1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see routing::router::get_route for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
24 use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
27 use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
30 use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
31 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
35 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
36 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
38 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,FeeEstimator};
39 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
40 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
41 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, ManyChannelMonitor, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
42 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
43 use routing::router::{Route, RouteHop};
46 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, OptionalField};
47 use chain::keysinterface::{ChannelKeys, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemoryChannelKeys};
48 use util::config::UserConfig;
49 use util::{byte_utils, events};
50 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer};
51 use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader};
52 use util::logger::Logger;
53 use util::errors::APIError;
56 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
57 use std::io::{Cursor, Read};
58 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock};
59 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
60 use std::time::Duration;
61 use std::marker::{Sync, Send};
63 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
65 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
67 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
68 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
69 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
71 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
72 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
73 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
74 // before we forward it.
76 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
77 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
78 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
79 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
80 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
82 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
83 enum PendingHTLCRouting {
85 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
86 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
89 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
90 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
94 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
95 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
96 routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
97 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
98 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
99 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
100 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
103 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
104 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
105 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
106 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
109 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
110 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
111 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
112 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
113 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
116 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
118 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
120 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
124 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
128 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
129 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
130 pub(super) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
131 short_channel_id: u64,
133 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
136 struct ClaimableHTLC {
137 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
139 /// Filled in when the HTLC was received with a payment_secret packet, which contains a
140 /// total_msat (which may differ from value if this is a Multi-Path Payment) and a
141 /// payment_secret which prevents path-probing attacks and can associate different HTLCs which
142 /// are part of the same payment.
143 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
147 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
148 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
149 pub(super) enum HTLCSource {
150 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
153 session_priv: SecretKey,
154 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
155 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
156 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
161 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
162 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
164 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
165 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
170 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
171 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
173 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
181 /// payment_hash type, use to cross-lock hop
182 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
183 pub struct PaymentHash(pub [u8;32]);
184 /// payment_preimage type, use to route payment between hop
185 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
186 pub struct PaymentPreimage(pub [u8;32]);
187 /// payment_secret type, use to authenticate sender to the receiver and tie MPP HTLCs together
188 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
189 pub struct PaymentSecret(pub [u8;32]);
191 type ShutdownResult = (Option<OutPoint>, ChannelMonitorUpdate, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
193 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
194 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
195 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
196 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
197 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
199 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
200 err: msgs::LightningError,
201 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
203 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
205 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
207 err: LightningError {
209 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
210 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
216 shutdown_finish: None,
220 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
222 err: LightningError {
224 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
226 shutdown_finish: None,
230 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
231 Self { err, shutdown_finish: None }
234 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
236 err: LightningError {
238 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
239 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
245 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
249 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
252 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
254 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
256 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
258 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
259 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
265 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => LightningError {
267 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
268 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
275 shutdown_finish: None,
280 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
281 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
282 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
283 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
284 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
286 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
287 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
288 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
289 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
290 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
291 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
292 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
294 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
298 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
299 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> {
300 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<ChanSigner>>,
301 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
302 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
303 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
304 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
305 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
306 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
307 /// (payment_hash, payment_secret) -> Vec<HTLCs> for tracking HTLCs that
308 /// were to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
309 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
310 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
312 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<(PaymentHash, Option<PaymentSecret>), Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
313 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
314 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
315 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
318 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
319 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
321 latest_features: InitFeatures,
324 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
325 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
327 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
328 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
329 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
330 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
331 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
332 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
333 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
334 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = Arc<ChannelManager<InMemoryChannelKeys, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>>;
336 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
337 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
338 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
339 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
340 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
341 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
342 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
343 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
344 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemoryChannelKeys, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
346 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
347 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
349 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
350 /// to individual Channels.
352 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
353 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
354 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
355 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
357 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
358 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
359 /// returning from ManyChannelMonitor::add_/update_monitor, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
360 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
361 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
362 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
363 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
365 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager), which
366 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
367 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
368 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
371 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
372 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
373 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
374 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
375 /// timer_chan_freshness_every_min roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
377 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
378 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
379 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
380 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
381 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
382 pub struct ChannelManager<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
383 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<Keys=ChanSigner>,
384 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
385 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
386 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
389 default_configuration: UserConfig,
390 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
396 pub(super) latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
398 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
399 last_block_hash: Mutex<BlockHash>,
400 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
403 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>,
405 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>,
406 our_network_key: SecretKey,
408 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
409 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
410 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
412 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
413 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
414 /// are currently open with that peer.
415 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
416 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
418 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
420 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
421 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
422 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
423 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
424 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
431 /// The amount of time we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time between when
432 /// we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
433 pub(crate) const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
434 /// The amount of time we're willing to wait to claim money back to us
435 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24 * 7;
437 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
438 /// HTLC's CLTV. This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
439 /// ie the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
440 /// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
441 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
442 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 12; //TODO?
443 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
445 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
446 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
447 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
448 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
449 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
450 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
453 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
455 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
456 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
459 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
461 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
462 pub struct ChannelDetails {
463 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
464 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
465 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
466 /// lifetime of the channel.
467 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
468 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
469 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
470 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
471 /// The node_id of our counterparty
472 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
473 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
474 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
475 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
476 pub counterparty_features: InitFeatures,
477 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
478 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
479 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
481 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
482 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
483 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
484 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
485 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
486 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
487 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
488 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
489 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
490 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
491 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
492 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
493 /// the peer is connected, and (c) no monitor update failure is pending resolution.
497 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
498 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
501 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
502 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
503 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
504 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
505 ParameterError(APIError),
506 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
507 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
508 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
511 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
513 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
514 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
515 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
516 /// paths than the ones selected).
517 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
518 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
519 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
520 /// in over-/re-payment.
522 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
523 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
524 /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
526 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
527 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
528 /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
529 /// with the latest update_id.
530 PartialFailure(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
533 macro_rules! handle_error {
534 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $their_node_id: expr) => {
537 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish }) => {
538 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
540 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
541 // entering the macro.
