1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`find_route`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 //! [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
24 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
25 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
30 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
35 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
38 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
39 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
40 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
41 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
42 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
43 // construct one themselves.
44 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
45 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
46 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
47 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
48 use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
49 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
50 use crate::routing::router::{DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RoutePath, Router};
51 use crate::routing::scoring::ProbabilisticScorer;
53 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
54 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
55 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
57 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
58 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PendingOutboundPayment};
59 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
60 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, KeysInterface, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, Sign, SignerProvider};
61 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig};
62 use crate::util::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
63 use crate::util::events;
64 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
65 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
66 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
67 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
68 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
71 use crate::prelude::*;
73 use core::cell::RefCell;
75 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock};
76 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
77 use core::time::Duration;
80 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
81 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::PaymentSendFailure;
83 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
85 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
86 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
87 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
89 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
90 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
91 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
92 // before we forward it.
94 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
95 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
96 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
97 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
98 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
100 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
101 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
103 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
104 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
105 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
106 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
109 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
110 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
111 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
114 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
115 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
119 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
120 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
121 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
122 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
123 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
124 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
125 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
126 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
129 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
130 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
131 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
132 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
135 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
136 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
137 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
138 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
139 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
142 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
143 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
145 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
146 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
147 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
150 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
151 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
153 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
154 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
157 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
158 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
161 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
165 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
166 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
167 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
168 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
169 short_channel_id: u64,
171 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
172 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
174 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
175 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
180 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
182 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
183 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
184 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
186 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
187 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
190 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
191 struct ClaimableHTLC {
192 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
194 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
196 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
198 /// The sum total of all MPP parts
202 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
203 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
204 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
205 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
207 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
208 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
213 impl Readable for PaymentId {
214 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
215 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
220 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
221 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
222 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
223 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
225 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
226 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
231 impl Readable for InterceptId {
232 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
233 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
237 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
238 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
239 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
240 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
241 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
244 session_priv: SecretKey,
245 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
246 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
247 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
248 payment_id: PaymentId,
249 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
250 payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters>,
253 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
254 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
255 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
257 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
259 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
261 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat, payment_params } => {
264 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
265 payment_id.hash(hasher);
266 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
267 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
268 payment_params.hash(hasher);
273 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
276 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
277 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
279 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
280 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
281 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
282 payment_secret: None,
283 payment_params: None,
288 struct ReceiveError {
294 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>);
296 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
297 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
298 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
299 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
300 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
302 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
303 err: msgs::LightningError,
304 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
305 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
307 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
309 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
311 err: LightningError {
313 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
314 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
321 shutdown_finish: None,
325 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
327 err: LightningError {
329 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
332 shutdown_finish: None,
336 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
337 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
340 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
342 err: LightningError {
344 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
345 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
351 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
352 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
356 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
359 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
361 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
362 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
366 log_level: Level::Warn,
369 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
371 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
373 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
375 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
376 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
384 shutdown_finish: None,
389 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
390 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
391 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
392 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
393 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
395 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
396 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
397 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
398 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
399 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
400 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
401 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
403 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
407 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
408 struct ClaimingPayment {
410 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
411 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
413 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
414 (0, amount_msat, required),
415 (2, payment_purpose, required),
416 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
419 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
420 struct ClaimablePayments {
421 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
422 /// failed/claimed by the user.
424 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
425 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
427 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
428 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
429 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, (events::PaymentPurpose, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>)>,
431 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
432 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
433 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
434 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
437 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
438 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder {
439 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
440 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
441 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
444 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
445 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
446 /// quite some time lag.
447 enum BackgroundEvent {
448 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
449 /// commitment transaction.
450 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
453 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
454 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
455 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
456 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
457 /// event can be generated.
458 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
459 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user.
460 EmitEvent { event: events::Event },
463 /// State we hold per-peer.
464 pub(super) struct PeerState<Signer: Sign> {
465 /// `temporary_channel_id` or `channel_id` -> `channel`.
467 /// Holds all channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once a channel has been assigned a
468 /// `channel_id`, the `temporary_channel_id` key in the map is updated and is replaced by the
470 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
471 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
472 latest_features: InitFeatures,
475 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
476 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
478 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
481 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
482 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
483 struct PendingInboundPayment {
484 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
485 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
486 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
487 /// this payment being removed.
489 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
490 user_payment_id: u64,
491 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
492 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
493 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
496 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
497 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
498 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
499 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
500 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
501 /// that implements KeysInterface or Router for its keys manager and router, respectively, but this
502 /// type alias chooses the concrete types of KeysManager and DefaultRouter.
504 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
505 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
511 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
513 Arc<Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>
518 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
519 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
520 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
521 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
522 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
523 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
524 /// that implements KeysInterface or Router for its keys manager and router, respectively, but this
525 /// type alias chooses the concrete types of KeysManager and DefaultRouter.
527 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
528 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<&'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e DefaultRouter<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L, &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>>, &'g L>;
530 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
531 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
533 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
534 /// to individual Channels.
536 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
537 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
538 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
539 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
541 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
542 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
543 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
544 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
545 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
546 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
547 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
549 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
550 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
551 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
552 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
555 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
556 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
557 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
558 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
559 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
561 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
562 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
563 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
564 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
565 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
568 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
569 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
570 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
571 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
572 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
576 // `total_consistency_lock`
578 // |__`forward_htlcs`
580 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
582 // |__`pending_inbound_payments`
584 // | |__`claimable_payments`
586 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
588 // | |__`channel_state`
590 // | |__`per_peer_state`
596 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
598 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
602 // | |__`pending_events`
604 // | |__`pending_background_events`
606 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
608 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
609 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
610 K::Target: KeysInterface,
611 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
615 default_configuration: UserConfig,
616 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
617 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
623 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
625 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
627 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
628 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
630 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
631 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
632 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
633 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
634 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
636 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
637 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
638 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
639 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
641 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
642 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
644 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
645 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
646 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
647 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
648 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
649 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
650 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
651 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
653 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
655 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
656 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
658 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
660 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
661 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
662 /// and via the classic SCID.
664 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
665 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
667 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
669 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
671 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
672 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
673 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
675 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
676 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
678 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
679 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
681 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
682 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
684 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
685 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
686 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
687 /// active channel list on load.
689 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
690 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
692 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
694 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
695 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
696 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
698 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
699 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
700 /// the handling of the events.
703 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
704 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
705 /// would break backwards compatability.
706 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
707 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
708 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
710 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
711 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
713 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
715 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
716 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
717 /// confirmation depth.
719 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
720 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
721 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
723 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
725 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
727 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
729 our_network_key: SecretKey,
730 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
732 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
734 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
735 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
736 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
738 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
739 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
741 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
742 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
743 /// keeping additional state.
744 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
746 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
747 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
748 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
749 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
751 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (message queues and the like). Currently
752 /// the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer basis, as well as the peer's latest
755 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
756 /// are currently open with that peer.
758 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
759 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
762 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
764 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
765 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
766 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
767 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
768 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
770 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
771 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
772 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
773 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
774 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
775 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
776 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
777 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
778 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
779 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
780 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
782 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
789 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
791 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
792 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
793 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
794 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
795 pub struct ChainParameters {
796 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
797 pub network: Network,
799 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
801 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
802 pub best_block: BestBlock,
805 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
811 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
812 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
813 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
814 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
815 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
816 /// updates are ready for persistence).
818 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
819 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
820 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
821 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
822 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
824 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
825 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
828 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
829 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
830 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
833 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
834 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
836 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
837 persistence_notifier: notifier,
838 should_persist: persist_check,
839 _read_guard: read_guard,
844 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
846 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
847 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
852 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
853 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
855 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
857 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
858 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
859 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
860 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
861 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
863 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
864 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
866 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
868 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
869 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
870 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
871 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
872 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
873 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
874 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
875 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
876 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
877 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
878 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
879 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
880 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
882 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
883 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
885 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
886 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
887 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
888 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
890 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
891 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
892 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
893 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
894 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
895 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
898 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
900 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
901 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
904 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
906 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
907 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
909 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
910 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
911 /// [`OutboundPayments::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
912 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
914 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
915 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
916 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
917 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
918 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
919 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
920 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
921 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
922 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
923 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
924 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
927 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
928 /// to better separate parameters.
929 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
930 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
931 /// The node_id of our counterparty
932 pub node_id: PublicKey,
933 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
934 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
935 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
936 pub features: InitFeatures,
937 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
938 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
939 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
941 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
943 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
944 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
945 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
946 /// payments to us through this channel.
947 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
948 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
949 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
950 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
951 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
952 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
953 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
956 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
957 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
958 pub struct ChannelDetails {
959 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
960 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
961 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
962 /// lifetime of the channel.
963 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
964 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
965 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
966 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
967 /// our counterparty already.
969 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
970 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
971 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
972 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
974 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
975 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
976 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
977 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
979 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
980 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
982 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
983 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
985 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
986 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
987 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
988 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
989 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
990 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
991 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
992 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
993 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
996 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
998 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
999 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1000 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1001 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1002 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1003 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1004 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1006 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1007 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1009 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1010 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1011 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1012 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1013 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1014 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1015 /// this value on chain.
1017 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1019 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1021 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1022 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1023 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or a random value if the channel was
1024 /// inbound. This may be zero for inbound channels serialized with LDK versions prior to
1026 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1027 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1028 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1029 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1031 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1032 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1033 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1034 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1036 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1037 pub balance_msat: u64,
1038 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1039 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1040 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1041 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1043 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1045 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1046 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1047 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1048 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1049 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1050 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1051 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1052 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1054 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1055 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1056 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1057 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1058 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1059 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1060 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1062 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1063 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1064 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1065 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1066 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1067 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1068 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1069 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1070 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1072 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1074 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1075 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1076 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1077 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1078 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1080 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1081 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1082 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1083 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1084 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1085 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1086 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1088 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1089 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1090 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1091 pub is_outbound: bool,
1092 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1093 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1094 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1095 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1096 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1098 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1099 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1100 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1101 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1103 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1104 pub is_usable: bool,
1105 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1106 pub is_public: bool,
1107 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1108 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1109 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1110 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1111 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1112 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1114 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1115 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1118 impl ChannelDetails {
1119 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1120 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1121 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1123 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1124 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1125 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1126 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1129 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1130 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1131 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1133 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1134 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1135 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1136 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1140 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1142 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
1144 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1145 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1146 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1147 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1149 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1150 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1151 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1154 macro_rules! handle_error {
1155 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
1158 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1159 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1161 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1162 // entering the macro.
