1063         per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
1064         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1065         pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
1066
1067         /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
1068         /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
1069         /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
1070         /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
1071         /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
1072         ///
1073         /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
1074         /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
1075         ///
1076         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1077         pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1078         /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
1079         pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
1080
1081         /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
1082         /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
1083         /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
1084         /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
1085         /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
1086         ///
1087         /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
1088         ///
1089         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1090         ///
1091         /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1092         pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1093         /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1094         /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1095         /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1096         /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1097         /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1098         /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1099         total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1100
1101         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1102         background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
1103
1104         persistence_notifier: Notifier,
1105
1106         entropy_source: ES,
1107         node_signer: NS,
1108         signer_provider: SP,
1109
1110         logger: L,
1111 }
1112
1113 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1114 ///
1115 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1116 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1117 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1118 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1119 pub struct ChainParameters {
1120         /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1121         pub network: Network,
1122
1123         /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1124         ///
1125         /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1126         pub best_block: BestBlock,
1127 }
1128
1129 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1130 #[must_use]
1131 enum NotifyOption {
1132         DoPersist,
1133         SkipPersist,
1134 }
1135
1136 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1137 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1138 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1139 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1140 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1141 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1142 ///
1143 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1144 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1145 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1146 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1147         persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1148         should_persist: F,
1149         // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1150         _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1151 }
1152
1153 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1154         fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1155                 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1156                 let _ = cm.get_cm().process_background_events(); // We always persist
1157
1158                 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1159                         persistence_notifier: &cm.get_cm().persistence_notifier,
1160                         should_persist: || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist },
1161                         _read_guard: read_guard,
1162                 }
1163
1164         }
1165
1166         /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
1167         /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first.
1168         fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1169                 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
1170
1171                 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1172                         persistence_notifier: notifier,
1173                         should_persist: persist_check,
1174                         _read_guard: read_guard,
1175                 }
1176         }
1177 }
1178
1179 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1180         fn drop(&mut self) {
1181                 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
1182                         self.persistence_notifier.notify();
1183                 }
1184         }
1185 }
1186
1187 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1188 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1189 ///
1190 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1191 ///
1192 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1193 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1194 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1195 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1196 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1197
1198 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1199 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1200 ///
1201 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1202 ///
1203 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1204 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1205 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1206 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1207 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1208 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1209 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1210 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1211 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1212 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1213 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1214 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1215 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1216
1217 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1218 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1219 /// this value.
1220 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1221 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1222 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1223 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1224
1225 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1226 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1227 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1228 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1229 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1230 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1231 #[deny(const_err)]
1232 #[allow(dead_code)]
1233 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1234
1235 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1236 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1237 #[deny(const_err)]
1238 #[allow(dead_code)]
1239 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1240
1241 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1242 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1243
1244 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
1245 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
1246 /// [`OutboundPayments::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
1247 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
1248
1249 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1250 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1251 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1252
1253 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1254 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1255 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1256
1257 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1258 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1259 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1260 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1261
1262 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1263 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1264 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1265
1266 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1267 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1268 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1269
1270 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1271 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1272 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1273         /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1274         pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1275         /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1276         pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1277         /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1278         /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1279         /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1280         pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1281 }
1282
1283 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1284 /// to better separate parameters.
1285 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1286 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1287         /// The node_id of our counterparty
1288         pub node_id: PublicKey,
1289         /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1290         /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1291         /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1292         pub features: InitFeatures,
1293         /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1294         /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1295         /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1296         ///
1297         /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1298         ///
1299         /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1300         pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1301         /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1302         /// payments to us through this channel.
1303         pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1304         /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1305         /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1306         /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1307         pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1308         /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1309         pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1310 }
1311
1312 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1313 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1314 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1315         /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1316         /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1317         /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1318         /// lifetime of the channel.
1319         pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1320         /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1321         pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1322         /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1323         /// our counterparty already.
1324         ///
1325         /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1326         /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1327         pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1328         /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1329         ///
1330         /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1331         pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1332         /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1333         /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1334         ///
1335         /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1336         /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1337         ///
1338         /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1339         /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1340         ///
1341         /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1342         /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1343         /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1344         /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1345         /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1346         pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1347         /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1348         /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1349         /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1350         /// `Some(0)`).
1351         ///
1352         /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1353         ///
1354         /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1355         /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1356         pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1357         /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1358         /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1359         /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1360         /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1361         ///
1362         /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1363         /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1364         ///
1365         /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1366         pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1367         /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1368         pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1369         /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1370         /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1371         /// this value on chain.
1372         ///
1373         /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1374         ///
1375         /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1376         ///
1377         /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1378         pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1379         /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or a random value if the channel was
1380         /// inbound. This may be zero for inbound channels serialized with LDK versions prior to
1381         /// 0.0.113.
1382         pub user_channel_id: u128,
1383         /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1384         /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1385         ///
1386         /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1387         pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1388         /// Our total balance.  This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1389         /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1390         /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1391         ///
1392         /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1393         /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1394         /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1395         /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1396         ///
1397         /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1398         pub balance_msat: u64,
1399         /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1400         /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1401         /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1402         /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1403         ///
1404         /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1405         ///
1406         /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1407         /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1408         /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1409         pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1410         /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1411         /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1412         /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1413         /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1414         ///
1415         /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`],
1416         /// [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`], and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1417         pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1418         /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
1419         /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
1420         /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
1421         /// route which is valid.
1422         pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1423         /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1424         /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1425         /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1426         /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1427         /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1428         ///
1429         /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1430         /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1431         /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1432         pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1433         /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1434         /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1435         /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1436         /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1437         /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1438         ///
1439         /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1440         ///
1441         /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1442         /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1443         /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1444         pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1445         /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1446         ///
1447         /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1448         pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1449         /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1450         /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1451         /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1452         /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1453         /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1454         ///
1455         /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1456         pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1457         /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1458         pub is_outbound: bool,
1459         /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1460         /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1461         /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1462         /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1463         /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1464         ///
1465         /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1466         pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1467         /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1468         /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1469         ///
1470         /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1471         pub is_usable: bool,
1472         /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1473         pub is_public: bool,
1474         /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1475         /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1476         pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1477         /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1478         pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1479         /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1480         ///
1481         /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1482         pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1483 }
1484
1485 impl ChannelDetails {
1486         /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1487         /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1488         /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1489         ///
1490         /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1491         /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1492         pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1493                 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1494         }
1495
1496         /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1497         /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1498         /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1499         ///
1500         /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1501         /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1502         pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1503                 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1504         }
1505
1506         fn from_channel_context<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner>(context: &ChannelContext<Signer>,
1507                 best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures) -> Self {
1508
1509                 let balance = context.get_available_balances();
1510                 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1511                         context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1512                 ChannelDetails {
1513                         channel_id: context.channel_id(),
1514                         counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1515                                 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1516                                 features: latest_features,
1517                                 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1518                                 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1519                                 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1520                                 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1521                                 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1522                                 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1523                                 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1524                                 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
1525                                         Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1526                                 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1527                         },
1528                         funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
1529                         // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1530                         // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1531                         channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1532                         short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
1533                         outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1534                         inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1535                         channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
1536                         feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1537                         unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1538                         balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1539                         inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1540                         outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1541                         next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1542                         next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1543                         user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
1544                         confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
1545                         confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1546                         force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1547                         is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
1548                         is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
1549                         is_usable: context.is_live(),
1550                         is_public: context.should_announce(),
1551                         inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1552                         inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1553                         config: Some(context.config()),
1554                 }
1555         }
1556 }
1557
1558 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1559 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1560 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1561 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1562         /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1563         Pending {
1564                 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1565                 /// abandoned.
1566                 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1567                 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1568                 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1569                 total_msat: u64,
1570         },
1571         /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1572         /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1573         /// payment is removed from tracking.
1574         Fulfilled {
1575                 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1576                 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1577                 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1578         },
1579         /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1580         /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1581         /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1582         Abandoned {
1583                 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1584                 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1585         },
1586 }
1587
1588 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1589 ///
1590 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
1591 #[derive(Clone)]
1592 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1593         /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1594         pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1595         /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1596         /// route hints.
1597         pub phantom_scid: u64,
1598         /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1599         pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1600 }
1601
1602 macro_rules! handle_error {
1603         ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1604                 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1605                 // entering the macro.
1606                 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1607                 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1608
1609                 match $internal {
1610                         Ok(msg) => Ok(msg),
1611                         Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1612                                 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1613
1614                                 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1615                                         $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1616                                         if let Some(update) = update_option {
1617                                                 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1618                                                         msg: update
1619                                                 });
1620                                         }
1621                                         if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1622                                                 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1623                                                         channel_id, user_channel_id,
1624                                                         reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1625                                                 }, None));
1626                                         }
1627                                 }
1628
1629                                 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1630                                 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1631                                 } else {
1632                                         msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1633                                                 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1634                                                 action: err.action.clone()
1635                                         });
1636                                 }
1637
1638                                 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1639                                         let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1640                                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1641                                                 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1642                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1643                                         }
1644                                 }
1645
1646                                 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1647                                 Err(err)
1648                         },
1649                 }
1650         } };
1651         ($self: ident, $internal: expr) => {
1652                 match $internal {
1653                         Ok(res) => Ok(res),
1654                         Err((chan, msg_handle_err)) => {
1655                                 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1656                                 handle_error!($self, Err(msg_handle_err), counterparty_node_id).map_err(|err| (chan, err))
1657                         },
1658                 }
1659         };
1660 }
1661
1662 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1663         ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
1664                 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.channel_id());
1665                 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1666                 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
1667                         short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1668                 } else {
1669                         // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1670                         // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1671                         // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1672                         // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1673                         // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1674                         // stage.
1675                         let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1676                         debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1677                 }
1678                 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1679         }}
1680 }
1681
1682 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1683 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1684         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1685                 match $err {
1686                         ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1687                                 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1688                         },
1689                         ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1690                                 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1691                         },
1692                         ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1693                                 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1694                                 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &$channel.context);
1695                                 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
1696                                 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.context.get_user_id(),
1697                                         shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1698                         },
1699                 }
1700         };
1701         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_context: expr, $channel_id: expr, PREFUNDED) => {
1702                 match $err {
1703                         // We should only ever have `ChannelError::Close` when prefunded channels error.
1704                         // In any case, just close the channel.
1705                         ChannelError::Warn(msg) | ChannelError::Ignore(msg) | ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1706                                 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing prefunded channel {} due to an error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1707                                 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &$channel_context);
1708                                 let shutdown_res = $channel_context.force_shutdown(false);
1709                                 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel_context.get_user_id(),
1710                                         shutdown_res, None))
1711                         },
1712                 }
1713         }
1714 }
1715
1716 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1717         ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1718                 match $res {
1719                         Ok(res) => res,
1720                         Err(e) => {
1721                                 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1722                                 if drop {
1723                                         $entry.remove_entry();
1724                                 }
1725                                 break Err(res);
1726                         }
1727                 }
1728         }
1729 }
1730
1731 macro_rules! try_v1_outbound_chan_entry {
1732         ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1733                 match $res {
1734                         Ok(res) => res,
1735                         Err(e) => {
1736                                 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut().context, $entry.key(), PREFUNDED);
1737                                 if drop {
1738                                         $entry.remove_entry();
1739                                 }
1740                                 return Err(res);
1741                         }
1742                 }
1743         }
1744 }
1745
1746 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1747         ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1748                 match $res {
1749                         Ok(res) => res,
1750                         Err(e) => {
1751                                 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1752                                 if drop {
1753                                         $entry.remove_entry();
1754                                 }
1755                                 return Err(res);
1756                         }
1757                 }
1758         }
1759 }
1760
1761 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1762         ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1763                 {
1764                         let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1765                         update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context);
1766                         channel
1767                 }
1768         }
1769 }
1770
1771 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1772         ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1773                 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1774                         node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1775                         msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1776                 });
1777                 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1778                 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1779                 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1780                 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
1781                 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
1782                         "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1783                 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
1784                         let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
1785                         assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
1786                                 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1787                 }
1788         }}
1789 }
1790
1791 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
1792         ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1793                 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
1794                         $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
1795                                 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
1796                                 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
1797                                 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1798                                 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
1799                                 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1800                         }, None));
1801                         $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
1802                 }
1803         }
1804 }
1805
1806 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1807         ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1808                 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1809                         debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
1810                         $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
1811                                 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
1812                                 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
1813                                 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1814                                 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
1815                         }, None));
1816                         $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1817                 }
1818         }
1819 }
1820
1821 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
1822         ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
1823                 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
1824                         &$self.node_signer, $self.genesis_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
1825                         $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
1826                 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
1827                 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
1828                         // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
1829                         // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
1830                         // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
1831                         // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
1832                         // now.
1833                         if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
1834                                 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
1835                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1836                                         msg,
1837                                 })
1838                         } else { None }
1839                 } else { None };
1840
1841                 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
1842                         .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
1843
1844                 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
1845                         &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
1846                         updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
1847                         updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
1848                         updates.announcement_sigs);
1849                 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
1850                         $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
1851                 }
1852
1853                 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
1854                 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
1855                 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
1856
1857                 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
1858
1859                 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1860                         $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1861                 }
1862                 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
1863                 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1864                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1865                         $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
1866                 }
1867         } }
1868 }
1869
1870 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
1871         ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $remove: expr, $completed: expr) => { {
1872                 // update_maps_on_chan_removal needs to be able to take id_to_peer, so make sure we can in
1873                 // any case so that it won't deadlock.
1874                 debug_assert_ne!($self.id_to_peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1875                 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
1876                         debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
1877                 }
1878                 match $update_res {
1879                         ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1880                                 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
1881                                         log_bytes!($chan.context.channel_id()[..]));
1882                                 Ok(false)
1883                         },
1884                         ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1885                                 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure",
1886                                         log_bytes!($chan.context.channel_id()[..]));
1887                                 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &$chan.context);
1888                                 let res = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(
1889                                         "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), $chan.context.channel_id(),
1890                                         $chan.context.get_user_id(), $chan.context.force_shutdown(false),
1891                                         $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok()));
1892                                 $remove;
1893                                 res
1894                         },
1895                         ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
1896                                 $completed;
1897                                 Ok(true)
1898                         },
1899                 }
1900         } };
1901         ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING_INITIAL_MONITOR, $remove: expr) => {
1902                 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state,
1903                         $per_peer_state_lock, $chan, _internal, $remove,
1904                         handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
1905         };
1906         ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
1907                 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan_entry.get_mut(), MANUALLY_REMOVING_INITIAL_MONITOR, $chan_entry.remove_entry())
1908         };
1909         ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING, $remove: expr) => { {
1910                 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
1911                         .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
1912                 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
1913                 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
1914                 // filter for uniqueness here.
1915                 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
1916                         .unwrap_or_else(|| {
1917                                 in_flight_updates.push($update);
1918                                 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
1919                         });
1920                 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
1921                 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state,
1922                         $per_peer_state_lock, $chan, _internal, $remove,
1923                         {
1924                                 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
1925                                 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
1926                                         handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
1927                                 }
1928                         })
1929         } };
1930         ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr) => {
1931                 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $funding_txo, $update, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan_entry.get_mut(), MANUALLY_REMOVING, $chan_entry.remove_entry())
1932         }
1933 }
1934
1935 macro_rules! process_events_body {
1936         ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
1937                 let mut processed_all_events = false;
1938                 while !processed_all_events {
1939                         if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
1940                                 return;
1941                         }
1942
1943                         let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
1944
1945                         {
1946                                 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
1947                                 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
1948                                 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1949
1950                                 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
1951                                 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
1952                                 if $self.process_background_events() == NotifyOption::DoPersist { result = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
1953
1954                                 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
1955                                 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
1956                                 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
1957                                         result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
1958                                 }
1959                         }
1960
1961                         let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
1962                         let num_events = pending_events.len();
1963                         if !pending_events.is_empty() {
1964                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
1965                         }
1966
1967                         let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
1968
1969                         for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
1970                                 $event_to_handle = event;
1971                                 $handle_event;
1972                                 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
1973                                         post_event_actions.push(action);
1974                                 }
1975                         }
1976
1977                         {
1978                                 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1979                                 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
1980                                 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
1981                                 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
1982                         }
1983
1984                         if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
1985                                 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
1986                                 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
1987                                 processed_all_events = false;
1988                         }
1989
1990                         if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
1991                                 $self.persistence_notifier.notify();
1992                         }
1993                 }
1994         }
1995 }
1996
1997 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1998 where
1999         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
2000         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2001         ES::Target: EntropySource,
2002         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2003         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2004         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2005         R::Target: Router,
2006         L::Target: Logger,
2007 {
2008         /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
2009         ///
2010         /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
2011         /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
2012         ///
2013         /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
2014         ///
2015         /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
2016         /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
2017         /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
2018         /// more details.
2019         ///
2020         /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
2021         /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
2022         /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
2023         pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
2024                 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2025                 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
2026                 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
2027                 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
2028                 ChannelManager {
2029                         default_configuration: config.clone(),
2030                         genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
2031                         fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
2032                         chain_monitor,
2033                         tx_broadcaster,
2034                         router,
2035
2036                         best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
2037
2038                         outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
2039                         pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2040                         pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
2041                         forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2042                         claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
2043                         pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2044                         id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2045                         short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2046
2047                         our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
2048                         secp_ctx,
2049
2050                         inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
2051                         fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2052
2053                         probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2054
2055                         highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
2056
2057                         per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2058
2059                         pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2060                         pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
2061                         pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2062                         total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2063                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2064                         background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
2065                         persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
2066
2067                         entropy_source,
2068                         node_signer,
2069                         signer_provider,
2070
2071                         logger,
2072                 }
2073         }
2074
2075         /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
2076         pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
2077                 &self.default_configuration
2078         }
2079
2080         fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2081                 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2082                 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
2083                 let mut i = 0;
2084                 loop {
2085                         if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
2086                                 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
2087                         } else {
2088                                 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
2089                         }
2090                         if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
2091                                 break;
2092                         }
2093                         i += 1;
2094                         if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
2095                 }
2096                 outbound_scid_alias
2097         }
2098
2099         /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2100         ///
2101         /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2102         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2103         /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2104         /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2105         /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2106         ///
2107         /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2108         /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2109         ///
2110         /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2111         /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2112         /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2113         ///
2114         /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2115         /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2116         /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2117         ///
2118         /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2119         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2120         /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2121         /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2122         /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2123         /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2124         ///
2125         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2126         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2127         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2128         pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
2129                 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2130                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2131                 }
2132
2133                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2134                 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2135                 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2136
2137                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2138
2139                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2140                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2141
2142                 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2143                 let channel = {
2144                         let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2145                         let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2146                         let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2147                         match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2148                                 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2149                                 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
2150                         {
2151                                 Ok(res) => res,
2152                                 Err(e) => {
2153                                         self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
2154                                         return Err(e);
2155                                 },
2156                         }
2157                 };
2158                 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
2159
2160                 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
2161                 match peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
2162                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2163                                 if cfg!(fuzzing) {
2164                                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
2165                                 } else {
2166                                         panic!("RNG is bad???");
2167                                 }
2168                         },
2169                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
2170                 }
2171
2172                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
2173                         node_id: their_network_key,
2174                         msg: res,
2175                 });
2176                 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
2177         }
2178
2179         fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2180                 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2181                 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2182                 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2183                 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2184                 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2185                 // the same channel.
2186                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2187                 {
2188                         let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2189                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2190                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2191                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2192                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2193                                 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(f) {
2194                                         let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2195                                                 peer_state.latest_features.clone());
2196                                         res.push(details);
2197                                 }
2198                         }
2199                 }
2200                 res
2201         }
2202
2203         /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
2204         /// more information.
2205         pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2206                 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2207                 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2208                 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2209                 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2210                 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2211                 // the same channel.
2212                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2213                 {
2214                         let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2215                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2216                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2217                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2218                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2219                                 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
2220                                         let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2221                                                 peer_state.latest_features.clone());
2222                                         res.push(details);
2223                                 }
2224                                 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter() {
2225                                         let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2226                                                 peer_state.latest_features.clone());
2227                                         res.push(details);
2228                                 }
2229                                 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter() {
2230                                         let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2231                                                 peer_state.latest_features.clone());
2232                                         res.push(details);
2233                                 }
2234                         }
2235                 }
2236                 res
2237         }
2238
2239         /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
2240         /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
2241         ///
2242         /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
2243         /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
2244         /// are.