542 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
545 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
547 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
548 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
549 if let Some(update) = update_option {
550 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
556 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
557 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
559 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
560 node_id: $their_node_id,
561 action: err.action.clone()
565 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
566 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
569 // Return error in case higher-API need one
576 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
577 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
580 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
581 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
583 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
584 log_trace!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
585 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
586 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
587 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
589 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
591 Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_)) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
596 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
597 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
600 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
601 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
603 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
604 log_trace!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
605 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
606 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
607 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
609 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
611 Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg)) => {
612 log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
613 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
614 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
615 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
617 let shutdown_res = chan.force_shutdown(false);
618 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
624 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
625 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
626 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
628 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
630 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
631 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]));
632 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
633 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
634 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
636 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
637 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
638 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
639 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
640 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
641 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
642 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
643 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
644 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
645 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()));
648 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
649 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards and {} fails",
650 log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]),
651 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
653 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
654 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
656 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
657 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
659 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
660 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len());
661 if !$resend_commitment {
662 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
665 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
667 $entry.get_mut().monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
668 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$entry.key()))
674 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
675 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
676 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
678 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
679 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
683 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
684 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
685 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
686 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
687 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
690 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
695 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>
696 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<Keys=ChanSigner>,
697 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
698 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
699 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
702 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
704 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
705 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
707 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
709 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
711 /// Users must provide the current blockchain height from which to track onchain channel
712 /// funding outpoints and send payments with reliable timelocks.
714 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
715 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods.
716 /// However, rather than calling these methods directly, the user should register
717 /// the ChannelManager as a listener to the BlockNotifier and call the BlockNotifier's
718 /// `block_(dis)connected` methods, which will notify all registered listeners in one
720 pub fn new(network: Network, fee_est: F, monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, current_blockchain_height: usize) -> Self {
721 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
724 default_configuration: config.clone(),
725 genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
726 fee_estimator: fee_est,
730 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(current_blockchain_height),
731 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(Default::default()),
734 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
735 by_id: HashMap::new(),
736 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
737 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
738 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
739 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
741 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
743 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
745 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
747 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
748 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
756 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
758 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
759 /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
760 /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
761 /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
763 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
764 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
766 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
767 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
768 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
769 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
770 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
773 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
774 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, config)?;
775 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
777 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
778 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
779 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
780 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
781 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
782 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
784 panic!("RNG is bad???");
787 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
789 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
790 node_id: their_network_key,
796 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<ChanSigner>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
797 let mut res = Vec::new();
799 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
800 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
801 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
802 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
803 res.push(ChannelDetails {
804 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
805 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
806 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
807 counterparty_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
808 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
809 inbound_capacity_msat,
810 outbound_capacity_msat,
811 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
812 is_live: channel.is_live(),
816 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
817 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
818 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.remote_network_id) {
819 chan.counterparty_features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
825 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
826 /// more information.
827 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
828 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
831 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
832 /// get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
834 /// These are guaranteed to have their is_live value set to true, see the documentation for
835 /// ChannelDetails::is_live for more info on exactly what the criteria are.
836 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
837 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
838 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
839 // really wanted anyway.
840 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
843 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
844 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
845 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
847 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
848 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
849 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
851 let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
852 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
853 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
854 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
855 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
856 let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
857 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
858 node_id: chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(),
861 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
862 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
863 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
865 (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
866 } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
868 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
871 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
872 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
874 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
875 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
880 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
881 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
882 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
891 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
892 let (funding_txo_option, monitor_update, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
893 log_trace!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
894 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
895 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
897 if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_option {
898 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
899 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
900 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
901 // ignore the result here.
902 let _ = self.monitor.update_monitor(funding_txo, monitor_update);
906 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
907 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
908 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
909 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
912 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
913 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
914 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
915 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
916 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
923 log_trace!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
924 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
925 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
926 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
927 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
933 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
934 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
935 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
936 for chan in self.list_channels() {
937 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
941 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>) {
942 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
943 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
945 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
946 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
947 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
948 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
949 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
950 failure_code: $err_code,
951 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
956 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
957 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
960 let shared_secret = {
961 let mut arr = [0; 32];
962 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
965 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
967 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
968 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
969 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
970 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
971 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
972 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
973 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
974 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
977 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
978 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
979 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
980 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
981 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
984 let mut channel_state = None;
985 macro_rules! return_err {
986 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
988 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
989 if channel_state.is_none() {
990 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
992 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
993 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
994 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
995 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
996 })), channel_state.unwrap());
1001 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
1002 let mut chacha_stream = ChaChaReader { chacha: &mut chacha, read: Cursor::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..]) };
1003 let (next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac) = {
1004 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut chacha_stream) {
1006 let error_code = match err {
1007 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
1008 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature|
1009 msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue|
1010 msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead => 0x4000 | 22, // invalid_onion_payload
1011 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
1013 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
1016 let mut hmac = [0; 32];
1017 if let Err(_) = chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut hmac[..]) {
1018 return_err!("Unable to decode hop data", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1025 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_hmac == [0; 32] {
1028 // In tests, make sure that the initial onion pcket data is, at least, non-0.
1029 // We could do some fancy randomness test here, but, ehh, whatever.
1030 // This checks for the issue where you can calculate the path length given the
1031 // onion data as all the path entries that the originator sent will be here
1032 // as-is (and were originally 0s).
1033 // Of course reverse path calculation is still pretty easy given naive routing
1034 // algorithms, but this fixes the most-obvious case.
1035 let mut next_bytes = [0; 32];
1036 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1037 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1038 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1039 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1043 // final_expiry_too_soon
1044 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure we have at least
1045 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
1046 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown payment hash, our payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward
1047 // before our onchain logic triggers a channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational).
1048 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) <= self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
1049 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
1051 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
1052 if next_hop_data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
1053 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1055 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1056 if next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1057 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1060 let payment_data = match next_hop_data.format {
1061 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => None,
1062 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => return_err!("Got non final data with an HMAC of 0", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]),
1063 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data } => payment_data,
1066 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1067 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1068 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1069 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1071 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1072 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
1074 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1076 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1077 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1078 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1079 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1082 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1083 let read_pos = chacha_stream.read(&mut new_packet_data).unwrap();
1084 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1086 // Check two things:
1087 // a) that the behavior of our stream here will return Ok(0) even if the TLV
1088 // read above emptied out our buffer and the unwrap() wont needlessly panic
1089 // b) that we didn't somehow magically end up with extra data.
