1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`find_route`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 //! [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
24 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
25 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
30 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
35 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
38 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
39 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
40 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
41 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
42 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
43 // construct one themselves.
44 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
45 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
46 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
47 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
48 use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
49 use crate::routing::router::{InFlightHtlcs, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RoutePath, RouteParameters};
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
53 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
54 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::PendingOutboundPayment;
55 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
56 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, Recipient};
57 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig};
58 use crate::util::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
59 use crate::util::events;
60 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
61 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
62 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
63 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
64 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
67 use crate::prelude::*;
69 use core::cell::RefCell;
71 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock};
72 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
73 use core::time::Duration;
76 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
78 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
79 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
80 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
82 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
83 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
84 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
85 // before we forward it.
87 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
88 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
89 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
90 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
91 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
93 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
94 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
96 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
97 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
98 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
99 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
102 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
103 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
104 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
107 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
108 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
112 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
113 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
114 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
115 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
116 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
117 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
118 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
119 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
122 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
123 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
124 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
125 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
128 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
129 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
130 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
131 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
132 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
135 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
136 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
138 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
139 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
140 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
143 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
144 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
146 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
147 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
150 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
151 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
154 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
158 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
159 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
160 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
161 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
162 short_channel_id: u64,
164 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
165 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
167 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
168 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
173 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
175 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
176 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
177 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
179 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
180 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
183 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
184 struct ClaimableHTLC {
185 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
187 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
189 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
191 /// The sum total of all MPP parts
195 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
196 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
197 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
198 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
200 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
201 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
206 impl Readable for PaymentId {
207 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
208 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
213 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
214 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
215 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
216 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
218 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
219 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
224 impl Readable for InterceptId {
225 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
226 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
230 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
231 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
232 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
233 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
234 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
237 session_priv: SecretKey,
238 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
239 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
240 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
241 payment_id: PaymentId,
242 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
243 payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters>,
246 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
247 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
248 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
250 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
252 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
254 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat, payment_params } => {
257 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
258 payment_id.hash(hasher);
259 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
260 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
261 payment_params.hash(hasher);
266 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
269 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
270 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
272 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
273 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
274 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
275 payment_secret: None,
276 payment_params: None,
281 struct ReceiveError {
287 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>);
289 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
290 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
291 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
292 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
293 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
295 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
296 err: msgs::LightningError,
297 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
298 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
300 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
302 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
304 err: LightningError {
306 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
307 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
314 shutdown_finish: None,
318 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
320 err: LightningError {
322 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
325 shutdown_finish: None,
329 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
330 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
333 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
335 err: LightningError {
337 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
338 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
344 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
345 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
349 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
352 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
354 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
355 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
359 log_level: Level::Warn,
362 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
364 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
366 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
368 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
369 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
377 shutdown_finish: None,
382 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
383 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
384 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
385 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
386 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
388 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
389 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
390 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
391 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
392 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
393 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
394 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
396 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
400 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
401 struct ClaimingPayment {
403 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
404 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
406 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
407 (0, amount_msat, required),
408 (2, payment_purpose, required),
409 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
412 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
413 struct ClaimablePayments {
414 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
415 /// failed/claimed by the user.
417 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
418 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
420 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
421 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
422 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, (events::PaymentPurpose, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>)>,
424 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
425 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
426 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
427 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
430 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
431 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
432 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
433 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
434 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
435 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
438 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
439 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
440 /// quite some time lag.
441 enum BackgroundEvent {
442 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
443 /// commitment transaction.
444 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
447 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
448 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
449 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
450 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
451 /// event can be generated.
452 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
453 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user.
454 EmitEvent { event: events::Event },
457 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
458 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
460 latest_features: InitFeatures,
463 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
464 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
466 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
469 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
470 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
471 struct PendingInboundPayment {
472 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
473 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
474 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
475 /// this payment being removed.
477 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
478 user_payment_id: u64,
479 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
480 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
481 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
484 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
485 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
486 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
487 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
488 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
489 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
490 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
492 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
493 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
495 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
496 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
497 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
498 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
499 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
500 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
501 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
502 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
504 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
505 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<&'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
507 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
508 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
510 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
511 /// to individual Channels.
513 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
514 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
515 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
516 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
518 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
519 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
520 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
521 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
522 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
523 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
524 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
526 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
527 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
528 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
529 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
532 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
533 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
534 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
535 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
536 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
538 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
539 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
540 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
541 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
542 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
545 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
546 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
547 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
548 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
549 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
553 // `total_consistency_lock`
555 // |__`forward_htlcs`
557 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
559 // |__`pending_inbound_payments`
561 // | |__`claimable_payments`
563 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments`
565 // | |__`channel_state`
569 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
571 // | |__`per_peer_state`
573 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
577 // | |__`pending_events`
579 // | |__`pending_background_events`
581 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
582 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
583 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
584 K::Target: KeysInterface,
585 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
588 default_configuration: UserConfig,
589 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
590 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
594 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
596 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
598 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
599 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
601 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
602 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
603 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>,
604 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
605 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>,
607 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
608 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
609 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
610 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
612 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
613 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
615 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
616 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
617 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
618 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
619 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
620 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
621 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
622 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
624 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
626 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
627 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment>>,
629 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
631 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
632 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
633 /// and via the classic SCID.
635 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
636 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
638 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
640 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
642 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
643 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
644 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
646 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
647 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
649 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
650 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
652 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
653 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
655 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
656 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
657 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
658 /// active channel list on load.
660 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
661 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
663 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
665 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
666 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
667 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
669 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
670 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
671 /// the handling of the events.
674 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
675 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
676 /// would break backwards compatability.
677 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
678 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
679 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
681 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
682 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
684 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
686 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
687 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
688 /// confirmation depth.
690 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
691 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
692 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
694 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
696 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
698 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
700 our_network_key: SecretKey,
701 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
703 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
705 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
706 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
707 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
709 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
710 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
712 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
713 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
714 /// keeping additional state.
715 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
717 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
718 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
719 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
720 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
722 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
723 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
724 /// are currently open with that peer.
725 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
726 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
729 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
730 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
732 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
733 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
734 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
735 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
736 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
737 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
738 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
739 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
740 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
741 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
742 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
744 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
751 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
753 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
754 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
755 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
756 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
757 pub struct ChainParameters {
758 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
759 pub network: Network,
761 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
763 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
764 pub best_block: BestBlock,
767 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
773 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
774 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
775 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
776 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
777 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
778 /// updates are ready for persistence).
780 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
781 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
782 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
783 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
784 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
786 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
787 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
790 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
791 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
792 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
795 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
796 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
798 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
799 persistence_notifier: notifier,
800 should_persist: persist_check,
801 _read_guard: read_guard,
806 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
808 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
809 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
814 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
815 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
817 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
819 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
820 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
821 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
822 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
823 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
825 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
826 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
828 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
830 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
831 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
832 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
833 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
834 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
835 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
836 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
837 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
838 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
839 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
840 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
841 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
842 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
844 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
845 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
847 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
848 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
849 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
850 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
852 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
853 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
854 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
855 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
856 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
857 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
860 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
862 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
863 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
866 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
868 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
869 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
871 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
872 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
873 /// [`ChannelManager::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
874 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
876 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
877 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
878 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
879 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
880 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
881 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
882 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
883 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
884 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
885 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
886 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
889 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
890 /// to better separate parameters.
891 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
892 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
893 /// The node_id of our counterparty
894 pub node_id: PublicKey,
895 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
896 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
897 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
898 pub features: InitFeatures,
899 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
900 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
901 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
903 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
905 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
906 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
907 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
908 /// payments to us through this channel.
909 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
910 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
911 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
912 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
913 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
914 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
915 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
918 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
919 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
920 pub struct ChannelDetails {
921 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
922 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
923 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
924 /// lifetime of the channel.
925 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
926 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
927 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
928 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
929 /// our counterparty already.
931 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
932 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
933 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
934 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
936 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
937 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
938 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
939 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
941 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
942 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
944 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
945 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
947 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
948 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
949 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
950 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
951 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
952 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
953 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
954 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
955 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
958 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
960 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
961 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
962 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
963 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
964 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
965 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
966 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
968 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
969 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
971 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
972 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
973 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
974 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
975 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
976 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
977 /// this value on chain.
979 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
981 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
983 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
984 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
985 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or a random value if the channel was
986 /// inbound. This may be zero for inbound channels serialized with LDK versions prior to
988 pub user_channel_id: u128,
989 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
990 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
991 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
993 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
994 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
995 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
996 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
998 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
999 pub balance_msat: u64,
1000 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1001 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1002 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1003 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1005 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1007 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1008 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1009 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1010 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1011 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1012 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1013 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1014 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1016 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1017 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1018 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1019 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1020 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1021 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1022 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1024 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1025 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1026 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1027 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1028 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1029 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1030 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1031 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1032 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1034 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1036 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1037 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1038 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1039 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1040 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1042 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1043 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1044 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1045 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1046 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1047 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1048 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1050 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1051 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1052 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1053 pub is_outbound: bool,
1054 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1055 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1056 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1057 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1058 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1060 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1061 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1062 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1063 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1065 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1066 pub is_usable: bool,
1067 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1068 pub is_public: bool,
1069 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1070 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1071 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1072 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1073 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1074 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1076 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1077 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1080 impl ChannelDetails {
1081 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1082 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1083 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1085 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1086 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1087 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1088 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1091 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1092 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1093 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1095 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1096 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1097 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1098 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1102 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
1103 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
1104 /// states for more.
1105 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
1106 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
1107 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
1108 /// send the payment at all.
1110 /// You can freely resend the payment in full (with the parameter error fixed).
1112 /// Because the payment failed outright, no payment tracking is done, you do not need to call
1113 /// [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] and [`ChannelManager::retry_payment`] will *not* work
1114 /// for this payment.
1115 ParameterError(APIError),
1116 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
1117 /// from attempting to send the payment at all.
1119 /// You can freely resend the payment in full (with the parameter error fixed).
1121 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1124 /// Because the payment failed outright, no payment tracking is done, you do not need to call
1125 /// [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] and [`ChannelManager::retry_payment`] will *not* work
1126 /// for this payment.
1127 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
1128 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
1129 /// You can freely resend the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
1130 /// paths than the ones selected).
1132 /// Because the payment failed outright, no payment tracking is done, you do not need to call
1133 /// [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] and [`ChannelManager::retry_payment`] will *not* work
1134 /// for this payment.
1135 AllFailedResendSafe(Vec<APIError>),
1136 /// Indicates that a payment for the provided [`PaymentId`] is already in-flight and has not
1137 /// yet completed (i.e. generated an [`Event::PaymentSent`]) or been abandoned (via
1138 /// [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`]).
1140 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
1142 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
1143 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
1144 /// in over-/re-payment.
1146 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1147 /// send_payment, and any `Err`s which are not [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] can be
1148 /// safely retried via [`ChannelManager::retry_payment`].
1150 /// Any entries which contain `Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInprogress)` or `Ok(())` MUST NOT be
1151 /// retried as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent
1152 /// (in the case of `Ok(())`) or will send once a [`MonitorEvent::Completed`] is provided for
1153 /// the next-hop channel with the latest update_id.