2245         pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2246                 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2247                 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2248                 // really wanted anyway.
2249                 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
2250         }
2251
2252         /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2253         pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2254                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2255                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2256
2257                 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2258                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2259                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2260                         let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2261                         return peer_state.channel_by_id
2262                                 .iter()
2263                                 .map(|(_, channel)|
2264                                         ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height, features.clone()))
2265                                 .collect();
2266                 }
2267                 vec![]
2268         }
2269
2270         /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2271         /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2272         ///
2273         /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2274         /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2275         /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2276         ///
2277         /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2278         pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2279                 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2280                         .filter_map(|(_, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2281                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2282                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2283                                                 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2284                                                 total_msat: *total_msat,
2285                                         })
2286                                 },
2287                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2288                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2289                                 },
2290                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2291                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2292                                 },
2293                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2294                         })
2295                         .collect()
2296         }
2297
2298         /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
2299         fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, context: &ChannelContext<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
2300                 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2301                 match context.unbroadcasted_funding() {
2302                         Some(transaction) => {
2303                                 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2304                                         channel_id: context.channel_id(), transaction
2305                                 }, None));
2306                         },
2307                         None => {},
2308                 }
2309                 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2310                         channel_id: context.channel_id(),
2311                         user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
2312                         reason: closure_reason
2313                 }, None));
2314         }
2315
2316         fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2317                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2318
2319                 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
2320                 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
2321                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2322
2323                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2324                                 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2325
2326                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2327                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2328                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2329                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2330                                         let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().context.get_funding_txo();
2331                                         let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2332                                         let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut()
2333                                                 .get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2334                                         failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2335
2336                                         // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2337                                         // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2338                                         // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2339                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2340                                                 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2341                                                 msg: shutdown_msg,
2342                                         });
2343
2344                                         // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2345                                         if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2346                                                 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
2347                                                         peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry).map(|_| ());
2348                                         }
2349
2350                                         if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
2351                                                 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
2352                                                 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
2353                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2354                                                                 msg: channel_update
2355                                                         });
2356                                                 }
2357                                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2358                                         }
2359                                         break Ok(());
2360                                 },
2361                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id) })
2362                         }
2363                 };
2364
2365                 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2366                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2367                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2368                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2369                 }
2370
2371                 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
2372                 Ok(())
2373         }
2374
2375         /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2376         /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2377         /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2378         ///
2379         ///  * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
2380         ///    [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2381         ///    estimate.
2382         ///  * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2383         ///    transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
2384         ///    would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2385         ///    counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2386         ///
2387         /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2388         ///
2389         /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2390         /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2391         /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2392         /// channel.
2393         ///
2394         /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2395         /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2396         /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2397         /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2398         pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2399                 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2400         }
2401
2402         /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2403         /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2404         /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2405         ///
2406         /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2407         /// the channel being closed or not:
2408         ///  * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2409         ///    transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2410         ///    [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2411         ///    estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2412         ///  * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2413         ///    transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2414         ///    will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2415         ///
2416         /// The `shutdown_script` provided  will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2417         /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2418         /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2419         /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2420         ///
2421         /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2422         ///
2423         /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2424         /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2425         /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2426         /// channel.
2427         ///
2428         /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2429         /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2430         /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2431         /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2432         pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2433                 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2434         }
2435
2436         #[inline]
2437         fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2438                 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
2439                 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
2440                 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2441                         let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2442                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2443                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2444                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2445                 }
2446                 if let Some((_, funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
2447                         // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2448                         // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2449                         // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2450                         // ignore the result here.
2451                         let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2452                 }
2453         }
2454
2455         /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2456         /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2457         fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2458         -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2459                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2460                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2461                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2462                 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
2463                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2464                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2465                         let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2466                                 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
2467                         } else {
2468                                 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
2469                         };
2470                         if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2471                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2472                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.get().context, closure_reason);
2473                                 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan);
2474                                 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2475                                 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2476                         } else if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2477                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2478                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.get().context, closure_reason);
2479                                 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan);
2480                                 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
2481                                 // Prefunded channel has no update
2482                                 (None, chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2483                         } else if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2484                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2485                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.get().context, closure_reason);
2486                                 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan);
2487                                 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
2488                                 // Prefunded channel has no update
2489                                 (None, chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2490                         } else {
2491                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), peer_node_id) });
2492                         }
2493                 };
2494                 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
2495                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2496                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2497                                 msg: update
2498                         });
2499                 }
2500
2501                 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
2502         }
2503
2504         fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2505                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2506                 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2507                         Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2508                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2509                                 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2510                                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2511                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2512                                                 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2513                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2514                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2515                                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2516                                                         },
2517                                                 }
2518                                         );
2519                                 }
2520                                 Ok(())
2521                         },
2522                         Err(e) => Err(e)
2523                 }
2524         }
2525
2526         /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2527         /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2528         /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2529         /// channel.
2530         pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2531         -> Result<(), APIError> {
2532                 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2533         }
2534
2535         /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2536         /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2537         /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2538         ///
2539         /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2540         /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2541         pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2542         -> Result<(), APIError> {
2543                 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2544         }
2545
2546         /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2547         /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2548         pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2549                 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2550                         let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2551                 }
2552         }
2553
2554         /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2555         /// local transaction(s).
2556         pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2557                 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2558                         let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2559                 }
2560         }
2561
2562         fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(
2563                 &self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32], payment_hash: PaymentHash,
2564                 amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>, allow_underpay: bool,
2565                 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
2566         ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError> {
2567                 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2568                 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry {
2569                         return Err(ReceiveError {
2570                                 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender",
2571                                 err_code: 18,
2572                                 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2573                         })
2574                 }
2575                 // final_expiry_too_soon
2576                 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2577                 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2578                 //
2579                 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2580                 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2581                 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2582                 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2583                 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2584                         let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
2585                         err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
2586                         err_data.extend_from_slice(&current_height.to_be_bytes());
2587                         return Err(ReceiveError {
2588                                 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
2589                                 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2590                         });
2591                 }
2592                 if (!allow_underpay && hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat) ||
2593                         (allow_underpay && hop_data.amt_to_forward >
2594                          amt_msat.saturating_add(counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)))
2595                 {
2596                         return Err(ReceiveError {
2597                                 err_code: 19,
2598                                 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
2599                                 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2600                         });
2601                 }
2602
2603                 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2604                         msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2605                                 return Err(ReceiveError {
2606                                         err_code: 0x4000|22,
2607                                         err_data: Vec::new(),
2608                                         msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2609                                 });
2610                         },
2611                         msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage, payment_metadata } => {
2612                                 if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2613                                         // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2614                                         // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2615                                         // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2616                                         // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2617                                         // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2618                                         let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2619                                         if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2620                                                 return Err(ReceiveError {
2621                                                         err_code: 0x4000|22,
2622                                                         err_data: Vec::new(),
2623                                                         msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2624                                                 });
2625                                         }
2626                                         if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && payment_data.is_some() {
2627                                                 return Err(ReceiveError {
2628                                                         err_code: 0x4000|22,
2629                                                         err_data: Vec::new(),
2630                                                         msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2631                                                 });
2632                                         }
2633                                         PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2634                                                 payment_data,
2635                                                 payment_preimage,
2636                                                 payment_metadata,
2637                                                 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2638                                         }
2639                                 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2640                                         PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2641                                                 payment_data: data,
2642                                                 payment_metadata,
2643                                                 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2644                                                 phantom_shared_secret,
2645                                         }
2646                                 } else {
2647                                         return Err(ReceiveError {
2648                                                 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2649                                                 err_data: Vec::new(),
2650                                                 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2651                                         });
2652                                 }
2653                         },
2654                 };
2655                 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2656                         routing,
2657                         payment_hash,
2658                         incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2659                         incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2660                         outgoing_amt_msat: hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2661                         outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2662                         skimmed_fee_msat: counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
2663                 })
2664         }
2665
2666         fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
2667                 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC
2668         ) -> Result<(onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg> {
2669                 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2670                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2671                                 {
2672                                         log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2673                                         return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2674                                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2675                                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2676                                                 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2677                                                 failure_code: $err_code,
2678                                         }));
2679                                 }
2680                         }
2681                 }
2682
2683                 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2684                         return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2685                 }
2686
2687                 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
2688                         Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
2689                 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
2690
2691                 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2692                         //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2693                         //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2694                         //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2695                         //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2696                         //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2697                         //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2698                         return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2699                 }
2700                 macro_rules! return_err {
2701                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2702                                 {
2703                                         log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2704                                         return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2705                                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2706                                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2707                                                 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2708                                                         .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2709                                         }));
2710                                 }
2711                         }
2712                 }
2713
2714                 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2715                         Ok(res) => res,
2716                         Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2717                                 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2718                         },
2719                         Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2720                                 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2721                         },
2722                 };
2723                 let (outgoing_scid, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, next_packet_pk_opt) = match next_hop {
2724                         onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
2725                                 next_hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData {
2726                                         format: msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id }, amt_to_forward,
2727                                         outgoing_cltv_value,
2728                                 }, ..
2729                         } => {
2730                                 let next_pk = onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx,
2731                                         msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &shared_secret);
2732                                 (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(next_pk))
2733                         },
2734                         // We'll do receive checks in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] so we have access to the
2735                         // inbound channel's state.
2736                         onion_utils::Hop::Receive { .. } => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
2737                         onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
2738                                 next_hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData { format: msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. }, .. }, ..
2739                         } => {
2740                                 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0; 0]);
2741                         }
2742                 };
2743
2744                 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
2745                 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
2746                 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
2747                         let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid).cloned();
2748                         let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
2749                                 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2750                                         // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2751                                         // phantom or an intercept.
2752                                         if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2753                                                 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
2754                                                 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.genesis_hash)
2755                                         {
2756                                                 None
2757                                         } else {
2758                                                 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2759                                         }
2760                                 },
2761                                 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
2762                         };
2763                         let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
2764                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2765                                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
2766                                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
2767                                         break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2768                                 }
2769                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2770                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2771                                 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2772                                         None => {
2773                                                 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
2774                                                 // have no consistency guarantees.
2775                                                 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2776                                         },
2777                                         Some(chan) => chan
2778                                 };
2779                                 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2780                                         // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2781                                         // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2782                                         // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2783                                         break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2784                                 }
2785                                 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
2786                                         // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2787                                         // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2788                                         // we don't have the channel here.
2789                                         break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2790                                 }
2791                                 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
2792
2793                                 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2794                                 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2795                                 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2796                                 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2797                                 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2798                                 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2799                                         // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
2800                                         // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
2801                                         // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
2802                                         if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
2803                                                 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2804                                         } else {
2805                                                 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
2806                                         }
2807                                 }
2808                                 if outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2809                                         break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2810                                 }
2811                                 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value) {
2812                                         break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2813                                 }
2814                                 chan_update_opt
2815                         } else {
2816                                 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
2817                                         // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
2818                                         // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
2819                                         // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
2820                                         break Some((
2821                                                         "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2822                                                         0x2000 | 2, None,
2823                                         ));
2824                                 }
2825                                 None
2826                         };
2827
2828                         let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2829                         // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2830                         // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2831                         // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2832                         if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2833                                 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2834                         }
2835                         if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2836                                 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2837                         }
2838                         // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2839                         // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2840                         // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2841                         // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2842                         // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2843                         // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2844                         // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2845                         // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2846                         if (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2847                                 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2848                         }
2849
2850                         break None;
2851                 }
2852                 {
2853                         let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2854                         if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2855                                 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2856                                         msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2857                                 }
2858                                 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2859                                         msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2860                                 }
2861                                 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2862                                         // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2863                                         0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2864                                 }
2865                                 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2866                                 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2867                                 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2868                         } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
2869                                 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
2870                                 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
2871                                 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
2872                                 // instead.
2873                                 code = 0x2000 | 2;
2874                         }
2875                         return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2876                 }
2877                 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt))
2878         }
2879
2880         fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
2881                 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, shared_secret: [u8; 32], decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop,
2882                 allow_underpay: bool, next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
2883         ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
2884                 macro_rules! return_err {
2885                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2886                                 {
2887                                         log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2888                                         return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2889                                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2890                                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2891                                                 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2892                                                         .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2893                                         }));
2894                                 }
2895                         }
2896                 }
2897                 match decoded_hop {
2898                         onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2899                                 // OUR PAYMENT!
2900                                 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
2901                                         msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat)
2902                                 {
2903                                         Ok(info) => {
2904                                                 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2905                                                 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2906                                                 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2907                                                 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2908                                                 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2909                                         },
2910                                         Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2911                                 }
2912                         },
2913                         onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2914                                 debug_assert!(next_packet_pubkey_opt.is_some());
2915                                 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2916                                         version: 0,
2917                                         public_key: next_packet_pubkey_opt.unwrap_or(Err(secp256k1::Error::InvalidPublicKey)),
2918                                         hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2919                                         hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2920                                 };
2921
2922                                 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2923                                         msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2924                                         msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2925                                                 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2926                                         },
2927                                 };
2928
2929                                 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2930                                         routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2931                                                 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2932                                                 short_channel_id,
2933                                         },
2934                                         payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2935                                         incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2936                                         incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2937                                         outgoing_amt_msat: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2938                                         outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2939                                         skimmed_fee_msat: None,
2940                                 })
2941                         }
2942                 }
2943         }
2944
2945         /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2946         /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2947         /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2948         ///
2949         /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
2950         /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
2951         /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2952         ///
2953         /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2954         /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
2955         fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2956                 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
2957                         return Err(LightningError {
2958                                 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2959                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2960                         });
2961                 }
2962                 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2963                         return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2964                 }
2965                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()));
2966                 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2967         }
2968
2969         /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2970         /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
2971         /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2972         /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2973         ///
2974         /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
2975         /// `peer_state`  corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
2976         /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2977         ///
2978         /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2979         /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
2980         fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2981                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()));
2982                 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
2983                         None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2984                         Some(id) => id,
2985                 };
2986
2987                 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2988         }
2989
2990         fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2991                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()));
2992                 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2993
2994                 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
2995                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
2996                         ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
2997                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
2998                         ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
2999                 };
3000
3001                 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
3002                         chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
3003                         short_channel_id,
3004                         timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
3005                         flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
3006                         cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
3007                         htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
3008                         htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
3009                         fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
3010                         fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
3011                         excess_data: Vec::new(),
3012                 };
3013                 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
3014                 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
3015                 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
3016                 // channel.
3017                 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
3018
3019                 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
3020                         signature: sig,
3021                         contents: unsigned
3022                 })
3023         }
3024
3025         #[cfg(test)]
3026         pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3027                 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3028                 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv_bytes)
3029         }
3030
3031         fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3032                 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
3033                 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3034
3035                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
3036                 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
3037                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
3038
3039                 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
3040                         .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected".to_owned()})?;
3041                 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
3042
3043                 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash)
3044                         .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute { err: "Route size too large considering onion data".to_owned()})?;
3045
3046                 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3047                         let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
3048                                 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
3049                                 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3050                         };
3051
3052                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3053                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3054                                 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
3055                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3056                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3057                         if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
3058                                 if !chan.get().context.is_live() {
3059                                         return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3060                                 }
3061                                 let funding_txo = chan.get().context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3062                                 let send_res = chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
3063                                         htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3064                                                 path: path.clone(),
3065                                                 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
3066                                                 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
3067                                                 payment_id,
3068                                         }, onion_packet, None, &self.logger);
3069                                 match break_chan_entry!(self, send_res, chan) {
3070                                         Some(monitor_update) => {
3071                                                 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
3072                                                         Err(e) => break Err(e),
3073                                                         Ok(false) => {
3074                                                                 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
3075                                                                 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
3076                                                                 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
3077                                                                 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
3078                                                                 // which we do in the send_payment check for
3079                                                                 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
3080                                                                 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
3081                                                         },
3082                                                         Ok(true) => {},
3083                                                 }
3084                                         },
3085                                         None => { },
3086                                 }
3087                         } else {
3088                                 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
3089                                 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
3090                                 // `channel_by_id` map.
3091                                 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
3092                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
3093                         }
3094                         return Ok(());
3095                 };
3096
3097                 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
3098                         Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3099                         Err(e) => {
3100                                 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
3101                         },
3102                 }
3103         }
3104
3105         /// Sends a payment along a given route.
3106         ///
3107         /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
3108         /// fields for more info.
3109         ///
3110         /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
3111         /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
3112         ///
3113         /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
3114         ///
3115         /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
3116         /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
3117         /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
3118         /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
3119         /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
3120         ///
3121         /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
3122         /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
3123         /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
3124         /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
3125         /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
3126         ///
3127         /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
3128         /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
3129         /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
3130         /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
3131         ///
3132         /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
3133         ///
3134         /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
3135         /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
3136         /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
3137         ///
3138         /// In general, a path may raise:
3139         ///  * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
3140         ///    node public key) is specified.
3141         ///  * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
3142         ///    (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
3143         ///    failure).
3144         ///  * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
3145         ///    relevant updates.
3146         ///
3147         /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
3148         /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
3149         /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
3150         ///
3151         /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3152         /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3153         /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
3154         /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
3155         /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3156         pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3157                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3158                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3159                 self.pending_outbound_payments
3160                         .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3161                                 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3162                                 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
3163         }
3164
3165         /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
3166         /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3167         pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
3168                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3169                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3170                 self.pending_outbound_payments
3171                         .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
3172                                 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
3173                                 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3174                                 &self.pending_events,
3175                                 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3176                                 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
3177         }
3178
3179         #[cfg(test)]
3180         pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3181                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3182                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3183                 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3184                         |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3185                         self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
3186         }
3187
3188         #[cfg(test)]
3189         pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
3190                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3191                 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3192         }
3193
3194         #[cfg(test)]
3195         pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3196                 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3197         }
3198
3199
3200         /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
3201         /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
3202         /// retries are exhausted.
3203         ///
3204         /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
3205         /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
3206         ///
3207         /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
3208         /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
3209         /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
3210         ///
3211         /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event is generated and we restart without this
3212         /// [`ChannelManager`] having been persisted, another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated.
3213         ///
3214         /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3215         /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3216         pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
3217                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3218                 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
3219         }
3220
3221         /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
3222         /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
3223         /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
3224         /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
3225         /// never reach the recipient.
3226         ///
3227         /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
3228         /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
3229         ///
3230         /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
3231         /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
3232         ///
3233         /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
3234         pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
3235                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3236                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3237                 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
3238                         route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
3239                         &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3240                         |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3241                         self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
3242         }
3243
3244         /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
3245         /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3246         ///
3247         /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
3248         /// payments.
3249         ///
3250         /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
3251         pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
3252                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3253                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3254                 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
3255                         payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3256                         || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),  &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3257                         &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
3258                         |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3259                         self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
3260         }
3261
3262         /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
3263         /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
3264         /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
3265         pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
3266                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3267                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3268                 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3269                         |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3270                         self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
3271         }
3272
3273         /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
3274         /// payment probe.
3275         #[cfg(test)]
3276         pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
3277                 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
3278         }
3279
3280         /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
3281         /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
3282         fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&OutboundV1Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
3283                 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
3284         ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3285                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3286                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3287                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3288
3289                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3290                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3291                 let (chan, msg) = match peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
3292                         Some(chan) => {
3293                                 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
3294
3295                                 let funding_res = chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
3296                                         .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
3297                                                 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
3298                                                 let user_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
3299                                                 let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
3300                                                 (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None))
3301                                         } else { unreachable!(); });
3302                                 match funding_res {
3303                                         Ok((chan, funding_msg)) => (chan, funding_msg),
3304                                         Err((chan, err)) => {
3305                                                 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3306                                                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3307
3308                                                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
3309                                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3310                                                         err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3311                                                 });
3312                                         },
3313                                 }
3314                         },
3315                         None => {
3316                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3317                                         err: format!(
3318                                                 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3319                                                 log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
3320                                 })
3321                         },
3322                 };
3323
3324                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3325                         node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3326                         msg,
3327                 });
3328                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
3329                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3330                                 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3331                         },
3332                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3333                                 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3334                                 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.context.channel_id(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
3335                                         panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
3336                                 }
3337                                 e.insert(chan);
3338                         }
3339                 }
3340                 Ok(())
3341         }
3342
3343         #[cfg(test)]
3344         pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3345                 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
3346                         Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3347                 })
3348         }
3349
3350         /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3351         ///
3352         /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3353         /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3354         ///
3355         /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3356         /// across the p2p network.