1091 debug_assert!(chacha_stream.read(&mut t).unwrap() == 0);
1093 // Once we've emptied the set of bytes our peer gave us, encrypt 0 bytes until we
1094 // fill the onion hop data we'll forward to our next-hop peer.
1095 chacha_stream.chacha.process_in_place(&mut new_packet_data[read_pos..]);
1097 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1099 let blinding_factor = {
1100 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
1101 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1102 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1103 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
1106 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
1108 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
1110 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1113 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1114 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
1117 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
1118 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1119 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1120 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
1121 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1125 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1126 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
1127 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
1128 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
1130 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1131 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1132 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1133 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1137 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1138 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1139 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
1140 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
1141 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
1142 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
1143 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1144 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1145 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1146 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
1148 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1150 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1151 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1153 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1154 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1155 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1156 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1157 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1158 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1159 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1161 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_their_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1162 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1164 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
1165 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1166 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1168 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1169 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1171 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1172 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now, but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty
1173 // packet sanitization (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational)
1174 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1175 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1177 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1178 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1180 // In theory, we would be safe against unitentional channel-closure, if we only required a margin of LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1181 // But, to be safe against policy reception, we use a longuer delay.
1182 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER) as u64 {
1183 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1189 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1190 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1191 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1192 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1194 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1195 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1197 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
1198 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
1199 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
1201 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1203 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1208 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1211 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
1212 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1213 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel<ChanSigner>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1214 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1215 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1219 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
1221 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1222 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1223 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
1224 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
1225 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
1226 cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
1227 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1228 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()),
1229 fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&self.fee_estimator),
1230 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
1231 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1234 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1235 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
1237 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1243 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
1244 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1245 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
1246 let (session_priv, prng_seed) = self.keys_manager.get_onion_rand();
1248 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
1249 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
1250 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height)?;
1251 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
1252 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
1254 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
1256 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1258 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
1259 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1260 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1261 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
1262 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1265 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1266 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
1268 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1269 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1271 if !chan.get().is_live() {
1272 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
1274 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1276 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1277 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1278 }, onion_packet, &self.logger), channel_state, chan)
1280 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
1281 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1282 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
1283 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
1284 // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
1285 // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
1286 // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
1287 // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
1288 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1291 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1292 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1293 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1294 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1295 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1296 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1297 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1305 } else { unreachable!(); }
1309 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
1310 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1312 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
1317 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1319 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1320 /// fields for more info.
1322 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1323 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1324 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1325 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1326 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1327 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1329 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
1331 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
1332 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
1333 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
1335 /// In general, a path may raise:
1336 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
1337 /// node public key) is specified.
1338 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
1339 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
1341 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
1342 /// relevant updates.
1344 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
1345 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
1346 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
1348 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
1349 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
1350 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
1351 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
1353 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
1354 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
1355 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
1356 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
1357 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
1358 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
1360 if route.paths.len() > 10 {
1361 // This limit is completely arbitrary - there aren't any real fundamental path-count
1362 // limits. After we support retrying individual paths we should likely bump this, but
1363 // for now more than 10 paths likely carries too much one-path failure.
1364 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Sending over more than 10 paths is not currently supported"}));
1366 let mut total_value = 0;
1367 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1368 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
1369 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
1370 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
1371 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
1372 continue 'path_check;
1374 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
1375 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1376 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
1377 continue 'path_check;
1380 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
1381 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
1383 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
1384 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
1387 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1388 let mut results = Vec::new();
1389 for path in route.paths.iter() {
1390 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height));
1392 let mut has_ok = false;
1393 let mut has_err = false;
1394 for res in results.iter() {
1395 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
1396 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
1397 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
1398 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
1405 if has_err && has_ok {
1406 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure(results))
1408 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
1414 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1416 /// Note that ALL inputs in the transaction pointed to by funding_txo MUST spend SegWit outputs
1417 /// or your counterparty can steal your funds!
1419 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1421 /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1422 /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1423 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1424 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1427 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1429 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo, &self.logger)
1430 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
1431 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
1432 } else { unreachable!(); })
1437 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_their_node_id()) {
1438 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1441 Err(_) => { return; }
1445 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1446 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
1447 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1450 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1451 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1452 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1454 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1460 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel<ChanSigner>) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1461 if !chan.should_announce() {
1462 log_trace!(self.logger, "Can't send announcement_signatures for private channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
1466 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1468 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1470 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1471 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1473 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1474 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1475 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1476 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1477 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1482 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
1483 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
1484 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
1486 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::std::u16::MAX as u32 / (msgs::NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
1489 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
1490 // smaller than 500:
1491 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
1493 /// Generates a signed node_announcement from the given arguments and creates a
1494 /// BroadcastNodeAnnouncement event. Note that such messages will be ignored unless peers have
1495 /// seen a channel_announcement from us (ie unless we have public channels open).
1497 /// RGB is a node "color" and alias is a printable human-readable string to describe this node
1498 /// to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
1500 /// addresses represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node accepts
1501 /// incoming connections. These will be broadcast to the network, publicly tying these
1502 /// addresses together. If you wish to preserve user privacy, addresses should likely contain
1503 /// only Tor Onion addresses.
1505 /// Panics if addresses is absurdly large (more than 500).
1506 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], addresses: Vec<msgs::NetAddress>) {
1507 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1509 if addresses.len() > 500 {
1510 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
1513 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1514 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1515 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
1516 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
1517 rgb, alias, addresses,
1518 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
1519 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1521 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1523 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1524 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
1525 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
1526 signature: self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key),
1527 contents: announcement
1532 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1534 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1535 /// Will likely generate further events.
1536 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1537 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1539 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1540 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1541 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
1543 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1544 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1546 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1547 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1548 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1549 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1551 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1552 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1553 match forward_info {
1554 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => {
1555 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1556 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1557 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1558 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1560 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
1561 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() }
1564 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1565 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
1566 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
1567 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
1568 // problem, not ours.