1163 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
1164 assert!($self.pending_events.try_lock().is_ok());
1167 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1169 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1170 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1171 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1172 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1176 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1177 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1178 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1179 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1184 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1185 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1187 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1188 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1189 action: err.action.clone()
1193 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1194 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1197 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1204 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1205 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {{
1206 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.channel_id());
1207 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1208 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1209 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1211 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1212 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1213 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1214 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1215 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1217 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1218 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1220 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1224 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1225 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1226 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1228 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1229 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1231 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1232 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1234 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1235 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1236 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel);
1237 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1238 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1239 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1245 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1246 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1250 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1252 $entry.remove_entry();
1260 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1261 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1265 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1267 $entry.remove_entry();
1275 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1276 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1278 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1279 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, channel);
1285 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_res {
1286 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
1288 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1289 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
1290 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $chan);
1291 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
1292 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
1293 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
1294 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
1295 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
1296 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
1297 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
1298 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
1299 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
1300 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.get_user_id(),
1301 $chan.force_shutdown(false), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
1304 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1305 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update in progress. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations",
1306 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
1307 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
1308 match $action_type {
1309 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
1310 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
1312 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
1313 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
1315 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
1316 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len(),
1317 (&$failed_finalized_fulfills as &Vec<HTLCSource>).len());
1318 if !$resend_commitment {
1319 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
1322 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
1324 $chan.monitor_updating_paused($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
1325 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
1327 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
1332 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
1333 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
1335 $entry.remove_entry();
1339 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY) => { {
1340 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
1341 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1343 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, NO_UPDATE) => {
1344 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1346 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_channel_ready: expr, OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED) => {
1347 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, false, $resend_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1349 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1350 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1352 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1353 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new())
1357 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1358 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1359 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1360 node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1361 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1363 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1364 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1365 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1366 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1367 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1368 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1369 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1370 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1371 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1372 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1377 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1378 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1379 if $channel.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1381 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1382 pending_events.push(events::Event::ChannelReady {
1383 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1384 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1385 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1386 channel_type: $channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
1389 $channel.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1394 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, R, L>
1396 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
1397 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1398 K::Target: KeysInterface,
1399 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1403 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1405 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1406 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1408 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1410 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1411 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1412 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1413 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1414 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1415 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1416 let inbound_pmt_key_material = keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1417 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1419 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1420 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1421 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
1426 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1428 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1429 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1431 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1432 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1433 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
1434 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1435 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
1436 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1437 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1438 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1440 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1441 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap()),
1444 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1445 fake_scid_rand_bytes: keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1447 probing_cookie_secret: keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1449 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1451 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1453 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1454 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1455 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1456 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
1464 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
1465 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1466 &self.default_configuration
1469 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1470 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1471 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1474 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1475 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1477 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
1479 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1483 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1488 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1490 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1491 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1492 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
1493 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
1494 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
1496 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1497 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1499 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1500 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1501 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1503 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1504 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1505 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1506 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1507 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1508 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1510 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1511 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1512 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1513 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1514 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1515 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1518 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1519 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1520 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1522 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1523 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1525 match per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) {
1526 None => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }),
1527 Some(peer_state_mutex) => {
1528 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1530 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
1531 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1532 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1533 match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key,
1534 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
1535 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
1539 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
1544 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1546 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1547 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1548 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1550 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1552 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1555 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1558 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1559 node_id: their_network_key,
1562 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1567 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1568 let mut res = Vec::new();
1569 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
1570 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
1571 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
1572 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
1573 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
1574 // the same channel.
1575 res.reserve(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
1577 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1578 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1579 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
1580 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1581 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1582 for (channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1583 let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
1584 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1585 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1586 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1587 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1588 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1589 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1590 features: peer_state.latest_features.clone(),
1591 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1592 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1593 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1594 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1595 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1596 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1597 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1598 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
1599 Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1600 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1602 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1603 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1604 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1605 channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1606 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1607 outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1608 inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1609 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1610 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1611 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1612 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1613 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1614 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1615 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1616 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1617 confirmations: Some(channel.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1618 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1619 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1620 is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(),
1621 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1622 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1623 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1624 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1625 config: Some(channel.config()),
1633 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1634 /// more information.
1635 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1636 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1639 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to [`find_route`]
1640 /// to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1642 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1643 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1646 /// [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
1647 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1648 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1649 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1650 // really wanted anyway.
1651 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1654 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1655 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1656 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1657 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1658 Some(transaction) => {
1659 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1663 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1664 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1665 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1666 reason: closure_reason
1670 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1671 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1673 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1674 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1675 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1676 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1677 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1678 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
1679 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1680 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1681 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1682 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1683 let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &peer_state.latest_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?;
1684 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1686 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1687 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1688 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
1689 let (result, is_permanent) =
1690 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
1692 remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
1697 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1698 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
1702 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1703 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
1704 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1705 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1709 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1713 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id) })
1716 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) });
1720 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1721 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
1722 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
1723 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
1726 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
1730 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1731 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1732 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1734 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1735 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1737 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1738 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1739 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1740 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1742 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1744 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1745 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1746 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1747 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1748 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None)
1751 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1752 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1753 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1755 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1756 /// the channel being closed or not:
1757 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1758 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1759 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1760 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1761 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1762 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1763 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1765 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1767 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1768 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1769 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1770 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1771 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1775 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1776 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1777 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1778 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1779 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
1780 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
1781 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1782 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
1784 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1785 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1786 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1787 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1788 // ignore the result here.
1789 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
1793 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
1794 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
1795 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
1796 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1798 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1799 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id) {
1800 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1801 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1802 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1803 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
1804 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
1806 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1808 remove_channel!(self, chan)
1810 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), peer_node_id) });
1813 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) });
1816 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1817 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(broadcast));
1818 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
1819 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1820 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1825 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
1828 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1829 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1830 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
1831 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
1832 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1833 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1834 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1835 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
1836 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
1846 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
1847 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
1848 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
1850 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
1851 -> Result<(), APIError> {
1852 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
1855 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
1856 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
1857 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
1859 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
1860 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
1861 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
1862 -> Result<(), APIError> {
1863 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
1866 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
1867 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
1868 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
1869 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1870 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
1874 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
1875 /// local transaction(s).
1876 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
1877 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1878 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
1882 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
1883 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
1885 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1886 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != cltv_expiry {
1887 return Err(ReceiveError {
1888 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value",
1890 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
1893 // final_expiry_too_soon
1894 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
1895 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
1896 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
1897 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
1898 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
1899 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1900 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
1901 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
1902 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
1903 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
1904 return Err(ReceiveError {
1905 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
1906 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
1909 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
1910 return Err(ReceiveError {
1912 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
1913 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
1917 let routing = match hop_data.format {
1918 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
1919 return Err(ReceiveError {
1920 err_code: 0x4000|22,
1921 err_data: Vec::new(),
1922 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
1925 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
1926 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
1927 return Err(ReceiveError {
1928 err_code: 0x4000|22,
1929 err_data: Vec::new(),
1930 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
1932 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
1933 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
1935 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1936 phantom_shared_secret,
1938 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
1939 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
1940 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
1941 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
1942 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
1943 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
1944 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
1945 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
1946 return Err(ReceiveError {
1947 err_code: 0x4000|22,
1948 err_data: Vec::new(),
1949 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
1953 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
1955 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1958 return Err(ReceiveError {
1959 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
1960 err_data: Vec::new(),
1961 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
1966 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
1969 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1970 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
1971 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_msat,
1972 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1976 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
1977 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
1978 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
1980 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1981 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
1982 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1983 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1984 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
1985 failure_code: $err_code,
1991 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
1992 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
1995 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key).secret_bytes();
1997 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
1998 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
1999 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2000 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2001 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2002 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2003 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2004 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2006 macro_rules! return_err {
2007 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2009 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2010 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2011 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2012 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2013 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2014 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2020 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2022 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2023 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2025 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2026 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2030 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2031 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2033 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2035 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2036 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2037 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2038 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2039 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2041 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2044 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2045 let new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2046 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2048 public_key: onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx, new_pubkey, &shared_secret),
2049 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2050 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2053 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2054 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2055 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2056 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2060 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2061 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2062 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2065 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2066 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2067 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2068 outgoing_amt_msat: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2069 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2074 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref outgoing_amt_msat, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2075 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2076 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2077 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2078 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2079 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
2080 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
2081 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
2082 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2083 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2084 // phantom or an intercept.
2085 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2086 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
2087 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)
2091 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2094 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
2096 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
2097 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2098 if let None = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2099 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2101 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id).unwrap();
2102 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2103 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2104 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2106 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
2107 // have no consistency guarantees.
2108 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2112 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2113 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2114 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2115 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2116 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2118 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2119 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2120 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2121 // we don't have the channel here.
2122 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2124 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2126 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2127 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2128 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2129 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2130 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2131 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2132 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2134 if *outgoing_amt_msat < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2135 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2137 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, *outgoing_amt_msat, *outgoing_cltv_value) {
2138 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2142 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
2143 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
2144 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
2145 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
2147 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2154 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2155 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2156 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2157 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2158 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2159 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2161 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2162 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2164 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2165 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2166 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2167 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2168 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2169 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2170 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2171 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2172 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2173 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2179 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2180 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2181 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2182 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2184 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2185 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2187 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2188 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2189 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2191 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2192 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2193 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2194 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
2195 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
2196 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
2197 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
2201 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2206 pending_forward_info
2209 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2210 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2211 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2213 /// May be called with peer_state already locked!
2214 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2215 if !chan.should_announce() {
2216 return Err(LightningError {
2217 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2218 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2221 if chan.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2222 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2224 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2225 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2228 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2229 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
2230 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2231 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2232 /// May be called with peer_state already locked!
