1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
27 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
31 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
39 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
40 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
41 // construct one themselves.
42 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
43 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
44 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
45 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
46 use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
47 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
48 use crate::routing::router::{DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, RoutePath, Router};
49 use crate::routing::scoring::ProbabilisticScorer;
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
53 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
55 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
56 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment};
57 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
58 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, ChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
59 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig};
60 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
61 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
62 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
63 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
64 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
65 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
67 use alloc::collections::BTreeMap;
70 use crate::prelude::*;
72 use core::cell::RefCell;
74 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
75 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
76 use core::time::Duration;
79 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
80 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
82 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
84 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
85 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
86 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
88 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
89 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
90 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
91 // before we forward it.
93 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
94 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
95 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
96 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
97 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
99 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
100 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
102 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
103 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
104 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
105 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
108 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
109 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
110 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
113 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
114 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
118 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
119 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
120 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
121 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
122 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
124 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
125 /// Sender intended amount to forward or receive (actual amount received
126 /// may overshoot this in either case)
127 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
128 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
131 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
132 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
133 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
134 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
137 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
138 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
139 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
140 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
141 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
144 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
145 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
147 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
148 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
149 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
152 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
153 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
155 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
156 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
159 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
160 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
163 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
167 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
168 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
169 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
170 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
171 short_channel_id: u64,
173 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
174 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
176 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
177 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
182 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
184 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
185 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
186 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
188 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
189 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
192 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
193 struct ClaimableHTLC {
194 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
196 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
198 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
199 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
200 sender_intended_value: u64,
201 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
203 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
204 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
205 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
206 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
210 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
212 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
213 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
214 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
216 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
217 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
222 impl Readable for PaymentId {
223 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
224 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
229 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
231 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
232 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
233 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
235 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
236 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
241 impl Readable for InterceptId {
242 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
243 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
248 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
249 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
250 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
251 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
252 OutboundRoute { session_priv: SecretKey },
255 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
257 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
258 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
259 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
261 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
262 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: *session_priv },
266 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
267 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
268 (0, short_channel_id, required),
269 (2, htlc_id, required),
271 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
272 (0, session_priv, required),
277 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
278 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
279 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
280 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
281 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
284 session_priv: SecretKey,
285 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
286 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
287 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
288 payment_id: PaymentId,
291 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
292 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
293 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
295 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
297 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
299 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
302 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
303 payment_id.hash(hasher);
304 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
310 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
312 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
313 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
315 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
316 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
317 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
321 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
322 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
323 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
324 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
325 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
326 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
328 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
334 struct ReceiveError {
340 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
341 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
343 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
344 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
345 pub enum FailureCode {
346 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
347 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
348 TemporaryNodeFailure = 0x2000 | 2,
349 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
350 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
351 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing = 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
352 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
353 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
354 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
355 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
356 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails = 0x4000 | 15,
359 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>);
361 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
362 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
363 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
364 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
365 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
367 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
368 err: msgs::LightningError,
369 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
370 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
372 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
374 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
376 err: LightningError {
378 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
379 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
386 shutdown_finish: None,
390 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
391 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
394 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
396 err: LightningError {
398 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
399 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
405 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
406 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
410 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
413 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
415 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
416 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
420 log_level: Level::Warn,
423 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
425 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
427 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
429 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
430 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
438 shutdown_finish: None,
443 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
444 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
445 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
446 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
447 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
449 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
450 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
451 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
452 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
453 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
454 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
455 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
457 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
461 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
462 struct ClaimingPayment {
464 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
465 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
467 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
468 (0, amount_msat, required),
469 (2, payment_purpose, required),
470 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
473 struct ClaimablePayment {
474 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
475 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
478 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
479 struct ClaimablePayments {
480 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
481 /// failed/claimed by the user.
483 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
484 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
486 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
487 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
488 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
490 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
491 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
492 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
493 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
496 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
497 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
498 /// quite some time lag.
499 enum BackgroundEvent {
500 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
501 /// commitment transaction.
502 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
506 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
507 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
508 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
509 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
510 /// event can be generated.
511 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
512 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user.
513 EmitEvent { event: events::Event },
516 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
517 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
518 (2, EmitEvent) => { (0, event, upgradable_required) },
521 /// State we hold per-peer.
522 pub(super) struct PeerState<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
523 /// `temporary_channel_id` or `channel_id` -> `channel`.
525 /// Holds all channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once a channel has been assigned a
526 /// `channel_id`, the `temporary_channel_id` key in the map is updated and is replaced by the
528 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
529 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
530 latest_features: InitFeatures,
531 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
532 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
533 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
534 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
535 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
537 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
538 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
539 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
540 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
542 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
543 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
544 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
545 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
546 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
547 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
548 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
549 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
550 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
551 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
555 impl <Signer: ChannelSigner> PeerState<Signer> {
556 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
557 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
558 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
559 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
560 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
563 self.channel_by_id.is_empty() && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
567 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
568 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
570 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
573 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
574 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
575 struct PendingInboundPayment {
576 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
577 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
578 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
579 /// this payment being removed.
581 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
582 user_payment_id: u64,
583 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
584 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
585 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
588 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
589 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
590 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
591 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
592 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
593 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
594 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
595 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
597 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
598 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
606 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
608 Arc<Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>
613 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
614 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
615 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
616 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
617 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
618 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
619 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
620 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
621 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
623 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
624 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<&'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e DefaultRouter<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L, &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>>, &'g L>;
626 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
627 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
629 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
630 /// to individual Channels.
632 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
633 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
634 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
635 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
637 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
638 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
639 /// returning from [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`], with ChannelManagers, writing updates
640 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during
641 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
642 /// [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the
643 /// `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
645 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
646 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
647 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
649 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
650 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
651 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
652 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
653 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
655 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
656 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
657 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
658 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
660 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
661 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
662 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
664 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
665 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
666 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
667 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
668 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
670 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
671 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
672 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
673 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
674 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
675 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
676 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
677 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
680 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
681 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
682 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
683 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
684 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
688 // `total_consistency_lock`
690 // |__`forward_htlcs`
692 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
694 // |__`per_peer_state`
696 // | |__`pending_inbound_payments`
698 // | |__`claimable_payments`
700 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
706 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
708 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
712 // | |__`pending_events`
714 // | |__`pending_background_events`
716 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
718 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
719 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
720 ES::Target: EntropySource,
721 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
722 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
723 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
727 default_configuration: UserConfig,
728 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
729 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
735 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
737 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
739 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
740 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
742 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
743 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
744 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
745 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
747 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
748 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
750 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
751 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
752 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
753 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
754 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
755 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
756 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
757 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
759 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
761 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
762 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
764 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
766 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
767 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
768 /// and via the classic SCID.