3357         ///
3358         /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3359         /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3360         ///
3361         /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3362         /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3363         /// keys per-channel).
3364         ///
3365         /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3366         /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3367         /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3368         ///
3369         /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3370         /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3371         /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3372         ///
3373         /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3374         /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3375         /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3376         /// for more details.
3377         ///
3378         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3379         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3380         pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3381                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3382
3383                 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3384                         if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3385                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3386                                         err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3387                                 });
3388                         }
3389                 }
3390                 {
3391                         let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3392                         // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3393                         // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3394                         // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3395                         // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3396                         if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 1 {
3397                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3398                                         err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3399                                 });
3400                         }
3401                 }
3402                 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
3403                         if tx.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
3404                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3405                                         err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3406                                 });
3407                         }
3408
3409                         let mut output_index = None;
3410                         let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3411                         for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3412                                 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
3413                                         if output_index.is_some() {
3414                                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3415                                                         err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3416                                                 });
3417                                         }
3418                                         output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3419                                 }
3420                         }
3421                         if output_index.is_none() {
3422                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3423                                         err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3424                                 });
3425                         }
3426                         Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
3427                 })
3428         }
3429
3430         /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
3431         ///
3432         /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3433         /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3434         /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3435         /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3436         ///
3437         /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3438         /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3439         ///
3440         /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3441         /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3442         ///
3443         /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3444         ///
3445         /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3446         /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3447         /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3448         /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3449         /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3450         /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3451         /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3452         pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
3453                 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
3454         ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3455                 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
3456                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3457                                 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
3458                         });
3459                 }
3460
3461                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3462                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3463                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3464                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3465                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3466                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3467                 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3468                         if !peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) {
3469                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3470                                         err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
3471                                 });
3472                         }
3473                 }
3474                 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3475                         let channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
3476                         let mut config = channel.context.config();
3477                         config.apply(config_update);
3478                         if !channel.context.update_config(&config) {
3479                                 continue;
3480                         }
3481                         if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
3482                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
3483                         } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
3484                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3485                                         node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3486                                         msg,
3487                                 });
3488                         }
3489                 }
3490                 Ok(())
3491         }
3492
3493         /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
3494         ///
3495         /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3496         /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3497         /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3498         /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3499         ///
3500         /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3501         /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3502         ///
3503         /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3504         /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3505         ///
3506         /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3507         ///
3508         /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3509         /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3510         /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3511         /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3512         /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3513         /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3514         /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3515         pub fn update_channel_config(
3516                 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
3517         ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3518                 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
3519         }
3520
3521         /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
3522         /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
3523         ///
3524         /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
3525         /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
3526         ///
3527         /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
3528         /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
3529         /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
3530         /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
3531         /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
3532         ///
3533         /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
3534         /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
3535         /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
3536         /// than expected.
3537         ///
3538         /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3539         /// backwards.
3540         ///
3541         /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
3542         /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3543         /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
3544         // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
3545         // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
3546         pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3547                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3548
3549                 let next_hop_scid = {
3550                         let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3551                         let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
3552                                 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
3553                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3554                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3555                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
3556                                 Some(chan) => {
3557                                         if !chan.context.is_usable() {
3558                                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3559                                                         err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
3560                                                 })
3561                                         }
3562                                         chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
3563                                 },
3564                                 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3565                                         err: format!("Funded channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}. Channel may still be opening.",
3566                                                 log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id), next_node_id)
3567                                 })
3568                         }
3569                 };
3570
3571                 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3572                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3573                                 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3574                         })?;
3575
3576                 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
3577                         PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
3578                                 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
3579                         },
3580                         _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3581                 };
3582                 let skimmed_fee_msat =
3583                         payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
3584                 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
3585                         skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
3586                         outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
3587                 };
3588
3589                 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
3590                         payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3591                         payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3592                         payment.prev_user_channel_id,
3593                         vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
3594                 )];
3595                 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
3596                 Ok(())
3597         }
3598
3599         /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
3600         /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
3601         ///
3602         /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3603         /// backwards.
3604         ///
3605         /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3606         pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3607                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3608
3609                 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3610                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3611                                 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3612                         })?;
3613
3614                 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
3615                         let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3616                                 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3617                                 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3618                                 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
3619                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
3620                                 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3621                         });
3622
3623                         let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
3624                         let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
3625                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3626                 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3627
3628                 Ok(())
3629         }
3630
3631         /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3632         ///
3633         /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3634         /// Will likely generate further events.
3635         pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3636                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3637
3638                 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
3639                 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3640                 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3641                 {
3642                         let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
3643                         mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
3644
3645                         for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
3646                                 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3647                                         macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
3648                                                 () => {
3649                                                         for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3650                                                                 match forward_info {
3651                                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3652                                                                                 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3653                                                                                 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3654                                                                                         routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3655                                                                                         outgoing_cltv_value, ..
3656                                                                                 }
3657                                                                         }) => {
3658                                                                                 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3659                                                                                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3660                                                                                                 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3661
3662                                                                                                 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3663                                                                                                         short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3664                                                                                                         outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3665                                                                                                         htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3666                                                                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3667                                                                                                         phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3668                                                                                                 });
3669
3670                                                                                                 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3671                                                                                                         HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3672                                                                                                 } else {
3673                                                                                                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3674                                                                                                 };
3675
3676                                                                                                 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3677                                                                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
3678                                                                                                         reason
3679                                                                                                 ));
3680                                                                                                 continue;
3681                                                                                         }
3682                                                                                 }
3683                                                                                 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3684                                                                                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3685                                                                                                 {
3686                                                                                                         failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3687                                                                                                 }
3688                                                                                         }
3689                                                                                 }
3690                                                                                 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3691                                                                                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3692                                                                                                 {
3693                                                                                                         failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3694                                                                                                 }
3695                                                                                         }
3696                                                                                 }
3697                                                                                 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3698                                                                                         let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3699                                                                                         if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
3700                                                                                                 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
3701                                                                                                 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3702                                                                                                         Ok(res) => res,
3703                                                                                                         Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3704                                                                                                                 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3705                                                                                                                 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3706                                                                                                                 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3707                                                                                                                 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3708                                                                                                                 // of the onion.
3709                                                                                                                 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3710                                                                                                         },
3711                                                                                                         Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3712                                                                                                                 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3713                                                                                                         },
3714                                                                                                 };
3715                                                                                                 match next_hop {
3716                                                                                                         onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3717                                                                                                                 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
3718                                                                                                                         incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3719                                                                                                                         outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None)
3720                                                                                                                 {
3721                                                                                                                         Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3722                                                                                                                         Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3723                                                                                                                 }
3724                                                                                                         },
3725                                                                                                         _ => panic!(),
3726                                                                                                 }
3727                                                                                         } else {
3728                                                                                                 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3729                                                                                         }
3730                                                                                 } else {
3731                                                                                         fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3732                                                                                 }
3733                                                                         },
3734                                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3735                                                                                 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3736                                                                                 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3737                                                                                 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3738                                                                                 // problem, not ours.
3739                                                                         }
3740                                                                 }
3741                                                         }
3742                                                 }
3743                                         }
3744                                         let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
3745                                                 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3746                                                 None => {
3747                                                         forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3748                                                         continue;
3749                                                 }
3750                                         };
3751                                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3752                                         let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3753                                         if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3754                                                 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3755                                                 continue;
3756                                         }
3757                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3758                                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3759                                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3760                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3761                                                         forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3762                                                         continue;
3763                                                 },
3764                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3765                                                         for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3766                                                                 match forward_info {
3767                                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3768                                                                                 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id: _,
3769                                                                                 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3770                                                                                         incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
3771                                                                                         routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
3772                                                                                 },
3773                                                                         }) => {
3774                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3775                                                                                 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3776                                                                                         short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3777                                                                                         outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3778                                                                                         htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3779                                                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3780                                                                                         // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3781                                                                                         phantom_shared_secret: None,
3782                                                                                 });
3783                                                                                 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
3784                                                                                         payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
3785                                                                                         onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, &self.logger)
3786                                                                                 {
3787                                                                                         if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3788                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3789                                                                                         } else {
3790                                                                                                 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3791                                                                                         }
3792                                                                                         let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3793                                                                                         failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3794                                                                                                 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
3795                                                                                                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3796                                                                                         ));
3797                                                                                         continue;
3798                                                                                 }
3799                                                                         },
3800                                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3801                                                                                 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3802                                                                         },
3803                                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3804                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3805                                                                                 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_fail_htlc(
3806                                                                                         htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
3807                                                                                 ) {
3808                                                                                         if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3809                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3810                                                                                         } else {
3811                                                                                                 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
3812                                                                                         }
3813                                                                                         // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3814                                                                                         // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3815                                                                                         // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3816                                                                                         continue;
3817                                                                                 }
3818                                                                         },
3819                                                                 }
3820                                                         }
3821                                                 }
3822                                         }
3823                                 } else {
3824                                         'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3825                                                 match forward_info {
3826                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3827                                                                 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3828                                                                 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3829                                                                         routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
3830                                                                         skimmed_fee_msat, ..
3831                                                                 }
3832                                                         }) => {
3833                                                                 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
3834                                                                         PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3835                                                                                 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3836                                                                                 let onion_fields =
3837                                                                                         RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret), payment_metadata };
3838                                                                                 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
3839                                                                                         Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
3840                                                                         },
3841                                                                         PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry } => {
3842                                                                                 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
3843                                                                                         payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
3844                                                                                         payment_metadata
3845                                                                                 };
3846                                                                                 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
3847                                                                                         payment_data, None, onion_fields)
3848                                                                         },
3849                                                                         _ => {
3850                                                                                 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3851                                                                         }
3852                                                                 };
3853                                                                 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3854                                                                         prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3855                                                                                 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3856                                                                                 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3857                                                                                 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3858                                                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3859                                                                                 phantom_shared_secret,
3860                                                                         },
3861                                                                         // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
3862                                                                         // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
3863                                                                         // if routing nodes overpay
3864                                                                         value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
3865                                                                         sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
3866                                                                         timer_ticks: 0,
3867                                                                         total_value_received: None,
3868                                                                         total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
3869                                                                         cltv_expiry,
3870                                                                         onion_payload,
3871                                                                         counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
3872                                                                 };
3873
3874                                                                 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
3875
3876                                                                 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3877                                                                         ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
3878                                                                                 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
3879                                                                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3880                                                                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3881                                                                                         &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
3882                                                                                 );
3883                                                                                 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3884                                                                                                 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3885                                                                                                 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3886                                                                                                 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3887                                                                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3888                                                                                                 phantom_shared_secret,
3889                                                                                         }), payment_hash,
3890                                                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
3891                                                                                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
3892                                                                                 ));
3893                                                                                 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
3894                                                                         }
3895                                                                 }
3896                                                                 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
3897                                                                 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3898                                                                 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3899                                                                         receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3900                                                                                 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3901                                                                 }
3902
3903                                                                 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3904                                                                         ($purpose: expr) => {{
3905                                                                                 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
3906                                                                                 let is_keysend = match $purpose {
3907                                                                                         events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(_) => true,
3908                                                                                         events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { .. } => false,
3909                                                                                 };
3910                                                                                 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3911                                                                                 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3912                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3913                                                                                 }
3914                                                                                 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
3915                                                                                         .entry(payment_hash)
3916                                                                                         // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
3917                                                                                         .or_insert_with(|| {
3918                                                                                                 committed_to_claimable = true;
3919                                                                                                 ClaimablePayment {
3920                                                                                                         purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
3921                                                                                                 }
3922                                                                                         });
3923                                                                                 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
3924                                                                                         let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
3925                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), log_keysend(!is_keysend));
3926                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3927                                                                                 }
3928                                                                                 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
3929                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3930                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3931                                                                                 }
3932                                                                                 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
3933                                                                                         if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
3934                                                                                                 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3935                                                                                         }
3936                                                                                 } else {
3937                                                                                         claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
3938                                                                                 }
3939                                                                                 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
3940                                                                                 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
3941                                                                                 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
3942                                                                                 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3943                                                                                         total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
3944                                                                                         earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
3945                                                                                         if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
3946                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3947                                                                                                         log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3948                                                                                                 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3949                                                                                         }
3950                                                                                         if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3951                                                                                 }
3952                                                                                 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
3953                                                                                 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
3954                                                                                 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
3955                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3956                                                                                 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
3957                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
3958                                                                                                 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3959                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3960                                                                                 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
3961                                                                                         #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
3962                                                                                                 committed_to_claimable = true;
3963                                                                                         }
3964                                                                                         let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3965                                                                                         htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3966                                                                                         let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
3967                                                                                         htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
3968                                                                                         let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
3969                                                                                                 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
3970                                                                                         debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
3971                                                                                                 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
3972                                                                                         new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3973                                                                                                 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3974                                                                                                 payment_hash,
3975                                                                                                 purpose: $purpose,
3976                                                                                                 amount_msat,
3977                                                                                                 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
3978                                                                                                 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3979                                                                                                 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3980                                                                                                 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
3981                                                                                                 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
3982                                                                                         }, None));
3983                                                                                         payment_claimable_generated = true;
3984                                                                                 } else {
3985                                                                                         // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3986                                                                                         // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3987                                                                                         // MPP parts.
3988                                                                                         htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3989                                                                                         #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
3990                                                                                                 committed_to_claimable = true;
3991                                                                                         }
3992                                                                                 }
3993                                                                                 payment_claimable_generated
3994                                                                         }}
3995                                                                 }
3996
3997                                                                 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3998                                                                 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3999                                                                 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
4000                                                                 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
4001                                                                 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
4002                                                                 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
4003                                                                 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4004                                                                 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4005                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4006                                                                                 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4007                                                                                         OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
4008                                                                                                 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4009                                                                                                 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
4010                                                                                                         Ok(result) => result,
4011                                                                                                         Err(()) => {
4012                                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4013                                                                                                                 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4014                                                                                                         }
4015                                                                                                 };
4016                                                                                                 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
4017                                                                                                         let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
4018                                                                                                         if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
4019                                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
4020                                                                                                                         log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
4021                                                                                                                 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4022                                                                                                         }
4023                                                                                                 }
4024                                                                                                 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4025                                                                                                         payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4026                                                                                                         payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4027                                                                                                 };
4028                                                                                                 check_total_value!(purpose);
4029                                                                                         },
4030                                                                                         OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
4031                                                                                                 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
4032                                                                                                 check_total_value!(purpose);
4033                                                                                         }
4034                                                                                 }
4035                                                                         },
4036                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
4037                                                                                 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4038                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4039                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4040                                                                                 }
4041                                                                                 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4042                                                                                 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
4043                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4044                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4045                                                                                 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
4046                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
4047                                                                                                 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
4048                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4049                                                                                 } else {
4050                                                                                         let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4051                                                                                                 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
4052                                                                                                 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4053                                                                                         };
4054                                                                                         let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
4055                                                                                         if payment_claimable_generated {
4056                                                                                                 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
4057                                                                                         }
4058                                                                                 }
4059                                                                         },
4060                                                                 };
4061                                                         },
4062                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4063                                                                 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
4064                                                         }
4065                                                 }
4066                                         }
4067                                 }
4068                         }
4069                 }
4070
4071                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4072                 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
4073                         || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4074                         &self.pending_events, &self.logger,
4075                         |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
4076                         self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv));
4077
4078                 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
4079                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4080                 }
4081                 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
4082
4083                 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
4084                 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
4085                 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
4086                 // network stack.
4087                 self.check_free_holding_cells();
4088
4089                 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
4090                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4091                 events.append(&mut new_events);
4092         }
4093
4094         /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
4095         ///
4096         /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
4097         fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
4098                 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
4099
4100                 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
4101                 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
4102
4103                 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
4104                 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
4105                 if background_events.is_empty() {
4106                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4107                 }
4108
4109                 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
4110                         match event {
4111                                 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, update)) => {
4112                                         // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
4113                                         // monitor updating completing.
4114                                         let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4115                                 },
4116                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update } => {
4117                                         let mut updated_chan = false;
4118                                         let res = {
4119                                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4120                                                 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4121                                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4122                                                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4123                                                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4124                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4125                                                                         updated_chan = true;
4126                                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
4127                                                                                 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan).map(|_| ())
4128                                                                 },
4129                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Ok(()),
4130                                                         }
4131                                                 } else { Ok(()) }
4132                                         };
4133                                         if !updated_chan {
4134                                                 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
4135                                                 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4136                                         }
4137                                         // TODO: If this channel has since closed, we're likely providing a payment
4138                                         // preimage update, which we must ensure is durable! We currently don't,
4139                                         // however, ensure that.
4140                                         if res.is_err() {
4141                                                 log_error!(self.logger,
4142                                                         "Failed to provide ChannelMonitorUpdate to closed channel! This likely lost us a payment preimage!");
4143                                         }
4144                                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4145                                 },
4146                         }
4147                 }
4148                 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4149         }
4150
4151         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4152         /// Process background events, for functional testing
4153         pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
4154                 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
4155                 let _ = self.process_background_events();
4156         }
4157
4158         fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
4159                 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; }
4160                 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
4161                 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4162                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4163                                 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4164                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4165                 }
4166                 if !chan.context.is_live() {
4167                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
4168                                 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4169                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4170                 }
4171                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4172                         log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4173
4174                 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.logger);
4175                 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4176         }
4177
4178         #[cfg(fuzzing)]
4179         /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
4180         /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
4181         /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
4182         /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
4183         pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
4184                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4185                         let mut should_persist = self.process_background_events();
4186
4187                         let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4188
4189                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4190                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4191                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4192                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4193                                 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
4194                                         let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4195                                         if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4196                                 }
4197                         }
4198
4199                         should_persist
4200                 });
4201         }
4202
4203         /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
4204         ///
4205         /// This currently includes:
4206         ///  * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
4207         ///  * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
4208         ///    than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
4209         ///    the channel.
4210         ///  * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
4211         ///    with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
4212         ///  * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
4213         ///
4214         /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
4215         /// estimate fetches.
4216         ///
4217         /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4218         /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
4219         pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
4220                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4221                         let mut should_persist = self.process_background_events();
4222
4223                         let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4224
4225                         let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
4226                         let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
4227                         let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
4228                         {
4229                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4230                                 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4231                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4232                                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4233                                         let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
4234                                         let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
4235                                         peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
4236                                                 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4237                                                 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4238
4239                                                 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
4240                                                         let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
4241                                                         handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
4242                                                         if needs_close { return false; }
4243                                                 }
4244
4245                                                 match chan.channel_update_status() {
4246                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
4247                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
4248                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
4249                                                                 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
4250                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
4251                                                                 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
4252                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
4253                                                                 n += 1;
4254                                                                 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4255                                                                         chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
4256                                                                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4257                                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4258                                                                                         msg: update
4259                                                                                 });
4260                                                                         }
4261                                                                         should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4262                                                                 } else {
4263                                                                         chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
4264                                                                 }
4265                                                         },
4266                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
4267                                                                 n += 1;
4268                                                                 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4269                                                                         chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
4270                                                                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4271                                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4272                                                                                         msg: update
4273                                                                                 });
4274                                                                         }
4275                                                                         should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4276                                                                 } else {
4277                                                                         chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
4278                                                                 }
4279                                                         },
4280                                                         _ => {},
4281                                                 }
4282
4283                                                 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4284
4285                                                 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
4286                                                         log_debug!(self.logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
4287                                                                         counterparty_node_id, log_bytes!(*chan_id));
4288                                                         pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4289                                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4290                                                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
4291                                                                         msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
4292                                                                                 channel_id: *chan_id,
4293                                                                                 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
4294                                                                         },
4295                                                                 },
4296                                                         });
4297                                                 }
4298
4299                                                 true
4300                                         });
4301                                         if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
4302                                                 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
4303                                         }
4304                                 }
4305                         }
4306
4307                         // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
4308                         // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
4309                         // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
4310                         // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
4311                         // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
4312                         // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
4313                         // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
4314                         if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
4315                                 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4316                                 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
4317                                         match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
4318                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
4319                                                         // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
4320                                                         // have no channels to the peer.