2233 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2234 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2235 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
2236 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2240 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2242 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2243 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2244 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2246 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2247 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2249 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2250 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2251 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2252 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2253 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
2254 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2255 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2256 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2259 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
2260 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
2262 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2268 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
2269 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_params: &Option<PaymentParameters>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2270 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2271 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2272 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2274 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2275 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
2276 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2277 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2278 return Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
2280 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2282 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2284 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2285 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2286 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2287 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
2290 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2291 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2292 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2293 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2294 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2295 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2296 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
2298 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2299 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
2301 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(
2302 htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2304 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2305 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2307 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2308 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2309 }, onion_packet, &self.logger),
2312 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
2313 let update_err = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
2314 let chan_id = chan.get().channel_id();
2316 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_err, chan,
2317 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true))
2319 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure, Err(e)) => break Err(e),
2320 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed, Ok(())) => {},
2321 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress, Err(_)) => {
2322 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
2323 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
2324 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
2325 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
2326 // which we do in the send_payment check for
2327 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
2328 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
2330 _ => unreachable!(),
2333 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan_id));
2334 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2335 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
2336 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2337 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
2338 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2339 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2340 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2349 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
2350 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
2351 // `channel_by_id` map.
2352 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
2353 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
2355 } else { return Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!" })}
2359 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2360 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2362 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2367 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2369 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
2370 /// fields for more info.
2372 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
2373 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
2374 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
2375 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a second payment with the same
2378 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
2379 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
2380 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
2381 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
2382 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
2384 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
2385 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
2387 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2388 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2389 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
2391 /// In general, a path may raise:
2392 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2393 /// node public key) is specified.
2394 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2395 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2397 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2398 /// relevant updates.
2400 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2401 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2402 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2404 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
2405 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
2406 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
2407 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
2410 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
2411 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
2412 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2414 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2415 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
2416 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2417 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2418 self.pending_outbound_payments
2419 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, &self.keys_manager, best_block_height,
2420 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2421 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2425 fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2426 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2427 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.keys_manager, best_block_height,
2428 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2429 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2433 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
2434 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2435 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, route, &self.keys_manager, best_block_height)
2439 /// Retries a payment along the given [`Route`].
2441 /// Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see
2442 /// [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the
2443 /// retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, if the payment
2444 /// for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success), or if
2445 /// further retries have been disabled with [`abandon_payment`].
2447 /// [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]
2448 /// [`abandon_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`]
2449 pub fn retry_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2450 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2451 self.pending_outbound_payments.retry_payment_with_route(route, payment_id, &self.keys_manager, best_block_height,
2452 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2453 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2456 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment will occur.
2458 /// After this method returns, no future calls to [`retry_payment`] for the given `payment_id`
2459 /// are allowed. If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be
2460 /// generated as soon as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
2462 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2463 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2464 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2466 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event is generated and we restart without this
2467 /// [`ChannelManager`] having been persisted, the payment may still be in the pending state
2468 /// upon restart. This allows further calls to [`retry_payment`] (and requiring a second call
2469 /// to [`abandon_payment`] to mark the payment as failed again). Otherwise, future calls to
2470 /// [`retry_payment`] will fail with [`PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError`].
2472 /// [`abandon_payment`]: Self::abandon_payment
2473 /// [`retry_payment`]: Self::retry_payment
2474 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2475 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2476 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2477 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2478 if let Some(payment_failed_ev) = self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id) {
2479 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(payment_failed_ev);
2483 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2484 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2485 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2486 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2487 /// never reach the recipient.
2489 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
2490 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
2492 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2493 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2495 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2497 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2498 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
2499 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2500 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(route, payment_preimage, payment_id, &self.keys_manager, best_block_height,
2501 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2502 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2505 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
2506 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
2507 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
2508 pub fn send_probe(&self, hops: Vec<RouteHop>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2509 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2510 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(hops, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.keys_manager, best_block_height,
2511 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2512 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2515 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
2518 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
2519 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
2522 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2523 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2524 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
2525 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
2526 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2527 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2528 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2529 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2530 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2531 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2534 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2536 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2538 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2539 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2540 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2541 } else { unreachable!(); })
2544 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) }) },
2547 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2548 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2551 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2552 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2557 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2558 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2561 mem::drop(channel_state);
2562 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2563 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2564 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2566 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2567 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
2568 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
2569 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
2576 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })
2581 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2582 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2583 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2587 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2589 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2590 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2592 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
2593 /// across the p2p network.
2595 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2596 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2598 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2599 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2600 /// keys per-channel).
2602 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2603 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2604 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2606 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2607 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2608 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2610 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
2611 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
2612 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
2613 /// for more details.
2615 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2616 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2617 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2618 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2620 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2621 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2622 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2623 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2628 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2629 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools at the next block. However, the modules
2630 // constituting our Lightning node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if
2631 // the wallet module is in advance on the LDK view, allow one more block of headroom.
2632 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 2 {
2633 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2634 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
2638 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2639 let mut output_index = None;
2640 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2641 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2642 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2643 if output_index.is_some() {
2644 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2645 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2648 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2649 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2650 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2653 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2656 if output_index.is_none() {
2657 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2658 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2661 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2665 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
2667 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
2668 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
2669 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
2670 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
2672 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
2673 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
2675 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
2676 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
2678 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
2680 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
2681 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
2682 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
2683 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
2684 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2685 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
2686 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
2687 pub fn update_channel_config(
2688 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
2689 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2690 if config.cltv_expiry_delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA {
2691 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2692 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
2696 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(
2697 &self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier,
2700 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2701 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2702 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2703 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2704 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2705 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2706 for channel_id in channel_ids {
2707 if !peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) {
2708 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2709 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
2713 for channel_id in channel_ids {
2714 let channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
2715 if !channel.update_config(config) {
2718 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
2719 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
2720 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
2721 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2722 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2728 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) });
2734 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
2735 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
2737 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
2738 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
2740 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
2741 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
2742 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
2743 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
2744 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
2746 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
2747 /// you from forwarding more than you received.
2749 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
2752 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
2753 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
2754 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
2755 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
2756 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2757 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2759 let next_hop_scid = {
2760 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2761 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id) {
2762 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2763 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2764 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
2766 if !chan.is_usable() {
2767 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2768 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
2771 chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.outbound_scid_alias())
2773 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2774 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id), next_node_id)
2778 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) });
2782 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
2783 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
2784 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
2787 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
2788 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
2789 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
2791 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
2793 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
2794 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
2797 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
2798 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
2799 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
2800 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
2801 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
2803 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
2807 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
2808 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
2810 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
2813 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
2814 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2815 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2817 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
2818 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
2819 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
2822 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
2823 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2824 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
2825 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
2826 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
2827 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
2828 phantom_shared_secret: None,
2831 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
2832 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
2833 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
2834 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
2839 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
2841 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
2842 /// Will likely generate further events.
2843 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
2844 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2846 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2847 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
2848 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
2850 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
2851 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
2853 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
2854 if short_chan_id != 0 {
2855 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
2857 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2858 match forward_info {
2859 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
2860 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
2861 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2862 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
2863 outgoing_cltv_value, incoming_amt_msat: _
2866 macro_rules! failure_handler {
2867 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
2868 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2870 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2871 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2872 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2873 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2874 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2875 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
2878 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
2879 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
2881 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
2884 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
2885 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
2891 macro_rules! fail_forward {
2892 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
2894 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
2898 macro_rules! failed_payment {
2899 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
2901 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
2905 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
2906 let phantom_secret_res = self.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::PhantomNode);
2907 if phantom_secret_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
2908 let phantom_shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &phantom_secret_res.unwrap()).secret_bytes();
2909 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
2911 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2912 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
2913 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
2914 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
2915 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
2917 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
2919 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2920 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
2924 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
2925 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
2926 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
2927 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
2933 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
2936 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
2939 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2940 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
2941 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
2942 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
2943 // problem, not ours.
2949 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
2950 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
2952 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
2956 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2957 if let None = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2958 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
2961 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id).unwrap();
2962 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2963 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2964 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
2965 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2966 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
2969 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2970 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2971 match forward_info {
2972 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
2973 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id: _,
2974 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2975 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
2976 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, incoming_amt_msat: _,
2979 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
2980 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2981 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2982 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2983 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2984 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2985 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
2986 phantom_shared_secret: None,
2988 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
2989 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
2990 onion_packet, &self.logger)
2992 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
2993 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
2995 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
2997 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
2998 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
2999 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
3000 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3005 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3006 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3008 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3009 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3010 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_fail_htlc(
3011 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
3013 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3014 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3016 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
3018 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3019 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3020 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3029 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3030 match forward_info {
3031 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3032 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3033 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3034 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, ..
3037 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret) = match routing {
3038 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3039 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3040 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data }, Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret)
3042 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3043 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage), None, None),
3045 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3048 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3049 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3050 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3051 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3052 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3053 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3054 phantom_shared_secret,
3056 value: outgoing_amt_msat,
3058 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
3063 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3064 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
3065 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3066 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3067 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
3069 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3070 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3071 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3072 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3073 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3074 phantom_shared_secret,
3076 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
3077 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
3081 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
3082 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3083 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3084 receiver_node_id = self.keys_manager.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3085 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3088 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3089 ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3090 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
3092 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3093 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3094 payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
3097 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3098 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3099 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3102 let (_, htlcs) = claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
3103 .or_insert_with(|| (purpose(), Vec::new()));
3104 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3105 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3106 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3107 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3111 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.value;
3112 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3113 total_value += htlc.value;
3114 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3115 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3116 if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat {
3117 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3118 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3119 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3121 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3123 _ => unreachable!(),
3126 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > $payment_data.total_msat {
3127 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
3128 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, $payment_data.total_msat);
3129 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3130 } else if total_value == $payment_data.total_msat {
3131 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3132 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3133 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3134 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3137 amount_msat: total_value,
3138 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3139 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3141 payment_claimable_generated = true;
3143 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3144 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3146 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3148 payment_claimable_generated
3152 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3153 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3154 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3155 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3156 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3157 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3158 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3159 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3160 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3161 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3162 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3163 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3164 let payment_preimage = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3165 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
3167 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3171 check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
3173 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3174 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3175 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3176 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3179 match claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
3180 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3181 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
3182 e.insert((purpose.clone(), vec![claimable_htlc]));
3183 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3184 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3185 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3187 amount_msat: outgoing_amt_msat,
3189 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3190 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3193 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3194 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3195 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3201 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3202 if payment_data.is_none() {
3203 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3204 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3207 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3208 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3209 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3210 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3211 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3212 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3213 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3214 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3216 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3217 if payment_claimable_generated {
3218 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3224 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3225 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3233 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3234 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3236 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3238 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
3239 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
3240 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
3242 self.check_free_holding_cells();
3244 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3245 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3246 events.append(&mut new_events);
3249 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3251 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3252 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3254 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3255 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3256 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3257 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3258 if background_events.is_empty() {
3262 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3264 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3265 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3266 // monitor updating completing.