770 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
771 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
773 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
775 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
777 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
778 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
779 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
781 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
782 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
784 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
785 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
787 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
788 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
790 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
791 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
792 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
793 /// active channel list on load.
795 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
796 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
798 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
800 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
801 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
802 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
804 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
805 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
806 /// the handling of the events.
808 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
809 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
812 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
813 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
814 /// would break backwards compatability.
815 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
816 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
817 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
819 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
820 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
822 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
824 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
825 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
826 /// confirmation depth.
828 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
829 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
830 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
832 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
834 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
836 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
838 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
840 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
842 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
843 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
844 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
846 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
847 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
849 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
850 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
851 /// keeping additional state.
852 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
854 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
855 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
856 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
857 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
859 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
860 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
862 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
863 /// are currently open with that peer.
865 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
866 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
869 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
871 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
872 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
873 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
874 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
875 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
877 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
878 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
879 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
880 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
881 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
882 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
883 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
884 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
885 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
886 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
887 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
889 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
898 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
900 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
901 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
902 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
903 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
904 pub struct ChainParameters {
905 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
906 pub network: Network,
908 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
910 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
911 pub best_block: BestBlock,
914 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
920 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
921 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
922 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
923 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
924 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
925 /// updates are ready for persistence).
927 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
928 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
929 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
930 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
931 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
933 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
934 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
937 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
938 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
939 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
942 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
943 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
945 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
946 persistence_notifier: notifier,
947 should_persist: persist_check,
948 _read_guard: read_guard,
953 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
955 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
956 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
961 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
962 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
964 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
966 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
967 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
968 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
969 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
970 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
972 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
973 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
975 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
977 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
978 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
979 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
980 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
981 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
982 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
983 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
984 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
985 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
986 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
987 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
988 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
989 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
991 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
992 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
994 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
995 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
996 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
997 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
999 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1000 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1001 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1002 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1003 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1004 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1007 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1009 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1010 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1013 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1015 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1016 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1018 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
1019 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
1020 /// [`OutboundPayments::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
1021 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
1023 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1024 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1025 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1026 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1028 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1029 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1030 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1032 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1033 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1034 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1036 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1037 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1038 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1039 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1040 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1041 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1042 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1043 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1044 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1045 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1046 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1049 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1050 /// to better separate parameters.
1051 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1052 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1053 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1054 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1055 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1056 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1057 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1058 pub features: InitFeatures,
1059 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1060 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1061 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1063 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1065 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1066 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1067 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1068 /// payments to us through this channel.
1069 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1070 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1071 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1072 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1073 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1074 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1075 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1078 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1079 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1080 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1081 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1082 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1083 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1084 /// lifetime of the channel.
1085 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1086 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1087 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1088 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1089 /// our counterparty already.
1091 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1092 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1093 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1094 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1096 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1097 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1098 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1099 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1101 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1102 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1104 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1105 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1107 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1108 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1109 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1110 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1111 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1112 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1113 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1114 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1115 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1118 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1120 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1121 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1122 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1123 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1124 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1125 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1126 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1128 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1129 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1131 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1132 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1133 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1134 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1135 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1136 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1137 /// this value on chain.
1139 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1141 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1143 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1144 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1145 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or a random value if the channel was
1146 /// inbound. This may be zero for inbound channels serialized with LDK versions prior to
1148 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1149 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1150 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1152 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1153 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1154 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1155 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1156 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1158 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1159 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1160 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1161 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1163 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1164 pub balance_msat: u64,
1165 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1166 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1167 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1168 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1170 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1172 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1173 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1174 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1175 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1176 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1177 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1178 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1179 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1181 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1182 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1183 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1184 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1185 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1186 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1187 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1189 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1190 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1191 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1192 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1193 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1194 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1195 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1196 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1197 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1199 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1201 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1202 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1203 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1204 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1205 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1207 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1208 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1209 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1210 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1211 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1212 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1213 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1215 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1216 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1217 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1218 pub is_outbound: bool,
1219 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1220 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1221 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1222 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1223 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1225 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1226 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1227 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1228 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1230 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1231 pub is_usable: bool,
1232 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1233 pub is_public: bool,
1234 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1235 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1236 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1237 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1238 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1239 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1241 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1242 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1245 impl ChannelDetails {
1246 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1247 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1248 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1250 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1251 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1252 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1253 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1256 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1257 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1258 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1260 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1261 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1262 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1263 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1266 fn from_channel<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner>(channel: &Channel<Signer>,
1267 best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures) -> Self {
1269 let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
1270 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1271 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1273 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1274 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1275 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1276 features: latest_features,
1277 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1278 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1279 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1280 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1281 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1282 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1283 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1284 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
1285 Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1286 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1288 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1289 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1290 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1291 channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1292 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1293 outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1294 inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1295 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1296 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(channel.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1297 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1298 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1299 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1300 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1301 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1302 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1303 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1304 confirmations: Some(channel.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1305 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1306 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1307 is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(),
1308 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1309 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1310 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1311 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1312 config: Some(channel.config()),
1317 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1318 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1319 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1320 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1321 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1323 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1325 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1326 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1327 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1330 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1331 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1332 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1334 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1335 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1336 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1338 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1339 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1340 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1342 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1343 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1347 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1349 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
1351 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1352 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1353 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1354 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1356 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1357 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1358 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1361 macro_rules! handle_error {
1362 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
1365 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1366 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1367 // entering the macro.
1368 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1369 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1371 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1373 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1374 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1375 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1376 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1380 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1381 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1382 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1383 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1388 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1389 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1391 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1392 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1393 action: err.action.clone()
1397 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1398 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1399 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1400 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1401 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1405 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1412 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1413 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {{
1414 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.channel_id());
1415 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1416 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1417 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1419 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1420 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1421 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1422 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1423 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1425 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1426 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1428 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1432 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1433 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1434 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1436 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1437 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1439 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1440 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1442 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1443 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1444 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel);
1445 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1446 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1447 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1453 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1454 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1458 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1460 $entry.remove_entry();
1468 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1469 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1473 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1475 $entry.remove_entry();
1483 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1484 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1486 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1487 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, channel);
1493 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1494 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1495 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1496 node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1497 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1499 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1500 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1501 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1502 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1503 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1504 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1505 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1506 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1507 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1508 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1513 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
1514 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1515 if $channel.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
1516 $locked_events.push(events::Event::ChannelPending {
1517 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1518 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.temporary_channel_id(),
1519 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1520 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1521 funding_txo: $channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1523 $channel.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
1528 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1529 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1530 if $channel.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1531 debug_assert!($channel.channel_pending_event_emitted());
1532 $locked_events.push(events::Event::ChannelReady {
1533 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1534 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1535 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1536 channel_type: $channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
1538 $channel.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1543 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
1544 ($self: ident, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
1545 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
1546 &$self.node_signer, $self.genesis_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
1547 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
1548 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1549 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.is_usable() {
1550 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
1551 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
1552 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
1553 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
1555 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
1556 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
1557 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1563 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
1564 .remove(&$chan.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
1566 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
1567 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
1568 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
1569 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
1570 updates.announcement_sigs);
1571 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
1572 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
1575 let channel_id = $chan.channel_id();
1576 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
1577 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
1579 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
1581 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1582 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1584 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
1585 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1586 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1587 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
1592 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
1593 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING, $remove: expr) => { {
1594 // update_maps_on_chan_removal needs to be able to take id_to_peer, so make sure we can in
1595 // any case so that it won't deadlock.