4321                                                         let remove_entry = {
4322                                                                 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
4323                                                                 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
4324                                                         };
4325                                                         if remove_entry {
4326                                                                 entry.remove_entry();
4327                                                         }
4328                                                 },
4329                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
4330                                         }
4331                                 }
4332                         }
4333
4334                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
4335                                 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4336                                         // This should be unreachable
4337                                         debug_assert!(false);
4338                                         return false;
4339                                 }
4340                                 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
4341                                         // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
4342                                         // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
4343                                         // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
4344                                         // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
4345                                         if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
4346                                                 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
4347                                         {
4348                                                 return true;
4349                                         } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
4350                                                 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
4351                                                 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
4352                                         }) {
4353                                                 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
4354                                                         .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
4355                                                 return false;
4356                                         }
4357                                 }
4358                                 true
4359                         });
4360
4361                         for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
4362                                 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
4363                                 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
4364                                 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
4365                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
4366                         }
4367
4368                         for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4369                                 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4370                         }
4371
4372                         self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self.pending_events);
4373
4374                         // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
4375                         // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
4376                         // than block the message queueing pipeline.
4377                         if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
4378                                 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4379                         }
4380
4381                         should_persist
4382                 });
4383         }
4384
4385         /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
4386         /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
4387         /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
4388         ///
4389         /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
4390         /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
4391         /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
4392         /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
4393         ///
4394         /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
4395         /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
4396         /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
4397         /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
4398         pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
4399                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
4400         }
4401
4402         /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
4403         /// reason for the failure.
4404         ///
4405         /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
4406         pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
4407                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4408
4409                 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
4410                 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
4411                         for htlc in payment.htlcs {
4412                                 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
4413                                 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4414                                 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
4415                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4416                         }
4417                 }
4418         }
4419
4420         /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
4421         fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
4422                 match failure_code {
4423                         FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
4424                         FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
4425                         FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
4426                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4427                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4428                                 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code as u16, htlc_msat_height_data)
4429                         }
4430                 }
4431         }
4432
4433         /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4434         /// that we want to return and a channel.
4435         ///
4436         /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
4437         /// forwarding
4438         fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4439                 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
4440                 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
4441                 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
4442                 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
4443                 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
4444                         chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
4445                 } else {
4446                         chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
4447                 };
4448                 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
4449                         self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
4450                 } else {
4451                         (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4452                 }
4453         }
4454
4455
4456         /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4457         /// that we want to return and a channel.
4458         fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4459                 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
4460                 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
4461                         let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
4462                         if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
4463                                 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
4464                                 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
4465                                 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4466                         }
4467                         (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4468                         msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4469                         upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4470                         (desired_err_code, enc.0)
4471                 } else {
4472                         // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
4473                         // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
4474                         // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
4475                         // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
4476                         (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4477                 }
4478         }
4479
4480         // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
4481         // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
4482         // be surfaced to the user.
4483         fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
4484                 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
4485                 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
4486         ) {
4487                 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
4488                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4489                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
4490                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4491                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4492                                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
4493                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
4494                                                 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
4495                                         },
4496                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4497                                 }
4498                         } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
4499                 };
4500
4501                 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
4502                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
4503                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
4504                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4505                 }
4506         }
4507
4508         /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
4509         /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
4510         fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
4511                 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
4512                 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
4513                 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
4514                 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
4515                 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
4516                         debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
4517                 }
4518
4519                 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
4520                 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
4521                 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
4522                 //timer handling.
4523
4524                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4525                 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
4526                 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4527                 match source {
4528                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
4529                                 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
4530                                         session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
4531                                         &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
4532                                 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
4533                         },
4534                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint }) => {
4535                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), onion_error);
4536                                 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
4537
4538                                 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
4539                                 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4540                                 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4541                                         push_forward_ev = true;
4542                                 }
4543                                 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
4544                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4545                                                 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
4546                                         },
4547                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4548                                                 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
4549                                         }
4550                                 }
4551                                 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
4552                                 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
4553                                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4554                                 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
4555                                         prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
4556                                         failed_next_destination: destination,
4557                                 }, None));
4558                         },
4559                 }
4560         }
4561
4562         /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
4563         /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
4564         ///
4565         /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
4566         /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
4567         /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
4568         /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
4569         ///
4570         /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
4571         /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
4572         /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
4573         /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
4574         ///
4575         /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
4576         /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
4577         /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
4578         /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
4579         /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4580         /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4581         pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4582                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4583
4584                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4585
4586                 let mut sources = {
4587                         let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4588                         if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
4589                                 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4590                                 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
4591                                         if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4592                                                 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4593                                                         .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4594                                                 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
4595                                                 break;
4596                                         }
4597                                 }
4598
4599                                 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
4600                                         ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
4601                                         payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id,
4602                                 });
4603                                 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
4604                                         debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
4605                                         log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
4606                                                 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4607                                 }
4608                                 payment.htlcs
4609                         } else { return; }
4610                 };
4611                 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
4612
4613                 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
4614                 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
4615                 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
4616                 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
4617                 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
4618                 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
4619                 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
4620                 let mut valid_mpp = true;
4621                 let mut errs = Vec::new();
4622                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4623                 for htlc in sources.iter() {
4624                         if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
4625                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4626                                 debug_assert!(false);
4627                                 valid_mpp = false;
4628                                 break;
4629                         }
4630                         prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
4631
4632                         if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
4633                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4634                                 debug_assert!(false);
4635                                 valid_mpp = false;
4636                                 break;
4637                         }
4638                         expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
4639                         claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
4640                 }
4641                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4642                 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
4643                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4644                         log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
4645                         return;
4646                 }
4647                 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
4648                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4649                         log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
4650                                 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
4651                         return;
4652                 }
4653                 if valid_mpp {
4654                         for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4655                                 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
4656                                         htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
4657                                         |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
4658                                 {
4659                                         if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
4660                                                 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
4661                                                 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
4662                                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
4663                                         } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
4664                                 }
4665                         }
4666                 }
4667                 if !valid_mpp {
4668                         for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4669                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4670                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4671                                 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4672                                 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
4673                                 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
4674                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4675                         }
4676                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4677                 }
4678
4679                 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
4680                 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
4681                         let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4682                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4683                 }
4684         }
4685
4686         fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
4687                 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
4688         -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
4689                 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
4690
4691                 {
4692                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4693                         let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
4694                         let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4695                                 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
4696                                 None => None
4697                         };
4698
4699                         let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
4700                                 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4701                                         .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
4702                         ).unwrap_or(None);
4703
4704                         if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
4705                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
4706                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4707                                 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4708                                         let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id();
4709                                         let fulfill_res = chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
4710
4711                                         if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = fulfill_res {
4712                                                 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)) {
4713                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
4714                                                                 log_bytes!(chan_id), action);
4715                                                         peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
4716                                                 }
4717                                                 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
4718                                                         peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4719                                                 if let Err(e) = res {
4720                                                         // TODO: This is a *critical* error - we probably updated the outbound edge
4721                                                         // of the HTLC's monitor with a preimage. We should retry this monitor
4722                                                         // update over and over again until morale improves.
4723                                                         log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}", payment_preimage);
4724                                                         return Err((counterparty_node_id, e));
4725                                                 }
4726                                         }
4727                                         return Ok(());
4728                                 }
4729                         }
4730                 }
4731                 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4732                         update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4733                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4734                                 payment_preimage,
4735                         }],
4736                 };
4737                 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4738                 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
4739                 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
4740                 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
4741                         // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
4742                         // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
4743                         // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
4744                         // again on restart.
4745                         log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4746                                 payment_preimage, update_res);
4747                 }
4748                 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
4749                 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
4750                 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
4751                 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
4752                 // `PaymentForwarded`).
4753                 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
4754                 Ok(())
4755         }
4756
4757         fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4758                 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
4759         }
4760
4761         fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
4762                 match source {
4763                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4764                                 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage, session_priv, path, from_onchain, &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
4765                         },
4766                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4767                                 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4768                                 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
4769                                         |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
4770                                                 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4771                                                         let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4772                                                                 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4773                                                         } else { None };
4774
4775                                                         Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
4776                                                                 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4777                                                                         fee_earned_msat,
4778                                                                         claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4779                                                                         prev_channel_id: Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
4780                                                                         next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_id),
4781                                                                         outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
4782                                                                 },
4783                                                                 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: None,
4784                                                         })
4785                                                 } else { None }
4786                                         });
4787                                 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
4788                                         let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4789                                         let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4790                                 }
4791                         },
4792                 }
4793         }
4794
4795         /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4796         pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4797                 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4798         }
4799
4800         fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
4801                 for action in actions.into_iter() {
4802                         match action {
4803                                 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
4804                                         let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4805                                         if let Some(ClaimingPayment { amount_msat, payment_purpose: purpose, receiver_node_id }) = payment {
4806                                                 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
4807                                                         payment_hash, purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4808                                                 }, None));
4809                                         }
4810                                 },
4811                                 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
4812                                         event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
4813                                 } => {
4814                                         self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
4815                                         if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
4816                                                 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, Some(blocker));
4817                                         }
4818                                 },
4819                         }
4820                 }
4821         }
4822
4823         /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
4824         /// update completion.
4825         fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4826                 channel: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
4827                 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
4828                 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
4829                 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
4830         -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
4831                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
4832                         log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()),
4833                         if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
4834                         if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
4835                         if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
4836                         if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
4837                         if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
4838
4839                 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
4840
4841                 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
4842                 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4843                         htlc_forwards = Some((channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias()),
4844                                 channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
4845                 }
4846
4847                 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4848                         send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
4849                 }
4850                 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
4851                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4852                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4853                                 msg,
4854                         });
4855                 }
4856
4857                 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
4858                         if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
4859                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4860                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4861                                         updates: update,
4862                                 });
4863                         }
4864                 } }
4865                 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
4866                         if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
4867                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4868                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4869                                         msg: revoke_and_ack,
4870                                 });
4871                         }
4872                 } }
4873                 match order {
4874                         RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
4875                                 handle_cs!();
4876                                 handle_raa!();
4877                         },
4878                         RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
4879                                 handle_raa!();
4880                                 handle_cs!();
4881                         },
4882                 }
4883
4884                 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
4885                         log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
4886                         self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
4887                 }
4888
4889                 {
4890                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4891                         emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
4892                         emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
4893                 }
4894
4895                 htlc_forwards
4896         }
4897
4898         fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
4899                 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
4900
4901                 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
4902                         Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4903                         None => {
4904                                 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
4905                                 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
4906                                 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4907                                 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4908                                         Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4909                                         None => return,
4910                                 }
4911                         }
4912                 };
4913                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4914                 let mut peer_state_lock;
4915                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4916                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
4917                 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4918                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4919                 let mut channel = {
4920                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()){
4921                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4922                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4923                         }
4924                 };
4925                 let remaining_in_flight =
4926                         if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
4927                                 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
4928                                 pending.len()
4929                         } else { 0 };
4930                 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
4931                         highest_applied_update_id, channel.get().context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
4932                         remaining_in_flight);
4933                 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4934                         return;
4935                 }
4936                 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel.get_mut());
4937         }
4938
4939         /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4940         ///
4941         /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4942         /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4943         /// the channel.
4944         ///
4945         /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4946         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4947         /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4948         ///
4949         /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
4950         /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
4951         /// used to accept such channels.
4952         ///
4953         /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4954         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4955         pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4956                 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4957         }
4958
4959         /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4960         /// it as confirmed immediately.
4961         ///
4962         /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4963         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4964         /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4965         ///
4966         /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4967         /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
4968         ///
4969         /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
4970         /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
4971         ///
4972         /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
4973         /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
4974         ///
4975         /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4976         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4977         pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4978                 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
4979         }
4980
4981         fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4982                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4983
4984                 let peers_without_funded_channels =
4985                         self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
4986                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4987                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4988                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4989                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4990                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4991                 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
4992                 match peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4993                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4994                                 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_accept() {
4995                                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4996                                 }
4997                                 if accept_0conf {
4998                                         channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
4999                                 } else if channel.get().context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
5000                                         let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5001                                                 node_id: channel.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5002                                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5003                                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
5004                                                 }
5005                                         };
5006                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5007                                         let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
5008                                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
5009                                 } else {
5010                                         // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
5011                                         // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
5012                                         // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
5013                                         if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
5014                                                 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5015                                                         node_id: channel.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5016                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5017                                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
5018                                                         }
5019                                                 };
5020                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5021                                                 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
5022                                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
5023                                         }
5024                                 }
5025
5026                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
5027                                         node_id: channel.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5028                                         msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
5029                                 });
5030                         }
5031                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
5032                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) });
5033                         }
5034                 }
5035                 Ok(())
5036         }
5037
5038         /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
5039         /// or 0-conf channels.
5040         ///
5041         /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
5042         /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
5043         fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
5044         where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> bool {
5045                 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
5046                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5047                 {
5048                         let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5049                         for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
5050                                 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5051                                 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
5052                                 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
5053                                 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
5054                                         peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
5055                                 }
5056                         }
5057                 }
5058                 return peers_without_funded_channels;
5059         }
5060
5061         fn unfunded_channel_count(
5062                 peer: &PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, best_block_height: u32
5063         ) -> usize {
5064                 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
5065                 for (_, chan) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
5066                         // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
5067                         // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
5068                         if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
5069                                 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
5070                         {
5071                                 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
5072                         }
5073                 }
5074                 for (_, chan) in peer.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter() {
5075                         if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
5076                                 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
5077                         }
5078                 }
5079                 num_unfunded_channels
5080         }
5081
5082         fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5083                 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
5084                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5085                 }
5086
5087                 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
5088                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5089                 }
5090
5091                 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
5092                 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
5093                 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
5094                 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
5095
5096                 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
5097                 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
5098                 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
5099                 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
5100                         self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
5101
5102                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5103                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5104                     .ok_or_else(|| {
5105                                 debug_assert!(false);
5106                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
5107                         })?;
5108                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5109                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5110
5111                 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
5112                 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
5113                 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
5114                 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
5115                         channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
5116                         !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
5117                 {
5118                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5119                                 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
5120                                 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5121                 }
5122
5123                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5124                 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
5125                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5126                                 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
5127                                 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5128                 }
5129
5130                 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
5131                         counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
5132                         &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
5133                 {
5134                         Err(e) => {
5135                                 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
5136                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
5137                         },
5138                         Ok(res) => res
5139                 };
5140                 let channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
5141                 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
5142                 if channel_exists {
5143                         self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
5144                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
5145                 } else {
5146                         if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
5147                                 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
5148                                 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
5149                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5150                                 }
5151                                 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5152                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5153                                 }
5154                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
5155                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5156                                         msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
5157                                 });
5158                         } else {
5159                                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5160                                 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
5161                                         temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
5162                                         counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5163                                         funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
5164                                         push_msat: msg.push_msat,
5165                                         channel_type: channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
5166                                 }, None));
5167                         }
5168                         peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, channel);
5169                 }
5170                 Ok(())
5171         }
5172
5173         fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5174                 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
5175                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5176                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5177                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
5178                                         debug_assert!(false);
5179                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
5180                                 })?;
5181                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5182                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5183                         match peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
5184                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5185                                         try_v1_outbound_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), chan);
5186                                         (chan.get().context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().context.get_user_id())
5187                                 },
5188                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
5189                         }
5190                 };
5191                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5192                 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
5193                         temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
5194                         counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
5195                         channel_value_satoshis: value,
5196                         output_script,
5197                         user_channel_id: user_id,
5198                 }, None));
5199                 Ok(())
5200         }
5201
5202         fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5203                 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5204
5205                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5206                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5207                         .ok_or_else(|| {
5208                                 debug_assert!(false);
5209                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
5210                         })?;
5211
5212                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5213                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5214                 let (chan, funding_msg, monitor) =
5215                         match peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
5216                                 Some(inbound_chan) => {
5217                                         match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger) {
5218                                                 Ok(res) => res,
5219                                                 Err((mut inbound_chan, err)) => {
5220                                                         // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
5221                                                         // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
5222                                                         // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
5223                                                         update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &inbound_chan.context);
5224                                                         let user_id = inbound_chan.context.get_user_id();
5225                                                         let shutdown_res = inbound_chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
5226                                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(format!("{}", err),
5227                                                                 msg.temporary_channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None));
5228                                                 },
5229                                         }
5230                                 },
5231                                 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
5232                         };
5233
5234                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
5235                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5236                                 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
5237                         },
5238                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5239                                 match self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
5240                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5241                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5242                                                         "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
5243                                                         funding_msg.channel_id))
5244                                         },
5245                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
5246                                                 i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
5247                                         }
5248                                 }
5249
5250                                 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
5251                                 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
5252                                 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
5253                                 // until we have persisted our monitor.
5254                                 let new_channel_id = funding_msg.channel_id;
5255                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
5256                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5257                                         msg: funding_msg,
5258                                 });
5259
5260                                 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
5261
5262                                 let chan = e.insert(chan);
5263                                 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, monitor_res, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
5264                                         per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING_INITIAL_MONITOR,
5265                                         { peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&new_channel_id) });
5266
5267                                 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
5268                                 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
5269                                 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
5270                                 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
5271                                 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
5272                                 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
5273                                 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
5274                                 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { shutdown_finish: Some((res, _)), .. }) = &mut res {
5275                                         res.0 = None;
5276                                 }
5277                                 res.map(|_| ())
5278                         }
5279                 }
5280         }
5281
5282         fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5283                 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5284                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5285                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5286                         .ok_or_else(|| {
5287                                 debug_assert!(false);
5288                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5289                         })?;
5290
5291                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5292                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5293                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5294                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5295                                 let monitor = try_chan_entry!(self,
5296                                         chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan);
5297                                 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor);
5298                                 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
5299                                 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
5300                                         // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
5301                                         // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
5302                                         // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
5303                                         if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
5304                                                 shutdown_finish.0.take();
5305                                         }
5306                                 }
5307                                 res.map(|_| ())
5308                         },
5309                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5310                 }
5311         }
5312
5313         fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5314                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5315                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5316                         .ok_or_else(|| {
5317                                 debug_assert!(false);
5318                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5319                         })?;
5320                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5321                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5322                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5323                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5324                                 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
5325                                         self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
5326                                 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
5327                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().context.channel_id()));
5328                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5329                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5330                                                 msg: announcement_sigs,
5331                                         });
5332                                 } else if chan.get().context.is_usable() {
5333                                         // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
5334                                         // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
5335                                         // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
5336                                         // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
5337                                         // announcement_signatures.
5338                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().context.channel_id()));
5339                                         if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5340                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5341                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5342                                                         msg,
5343                                                 });
5344                                         }
5345                                 }
5346
5347                                 {
5348                                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5349                                         emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan.get_mut());
5350                                 }
5351
5352                                 Ok(())
5353                         },
5354                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5355                 }
5356         }
5357
5358         fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5359                 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
5360                 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
5361                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5362                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5363                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
5364                                         debug_assert!(false);
5365                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5366                                 })?;
5367                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5368                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5369                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5370                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
5371
5372                                         if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
5373                                                 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
5374                                                         log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
5375                                                         if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
5376                                         }
5377
5378                                         let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().context.get_funding_txo();
5379                                         let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self,
5380                                                 chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_entry);
5381                                         dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
5382
5383                                         if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
5384                                                 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
5385                                                 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
5386                                                 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
5387                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5388                                                         node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
5389                                                         msg,
5390                                                 });
5391                                         }
5392
5393                                         // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
5394                                         if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
5395                                                 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
5396                                                         peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry).map(|_| ());
5397                                         }
5398                                         break Ok(());
5399                                 },
5400                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5401                         }
5402                 };
5403                 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
5404                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
5405                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5406                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5407                 }
5408
5409                 result
5410         }
5411
5412         fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5413                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5414                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5415                         .ok_or_else(|| {
5416                                 debug_assert!(false);
5417                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5418                         })?;
5419                 let (tx, chan_option) = {
5420                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5421                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5422                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5423                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
5424                                         let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
5425                                         if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
5426                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5427                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5428                                                         msg,
5429                                                 });
5430                                         }
5431                                         if tx.is_some() {
5432                                                 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
5433                                                 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
5434                                                 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
5435                                                 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
5436                                                 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
5437                                                 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
5438                                         } else { (tx, None) }
5439                                 },
5440                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5441                         }
5442                 };
5443                 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
5444                         log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
5445                         self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
5446                 }
5447                 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
5448                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5449                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5450                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5451                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5452                                         msg: update
5453                                 });
5454                         }
5455                         self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5456                 }
5457                 Ok(())
5458         }
5459
5460         fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5461                 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
5462                 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
5463                 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
5464                 //
5465                 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
5466                 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
5467                 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
5468                 //but we should prevent it anyway.