3267 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
3274 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3275 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3276 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3277 self.process_background_events();
3280 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
3281 if !chan.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; }
3282 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3283 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
3284 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3285 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3286 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3288 if !chan.is_live() {
3289 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3290 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3291 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3293 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3294 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3296 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.logger);
3297 NotifyOption::DoPersist
3301 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3302 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3303 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3304 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3305 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3306 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3307 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3309 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3311 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3312 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3313 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3314 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3315 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
3316 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3317 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3325 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3327 /// This currently includes:
3328 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3329 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3330 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3332 /// * Expiring a channel's previous `ChannelConfig` if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
3333 /// with the current `ChannelConfig`.
3335 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
3336 /// estimate fetches.
3337 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3338 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3339 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3340 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3342 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3344 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
3345 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
3347 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3348 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3349 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3350 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3351 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3352 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3353 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3354 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3355 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3356 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3358 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3359 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
3360 handle_errors.push((Err(err), *counterparty_node_id));
3361 if needs_close { return false; }
3364 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3365 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3366 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3367 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3368 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3369 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3370 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3371 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3375 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3376 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3378 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3379 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3380 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3384 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3385 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3390 chan.maybe_expire_prev_config();
3397 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
3398 if htlcs.is_empty() {
3399 // This should be unreachable
3400 debug_assert!(false);
3403 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3404 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
3405 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
3406 if htlcs[0].total_msat == htlcs.iter().fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.value) {
3408 } else if htlcs.into_iter().any(|htlc| {
3409 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
3410 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3412 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(htlcs.drain(..).map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
3419 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
3420 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
3421 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
3422 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
3423 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
3426 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3427 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3430 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self.pending_events);
3432 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
3433 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
3434 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
3435 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
3436 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3443 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3444 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3445 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3447 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
3448 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
3449 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
3450 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
3452 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
3453 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
3454 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
3455 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
3456 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
3457 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3459 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
3460 if let Some((_, mut sources)) = removed_source {
3461 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3462 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3463 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
3464 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
3465 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
3466 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
3467 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3472 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3473 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3475 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
3477 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3478 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
3479 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
3480 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
3481 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
3482 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
3483 chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
3485 chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
3487 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
3488 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
3490 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3495 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3496 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3497 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3498 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
3499 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
3500 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
3501 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3502 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
3503 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
3504 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3506 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3507 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3508 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3509 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
3511 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
3512 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
3513 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
3514 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
3515 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3519 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3520 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3521 // be surfaced to the user.
3522 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
3523 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
3524 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
3526 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
3527 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3528 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
3529 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3530 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3531 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3532 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3533 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
3535 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3537 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
3540 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3541 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
3542 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
3543 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3547 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3548 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
3549 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
3550 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
3552 // Ensure that the `channel_state` and no peer state channel storage lock is not held
3553 // when calling this function.
3554 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock_order requirement for
3555 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `channel_state` and `per_peer_state` locks,
3556 // which calling this function with the locks aquired would.
3557 assert!(self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
3558 assert!(self.per_peer_state.try_write().is_ok());
3561 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3562 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3563 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3566 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3567 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3568 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3570 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, ref payment_params, .. } => {
3571 self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_params, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx, &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
3573 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint }) => {
3574 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), onion_error);
3575 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
3577 let mut forward_event = None;
3578 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
3579 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3580 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
3582 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
3583 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3584 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
3586 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3587 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
3590 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
3591 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3592 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
3593 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3594 time_forwardable: time
3597 pending_events.push(events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
3598 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
3599 failed_next_destination: destination,
3605 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
3606 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
3608 /// Note that calling this method does *not* guarantee that the payment has been claimed. You
3609 /// *must* wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] event which upon a successful claim will be
3610 /// provided to your [`EventHandler`] when [`process_pending_events`] is next called.
3612 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
3613 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
3614 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
3615 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
3617 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
3618 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
3619 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
3620 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3621 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3622 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
3623 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3625 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3628 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3629 if let Some((payment_purpose, sources)) = claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
3630 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3631 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3632 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3633 let phantom_pubkey = self.keys_manager.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3634 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3635 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
3640 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
3641 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: sources.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
3642 payment_purpose, receiver_node_id,
3644 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
3645 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
3646 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
3647 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3652 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
3654 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we check that all channels which contain a claimable
3655 // HTLC still exist. While this isn't guaranteed to remain true if a channel closes while
3656 // we're claiming (or even after we claim, before the commitment update dance completes),
3657 // it should be a relatively rare race, and we'd rather not claim HTLCs that require us to
3658 // go on-chain (and lose the on-chain fee to do so) than just reject the payment.
3660 // Note that we'll still always get our funds - as long as the generated
3661 // `ChannelMonitorUpdate` makes it out to the relevant monitor we can claim on-chain.
3663 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
3664 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
3665 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
3666 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
3667 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
3669 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
3670 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
3671 let mut valid_mpp = true;
3672 let mut errs = Vec::new();
3673 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3674 let mut per_peer_state = Some(self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap());
3675 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3676 let (counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3677 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3684 if let None = per_peer_state.as_ref().unwrap().get(&counterparty_node_id) {
3689 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.as_ref().unwrap().get(&counterparty_node_id).unwrap();
3690 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3691 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3693 if let None = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&chan_id) {
3698 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
3699 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
3700 debug_assert!(false);
3705 expected_amt_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
3706 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload {
3707 // We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check
3708 // that there's one payment here and move on.
3709 if sources.len() != 1 {
3710 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP spontaneous payment - this should not be reachable!");
3711 debug_assert!(false);
3717 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
3719 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
3720 mem::drop(channel_state);
3721 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3722 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
3723 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
3726 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
3727 mem::drop(channel_state);
3728 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3729 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
3730 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
3731 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
3735 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3736 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3737 if per_peer_state.is_none() { per_peer_state = Some(self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap()); }
3738 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.take().unwrap(), per_peer_state.take().unwrap(),
3739 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
3740 |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
3742 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
3743 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
3744 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
3745 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
3746 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
3750 mem::drop(channel_state);
3751 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3753 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3754 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3755 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
3756 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
3757 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
3758 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
3759 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3761 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
3764 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
3765 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
3766 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3767 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
3771 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
3772 mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>,
3773 per_peer_state_lock: RwLockReadGuard<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
3774 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
3775 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
3776 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
3778 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
3779 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3781 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3782 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
3786 let (found_channel, mut peer_state_opt) = if counterparty_node_id_opt.is_some() && per_peer_state_lock.get(&counterparty_node_id_opt.unwrap()).is_some() {
3787 let peer_mutex = per_peer_state_lock.get(&counterparty_node_id_opt.unwrap()).unwrap();
3788 let peer_state = peer_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3789 let found_channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(&chan_id);
3790 (found_channel, Some(peer_state))
3791 } else { (false, None) };
3794 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state_opt.as_mut().unwrap().channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
3795 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3796 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
3797 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
3798 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
3799 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3800 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
3802 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
3803 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3804 payment_preimage, e);
3805 let err = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err();
3806 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3807 mem::drop(peer_state_opt);
3808 mem::drop(per_peer_state_lock);
3809 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)));
3810 return Err((counterparty_node_id, err));
3813 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
3814 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
3815 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3816 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3817 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3818 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3819 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3820 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
3821 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3822 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3828 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3829 mem::drop(peer_state_opt);
3830 mem::drop(per_peer_state_lock);
3831 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)));
3837 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
3838 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3839 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
3841 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
3842 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
3843 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same update and try
3844 // again on restart.
3845 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
3846 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
3847 payment_preimage, e);
3850 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
3852 chan.remove_entry();
3854 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3855 mem::drop(peer_state_opt);
3856 mem::drop(per_peer_state_lock);
3857 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
3858 Err((counterparty_node_id, res))
3862 // We've held the peer_state mutex since finding the channel and setting
3863 // found_channel to true, so the channel can't have been dropped.
3867 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3868 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
3869 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
3873 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
3874 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
3875 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, preimage_update);
3876 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
3877 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
3878 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
3879 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
3880 // again on restart.
3881 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3882 payment_preimage, update_res);
3884 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3885 mem::drop(peer_state_opt);
3886 mem::drop(per_peer_state_lock);
3887 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
3888 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
3889 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
3890 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
3891 // `PaymentForwarded`).
3892 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
3897 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
3898 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
3901 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
3903 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
3904 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3905 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage, session_priv, path, from_onchain, &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
3907 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
3908 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
3909 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state_lock, self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(), hop_data, payment_preimage,
3910 |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
3911 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
3912 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
3913 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
3916 let prev_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
3917 let next_channel_id = Some(next_channel_id);
3919 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
3921 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
3927 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
3928 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3929 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
3935 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
3936 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
3937 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
3940 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
3941 for action in actions.into_iter() {
3943 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
3944 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
3945 if let Some(ClaimingPayment { amount_msat, payment_purpose: purpose, receiver_node_id }) = payment {
3946 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
3947 payment_hash, purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3951 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event } => {
3952 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(event);
3958 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
3959 /// update completion.
3960 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
3961 channel: &mut Channel<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
3962 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
3963 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
3964 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
3965 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
3966 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
3968 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get_counterparty_node_id();
3969 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
3970 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.outbound_scid_alias()),
3971 channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
3974 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
3975 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
3977 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
3978 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
3979 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
3984 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel);
3986 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
3987 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
3988 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3989 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
3994 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
3995 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
3996 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
3997 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
3998 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4003 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
4007 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
4013 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
4014 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
4015 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4021 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
4022 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4025 let (mut pending_failures, finalized_claims, counterparty_node_id) = {
4026 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4027 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4028 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
4029 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4031 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
4032 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
4033 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4034 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4035 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4040 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4041 let mut peer_state_lock;
4043 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4044 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4045 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4046 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()){
4047 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4048 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4052 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4056 let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
4057 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() {
4058 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
4059 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
4060 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
4061 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
4063 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()) {
4064 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4065 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4070 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(&mut channel_state.pending_msg_events, channel.get_mut(), updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready, updates.announcement_sigs);
4071 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4072 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4075 (updates.failed_htlcs, updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs, counterparty_node_id)
4077 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
4078 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
4080 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claims);
4081 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4082 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id: funding_txo.to_channel_id() };
4083 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
4087 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4089 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4090 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4093 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4094 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4095 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4097 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
4098 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
4099 /// used to accept such channels.