1596 debug_assert!($self.id_to_peer.try_lock().is_ok());
1598 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1599 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
1600 log_bytes!($chan.channel_id()[..]));
1603 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1604 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure",
1605 log_bytes!($chan.channel_id()[..]));
1606 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $chan);
1607 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(
1608 "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), $chan.channel_id(),
1609 $chan.get_user_id(), $chan.force_shutdown(false),
1610 $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok()));
1614 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
1615 if ($update_id == 0 || $chan.get_next_monitor_update()
1616 .expect("We can't be processing a monitor update if it isn't queued")
1617 .update_id == $update_id) &&
1618 $chan.get_latest_monitor_update_id() == $update_id
1620 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
1626 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr) => {
1627 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan_entry.get_mut(), MANUALLY_REMOVING, $chan_entry.remove_entry())
1631 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1633 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
1634 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1635 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1636 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1637 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1638 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1642 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
1644 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1645 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
1647 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1649 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
1650 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
1651 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
1654 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
1655 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
1656 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
1657 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1658 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1659 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1660 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1661 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1663 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1664 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1665 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
1670 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1672 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1673 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1674 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
1675 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1676 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
1677 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1678 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1679 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1681 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1684 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1685 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1687 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1689 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1691 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1693 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1694 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1695 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1696 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
1706 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
1707 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1708 &self.default_configuration
1711 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1712 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1713 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1716 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1717 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1719 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
1721 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1725 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1730 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1732 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1733 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1734 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
1735 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
1736 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
1738 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1739 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1741 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1742 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1743 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1745 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1746 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1747 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1748 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1749 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1750 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1752 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1753 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1754 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1755 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1756 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1757 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1760 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1761 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1762 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1764 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1766 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
1767 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
1769 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1771 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
1772 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1773 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1774 match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
1775 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
1776 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
1780 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
1785 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1787 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1788 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1789 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1791 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1793 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1796 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1799 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1800 node_id: their_network_key,
1803 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1806 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1807 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
1808 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
1809 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
1810 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
1811 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
1812 // the same channel.
1813 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
1815 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1816 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1817 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
1818 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1819 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1820 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1821 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel(channel, best_block_height,
1822 peer_state.latest_features.clone());
1830 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
1831 /// more information.
1832 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1833 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1836 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1837 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1839 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1840 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1842 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1843 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1844 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1845 // really wanted anyway.
1846 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1849 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
1850 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1851 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1852 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1854 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
1855 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1856 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1857 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1858 return peer_state.channel_by_id
1861 ChannelDetails::from_channel(channel, best_block_height, features.clone()))
1867 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
1868 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1870 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
1871 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
1872 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
1874 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
1875 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
1876 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
1877 .filter_map(|(_, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
1878 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
1879 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
1880 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
1881 total_msat: *total_msat,
1884 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
1885 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
1887 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
1888 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
1890 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
1895 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1896 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1897 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1898 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1899 Some(transaction) => {
1900 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1904 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1905 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1906 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1907 reason: closure_reason
1911 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1912 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1914 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1915 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1916 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1918 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
1919 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
1921 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1922 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1923 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1924 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1925 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo();
1926 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1927 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut()
1928 .get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?;
1929 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1931 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
1932 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
1933 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
1934 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1935 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
1939 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1940 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
1941 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1942 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
1943 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry);
1946 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1947 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
1948 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1949 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1953 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1957 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id) })
1961 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1962 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
1963 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
1964 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
1967 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
1971 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1972 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1973 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1975 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1976 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1978 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1979 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1980 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1981 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1983 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
1985 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1986 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1987 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1988 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
1989 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1990 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None)
1993 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1994 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1995 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1997 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1998 /// the channel being closed or not:
1999 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2000 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2001 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2002 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2003 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2004 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2005 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2007 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2009 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2010 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2011 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2012 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2013 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2014 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
2018 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2019 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
2020 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
2021 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2022 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2023 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2024 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2025 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2027 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
2028 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2029 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2030 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2031 // ignore the result here.
2032 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2036 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2037 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2038 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2039 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2040 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2041 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2042 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2044 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2045 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2046 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2047 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2048 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) });
2050 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2052 remove_channel!(self, chan)
2054 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), peer_node_id) });
2057 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2058 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2059 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2060 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2061 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2066 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
2069 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2070 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2071 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2072 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2073 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2074 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2075 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2076 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2077 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2078 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2079 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2080 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2091 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2092 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2093 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2095 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2096 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2097 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2100 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2101 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2102 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2104 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2105 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2106 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2107 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2108 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2111 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2112 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2113 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2114 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2115 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2119 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2120 /// local transaction(s).
2121 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2122 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2123 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2127 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2128 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
2130 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2131 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry {
2132 return Err(ReceiveError {
2133 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender",
2135 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2138 // final_expiry_too_soon
2139 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2140 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2142 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2143 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2144 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2145 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2146 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2147 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
2148 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
2149 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
2150 return Err(ReceiveError {
2151 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
2152 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2155 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
2156 return Err(ReceiveError {
2158 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
2159 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2163 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2164 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2165 return Err(ReceiveError {
2166 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2167 err_data: Vec::new(),
2168 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2171 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage, .. } => { // TODO: expose the payment_metadata to the user
2172 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2173 return Err(ReceiveError {
2174 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2175 err_data: Vec::new(),
2176 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2178 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2179 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2181 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2182 phantom_shared_secret,
2184 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2185 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2186 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2187 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2188 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2189 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2190 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2191 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2192 return Err(ReceiveError {
2193 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2194 err_data: Vec::new(),
2195 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2199 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2201 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2204 return Err(ReceiveError {
2205 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2206 err_data: Vec::new(),
2207 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2212 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2215 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2216 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2217 outgoing_amt_msat: hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2218 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2222 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
2223 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2224 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2226 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2227 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2228 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2229 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2230 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2231 failure_code: $err_code,
2237 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2238 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2241 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
2242 Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
2243 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
2245 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2246 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2247 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2248 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2249 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2250 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2251 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2252 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2254 macro_rules! return_err {
2255 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2257 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2258 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2259 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2260 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2261 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2262 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2268 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2270 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2271 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2273 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2274 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2278 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2279 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2281 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2283 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2284 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2285 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2286 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2287 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2289 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2292 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2293 let new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2294 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2296 public_key: onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx, new_pubkey, &shared_secret),
2297 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2298 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2301 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2302 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2303 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2304 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2308 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2309 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2310 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2313 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2314 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2315 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2316 outgoing_amt_msat: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2317 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2322 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref outgoing_amt_msat, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2323 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2324 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2325 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2326 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2327 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
2328 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(short_channel_id).cloned();
2329 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
2330 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2331 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2332 // phantom or an intercept.