5469
5470                 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
5471                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5472                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5473                         .ok_or_else(|| {
5474                                 debug_assert!(false);
5475                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5476                         })?;
5477                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5478                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5479                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5480                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5481
5482                                 let pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
5483                                         Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
5484                                                 self.construct_pending_htlc_status(msg, shared_secret, next_hop,
5485                                                         chan.get().context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt),
5486                                         Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
5487                                 };
5488                                 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
5489                                         // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
5490                                         // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
5491                                         // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
5492                                         match pending_forward_info {
5493                                                 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
5494                                                         let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
5495                                                                 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
5496                                                                 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
5497                                                         } else {
5498                                                                 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
5499                                                         }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
5500                                                         let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
5501                                                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
5502                                                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
5503                                                                 reason
5504                                                         };
5505                                                         PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
5506                                                 },
5507                                                 _ => pending_forward_info
5508                                         }
5509                                 };
5510                                 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), chan);
5511                         },
5512                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5513                 }
5514                 Ok(())
5515         }
5516
5517         fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5518                 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
5519                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5520                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5521                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
5522                                         debug_assert!(false);
5523                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5524                                 })?;
5525                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5526                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5527                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5528                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5529                                         try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan)
5530                                 },
5531                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5532                         }
5533                 };
5534                 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
5535                 Ok(())
5536         }
5537
5538         fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5539                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5540                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5541                         .ok_or_else(|| {
5542                                 debug_assert!(false);
5543                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5544                         })?;
5545                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5546                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5547                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5548                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5549                                 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan);
5550                         },
5551                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5552                 }
5553                 Ok(())
5554         }
5555
5556         fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5557                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5558                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5559                         .ok_or_else(|| {
5560                                 debug_assert!(false);
5561                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5562                         })?;
5563                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5564                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5565                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5566                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5567                                 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
5568                                         let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
5569                                         try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
5570                                 }
5571                                 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan);
5572                                 Ok(())
5573                         },
5574                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5575                 }
5576         }
5577
5578         fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5579                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5580                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5581                         .ok_or_else(|| {
5582                                 debug_assert!(false);
5583                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5584                         })?;
5585                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5586                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5587                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5588                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5589                                 let funding_txo = chan.get().context.get_funding_txo();
5590                                 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5591                                 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
5592                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
5593                                                 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan).map(|_| ())
5594                                 } else { Ok(()) }
5595                         },
5596                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5597                 }
5598         }
5599
5600         #[inline]
5601         fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
5602                 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
5603                         let mut push_forward_event = false;
5604                         let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
5605                         let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
5606                         if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5607                                 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
5608                                         let scid = match forward_info.routing {
5609                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
5610                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
5611                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
5612                                         };
5613                                         // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
5614                                         let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
5615
5616                                         let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5617                                         let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
5618                                         match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
5619                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5620                                                         entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5621                                                                 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
5622                                                 },
5623                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5624                                                         if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
5625                                                            fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
5626                                                         {
5627                                                                 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
5628                                                                 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5629                                                                 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
5630                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5631                                                                                 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
5632                                                                                         requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
5633                                                                                         payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
5634                                                                                         inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
5635                                                                                         expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
5636                                                                                         intercept_id
5637                                                                                 }, None));
5638                                                                                 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5639                                                                                         prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
5640                                                                         },
5641                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5642                                                                                 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
5643                                                                                 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5644                                                                                         short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
5645                                                                                         outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5646                                                                                         htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
5647                                                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
5648                                                                                         phantom_shared_secret: None,
5649                                                                                 });
5650
5651                                                                                 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
5652                                                                                                 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
5653                                                                                                 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
5654                                                                                 ));
5655                                                                         }
5656                                                                 }
5657                                                         } else {
5658                                                                 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
5659                                                                 // payments are being processed.
5660                                                                 if forward_htlcs_empty {
5661                                                                         push_forward_event = true;
5662                                                                 }
5663                                                                 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5664                                                                         prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
5665                                                         }
5666                                                 }
5667                                         }
5668                                 }
5669                         }
5670
5671                         for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
5672                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
5673                         }
5674
5675                         if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
5676                                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5677                                 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
5678                         }
5679                         if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
5680                 }
5681         }
5682
5683         // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued.
5684         fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
5685                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5686                 let forward_ev_exists = pending_events.iter()
5687                         .find(|(ev, _)| if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false })
5688                         .is_some();
5689                 if !forward_ev_exists {
5690                         pending_events.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
5691                                 time_forwardable:
5692                                         Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
5693                         }, None));
5694                 }
5695         }
5696
5697         /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
5698         /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other event
5699         /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
5700         /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
5701         fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
5702                 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
5703                 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
5704         ) -> bool {
5705                 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
5706                         .get(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
5707                 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
5708                         action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
5709                                 channel_funding_outpoint,
5710                                 counterparty_node_id,
5711                         })
5712                 })
5713         }
5714
5715         fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5716                 let (htlcs_to_fail, res) = {
5717                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5718                         let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5719                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
5720                                         debug_assert!(false);
5721                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5722                                 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
5723                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5724                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5725                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5726                                         let funding_txo = chan.get().context.get_funding_txo();
5727                                         let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5728                                         let res = if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
5729                                                 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
5730                                                         peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan).map(|_| ())
5731                                         } else { Ok(()) };
5732                                         (htlcs_to_fail, res)
5733                                 },
5734                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5735                         }
5736                 };
5737                 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
5738                 res
5739         }
5740
5741         fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5742                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5743                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5744                         .ok_or_else(|| {
5745                                 debug_assert!(false);
5746                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5747                         })?;
5748                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5749                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5750                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5751                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5752                                 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
5753                         },
5754                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5755                 }
5756                 Ok(())
5757         }
5758
5759         fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5760                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5761                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5762                         .ok_or_else(|| {
5763                                 debug_assert!(false);
5764                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5765                         })?;
5766                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5767                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5768                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5769                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5770                                 if !chan.get().context.is_usable() {
5771                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
5772                                 }
5773
5774                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5775                                         msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
5776                                                 &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
5777                                                 msg, &self.default_configuration
5778                                         ), chan),
5779                                         // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5780                                         // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5781                                         update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap()),
5782                                 });
5783                         },
5784                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5785                 }
5786                 Ok(())
5787         }
5788
5789         /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
5790         fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5791                 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
5792                         Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
5793                         None => {
5794                                 // It's not a local channel
5795                                 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5796                         }
5797                 };
5798                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5799                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
5800                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
5801                         return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5802                 }
5803                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5804                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5805                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5806                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5807                                 if chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5808                                         if chan.get().context.should_announce() {
5809                                                 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
5810                                                 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
5811                                                 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
5812                                                 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5813                                         }
5814                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
5815                                 }
5816                                 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
5817                                 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
5818                                 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
5819                                         return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5820                                 } else {
5821                                         log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
5822                                         try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
5823                                 }
5824                         },
5825                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5826                 }
5827                 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
5828         }
5829
5830         fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5831                 let htlc_forwards;
5832                 let need_lnd_workaround = {
5833                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5834
5835                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5836                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
5837                                         debug_assert!(false);
5838                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5839                                 })?;
5840                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5841                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5842                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5843                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5844                                         // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
5845                                         // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
5846                                         // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
5847                                         // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
5848                                         let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
5849                                                 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash,
5850                                                 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
5851                                         let mut channel_update = None;
5852                                         if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
5853                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5854                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5855                                                         msg,
5856                                                 });
5857                                         } else if chan.get().context.is_usable() {
5858                                                 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
5859                                                 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
5860                                                 // they have the latest channel parameters.
5861                                                 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5862                                                         channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5863                                                                 node_id: chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5864                                                                 msg,
5865                                                         });
5866                                                 }
5867                                         }
5868                                         let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
5869                                         htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
5870                                                 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
5871                                                 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
5872                                         if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
5873                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
5874                                         }
5875                                         need_lnd_workaround
5876                                 },
5877                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5878                         }
5879                 };
5880
5881                 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
5882                         self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
5883                 }
5884
5885                 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
5886                         self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
5887                 }
5888                 Ok(())
5889         }
5890
5891         /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
5892         fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
5893                 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5894
5895                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5896                 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5897                 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5898                 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5899                         for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
5900                                 match monitor_event {
5901                                         MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5902                                                 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5903                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5904                                                         self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
5905                                                 } else {
5906                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5907                                                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5908                                                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5909                                                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5910                                                 }
5911                                         },
5912                                         MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5913                                         MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5914                                                 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
5915                                                         Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
5916                                                         None => {
5917                                                                 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5918                                                                 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5919                                                                 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5920                                                                 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
5921                                                         }
5922                                                 };
5923                                                 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
5924                                                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5925                                                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5926                                                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5927                                                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5928                                                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5929                                                                 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5930                                                                         let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5931                                                                         failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
5932                                                                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5933                                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5934                                                                                         msg: update
5935                                                                                 });
5936                                                                         }
5937                                                                         let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5938                                                                                 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5939                                                                         } else {
5940                                                                                 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5941                                                                         };
5942                                                                         self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, reason);
5943                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5944                                                                                 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5945                                                                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5946                                                                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5947                                                                                 },
5948                                                                         });
5949                                                                 }
5950                                                         }
5951                                                 }
5952                                         },
5953                                         MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5954                                                 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
5955                                         },
5956                                 }
5957                         }
5958                 }
5959
5960                 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5961                         self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5962                 }
5963
5964                 has_pending_monitor_events
5965         }
5966
5967         /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5968         /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5969         /// update events as a separate process method here.
5970         #[cfg(fuzzing)]
5971         pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5972                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5973                 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
5974         }
5975
5976         /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5977         /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5978         /// update was applied.
5979         fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5980                 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5981                 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5982                 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5983
5984                 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
5985                 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
5986                 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
5987                 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
5988                 'peer_loop: loop {
5989                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5990                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5991                                 'chan_loop: loop {
5992                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5993                                         let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5994                                         for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
5995                                                 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5996                                                 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
5997                                                 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
5998                                                         chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger);
5999                                                 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
6000                                                         failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
6001                                                 }
6002                                                 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
6003                                                         has_monitor_update = true;
6004
6005                                                         let channel_id: [u8; 32] = *channel_id;
6006                                                         let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
6007                                                                 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING,
6008                                                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id));
6009                                                         if res.is_err() {
6010                                                                 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, res));
6011                                                         }
6012                                                         continue 'peer_loop;
6013                                                 }
6014                                         }
6015                                         break 'chan_loop;
6016                                 }
6017                         }
6018                         break 'peer_loop;
6019                 }
6020
6021                 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
6022                 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
6023                         self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
6024                 }
6025
6026                 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
6027                         let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
6028                 }
6029
6030                 has_update
6031         }
6032
6033         /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
6034         /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
6035         /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
6036         fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
6037                 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
6038                 let mut has_update = false;
6039                 {
6040                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6041
6042                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6043                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6044                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6045                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6046                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
6047                                         match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
6048                                                 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
6049                                                         if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
6050                                                                 has_update = true;
6051                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
6052                                                                         node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
6053                                                                 });
6054                                                         }
6055                                                         if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
6056                                                                 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
6057                                                                 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
6058                                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6059                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6060                                                                                 msg: update
6061                                                                         });
6062                                                                 }
6063
6064                                                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
6065
6066                                                                 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
6067                                                                 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
6068                                                                 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
6069                                                                 false
6070                                                         } else { true }
6071                                                 },
6072                                                 Err(e) => {
6073                                                         has_update = true;
6074                                                         let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
6075                                                         handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
6076                                                         !close_channel
6077                                                 }
6078                                         }
6079                                 });
6080                         }
6081                 }
6082
6083                 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
6084                         let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
6085                 }
6086
6087                 has_update
6088         }
6089
6090         /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
6091         /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
6092         /// Channel object.
6093         fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
6094                 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6095                         // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
6096                         // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
6097                         // reorganized out of the main chain.
6098                         // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
6099                         // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
6100                         // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
6101                         // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
6102                         if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
6103                                 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
6104                                 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
6105                                         assert!(should_broadcast);
6106                                 } else { unreachable!(); }
6107                                 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
6108                                         BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
6109                                                 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
6110                                         });
6111                         }
6112                         self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6113                 }
6114         }
6115
6116         /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
6117         /// to pay us.
6118         ///
6119         /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
6120         /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
6121         ///
6122         /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
6123         /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
6124         /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
6125         /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
6126         ///
6127         /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
6128         ///
6129         /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
6130         /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
6131         ///
6132         /// # Note
6133         ///
6134         /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
6135         /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
6136         ///
6137         /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
6138         ///
6139         /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
6140         /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
6141         ///
6142         /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
6143         /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
6144         /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
6145         /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
6146         /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
6147         /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
6148         pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
6149                 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
6150                 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
6151                         &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
6152                         min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
6153         }
6154
6155         /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
6156         /// stored external to LDK.
6157         ///
6158         /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
6159         /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
6160         /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
6161         ///
6162         /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
6163         /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
6164         /// payments.
6165         ///
6166         /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
6167         /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
6168         /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
6169         /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
6170         ///
6171         /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
6172         /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
6173         /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
6174         /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
6175         /// invoices when no timeout is set.
6176         ///
6177         /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
6178         /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
6179         /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
6180         /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
6181         /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
6182         ///
6183         /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
6184         /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
6185         ///
6186         /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
6187         /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
6188         ///
6189         /// # Note
6190         ///
6191         /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
6192         /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
6193         ///
6194         /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
6195         ///
6196         /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
6197         /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
6198         ///
6199         /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
6200         /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
6201         pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
6202                 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
6203                 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
6204                         invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
6205                         min_final_cltv_expiry)
6206         }
6207
6208         /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
6209         /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
6210         ///
6211         /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
6212         pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
6213                 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
6214         }
6215
6216         /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
6217         /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
6218         ///
6219         /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
6220         pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
6221                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6222                 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
6223                 loop {
6224                         let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
6225                         // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
6226                         match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
6227                                 Some(_) => continue,
6228                                 None => return scid_candidate
6229                         }
6230                 }
6231         }
6232
6233         /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
6234         ///
6235         /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
6236         pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
6237                 PhantomRouteHints {
6238                         channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
6239                         phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
6240                         real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
6241                 }
6242         }
6243
6244         /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
6245         /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
6246         /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
6247         ///
6248         /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
6249         /// times to get a unique scid.
6250         pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
6251                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6252                 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
6253                 loop {
6254                         let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
6255                         // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
6256                         if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
6257                         return scid_candidate
6258                 }
6259         }
6260
6261         /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
6262         /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
6263         pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
6264                 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
6265
6266                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6267                 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6268                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6269                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6270                         for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
6271                                 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
6272                                         if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
6273                                                 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
6274                                         }
6275                                 }
6276                         }
6277                 }
6278
6279                 inflight_htlcs
6280         }
6281
6282         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6283         pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
6284                 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
6285                 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
6286                 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
6287                 events.into_inner()
6288         }
6289
6290         #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
6291         pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
6292                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6293                 events.push_back((event, None));
6294         }
6295
6296         #[cfg(test)]
6297         pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
6298                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6299                 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
6300         }
6301
6302         #[cfg(test)]
6303         pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
6304                 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
6305         }
6306
6307         #[cfg(test)]
6308         pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
6309                 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
6310         }
6311
6312         /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
6313         /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
6314         /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
6315         /// making progress and then any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
6316         fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
6317                 let mut errors = Vec::new();
6318                 loop {
6319                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6320                         if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6321                                 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6322                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
6323
6324                                 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
6325                                         // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
6326                                         if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6327                                                 .get_mut(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
6328                                         {
6329                                                 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
6330                                         }
6331                                 }
6332
6333                                 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
6334                                         channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id) {
6335                                         // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
6336                                         // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
6337                                         // update(s) when those blockers complete.
6338                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
6339                                                 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
6340                                         break;
6341                                 }
6342
6343                                 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
6344                                         debug_assert_eq!(chan.get().context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
6345                                         if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.get_mut().unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
6346                                                 log_debug!(self.logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
6347                                                         log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
6348                                                 if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
6349                                                         peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
6350                                                 {
6351                                                         errors.push((e, counterparty_node_id));
6352                                                 }
6353                                                 if further_update_exists {
6354                                                         // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
6355                                                         // top of the loop.
6356                                                         continue;
6357                                                 }
6358                                         } else {
6359                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
6360                                                         log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
6361                                         }
6362                                 }
6363                         } else {
6364                                 log_debug!(self.logger,
6365                                         "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
6366                                         log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6367                         }
6368                         break;
6369                 }
6370                 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in errors {
6371                         let res = Err::<(), _>(err);
6372                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
6373                 }
6374         }
6375
6376         fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
6377                 for action in actions {
6378                         match action {
6379                                 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6380                                         channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
6381                                 } => {
6382                                         self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, None);
6383                                 }
6384                         }
6385                 }
6386         }
6387
6388         /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
6389         /// using the given event handler.
6390         ///
6391         /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
6392         pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
6393                 &self, handler: H
6394         ) {
6395                 let mut ev;
6396                 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
6397         }
6398 }
6399
6400 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6401 where
6402         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6403         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6404         ES::Target: EntropySource,
6405         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6406         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6407         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6408         R::Target: Router,
6409         L::Target: Logger,
6410 {
6411         /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
6412         /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
6413         /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
6414         /// is always placed next to each other.
6415         ///
6416         /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
6417         /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
6418         /// `MessageSendEvent`s  for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
6419         /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
6420         ///
6421         /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
6422         /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
6423         /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
6424         fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
6425                 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
6426                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6427                         let mut result = self.process_background_events();
6428
6429                         // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
6430                         // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
6431                         if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
6432                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6433                         }
6434
6435                         if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
6436                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6437                         }
6438                         if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
6439                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6440                         }
6441
6442                         let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
6443                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6444                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6445                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6446                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6447                                 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
6448                                         pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
6449                                 }
6450                         }
6451
6452                         if !pending_events.is_empty() {
6453                                 events.replace(pending_events);
6454                         }
6455
6456                         result
6457                 });
6458                 events.into_inner()
6459         }
6460 }
6461
6462 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6463 where
6464         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6465         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6466         ES::Target: EntropySource,
6467         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6468         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6469         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6470         R::Target: Router,
6471         L::Target: Logger,
6472 {
6473         /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
6474         ///
6475         /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
6476         /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
6477         fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
6478                 let mut ev;
6479                 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
6480         }
6481 }
6482
6483 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6484 where
6485         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6486         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6487         ES::Target: EntropySource,
6488         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6489         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6490         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6491         R::Target: Router,
6492         L::Target: Logger,
6493 {
6494         fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
6495                 {
6496                         let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6497                         assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
6498                                 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
6499                         assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
6500                                 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
6501                 }
6502
6503                 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
6504                 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
6505         }
6506
6507         fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
6508                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6509                         &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6510                 let new_height = height - 1;
6511                 {
6512                         let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
6513                         assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
6514                                 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
6515                         assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
6516                                 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
6517                         *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
6518                 }
6519
6520                 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6521         }
6522 }
6523
6524 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6525 where
6526         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6527         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6528         ES::Target: EntropySource,
6529         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6530         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6531         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6532         R::Target: Router,
6533         L::Target: Logger,
6534 {
6535         fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
6536                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6537                 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6538                 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6539
6540                 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
6541                 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
6542
6543                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6544                         &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6545                 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
6546                         .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
6547
6548                 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6549                 if height < last_best_block_height {
6550                         let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6551                         self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6552                 }
6553         }
6554
6555         fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
6556                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6557                 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6558                 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6559
6560                 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
6561                 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
6562
6563                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6564                         &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6565                 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
6566
6567                 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6568
6569                 macro_rules! max_time {
6570                         ($timestamp: expr) => {
6571                                 loop {
6572                                         // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
6573                                         // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
6574                                         // having an explicit local time source.
6575                                         // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
6576                                         // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
6577                                         let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6578                                         if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
6579                                         if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
6580                                                 break;
6581                                         }
6582                                 }
6583                         }
6584                 }
6585                 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
6586                 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6587                 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
6588                         inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
6589                 });
6590         }
6591
6592         fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
6593                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
6594                 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
6595                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6596                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6597                         for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
6598                                 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.context.get_funding_txo(), chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
6599                                         res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
6600                                 }
6601                         }
6602                 }
6603                 res
6604         }
6605
6606         fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
6607                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6608                         &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6609                 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
6610                         if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
6611                                 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
6612                                         channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
6613                                 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6614                         } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6615                 });
6616         }
6617 }
6618
6619 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6620 where
6621         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6622         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6623         ES::Target: EntropySource,
6624         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6625         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6626         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6627         R::Target: Router,
6628         L::Target: Logger,
6629 {
6630         /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
6631         /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
6632         /// the function.