4101 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4102 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4103 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4104 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4107 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4108 /// it as confirmed immediately.
4110 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4111 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4112 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4114 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4115 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
4117 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
4118 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
4120 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
4121 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
4123 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4124 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4125 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4126 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
4129 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4130 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4132 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4133 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4134 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4135 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
4136 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4137 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4138 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4139 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4140 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4141 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4144 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
4145 } else if channel.get().get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4146 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4147 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4148 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4149 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
4152 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4153 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4154 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
4157 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4158 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4159 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4162 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4163 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) });
4167 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) });
4172 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4173 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4174 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4177 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4178 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4181 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
4182 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
4183 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
4185 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4186 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager,
4187 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &their_features, msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration,
4188 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4191 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4192 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4196 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4197 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4198 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4199 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
4200 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4201 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4202 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4203 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4204 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4205 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4207 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4208 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4209 if channel.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4210 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4212 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4213 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4214 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4217 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4218 pending_events.push(
4219 events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4220 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4221 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4222 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4223 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4224 channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4229 entry.insert(channel);
4233 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4238 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4239 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4240 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4241 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
4242 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4243 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4244 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4245 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4246 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &their_features), chan);
4247 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4249 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4252 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4255 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4256 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4257 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4258 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4259 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4261 user_channel_id: user_id,
4266 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4267 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4268 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4269 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4270 let ((funding_msg, monitor, mut channel_ready), mut chan) = {
4271 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4272 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
4273 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4274 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4275 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4276 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4277 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.keys_manager, &self.logger), chan), chan.remove())
4279 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4282 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4285 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the peer_state
4286 // lock before watch_channel
4287 match self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
4288 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4289 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
4290 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4291 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4292 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4293 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4294 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
4295 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
4296 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4297 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(false);
4298 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4299 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
4301 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
4302 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4303 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4304 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
4305 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4306 chan.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, channel_ready.is_some(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4307 channel_ready = None; // Don't send the channel_ready now
4310 // It's safe to unwrap as we've held the `per_peer_state` read lock since checking that the
4311 // peer exists, despite the inner PeerState potentially having no channels after removing
4312 // the channel above.
4313 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id).unwrap();
4314 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4315 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4316 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4317 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4318 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4320 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4321 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4322 match id_to_peer.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
4323 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4324 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4325 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
4326 funding_msg.channel_id))
4328 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
4329 i_e.insert(chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
4332 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4333 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4336 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4337 send_channel_ready!(self, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
4345 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4347 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4348 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4349 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4350 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4351 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
4352 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4353 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4354 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4355 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4356 let (monitor, funding_tx, channel_ready) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.keys_manager, &self.logger) {
4357 Ok(update) => update,
4358 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan),
4360 match self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
4361 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4363 let mut res = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, channel_ready.is_some(), OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED);
4364 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4365 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4366 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4367 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4368 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4369 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4375 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4376 send_channel_ready!(self, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get(), msg);
4380 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4383 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4386 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
4387 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
4391 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4392 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4393 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4394 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4395 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
4396 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4397 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4398 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4399 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4400 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, self.get_our_node_id(),
4401 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
4402 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4403 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4404 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4405 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4406 msg: announcement_sigs,
4408 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4409 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4410 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4411 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4412 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4413 // announcement_signatures.
4414 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4415 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4416 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4417 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4423 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, chan.get_mut());
4427 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4430 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4434 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4435 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4436 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4437 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4438 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4439 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4440 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
4441 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4442 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4443 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4444 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4446 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4447 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4448 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4449 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4452 let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), chan_entry);
4453 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4455 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4456 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
4457 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
4458 let (result, is_permanent) =
4459 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
4461 remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
4466 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4467 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4468 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4475 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4478 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4481 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4482 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
4483 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
4484 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
4487 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
4491 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4492 let (tx, chan_option) = {
4493 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4494 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4495 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4496 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
4497 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4498 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4499 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4500 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4501 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
4502 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
4503 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4504 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4509 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
4510 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
4511 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
4512 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
4513 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
4514 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
4515 } else { (tx, None) }
4517 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4520 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4523 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
4524 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
4525 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
4527 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
4528 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4529 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4530 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4534 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4539 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4540 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
4541 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
4542 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
4544 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
4545 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
4546 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
4547 //but we should prevent it anyway.
4549 let pending_forward_info = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
4550 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4551 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
4552 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4553 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4554 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4555 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4557 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
4558 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
4559 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
4560 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
4561 match pending_forward_info {
4562 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
4563 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
4564 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
4565 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
4567 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
4568 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
4569 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4570 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
4571 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4574 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
4576 _ => pending_forward_info
4579 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), chan);
4581 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4584 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4589 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4590 let channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4591 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
4592 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4593 if let None = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
4594 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id));
4596 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id).unwrap();
4597 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4598 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4599 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4600 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4601 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan)
4603 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4606 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
4610 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4611 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4612 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
4613 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4614 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4615 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4616 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4617 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan);
4619 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4622 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id));
4627 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4628 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4629 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
4630 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4631 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4632 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4633 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4634 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
4635 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
4636 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
4638 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan);
4641 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4644 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4648 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4649 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4650 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4651 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4652 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
4653 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4654 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4655 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4656 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4657 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
4658 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
4659 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan),
4660 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
4661 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
4662 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
4663 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan);
4668 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
4669 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some()) {
4673 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4674 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4675 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4677 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
4678 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4679 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4680 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4681 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4682 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4683 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4684 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4686 commitment_signed: msg,
4692 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4695 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4700 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
4701 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
4702 let mut forward_event = None;
4703 let mut new_intercept_events = Vec::new();
4704 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
4705 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4706 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4707 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
4708 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
4709 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
4710 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
4712 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
4713 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
4715 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4716 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
4717 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
4718 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4719 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4720 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
4722 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4723 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
4724 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
4726 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
4727 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4728 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
4729 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4730 new_intercept_events.push(events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
4731 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
4732 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
4733 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
4734 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
4737 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4738 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
4740 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4741 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
4742 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4743 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4744 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4745 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4746 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4747 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4750 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
4751 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
4752 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
4757 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
4758 // payments are being processed.
4759 if forward_htlcs_empty {
4760 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
4762 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4763 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
4770 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
4771 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4774 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
4775 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4776 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
4779 match forward_event {
4781 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4782 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
4783 time_forwardable: time
4791 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4792 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
4794 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4795 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4796 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4797 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
4798 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4799 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4800 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4801 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4802 let was_paused_for_mon_update = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
4803 let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self,
4804 chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
4805 htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs;
4806 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), raa_updates.monitor_update);
4807 if was_paused_for_mon_update {
4808 assert!(update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
4809 assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none());
4810 assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty());
4811 assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4812 assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty());
4813 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Existing pending monitor update prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
4815 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
4816 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan,
4817 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
4818 raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(), false,
4819 raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4820 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
4822 } else { unreachable!(); }
4824 if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update {
4825 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4826 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4830 break Ok((raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4831 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs,
4832 chan.get().get_short_channel_id()
4833 .unwrap_or(chan.get().outbound_scid_alias()),
4834 chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(),
4835 chan.get().get_user_id()))
4837 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4840 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4843 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
4845 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, finalized_claim_htlcs,
4846 short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, user_channel_id)) =>
4848 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4849 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: channel_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
4850 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
4852 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, user_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
4853 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claim_htlcs);
4860 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4861 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4862 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
4863 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4864 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4865 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4866 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4867 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
4869 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4872 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id));
4877 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4878 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4879 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4880 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4881 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
4882 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4883 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4884 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4885 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4886 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
4887 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
4890 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
4891 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
4892 self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), msg), chan),
4893 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
4894 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
4895 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4898 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4901 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id));
4906 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
4907 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4908 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
4909 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
4911 // It's not a local channel
4912 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
4915 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4916 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id) {
4917 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4918 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4919 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4920 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4921 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4922 if chan.get().should_announce() {
4923 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
4924 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
4925 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
4926 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4928 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
4930 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
4931 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
4932 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
4933 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4935 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
4936 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
4939 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
4942 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
4944 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
4947 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4949 let need_lnd_workaround = {
4950 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4951 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4952 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4954 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
4955 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4956 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4957 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4958 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4959 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
4960 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
4961 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
4962 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
4963 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
4964 msg, &self.logger, self.our_network_pubkey.clone(), self.genesis_hash,
4965 &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
4966 let mut channel_update = None;
4967 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
4968 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4969 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4972 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4973 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
4974 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
4975 // they have the latest channel parameters.
4976 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4977 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4978 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4983 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
4984 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
4985 &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
4986 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
4987 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4988 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4992 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4995 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id));
4999 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
5000 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
5003 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
5004 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
5009 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
5010 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
5011 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5012 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5013 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5014 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5015 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
5016 match monitor_event {
5017 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5018 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5019 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5020 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
5022 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5023 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5024 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5025 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5028 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5029 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5030 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5031 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5032 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
5033 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
5035 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5036 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5037 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5038 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
5041 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
5042 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5043 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5044 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5045 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5046 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5047 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5048 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5049 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
5050 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5051 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5055 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5056 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5058 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5060 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
5061 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5062 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5063 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5064 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5071 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5072 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
5078 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5079 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5082 has_pending_monitor_events
5085 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5086 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5087 /// update events as a separate process method here.
5089 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5090 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
5093 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5094 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5095 /// update was applied.
5096 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5097 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5098 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5099 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5101 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5102 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5103 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5104 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5106 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5107 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5108 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5109 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5110 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
5111 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
5112 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5114 holding_cell_failed_htlcs,
5116 chan.get_counterparty_node_id()
5119 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
5120 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
5121 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
5122 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5123 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5124 updates: commitment_update,
5128 has_monitor_update = true;
5129 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, channel_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
5130 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
5131 if close_channel { return false; }
5138 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5139 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5140 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
5148 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5149 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5150 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
5153 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5154 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5160 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5161 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5162 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5163 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5164 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5165 let mut has_update = false;
5167 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5168 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5169 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5170 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5172 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5173 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5174 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5175 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5176 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5177 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5178 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5180 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5181 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5184 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5185 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5186 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5187 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5188 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5193 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5195 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5196 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
5197 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
5203 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5204 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5212 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5213 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5219 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5220 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5222 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5223 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5224 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5225 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5226 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5227 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5228 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5229 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5230 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5231 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5232 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5233 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5234 assert!(should_broadcast);
5235 } else { unreachable!(); }
5236 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
5238 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5242 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5243 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5245 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5246 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5249 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5251 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5252 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5253 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5254 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5255 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5256 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5257 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5258 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5259 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5260 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5261 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5262 // never fail a payment too early.