1575 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
1576 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1577 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1578 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1579 match forward_info {
1580 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
1581 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
1583 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value }, } => {
1584 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), prev_short_channel_id, short_chan_id);
1585 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1586 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1587 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1588 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
1590 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet) {
1592 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1593 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
1595 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
1597 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap();
1598 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
1599 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }
1605 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1607 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1608 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1609 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1610 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1611 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1612 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1613 // this channel currently :/.
1619 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
1620 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
1622 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
1623 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} after delay", short_chan_id);
1624 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1626 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1627 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail backwards to short_id {}: {}", short_chan_id, msg);
1629 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
1631 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
1632 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
1633 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
1636 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1638 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1639 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
1640 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
1641 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
1642 // messages when we can.
1643 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
1644 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
1645 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
1652 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1653 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
1656 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
1657 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
1658 let their_node_id = chan.get().get_their_node_id();
1659 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
1660 ChannelError::Ignore(_) => {
1661 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1663 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1664 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
1665 let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
1666 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1667 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1669 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update(&channel).ok()))
1671 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
1673 handle_errors.push((their_node_id, err));
1677 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1678 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_their_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
1681 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1682 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
1683 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1684 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1685 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1686 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
1687 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1689 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1697 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1698 match forward_info {
1699 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
1700 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry },
1701 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. }, } => {
1702 let prev_hop = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1703 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1704 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1705 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
1708 let mut total_value = 0;
1709 let payment_secret_opt =
1710 if let &Some(ref data) = &payment_data { Some(data.payment_secret.clone()) } else { None };
1711 let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry((payment_hash, payment_secret_opt))
1712 .or_insert(Vec::new());
1713 htlcs.push(ClaimableHTLC {
1715 value: amt_to_forward,
1716 payment_data: payment_data.clone(),
1717 cltv_expiry: incoming_cltv_expiry,
1719 if let &Some(ref data) = &payment_data {
1720 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
1721 total_value += htlc.value;
1722 if htlc.payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat != data.total_msat {
1723 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
1725 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
1727 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > data.total_msat {
1728 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
1729 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
1730 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
1731 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(
1732 self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire)
1736 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1737 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
1738 htlc_id: htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
1739 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
1741 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
1744 } else if total_value == data.total_msat {
1745 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1746 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1747 payment_secret: Some(data.payment_secret),
1752 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1753 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1754 payment_secret: None,
1755 amt: amt_to_forward,
1759 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
1760 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
1762 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1763 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
1771 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1772 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
1775 for (their_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
1776 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id);
1779 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1780 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1781 events.append(&mut new_events);
1784 /// If a peer is disconnected we mark any channels with that peer as 'disabled'.
1785 /// After some time, if channels are still disabled we need to broadcast a ChannelUpdate
1786 /// to inform the network about the uselessness of these channels.
1788 /// This method handles all the details, and must be called roughly once per minute.
1789 pub fn timer_chan_freshness_every_min(&self) {
1790 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1791 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1792 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1793 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter_mut() {
1794 if chan.is_disabled_staged() && !chan.is_live() {
1795 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1796 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1801 } else if chan.is_disabled_staged() && chan.is_live() {
1803 } else if chan.is_disabled_marked() {
1804 chan.to_disabled_staged();
1809 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
1810 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
1811 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
1812 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
1813 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
1814 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> bool {
1815 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1817 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1818 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&(*payment_hash, *payment_secret));
1819 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1820 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
1821 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1822 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
1823 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
1824 self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32,
1826 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
1827 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
1828 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
1834 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
1835 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
1836 // be surfaced to the user.
1837 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(&self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
1838 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
1840 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
1841 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
1842 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
1843 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
1844 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update(&chan_entry.get()) {
1845 (0x1000|7, upd.encode_with_len())
1847 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
1850 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
1852 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1853 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
1854 htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
1856 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1857 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1858 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1860 rejected_by_dest: false,
1872 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
1873 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
1874 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
1875 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
1876 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
1877 /// still-available channels.
1878 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
1879 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
1880 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
1881 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
1884 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, .. } => {
1885 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1886 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1887 match &onion_error {
1888 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
1890 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
1892 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
1893 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
1894 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
1895 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
1896 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
1897 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1898 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
1903 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1904 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1905 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1906 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
1908 error_code: onion_error_code,
1910 error_data: onion_error_data
1914 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
1920 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
1921 // TODO: We'd like to generate a PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate for temporary
1922 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as get_route
1923 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
1925 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
1926 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
1927 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1928 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1929 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1930 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
1932 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
1934 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
1940 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => {
1941 let err_packet = match onion_error {
1942 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
1943 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
1944 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
1945 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
1947 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
1948 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1949 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
1953 let mut forward_event = None;
1954 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
1955 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
1957 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
1958 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1959 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
1961 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1962 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
1965 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1966 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
1967 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1968 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
1969 time_forwardable: time
1976 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
1977 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
1978 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
1980 /// You must specify the expected amounts for this HTLC, and we will only claim HTLCs
1981 /// available within a few percent of the expected amount. This is critical for several
1982 /// reasons : a) it avoids providing senders with `proof-of-payment` (in the form of the
1983 /// payment_preimage without having provided the full value and b) it avoids certain
1984 /// privacy-breaking recipient-probing attacks which may reveal payment activity to
1985 /// motivated attackers.
1987 /// Note that the privacy concerns in (b) are not relevant in payments with a payment_secret
1988 /// set. Thus, for such payments we will claim any payments which do not under-pay.
1990 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
1991 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, expected_amount: u64) -> bool {
1992 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
1994 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1996 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1997 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&(payment_hash, *payment_secret));
1998 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1999 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
2001 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
2002 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
2003 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
2004 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
2006 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
2007 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
2008 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
2009 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
2010 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
2013 let (is_mpp, mut valid_mpp) = if let &Some(ref data) = &sources[0].payment_data {
2014 assert!(payment_secret.is_some());
2015 (true, data.total_msat >= expected_amount)
2017 assert!(payment_secret.is_none());
2021 for htlc in sources.iter() {
2022 if !is_mpp || !valid_mpp { break; }
2023 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
2028 let mut errs = Vec::new();
2029 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
2030 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
2031 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
2032 if (is_mpp && !valid_mpp) || (!is_mpp && (htlc.value < expected_amount || htlc.value > expected_amount * 2)) {
2033 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
2034 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
2035 self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32,
2037 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
2038 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
2039 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
2041 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
2043 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = e.1.err.action {
2044 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
2045 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
2046 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", e.1.err.err);
2047 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
2048 } else { errs.push(e); }
2050 Err(None) if is_mpp => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
2052 log_warn!(self.logger, "Channel we expected to claim an HTLC from was closed.");
2054 Ok(()) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
2059 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
2060 // which were generated.