6633         fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
6634                         (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
6635                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6636                 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6637                 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6638
6639                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6640                 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
6641                 {
6642                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6643                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6644                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6645                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6646                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6647                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
6648                                         let res = f(channel);
6649                                         if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
6650                                                 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
6651                                                         let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
6652                                                         timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
6653                                                                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
6654                                                 }
6655                                                 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
6656                                                         send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
6657                                                         if channel.context.is_usable() {
6658                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
6659                                                                 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
6660                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6661                                                                                 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6662                                                                                 msg,
6663                                                                         });
6664                                                                 }
6665                                                         } else {
6666                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
6667                                                         }
6668                                                 }
6669
6670                                                 {
6671                                                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6672                                                         emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
6673                                                 }
6674
6675                                                 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
6676                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
6677                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6678                                                                 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6679                                                                 msg: announcement_sigs,
6680                                                         });
6681                                                         if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6682                                                                 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
6683                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6684                                                                                 msg: announcement,
6685                                                                                 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6686                                                                                 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6687                                                                                 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
6688                                                                         });
6689                                                                 }
6690                                                         }
6691                                                 }
6692                                                 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
6693                                                         if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
6694                                                                 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
6695                                                                 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
6696                                                                 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
6697                                                                 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
6698                                                                 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
6699                                                                 // is always consistent.
6700                                                                 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
6701                                                                 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
6702                                                                 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
6703                                                                         "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
6704                                                                         fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
6705                                                         }
6706                                                 }
6707                                         } else if let Err(reason) = res {
6708                                                 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
6709                                                 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
6710                                                 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
6711                                                 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true));
6712                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
6713                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6714                                                                 msg: update
6715                                                         });
6716                                                 }
6717                                                 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
6718                                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, reason);
6719                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6720                                                         node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6721                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
6722                                                                 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
6723                                                                 data: reason_message,
6724                                                         } },
6725                                                 });
6726                                                 return false;
6727                                         }
6728                                         true
6729                                 });
6730                         }
6731                 }
6732
6733                 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6734                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
6735                                 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
6736                                         // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
6737                                         // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
6738                                         // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
6739                                         // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
6740                                         if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6741                                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
6742                                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
6743
6744                                                 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
6745                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
6746                                                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
6747                                                 false
6748                                         } else { true }
6749                                 });
6750                                 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
6751                         });
6752
6753                         let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6754                         intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
6755                                 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6756                                         let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6757                                                 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
6758                                                 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
6759                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6760                                                 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6761                                                 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
6762                                         });
6763
6764                                         let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
6765                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6766                                                 _ => unreachable!(),
6767                                         };
6768                                         timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
6769                                                         HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
6770                                                         HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
6771                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
6772                                         false
6773                                 } else { true }
6774                         });
6775                 }
6776
6777                 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
6778
6779                 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
6780                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
6781                 }
6782         }
6783
6784         /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
6785         ///
6786         /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
6787         /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
6788         ///
6789         pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
6790                 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
6791         }
6792
6793         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6794         pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
6795                 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
6796         }
6797
6798         /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
6799         /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
6800         pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
6801                 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
6802         }
6803
6804         /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6805         /// [`ChannelManager`].
6806         pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6807                 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6808         }
6809
6810         /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6811         /// [`ChannelManager`].
6812         ///
6813         /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6814         /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6815         #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6816         pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6817                 provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
6818         }
6819
6820         /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6821         /// [`ChannelManager`].
6822         pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
6823                 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
6824         }
6825
6826         /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6827         /// [`ChannelManager`].
6828         pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6829                 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
6830         }
6831
6832         /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6833         /// [`ChannelManager`].
6834         pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
6835                 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6836         }
6837 }
6838
6839 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
6840         ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6841 where
6842         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6843         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6844         ES::Target: EntropySource,
6845         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6846         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6847         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6848         R::Target: Router,
6849         L::Target: Logger,
6850 {
6851         fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
6852                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6853                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6854         }
6855
6856         fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
6857                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6858                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6859                          msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6860         }
6861
6862         fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
6863                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6864                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6865         }
6866
6867         fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
6868                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6869                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6870                          msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6871         }
6872
6873         fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
6874                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6875                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6876         }
6877
6878         fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
6879                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6880                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6881         }
6882
6883         fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
6884                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6885                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6886         }
6887
6888         fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
6889                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6890                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6891         }
6892
6893         fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
6894                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6895                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6896         }
6897
6898         fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
6899                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6900                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6901         }
6902
6903         fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
6904                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6905                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6906         }
6907
6908         fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
6909                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6910                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6911         }
6912
6913         fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
6914                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6915                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6916         }
6917
6918         fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
6919                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6920                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6921         }
6922
6923         fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
6924                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6925                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6926         }
6927
6928         fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
6929                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6930                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6931         }
6932
6933         fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
6934                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6935                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6936         }
6937
6938         fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
6939                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6940                         let force_persist = self.process_background_events();
6941                         if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
6942                                 if force_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { NotifyOption::DoPersist } else { persist }
6943                         } else {
6944                                 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
6945                         }
6946                 });
6947         }
6948
6949         fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
6950                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6951                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6952         }
6953
6954         fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
6955                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6956                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6957                 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6958                 let remove_peer = {
6959                         log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
6960                                 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6961                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
6962                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6963                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6964                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6965                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6966                                         chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
6967                                         if chan.is_shutdown() {
6968                                                 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
6969                                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
6970                                                 return false;
6971                                         }
6972                                         true
6973                                 });
6974                                 peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6975                                         update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
6976                                         self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
6977                                         false
6978                                 });
6979                                 peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6980                                         update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
6981                                         self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
6982                                         false
6983                                 });
6984                                 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
6985                                         match msg {
6986                                                 // V1 Channel Establishment
6987                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
6988                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
6989                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
6990                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
6991                                                 // V2 Channel Establishment
6992                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
6993                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
6994                                                 // Common Channel Establishment
6995                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
6996                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
6997                                                 // Interactive Transaction Construction
6998                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
6999                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
7000                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
7001                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
7002                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
7003                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
7004                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
7005                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
7006                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
7007                                                 // Channel Operations
7008                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
7009                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
7010                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
7011                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
7012                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
7013                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
7014                                                 // Gossip
7015                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
7016                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
7017                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
7018                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
7019                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
7020                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
7021                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
7022                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
7023                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
7024                                         }
7025                                 });
7026                                 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
7027                                 peer_state.is_connected = false;
7028                                 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
7029                         } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
7030                 };
7031                 if remove_peer {
7032                         per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
7033                 }
7034                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
7035
7036                 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7037                         self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
7038                 }
7039         }
7040
7041         fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
7042                 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
7043                         log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7044                         return Err(());
7045                 }
7046
7047                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7048
7049                 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
7050                 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
7051                 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
7052                 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
7053                 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
7054                 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
7055
7056                 {
7057                         let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7058                         match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
7059                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
7060                                         if inbound_peer_limited {
7061                                                 return Err(());
7062                                         }
7063                                         e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
7064                                                 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
7065                                                 outbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
7066                                                 inbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
7067                                                 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
7068                                                 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7069                                                 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
7070                                                 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
7071                                                 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
7072                                                 is_connected: true,
7073                                         }));
7074                                 },
7075                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
7076                                         let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
7077                                         peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
7078
7079                                         let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7080                                         if inbound_peer_limited &&
7081                                                 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
7082                                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
7083                                         {
7084                                                 return Err(());
7085                                         }
7086
7087                                         debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
7088                                         peer_state.is_connected = true;
7089                                 },
7090                         }
7091                 }
7092
7093                 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7094
7095                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7096                 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7097                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7098                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7099                         let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7100                         peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
7101                                 let retain = if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
7102                                         if !chan.context.have_received_message() {
7103                                                 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
7104                                                 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
7105                                                 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
7106                                                 // drop it.
7107                                                 false
7108                                         } else {
7109                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
7110                                                         node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7111                                                         msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
7112                                                 });
7113                                                 true
7114                                         }
7115                                 } else { true };
7116                                 if retain && chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
7117                                         if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.default_configuration) {
7118                                                 if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
7119                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
7120                                                                 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7121                                                                 msg, update_msg,
7122                                                         });
7123                                                 }
7124                                         }
7125                                 }
7126                                 retain
7127                         });
7128                 }
7129                 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
7130                 Ok(())
7131         }
7132
7133         fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
7134                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7135
7136                 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
7137                         let channel_ids: Vec<[u8; 32]> = {
7138                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7139                                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
7140                                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
7141                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7142                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7143                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned()
7144                                         .chain(peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.keys().cloned())
7145                                         .chain(peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.keys().cloned()).collect()
7146                         };
7147                         for channel_id in channel_ids {
7148                                 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
7149                                 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
7150                         }
7151                 } else {
7152                         {
7153                                 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
7154                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7155                                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
7156                                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
7157                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7158                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7159                                 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
7160                                         if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
7161                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
7162                                                         node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7163                                                         msg,
7164                                                 });
7165                                                 return;
7166                                         }
7167                                 }
7168                         }
7169
7170                         // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
7171                         let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
7172                 }
7173         }
7174
7175         fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
7176                 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
7177         }
7178
7179         fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
7180                 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
7181         }
7182
7183         fn get_genesis_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
7184                 Some(vec![ChainHash::from(&self.genesis_hash[..])])
7185         }
7186
7187         fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
7188                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7189                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7190                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7191         }
7192
7193         fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
7194                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7195                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7196                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7197         }
7198
7199         fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
7200                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7201                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7202                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7203         }
7204
7205         fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
7206                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7207                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7208                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7209         }
7210
7211         fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
7212                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7213                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7214                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7215         }
7216
7217         fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
7218                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7219                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7220                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7221         }
7222
7223         fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
7224                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7225                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7226                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7227         }
7228
7229         fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
7230                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7231                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7232                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7233         }
7234
7235         fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
7236                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7237                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7238                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7239         }
7240 }
7241
7242 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7243 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7244 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
7245         provided_init_features(config).to_context()
7246 }
7247
7248 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7249 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7250 ///
7251 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
7252 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
7253 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
7254 pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InvoiceFeatures {
7255         provided_init_features(config).to_context()
7256 }
7257
7258 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7259 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7260 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
7261         provided_init_features(config).to_context()
7262 }
7263
7264 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7265 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7266 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
7267         ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
7268 }
7269
7270 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7271 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7272 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
7273         // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
7274         // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
7275         // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
7276         let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
7277         features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
7278         features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
7279         features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
7280         features.set_static_remote_key_required();
7281         features.set_payment_secret_required();
7282         features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
7283         features.set_wumbo_optional();
7284         features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
7285         features.set_channel_type_optional();
7286         features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
7287         features.set_zero_conf_optional();
7288         if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
7289                 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
7290         }
7291         features
7292 }
7293
7294 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
7295 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
7296
7297 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
7298         (2, fee_base_msat, required),
7299         (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
7300         (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
7301 });
7302
7303 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
7304         (2, node_id, required),
7305         (4, features, required),
7306         (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
7307         (8, forwarding_info, option),
7308         (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
7309         (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
7310 });
7311
7312 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
7313         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7314                 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7315                 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
7316                 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
7317                 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
7318                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7319                         (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
7320                         (2, self.channel_id, required),
7321                         (3, self.channel_type, option),
7322                         (4, self.counterparty, required),
7323                         (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
7324                         (6, self.funding_txo, option),
7325                         (7, self.config, option),
7326                         (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
7327                         (9, self.confirmations, option),
7328                         (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
7329                         (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
7330                         (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
7331                         (16, self.balance_msat, required),
7332                         (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
7333                         (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
7334                         (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
7335                         (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
7336                         (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
7337                         (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
7338                         (26, self.is_outbound, required),
7339                         (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
7340                         (30, self.is_usable, required),
7341                         (32, self.is_public, required),
7342                         (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
7343                         (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
7344                         (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
7345                         (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
7346                 });
7347                 Ok(())
7348         }
7349 }
7350
7351 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
7352         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7353                 _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7354                         (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
7355                         (2, channel_id, required),
7356                         (3, channel_type, option),
7357                         (4, counterparty, required),
7358                         (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
7359                         (6, funding_txo, option),
7360                         (7, config, option),
7361                         (8, short_channel_id, option),
7362                         (9, confirmations, option),
7363                         (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
7364                         (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
7365                         (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
7366                         (16, balance_msat, required),
7367                         (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
7368                         // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
7369                         // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
7370                         (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
7371                         (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
7372                         (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
7373                         (22, confirmations_required, option),
7374                         (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
7375                         (26, is_outbound, required),
7376                         (28, is_channel_ready, required),
7377                         (30, is_usable, required),
7378                         (32, is_public, required),
7379                         (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
7380                         (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
7381                         (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
7382                         (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
7383                 });
7384
7385                 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7386                 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
7387                 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
7388                 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
7389                         ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
7390
7391                 Ok(Self {
7392                         inbound_scid_alias,
7393                         channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
7394                         channel_type,
7395                         counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
7396                         outbound_scid_alias,
7397                         funding_txo,
7398                         config,
7399                         short_channel_id,
7400                         channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
7401                         unspendable_punishment_reserve,
7402                         user_channel_id,
7403                         balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
7404                         outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
7405                         next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
7406                         next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
7407                         inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
7408                         confirmations_required,
7409                         confirmations,
7410                         force_close_spend_delay,
7411                         is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
7412                         is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
7413                         is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
7414                         is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
7415                         inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
7416                         inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
7417                         feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
7418                 })
7419         }
7420 }
7421
7422 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
7423         (2, channels, vec_type),
7424         (4, phantom_scid, required),
7425         (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
7426 });
7427
7428 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
7429         (0, Forward) => {
7430                 (0, onion_packet, required),
7431                 (2, short_channel_id, required),
7432         },
7433         (1, Receive) => {
7434                 (0, payment_data, required),
7435                 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
7436                 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
7437                 (3, payment_metadata, option),
7438         },
7439         (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
7440                 (0, payment_preimage, required),
7441                 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
7442                 (3, payment_metadata, option),
7443                 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
7444         },
7445 ;);
7446
7447 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
7448         (0, routing, required),
7449         (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
7450         (4, payment_hash, required),
7451         (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
7452         (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
7453         (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
7454         (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
7455 });
7456
7457
7458 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
7459         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7460                 match self {
7461                         HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
7462                                 0u8.write(writer)?;
7463                                 channel_id.write(writer)?;
7464                                 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7465                                 reason.write(writer)?;
7466                         },
7467                         HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
7468                                 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
7469                         }) => {
7470                                 1u8.write(writer)?;
7471                                 channel_id.write(writer)?;
7472                                 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7473                                 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
7474                                 failure_code.write(writer)?;
7475                         },
7476                 }
7477                 Ok(())
7478         }
7479 }
7480
7481 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
7482         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7483                 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7484                 match id {
7485                         0 => {
7486                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
7487                                         channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7488                                         htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7489                                         reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
7490                                 }))
7491                         },
7492                         1 => {
7493                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
7494                                         channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7495                                         htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7496                                         sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
7497                                         failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
7498                                 }))
7499                         },
7500                         // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
7501                         // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
7502                         // messages contained in the variants.
7503                         // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
7504                         // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
7505                         // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
7506                         2 => {
7507                                 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
7508                                 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
7509                                 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
7510                                 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
7511                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
7512                         },
7513                         3 => {
7514                                 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
7515                                 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
7516                                 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
7517                                 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
7518                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
7519                         },
7520                         _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
7521                 }
7522         }
7523 }
7524
7525 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
7526         (0, Forward),
7527         (1, Fail),
7528 );
7529
7530 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
7531         (0, short_channel_id, required),
7532         (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
7533         (2, outpoint, required),
7534         (4, htlc_id, required),
7535         (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
7536 });
7537
7538 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
7539         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7540                 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
7541                         OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
7542                         OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
7543                 };
7544                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7545                         (0, self.prev_hop, required),
7546                         (1, self.total_msat, required),
7547                         (2, self.value, required),
7548                         (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
7549                         (4, payment_data, option),
7550                         (5, self.total_value_received, option),
7551                         (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
7552                         (8, keysend_preimage, option),
7553                         (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
7554                 });
7555                 Ok(())
7556         }
7557 }
7558
7559 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
7560         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7561                 _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7562                         (0, prev_hop, required),
7563                         (1, total_msat, option),
7564                         (2, value_ser, required),
7565                         (3, sender_intended_value, option),
7566                         (4, payment_data_opt, option),
7567                         (5, total_value_received, option),
7568                         (6, cltv_expiry, required),
7569                         (8, keysend_preimage, option),
7570                         (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
7571                 });
7572                 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
7573                 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
7574                 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
7575                         Some(p) => {
7576                                 if payment_data.is_some() {
7577                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7578                                 }
7579                                 if total_msat.is_none() {
7580                                         total_msat = Some(value);
7581                                 }
7582                                 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
7583                         },
7584                         None => {
7585                                 if total_msat.is_none() {
7586                                         if payment_data.is_none() {
7587                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7588                                         }
7589                                         total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
7590                                 }
7591                                 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
7592                         },
7593                 };
7594                 Ok(Self {
7595                         prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
7596                         timer_ticks: 0,
7597                         value,
7598                         sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
7599                         total_value_received,
7600                         total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
7601                         onion_payload,
7602                         cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
7603                         counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
7604                 })
7605         }
7606 }
7607
7608 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
7609         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7610                 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7611                 match id {
7612                         0 => {
7613                                 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
7614                                 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
7615                                 let mut path_hops: Option<Vec<RouteHop>> = Some(Vec::new());
7616                                 let mut payment_id = None;
7617                                 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
7618                                 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
7619                                 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7620                                         (0, session_priv, required),
7621                                         (1, payment_id, option),
7622                                         (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
7623                                         (4, path_hops, vec_type),
7624                                         (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
7625                                         (6, blinded_tail, option),
7626                                 });
7627                                 if payment_id.is_none() {
7628                                         // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
7629                                         // instead.
7630                                         payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
7631                                 }
7632                                 let path = Path { hops: path_hops.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?, blinded_tail };
7633                                 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
7634                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7635                                 }
7636                                 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
7637                                         if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
7638                                                 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
7639                                                         *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7640                                                 }
7641                                         }
7642                                 }
7643                                 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7644                                         session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
7645                                         first_hop_htlc_msat,
7646                                         path,
7647                                         payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
7648                                 })
7649                         }
7650                         1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
7651                         _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
7652                 }
7653         }
7654 }
7655
7656 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
7657         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
7658                 match self {
7659                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
7660                                 0u8.write(writer)?;
7661                                 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
7662                                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7663                                         (0, session_priv, required),
7664                                         (1, payment_id_opt, option),
7665                                         (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
7666                                         // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
7667                                         (4, path.hops, vec_type),
7668                                         (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
7669                                         (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
7670                                  });
7671                         }
7672                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
7673                                 1u8.write(writer)?;
7674                                 field.write(writer)?;
7675                         }
7676                 }
7677                 Ok(())
7678         }
7679 }
7680
7681 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
7682         (0, forward_info, required),
7683         (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
7684         (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
7685         (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
7686         (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
7687 });
7688
7689 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
7690         (1, FailHTLC) => {
7691                 (0, htlc_id, required),
7692                 (2, err_packet, required),
7693         };
7694         (0, AddHTLC)
7695 );
7696
7697 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
7698         (0, payment_secret, required),
7699         (2, expiry_time, required),
7700         (4, user_payment_id, required),
7701         (6, payment_preimage, required),
7702         (8, min_value_msat, required),
7703 });
7704
7705 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7706 where
7707         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7708         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7709         ES::Target: EntropySource,
7710         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7711         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7712         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7713         R::Target: Router,
7714         L::Target: Logger,
7715 {
7716         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7717                 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
7718
7719                 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7720
7721                 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
7722                 {
7723                         let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7724                         best_block.height().write(writer)?;
7725                         best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
7726                 }
7727
7728                 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
7729                 {
7730                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7731                         let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
7732                         let mut number_of_channels = 0;
7733                         for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7734                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7735                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7736                                 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
7737                                         serializable_peer_count += 1;
7738                                 }
7739                                 number_of_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.len();
7740                                 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
7741                                         if !channel.context.is_funding_initiated() {
7742                                                 unfunded_channels += 1;
7743                                         }
7744                                 }
7745                         }
7746
7747                         ((number_of_channels - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
7748
7749                         for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7750                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7751                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7752                                 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
7753                                         if channel.context.is_funding_initiated() {
7754                                                 channel.write(writer)?;
7755                                         }
7756                                 }
7757                         }
7758                 }
7759
7760                 {
7761                         let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7762                         (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7763                         for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
7764                                 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
7765                                 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7766                                 for forward in pending_forwards {
7767                                         forward.write(writer)?;
7768                                 }
7769                         }
7770                 }
7771
7772                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7773
7774                 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7775                 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
7776                 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7777
7778                 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
7779                 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
7780                 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7781                 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
7782                         payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7783                         (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7784                         for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
7785                                 htlc.write(writer)?;
7786                         }
7787                         htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
7788                         htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
7789                 }
7790
7791                 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
7792                 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
7793                 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7794                         // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
7795                         // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
7796                         // per_peer_state lock at all.