5263 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5265 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5268 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5273 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5276 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5277 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5279 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
5280 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5281 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5283 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5285 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5286 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5290 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5291 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5293 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5295 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5296 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5297 /// [`PaymentClaimable::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::payment_preimage
5298 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5299 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5300 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, &self.keys_manager, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5303 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5304 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5306 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5309 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5311 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5313 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5314 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5315 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5316 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5317 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5320 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5321 /// stored external to LDK.
5323 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5324 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5325 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5327 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5328 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5331 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5332 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5333 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5334 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5336 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5337 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5338 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5339 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5340 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5342 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5343 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5344 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
5345 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5346 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
5348 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
5349 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
5351 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5352 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5356 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5357 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5359 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5361 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5362 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5363 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5364 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5367 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5368 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5370 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5373 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5375 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5377 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5378 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5381 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5382 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5384 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5385 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5386 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5389 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5390 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5392 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5393 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5394 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5395 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5397 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
5398 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5399 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
5400 Some(_) => continue,
5401 None => return scid_candidate
5406 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5408 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5409 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5411 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5412 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5413 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5417 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
5418 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
5419 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
5421 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
5422 /// times to get a unique scid.
5423 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5424 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5425 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5427 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
5428 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5429 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
5430 return scid_candidate
5434 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
5435 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
5436 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
5437 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
5439 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5440 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5441 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5442 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5443 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
5444 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
5445 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
5446 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
5455 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5456 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5457 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5458 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
5459 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5464 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
5465 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5466 if events.is_empty() { None } else { Some(events.remove(0)) }
5470 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5471 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
5475 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5476 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
5479 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
5480 /// using the given event handler.
5482 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
5483 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
5486 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock until the returned future completes so that
5487 // we can be sure no other persists happen while processing events.
5488 let _read_guard = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
5490 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5492 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5493 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5494 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5495 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5498 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5499 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5500 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5503 for event in pending_events {
5504 handler(event).await;
5507 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
5508 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
5513 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, R, L>
5515 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5516 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5517 K::Target: KeysInterface,
5518 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5522 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5523 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5524 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5525 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5527 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5528 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5529 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5530 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5533 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5534 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5536 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
5537 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5540 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
5541 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5542 mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
5544 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5545 events.replace(pending_events);
5554 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, R, L>
5556 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5557 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5558 K::Target: KeysInterface,
5559 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5563 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
5565 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
5566 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
5567 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
5568 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5569 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5571 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5572 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5573 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5574 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5577 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5578 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5579 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5582 for event in pending_events {
5583 handler.handle_event(event);
5591 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, R, L>
5593 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5594 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5595 K::Target: KeysInterface,
5596 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5600 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5602 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5603 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
5604 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
5605 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
5606 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
5609 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
5610 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
5613 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5614 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5615 let new_height = height - 1;
5617 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
5618 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
5619 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
5620 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
5621 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
5622 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
5625 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5629 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, R, L>
5631 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5632 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5633 K::Target: KeysInterface,
5634 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5638 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5639 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5640 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5641 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5643 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5644 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
5646 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5647 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger)
5648 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
5650 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5651 if height < last_best_block_height {
5652 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5653 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5657 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5658 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5659 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5660 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5662 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5663 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
5665 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5667 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
5669 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5671 macro_rules! max_time {
5672 ($timestamp: expr) => {
5674 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
5675 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
5676 // having an explicit local time source.
5677 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
5678 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
5679 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5680 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
5681 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
5687 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
5688 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5689 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
5690 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
5694 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
5695 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
5696 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5697 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5698 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5699 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
5700 if let (Some(funding_txo), block_hash) = (chan.get_funding_txo(), chan.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
5701 res.push((funding_txo.txid, block_hash));
5708 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
5709 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5710 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
5711 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
5712 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
5713 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
5714 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5715 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5720 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, R, L>
5722 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5723 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5724 K::Target: KeysInterface,
5725 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5729 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
5730 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
5732 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
5733 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
5734 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5735 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5736 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5738 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5739 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5741 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5742 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5743 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5744 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5745 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5746 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5747 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5748 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
5749 let res = f(channel);
5750 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
5751 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
5752 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
5753 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
5754 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.channel_id() }));
5756 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
5757 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
5758 if channel.is_usable() {
5759 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5760 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
5761 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5762 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5767 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5771 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel);
5773 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
5774 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5775 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5776 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5777 msg: announcement_sigs,
5779 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5780 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, height) {
5781 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5783 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5784 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5785 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap(),
5790 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
5791 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
5792 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
5793 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
5794 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
5795 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
5796 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
5797 // is always consistent.
5798 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
5799 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
5800 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()),
5801 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
5802 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
5805 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
5806 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, channel);
5807 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
5808 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
5809 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
5810 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
5811 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5815 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
5816 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
5817 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5818 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5819 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
5820 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
5821 data: reason_message,
5831 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5832 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
5833 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
5834 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
5835 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
5836 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
5837 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
5838 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
5839 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5840 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
5842 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
5843 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
5844 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
5848 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
5851 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5852 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
5853 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
5854 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5855 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
5856 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
5857 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
5858 phantom_shared_secret: None,
5859 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
5862 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
5863 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
5864 _ => unreachable!(),
5866 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
5867 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
5868 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
5869 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
5875 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
5877 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
5878 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
5882 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
5883 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
5884 /// [`await_persistable_update`], [`await_persistable_update_timeout`], or a future returned by
5885 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`] is guaranteed to be woken up.
5887 /// Note that this method is not available with the `no-std` feature.
5889 /// [`await_persistable_update`]: Self::await_persistable_update
5890 /// [`await_persistable_update_timeout`]: Self::await_persistable_update_timeout
5891 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`]: Self::get_persistable_update_future
5892 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
5893 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
5894 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
5897 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
5898 /// [`await_persistable_update`], `await_persistable_update_timeout`, or a future returned by
5899 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`] is guaranteed to be woken up.
5901 /// [`await_persistable_update`]: Self::await_persistable_update
5902 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`]: Self::get_persistable_update_future
5903 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
5904 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
5907 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when a persistable update is available. Note that
5908 /// callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this [`ChannelManager`] and
5909 /// should instead register actions to be taken later.
5910 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
5911 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
5914 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5915 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
5916 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
5919 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
5920 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
5921 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
5922 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
5926 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
5927 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, R, L>
5929 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5930 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5931 K::Target: KeysInterface,
5932 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5936 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
5937 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5938 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5941 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
5942 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5943 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5946 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
5947 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5948 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5951 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
5952 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5953 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5956 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
5957 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5958 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5961 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
5962 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5963 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5966 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
5967 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5968 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5971 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
5972 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5973 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5976 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
5977 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5978 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5981 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
5982 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5983 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5986 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
5987 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5988 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5991 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
5992 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5993 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5996 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
5997 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5998 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6001 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
6002 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6003 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6006 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
6007 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6008 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6011 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
6012 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6013 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
6016 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
6021 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
6022 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6023 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6026 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
6027 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6028 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6029 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
6030 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6031 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6033 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
6034 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates. We believe we {} make future connections to this peer.",
6035 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id), if no_connection_possible { "cannot" } else { "can" });
6036 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
6037 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6038 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6039 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6040 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6041 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
6042 if chan.is_shutdown() {
6043 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
6044 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
6047 no_channels_remain = false;
6053 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
6055 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6056 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6057 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6058 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6059 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6060 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6061 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6062 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6063 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6064 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6065 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6066 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6067 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6068 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
6069 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6070 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6071 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
6072 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
6073 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
6074 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
6077 mem::drop(channel_state);
6079 if no_channels_remain {
6080 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
6082 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6084 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6085 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6089 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) -> Result<(), ()> {
6090 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
6091 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting with no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6095 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6097 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6100 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6101 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
6102 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6103 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
6104 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
6105 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
6108 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
6109 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
6114 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6115 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
6116 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
6117 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6119 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6120 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6121 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6122 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6123 let retain = if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6124 if !chan.have_received_message() {
6125 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
6126 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
6127 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
6131 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6132 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6133 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
6138 if retain && chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6139 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()) {
6140 if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
6141 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
6142 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6151 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
6155 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
6156 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6158 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
6159 for chan in self.list_channels() {
6160 if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
6161 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6162 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6167 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
6168 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6169 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6170 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
6171 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6172 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6173 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
6174 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6177 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
6178 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
6179 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6188 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6189 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6193 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6194 provided_node_features()
6197 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
6198 provided_init_features()
6202 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6203 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6204 pub fn provided_node_features() -> NodeFeatures {
6205 provided_init_features().to_context()
6208 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6209 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6211 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6212 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6213 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6214 pub fn provided_invoice_features() -> InvoiceFeatures {
6215 provided_init_features().to_context()
6218 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6219 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6220 pub fn provided_channel_features() -> ChannelFeatures {
6221 provided_init_features().to_context()
6224 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6225 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6226 pub fn provided_init_features() -> InitFeatures {
6227 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
6228 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the ChannelMessageHandler impl for
6229 // ErroringMessageHandler.