2061 channel_state.take();
2063 for (their_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
2064 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
2065 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, their_node_id);
2072 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> Result<(), Option<(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)>> {
2073 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
2074 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
2075 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
2076 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
2082 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
2083 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
2084 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
2085 Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
2086 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_option {
2087 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2088 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
2089 assert!(msgs.is_none());
2091 return Err(Some((chan.get().get_their_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err())));
2095 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
2096 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2097 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
2098 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2099 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2100 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
2101 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2102 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2111 // TODO: Do something with e?
2112 // This should only occur if we are claiming an HTLC at the same time as the
2113 // HTLC is being failed (eg because a block is being connected and this caused
2114 // an HTLC to time out). This should, of course, only occur if the user is the
2115 // one doing the claiming (as it being a part of a peer claim would imply we're
2116 // about to lose funds) and only if the lock in claim_funds was dropped as a
2117 // previous HTLC was failed (thus not for an MPP payment).
2118 debug_assert!(false, "This shouldn't be reachable except in absurdly rare cases between monitor updates and HTLC timeouts: {:?}", e);
2122 } else { unreachable!(); }
2125 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
2127 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
2128 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2129 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2130 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
2134 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
2135 if let Err((their_node_id, err)) = match self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage) {
2138 // TODO: There is probably a channel monitor somewhere that needs to
2139 // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
2140 // why it's missing.
2143 Err(Some(res)) => Err(res),
2145 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2146 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
2147 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, their_node_id);
2153 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
2154 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
2155 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
2158 /// Restores a single, given channel to normal operation after a
2159 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
2162 /// All ChannelMonitor updates up to and including highest_applied_update_id must have been
2163 /// fully committed in every copy of the given channels' ChannelMonitors.
2165 /// Note that there is no effect to calling with a highest_applied_update_id other than the
2166 /// current latest ChannelMonitorUpdate and one call to this function after multiple
2167 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures is fine. The highest_applied_update_id field
2168 /// exists largely only to prevent races between this and concurrent update_monitor calls.
2170 /// Thus, the anticipated use is, at a high level:
2171 /// 1) You register a ManyChannelMonitor with this ChannelManager,
2172 /// 2) it stores each update to disk, and begins updating any remote (eg watchtower) copies of
2173 /// said ChannelMonitors as it can, returning ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures
2174 /// any time it cannot do so instantly,
2175 /// 3) update(s) are applied to each remote copy of a ChannelMonitor,
2176 /// 4) once all remote copies are updated, you call this function with the update_id that
2177 /// completed, and once it is the latest the Channel will be re-enabled.
2178 pub fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
2179 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2181 let mut close_results = Vec::new();
2182 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
2183 let mut htlc_failures = Vec::new();
2184 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
2187 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2188 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2189 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2190 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2191 let channel = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
2195 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
2199 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, needs_broadcast_safe, funding_locked) = channel.monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger);
2200 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2201 htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), pending_forwards));
2203 htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures);
2205 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
2206 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
2207 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2208 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2213 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
2214 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
2215 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2216 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2217 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2222 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2226 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2231 if needs_broadcast_safe {
2232 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
2233 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(),
2234 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
2237 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
2238 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2239 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2242 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
2243 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2244 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2245 msg: announcement_sigs,
2248 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2252 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().append(&mut pending_events);
2254 for failure in htlc_failures.drain(..) {
2255 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2257 self.forward_htlcs(&mut htlc_forwards[..]);
2259 for res in close_results.drain(..) {
2260 self.finish_force_close_channel(res);
2264 fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2265 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
2266 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
2269 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_node_id.clone(), their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration)
2270 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
2271 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2272 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2273 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
2274 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
2275 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2276 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
2277 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2278 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
2280 entry.insert(channel);
2286 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2287 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
2288 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2289 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2290 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
2291 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2292 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2293 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
2295 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, their_features), channel_state, chan);
2296 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
2298 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
2301 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2302 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
2303 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
2304 channel_value_satoshis: value,
2305 output_script: output_script,
2306 user_channel_id: user_id,
2311 fn internal_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2312 let ((funding_msg, monitor_update), mut chan) = {
2313 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2314 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2315 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
2316 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2317 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2318 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
2320 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
2322 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
2325 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
2326 // lock before add_monitor
2327 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().0, monitor_update) {
2329 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
2330 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
2331 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
2332 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
2333 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
2334 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), None));
2336 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
2337 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
2338 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
2339 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
2340 // until we have persisted our monitor.
2341 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2345 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2346 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2347 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
2348 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2349 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
2351 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2352 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
2353 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2362 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2363 let (funding_txo, user_id) = {
2364 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2365 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2366 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2367 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2368 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2369 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2371 let monitor = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
2372 Ok(update) => update,
2373 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
2375 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
2376 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
2378 (chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get().get_user_id())
2380 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2383 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2384 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
2385 funding_txo: funding_txo,
2386 user_channel_id: user_id,
2391 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2392 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2393 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2394 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2395 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2396 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2397 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2399 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg), channel_state, chan);
2400 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
2401 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for {} in response to funding_locked", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2402 // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our
2403 // announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote
2404 // funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking
2405 // block connection. We should guanrantee to broadcast announcement_sigs to our peer whatever
2406 // the order of the events but our peer may not receive it due to disconnection. The specs
2407 // lacking an acknowledgement for announcement_sigs we may have to re-send them at peer
2408 // connection in the future if simultaneous misses by both peers due to network/hardware
2409 // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs
2410 // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network.