1155 /// The errors themselves, in the same order as the route hops.
1156 results: Vec<Result<(), APIError>>,
1157 /// If some paths failed without irrevocably committing to the new HTLC(s), this will
1158 /// contain a [`RouteParameters`] object which can be used to calculate a new route that
1159 /// will pay all remaining unpaid balance.
1160 failed_paths_retry: Option<RouteParameters>,
1161 /// The payment id for the payment, which is now at least partially pending.
1162 payment_id: PaymentId,
1166 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1168 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
1170 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1171 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1172 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1173 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1175 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1176 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1177 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1180 macro_rules! handle_error {
1181 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
1184 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1185 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1187 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1188 // entering the macro.
1189 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
1190 assert!($self.pending_events.try_lock().is_ok());
1193 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1195 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1196 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1197 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1198 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1202 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1203 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1204 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1205 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1210 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1211 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1213 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1214 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1215 action: err.action.clone()
1219 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1220 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1223 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1230 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1231 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {{
1232 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.channel_id());
1233 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1234 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1235 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1237 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1238 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1239 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1240 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1241 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1243 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1244 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1246 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1250 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1251 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1252 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1254 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1255 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1257 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1258 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1260 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1261 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1262 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel);
1263 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1264 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1265 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1271 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1272 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1276 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1278 $entry.remove_entry();
1286 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1287 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1291 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1293 $entry.remove_entry();
1301 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1302 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1304 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1305 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, channel);
1311 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_res {
1312 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
1314 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1315 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
1316 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $chan);
1317 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
1318 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
1319 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
1320 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
1321 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
1322 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
1323 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
1324 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
1325 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
1326 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.get_user_id(),
1327 $chan.force_shutdown(false), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
1330 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1331 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update in progress. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations",
1332 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
1333 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
1334 match $action_type {
1335 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
1336 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
1338 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
1339 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
1341 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
1342 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len(),
1343 (&$failed_finalized_fulfills as &Vec<HTLCSource>).len());
1344 if !$resend_commitment {
1345 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
1348 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
1350 $chan.monitor_updating_paused($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
1351 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
1353 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
1358 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
1359 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
1361 $entry.remove_entry();
1365 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY) => { {
1366 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
1367 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1369 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, NO_UPDATE) => {
1370 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1372 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_channel_ready: expr, OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED) => {
1373 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, false, $resend_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1375 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1376 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1378 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1379 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new())
1383 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1384 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1385 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1386 node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1387 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1389 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1390 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1391 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1392 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1393 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1394 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1395 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1396 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1397 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1398 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1403 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1404 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1405 if $channel.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1407 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1408 pending_events.push(events::Event::ChannelReady {
1409 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1410 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1411 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1412 channel_type: $channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
1415 $channel.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1420 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
1421 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
1422 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1423 K::Target: KeysInterface,
1424 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1427 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1429 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1430 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1432 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1434 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1435 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1436 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1437 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1438 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1439 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1440 let inbound_pmt_key_material = keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1441 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1443 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1444 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1445 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
1449 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1451 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1452 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1453 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1455 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1456 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1457 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1458 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1459 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
1460 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1461 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1462 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1464 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1465 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap()),
1468 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1469 fake_scid_rand_bytes: keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1471 probing_cookie_secret: keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1473 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1475 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1477 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1478 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1479 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1480 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
1488 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
1489 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1490 &self.default_configuration
1493 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1494 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1495 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1498 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1499 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1501 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
1503 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1507 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1512 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1514 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1515 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1516 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
1517 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
1518 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
1520 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1521 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1523 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1524 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1525 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1527 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1528 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1529 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1530 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1531 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1532 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1534 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1535 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1536 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1537 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1538 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1539 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1543 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1544 match per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) {
1545 Some(peer_state) => {
1546 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
1547 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1548 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1549 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1550 match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key,
1551 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
1552 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
1556 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
1561 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }),
1564 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1566 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1567 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1568 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1570 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1571 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1572 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1573 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1575 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1577 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1580 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1582 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1583 node_id: their_network_key,
1586 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1589 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1590 let mut res = Vec::new();
1592 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1593 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1594 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1595 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1596 let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
1597 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1598 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1599 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1600 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1601 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1602 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1603 features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1604 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1605 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1606 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1607 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1608 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1609 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1610 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1611 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
1612 Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1613 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1615 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1616 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1617 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1618 channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1619 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1620 outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1621 inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1622 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1623 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1624 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1625 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1626 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1627 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1628 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1629 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1630 confirmations: Some(channel.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1631 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1632 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1633 is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(),
1634 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1635 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1636 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1637 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1638 config: Some(channel.config()),
1642 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1643 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1644 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
1645 chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1651 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1652 /// more information.
1653 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1654 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1657 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to [`find_route`]
1658 /// to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1660 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1661 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1664 /// [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
1665 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1666 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1667 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1668 // really wanted anyway.
1669 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1672 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1673 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1674 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1675 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1676 Some(transaction) => {
1677 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1681 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1682 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1683 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1684 reason: closure_reason
1688 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1689 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1691 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1692 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1693 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1694 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1695 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1696 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1697 if *counterparty_node_id != chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id(){
1698 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The passed counterparty_node_id doesn't match the channel's counterparty node_id".to_owned() });
1700 let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = {
1701 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1702 match per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
1703 Some(peer_state) => {
1704 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1705 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1706 chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?
1708 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", counterparty_node_id) }),
1711 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1713 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1714 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1715 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
1716 let (result, is_permanent) =
1717 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
1719 remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
1724 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1725 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
1729 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1730 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
1731 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1732 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1736 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1740 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1744 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1745 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
1746 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
1747 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
1750 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
1754 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1755 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1756 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1758 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1759 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1761 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1762 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1763 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1764 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1766 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1768 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1769 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1770 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1771 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1772 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None)
1775 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1776 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1777 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1779 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1780 /// the channel being closed or not:
1781 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1782 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1783 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1784 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1785 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1786 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1787 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1789 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1791 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1792 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1793 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1794 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1795 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1799 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1800 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1801 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1802 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1803 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
1804 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
1805 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1806 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
1808 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1809 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1810 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1811 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1812 // ignore the result here.
1813 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
1817 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
1818 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
1819 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
1820 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1822 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1823 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1824 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1825 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *peer_node_id {
1826 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1828 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
1829 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
1831 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1833 remove_channel!(self, chan)
1835 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1838 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1839 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(broadcast));
1840 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
1841 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1842 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1847 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
1850 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1851 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1852 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
1853 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
1854 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1855 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1856 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1857 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
1858 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
1868 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
1869 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
1870 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
1872 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
1873 -> Result<(), APIError> {
1874 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
1877 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
1878 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
1879 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
1881 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
1882 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
1883 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
1884 -> Result<(), APIError> {
1885 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
1888 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
1889 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
1890 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
1891 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1892 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
1896 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
1897 /// local transaction(s).
1898 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
1899 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1900 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
1904 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
1905 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
1907 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1908 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != cltv_expiry {
1909 return Err(ReceiveError {
1910 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value",
1912 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
1915 // final_expiry_too_soon
1916 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
1917 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
1918 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
1919 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
1920 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
1921 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1922 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
1923 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
1924 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
1925 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
1926 return Err(ReceiveError {
1927 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
1928 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
1931 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
1932 return Err(ReceiveError {
1934 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
1935 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
1939 let routing = match hop_data.format {
1940 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
1941 return Err(ReceiveError {
1942 err_code: 0x4000|22,
1943 err_data: Vec::new(),
1944 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
1947 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
1948 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
1949 return Err(ReceiveError {
1950 err_code: 0x4000|22,
1951 err_data: Vec::new(),
1952 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
1954 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
1955 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
1957 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1958 phantom_shared_secret,
1960 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
1961 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
1962 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
1963 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
1964 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
1965 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
1966 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
1967 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
1968 return Err(ReceiveError {
1969 err_code: 0x4000|22,
1970 err_data: Vec::new(),
1971 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
1975 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
1977 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1980 return Err(ReceiveError {
1981 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
1982 err_data: Vec::new(),
1983 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
1988 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
1991 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1992 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
1993 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_msat,
1994 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1998 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
1999 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2000 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2002 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2003 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2004 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2005 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2006 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2007 failure_code: $err_code,
2013 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2014 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2017 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key).secret_bytes();
2019 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2020 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2021 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2022 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2023 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2024 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2025 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2026 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2028 macro_rules! return_err {
2029 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2031 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2032 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2033 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2034 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2035 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2036 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2042 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2044 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2045 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2047 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2048 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2052 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2053 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2055 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2057 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2058 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2059 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2060 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2061 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2063 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2066 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2067 let new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2068 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2070 public_key: onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx, new_pubkey, &shared_secret),
2071 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2072 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2075 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2076 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2077 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2078 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2082 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2083 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2084 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2087 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2088 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2089 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2090 outgoing_amt_msat: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2091 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2096 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref outgoing_amt_msat, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2097 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2098 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2099 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2100 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2101 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
2102 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
2103 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2104 let forwarding_id_opt = match id_option {
2105 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2106 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2107 // phantom or an intercept.
2108 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2109 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
2110 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)
2114 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2117 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => Some(chan_id.clone()),
2119 let chan_update_opt = if let Some(forwarding_id) = forwarding_id_opt {
2120 let chan = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2122 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and by_id maps have
2123 // no consistency guarantees.
2124 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2128 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2129 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2130 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2131 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2132 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2134 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2135 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2136 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2137 // we don't have the channel here.
2138 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2140 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2142 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2143 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2144 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2145 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2146 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2147 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2148 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2150 if *outgoing_amt_msat < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2151 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2153 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, *outgoing_amt_msat, *outgoing_cltv_value) {
2154 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2158 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
2159 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
2160 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
2161 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
2163 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2170 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2171 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2172 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2173 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2174 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2175 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2177 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2178 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2180 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2181 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2182 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2183 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2184 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2185 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2186 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2187 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2188 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2189 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2195 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2196 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2197 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2198 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2200 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2201 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2203 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2204 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2205 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2207 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2208 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2209 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2210 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
2211 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
2212 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
2213 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
2217 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2222 pending_forward_info
2225 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2226 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2227 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2229 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2230 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2231 if !chan.should_announce() {
2232 return Err(LightningError {
2233 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2234 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2237 if chan.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2238 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2240 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2241 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2244 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2245 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
2246 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2247 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2248 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2249 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2250 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2251 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
2252 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2256 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2258 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2259 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2260 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2262 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2263 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2265 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2266 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2267 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2268 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2269 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
2270 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2271 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2272 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2275 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
2276 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
2278 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2284 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
2285 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_params: &Option<PaymentParameters>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2286 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2287 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2288 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2290 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2291 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
2292 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2293 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2294 return Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
2296 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2298 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2300 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2301 let id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2302 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2303 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
2306 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2307 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2308 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
2310 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
2311 return Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
2313 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2314 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
2316 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(
2317 htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2319 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2320 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2322 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2323 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2324 }, onion_packet, &self.logger),
2327 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
2328 let update_err = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
2329 let chan_id = chan.get().channel_id();
2331 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_err, chan,
2332 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true))
2334 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure, Err(e)) => break Err(e),
2335 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed, Ok(())) => {},
2336 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress, Err(_)) => {
2337 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
2338 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
2339 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
2340 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
2341 // which we do in the send_payment check for
2342 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
2343 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
2345 _ => unreachable!(),
2348 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan_id));
2349 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2350 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
2351 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2352 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
2353 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2354 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2355 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2364 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
2365 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the `by_id` map.