6230 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
6231 features.set_data_loss_protect_optional();
6232 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
6233 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
6234 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
6235 features.set_payment_secret_required();
6236 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
6237 features.set_wumbo_optional();
6238 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
6239 features.set_channel_type_optional();
6240 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
6241 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
6245 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6246 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6248 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
6249 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
6250 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
6251 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
6254 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
6255 (2, node_id, required),
6256 (4, features, required),
6257 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
6258 (8, forwarding_info, option),
6259 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6260 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6263 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
6264 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6265 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6266 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6267 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
6268 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
6269 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6270 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
6271 (2, self.channel_id, required),
6272 (3, self.channel_type, option),
6273 (4, self.counterparty, required),
6274 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
6275 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
6276 (7, self.config, option),
6277 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
6278 (9, self.confirmations, option),
6279 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
6280 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6281 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6282 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
6283 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6284 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6285 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6286 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6287 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6288 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
6289 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
6290 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
6291 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
6292 (30, self.is_usable, required),
6293 (32, self.is_public, required),
6294 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6295 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6296 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6302 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
6303 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6304 init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6305 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
6306 (2, channel_id, required),
6307 (3, channel_type, option),
6308 (4, counterparty, required),
6309 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6310 (6, funding_txo, option),
6311 (7, config, option),
6312 (8, short_channel_id, option),
6313 (9, confirmations, option),
6314 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
6315 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6316 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6317 (16, balance_msat, required),
6318 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6319 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6320 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6321 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6322 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6323 (22, confirmations_required, option),
6324 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
6325 (26, is_outbound, required),
6326 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
6327 (30, is_usable, required),
6328 (32, is_public, required),
6329 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6330 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6331 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6334 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6335 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6336 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
6337 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
6338 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
6342 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
6344 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
6345 outbound_scid_alias,
6349 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
6350 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
6352 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
6353 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6354 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
6355 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6356 confirmations_required,
6358 force_close_spend_delay,
6359 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
6360 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
6361 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
6362 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
6363 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
6364 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
6369 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
6370 (2, channels, vec_type),
6371 (4, phantom_scid, required),
6372 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
6375 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
6377 (0, onion_packet, required),
6378 (2, short_channel_id, required),
6381 (0, payment_data, required),
6382 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6383 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6385 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
6386 (0, payment_preimage, required),
6387 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6391 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
6392 (0, routing, required),
6393 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
6394 (4, payment_hash, required),
6395 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
6396 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
6397 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
6401 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6402 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6404 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
6406 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6407 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6408 reason.write(writer)?;
6410 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6411 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
6414 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6415 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6416 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
6417 failure_code.write(writer)?;
6424 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6425 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6426 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6429 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6430 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6431 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6432 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
6436 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6437 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6438 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6439 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
6440 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
6443 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
6444 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
6445 // messages contained in the variants.
6446 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
6447 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
6448 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
6450 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6451 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6452 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6453 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6454 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
6457 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6458 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6459 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6460 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6461 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
6463 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6468 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
6473 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
6474 (0, short_channel_id, required),
6475 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6476 (2, outpoint, required),
6477 (4, htlc_id, required),
6478 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
6481 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
6482 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6483 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
6484 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
6485 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
6487 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6488 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
6489 (1, self.total_msat, required),
6490 (2, self.value, required),
6491 (4, payment_data, option),
6492 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
6493 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
6499 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
6500 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6501 let mut prev_hop = crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6503 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
6504 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
6505 let mut total_msat = None;
6506 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
6507 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6508 (0, prev_hop, required),
6509 (1, total_msat, option),
6510 (2, value, required),
6511 (4, payment_data, option),
6512 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
6513 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
6515 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
6517 if payment_data.is_some() {
6518 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6520 if total_msat.is_none() {
6521 total_msat = Some(value);
6523 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
6526 if total_msat.is_none() {
6527 if payment_data.is_none() {
6528 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6530 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
6532 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
6536 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
6539 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
6546 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
6547 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6548 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6551 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6552 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
6553 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
6554 let mut payment_id = None;
6555 let mut payment_secret = None;
6556 let mut payment_params = None;
6557 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6558 (0, session_priv, required),
6559 (1, payment_id, option),
6560 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6561 (3, payment_secret, option),
6562 (4, path, vec_type),
6563 (5, payment_params, option),
6565 if payment_id.is_none() {
6566 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
6568 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
6570 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6571 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
6572 first_hop_htlc_msat,
6573 path: path.unwrap(),
6574 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
6579 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6580 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6585 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
6586 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
6588 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payment_params } => {
6590 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
6591 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6592 (0, session_priv, required),
6593 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
6594 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6595 (3, payment_secret, option),
6596 (4, *path, vec_type),
6597 (5, payment_params, option),
6600 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
6602 field.write(writer)?;
6609 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
6610 (0, forward_info, required),
6611 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
6612 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
6613 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
6614 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
6617 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
6619 (0, htlc_id, required),
6620 (2, err_packet, required),
6625 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
6626 (0, payment_secret, required),
6627 (2, expiry_time, required),
6628 (4, user_payment_id, required),
6629 (6, payment_preimage, required),
6630 (8, min_value_msat, required),
6633 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, R, L>
6635 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6636 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6637 K::Target: KeysInterface,
6638 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6642 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6643 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
6645 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6647 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
6649 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6650 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
6651 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
6655 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6656 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
6657 let mut number_of_channels = 0;
6658 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6659 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6660 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6661 number_of_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.len();
6662 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
6663 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6664 unfunded_channels += 1;
6669 ((number_of_channels - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
6671 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6672 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6673 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6674 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
6675 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6676 channel.write(writer)?;
6683 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6684 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6685 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
6686 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6687 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6688 for forward in pending_forwards {
6689 forward.write(writer)?;
6694 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6695 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
6696 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6698 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
6699 (claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6700 for (payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops)) in claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
6701 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6702 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6703 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
6704 htlc.write(writer)?;
6706 htlc_purposes.push(purpose);
6709 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6710 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6711 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6712 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
6713 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6714 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
6717 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6718 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6719 for event in events.iter() {
6720 event.write(writer)?;
6723 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
6724 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6725 for event in background_events.iter() {
6727 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
6729 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
6730 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
6735 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
6736 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
6737 // likely to be identical.
6738 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6739 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6741 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6742 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
6743 hash.write(writer)?;
6744 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
6747 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
6748 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
6749 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6750 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
6751 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
6754 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
6755 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6757 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6758 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6759 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
6760 session_priv.write(writer)?;
6763 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
6764 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
6768 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
6769 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
6770 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6772 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6773 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6774 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
6780 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
6781 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6782 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
6783 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
6786 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
6787 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
6788 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
6789 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
6790 pending_claiming_payments = None;
6792 debug_assert!(false, "While we have code to serialize pending_claiming_payments, the map should always be empty until a later PR");
6795 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6796 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
6797 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
6798 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
6799 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
6800 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
6801 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
6802 (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
6803 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
6810 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
6812 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
6814 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6815 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
6816 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
6817 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
6818 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
6819 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
6820 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
6821 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
6822 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6823 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
6824 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
6825 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
6826 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
6828 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
6829 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
6831 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
6832 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
6834 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
6835 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
6836 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
6837 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
6838 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
6839 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
6841 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
6842 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
6844 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6845 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6846 K::Target: KeysInterface,
6847 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6851 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
6852 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
6854 pub keys_manager: K,
6856 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6858 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
6859 pub fee_estimator: F,
6860 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6862 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
6863 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
6864 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
6865 pub chain_monitor: M,
6867 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
6868 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
6869 /// force-closed during deserialization.
6870 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
6871 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
6872 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
6874 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
6876 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
6877 /// deserialization.
6879 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
6880 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
6881 pub default_config: UserConfig,
6883 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
6884 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
6886 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
6887 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
6888 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
6889 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
6891 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
6894 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
6895 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
6898 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
6899 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, R, L>
6901 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6902 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6903 K::Target: KeysInterface,
6904 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6908 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
6909 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
6910 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
6911 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
6912 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
6914 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
6915 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
6920 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
6921 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
6922 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
6923 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, R, L>>)
6925 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6926 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6927 K::Target: KeysInterface,
6928 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6932 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6933 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
6934 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
6938 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
6939 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, R, L>)
6941 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6942 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6943 K::Target: KeysInterface,
6944 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6948 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6949 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6951 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6952 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6953 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6955 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
6957 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6958 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6959 let mut peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6960 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6961 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6962 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
6963 for _ in 0..channel_count {
6964 let mut channel: Channel<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (&args.keys_manager, best_block_height))?;
6965 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
6966 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
6967 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
6968 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
6969 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
6970 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
6971 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
6972 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
6973 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
6974 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
6975 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
6976 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
6977 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
6978 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
6979 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
6980 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6981 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
6982 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
6983 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
6984 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
6985 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
6986 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
6987 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
6988 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
6989 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
6990 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
6991 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
6992 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
6993 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
6994 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6995 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
6996 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
6998 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
6999 let mut found_htlc = false;
7000 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7001 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
7004 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
7005 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
7006 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
7007 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
7008 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
7009 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
7010 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
7011 log_info!(args.logger,
7012 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
7013 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7014 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7018 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7019 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
7020 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7022 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7023 id_to_peer.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel.get_counterparty_node_id());
7025 match peer_channels.entry(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
7026 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7027 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
7028 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7030 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7031 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
7032 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7033 entry.insert(by_id_map);
7037 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
7038 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
7039 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
7040 // safely discard the channel.