2333 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2334 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
2335 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)
2339 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2342 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
2344 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
2345 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2346 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
2347 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
2348 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2350 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2351 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2352 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2354 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
2355 // have no consistency guarantees.
2356 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2360 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2361 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2362 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2363 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2364 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2366 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2367 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2368 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2369 // we don't have the channel here.
2370 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2372 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2374 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2375 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2376 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2377 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2378 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2379 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2380 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2382 if *outgoing_amt_msat < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2383 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2385 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, *outgoing_amt_msat, *outgoing_cltv_value) {
2386 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2390 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
2391 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
2392 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
2393 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
2395 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2402 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2403 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2404 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2405 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2406 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2407 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2409 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2410 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2412 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2413 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2414 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2415 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2416 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2417 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2418 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2419 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2420 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2421 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2427 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2428 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2429 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2430 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2432 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2433 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2435 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2436 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2437 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2439 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2440 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2441 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2442 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
2443 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
2444 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
2445 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
2449 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2454 pending_forward_info
2457 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2458 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2459 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2461 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
2462 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
2463 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2465 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2466 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
2467 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2468 if !chan.should_announce() {
2469 return Err(LightningError {
2470 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2471 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2474 if chan.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2475 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2477 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2478 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2481 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2482 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
2483 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2484 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2486 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
2487 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
2488 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2490 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2491 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
2492 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2493 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2494 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
2495 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2499 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2501 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2502 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2503 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2505 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2506 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2508 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2509 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2510 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2511 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2512 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
2513 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2514 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2515 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2517 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
2518 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
2519 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
2521 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
2523 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2530 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2531 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2532 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv_bytes)
2535 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2536 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
2537 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2539 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2540 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
2541 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2543 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2544 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected".to_owned()})?;
2545 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2546 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2547 return Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Route size too large considering onion data".to_owned()});
2549 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2551 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2552 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2553 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2554 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
2557 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2558 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
2559 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
2560 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2561 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2562 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
2563 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2564 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
2566 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2567 let send_res = chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
2568 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2570 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2571 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2573 }, onion_packet, &self.logger);
2574 match break_chan_entry!(self, send_res, chan) {
2575 Some(monitor_update) => {
2576 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2577 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
2578 if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
2581 if update_res == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress {
2582 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
2583 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
2584 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
2585 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
2586 // which we do in the send_payment check for
2587 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
2588 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
2594 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
2595 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
2596 // `channel_by_id` map.
2597 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
2598 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
2603 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2604 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2606 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2611 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2613 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
2614 /// fields for more info.
2616 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
2617 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
2619 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
2621 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
2622 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
2623 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
2624 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
2625 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
2627 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
2628 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
2629 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
2630 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
2631 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
2633 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
2634 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
2635 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
2636 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
2638 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
2640 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
2641 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2642 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
2644 /// In general, a path may raise:
2645 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2646 /// node public key) is specified.
2647 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2648 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2650 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2651 /// relevant updates.
2653 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
2654 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2655 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2657 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2658 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2659 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
2660 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
2661 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
2662 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2663 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2664 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2665 self.pending_outbound_payments
2666 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2667 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2668 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2671 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment`], but will automatically find a route based on
2672 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
2673 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
2674 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2675 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2676 self.pending_outbound_payments
2677 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
2678 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
2679 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
2680 &self.pending_events,
2681 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2682 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2686 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2687 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2688 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2689 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2690 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2691 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2695 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
2696 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2697 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
2701 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
2702 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
2703 /// retries are exhausted.
2705 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
2706 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
2708 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2709 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2710 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2712 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event is generated and we restart without this
2713 /// [`ChannelManager`] having been persisted, another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated.
2715 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2716 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2717 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2718 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2719 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, &self.pending_events);
2722 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2723 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2724 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2725 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2726 /// never reach the recipient.
2728 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
2729 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
2731 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2732 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2734 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2736 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2737 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
2738 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2739 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2740 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
2741 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
2742 &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2743 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2744 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2747 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
2748 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
2750 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
2753 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
2754 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
2755 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2756 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2757 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
2758 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
2759 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2760 &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
2761 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2762 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2765 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
2766 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
2767 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
2768 pub fn send_probe(&self, hops: Vec<RouteHop>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2769 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2770 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2771 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(hops, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2772 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2773 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2776 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
2779 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
2780 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
2783 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2784 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2785 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
2786 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
2787 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2788 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2789 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2790 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2792 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2793 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2796 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2798 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2800 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2801 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2802 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2803 } else { unreachable!(); })
2806 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) }) },
2809 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2810 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2813 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2814 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
2819 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2820 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2823 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2824 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2825 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2827 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2828 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
2829 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
2830 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
2839 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2840 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2841 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2845 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2847 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2848 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2850 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
2851 /// across the p2p network.
2853 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2854 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2856 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2857 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2858 /// keys per-channel).
2860 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2861 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2862 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2864 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2865 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2866 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2868 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
2869 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
2870 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
2871 /// for more details.
2873 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2874 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2875 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2876 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2878 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2879 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2880 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2881 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2886 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2887 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools at the next block. However, the modules
2888 // constituting our Lightning node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if
2889 // the wallet module is in advance on the LDK view, allow one more block of headroom.
2890 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 2 {
2891 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2892 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
2896 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2897 let mut output_index = None;
2898 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2899 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2900 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2901 if output_index.is_some() {
2902 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2903 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2906 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2907 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2908 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2911 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2914 if output_index.is_none() {
2915 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2916 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2919 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2923 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
2925 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
2926 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
2927 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
2928 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
2930 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
2931 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
2933 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
2934 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
2936 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
2938 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
2939 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
2940 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
2941 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
2942 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2943 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
2944 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
2945 pub fn update_channel_config(
2946 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
2947 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2948 if config.cltv_expiry_delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA {
2949 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2950 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
2954 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(
2955 &self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier,
2957 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2958 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2959 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2960 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2961 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2962 for channel_id in channel_ids {
2963 if !peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) {
2964 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2965 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
2969 for channel_id in channel_ids {
2970 let channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
2971 if !channel.update_config(config) {
2974 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
2975 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
2976 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
2977 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2978 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2986 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
2987 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
2989 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
2990 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
2992 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
2993 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
2994 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
2995 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
2996 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
2998 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
2999 /// you from forwarding more than you received.