2366 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
2367 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
2372 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2373 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2375 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2380 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2382 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
2383 /// fields for more info.
2385 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
2386 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
2387 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
2388 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a second payment with the same
2391 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
2392 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
2393 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
2394 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
2395 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
2397 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
2398 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
2400 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2401 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2402 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
2404 /// In general, a path may raise:
2405 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2406 /// node public key) is specified.
2407 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2408 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2410 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2411 /// relevant updates.
2413 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2414 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2415 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2417 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
2418 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
2419 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
2420 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
2423 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
2424 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
2425 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2427 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2428 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
2429 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2430 let onion_session_privs = self.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, *payment_secret, payment_id, route)?;
2431 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None, payment_id, None, onion_session_privs)
2435 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
2436 self.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, route)
2439 fn add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
2440 let mut onion_session_privs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2441 for _ in 0..route.paths.len() {
2442 onion_session_privs.push(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
2445 let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2446 match pending_outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
2447 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => Err(PaymentSendFailure::DuplicatePayment),
2448 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2449 let payment = entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2450 session_privs: HashSet::new(),
2451 pending_amt_msat: 0,
2452 pending_fee_msat: Some(0),
2455 starting_block_height: self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
2456 total_msat: route.get_total_amount(),
2459 for (path, session_priv_bytes) in route.paths.iter().zip(onion_session_privs.iter()) {
2460 assert!(payment.insert(*session_priv_bytes, path));
2463 Ok(onion_session_privs)
2468 fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2469 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
2470 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
2472 if payment_secret.is_none() && route.paths.len() > 1 {
2473 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Payment secret is required for multi-path payments".to_string()}));
2475 let mut total_value = 0;
2476 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2477 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2478 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
2479 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
2480 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
2481 continue 'path_check;
2483 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
2484 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
2485 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
2486 continue 'path_check;
2489 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2490 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
2492 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
2493 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
2495 if let Some(amt_msat) = recv_value_msat {
2496 debug_assert!(amt_msat >= total_value);
2497 total_value = amt_msat;
2500 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2501 let mut results = Vec::new();
2502 debug_assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), onion_session_privs.len());
2503 for (path, session_priv) in route.paths.iter().zip(onion_session_privs.into_iter()) {
2504 let mut path_res = self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &route.payment_params, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, &keysend_preimage, session_priv);
2507 Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress) => {
2508 // While a MonitorUpdateInProgress is an Err(_), the payment is still
2509 // considered "in flight" and we shouldn't remove it from the
2510 // PendingOutboundPayment set.
2513 let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2514 if let Some(payment) = pending_outbounds.get_mut(&payment_id) {
2515 let removed = payment.remove(&session_priv, Some(path));
2516 debug_assert!(removed, "This can't happen as the payment has an entry for this path added by callers");
2518 debug_assert!(false, "This can't happen as the payment was added by callers");
2519 path_res = Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Internal error: payment disappeared during processing. Please report this bug!".to_owned() });
2523 results.push(path_res);
2525 let mut has_ok = false;
2526 let mut has_err = false;
2527 let mut pending_amt_unsent = 0;
2528 let mut max_unsent_cltv_delta = 0;
2529 for (res, path) in results.iter().zip(route.paths.iter()) {
2530 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
2531 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
2532 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress) = res {
2533 // MonitorUpdateInProgress is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
2537 } else if res.is_err() {
2538 pending_amt_unsent += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2539 max_unsent_cltv_delta = cmp::max(max_unsent_cltv_delta, path.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta);
2542 if has_err && has_ok {
2543 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure {
2546 failed_paths_retry: if pending_amt_unsent != 0 {
2547 if let Some(payment_params) = &route.payment_params {
2548 Some(RouteParameters {
2549 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2550 final_value_msat: pending_amt_unsent,
2551 final_cltv_expiry_delta: max_unsent_cltv_delta,
2557 // If we failed to send any paths, we should remove the new PaymentId from the
2558 // `pending_outbound_payments` map, as the user isn't expected to `abandon_payment`.
2559 let removed = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().remove(&payment_id).is_some();
2560 debug_assert!(removed, "We should always have a pending payment to remove here");
2561 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedResendSafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
2567 /// Retries a payment along the given [`Route`].
2569 /// Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see
2570 /// [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the
2571 /// retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, if the payment
2572 /// for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success), or if
2573 /// further retries have been disabled with [`abandon_payment`].
2575 /// [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]
2576 /// [`abandon_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`]
2577 pub fn retry_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2578 const RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE: u64 = 10;
2579 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2580 if path.len() == 0 {
2581 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2582 err: "length-0 path in route".to_string()
2587 let mut onion_session_privs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2588 for _ in 0..route.paths.len() {
2589 onion_session_privs.push(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
2592 let (total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret) = {
2593 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2594 match outbounds.get_mut(&payment_id) {
2596 let res = match payment {
2597 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2598 total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret, pending_amt_msat, ..
2600 let retry_amt_msat: u64 = route.paths.iter().map(|path| path.last().unwrap().fee_msat).sum();
2601 if retry_amt_msat + *pending_amt_msat > *total_msat * (100 + RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE) / 100 {
2602 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2603 err: format!("retry_amt_msat of {} will put pending_amt_msat (currently: {}) more than 10% over total_payment_amt_msat of {}", retry_amt_msat, pending_amt_msat, total_msat).to_string()
2606 (*total_msat, *payment_hash, *payment_secret)
2608 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => {
2609 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2610 err: "Unable to retry payments that were initially sent on LDK versions prior to 0.0.102".to_string()
2613 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {
2614 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2615 err: "Payment already completed".to_owned()
2618 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {
2619 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2620 err: "Payment already abandoned (with some HTLCs still pending)".to_owned()
2624 for (path, session_priv_bytes) in route.paths.iter().zip(onion_session_privs.iter()) {
2625 assert!(payment.insert(*session_priv_bytes, path));
2630 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2631 err: format!("Payment with ID {} not found", log_bytes!(payment_id.0)),
2635 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &payment_secret, None, payment_id, Some(total_msat), onion_session_privs)
2638 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment will occur.
2640 /// After this method returns, no future calls to [`retry_payment`] for the given `payment_id`
2641 /// are allowed. If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be
2642 /// generated as soon as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
2644 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2645 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2646 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2648 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event is generated and we restart without this
2649 /// [`ChannelManager`] having been persisted, the payment may still be in the pending state
2650 /// upon restart. This allows further calls to [`retry_payment`] (and requiring a second call
2651 /// to [`abandon_payment`] to mark the payment as failed again). Otherwise, future calls to
2652 /// [`retry_payment`] will fail with [`PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError`].
2654 /// [`abandon_payment`]: Self::abandon_payment
2655 /// [`retry_payment`]: Self::retry_payment
2656 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2657 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2658 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2659 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2661 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2662 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
2663 if let Ok(()) = payment.get_mut().mark_abandoned() {
2664 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
2665 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2667 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
2675 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2676 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2677 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2678 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2679 /// never reach the recipient.
2681 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
2682 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
2684 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2685 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2687 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2689 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2690 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
2691 let preimage = match payment_preimage {
2693 None => PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()),
2695 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0).into_inner());
2696 let onion_session_privs = self.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, None, payment_id, &route)?;
2698 match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, Some(preimage), payment_id, None, onion_session_privs) {
2699 Ok(()) => Ok(payment_hash),
2704 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
2705 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
2706 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
2707 pub fn send_probe(&self, hops: Vec<RouteHop>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2708 let payment_id = PaymentId(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
2710 let payment_hash = self.probing_cookie_from_id(&payment_id);
2713 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2714 err: "No need probing a path with less than two hops".to_string()
2718 let route = Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None };
2719 let onion_session_privs = self.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, None, payment_id, &route)?;
2721 match self.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &None, None, payment_id, None, onion_session_privs) {
2722 Ok(()) => Ok((payment_hash, payment_id)),
2727 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
2729 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
2730 let target_payment_hash = self.probing_cookie_from_id(payment_id);
2731 target_payment_hash == *payment_hash
2734 /// Returns the 'probing cookie' for the given [`PaymentId`].
2735 fn probing_cookie_from_id(&self, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> PaymentHash {
2736 let mut preimage = [0u8; 64];
2737 preimage[..32].copy_from_slice(&self.probing_cookie_secret);
2738 preimage[32..].copy_from_slice(&payment_id.0);
2739 PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage).into_inner())
2742 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2743 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2744 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
2745 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], _counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
2746 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2748 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2750 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2752 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2753 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2754 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2755 } else { unreachable!(); })
2758 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
2760 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2761 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2764 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2765 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2770 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2771 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2772 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2775 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2776 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2777 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2779 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2780 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
2781 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
2782 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
2791 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2792 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2793 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2797 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2799 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2800 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2802 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
2803 /// across the p2p network.
2805 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2806 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2808 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2809 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2810 /// keys per-channel).
2812 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2813 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2814 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2816 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2817 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2818 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2820 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
2821 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
2822 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
2823 /// for more details.
2825 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2826 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2827 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2828 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2830 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2831 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2832 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2833 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2838 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2839 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools at the next block. However, the modules
2840 // constituting our Lightning node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if
2841 // the wallet module is in advance on the LDK view, allow one more block of headroom.
2842 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 2 {
2843 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2844 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
2848 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2849 let mut output_index = None;
2850 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2851 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2852 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2853 if output_index.is_some() {
2854 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2855 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2858 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2859 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2860 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2863 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2866 if output_index.is_none() {
2867 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2868 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2871 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2875 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
2877 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
2878 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
2879 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
2880 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
2882 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
2883 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
2885 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
2886 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
2888 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
2890 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
2891 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
2892 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
2893 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
2894 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2895 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
2896 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
2897 pub fn update_channel_config(
2898 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
2899 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2900 if config.cltv_expiry_delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA {
2901 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2902 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
2906 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(
2907 &self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier,
2910 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2911 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2912 for channel_id in channel_ids {
2913 let channel_counterparty_node_id = channel_state.by_id.get(channel_id)
2914 .ok_or(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2915 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found", log_bytes!(*channel_id)),
2917 .get_counterparty_node_id();
2918 if channel_counterparty_node_id != *counterparty_node_id {
2919 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2920 err: "counterparty node id mismatch".to_owned(),
2924 for channel_id in channel_ids {
2925 let channel = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
2926 if !channel.update_config(config) {
2929 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
2930 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
2931 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
2932 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2933 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2942 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
2943 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
2945 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
2946 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
2948 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
2949 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
2950 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
2951 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
2952 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
2954 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
2955 /// you from forwarding more than you received.