2411 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2412 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2413 msg: announcement_sigs,
2418 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2422 fn internal_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2423 let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
2424 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2425 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2427 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
2428 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2429 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2430 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2432 let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
2433 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2434 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2435 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2439 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2440 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2441 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2445 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
2446 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2447 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2449 (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2450 } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
2452 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2455 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
2456 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2458 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2459 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2460 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2461 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2469 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2470 let (tx, chan_option) = {
2471 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2472 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2473 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
2474 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2475 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2476 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2478 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
2479 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2480 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2481 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2486 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
2487 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
2488 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
2489 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
2490 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
2491 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2492 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2494 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2495 } else { (tx, None) }
2497 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2500 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
2501 log_trace!(self.logger, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
2502 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
2504 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2505 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2506 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2507 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2515 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2516 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
2517 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
2518 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
2520 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
2521 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
2522 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
2523 //but we should prevent it anyway.
2525 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
2526 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2528 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2529 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2530 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2531 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2534 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<ChanSigner>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
2535 // Ensure error_code has the UPDATE flag set, since by default we send a
2536 // channel update along as part of failing the HTLC.
2537 assert!((error_code & 0x1000) != 0);
2538 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
2539 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
2540 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
2541 match pending_forward_info {
2542 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
2543 let reason = if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update(chan) {
2544 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &{
2545 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
2546 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
2547 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
2548 res.extend_from_slice(&upd.encode_with_len()[..]);
2552 // The only case where we'd be unable to
2553 // successfully get a channel update is if the
2554 // channel isn't in the fully-funded state yet,
2555 // implying our counterparty is trying to route
2556 // payments over the channel back to themselves
2557 // (cause no one else should know the short_id
2558 // is a lightning channel yet). We should have
2559 // no problem just calling this
2560 // unknown_next_peer (0x4000|10).
2561 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
2563 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2564 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2565 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2568 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
2570 _ => pending_forward_info
2573 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
2575 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2580 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2581 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2583 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2584 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2585 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2586 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2587 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2589 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
2591 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2594 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
2598 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2599 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2600 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2601 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2602 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2603 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2604 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2606 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
2608 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2613 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2614 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2615 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2616 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2617 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2618 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2619 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2621 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
2622 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
2623 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
2625 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
2628 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2632 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2633 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2634 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2635 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2636 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2637 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2638 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2640 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, monitor_update) =
2641 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
2642 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
2643 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
2644 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
2645 let _ = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
2646 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
2651 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2652 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
2653 //TODO: Rebroadcast closing_signed if present on monitor update restoration
2655 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2656 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2657 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2659 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
2660 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2661 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2662 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2663 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2664 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2665 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2666 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2668 commitment_signed: msg,
2672 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2673 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2674 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2680 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2685 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
2686 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
2687 let mut forward_event = None;
2688 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2689 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2690 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2691 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
2693 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2694 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
2695 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
2696 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
2698 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2699 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
2701 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2702 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
2707 match forward_event {
2709 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2710 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2711 time_forwardable: time
2719 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2720 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
2722 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2723 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2724 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2725 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2726 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2727 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2729 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
2730 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail_in) =
2731 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
2732 htlcs_to_fail = htlcs_to_fail_in;
2733 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2734 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
2735 assert!(commitment_update.is_none() && closing_signed.is_none() && pending_forwards.is_empty() && pending_failures.is_empty());
2736 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
2738 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, commitment_update.is_some(), pending_forwards, pending_failures) {
2740 } else { unreachable!(); }
2743 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2744 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2745 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2749 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2750 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2751 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2755 break Ok((pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel")))
2757 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2760 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id);
2762 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id)) => {
2763 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
2764 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2766 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
2773 fn internal_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2774 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2775 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2776 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2777 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2778 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2779 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2781 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
2783 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2788 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2789 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2790 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2792 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2793 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2794 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2795 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2797 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2798 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
2801 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2802 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) =
2803 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone()), channel_state, chan);
2805 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
2806 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2808 let their_node_key = if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 };
2809 let their_bitcoin_key = if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 };
2810 match (self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, their_node_key),
2811 self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, their_bitcoin_key)) {
2813 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close(format!("Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature: {:?}. Maybe using different node_secret for transport and routing msg? UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}", e, &announcement, their_node_key));
2814 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
2817 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close(format!("Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature: {:?}. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})", e, &announcement, their_bitcoin_key));
2818 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
2824 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2826 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2827 msg: msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
2828 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
2829 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
2830 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
2831 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
2832 contents: announcement,
2834 update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
2837 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2842 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2843 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2844 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2846 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2847 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2848 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2849 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2851 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
2852 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
2853 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
2854 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
2855 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, monitor_update_opt, mut order, shutdown) =
2856 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
2857 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
2858 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2859 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
2860 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
2861 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
2862 if revoke_and_ack.is_none() {
2863 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
2865 if commitment_update.is_none() {
2866 order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
2868 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, order, revoke_and_ack.is_some(), commitment_update.is_some());
2869 //TODO: Resend the funding_locked if needed once we get the monitor running again
2872 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
2873 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2874 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2878 macro_rules! send_raa { () => {
2879 if let Some(msg) = revoke_and_ack {
2880 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2881 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2886 macro_rules! send_cu { () => {
2887 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2888 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2889 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2895 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2899 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2904 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2905 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2906 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2912 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2916 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
2917 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
2918 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
2919 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
2921 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2922 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2924 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2925 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2926 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2928 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id) {