3001 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3004 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
3005 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3006 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
3007 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
3008 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3009 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3011 let next_hop_scid = {
3012 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3013 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
3014 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
3015 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3016 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3017 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
3019 if !chan.is_usable() {
3020 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3021 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
3024 chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.outbound_scid_alias())
3026 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3027 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id), next_node_id)
3032 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3033 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3034 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3037 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
3038 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
3039 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
3041 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3043 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
3044 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
3047 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
3048 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3049 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3050 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
3051 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
3053 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
3057 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
3058 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
3060 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3063 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3064 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3065 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3067 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3068 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3069 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3072 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
3073 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3074 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3075 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3076 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
3077 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
3078 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3081 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
3082 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
3083 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3084 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3089 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3091 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3092 /// Will likely generate further events.
3093 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3094 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3096 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
3097 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3098 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3100 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
3101 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
3103 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
3104 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3105 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
3107 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3108 match forward_info {
3109 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3110 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3111 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3112 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3113 outgoing_cltv_value, incoming_amt_msat: _
3116 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3117 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3118 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3120 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3121 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3122 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3123 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3124 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3125 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3128 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3129 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3131 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3134 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3135 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
3141 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3142 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3144 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3148 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3149 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3151 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3155 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3156 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3157 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
3158 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
3159 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3161 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3162 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3163 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3164 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3165 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3167 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3169 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3170 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3174 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3175 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
3176 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3177 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3183 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3186 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3189 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3190 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3191 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3192 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3193 // problem, not ours.
3199 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
3200 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3202 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3206 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3207 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3208 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3209 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3212 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3213 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3214 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3215 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3216 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3219 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3220 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3221 match forward_info {
3222 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3223 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id: _,
3224 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3225 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
3226 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, incoming_amt_msat: _,
3229 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3230 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3231 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3232 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3233 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3234 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3235 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3236 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3238 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
3239 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
3240 onion_packet, &self.logger)
3242 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3243 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3245 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3247 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3248 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3249 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
3250 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3255 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3256 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3258 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3259 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3260 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_fail_htlc(
3261 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
3263 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3264 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3266 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
3268 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3269 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3270 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3279 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3280 match forward_info {
3281 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3282 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3283 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3284 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat, ..
3287 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret) = match routing {
3288 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3289 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3290 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data }, Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret)
3292 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3293 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage), None, None),
3295 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3298 let mut claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3299 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3300 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3301 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3302 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3303 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3304 phantom_shared_secret,
3306 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
3307 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
3308 // if routing nodes overpay
3309 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
3310 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
3312 total_value_received: None,
3313 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
3318 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
3320 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3321 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
3322 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
3323 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3324 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3325 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
3327 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3328 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3329 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3330 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3331 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3332 phantom_shared_secret,
3334 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
3335 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
3337 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
3340 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
3341 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3342 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3343 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3344 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3347 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3348 ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3349 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
3351 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3352 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3353 payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
3356 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3357 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3358 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3360 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
3361 .entry(payment_hash)
3362 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
3363 .or_insert_with(|| {
3364 committed_to_claimable = true;
3366 purpose: purpose(), htlcs: Vec::new()
3369 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
3370 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3371 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3372 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3373 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3376 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
3377 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
3378 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3379 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
3380 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
3381 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3382 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3383 if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat {
3384 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3385 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3386 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3388 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3390 _ => unreachable!(),
3393 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
3394 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
3395 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
3396 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3397 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= $payment_data.total_msat {
3398 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
3399 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3400 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3401 } else if total_value >= $payment_data.total_msat {
3402 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
3403 committed_to_claimable = true;
3405 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3406 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3407 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
3408 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
3409 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3410 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3414 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3415 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3416 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
3418 payment_claimable_generated = true;
3420 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3421 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3423 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3424 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
3425 committed_to_claimable = true;
3428 payment_claimable_generated
3432 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3433 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3434 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3435 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3436 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3437 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3438 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3439 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3440 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3441 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3442 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3443 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3444 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3445 Ok(result) => result,
3447 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3448 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3451 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
3452 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
3453 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
3454 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
3455 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
3456 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3459 check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
3461 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3462 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3463 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3464 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3466 match claimable_payments.claimable_payments.entry(payment_hash) {
3467 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3468 let amount_msat = claimable_htlc.value;
3469 claimable_htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat);
3470 let claim_deadline = Some(claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER);
3471 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
3472 e.insert(ClaimablePayment {
3473 purpose: purpose.clone(),
3474 htlcs: vec![claimable_htlc],
3476 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3477 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3478 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3482 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3483 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3487 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3488 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3489 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3495 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3496 if payment_data.is_none() {
3497 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3498 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3500 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3501 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3502 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3503 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3504 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3505 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3506 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3507 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3509 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3510 if payment_claimable_generated {
3511 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3517 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3518 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3526 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3527 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
3528 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3529 &self.pending_events, &self.logger,
3530 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3531 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv));
3533 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3534 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3536 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3538 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
3539 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
3540 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
3542 self.check_free_holding_cells();
3544 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3545 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3546 events.append(&mut new_events);
3549 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3551 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3552 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3554 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3555 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3556 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3557 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3558 if background_events.is_empty() {
3562 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3564 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3565 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3566 // monitor updating completing.
3567 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
3574 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3575 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3576 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3577 self.process_background_events();
3580 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
3581 if !chan.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; }
3582 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3583 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
3584 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3585 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3586 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3588 if !chan.is_live() {
3589 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3590 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3591 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3593 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3594 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3596 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.logger);
3597 NotifyOption::DoPersist
3601 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3602 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3603 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3604 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3605 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3606 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3607 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3609 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3611 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3612 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3613 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3614 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3615 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
3616 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3617 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3625 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3627 /// This currently includes:
3628 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3629 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3630 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3632 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
3633 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
3634 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
3636 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
3637 /// estimate fetches.
3639 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3640 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
3641 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3642 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3643 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3644 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3646 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3648 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
3649 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
3650 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
3652 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3653 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3654 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3655 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3656 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
3657 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
3658 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3659 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3660 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3662 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3663 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
3664 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
3665 if needs_close { return false; }
3668 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3669 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3670 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3671 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3672 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3673 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3674 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3675 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3679 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3680 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3682 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3683 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3684 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3688 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3689 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3694 chan.maybe_expire_prev_config();
3698 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
3699 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
3704 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
3705 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
3706 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
3707 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
3708 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
3709 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
3710 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
3711 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
3712 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3713 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
3714 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
3715 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
3716 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
3717 // have no channels to the peer.