2957 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
2960 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
2961 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
2962 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
2963 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
2964 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], _next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2965 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2967 let next_hop_scid = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
2969 if !chan.is_usable() {
2970 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2971 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
2974 chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.outbound_scid_alias())
2976 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2977 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
2981 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
2982 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
2983 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
2986 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
2987 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
2988 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
2990 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
2992 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
2993 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
2996 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
2997 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
2998 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
2999 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
3000 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
3002 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
3006 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
3007 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
3009 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3012 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3013 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3014 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3016 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3017 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3018 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3021 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
3022 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3023 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3024 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3025 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
3026 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
3027 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3030 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
3031 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
3032 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3033 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3038 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3040 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3041 /// Will likely generate further events.
3042 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3043 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3045 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
3046 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3047 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3049 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
3050 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
3052 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
3053 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3054 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
3056 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3057 match forward_info {
3058 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3059 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3060 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3061 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3062 outgoing_cltv_value, incoming_amt_msat: _
3065 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3066 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3067 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3069 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3070 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3071 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3072 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3073 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3074 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3077 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3078 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3080 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3083 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3084 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
3090 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3091 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3093 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3097 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3098 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3100 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3104 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3105 let phantom_secret_res = self.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3106 if phantom_secret_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
3107 let phantom_shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &phantom_secret_res.unwrap()).secret_bytes();
3108 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3110 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3111 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3112 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3113 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3114 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3116 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3118 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3119 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3123 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3124 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
3125 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3126 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3132 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3135 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3138 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3139 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3140 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3141 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3142 // problem, not ours.
3148 let forward_chan_id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
3149 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
3151 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3155 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3156 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3157 match channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3158 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3159 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3162 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3163 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3164 match forward_info {
3165 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3166 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id: _,
3167 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3168 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
3169 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, incoming_amt_msat: _,
3172 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3173 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3174 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3175 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3176 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3177 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3178 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3179 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3181 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
3182 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
3183 onion_packet, &self.logger)
3185 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3186 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3188 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3190 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3191 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3192 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
3193 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3198 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3199 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3201 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3202 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3203 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_fail_htlc(
3204 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
3206 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3207 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3209 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
3211 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3212 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3213 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3222 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3223 match forward_info {
3224 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3225 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3226 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3227 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, ..
3230 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret) = match routing {
3231 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3232 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3233 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data }, Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret)
3235 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3236 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage), None, None),
3238 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3241 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3242 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3243 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3244 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3245 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3246 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3247 phantom_shared_secret,
3249 value: outgoing_amt_msat,
3251 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
3256 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3257 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
3258 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3259 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3260 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
3262 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3263 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3264 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3265 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3266 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3267 phantom_shared_secret,
3269 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
3270 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
3274 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
3275 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3276 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3277 receiver_node_id = self.keys_manager.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3278 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3281 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3282 ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3283 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
3285 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3286 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3287 payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
3290 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3291 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3292 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3295 let (_, htlcs) = claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
3296 .or_insert_with(|| (purpose(), Vec::new()));
3297 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3298 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3299 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3300 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3304 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.value;
3305 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3306 total_value += htlc.value;
3307 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3308 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3309 if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat {
3310 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3311 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3312 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3314 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3316 _ => unreachable!(),
3319 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > $payment_data.total_msat {
3320 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
3321 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, $payment_data.total_msat);
3322 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3323 } else if total_value == $payment_data.total_msat {
3324 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3325 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3326 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3327 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3330 amount_msat: total_value,
3331 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3332 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3334 payment_claimable_generated = true;
3336 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3337 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3339 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3341 payment_claimable_generated
3345 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3346 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3347 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3348 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3349 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3350 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3351 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3352 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3353 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3354 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3355 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3356 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3357 let payment_preimage = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3358 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
3360 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3364 check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
3366 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3367 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3368 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3369 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3372 match claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
3373 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3374 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
3375 e.insert((purpose.clone(), vec![claimable_htlc]));
3376 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3377 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3378 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3380 amount_msat: outgoing_amt_msat,
3382 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3383 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3386 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3387 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3388 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3394 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3395 if payment_data.is_none() {
3396 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3397 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3400 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3401 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3402 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3403 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3404 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3405 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3406 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3407 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3409 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3410 if payment_claimable_generated {
3411 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3417 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3418 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3426 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3427 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3429 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3431 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
3432 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
3433 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
3435 self.check_free_holding_cells();
3437 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3438 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3439 events.append(&mut new_events);
3442 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3444 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3445 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3447 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3448 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3449 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3450 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3451 if background_events.is_empty() {
3455 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3457 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3458 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3459 // monitor updating completing.
3460 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
3467 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3468 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3469 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3470 self.process_background_events();
3473 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
3474 if !chan.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; }
3475 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3476 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
3477 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3478 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3479 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3481 if !chan.is_live() {
3482 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3483 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3484 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3486 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3487 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3489 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.logger);
3490 NotifyOption::DoPersist
3494 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3495 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3496 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3497 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3498 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3499 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3500 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3502 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3504 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3505 for (chan_id, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter_mut() {
3506 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3507 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3514 fn remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self) {
3515 // If an outbound payment was completed, and no pending HTLCs remain, we should remove it
3516 // from the map. However, if we did that immediately when the last payment HTLC is claimed,
3517 // this could race the user making a duplicate send_payment call and our idempotency
3518 // guarantees would be violated. Instead, we wait a few timer ticks to do the actual
3519 // removal. This should be more than sufficient to ensure the idempotency of any
3520 // `send_payment` calls that were made at the same time the `PaymentSent` event was being
3522 let mut pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3523 let pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3524 pending_outbound_payments.retain(|payment_id, payment| {
3525 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, timer_ticks_without_htlcs, .. } = payment {
3526 let mut no_remaining_entries = session_privs.is_empty();
3527 if no_remaining_entries {
3528 for ev in pending_events.iter() {
3530 events::Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: Some(ev_payment_id), .. } |
3531 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ev_payment_id, .. } |
3532 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_id: Some(ev_payment_id), .. } => {
3533 if payment_id == ev_payment_id {
3534 no_remaining_entries = false;
3542 if no_remaining_entries {
3543 *timer_ticks_without_htlcs += 1;
3544 *timer_ticks_without_htlcs <= IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3546 *timer_ticks_without_htlcs = 0;
3553 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3555 /// This currently includes:
3556 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3557 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3558 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3560 /// * Expiring a channel's previous `ChannelConfig` if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
3561 /// with the current `ChannelConfig`.
3563 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
3564 /// estimate fetches.
3565 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3566 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3567 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3568 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3570 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3572 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
3573 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
3575 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3576 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3577 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3578 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3579 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3580 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3582 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3583 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
3584 handle_errors.push((Err(err), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()));
3585 if needs_close { return false; }
3588 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3589 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3590 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3591 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3592 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3593 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3594 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3595 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3599 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3600 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3602 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3603 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3604 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3608 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3609 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3614 chan.maybe_expire_prev_config();
3620 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
3621 if htlcs.is_empty() {
3622 // This should be unreachable
3623 debug_assert!(false);
3626 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3627 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
3628 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
3629 if htlcs[0].total_msat == htlcs.iter().fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.value) {
3631 } else if htlcs.into_iter().any(|htlc| {
3632 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
3633 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3635 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(htlcs.drain(..).map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
3642 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
3643 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
3644 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
3645 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
3646 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
3649 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3650 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3653 self.remove_stale_resolved_payments();
3655 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
3656 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
3657 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
3658 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
3659 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3666 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3667 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3668 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3670 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
3671 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
3672 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
3673 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
3675 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
3676 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
3677 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
3678 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
3679 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
3680 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3682 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
3683 if let Some((_, mut sources)) = removed_source {
3684 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3685 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3686 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
3687 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
3688 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
3689 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
3690 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3695 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3696 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3698 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
3700 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3701 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
3702 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
3703 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
3704 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
3705 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
3706 chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
3708 chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
3710 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
3711 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
3713 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3718 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3719 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3720 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3721 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
3722 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
3723 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
3724 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3725 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
3726 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
3727 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3729 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3730 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3731 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3732 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
3734 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
3735 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
3736 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
3737 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
3738 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3742 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3743 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3744 // be surfaced to the user.
3745 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
3746 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
3747 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
3749 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
3750 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3751 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3752 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
3754 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3757 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3758 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
3759 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
3760 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3764 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3765 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
3766 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
3767 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
3769 // Ensure that the `channel_state` lock is not held when calling this function.
3770 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock_order requirement for
3771 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `channel_state` lock, which calling this
3772 // function with the `channel_state` locked would.
3773 assert!(self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
3776 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3777 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3778 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3781 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3782 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3783 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3785 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, ref payment_params, .. } => {
3786 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3787 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3788 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3789 let mut all_paths_failed = false;
3790 let mut full_failure_ev = None;
3791 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(*payment_id) {
3792 if !payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
3793 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3796 if payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3797 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received failure of HTLC with payment_hash {} after payment completion", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3800 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3801 all_paths_failed = true;
3802 if payment.get().abandoned() {
3803 full_failure_ev = Some(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
3804 payment_id: *payment_id,
3805 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
3811 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3814 let mut retry = if let Some(payment_params_data) = payment_params {
3815 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3816 Some(RouteParameters {
3817 payment_params: payment_params_data.clone(),
3818 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3819 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3822 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3824 let path_failure = {
3826 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_error.decode_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source);
3828 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_error.decode_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source);
3830 if self.payment_is_probe(payment_hash, &payment_id) {
3831 if !payment_retryable {
3832 events::Event::ProbeSuccessful {
3833 payment_id: *payment_id,
3834 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3838 events::Event::ProbeFailed {
3839 payment_id: *payment_id,
3840 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3846 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
3847 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
3848 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
3849 if let Some(scid) = short_channel_id {
3850 retry.as_mut().map(|r| r.payment_params.previously_failed_channels.push(scid));
3852 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3853 payment_id: Some(*payment_id),
3854 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3855 payment_failed_permanently: !payment_retryable,
3862 error_code: onion_error_code,
3864 error_data: onion_error_data
3868 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3869 pending_events.push(path_failure);
3870 if let Some(ev) = full_failure_ev { pending_events.push(ev); }
3872 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint }) => {
3873 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), onion_error);
3874 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
3876 let mut forward_event = None;
3877 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
3878 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3879 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
3881 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
3882 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3883 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
3885 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3886 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
3889 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
3890 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3891 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
3892 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3893 time_forwardable: time
3896 pending_events.push(events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
3897 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
3898 failed_next_destination: destination,
3904 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
3905 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
3907 /// Note that calling this method does *not* guarantee that the payment has been claimed. You
3908 /// *must* wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] event which upon a successful claim will be
3909 /// provided to your [`EventHandler`] when [`process_pending_events`] is next called.
3911 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
3912 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
3913 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
3914 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
3916 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
3917 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
3918 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
3919 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3920 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3921 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
3922 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3924 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3927 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3928 if let Some((payment_purpose, sources)) = claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
3929 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3930 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3931 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3932 let phantom_pubkey = self.keys_manager.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3933 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3934 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
3939 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
3940 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: sources.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
3941 payment_purpose, receiver_node_id,
3943 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
3944 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
3945 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
3946 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3951 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
3953 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we check that all channels which contain a claimable
3954 // HTLC still exist. While this isn't guaranteed to remain true if a channel closes while
3955 // we're claiming (or even after we claim, before the commitment update dance completes),
3956 // it should be a relatively rare race, and we'd rather not claim HTLCs that require us to
3957 // go on-chain (and lose the on-chain fee to do so) than just reject the payment.