2929 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("Failed to find corresponding channel for id {}", channel_id.to_hex())}),
2930 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2931 if !chan.get().is_outbound() {
2932 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel".to_owned()});
2934 if chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
2935 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2937 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2938 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected".to_owned()});
2940 their_node_id = chan.get().get_their_node_id();
2941 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) =
2942 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw, &self.logger), channel_state, chan)
2944 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2947 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2948 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
2949 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2950 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2951 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2952 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2953 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2954 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2964 match handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id) {
2965 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2966 Err(e) => { Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: e.err })}
2971 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> events::MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>
2972 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<Keys=ChanSigner>,
2973 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2974 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
2975 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2978 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<events::MessageSendEvent> {
2979 // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: it's very easy for a
2980 // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
2981 // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
2983 //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
2984 for htlc_update in self.monitor.get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated() {
2985 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
2986 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
2987 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
2989 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
2990 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2995 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2996 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2997 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
3002 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>
3003 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<Keys=ChanSigner>,
3004 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3005 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
3006 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3009 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
3010 // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: it's very easy for a
3011 // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
3012 // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
3014 //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
3015 for htlc_update in self.monitor.get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated() {
3016 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
3017 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
3018 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
3020 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
3021 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
3026 let mut ret = Vec::new();
3027 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3028 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
3033 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref + Sync + Send, T: Deref + Sync + Send, K: Deref + Sync + Send, F: Deref + Sync + Send, L: Deref + Sync + Send>
3034 ChainListener for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>
3035 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<Keys=ChanSigner>,
3036 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3037 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
3038 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3041 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[usize]) {
3042 let header_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
3043 log_trace!(self.logger, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", header_hash, height, txn_matched.len());
3044 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3045 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3046 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
3048 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3049 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3050 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3051 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3052 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
3053 let res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
3054 if let Ok((chan_res, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs)) = res {
3055 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
3056 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&channel).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
3057 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3058 failure_code: 0x1000 | 14, // expiry_too_soon, or at least it is now
3062 if let Some(funding_locked) = chan_res {
3063 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
3064 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
3065 msg: funding_locked,
3067 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
3068 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked and announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
3069 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
3070 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
3071 msg: announcement_sigs,
3074 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
3076 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
3078 } else if let Err(e) = res {
3079 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
3080 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
3081 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e },
3085 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
3086 for tx in txn_matched {
3087 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
3088 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
3089 log_trace!(self.logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
3090 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3091 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3093 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
3094 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
3095 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
3096 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
3097 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
3098 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3107 if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height, &self.logger) {
3108 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3109 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3111 // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
3112 // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
3113 // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
3114 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(false));
3115 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
3116 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3125 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|&(ref payment_hash, _), htlcs| {
3126 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3127 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
3128 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
3129 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
3130 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
3131 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
3132 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3133 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
3134 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3135 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
3136 data: htlc_msat_height_data
3141 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
3144 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3145 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3148 for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
3149 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
3151 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
3152 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header_hash;
3154 // Update last_node_announcement_serial to be the max of its current value and the
3155 // block timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
3156 // having an explicit local time source.
3157 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully update
3158 // last_node_announcement_serial or decide we don't need to.
3159 let old_serial = self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire);
3160 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
3161 if self.last_node_announcement_serial.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
3167 /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
3168 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, _: u32) {
3169 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3170 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3172 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3173 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3174 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3175 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3176 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| {
3177 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
3178 if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
3179 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3181 failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown(true));
3182 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
3183 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3193 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3194 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3196 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
3197 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header.bitcoin_hash();
3201 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref + Sync + Send, T: Deref + Sync + Send, K: Deref + Sync + Send, F: Deref + Sync + Send, L: Deref + Sync + Send>
3202 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>
3203 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<Keys=ChanSigner>,
3204 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3205 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
3206 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3209 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
3210 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3211 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, their_features, msg), *their_node_id);
3214 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
3215 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3216 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, their_features, msg), *their_node_id);
3219 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
3220 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3221 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
3224 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
3225 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3226 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
3229 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
3230 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3231 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
3234 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
3235 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3236 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
3239 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
3240 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3241 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
3244 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
3245 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3246 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
3249 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
3250 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3251 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
3254 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
3255 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3256 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
3259 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
3260 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3261 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
3264 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
3265 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3266 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
3269 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
3270 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3271 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
3274 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
3275 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3276 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
3279 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
3280 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3281 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
3284 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
3285 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3286 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
3289 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
3290 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3291 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3292 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
3293 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
3295 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3296 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3297 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3298 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3299 if no_connection_possible {
3300 log_debug!(self.logger, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
3301 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
3302 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
3303 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3304 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3306 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(true));
3307 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
3308 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3318 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
3319 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
3320 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
3321 // Note that currently on channel reestablish we assert that there are no
3322 // holding cell add-HTLCs, so if in the future we stop removing uncommitted HTLCs
3323 // on peer disconnect here, there will need to be corresponding changes in
3324 // reestablish logic.
3325 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
3326 chan.to_disabled_marked();
3327 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
3328 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
3329 failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
3331 if chan.is_shutdown() {
3332 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3333 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3337 no_channels_remain = false;
3343 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
3345 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3346 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3347 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3348 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3349 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3350 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3351 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3352 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3353 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3354 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3355 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3356 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
3357 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
3358 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
3359 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3360 &events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => true,
3364 if no_channels_remain {
3365 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(their_node_id);
3368 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3369 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3371 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
3372 for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
3373 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
3378 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
3379 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
3381 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3384 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3385 match peer_state_lock.entry(their_node_id.clone()) {
3386 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3387 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
3388 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
3391 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
3392 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
3397 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3398 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3399 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3400 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
3401 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
3402 if !chan.have_received_message() {
3403 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
3404 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
3405 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
3409 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
3410 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
3411 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
3417 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
3420 fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