3718 let remove_entry = {
3719 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
3720 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
3723 entry.remove_entry();
3726 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
3731 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
3732 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
3733 // This should be unreachable
3734 debug_assert!(false);
3737 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3738 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
3739 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
3740 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
3741 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
3742 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
3743 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
3746 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
3747 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
3748 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3750 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
3751 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
3758 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
3759 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
3760 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
3761 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
3762 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
3765 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3766 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3769 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self.pending_events);
3771 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
3772 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
3773 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
3774 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
3775 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3782 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3783 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3784 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3786 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
3787 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
3788 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
3789 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
3791 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
3792 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
3793 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
3794 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
3795 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
3796 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
3799 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
3800 /// reason for the failure.
3802 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
3803 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
3804 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3806 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
3807 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
3808 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
3809 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
3810 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
3811 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
3812 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3817 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
3818 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
3819 match failure_code {
3820 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
3821 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
3822 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
3823 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3824 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
3825 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code as u16, htlc_msat_height_data)
3830 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3831 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3833 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
3835 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3836 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
3837 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
3838 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
3839 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
3840 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
3841 chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
3843 chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
3845 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
3846 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
3848 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3853 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3854 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3855 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3856 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
3857 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
3858 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
3859 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3860 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
3861 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
3862 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3864 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3865 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3866 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3867 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
3869 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
3870 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
3871 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
3872 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
3873 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3877 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3878 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3879 // be surfaced to the user.
3880 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
3881 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
3882 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
3884 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
3885 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3886 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
3887 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3888 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3889 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3890 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3891 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
3893 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3895 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
3898 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3899 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
3900 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
3901 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3905 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3906 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
3907 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
3908 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
3909 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
3910 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
3911 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
3912 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
3913 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
3916 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3917 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3918 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3921 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3922 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3923 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3925 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
3926 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
3927 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
3928 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
3929 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
3931 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint }) => {
3932 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), onion_error);
3933 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
3935 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
3936 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
3937 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3938 push_forward_ev = true;
3940 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
3941 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3942 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
3944 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3945 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
3948 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
3949 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
3950 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3951 pending_events.push(events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
3952 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
3953 failed_next_destination: destination,
3959 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
3960 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
3962 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
3963 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
3964 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
3965 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
3967 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
3968 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
3969 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
3970 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
3972 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
3973 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
3974 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
3975 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
3976 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3977 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3978 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
3979 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3981 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3984 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3985 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
3986 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3987 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
3988 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3989 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3990 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3991 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
3996 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
3997 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
3998 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id,
4000 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
4001 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
4002 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
4003 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4008 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
4010 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
4011 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
4012 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
4013 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
4014 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
4015 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
4016 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
4017 let mut valid_mpp = true;
4018 let mut errs = Vec::new();
4019 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4020 for htlc in sources.iter() {
4021 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
4022 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4023 debug_assert!(false);
4027 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
4029 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
4030 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4031 debug_assert!(false);
4035 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
4037 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload {
4038 // We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check
4039 // that there's one payment here and move on.
4040 if sources.len() != 1 {
4041 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP spontaneous payment - this should not be reachable!");
4042 debug_assert!(false);
4048 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
4050 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4051 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
4052 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4053 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
4056 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
4057 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4058 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
4059 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
4063 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4064 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
4065 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
4066 |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
4068 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
4069 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
4070 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
4071 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
4072 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
4077 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4078 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4079 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4080 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4081 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
4082 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
4083 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4085 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4088 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
4089 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
4090 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4091 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4095 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
4096 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
4097 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
4098 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
4101 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4102 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
4103 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4104 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
4108 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
4109 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4110 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
4113 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
4114 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
4115 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4116 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4117 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4118 let fulfill_res = chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
4120 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = fulfill_res {
4121 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)) {
4122 log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
4123 log_bytes!(chan_id), action);
4124 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
4126 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4127 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update);
4128 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
4129 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4130 if let Err(e) = res {
4131 // TODO: This is a *critical* error - we probably updated the outbound edge
4132 // of the HTLC's monitor with a preimage. We should retry this monitor
4133 // update over and over again until morale improves.
4134 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}", payment_preimage);
4135 return Err((counterparty_node_id, e));
4142 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4143 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4144 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4148 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4149 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
4150 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
4151 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
4152 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
4153 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
4154 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
4155 // again on restart.
4156 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4157 payment_preimage, update_res);
4159 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
4160 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
4161 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
4162 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
4163 // `PaymentForwarded`).
4164 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
4168 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4169 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
4172 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
4174 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4175 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage, session_priv, path, from_onchain, &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
4177 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4178 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4179 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
4180 |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
4181 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4182 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4183 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4186 let prev_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
4187 let next_channel_id = Some(next_channel_id);
4189 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4191 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4194 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
4198 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
4199 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4200 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4206 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4207 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4208 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4211 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
4212 for action in actions.into_iter() {
4214 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
4215 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4216 if let Some(ClaimingPayment { amount_msat, payment_purpose: purpose, receiver_node_id }) = payment {
4217 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
4218 payment_hash, purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4222 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event } => {
4223 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(event);
4229 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
4230 /// update completion.
4231 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4232 channel: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
4233 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
4234 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
4235 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
4236 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
4237 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
4238 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()),
4239 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
4240 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
4241 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
4242 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
4243 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
4245 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
4247 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get_counterparty_node_id();
4248 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4249 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.outbound_scid_alias()),
4250 channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
4253 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4254 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
4256 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
4257 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4258 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4263 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
4264 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
4265 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4266 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4271 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
4272 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
4273 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4274 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4275 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4280 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
4284 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
4290 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
4291 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
4292 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4296 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4297 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
4298 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
4304 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
4305 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
4307 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
4308 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4310 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
4311 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
4312 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4313 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4314 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4319 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4320 let mut peer_state_lock;
4321 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4322 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
4323 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4324 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4326 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()){
4327 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4328 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4331 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}",
4332 highest_applied_update_id, channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id());
4333 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4336 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, highest_applied_update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel.get_mut());
4339 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4341 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4342 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4345 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4346 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4347 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4349 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
4350 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
4351 /// used to accept such channels.
4353 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4354 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4355 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4356 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4359 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4360 /// it as confirmed immediately.
4362 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4363 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4364 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4366 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4367 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
4369 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
4370 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
4372 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
4373 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
4375 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4376 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4377 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4378 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
4381 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4382 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4384 let peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| !peer.channel_by_id.is_empty());
4385 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4386 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4387 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4388 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4389 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4390 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.len() == 1;
4391 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4392 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4393 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4394 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4397 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
4398 } else if channel.get().get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4399 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4400 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4401 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4402 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
4405 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4406 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4407 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
4409 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
4410 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
4411 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
4412 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
4413 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4414 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4415 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4416 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
4419 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4420 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4421 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
4425 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4426 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4427 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4430 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4431 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) });
4437 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
4438 /// or 0-conf channels.