3959 // Note that we'll still always get our funds - as long as the generated
3960 // `ChannelMonitorUpdate` makes it out to the relevant monitor we can claim on-chain.
3962 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
3963 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
3964 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
3965 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
3966 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
3968 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
3969 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
3970 let mut valid_mpp = true;
3971 let mut errs = Vec::new();
3972 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3973 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3974 let chan_id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3975 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
3982 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_id) {
3987 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
3988 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
3989 debug_assert!(false);
3993 expected_amt_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
3994 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload {
3995 // We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check
3996 // that there's one payment here and move on.
3997 if sources.len() != 1 {
3998 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP spontaneous payment - this should not be reachable!");
3999 debug_assert!(false);
4005 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
4007 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
4008 mem::drop(channel_state);
4009 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4010 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
4013 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
4014 mem::drop(channel_state);
4015 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4016 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
4017 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
4021 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4022 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
4023 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.take().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop,
4025 |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
4027 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
4028 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
4029 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
4030 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
4031 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
4035 mem::drop(channel_state);
4037 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4038 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4039 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4040 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4041 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
4042 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
4043 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4045 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4048 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
4049 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
4050 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4051 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4055 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
4056 mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>,
4057 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
4058 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
4059 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
4061 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
4062 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4063 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4064 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4065 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
4066 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
4067 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
4068 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4069 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4071 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
4072 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4073 payment_preimage, e);
4074 let err = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err();
4075 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4076 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)));
4077 return Err((counterparty_node_id, err));
4080 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
4081 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
4082 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4083 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4084 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4085 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4086 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4087 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
4088 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4089 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4095 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4096 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)));
4102 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
4103 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4104 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4106 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
4107 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
4108 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same update and try
4109 // again on restart.
4110 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
4111 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
4112 payment_preimage, e);
4115 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
4117 chan.remove_entry();
4119 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4120 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
4121 Err((counterparty_node_id, res))
4125 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4126 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4127 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4131 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4132 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
4133 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, preimage_update);
4134 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
4135 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
4136 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
4137 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
4138 // again on restart.
4139 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4140 payment_preimage, update_res);
4142 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4143 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
4144 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
4145 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
4146 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
4147 // `PaymentForwarded`).
4148 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
4153 fn finalize_claims(&self, mut sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4154 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4155 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4156 for source in sources.drain(..) {
4157 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } = source {
4158 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
4159 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
4160 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
4161 assert!(payment.get().is_fulfilled());
4162 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, None) {
4163 pending_events.push(
4164 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
4166 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash(),
4176 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
4178 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4179 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4180 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
4181 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
4182 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4183 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
4184 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4185 if !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
4186 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4187 let fee_paid_msat = payment.get().get_pending_fee_msat();
4188 pending_events.push(
4189 events::Event::PaymentSent {
4190 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
4196 payment.get_mut().mark_fulfilled();
4200 // We currently immediately remove HTLCs which were fulfilled on-chain.
4201 // This could potentially lead to removing a pending payment too early,
4202 // with a reorg of one block causing us to re-add the fulfilled payment on
4204 // TODO: We should have a second monitor event that informs us of payments
4205 // irrevocably fulfilled.
4206 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
4207 let payment_hash = Some(PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner()));
4208 pending_events.push(
4209 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
4218 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
4221 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4222 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4223 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage,
4224 |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
4225 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4226 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4227 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4230 let prev_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
4231 let next_channel_id = Some(next_channel_id);
4233 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4235 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4241 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
4242 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4243 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4249 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4250 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4251 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4254 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
4255 for action in actions.into_iter() {
4257 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
4258 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4259 if let Some(ClaimingPayment { amount_msat, payment_purpose: purpose, receiver_node_id }) = payment {
4260 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
4261 payment_hash, purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4265 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event } => {
4266 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(event);
4272 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
4273 /// update completion.
4274 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4275 channel: &mut Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
4276 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
4277 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
4278 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
4279 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
4280 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
4282 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get_counterparty_node_id();
4283 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4284 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.outbound_scid_alias()),
4285 channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
4288 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4289 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
4291 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
4292 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4293 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4298 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel);
4300 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
4301 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
4302 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4303 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4308 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
4309 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
4310 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4311 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4312 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4317 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
4321 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
4327 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
4328 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
4329 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4335 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
4336 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4339 let (mut pending_failures, finalized_claims, counterparty_node_id) = {
4340 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4341 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4342 let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4343 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4344 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4346 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4350 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4351 let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
4352 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() {
4353 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
4354 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
4355 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
4356 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
4358 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()) {
4359 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4360 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4365 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(&mut channel_state.pending_msg_events, channel.get_mut(), updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready, updates.announcement_sigs);
4366 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4367 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4370 (updates.failed_htlcs, updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs, counterparty_node_id)
4372 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
4373 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
4375 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claims);
4376 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4377 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id: funding_txo.to_channel_id() };
4378 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
4382 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4384 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4385 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4388 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4389 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4390 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4392 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
4393 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
4394 /// used to accept such channels.
4396 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4397 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4398 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4399 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4402 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4403 /// it as confirmed immediately.
4405 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4406 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4407 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4409 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4410 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
4412 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
4413 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
4415 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
4416 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
4418 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4419 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4420 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4421 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
4424 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4425 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4427 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4428 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4429 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4430 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4431 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4432 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4434 if *counterparty_node_id != channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id() {
4435 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The passed counterparty_node_id doesn't match the channel's counterparty node_id".to_owned() });
4438 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
4439 } else if channel.get().get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4440 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4441 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4442 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4443 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
4446 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4447 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4448 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
4451 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4452 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4453 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4456 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4457 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Can't accept a channel that doesn't exist".to_owned() });
4463 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4464 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4465 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4468 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4469 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4472 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
4473 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
4474 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
4476 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4477 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager,
4478 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &their_features, msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration,
4479 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4482 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4483 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4487 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4488 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4489 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4490 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4491 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4492 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4494 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4495 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4496 if channel.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4497 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4499 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4500 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4501 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4504 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4505 pending_events.push(
4506 events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4507 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4508 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4509 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4510 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4511 channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4516 entry.insert(channel);
4522 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4523 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4524 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4525 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4526 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4527 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4528 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4529 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4531 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &their_features), chan);
4532 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4534 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4537 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4538 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4539 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4540 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4541 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4543 user_channel_id: user_id,
4548 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4549 let ((funding_msg, monitor, mut channel_ready), mut chan) = {
4550 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4551 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4552 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4553 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4554 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4555 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4556 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4558 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.keys_manager, &self.logger), chan), chan.remove())
4560 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4563 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
4564 // lock before watch_channel
4565 match self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
4566 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4567 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
4568 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4569 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4570 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4571 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4572 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
4573 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
4574 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4575 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(false);
4576 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4577 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
4579 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
4580 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4581 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4582 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
4583 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4584 chan.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, channel_ready.is_some(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4585 channel_ready = None; // Don't send the channel_ready now
4588 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4589 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4590 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4591 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4592 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4594 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4595 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4596 match id_to_peer.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
4597 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4598 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4599 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
4600 funding_msg.channel_id))
4602 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
4603 i_e.insert(chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
4606 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4607 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4610 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4611 send_channel_ready!(self, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
4619 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4621 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4622 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4623 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4624 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4625 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4626 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4627 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4629 let (monitor, funding_tx, channel_ready) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.keys_manager, &self.logger) {
4630 Ok(update) => update,
4631 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan),
4633 match self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
4634 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4636 let mut res = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, channel_ready.is_some(), OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED);
4637 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4638 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4639 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4640 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4641 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4642 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4648 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4649 send_channel_ready!(self, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get(), msg);
4653 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4656 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
4657 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
4661 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4662 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4663 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4664 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4665 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4666 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4667 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4669 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, self.get_our_node_id(),
4670 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
4671 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4672 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4673 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4674 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4675 msg: announcement_sigs,
4677 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4678 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4679 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4680 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4681 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4682 // announcement_signatures.
4683 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4684 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4685 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4686 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4692 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, chan.get_mut());
4696 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4700 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4701 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4702 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4703 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4704 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4706 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4707 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4708 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4709 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4712 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4713 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4714 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4715 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4718 let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), chan_entry);
4719 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4721 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4722 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
4723 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
4724 let (result, is_permanent) =
4725 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
4727 remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
4732 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4733 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4734 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4741 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4744 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4745 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
4746 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
4747 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
4750 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
4754 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4755 let (tx, chan_option) = {
4756 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4757 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4758 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4759 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4760 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4761 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4763 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
4764 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
4765 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4766 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4771 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
4772 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
4773 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
4774 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
4775 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
4776 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
4777 } else { (tx, None) }
4779 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4782 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
4783 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
4784 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
4786 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
4787 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4788 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4789 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4793 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4798 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4799 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
4800 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
4801 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
4803 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
4804 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
4805 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
4806 //but we should prevent it anyway.
4808 let pending_forward_info = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
4809 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4810 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4812 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4813 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4814 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4815 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4818 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
4819 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
4820 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
4821 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
4822 match pending_forward_info {
4823 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
4824 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
4825 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
4826 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
4828 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
4829 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
4830 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4831 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
4832 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4835 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
4837 _ => pending_forward_info
4840 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), chan);
4842 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4847 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4848 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4849 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
4850 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4851 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4852 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4853 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4854 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4856 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan)
4858 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4861 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
4865 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4866 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4867 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4868 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4869 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4870 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4871 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4873 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan);
4875 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4880 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4881 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4882 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4883 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4884 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4885 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4886 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4888 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
4889 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
4890 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
4892 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan);
4895 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4899 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4900 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4901 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4902 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4903 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4904 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4905 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4907 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
4908 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
4909 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan),
4910 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
4911 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
4912 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
4913 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan);
4918 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
4919 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some()) {
4923 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4924 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4925 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4927 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
4928 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4929 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4930 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4931 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4932 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4933 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4934 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4936 commitment_signed: msg,
4942 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4947 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
4948 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
4949 let mut forward_event = None;
4950 let mut new_intercept_events = Vec::new();
4951 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
4952 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4953 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4954 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
4955 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
4956 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
4957 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
4959 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
4960 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
4962 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4963 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
4964 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
4965 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4966 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4967 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
4969 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4970 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
4971 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
4973 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
4974 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4975 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
4976 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4977 new_intercept_events.push(events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
4978 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
4979 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
4980 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
4981 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
4984 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4985 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
4987 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4988 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
4989 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4990 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4991 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4992 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4993 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4994 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4997 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
4998 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
4999 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
5004 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
5005 // payments are being processed.