3421 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3423 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
3424 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3425 if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id {
3426 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
3430 self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
3435 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
3436 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
3438 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCInfo {
3439 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3440 match &self.routing {
3441 &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id } => {
3443 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
3444 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3446 &PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { ref payment_data, ref incoming_cltv_expiry } => {
3448 payment_data.write(writer)?;
3449 incoming_cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
3452 self.incoming_shared_secret.write(writer)?;
3453 self.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3454 self.amt_to_forward.write(writer)?;
3455 self.outgoing_cltv_value.write(writer)?;
3460 impl Readable for PendingHTLCInfo {
3461 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, DecodeError> {
3462 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
3463 routing: match Readable::read(reader)? {
3464 0u8 => PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
3465 onion_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
3466 short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3468 1u8 => PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
3469 payment_data: Readable::read(reader)?,
3470 incoming_cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
3472 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3474 incoming_shared_secret: Readable::read(reader)?,
3475 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
3476 amt_to_forward: Readable::read(reader)?,
3477 outgoing_cltv_value: Readable::read(reader)?,
3482 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
3483 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3485 &HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(ref fail_msg) => {
3487 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3489 &HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(ref fail_msg) => {
3491 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3498 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
3499 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailureMsg, DecodeError> {
3500 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3501 0 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3502 1 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3503 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3508 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCStatus {
3509 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3511 &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(ref forward_info) => {
3513 forward_info.write(writer)?;
3515 &PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(ref fail_msg) => {
3517 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3524 impl Readable for PendingHTLCStatus {
3525 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCStatus, DecodeError> {
3526 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3527 0 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3528 1 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3529 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3534 impl_writeable!(HTLCPreviousHopData, 0, {
3537 incoming_packet_shared_secret
3540 impl_writeable!(ClaimableHTLC, 0, {
3547 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
3548 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3550 &HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref hop_data) => {
3552 hop_data.write(writer)?;
3554 &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
3556 path.write(writer)?;
3557 session_priv.write(writer)?;
3558 first_hop_htlc_msat.write(writer)?;
3565 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
3566 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCSource, DecodeError> {
3567 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3568 0 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3569 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3570 path: Readable::read(reader)?,
3571 session_priv: Readable::read(reader)?,
3572 first_hop_htlc_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
3574 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3579 impl Writeable for HTLCFailReason {
3580 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3582 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
3586 &HTLCFailReason::Reason { ref failure_code, ref data } => {
3588 failure_code.write(writer)?;
3589 data.write(writer)?;
3596 impl Readable for HTLCFailReason {
3597 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailReason, DecodeError> {
3598 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3599 0 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: Readable::read(reader)? }),
3600 1 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3601 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
3602 data: Readable::read(reader)?,
3604 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3609 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
3610 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3612 &HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { ref prev_short_channel_id, ref prev_htlc_id, ref forward_info } => {
3614 prev_short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3615 prev_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3616 forward_info.write(writer)?;
3618 &HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3620 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3621 err_packet.write(writer)?;
3628 impl Readable for HTLCForwardInfo {
3629 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCForwardInfo, DecodeError> {
3630 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3631 0 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC {
3632 prev_short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3633 prev_htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3634 forward_info: Readable::read(reader)?,
3636 1 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC {
3637 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3638 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
3640 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3645 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Writeable, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>
3646 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<Keys=ChanSigner>,
3647 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3648 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
3649 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3652 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3653 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
3655 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3656 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3658 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
3659 (self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
3660 self.last_block_hash.lock().unwrap().write(writer)?;
3662 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3663 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
3664 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3665 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3666 unfunded_channels += 1;
3669 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
3670 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3671 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3672 channel.write(writer)?;
3676 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3677 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
3678 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3679 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3680 for forward in pending_forwards {
3681 forward.write(writer)?;
3685 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3686 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
3687 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3688 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3689 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
3690 htlc.write(writer)?;
3694 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3695 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3696 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3697 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
3698 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3699 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
3702 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3703 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3704 for event in events.iter() {
3705 event.write(writer)?;
3708 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
3714 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
3716 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
3718 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
3719 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling <(Sha256dHash,
3720 /// ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args).
3721 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
3722 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
3723 /// 3) Register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints with your chain watch mechanism using
3724 /// ChannelMonitor::get_monitored_outpoints and ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
3725 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
3726 /// 5) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local ManyChannelMonitor.
3727 /// 6) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
3728 /// 7) Register the new ChannelManager with your ChainWatchInterface.
3729 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner: 'a + ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
3730 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<Keys=ChanSigner>,
3731 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3732 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
3733 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3737 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
3738 /// deserialization.
3739 pub keys_manager: K,
3741 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3743 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
3744 pub fee_estimator: F,
3745 /// The ManyChannelMonitor for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3747 /// No calls to the ManyChannelMonitor will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
3748 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
3749 /// ManyChannelMonitor after deserializing this ChannelManager.
3752 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
3753 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
3754 /// force-closed during deserialization.
3755 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
3756 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
3757 /// deserialization.
3759 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
3760 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
3761 pub default_config: UserConfig,
3763 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
3764 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
3766 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
3767 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
3768 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
3769 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
3771 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
3773 pub channel_monitors: &'a mut HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>>,
3776 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
3777 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
3778 impl<'a, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
3779 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>>)
3780 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<Keys=ChanSigner>,
3781 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3782 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
3783 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3786 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3787 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
3788 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
3792 impl<'a, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
3793 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>)
3794 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<Keys=ChanSigner>,
3795 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3796 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
3797 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3800 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3801 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3802 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3803 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
3804 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
3807 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3808 let latest_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3809 let last_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3811 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3813 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3814 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3815 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3816 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3817 for _ in 0..channel_count {
3818 let mut channel: Channel<ChanSigner> = Readable::read(reader)?;
3819 if channel.last_block_connected != Default::default() && channel.last_block_connected != last_block_hash {
3820 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3823 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
3824 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
3825 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
3826 if channel.get_cur_local_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_local_commitment_number() ||
3827 channel.get_revoked_remote_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
3828 channel.get_cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_remote_commitment_number() ||
3829 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
3830 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
3831 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3832 } else if channel.get_cur_local_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_local_commitment_number() ||
3833 channel.get_revoked_remote_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
3834 channel.get_cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_remote_commitment_number() ||
3835 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
3836 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
3837 let (_, _, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
3838 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
3839 monitor.broadcast_latest_local_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
3841 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3842 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
3844 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
3847 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3851 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
3852 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
3853 monitor.broadcast_latest_local_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
3857 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
3858 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3859 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3860 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
3861 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3862 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3863 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
3864 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
3865 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3867 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
3870 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3871 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3872 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
3873 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3874 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3875 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
3876 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
3877 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3879 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
3882 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3883 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
3884 for _ in 0..peer_count {
3885 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
3886 let peer_state = PeerState {
3887 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
3889 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
3892 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3893 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
3894 for _ in 0..event_count {
3895 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
3896 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
3901 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3903 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
3905 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
3906 monitor: args.monitor,
3907 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
3909 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(latest_block_height as usize),
3910 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(last_block_hash),
3911 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
3913 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
3918 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
3920 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
3922 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
3924 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
3926 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
3927 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
3928 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
3929 logger: args.logger,
3930 default_configuration: args.default_config,
3933 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
3934 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
3937 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
3938 //connection or two.
3940 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))