7797                         peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
7798                 }
7799
7800                 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
7801                 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
7802                         // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
7803                         // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
7804                         // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
7805                         // no channels.
7806                         if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
7807                                 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
7808                                 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
7809                                 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
7810                                         monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
7811                                                 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
7812                                                 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
7813                                 }
7814                         }
7815                 }
7816
7817                 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7818                 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
7819                 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
7820                 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
7821                 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
7822                 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
7823                         // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
7824                         // well save the space and not write any events here.
7825                         0u64.write(writer)?;
7826                 } else {
7827                         (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7828                         for (event, _) in events.iter() {
7829                                 event.write(writer)?;
7830                         }
7831                 }
7832
7833                 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
7834                 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
7835                 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
7836                 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
7837                 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
7838                 0u64.write(writer)?;
7839
7840                 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
7841                 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
7842                 // likely to be identical.
7843                 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7844                 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7845
7846                 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7847                 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
7848                         hash.write(writer)?;
7849                         pending_payment.write(writer)?;
7850                 }
7851
7852                 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
7853                 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
7854                 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7855                         if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
7856                                 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
7857                         }
7858                 }
7859                 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
7860                 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7861                         match outbound {
7862                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7863                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7864                                         for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
7865                                                 session_priv.write(writer)?;
7866                                         }
7867                                 }
7868                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
7869                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
7870                         }
7871                 }
7872
7873                 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
7874                 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
7875                 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7876                         match outbound {
7877                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7878                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7879                                         pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
7880                                 },
7881                                 _ => {},
7882                         }
7883                 }
7884
7885                 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
7886                 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7887                 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
7888                         pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
7889                 }
7890
7891                 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
7892                 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
7893                         // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
7894                         // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
7895                         pending_claiming_payments = None;
7896                 }
7897
7898                 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
7899                 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
7900                         for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
7901                                 if !updates.is_empty() {
7902                                         if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(HashMap::new()); }
7903                                         in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
7904                                 }
7905                         }
7906                 }
7907
7908                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7909                         (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
7910                         (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7911                         (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
7912                         (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7913                         (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
7914                         (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
7915                         (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
7916                         (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
7917                         (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7918                         (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
7919                         (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
7920                         (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
7921                 });
7922
7923                 Ok(())
7924         }
7925 }
7926
7927 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
7928         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7929                 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
7930                 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
7931                         event.write(w)?;
7932                         action.write(w)?;
7933                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
7934                                 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
7935                                 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
7936                                 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
7937                                 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
7938                                 // check that the event is sane here.
7939                                 let event_encoded = event.encode();
7940                                 let event_read: Option<Event> =
7941                                         MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
7942                                 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
7943                         }
7944                 }
7945                 Ok(())
7946         }
7947 }
7948 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
7949         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7950                 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7951                 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
7952                 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
7953                         MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
7954                         len) as usize);
7955                 for _ in 0..len {
7956                         let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
7957                         let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
7958                         if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
7959                                 events.push_back((ev, action));
7960                         } else if action.is_some() {
7961                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7962                         }
7963                 }
7964                 Ok(events)
7965         }
7966 }
7967
7968 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
7969 ///
7970 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
7971 /// is:
7972 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7973 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
7974 ///    `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
7975 ///    This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
7976 ///    [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
7977 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
7978 ///    same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
7979 ///    [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
7980 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7981 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
7982 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
7983 ///    Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
7984 ///    will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
7985 ///    the next step.
7986 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
7987 ///    [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
7988 ///
7989 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
7990 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
7991 ///
7992 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
7993 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
7994 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
7995 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
7996 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
7997 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
7998 ///
7999 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
8000 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8001 where
8002         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8003         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8004         ES::Target: EntropySource,
8005         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8006         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8007         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8008         R::Target: Router,
8009         L::Target: Logger,
8010 {
8011         /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
8012         pub entropy_source: ES,
8013
8014         /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
8015         pub node_signer: NS,
8016
8017         /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
8018         /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
8019         /// signing data.
8020         pub signer_provider: SP,
8021
8022         /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
8023         ///
8024         /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
8025         pub fee_estimator: F,
8026         /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
8027         ///
8028         /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
8029         /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
8030         /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
8031         pub chain_monitor: M,
8032
8033         /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
8034         /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
8035         /// force-closed during deserialization.
8036         pub tx_broadcaster: T,
8037         /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
8038         /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
8039         ///
8040         /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
8041         pub router: R,
8042         /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
8043         /// deserialization.
8044         pub logger: L,
8045         /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
8046         /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
8047         pub default_config: UserConfig,
8048
8049         /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
8050         /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
8051         ///
8052         /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
8053         /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
8054         /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
8055         /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
8056         ///
8057         /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
8058         /// this struct.
8059         ///
8060         /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
8061         pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
8062 }
8063
8064 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8065                 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8066 where
8067         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8068         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8069         ES::Target: EntropySource,
8070         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8071         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8072         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8073         R::Target: Router,
8074         L::Target: Logger,
8075 {
8076         /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
8077         /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
8078         /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
8079         pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
8080                         mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
8081                 Self {
8082                         entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
8083                         channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
8084                 }
8085         }
8086 }
8087
8088 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
8089 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
8090 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8091         ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
8092 where
8093         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8094         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8095         ES::Target: EntropySource,
8096         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8097         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8098         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8099         R::Target: Router,
8100         L::Target: Logger,
8101 {
8102         fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8103                 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
8104                 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
8105         }
8106 }
8107
8108 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8109         ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
8110 where
8111         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8112         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8113         ES::Target: EntropySource,
8114         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8115         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8116         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8117         R::Target: Router,
8118         L::Target: Logger,
8119 {
8120         fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8121                 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
8122
8123                 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
8124                 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8125                 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
8126
8127                 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
8128
8129                 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8130                 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8131                 let mut peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8132                 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8133                 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8134                 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
8135                 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
8136                 for _ in 0..channel_count {
8137                         let mut channel: Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (
8138                                 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
8139                         ))?;
8140                         let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8141                         funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
8142                         if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
8143                                 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
8144                                                 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
8145                                                 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
8146                                                 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
8147                                         // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
8148                                         log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
8149                                         log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
8150                                         log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
8151                                                 log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
8152                                         let (monitor_update, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
8153                                         if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = monitor_update {
8154                                                 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
8155                                                         counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
8156                                                 });
8157                                         }
8158                                         failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
8159                                         channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
8160                                                 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8161                                                 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
8162                                                 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
8163                                         }, None));
8164                                         for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
8165                                                 let mut found_htlc = false;
8166                                                 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
8167                                                         if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
8168                                                 }
8169                                                 if !found_htlc {
8170                                                         // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
8171                                                         // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
8172                                                         // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
8173                                                         // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
8174                                                         // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
8175                                                         // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
8176                                                         // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
8177                                                         log_info!(args.logger,
8178                                                                 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
8179                                                                 log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
8180                                                         failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8181                                                 }
8182                                         }
8183                                 } else {
8184                                         log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
8185                                                 log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
8186                                                 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
8187                                         if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
8188                                                 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8189                                         }
8190                                         if channel.context.is_funding_initiated() {
8191                                                 id_to_peer.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
8192                                         }
8193                                         match peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
8194                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
8195                                                         let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
8196                                                         by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel);
8197                                                 },
8198                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
8199                                                         let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
8200                                                         by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel);
8201                                                         entry.insert(by_id_map);
8202                                                 }
8203                                         }
8204                                 }
8205                         } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
8206                                 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
8207                                 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
8208                                 // safely discard the channel.
8209                                 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false);
8210                                 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
8211                                         channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8212                                         user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
8213                                         reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
8214                                 }, None));
8215                         } else {
8216                                 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
8217                                 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
8218                                 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
8219                                 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
8220                                 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
8221                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8222                         }
8223                 }
8224
8225                 for (funding_txo, _) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
8226                         if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
8227                                 log_info!(args.logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
8228                                         log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
8229                                 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
8230                                         update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
8231                                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
8232                                 };
8233                                 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
8234                         }
8235                 }
8236
8237                 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
8238                 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8239                 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
8240                 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
8241                         let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8242                         let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8243                         let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
8244                         for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
8245                                 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
8246                         }
8247                         forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
8248                 }
8249
8250                 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8251                 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
8252                 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
8253                         let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
8254                         let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8255                         let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
8256                         for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
8257                                 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
8258                         }
8259                         claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
8260                 }
8261
8262                 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
8263                         PeerState {
8264                                 channel_by_id,
8265                                 outbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8266                                 inbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8267                                 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
8268                                 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
8269                                 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8270                                 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
8271                                 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8272                                 is_connected: false,
8273                         }
8274                 };
8275
8276                 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8277                 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>)>()));
8278                 for _ in 0..peer_count {
8279                         let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
8280                         let peer_chans = peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new());
8281                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
8282                         peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
8283                         per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
8284                 }
8285
8286                 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8287                 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
8288                         VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
8289                 for _ in 0..event_count {
8290                         match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
8291                                 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
8292                                 None => continue,
8293                         }
8294                 }
8295
8296                 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8297                 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
8298                         match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8299                                 0 => {
8300                                         // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
8301                                         // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
8302                                         // on-startup monitor updates.
8303                                         let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
8304                                         let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
8305                                 }
8306                                 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8307                         }
8308                 }
8309
8310                 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
8311                 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8312
8313                 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8314                 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
8315                 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
8316                         if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
8317                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8318                         }
8319                 }
8320
8321                 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8322                 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
8323                         HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
8324                 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
8325                         let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
8326                         let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
8327                                 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
8328                         };
8329                         if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
8330                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8331                         };
8332                 }
8333
8334                 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
8335                 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
8336                 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
8337                 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
8338                 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
8339                 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
8340                 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
8341                 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
8342                 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
8343                 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
8344                 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
8345                 let mut events_override = None;
8346                 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
8347                 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8348                         (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
8349                         (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
8350                         (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
8351                         (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
8352                         (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
8353                         (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
8354                         (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
8355                         (8, events_override, option),
8356                         (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
8357                         (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
8358                         (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
8359                         (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
8360                 });
8361                 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
8362                         fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8363                 }
8364
8365                 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
8366                         probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8367                 }
8368
8369                 if let Some(events) = events_override {
8370                         pending_events_read = events;
8371                 }
8372
8373                 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
8374                         pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
8375                 }
8376
8377                 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
8378                         pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
8379                 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
8380                         let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
8381                         for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
8382                                 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
8383                         }
8384                         pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
8385                 }
8386                 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
8387                         pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
8388                         retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
8389                 };
8390
8391                 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
8392                 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
8393                 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
8394                 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
8395                 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
8396                 //
8397                 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
8398                 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
8399                 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
8400                 //
8401                 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
8402                 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
8403                 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
8404                         ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
8405                          $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
8406                         ) => { {
8407                                 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
8408                                 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
8409                                 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
8410                                         log_trace!(args.logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
8411                                                 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, log_bytes!($funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
8412                                         max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
8413                                         pending_background_events.push(
8414                                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
8415                                                         counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
8416                                                         funding_txo: $funding_txo,
8417                                                         update: update.clone(),
8418                                                 });
8419                                 }
8420                                 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
8421                                         log_error!(args.logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
8422                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8423                                 }
8424                                 max_in_flight_update_id
8425                         } }
8426                 }
8427
8428                 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
8429                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
8430                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8431                         for (_, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
8432                                 // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
8433                                 // discarded.
8434                                 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8435                                 let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
8436                                         .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
8437                                 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
8438                                 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
8439                                         if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
8440                                                 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
8441                                                         handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
8442                                                                 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, ""));
8443                                         }
8444                                 }
8445                                 if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
8446                                         // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
8447                                         log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
8448                                         log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
8449                                                 log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
8450                                         log_error!(args.logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
8451                                         log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
8452                                         log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
8453                                         log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
8454                                         log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
8455                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8456                                 }
8457                         }
8458                 }
8459
8460                 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
8461                         for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
8462                                 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
8463                                         // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
8464                                         // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
8465                                         // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
8466                                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
8467                                                 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(HashMap::new()))
8468                                         });
8469                                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8470                                         handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
8471                                                 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, "closed ");
8472                                 } else {
8473                                         log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
8474                                         log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.",
8475                                                 log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
8476                                         log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
8477                                         log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
8478                                         log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
8479                                         log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
8480                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8481                                 }
8482                         }
8483                 }
8484
8485                 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
8486                 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
8487
8488                 {
8489                         // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
8490                         // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
8491                         // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
8492                         // corresponding `Channel` at all).
8493                         // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
8494                         // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
8495                         // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
8496                         // 0.0.102+
8497                         for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
8498                                 if id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
8499                                         for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
8500                                                 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
8501                                                         if path.hops.is_empty() {
8502                                                                 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
8503                                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8504                                                         }
8505
8506                                                         let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
8507                                                         let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
8508                                                         session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
8509                                                         match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
8510                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
8511                                                                         let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
8512                                                                         log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
8513                                                                                 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
8514                                                                 },
8515                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
8516                                                                         let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
8517                                                                         entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
8518                                                                                 retry_strategy: None,
8519                                                                                 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
8520                                                                                 payment_params: None,
8521                                                                                 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
8522                                                                                 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
8523                                                                                 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
8524                                                                                 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
8525                                                                                 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
8526                                                                                 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
8527                                                                                 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
8528                                                                                 total_msat: path_amt,
8529                                                                                 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
8530                                                                         });
8531                                                                         log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
8532                                                                                 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0),  log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
8533                                                                 }
8534                                                         }
8535                                                 }
8536                                         }
8537                                         for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
8538                                                 match htlc_source {
8539                                                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
8540                                                                 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
8541                                                                         info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
8542                                                                                 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
8543                                                                 };
8544                                                                 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
8545                                                                 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
8546                                                                 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
8547                                                                 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
8548                                                                 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
8549                                                                 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
8550                                                                         forwards.retain(|forward| {
8551                                                                                 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
8552                                                                                         if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
8553                                                                                                 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
8554                                                                                                         log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
8555                                                                                                 false
8556                                                                                         } else { true }
8557                                                                                 } else { true }
8558                                                                         });
8559                                                                         !forwards.is_empty()
8560                                                                 });
8561                                                                 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
8562                                                                         if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
8563                                                                                 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
8564                                                                                         log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
8565                                                                                 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
8566                                                                                         if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
8567                                                                                                 intercepted_id != ev_id
8568                                                                                         } else { true }
8569                                                                                 });
8570                                                                                 false
8571                                                                         } else { true }
8572                                                                 });
8573                                                         },
8574                                                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
8575                                                                 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
8576                                                                         let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
8577                                                                         // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
8578                                                                         // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
8579                                                                         // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
8580                                                                         // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
8581                                                                         // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
8582                                                                         // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
8583                                                                         // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
8584                                                                         // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
8585                                                                         pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv, path, false, &pending_events, &args.logger);
8586                                                                         pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
8587                                                                 }
8588                                                         },
8589                                                 }
8590                                         }
8591                                 }
8592                         }
8593                 }
8594
8595                 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
8596                         // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
8597                         // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
8598                         // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
8599                         // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
8600                         // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
8601                         pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
8602                                 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
8603                         }, None));
8604                 }
8605
8606                 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
8607                 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
8608
8609                 let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
8610                 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
8611                         if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
8612                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8613                         }
8614                         if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
8615                                 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
8616                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8617                                 }
8618                                 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
8619                                         purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
8620                                 {
8621                                         let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
8622                                                 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
8623                                         });
8624                                         if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
8625                                 }
8626                         } else {
8627                                 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
8628                                         let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
8629                                                 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
8630                                         });
8631                                         if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
8632                                 }
8633                         }
8634                 } else {
8635                         // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
8636                         // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
8637                         for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
8638                                 if htlcs.is_empty() {
8639                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8640                                 }
8641                                 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
8642                                         OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
8643                                                 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
8644                                                         events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
8645                                                                 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
8646                                                                         Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
8647                                                                         None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
8648                                                                                 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
8649                                                                                 Err(()) => {
8650                                                                                         log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
8651                                                                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8652                                                                                 }
8653                                                                         }
8654                                                                 },
8655                                                                 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
8656                                                         }
8657                                                 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
8658                                         },
8659                                         OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
8660                                                 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
8661                                 };
8662                                 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
8663                                         purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
8664                                 });
8665                         }
8666                 }
8667
8668                 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8669                 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8670
8671                 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
8672                         Ok(key) => key,
8673                         Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8674                 };
8675                 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
8676                         if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
8677                                 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
8678                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8679                         }
8680                 }
8681
8682                 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
8683                 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
8684                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8685                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8686                         for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
8687                                 if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
8688                                         let mut outbound_scid_alias;
8689                                         loop {
8690                                                 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
8691                                                         .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
8692                                                 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
8693                                         }
8694                                         chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
8695                                 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
8696                                         // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
8697                                         // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
8698                                         log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
8699                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8700                                 }
8701                                 if chan.context.is_usable() {
8702                                         if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
8703                                                 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
8704                                                 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
8705                                                 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
8706                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8707                                         }
8708                                 }
8709                         }
8710                 }
8711
8712                 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
8713
8714                 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
8715                         for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
8716                                 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
8717                                         log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
8718                                         let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
8719                                         let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
8720                                         let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
8721                                         if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
8722                                                 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
8723                                                         .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
8724                                                 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
8725                                         }
8726                                         for claimable_htlc in payment.htlcs {
8727                                                 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
8728
8729                                                 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
8730                                                 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
8731                                                 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
8732                                                 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
8733                                                 //
8734                                                 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
8735                                                 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
8736                                                 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
8737                                                 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
8738                                                 // reason to.
8739                                                 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
8740                                                 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
8741                                                 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
8742                                                 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
8743                                                 // restart.
8744                                                 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
8745                                                 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
8746                                                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
8747                                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8748                                                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8749                                                         if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
8750                                                                 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
8751                                                         }
8752                                                 }
8753                                                 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
8754                                                         previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
8755                                                 }
8756                                         }
8757                                         pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
8758                                                 receiver_node_id,
8759                                                 payment_hash,
8760                                                 purpose: payment.purpose,
8761                                                 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
8762                                         }, None));
8763                                 }
8764                         }
8765                 }
8766
8767                 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
8768                         if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
8769                                 for (_, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
8770                                         for action in actions.iter() {
8771                                                 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
8772                                                         downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
8773                                                                 Some((blocked_node_id, blocked_channel_outpoint, blocking_action)), ..
8774                                                 } = action {
8775                                                         if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&blocked_node_id) {
8776                                                                 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
8777                                                                         .entry(blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id())
8778                                                                         .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
8779                                                         }
8780                                                 }
8781                                         }
8782                                 }
8783                                 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
8784                         } else {
8785                                 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
8786                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8787                         }
8788                 }
8789
8790                 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
8791                         genesis_hash,
8792                         fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
8793                         chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
8794                         tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
8795                         router: args.router,
8796
8797                         best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
8798
8799                         inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
8800                         pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
8801                         pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
8802                         pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
8803
8804                         forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
8805                         claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
8806                         outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
8807                         id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
8808                         short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
8809                         fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
8810
8811                         probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
8812
8813                         our_network_pubkey,
8814                         secp_ctx,
8815
8816                         highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
8817
8818                         per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
8819
8820                         pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
8821                         pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
8822                         pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
8823                         total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
8824                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
8825                         background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
8826                         persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
8827
8828                         entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
8829                         node_signer: args.node_signer,
8830                         signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
8831
8832                         logger: args.logger,
8833                         default_configuration: args.default_config,
8834                 };
8835
8836                 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
8837                         let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
8838                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
8839                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
8840                         channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
8841                 }
8842
8843                 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
8844                 //connection or two.