5006 if forward_htlcs_empty {
5007 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
5009 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5010 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
5017 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
5018 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
5021 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
5022 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5023 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
5026 match forward_event {
5028 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5029 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
5030 time_forwardable: time
5038 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5039 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
5041 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5042 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5043 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5044 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5045 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5046 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5048 let was_paused_for_mon_update = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
5049 let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self,
5050 chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5051 htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs;
5052 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), raa_updates.monitor_update);
5053 if was_paused_for_mon_update {
5054 assert!(update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
5055 assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none());
5056 assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty());
5057 assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty());
5058 assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty());
5059 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Existing pending monitor update prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
5061 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
5062 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan,
5063 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
5064 raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(), false,
5065 raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
5066 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
5068 } else { unreachable!(); }
5070 if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update {
5071 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5072 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5076 break Ok((raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
5077 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs,
5078 chan.get().get_short_channel_id()
5079 .unwrap_or(chan.get().outbound_scid_alias()),
5080 chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(),
5081 chan.get().get_user_id()))
5083 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5086 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
5088 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, finalized_claim_htlcs,
5089 short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, user_channel_id)) =>
5091 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
5092 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: channel_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5093 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
5095 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, user_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
5096 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claim_htlcs);
5103 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5104 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5105 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5106 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5107 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5108 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5109 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5111 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
5113 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5118 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5119 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5120 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5122 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5123 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5124 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5125 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5127 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
5128 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
5131 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5132 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
5133 self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), msg), chan),
5134 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5135 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5136 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
5139 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5144 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
5145 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5146 let chan_id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
5147 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
5149 // It's not a local channel
5150 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5153 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5154 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5155 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5156 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5157 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5158 if chan.get().should_announce() {
5159 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
5160 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
5161 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
5162 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5164 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
5166 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
5167 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
5168 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
5169 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5171 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
5172 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
5175 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5177 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
5180 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5182 let need_lnd_workaround = {
5183 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5184 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5186 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5187 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5188 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5189 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5191 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
5192 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
5193 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
5194 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
5195 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
5196 msg, &self.logger, self.our_network_pubkey.clone(), self.genesis_hash,
5197 &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
5198 let mut channel_update = None;
5199 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
5200 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5201 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5204 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
5205 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
5206 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
5207 // they have the latest channel parameters.
5208 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5209 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5210 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
5215 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
5216 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
5217 &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
5218 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
5219 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
5220 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
5224 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5228 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
5229 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
5232 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
5233 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
5238 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
5239 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
5240 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5241 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5242 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5243 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5244 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
5245 match monitor_event {
5246 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5247 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5248 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5249 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
5251 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5252 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5253 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5254 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5257 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5258 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5259 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5260 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5261 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5262 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5263 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5264 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5265 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
5266 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5267 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5271 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5272 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5274 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5276 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
5277 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5278 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5279 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5280 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5285 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5286 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id);
5292 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5293 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5296 has_pending_monitor_events
5299 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5300 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5301 /// update events as a separate process method here.
5303 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5304 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
5307 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5308 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5309 /// update was applied.
5310 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5311 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5312 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5313 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5315 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5316 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5317 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5318 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5320 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5321 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
5322 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
5323 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5325 holding_cell_failed_htlcs,
5327 chan.get_counterparty_node_id()
5330 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
5331 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
5332 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
5333 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5334 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5335 updates: commitment_update,
5339 has_monitor_update = true;
5340 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, channel_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
5341 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
5342 if close_channel { return false; }
5349 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5350 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5351 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
5358 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5359 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5360 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
5363 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5364 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5370 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5371 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5372 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5373 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5374 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5375 let mut has_update = false;
5377 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5378 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5379 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5380 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5382 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5383 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5384 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5385 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5387 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5388 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5391 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5392 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5393 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5394 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5395 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5400 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5402 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5403 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
5404 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
5410 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5411 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5418 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5419 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5425 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5426 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5428 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5429 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5430 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5431 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5432 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5433 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5434 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5435 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5436 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5437 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5438 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5439 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5440 assert!(should_broadcast);
5441 } else { unreachable!(); }
5442 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
5444 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5448 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5449 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5451 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5452 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5455 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5457 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5458 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5459 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5460 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5461 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5462 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5463 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5464 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5465 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5466 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5467 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5468 // never fail a payment too early.
5469 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5471 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5474 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5479 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5482 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5483 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5485 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
5486 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5487 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5489 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5491 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5492 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5496 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5497 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5499 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5501 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5502 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5503 /// [`PaymentClaimable::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::payment_preimage
5504 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5505 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5506 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, &self.keys_manager, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5509 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5510 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5512 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5515 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5517 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5519 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5520 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5521 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5522 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5523 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5526 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5527 /// stored external to LDK.
5529 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5530 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5531 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5533 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5534 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5537 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5538 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5539 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5540 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5542 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5543 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5544 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5545 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5546 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5548 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5549 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5550 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
5551 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5552 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
5554 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
5555 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
5557 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5558 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5562 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5563 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5565 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5567 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5568 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5569 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5570 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5573 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5574 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5576 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5579 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5581 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5583 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5584 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5587 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5588 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5590 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5591 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5592 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5595 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5596 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5598 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5599 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5600 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5601 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5603 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
5604 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5605 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
5606 Some(_) => continue,
5607 None => return scid_candidate
5612 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5614 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5615 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5617 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5618 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5619 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5623 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
5624 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
5625 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
5627 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
5628 /// times to get a unique scid.
5629 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5630 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5631 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5633 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
5634 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5635 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
5636 return scid_candidate
5640 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
5641 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
5642 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
5643 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
5645 for chan in self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.values() {
5646 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
5647 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
5648 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
5656 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5657 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5658 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5659 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
5660 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5665 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
5666 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5667 if events.is_empty() { None } else { Some(events.remove(0)) }
5671 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5672 !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().is_empty()
5676 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5677 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().clear()
5680 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
5681 /// using the given event handler.
5683 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
5684 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
5687 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock until the returned future completes so that
5688 // we can be sure no other persists happen while processing events.
5689 let _read_guard = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
5691 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5693 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5694 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5695 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5696 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5699 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5700 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5701 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5704 for event in pending_events {
5705 handler(event).await;
5708 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
5709 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
5714 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
5715 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
5716 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5717 K::Target: KeysInterface,
5718 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5721 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5722 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5723 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5724 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5726 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5727 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5728 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5729 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5732 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5733 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5735 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
5736 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5739 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
5740 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5741 mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
5743 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5744 events.replace(pending_events);
5753 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
5755 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
5756 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5757 K::Target: KeysInterface,
5758 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5761 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
5763 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
5764 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
5765 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
5766 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5767 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5769 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5770 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5771 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5772 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5775 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5776 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5777 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5780 for event in pending_events {
5781 handler.handle_event(event);
5789 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
5791 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
5792 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5793 K::Target: KeysInterface,
5794 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5797 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5799 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5800 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
5801 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
5802 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
5803 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
5806 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
5807 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
5810 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5811 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5812 let new_height = height - 1;
5814 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
5815 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
5816 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
5817 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
5818 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
5819 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
5822 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5826 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
5828 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
5829 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5830 K::Target: KeysInterface,
5831 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5834 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5835 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5836 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5837 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5839 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5840 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
5842 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5843 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger)
5844 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
5846 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5847 if height < last_best_block_height {
5848 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5849 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5853 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5854 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5855 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5856 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5858 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5859 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
5861 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5863 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
5865 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5867 macro_rules! max_time {
5868 ($timestamp: expr) => {
5870 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
5871 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
5872 // having an explicit local time source.
5873 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
5874 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
5875 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5876 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
5877 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
5883 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
5884 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5885 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
5886 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
5890 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
5891 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5892 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
5893 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
5894 if let (Some(funding_txo), block_hash) = (chan.get_funding_txo(), chan.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
5895 res.push((funding_txo.txid, block_hash));
5901 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
5902 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5903 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
5904 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
5905 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
5906 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
5907 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5908 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5913 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
5915 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
5916 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5917 K::Target: KeysInterface,
5918 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5921 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
5922 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
5924 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
5925 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
5926 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5927 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5928 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5930 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5931 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5933 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5934 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5935 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5936 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
5937 let res = f(channel);
5938 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
5939 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
5940 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
5941 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
5942 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.channel_id() }));
5944 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
5945 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
5946 if channel.is_usable() {
5947 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5948 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
5949 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5950 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5955 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5959 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel);
5961 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
5962 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5963 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5964 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5965 msg: announcement_sigs,
5967 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5968 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, height) {
5969 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5971 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5972 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5973 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap(),
5978 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
5979 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
5980 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
5981 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
5982 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
5983 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
5984 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
5985 // is always consistent.
5986 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
5987 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
5988 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()),
5989 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
5990 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
5993 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
5994 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, channel);
5995 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
5996 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
5997 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
5998 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
5999 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6003 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
6004 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
6005 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6006 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6007 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
6008 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6009 data: reason_message,
6018 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6019 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
6020 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
6021 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
6022 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
6023 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
6024 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
6025 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6026 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
6027 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
6029 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
6030 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
6031 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
6035 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
6038 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6039 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
6040 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6041 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6042 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
6043 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
6044 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6045 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6046 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
6049 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
6050 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6051 _ => unreachable!(),
6053 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
6054 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
6055 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
6056 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
6062 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
6064 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
6065 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
6069 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
6070 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
6071 /// [`await_persistable_update`], [`await_persistable_update_timeout`], or a future returned by
6072 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`] is guaranteed to be woken up.
6074 /// Note that this method is not available with the `no-std` feature.
6076 /// [`await_persistable_update`]: Self::await_persistable_update
6077 /// [`await_persistable_update_timeout`]: Self::await_persistable_update_timeout
6078 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`]: Self::get_persistable_update_future
6079 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
6080 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
6081 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
6084 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
6085 /// [`await_persistable_update`], `await_persistable_update_timeout`, or a future returned by
6086 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`] is guaranteed to be woken up.
6088 /// [`await_persistable_update`]: Self::await_persistable_update
6089 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`]: Self::get_persistable_update_future
6090 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
6091 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
6094 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when a persistable update is available. Note that
6095 /// callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this [`ChannelManager`] and
6096 /// should instead register actions to be taken later.
6097 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
6098 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
6101 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6102 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
6103 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
6106 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
6107 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
6108 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
6109 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
6113 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref >
6114 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
6115 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
6116 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6117 K::Target: KeysInterface,
6118 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6121 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
6122 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6123 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6126 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
6127 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6128 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6131 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
6132 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6133 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6136 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
6137 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6138 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6141 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
6142 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6143 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6146 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
6147 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6148 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6151 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
6152 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6153 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6156 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
6157 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6158 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6161 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
6162 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6163 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6166 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
6167 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6168 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6171 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
6172 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6173 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6176 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
6177 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6178 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6181 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
6182 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6183 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6186 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
6187 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6188 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6191 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
6192 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6193 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6196 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
6197 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6198 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
6201 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
6206 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
6207 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6208 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6211 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
6212 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6213 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6214 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
6216 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6217 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
6218 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
6219 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates. We believe we {} make future connections to this peer.",
6220 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id), if no_connection_possible { "cannot" } else { "can" });
6221 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6222 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6223 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
6224 if chan.is_shutdown() {
6225 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
6226 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
6229 no_channels_remain = false;
6234 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
6236 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6237 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6238 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6239 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6240 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6241 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6242 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6243 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6244 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6245 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6246 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6247 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6248 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6249 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
6250 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6251 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6252 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
6253 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
6254 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
6255 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
6259 if no_channels_remain {
6260 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
6263 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6264 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6268 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) -> Result<(), ()> {
6269 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
6270 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting with no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6274 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6276 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6279 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6280 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
6281 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6282 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
6283 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
6286 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
6287 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
6292 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6293 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
6294 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
6295 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6296 let retain = if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6297 if !chan.have_received_message() {
6298 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
6299 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
6300 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
6304 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6305 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6306 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
6311 if retain && chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6312 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()) {
6313 if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
6314 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
6315 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6323 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
6327 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
6328 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6330 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
6331 for chan in self.list_channels() {
6332 if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
6333 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6334 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6339 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
6340 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6341 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
6342 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6345 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
6346 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
6347 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6355 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6356 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6360 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6361 provided_node_features()
6364 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
6365 provided_init_features()
6369 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6370 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6371 pub fn provided_node_features() -> NodeFeatures {
6372 provided_init_features().to_context()
6375 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6376 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6378 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6379 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6380 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6381 pub fn provided_invoice_features() -> InvoiceFeatures {
6382 provided_init_features().to_context()
6385 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6386 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6387 pub fn provided_channel_features() -> ChannelFeatures {
6388 provided_init_features().to_context()
6391 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6392 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6393 pub fn provided_init_features() -> InitFeatures {
6394 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
6395 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the ChannelMessageHandler impl for
6396 // ErroringMessageHandler.