7041 let _ = channel.force_shutdown(false);
7042 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7043 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7044 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7045 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
7048 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7049 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7050 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7051 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7052 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7053 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7057 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
7058 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
7059 log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
7060 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
7064 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
7065 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7066 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7067 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
7068 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7069 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7070 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
7071 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
7072 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
7074 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
7077 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7078 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7079 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
7080 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7081 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7082 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
7083 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
7084 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
7086 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
7089 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7090 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>)>()));
7091 for _ in 0..peer_count {
7092 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7093 let peer_state = PeerState {
7094 channel_by_id: peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new()),
7095 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
7097 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
7100 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7101 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
7102 for _ in 0..event_count {
7103 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
7104 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
7109 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7110 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
7111 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
7112 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7113 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
7114 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7118 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
7119 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7121 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7122 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
7123 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
7124 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
7125 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7129 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7130 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
7131 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
7132 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
7133 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
7134 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
7135 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
7137 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
7138 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7142 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
7143 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
7144 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
7145 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
7146 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
7147 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7148 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7149 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
7150 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
7151 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7152 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
7153 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7154 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
7155 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7156 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
7157 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
7158 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7159 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
7161 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
7162 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
7165 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
7166 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
7169 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
7170 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
7171 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
7172 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
7173 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
7174 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
7176 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
7178 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
7179 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
7180 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
7181 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
7182 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
7183 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
7184 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
7186 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7187 if id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
7188 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() {
7189 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
7190 if path.is_empty() {
7191 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
7192 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7194 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
7195 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
7196 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
7197 match pending_outbound_payments.as_mut().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
7198 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7199 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
7200 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
7201 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
7203 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7204 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
7205 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
7206 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
7207 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
7209 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
7210 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
7211 total_msat: path_amt,
7212 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
7214 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
7215 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
7220 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7221 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) = htlc_source {
7222 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
7223 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
7224 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
7226 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
7227 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
7228 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
7229 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
7230 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
7231 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
7232 forwards.retain(|forward| {
7233 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
7234 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
7235 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7236 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7241 !forwards.is_empty()
7243 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
7244 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
7245 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7246 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7247 pending_events_read.retain(|event| {
7248 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
7249 intercepted_id != ev_id
7261 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
7262 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
7263 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
7264 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
7265 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
7266 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
7267 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
7268 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
7272 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
7273 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
7275 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
7276 if let Some(mut purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
7277 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
7278 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7280 for (purpose, (payment_hash, previous_hops)) in purposes.drain(..).zip(claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..)) {
7281 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7284 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
7285 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
7286 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
7287 if previous_hops.is_empty() {
7288 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7290 let purpose = match &previous_hops[0].onion_payload {
7291 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
7292 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
7293 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
7294 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
7295 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
7296 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
7297 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
7299 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7300 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7304 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
7306 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
7308 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
7309 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
7311 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7315 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7316 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
7318 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
7319 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
7322 let our_network_key = match args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node) {
7324 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7326 let our_network_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &our_network_key);
7327 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
7328 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
7329 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
7330 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7334 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
7335 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
7336 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7337 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7338 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
7339 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
7340 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
7342 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
7343 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.keys_manager);
7344 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
7346 chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
7347 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
7348 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7349 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7350 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7351 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7353 if chan.is_usable() {
7354 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
7355 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7356 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7357 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7358 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7364 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
7366 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7367 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
7368 if let Some((payment_purpose, claimable_htlcs)) = claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
7369 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7370 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
7371 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
7372 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
7373 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
7374 let phantom_pubkey = args.keys_manager.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
7375 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
7376 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
7378 for claimable_htlc in claimable_htlcs {
7379 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
7381 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
7382 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
7383 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
7384 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
7386 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
7387 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
7388 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
7389 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
7391 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
7392 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
7393 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
7394 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
7396 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
7397 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
7398 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
7399 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7400 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7401 if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
7402 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
7405 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
7406 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
7409 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
7412 purpose: payment_purpose,
7413 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
7419 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
7421 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
7422 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
7423 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
7424 router: args.router,
7426 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
7428 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
7429 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7431 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
7432 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
7433 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments { pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()) },
7434 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
7436 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
7437 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_htlcs, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
7438 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
7439 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
7440 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
7441 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
7443 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
7449 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
7451 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
7453 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
7454 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
7455 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
7456 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
7458 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
7459 logger: args.logger,
7460 default_configuration: args.default_config,
7463 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7464 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
7465 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
7466 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7467 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7470 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
7471 //connection or two.
7473 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
7479 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7480 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7481 use core::time::Duration;
7482 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
7483 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
7484 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure};
7485 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7486 use crate::ln::msgs;
7487 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
7488 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
7489 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7490 use crate::util::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
7491 use crate::util::test_utils;
7492 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, KeysInterface};
7495 fn test_notify_limits() {
7496 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
7497 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
7498 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7499 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7500 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7501 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7503 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
7504 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
7505 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7506 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7507 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7509 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7511 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
7512 // to connect messages with new values
7513 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7514 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7515 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7516 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7518 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
7519 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7520 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7521 // ... but the last node should not.
7522 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7523 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
7524 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7525 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7527 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
7528 // about the channel.
7529 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7530 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7531 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7533 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
7535 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7536 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7537 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7538 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7539 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7540 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7542 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
7543 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7544 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7546 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
7547 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
7548 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
7549 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
7550 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
7551 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
7553 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
7554 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
7555 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7556 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7557 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7558 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7559 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7560 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7562 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
7563 // the channel info has updated.
7564 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7565 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7566 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7567 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7568 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7569 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7573 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
7574 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
7576 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7577 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7578 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7579 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7580 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7582 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
7583 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
7584 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
7585 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
7587 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
7588 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
7589 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
7590 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
7591 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
7592 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
7593 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7594 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7595 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7596 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
7598 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
7599 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
7600 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7601 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7602 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7603 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7604 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7605 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7606 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7607 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7608 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7609 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
7610 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7611 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7612 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7613 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7614 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7615 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7616 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7617 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7618 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7619 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
7621 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
7622 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
7623 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7624 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7625 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7626 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
7628 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
7629 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
7630 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
7631 // lightning messages manually.
7632 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7633 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
7634 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7636 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7637 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7638 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
7639 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7640 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7641 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
7642 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7643 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7644 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
7645 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7646 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7647 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7648 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7649 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7650 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7651 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
7652 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7653 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7654 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
7655 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7656 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7657 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7658 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7659 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
7660 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7662 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
7663 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
7664 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7665 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
7667 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
7668 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
7669 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
7670 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
7672 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7675 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7676 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7677 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7678 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7680 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7683 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7684 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7685 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7686 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7688 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7693 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
7694 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
7695 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
7696 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
7697 // fails as expected.
7698 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7699 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7700 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7701 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7702 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7703 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7704 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7706 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
7707 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
7708 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
7710 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
7711 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7712 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id()),
7713 final_value_msat: 100_000,
7714 final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
7716 let route = find_route(
7717 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
7718 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7720 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
7721 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7722 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7723 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7724 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7725 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7726 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7727 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7728 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7729 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
7730 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
7731 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7732 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
7733 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7734 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7735 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7736 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7737 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7738 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7739 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7740 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7741 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7742 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7744 // Finally, claim the original payment.
7745 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7747 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
7748 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7749 let route = find_route(
7750 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
7751 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7753 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
7754 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7755 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7756 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7757 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
7758 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
7759 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
7761 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
7762 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7763 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
7764 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7765 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7766 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7767 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7768 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7769 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7770 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7771 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7772 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7773 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
7774 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7775 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7776 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7777 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7778 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7779 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7780 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7781 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7782 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7783 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7785 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
7786 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7790 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
7791 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
7792 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
7793 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7794 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7795 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7796 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7798 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7799 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7800 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7801 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7803 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7804 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7805 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7806 final_value_msat: 10_000,
7807 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7809 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
7810 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7811 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7812 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7813 let route = find_route(
7814 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7815 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7818 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7819 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
7820 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash, None, PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
7821 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
7822 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7824 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7825 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7826 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7827 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7828 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7829 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7830 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7832 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
7836 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
7837 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
7838 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7839 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7840 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7841 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7843 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7844 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7845 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7846 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7848 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7849 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7850 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7851 final_value_msat: 10_000,
7852 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7854 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
7855 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7856 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7857 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7858 let route = find_route(
7859 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7860 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7863 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7864 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7865 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
7866 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, Some(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
7867 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
7868 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7870 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7871 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7872 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7873 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7874 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7875 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7876 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7878 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
7882 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
7883 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
7884 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
7885 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
7886 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7888 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7889 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7890 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7891 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7893 // Marshall an MPP route.
7894 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
7895 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
7896 route.paths.push(path);
7897 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7898 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
7899 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
7900 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
7901 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
7902 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
7904 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None, PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap_err() {
7905 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
7906 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
7907 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
7912 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
7913 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
7914 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7915 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7916 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7917 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7919 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
7920 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
7922 total_msat: 100_000,
7925 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
7926 // payment verification fails as expected.
7927 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
7928 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
7929 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
7930 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
7932 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment".to_string(), "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash".to_string(), 1);
7936 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
7937 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
7941 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
7942 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
7943 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
7944 // the channel is successfully closed.
7945 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7946 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7947 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7948 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7950 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
7951 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7952 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel);
7953 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7954 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel);
7956 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
7957 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
7959 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
7960 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
7961 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7962 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7965 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
7967 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
7968 // as it has the funding transaction.
7969 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7970 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
7971 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
7973 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7976 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7978 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
7980 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7981 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
7982 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
7984 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
7985 // as it has the funding transaction.
7986 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7987 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
7988 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
7990 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7991 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7992 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
7993 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7994 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
7995 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
7996 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
7998 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
7999 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8000 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8001 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
8003 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8004 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
8006 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
8007 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
8008 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
8009 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
8010 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8011 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8012 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8014 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
8015 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
8016 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
8017 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
8018 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8019 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8020 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8023 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8025 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
8026 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
8027 // closing transaction).
8028 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
8029 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
8030 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8032 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
8033 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
8034 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8035 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8036 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8039 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8041 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
8043 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
8044 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
8045 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8047 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8049 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8050 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8054 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
8056 use crate::chain::Listen;
8057 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
8058 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, KeysManager, KeysInterface, InMemorySigner};
8059 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId};
8060 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
8061 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
8062 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
8063 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, get_route};
8064 use crate::util::test_utils;
8065 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
8066 use crate::util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
8068 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8069 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8070 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
8072 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
8076 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
8077 node: &'a ChannelManager<
8078 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
8079 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
8080 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
8081 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
8082 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
8083 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>,
8088 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
8089 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
8092 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
8093 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
8094 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
8096 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
8097 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
8099 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
8100 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
8101 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8102 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger_a)));
8104 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
8105 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
8107 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
8108 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
8109 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
8110 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8112 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
8114 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
8116 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8117 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
8118 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
8119 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
8120 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8122 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
8124 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
8126 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8127 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8128 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8129 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8130 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8133 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
8134 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8135 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
8137 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8138 } else { panic!(); }
8140 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8141 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8143 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
8146 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8149 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
8150 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
8152 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8153 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8154 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
8155 match msg_events[0] {
8156 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
8157 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
8158 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8162 match msg_events[1] {
8163 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8167 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8168 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
8170 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8171 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
8173 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8176 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8177 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
8179 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8180 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8182 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8185 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger_a);
8187 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
8188 macro_rules! send_payment {
8189 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
8190 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
8191 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id())
8192 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
8193 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
8194 let seed = [3u8; 32];
8195 let keys_manager = KeysManager::new(&seed, 42, 42);
8196 let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8197 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &dummy_graph.read_only(),
8198 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
8200 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
8201 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
8203 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
8204 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
8206 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8207 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
8208 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8209 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
8210 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
8211 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8212 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8213 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8215 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
8216 expect_payment_claimable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
8217 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8218 expect_payment_claimed!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
8220 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
8221 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
8222 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
8223 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8224 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
8226 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
8229 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
8230 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8231 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8232 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8234 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
8239 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
8240 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);