4440 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
4441 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
4442 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
4443 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> bool {
4444 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
4445 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4447 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4448 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
4449 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
4450 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
4451 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
4452 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.channel_by_id.len() {
4453 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
4457 return peers_without_funded_channels;
4460 fn unfunded_channel_count(
4461 peer: &PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, best_block_height: u32
4463 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
4464 for (_, chan) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
4465 if !chan.is_outbound() && chan.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
4466 chan.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
4468 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
4471 num_unfunded_channels
4474 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4475 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4476 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4479 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4480 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4483 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
4484 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
4485 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
4486 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4488 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
4489 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
4490 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
4491 let channeled_peers_without_funding = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| !node.channel_by_id.is_empty());
4493 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4494 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4496 debug_assert!(false);
4497 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
4499 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4500 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4502 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
4503 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
4504 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
4505 if peer_state.channel_by_id.is_empty() &&
4506 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
4507 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
4509 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4510 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
4511 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4514 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4515 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
4516 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4517 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
4518 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4521 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
4522 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
4523 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4526 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4527 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4531 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4532 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4533 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4534 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4536 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4537 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4538 if channel.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4539 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4541 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4542 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4543 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4546 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4547 pending_events.push(
4548 events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4549 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4550 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4551 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4552 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4553 channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4558 entry.insert(channel);
4564 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4565 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4566 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4567 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4569 debug_assert!(false);
4570 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
4572 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4573 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4574 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4575 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4576 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), chan);
4577 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4579 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4582 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4583 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4584 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4585 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4586 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4588 user_channel_id: user_id,
4593 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4594 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4596 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4597 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4599 debug_assert!(false);
4600 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
4603 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4604 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4605 let ((funding_msg, monitor), chan) =
4606 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4607 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4608 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan), chan.remove())
4610 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4613 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4614 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4615 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4617 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4618 match self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().entry(chan.channel_id()) {
4619 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4620 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4621 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
4622 funding_msg.channel_id))
4624 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
4625 i_e.insert(chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
4629 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4630 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4631 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
4632 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4633 let new_channel_id = funding_msg.channel_id;
4634 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4635 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4639 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
4641 let chan = e.insert(chan);
4642 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, monitor_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
4643 per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING, { peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&new_channel_id) });
4645 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4646 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4647 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4648 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4649 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
4650 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
4651 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4652 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { shutdown_finish: Some((res, _)), .. }) = &mut res {
4660 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4661 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4662 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4663 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4665 debug_assert!(false);
4666 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4669 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4670 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4671 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4672 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4673 let monitor = try_chan_entry!(self,
4674 chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan);
4675 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor);
4676 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4677 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4678 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4679 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4680 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4681 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4682 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4687 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4691 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4692 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4693 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4695 debug_assert!(false);
4696 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4698 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4699 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4700 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4701 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4702 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
4703 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
4704 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4705 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4706 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4707 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4708 msg: announcement_sigs,
4710 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4711 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4712 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4713 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4714 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4715 // announcement_signatures.
4716 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4717 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4718 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4719 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4726 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4727 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan.get_mut());
4732 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4736 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4737 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4738 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4739 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4740 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4742 debug_assert!(false);
4743 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4745 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4746 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4747 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4748 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4750 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4751 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4752 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4753 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4756 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo();
4757 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self,
4758 chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_entry);
4759 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4761 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4762 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
4763 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
4764 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
4765 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4766 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4771 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4772 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
4773 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4774 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
4775 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry);
4779 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4782 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4783 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
4784 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
4785 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
4791 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4792 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4793 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4795 debug_assert!(false);
4796 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4798 let (tx, chan_option) = {
4799 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4800 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4801 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4802 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4803 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
4804 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
4805 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4806 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4811 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
4812 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
4813 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
4814 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
4815 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
4816 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
4817 } else { (tx, None) }
4819 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4822 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
4823 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
4824 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
4826 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
4827 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4828 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4829 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4830 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4834 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4839 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4840 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
4841 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
4842 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
4844 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
4845 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
4846 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
4847 //but we should prevent it anyway.
4849 let pending_forward_info = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
4850 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4851 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4853 debug_assert!(false);
4854 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4856 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4857 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4858 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4859 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4861 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
4862 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
4863 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
4864 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
4865 match pending_forward_info {
4866 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
4867 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
4868 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
4869 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
4871 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
4872 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
4873 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4874 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
4875 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4878 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
4880 _ => pending_forward_info
4883 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), chan);
4885 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4890 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4891 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
4892 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4893 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4895 debug_assert!(false);
4896 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4898 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4899 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4900 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4901 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4902 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan)
4904 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4907 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
4911 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4912 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4913 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4915 debug_assert!(false);
4916 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4918 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4919 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4920 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4921 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4922 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan);
4924 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4929 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4930 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4931 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4933 debug_assert!(false);
4934 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4936 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4937 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4938 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4939 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4940 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
4941 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
4942 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
4944 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan);
4947 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4951 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4952 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4953 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4955 debug_assert!(false);
4956 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4958 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4959 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4960 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4961 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4962 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo();
4963 let monitor_update = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
4964 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
4965 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4966 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
4967 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
4969 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4974 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
4975 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
4976 let mut push_forward_event = false;
4977 let mut new_intercept_events = Vec::new();
4978 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
4979 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4980 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4981 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
4982 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
4983 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
4984 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
4986 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
4987 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
4989 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4990 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
4991 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
4992 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4993 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4994 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
4996 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4997 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
4998 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
5000 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
5001 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5002 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
5003 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5004 new_intercept_events.push(events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
5005 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
5006 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
5007 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
5008 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
5011 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5012 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
5014 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5015 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
5016 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5017 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
5018 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5019 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
5020 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
5021 phantom_shared_secret: None,
5024 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
5025 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
5026 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
5031 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
5032 // payments are being processed.
5033 if forward_htlcs_empty {
5034 push_forward_event = true;
5036 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5037 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
5044 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
5045 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
5048 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
5049 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5050 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
5052 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
5056 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued.