6397 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
6398 features.set_data_loss_protect_optional();
6399 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
6400 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
6401 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
6402 features.set_payment_secret_required();
6403 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
6404 features.set_wumbo_optional();
6405 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
6406 features.set_channel_type_optional();
6407 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
6408 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
6412 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6413 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6415 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
6416 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
6417 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
6418 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
6421 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
6422 (2, node_id, required),
6423 (4, features, required),
6424 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
6425 (8, forwarding_info, option),
6426 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6427 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6430 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
6431 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6432 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6433 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6434 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
6435 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
6436 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6437 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
6438 (2, self.channel_id, required),
6439 (3, self.channel_type, option),
6440 (4, self.counterparty, required),
6441 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
6442 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
6443 (7, self.config, option),
6444 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
6445 (9, self.confirmations, option),
6446 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
6447 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6448 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6449 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
6450 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6451 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6452 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6453 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6454 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6455 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
6456 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
6457 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
6458 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
6459 (30, self.is_usable, required),
6460 (32, self.is_public, required),
6461 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6462 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6463 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6469 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
6470 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6471 init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6472 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
6473 (2, channel_id, required),
6474 (3, channel_type, option),
6475 (4, counterparty, required),
6476 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6477 (6, funding_txo, option),
6478 (7, config, option),
6479 (8, short_channel_id, option),
6480 (9, confirmations, option),
6481 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
6482 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6483 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6484 (16, balance_msat, required),
6485 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6486 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6487 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6488 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6489 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6490 (22, confirmations_required, option),
6491 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
6492 (26, is_outbound, required),
6493 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
6494 (30, is_usable, required),
6495 (32, is_public, required),
6496 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6497 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6498 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6501 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6502 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6503 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
6504 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
6505 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
6509 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
6511 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
6512 outbound_scid_alias,
6516 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
6517 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
6519 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
6520 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6521 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
6522 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6523 confirmations_required,
6525 force_close_spend_delay,
6526 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
6527 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
6528 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
6529 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
6530 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
6531 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
6536 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
6537 (2, channels, vec_type),
6538 (4, phantom_scid, required),
6539 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
6542 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
6544 (0, onion_packet, required),
6545 (2, short_channel_id, required),
6548 (0, payment_data, required),
6549 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6550 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6552 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
6553 (0, payment_preimage, required),
6554 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6558 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
6559 (0, routing, required),
6560 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
6561 (4, payment_hash, required),
6562 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
6563 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
6564 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
6568 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6569 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6571 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
6573 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6574 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6575 reason.write(writer)?;
6577 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6578 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
6581 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6582 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6583 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
6584 failure_code.write(writer)?;
6591 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6592 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6593 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6596 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6597 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6598 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6599 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
6603 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6604 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6605 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6606 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
6607 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
6610 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
6611 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
6612 // messages contained in the variants.
6613 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
6614 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
6615 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
6617 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6618 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6619 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6620 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6621 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
6624 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6625 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6626 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6627 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6628 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
6630 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6635 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
6640 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
6641 (0, short_channel_id, required),
6642 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6643 (2, outpoint, required),
6644 (4, htlc_id, required),
6645 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
6648 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
6649 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6650 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
6651 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
6652 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
6654 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6655 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
6656 (1, self.total_msat, required),
6657 (2, self.value, required),
6658 (4, payment_data, option),
6659 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
6660 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
6666 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
6667 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6668 let mut prev_hop = crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6670 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
6671 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
6672 let mut total_msat = None;
6673 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
6674 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6675 (0, prev_hop, required),
6676 (1, total_msat, option),
6677 (2, value, required),
6678 (4, payment_data, option),
6679 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
6680 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
6682 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
6684 if payment_data.is_some() {
6685 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6687 if total_msat.is_none() {
6688 total_msat = Some(value);
6690 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
6693 if total_msat.is_none() {
6694 if payment_data.is_none() {
6695 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6697 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
6699 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
6703 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
6706 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
6713 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
6714 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6715 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6718 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6719 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
6720 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
6721 let mut payment_id = None;
6722 let mut payment_secret = None;
6723 let mut payment_params = None;
6724 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6725 (0, session_priv, required),
6726 (1, payment_id, option),
6727 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6728 (3, payment_secret, option),
6729 (4, path, vec_type),
6730 (5, payment_params, option),
6732 if payment_id.is_none() {
6733 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
6735 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
6737 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6738 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
6739 first_hop_htlc_msat,
6740 path: path.unwrap(),
6741 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
6746 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6747 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6752 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
6753 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
6755 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payment_params } => {
6757 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
6758 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6759 (0, session_priv, required),
6760 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
6761 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6762 (3, payment_secret, option),
6763 (4, *path, vec_type),
6764 (5, payment_params, option),
6767 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
6769 field.write(writer)?;
6776 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
6777 (0, forward_info, required),
6778 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
6779 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
6780 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
6781 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
6784 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
6786 (0, htlc_id, required),
6787 (2, err_packet, required),
6792 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
6793 (0, payment_secret, required),
6794 (2, expiry_time, required),
6795 (4, user_payment_id, required),
6796 (6, payment_preimage, required),
6797 (8, min_value_msat, required),
6800 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
6801 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
6802 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6803 K::Target: KeysInterface,
6804 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6807 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6808 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
6810 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6812 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
6814 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6815 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
6816 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
6820 // Take `channel_state` lock temporarily to avoid creating a lock order that requires
6821 // that the `forward_htlcs` lock is taken after `channel_state`
6822 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6823 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
6824 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6825 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6826 unfunded_channels += 1;
6829 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
6830 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6831 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6832 channel.write(writer)?;
6838 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6839 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6840 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
6841 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6842 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6843 for forward in pending_forwards {
6844 forward.write(writer)?;
6849 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6850 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
6851 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6853 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
6854 (claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6855 for (payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops)) in claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
6856 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6857 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6858 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
6859 htlc.write(writer)?;
6861 htlc_purposes.push(purpose);
6864 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6865 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6866 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6867 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
6868 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6869 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
6872 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6873 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6874 for event in events.iter() {
6875 event.write(writer)?;
6878 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
6879 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6880 for event in background_events.iter() {
6882 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
6884 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
6885 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
6890 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
6891 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
6892 // likely to be identical.
6893 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6894 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6896 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6897 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
6898 hash.write(writer)?;
6899 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
6902 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
6903 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
6904 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6905 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
6906 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
6909 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
6910 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6912 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6913 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6914 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
6915 session_priv.write(writer)?;
6918 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
6919 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
6923 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
6924 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
6925 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6927 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6928 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6929 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
6935 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
6936 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6937 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
6938 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
6941 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
6942 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
6943 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
6944 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
6945 pending_claiming_payments = None;
6947 debug_assert!(false, "While we have code to serialize pending_claiming_payments, the map should always be empty until a later PR");
6950 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6951 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
6952 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
6953 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
6954 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
6955 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
6956 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
6957 (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
6958 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
6965 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
6967 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
6969 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6970 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
6971 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
6972 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
6973 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
6974 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
6975 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
6976 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
6977 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6978 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
6979 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
6980 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
6981 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
6983 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
6984 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
6986 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
6987 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
6989 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
6990 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
6991 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
6992 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
6993 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
6994 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
6996 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
6997 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6998 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
6999 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7000 K::Target: KeysInterface,
7001 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7004 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
7005 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
7007 pub keys_manager: K,
7009 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7011 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
7012 pub fee_estimator: F,
7013 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7015 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
7016 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
7017 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
7018 pub chain_monitor: M,
7020 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
7021 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
7022 /// force-closed during deserialization.
7023 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
7024 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
7025 /// deserialization.
7027 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
7028 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
7029 pub default_config: UserConfig,
7031 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
7032 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
7034 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
7035 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
7036 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
7037 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
7039 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
7042 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
7043 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>,
7046 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
7047 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, L>
7048 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
7049 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7050 K::Target: KeysInterface,
7051 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7054 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
7055 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
7056 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
7057 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
7058 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>) -> Self {
7060 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
7061 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
7066 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
7067 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
7068 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
7069 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>>)
7070 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
7071 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7072 K::Target: KeysInterface,
7073 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7076 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7077 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
7078 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
7082 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
7083 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>)
7084 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
7085 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7086 K::Target: KeysInterface,
7087 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7090 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7091 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7093 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7094 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7095 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7097 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7099 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7100 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7101 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7102 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7103 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7104 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
7105 for _ in 0..channel_count {
7106 let mut channel: Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (&args.keys_manager, best_block_height))?;
7107 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7108 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
7109 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
7110 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7111 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7112 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7113 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7114 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
7115 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
7116 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7117 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7118 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7119 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7120 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7121 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7122 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7123 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7124 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7125 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7126 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7127 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
7128 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
7129 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
7130 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7131 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7132 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
7133 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
7134 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
7135 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7136 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7137 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7138 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
7140 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7141 let mut found_htlc = false;
7142 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7143 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
7146 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
7147 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
7148 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
7149 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
7150 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
7151 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
7152 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
7153 log_info!(args.logger,
7154 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
7155 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7156 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7160 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7161 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
7162 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7164 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7165 id_to_peer.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel.get_counterparty_node_id());
7167 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7169 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
7170 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
7171 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
7172 // safely discard the channel.