8845
8846                 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
8847         }
8848 }
8849
8850 #[cfg(test)]
8851 mod tests {
8852         use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8853         use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8854         use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
8855         use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
8856         use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
8857         use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
8858         use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
8859         use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
8860         use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
8861         use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
8862         use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
8863         use crate::util::errors::APIError;
8864         use crate::util::test_utils;
8865         use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
8866         use crate::sign::EntropySource;
8867
8868         #[test]
8869         fn test_notify_limits() {
8870                 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
8871                 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
8872                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8873                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8874                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8875                 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8876
8877                 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
8878                 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
8879                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8880                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8881                 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8882
8883                 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8884
8885                 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
8886                 // to connect messages with new values
8887                 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
8888                 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
8889                 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
8890                         &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
8891                 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
8892                         &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
8893
8894                 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
8895                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8896                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8897                 // ... but the last node should not.
8898                 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8899                 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
8900                 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8901                 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8902
8903                 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
8904                 // about the channel.
8905                 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
8906                 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
8907                 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8908
8909                 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
8910                 // parties.
8911                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
8912                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
8913                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
8914                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
8915                 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8916                 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8917
8918                 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
8919                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8920                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8921
8922                 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
8923                 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
8924                 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
8925                 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
8926                 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
8927                 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
8928
8929                 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
8930                 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
8931                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
8932                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
8933                 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8934                 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8935                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8936                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8937
8938                 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
8939                 // the channel info has updated.
8940                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
8941                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
8942                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8943                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8944                 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8945                 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8946         }
8947
8948         #[test]
8949         fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
8950                 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
8951                 // expected.
8952                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8953                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8954                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8955                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8956                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8957
8958                 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
8959                 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8960                 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
8961                 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
8962
8963                 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
8964                 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
8965                 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
8966                 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
8967                 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
8968                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
8969                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
8970                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
8971                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8972                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8973                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8974                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
8975
8976                 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
8977                 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
8978                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8979                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8980                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8981                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8982                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8983                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8984                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8985                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8986                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8987                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8988                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
8989                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8990                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8991                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8992                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8993                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8994                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8995                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8996                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8997                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8998                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
8999
9000                 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
9001                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
9002                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
9003                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9004                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9005                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9006                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
9007
9008                 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
9009                 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
9010                 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
9011                 // lightning messages manually.
9012                 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9013                 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
9014                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
9015
9016                 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9017                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9018                 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
9019                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9020                 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9021                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
9022                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9023                 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9024                 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
9025                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9026                 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9027                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9028                 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
9029                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9030                 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9031                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
9032                 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9033                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9034                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
9035                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9036                 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
9037                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9038                 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9039                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
9040                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9041
9042                 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
9043                 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
9044                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9045                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
9046                 match events[0] {
9047                         Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
9048                                 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
9049                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
9050                                 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
9051                         },
9052                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9053                 }
9054                 match events[1] {
9055                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
9056                                 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
9057                                 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
9058                                 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
9059                         },
9060                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9061                 }
9062                 match events[2] {
9063                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
9064                                 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
9065                                 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
9066                                 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
9067                         },
9068                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9069                 }
9070         }
9071
9072         #[test]
9073         fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
9074                 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
9075                 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
9076         }
9077
9078         fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
9079                 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
9080                 //      outbound regular payment fails as expected.
9081                 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
9082                 //      fails as expected.
9083                 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
9084                 //      payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
9085                 //      reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
9086                 //      secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
9087                 //      `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
9088                 //      payment secrets and reject otherwise.
9089                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9090                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9091                 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
9092                 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
9093                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
9094                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9095                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9096                 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9097                 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9098
9099                 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
9100                 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
9101                 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
9102
9103                 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
9104                 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9105                         payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
9106                         final_value_msat: 100_000,
9107                 };
9108                 let route = find_route(
9109                         &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
9110                         None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9111                 ).unwrap();
9112                 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9113                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9114                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9115                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9116                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9117                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
9118                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9119                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9120                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9121                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9122                 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
9123                 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
9124                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9125                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
9126                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9127                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9128                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9129                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9130                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9131                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9132                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9133                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9134                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9135                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
9136
9137                 // Finally, claim the original payment.
9138                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
9139
9140                 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
9141                 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9142                 let route = find_route(
9143                         &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
9144                         None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9145                 ).unwrap();
9146                 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9147                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9148                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9149                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9150                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9151                 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9152                 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9153                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
9154
9155                 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
9156                 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
9157                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9158                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9159                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9160                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9161                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9162                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
9163                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9164                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9165                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9166                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9167                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9168                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
9169                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9170                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9171                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9172                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9173                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9174                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9175                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9176                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9177                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9178                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
9179
9180                 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
9181                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
9182
9183                 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
9184                 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
9185                 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9186                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
9187                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9188                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9189                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9190                 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9191                 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9192                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
9193
9194                 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
9195                 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9196                         payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
9197                         final_value_msat: 100_000,
9198                 };
9199                 let route = find_route(
9200                         &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
9201                         None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9202                 ).unwrap();
9203                 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
9204                 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9205                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
9206                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9207                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9208                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9209                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
9210                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9211                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9212                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9213                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9214                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9215                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
9216                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9217                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9218                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9219                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9220                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9221                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9222                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9223                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9224                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9225                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
9226
9227                 // Finally, claim the original payment.
9228                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
9229         }
9230
9231         #[test]
9232         fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
9233                 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
9234                 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
9235                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9236                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9237                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9238                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9239
9240                 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9241                 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9242
9243                 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9244                 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9245                         payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false),
9246                         final_value_msat: 10_000,
9247                 };
9248                 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
9249                 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9250                 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9251                 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9252                 let route = find_route(
9253                         &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9254                         nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9255                 ).unwrap();
9256
9257                 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9258                 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
9259                 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
9260                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
9261                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
9262                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
9263                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9264
9265                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9266                 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
9267                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9268                 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
9269                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9270                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9271                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
9272
9273                 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
9274         }
9275
9276         #[test]
9277         fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
9278                 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
9279                 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
9280                 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
9281                 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
9282                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9283                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9284                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
9285                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9286
9287                 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9288                 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9289
9290                 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9291                 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9292                         payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false),
9293                         final_value_msat: 10_000,
9294                 };
9295                 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
9296                 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9297                 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9298                 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9299                 let route = find_route(
9300                         &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9301                         nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9302                 ).unwrap();
9303
9304                 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9305                 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
9306                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
9307                 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
9308                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
9309                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
9310                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
9311                         PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
9312                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9313
9314                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9315                 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
9316                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9317                 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
9318                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9319                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9320                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
9321
9322                 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
9323         }
9324
9325         #[test]
9326         fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
9327                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9328                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9329                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9330                 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9331
9332                 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9333                 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9334                 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9335                 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9336
9337                 // Marshall an MPP route.
9338                 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
9339                 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
9340                 route.paths.push(path);
9341                 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9342                 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
9343                 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
9344                 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
9345                 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
9346                 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
9347
9348                 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9349                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
9350                 .unwrap_err() {
9351                         PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
9352                                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
9353                         },
9354                         _ => panic!("unexpected error")
9355                 }
9356         }
9357
9358         #[test]
9359         fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
9360                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9361                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9362                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9363                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9364
9365                 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9366
9367                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9368                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9369
9370                 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9371                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
9372                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9373                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9374
9375                 {
9376                         // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
9377                         // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
9378                         let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9379                         // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
9380                         assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
9381                         assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
9382                 }
9383
9384                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9385
9386                 {
9387                         // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
9388                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
9389                 }
9390         }
9391
9392         #[test]
9393         fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
9394                 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
9395                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9396                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9397                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9398                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9399
9400                 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
9401                 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
9402                         payment_secret,
9403                         total_msat: 100_000,
9404                 };
9405
9406                 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
9407                 // payment verification fails as expected.
9408                 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
9409                 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
9410                 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
9411                         Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
9412                         Err(()) => {
9413                                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
9414                         }
9415                 }
9416
9417                 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
9418                 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
9419         }
9420
9421         #[test]
9422         fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
9423                 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
9424                 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
9425                 // the channel is successfully closed.
9426                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9427                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9428                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9429                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9430
9431                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9432                 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9433                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
9434                 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9435                 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
9436
9437                 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
9438                 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
9439                 {
9440                         // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
9441                         // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
9442                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9443                         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9444                 }
9445
9446                 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9447                 {
9448                         // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
9449                         // as it has the funding transaction.
9450                         let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9451                         assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
9452                         assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9453                 }
9454
9455                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9456
9457                 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9458
9459                 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9460                 {
9461                         let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9462                         assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
9463                         assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9464                 }
9465                 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9466
9467                 {
9468                         // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
9469                         // as it has the funding transaction.
9470                         let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9471                         assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
9472                         assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9473                 }
9474                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9475                 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9476                 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
9477                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9478                 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9479                 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9480                 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
9481                 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
9482
9483                 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9484                 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9485                 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9486                 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
9487
9488                 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9489                 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
9490                 {
9491                         // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
9492                         // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
9493                         // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
9494                         // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
9495                         let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9496                         assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
9497                         assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9498                 }
9499
9500                 {
9501                         // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
9502                         // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
9503                         // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
9504                         // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
9505                         let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9506                         assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
9507                         assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9508                 }
9509
9510                 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9511                 {
9512                         // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
9513                         // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
9514                         // closing transaction).
9515                         // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
9516                         // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
9517                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9518
9519                         // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s  `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
9520                         // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
9521                         let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9522                         assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
9523                         assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9524                 }
9525
9526                 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9527
9528                 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
9529                 {
9530                         // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
9531                         // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
9532                         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9533                 }
9534                 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9535
9536                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
9537                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
9538         }
9539
9540         fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
9541                 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
9542                 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
9543         }
9544
9545         fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
9546                 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
9547                 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
9548         }
9549
9550         fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
9551                 match res_err {
9552                         Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
9553                                 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
9554                         },
9555                         Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
9556                                 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
9557                         },
9558                         Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
9559                         Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
9560                 }
9561         }
9562
9563         #[test]
9564         fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
9565                 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
9566                 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
9567                 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
9568                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9569                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
9570                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
9571                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
9572
9573                 // Dummy values
9574                 let channel_id = [4; 32];
9575                 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9576                 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
9577
9578                 // Test the API functions.
9579                 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
9580
9581                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
9582
9583                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
9584
9585                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
9586
9587                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
9588
9589                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
9590
9591                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
9592         }
9593
9594         #[test]
9595         fn test_connection_limiting() {
9596                 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
9597                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9598                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9599                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9600                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9601
9602                 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
9603
9604                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9605                 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9606
9607                 let mut funding_tx = None;
9608                 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
9609                         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9610                         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9611
9612                         if idx == 0 {
9613                                 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
9614                                 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
9615                                 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
9616                                 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
9617                                 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9618
9619                                 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9620                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9621                                 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9622
9623                                 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9624
9625                                 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
9626                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9627                                 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9628                         }
9629                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9630                 }
9631
9632                 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
9633                 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9634                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9635                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
9636                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9637
9638                 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
9639                 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
9640                 // limit.
9641                 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
9642                 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
9643                         let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
9644                                 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
9645                         peer_pks.push(random_pk);
9646                         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9647                                 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9648                         }, true).unwrap();
9649                 }
9650                 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
9651                         &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
9652                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9653                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9654                 }, true).unwrap_err();
9655
9656                 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
9657                 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
9658                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9659                 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9660                 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
9661                 for ev in chan_closed_events {
9662                         if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
9663                 }
9664                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9665                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9666                 }, true).unwrap();
9667                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
9668                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9669                 }, true).unwrap_err();
9670
9671                 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
9672                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
9673                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9674                 }, false).unwrap();
9675                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9676
9677                 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
9678                 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
9679                 // open channels.
9680                 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
9681                 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
9682                         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
9683                         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
9684                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9685                 }
9686                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9687                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
9688                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9689
9690                 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
9691                 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9692                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
9693
9694                 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
9695                 // "protected" and can connect again.
9696                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
9697                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
9698                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9699                 }, true).unwrap();
9700                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9701
9702                 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
9703                 // last_random_pk.
9704                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9705                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
9706         }
9707
9708         #[test]
9709         fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
9710                 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
9711                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9712                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9713                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9714                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9715
9716                 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
9717
9718                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9719                 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9720
9721                 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
9722                         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9723                         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9724                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9725                 }
9726
9727                 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
9728                 // rejected.
9729                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9730                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
9731                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9732
9733                 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
9734                 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9735                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9736
9737                 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
9738                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9739                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
9740                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9741         }
9742
9743         #[test]
9744         fn test_0conf_limiting() {
9745                 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
9746                 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
9747                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9748                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9749                 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
9750                 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
9751                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
9752                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9753
9754                 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
9755
9756                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9757                 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9758
9759                 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
9760                 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
9761                         let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
9762                                 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
9763                         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9764                                 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9765                         }, true).unwrap();
9766
9767                         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9768                         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9769                         match events[0] {
9770                                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
9771                                         nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
9772                                 }
9773                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9774                         }
9775                         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
9776                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9777                 }
9778
9779                 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
9780                 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
9781                         &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
9782                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9783                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9784                 }, true).unwrap();
9785                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9786                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9787                 match events[0] {
9788                         Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
9789                                 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
9790                                         Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
9791                                                 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
9792                                         _ => panic!(),
9793                                 }
9794                         }
9795                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9796                 }
9797                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
9798                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9799
9800                 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
9801                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9802                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9803                 match events[0] {
9804                         Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
9805                                 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
9806                         }
9807                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9808                 }
9809                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
9810         }
9811
9812         #[test]
9813         fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
9814                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
9815                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
9816                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
9817                 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
9818                 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
9819                 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
9820                 let hop_data = msgs::OnionHopData {
9821                         amt_to_forward: 100,
9822                         outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
9823                         format: msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode {
9824                                 keysend_preimage: None,
9825                                 payment_metadata: None,
9826                                 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
9827                                         payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
9828                                 }),
9829                         }
9830                 };
9831                 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
9832                 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
9833                 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::ReceiveError { err_code, .. }) =
9834                         node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9835                                 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat))
9836                 {
9837                         assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
9838                 } else { panic!(); }
9839
9840                 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
9841                 let hop_data = msgs::OnionHopData { // This is the same hop_data as above, OnionHopData doesn't implement Clone
9842                         amt_to_forward: 100,
9843                         outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
9844                         format: msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode {
9845                                 keysend_preimage: None,
9846                                 payment_metadata: None,
9847                                 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
9848                                         payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
9849                                 }),
9850                         }
9851                 };
9852                 assert!(node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9853                         sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat)).is_ok());
9854         }
9855
9856         #[test]
9857         fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
9858                 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
9859                 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
9860                 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
9861                 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
9862
9863                 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
9864                 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
9865
9866                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9867                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9868                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
9869                         &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
9870                 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9871
9872                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9873                 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9874
9875                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9876                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9877                 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9878                 match &msg_events[0] {
9879                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
9880                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9881                                 match action {
9882                                         ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
9883                                                 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
9884                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
9885                                 }
9886                         }
9887                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9888                 }
9889
9890                 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9891                 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9892                 match events[0] {
9893                         Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
9894                                 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
9895                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9896                 }
9897                 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9898         }
9899
9900         #[test]
9901         fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
9902                 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
9903                 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
9904                 // the channel without the anchors feature.
9905                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9906                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9907                 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
9908                 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
9909                 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
9910                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
9911                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9912
9913                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
9914                 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9915                 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
9916
9917                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9918                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9919                 match events[0] {
9920                         Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
9921                                 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9922                         }
9923                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9924                 }
9925
9926                 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9927                 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
9928
9929                 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9930                 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
9931
9932                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9933         }
9934
9935         #[test]
9936         fn test_update_channel_config() {
9937                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9938                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
9939                 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
9940                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
9941                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
9942                 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9943                 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
9944
9945                 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
9946                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9947                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
9948
9949                 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
9950                 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
9951                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
9952                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9953                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9954                 match &events[0] {
9955                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9956                         _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
9957                 }
9958
9959                 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
9960                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9961                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
9962
9963                 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
9964                 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
9965                         cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
9966                         ..Default::default()
9967                 }).unwrap();
9968                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
9969                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9970                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9971                 match &events[0] {
9972                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9973                         _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
9974                 }
9975
9976                 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
9977                 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
9978                         forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
9979                         ..Default::default()
9980                 }).unwrap();
9981                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
9982                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
9983                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9984                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9985                 match &events[0] {
9986                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9987                         _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
9988                 }
9989         }
9990 }
9991
9992 #[cfg(ldk_bench)]
9993 pub mod bench {
9994         use crate::chain::Listen;
9995         use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
9996         use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
9997         use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
9998         use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
9999         use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
10000         use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
10001         use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
10002         use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
10003         use crate::util::test_utils;
10004         use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
10005
10006         use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
10007         use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
10008         use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
10009
10010         use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
10011
10012         use criterion::Criterion;
10013
10014         type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
10015                 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
10016                         &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
10017                         &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
10018                 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
10019                 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
10020                 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
10021
10022         struct ANodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
10023                 node: &'a Manager<'a, P>,
10024         }
10025         impl<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'a, P> {
10026                 type CM = Manager<'a, P>;
10027                 #[inline]
10028                 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'a, P> { self.node }
10029                 #[inline]
10030                 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
10031         }
10032
10033         pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
10034                 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
10035         }
10036
10037         pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
10038                 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
10039                 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
10040                 // calls per node.
10041                 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
10042
10043                 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
10044                 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
10045                 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
10046                 let scorer = Mutex::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
10047                 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
10048
10049                 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
10050                 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
10051
10052                 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
10053                 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
10054                 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
10055                 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
10056                         network,
10057                         best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
10058                 });
10059                 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
10060
10061                 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
10062                 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
10063                 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
10064                 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
10065                 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
10066                         network,
10067                         best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
10068                 });
10069                 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
10070
10071                 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
10072                         features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10073                 }, true).unwrap();
10074                 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
10075                         features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10076                 }, false).unwrap();
10077                 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
10078                 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
10079                 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
10080
10081                 let tx;
10082                 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
10083                         tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
10084                                 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
10085                         }]};
10086                         node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
10087                 } else { panic!(); }
10088
10089                 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
10090                 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10091                 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
10092                 match events_b[0] {
10093                         Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
10094                                 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
10095                         },
10096                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10097                 }
10098
10099                 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
10100                 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10101                 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
10102                 match events_a[0] {
10103                         Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
10104                                 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
10105                         },
10106                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10107                 }
10108
10109                 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
10110
10111                 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), 42, vec![tx]);
10112                 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
10113                 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
10114
10115                 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
10116                 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10117                 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
10118                 match msg_events[0] {
10119                         MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
10120                                 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
10121                                 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
10122                         },
10123                         _ => panic!(),
10124                 }
10125                 match msg_events[1] {
10126                         MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
10127                         _ => panic!(),
10128                 }
10129
10130                 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10131                 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
10132                 match events_a[0] {
10133                         Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
10134                                 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
10135                         },
10136                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10137                 }
10138
10139                 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10140                 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
10141                 match events_b[0] {
10142                         Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
10143                                 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
10144                         },
10145                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10146                 }
10147
10148                 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
10149                 macro_rules! send_payment {
10150                         ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
10151                                 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
10152                                         .with_bolt11_features($node_b.invoice_features()).unwrap();
10153                                 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
10154                                 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
10155                                 payment_count += 1;
10156                                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
10157                                 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
10158
10159                                 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
10160                                         PaymentId(payment_hash.0), RouteParameters {
10161                                                 payment_params, final_value_msat: 10_000,
10162                                         }, Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
10163                                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
10164                                 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10165                                 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
10166                                 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
10167                                 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
10168                                 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
10169                                 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
10170
10171                                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
10172                                 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
10173                                 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
10174                                 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
10175
10176                                 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
10177                                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
10178                                                 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
10179                                                 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10180                                                 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
10181                                         },
10182                                         _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
10183                                 }
10184
10185                                 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
10186                                 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
10187                                 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
10188                                 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
10189
10190                                 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
10191                         }
10192                 }
10193
10194                 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
10195                         send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
10196                         send_payment!(node_b, node_a);
10197                 }));
10198         }
10199 }