7173 let _ = channel.force_shutdown(false);
7174 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7175 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7176 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7177 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
7180 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7181 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7182 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7183 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7184 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7185 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7189 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
7190 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
7191 log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
7192 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
7196 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
7197 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7198 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7199 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
7200 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7201 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7202 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
7203 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
7204 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
7206 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
7209 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7210 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7211 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
7212 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7213 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7214 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
7215 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
7216 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
7218 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
7221 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7222 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
7223 for _ in 0..peer_count {
7224 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7225 let peer_state = PeerState {
7226 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
7228 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
7231 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7232 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
7233 for _ in 0..event_count {
7234 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
7235 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
7240 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7241 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
7242 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
7243 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7244 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
7245 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7249 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
7250 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7252 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7253 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
7254 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
7255 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
7256 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7260 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7261 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
7262 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
7263 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
7264 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
7265 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
7266 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
7268 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
7269 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7273 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
7274 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
7275 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
7276 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
7277 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
7278 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7279 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7280 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
7281 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
7282 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7283 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
7284 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7285 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
7286 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7287 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
7288 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
7289 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7290 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
7292 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
7293 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
7296 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
7297 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
7300 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
7301 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
7302 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
7303 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
7304 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
7305 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
7307 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
7309 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
7310 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
7311 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
7312 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
7313 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
7314 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
7315 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
7317 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7318 if by_id.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
7319 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() {
7320 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
7321 if path.is_empty() {
7322 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
7323 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7325 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
7326 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
7327 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
7328 match pending_outbound_payments.as_mut().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
7329 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7330 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
7331 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
7332 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
7334 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7335 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
7336 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
7337 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
7338 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
7340 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
7341 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
7342 total_msat: path_amt,
7343 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
7345 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
7346 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
7351 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7352 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) = htlc_source {
7353 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
7354 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
7355 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
7357 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
7358 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
7359 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
7360 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
7361 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
7362 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
7363 forwards.retain(|forward| {
7364 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
7365 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
7366 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7367 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7372 !forwards.is_empty()
7374 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
7375 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
7376 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7377 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7378 pending_events_read.retain(|event| {
7379 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
7380 intercepted_id != ev_id
7392 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
7393 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
7394 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
7395 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
7396 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
7397 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
7398 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
7399 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
7403 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
7404 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
7406 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
7407 if let Some(mut purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
7408 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
7409 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7411 for (purpose, (payment_hash, previous_hops)) in purposes.drain(..).zip(claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..)) {
7412 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7415 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
7416 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
7417 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
7418 if previous_hops.is_empty() {
7419 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7421 let purpose = match &previous_hops[0].onion_payload {
7422 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
7423 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
7424 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
7425 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
7426 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
7427 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
7428 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
7430 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7431 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7435 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
7437 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
7439 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
7440 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
7442 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7446 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7447 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
7449 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
7450 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
7453 let our_network_key = match args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node) {
7455 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7457 let our_network_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &our_network_key);
7458 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
7459 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
7460 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
7461 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7465 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
7466 for (chan_id, chan) in by_id.iter_mut() {
7467 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
7468 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
7470 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
7471 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.keys_manager);
7472 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
7474 chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
7475 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
7476 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7477 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7478 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7479 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7481 if chan.is_usable() {
7482 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
7483 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7484 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7485 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7486 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7491 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
7493 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7494 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
7495 if let Some((payment_purpose, claimable_htlcs)) = claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
7496 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7497 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
7498 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
7499 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
7500 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
7501 let phantom_pubkey = args.keys_manager.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
7502 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
7503 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
7505 for claimable_htlc in claimable_htlcs {
7506 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
7508 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
7509 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
7510 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
7511 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
7513 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
7514 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
7515 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
7516 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
7518 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
7519 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
7520 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
7521 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
7523 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
7524 if let Some(channel) = by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
7525 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
7527 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
7528 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
7531 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
7534 purpose: payment_purpose,
7535 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
7541 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
7543 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
7544 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
7545 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
7547 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
7549 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
7551 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7553 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
7554 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
7555 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
7556 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
7558 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
7559 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_htlcs, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
7560 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
7561 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
7562 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
7563 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
7565 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
7571 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
7573 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
7575 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
7576 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
7577 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
7578 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
7580 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
7581 logger: args.logger,
7582 default_configuration: args.default_config,
7585 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7586 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
7587 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
7588 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7589 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7592 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
7593 //connection or two.
7595 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
7601 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7602 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7603 use core::time::Duration;
7604 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
7605 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
7606 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure};
7607 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7608 use crate::ln::msgs;
7609 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
7610 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
7611 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7612 use crate::util::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
7613 use crate::util::test_utils;
7614 use crate::chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
7617 fn test_notify_limits() {
7618 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
7619 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
7620 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7621 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7622 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7623 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7625 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
7626 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
7627 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7628 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7629 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7631 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7633 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
7634 // to connect messages with new values
7635 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7636 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7637 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7638 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7640 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
7641 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7642 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7643 // ... but the last node should not.
7644 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7645 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
7646 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7647 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7649 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
7650 // about the channel.
7651 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7652 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7653 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7655 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
7657 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7658 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7659 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7660 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7661 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7662 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7664 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
7665 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7666 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7668 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
7669 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
7670 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
7671 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
7672 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
7673 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
7675 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
7676 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
7677 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7678 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7679 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7680 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7681 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7682 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7684 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
7685 // the channel info has updated.
7686 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7687 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7688 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7689 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7690 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7691 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7695 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
7696 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
7698 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7699 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7700 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7701 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7702 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7704 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
7705 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
7706 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
7707 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
7709 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
7710 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
7711 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
7712 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
7713 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
7714 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
7715 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7716 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7717 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7718 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
7720 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
7721 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
7722 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7723 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7724 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7725 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7726 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7727 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7728 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7729 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7730 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7731 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
7732 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7733 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7734 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7735 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7736 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7737 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7738 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7739 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7740 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7741 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
7743 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
7744 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
7745 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7746 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7747 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7748 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
7750 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
7751 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
7752 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
7753 // lightning messages manually.
7754 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7755 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
7756 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7758 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7759 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7760 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
7761 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7762 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7763 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
7764 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7765 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7766 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
7767 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7768 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7769 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7770 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7771 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7772 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7773 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
7774 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7775 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7776 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
7777 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7778 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7779 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7780 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7781 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
7782 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7784 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
7785 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
7786 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7787 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
7789 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
7790 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
7791 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
7792 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
7794 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7797 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7798 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7799 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7800 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7802 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7805 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7806 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7807 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7808 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7810 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7815 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
7816 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
7817 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
7818 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
7819 // fails as expected.
7820 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7821 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7822 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7823 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7824 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7825 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7826 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7828 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
7829 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
7830 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
7832 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
7833 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7834 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id()),
7835 final_value_msat: 100_000,
7836 final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
7838 let route = find_route(
7839 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
7840 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7842 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
7843 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7844 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7845 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7846 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7847 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7848 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7849 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7850 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7851 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
7852 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
7853 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7854 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
7855 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7856 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7857 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7858 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7859 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7860 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7861 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7862 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7863 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7864 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7866 // Finally, claim the original payment.
7867 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7869 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
7870 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7871 let route = find_route(
7872 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
7873 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7875 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
7876 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7877 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7878 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7879 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
7880 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
7881 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
7883 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
7884 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7885 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
7886 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7887 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7888 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7889 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7890 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7891 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7892 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7893 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7894 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7895 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
7896 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7897 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7898 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7899 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7900 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7901 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7902 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7903 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7904 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7905 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7907 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
7908 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7912 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
7913 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
7914 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
7915 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7916 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7917 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7918 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7920 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7921 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7922 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7923 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7925 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7926 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7927 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7928 final_value_msat: 10_000,
7929 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7931 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
7932 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7933 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7934 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7935 let route = find_route(
7936 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7937 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7940 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7941 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
7942 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash, None, PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
7943 nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
7944 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7946 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7947 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7948 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7949 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7950 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7951 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7952 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7954 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
7958 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
7959 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
7960 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7961 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7962 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7963 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7965 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7966 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7967 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7968 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7970 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7971 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7972 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7973 final_value_msat: 10_000,
7974 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7976 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
7977 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7978 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7979 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7980 let route = find_route(
7981 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7982 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7985 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7986 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7987 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
7988 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, Some(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
7989 nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
7990 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7992 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7993 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7994 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7995 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7996 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7997 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7998 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8000 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
8004 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
8005 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8006 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8007 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8008 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8010 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8011 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8012 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8013 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8015 // Marshall an MPP route.
8016 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8017 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8018 route.paths.push(path);
8019 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8020 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8021 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8022 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8023 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8024 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8026 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None, PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap_err() {
8027 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
8028 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
8029 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
8034 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
8035 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
8036 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8037 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8038 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8039 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8041 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
8042 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
8044 total_msat: 100_000,
8047 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
8048 // payment verification fails as expected.
8049 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
8050 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
8051 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
8052 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
8054 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment".to_string(), "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash".to_string(), 1);
8058 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
8059 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
8063 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
8064 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
8065 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
8066 // the channel is successfully closed.
8067 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8068 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8069 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8070 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8072 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8073 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8074 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel);
8075 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8076 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel);
8078 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
8079 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
8081 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
8082 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
8083 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8084 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8087 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8089 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8090 // as it has the funding transaction.
8091 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8092 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8093 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8095 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8098 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8100 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8102 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8103 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8104 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8106 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8107 // as it has the funding transaction.
8108 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8109 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8110 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8112 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8113 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8114 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
8115 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8116 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8117 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
8118 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
8120 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8121 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8122 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8123 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
8125 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8126 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
8128 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
8129 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
8130 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
8131 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
8132 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8133 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8134 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8136 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
8137 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
8138 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
8139 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
8140 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8141 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8142 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8145 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8147 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
8148 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
8149 // closing transaction).
8150 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
8151 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
8152 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8154 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
8155 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
8156 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8157 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8158 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8161 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8163 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
8165 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
8166 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
8167 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8169 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8171 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8172 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8176 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
8178 use crate::chain::Listen;
8179 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
8180 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, KeysInterface, InMemorySigner};
8181 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId};
8182 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
8183 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
8184 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
8185 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, get_route};
8186 use crate::util::test_utils;
8187 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
8188 use crate::util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
8190 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8191 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8192 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
8194 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
8198 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
8199 node: &'a ChannelManager<
8200 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
8201 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
8202 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
8203 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
8204 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>,
8209 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
8210 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
8213 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
8214 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
8215 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
8217 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
8218 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
8220 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
8221 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
8223 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
8224 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
8226 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8227 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
8228 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
8229 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
8230 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8232 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
8234 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
8236 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8237 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
8238 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
8239 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
8240 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8242 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
8244 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
8246 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8247 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8248 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8249 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8250 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8253 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
8254 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8255 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
8257 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8258 } else { panic!(); }
8260 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8261 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8263 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
8266 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8269 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
8270 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
8272 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8273 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8274 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
8275 match msg_events[0] {
8276 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
8277 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
8278 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8282 match msg_events[1] {
8283 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8287 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8288 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
8290 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8291 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
8293 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8296 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8297 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
8299 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8300 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8302 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8305 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger_a);
8307 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
8308 macro_rules! send_payment {
8309 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
8310 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
8311 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id())
8312 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
8313 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
8314 let seed = [3u8; 32];
8315 let keys_manager = KeysManager::new(&seed, 42, 42);
8316 let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8317 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &dummy_graph.read_only(),
8318 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
8320 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
8321 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
8323 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
8324 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
8326 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8327 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
8328 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8329 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
8330 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
8331 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8332 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8333 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8335 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
8336 expect_payment_claimable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
8337 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8338 expect_payment_claimed!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
8340 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
8341 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
8342 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
8343 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8344 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
8346 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
8349 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
8350 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8351 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8352 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8354 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
8359 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
8360 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);