5057 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
5058 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5059 let forward_ev_exists = pending_events.iter()
5060 .find(|ev| if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false })
5062 if !forward_ev_exists {
5063 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
5065 Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
5070 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5071 let (htlcs_to_fail, res) = {
5072 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5073 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5075 debug_assert!(false);
5076 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5077 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
5078 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5079 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5080 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5081 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo();
5082 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5083 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
5084 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5085 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
5086 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5087 (htlcs_to_fail, res)
5089 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5092 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
5096 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5097 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5098 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5100 debug_assert!(false);
5101 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5103 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5104 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5105 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5106 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5107 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
5109 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5114 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5115 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5116 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5118 debug_assert!(false);
5119 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5121 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5122 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5123 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5124 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5125 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
5126 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
5129 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5130 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
5131 &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
5132 msg, &self.default_configuration
5134 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5135 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5136 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap()),
5139 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5144 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
5145 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5146 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
5147 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
5149 // It's not a local channel
5150 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5153 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5154 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
5155 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
5156 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5158 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5159 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5160 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5161 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5162 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5163 if chan.get().should_announce() {
5164 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
5165 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
5166 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
5167 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5169 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
5171 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
5172 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
5173 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
5174 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5176 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
5177 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
5180 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5182 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
5185 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5187 let need_lnd_workaround = {
5188 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5190 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5192 debug_assert!(false);
5193 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5195 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5196 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5197 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5198 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5199 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
5200 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
5201 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
5202 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
5203 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
5204 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash,
5205 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
5206 let mut channel_update = None;
5207 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
5208 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5209 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5212 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
5213 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
5214 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
5215 // they have the latest channel parameters.
5216 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5217 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5218 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
5223 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
5224 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
5225 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
5226 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
5227 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
5228 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
5232 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5236 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
5237 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
5240 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
5241 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
5246 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
5247 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
5248 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5250 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5251 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5252 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5253 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5254 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
5255 match monitor_event {
5256 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5257 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5258 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5259 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
5261 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5262 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5263 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5264 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5267 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5268 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5269 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
5270 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
5272 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5273 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5274 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5275 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
5278 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
5279 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5280 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5281 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5282 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5283 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5284 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5285 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5286 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
5287 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5288 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5292 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5293 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5295 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5297 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
5298 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5299 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5300 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5301 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5308 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5309 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
5315 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5316 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5319 has_pending_monitor_events
5322 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5323 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5324 /// update events as a separate process method here.
5326 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5327 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5328 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5329 NotifyOption::DoPersist
5331 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
5336 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5337 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5338 /// update was applied.
5339 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5340 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5341 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5342 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5344 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
5345 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
5346 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
5347 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
5349 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5350 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5352 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5353 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5354 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
5355 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
5356 let funding_txo = chan.get_funding_txo();
5357 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
5358 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger);
5359 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5360 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
5362 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
5363 has_monitor_update = true;
5365 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(
5366 funding_txo.expect("channel is live"), monitor_update);
5367 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5368 let channel_id: [u8; 32] = *channel_id;
5369 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
5370 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING,
5371 peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id));
5373 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, res));
5375 continue 'peer_loop;
5384 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5385 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5386 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
5389 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5390 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5396 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5397 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5398 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5399 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5400 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5401 let mut has_update = false;
5403 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5405 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5406 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5407 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5408 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5409 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5410 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5411 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5412 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5414 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5415 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5418 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5419 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5420 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5421 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5422 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5427 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5429 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5430 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
5431 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
5437 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5438 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5446 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5447 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5453 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5454 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5456 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5457 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5458 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5459 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5460 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5461 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5462 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5463 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5464 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5465 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5466 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5467 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5468 assert!(should_broadcast);
5469 } else { unreachable!(); }
5470 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
5472 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5476 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5477 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5479 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5480 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5483 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5485 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5486 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5487 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5488 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5489 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5490 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5491 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5492 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5493 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5494 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5495 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5496 // never fail a payment too early.
5497 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5499 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5502 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5507 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5510 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5511 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5513 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
5514 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
5515 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5516 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5518 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5520 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5521 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5525 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5526 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5528 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5530 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5531 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5533 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5534 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5535 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
5536 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
5537 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
5538 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5539 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
5540 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5541 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
5542 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5543 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
5546 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5547 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5549 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5552 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5554 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5556 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5557 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5558 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5559 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5560 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5563 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5564 /// stored external to LDK.
5566 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5567 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5568 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5570 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5571 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5574 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5575 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5576 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5577 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5579 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5580 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5581 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5582 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5583 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5585 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5586 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5587 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
5588 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5589 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
5591 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
5592 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
5594 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5595 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5599 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5600 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5602 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5604 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5605 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5607 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5608 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5609 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
5610 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5611 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
5612 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5613 min_final_cltv_expiry)
5616 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5617 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5619 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5622 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5624 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5626 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5627 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5630 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5631 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5633 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5634 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5635 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5638 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5639 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5641 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5642 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5643 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5644 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5646 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5647 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5648 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
5649 Some(_) => continue,
5650 None => return scid_candidate
5655 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5657 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5658 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5660 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5661 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5662 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5666 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
5667 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
5668 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
5670 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
5671 /// times to get a unique scid.
5672 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5673 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5674 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5676 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5677 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5678 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
5679 return scid_candidate
5683 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
5684 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
5685 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
5686 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
5688 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5689 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5690 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5691 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5692 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
5693 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
5694 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
5695 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
5704 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5705 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5706 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5707 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
5708 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5712 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
5713 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
5714 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5719 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
5720 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5721 if events.is_empty() { None } else { Some(events.remove(0)) }
5725 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5726 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
5730 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5731 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
5734 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
5735 /// using the given event handler.
5737 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
5738 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
5741 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock until the returned future completes so that
5742 // we can be sure no other persists happen while processing events.
5743 let _read_guard = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
5745 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5747 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5748 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5749 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5750 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5753 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5754 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5755 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5758 for event in pending_events {
5759 handler(event).await;
5762 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
5763 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
5768 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5770 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5771 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5772 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5773 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5774 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5775 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5779 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
5780 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
5781 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
5782 /// is always placed next to each other.
5784 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
5785 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
5786 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
5787 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
5789 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
5790 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
5791 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
5792 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5793 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5794 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5795 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5797 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5798 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5799 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5800 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5803 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5804 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5806 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
5807 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5810 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
5811 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5812 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5813 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5814 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5815 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
5816 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
5820 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5821 events.replace(pending_events);
5830 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5832 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5833 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5834 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5835 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5836 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5837 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5841 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
5843 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
5844 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
5845 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
5846 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5847 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5849 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5850 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5851 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5852 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5855 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5856 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5857 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5860 for event in pending_events {
5861 handler.handle_event(event);
5869 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5871 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5872 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5873 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5874 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5875 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5876 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5880 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5882 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5883 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
5884 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
5885 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
5886 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
5889 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
5890 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
5893 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5894 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5895 let new_height = height - 1;
5897 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
5898 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
5899 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
5900 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
5901 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
5902 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
5905 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5909 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5911 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5912 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5913 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5914 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5915 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5916 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5920 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5921 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5922 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5923 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5925 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5926 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
5928 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5929 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
5930 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
5932 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5933 if height < last_best_block_height {
5934 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5935 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5939 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5940 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5941 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5942 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5944 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5945 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
5947 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5949 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
5951 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5953 macro_rules! max_time {
5954 ($timestamp: expr) => {
5956 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
5957 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
5958 // having an explicit local time source.
5959 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
5960 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
5961 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5962 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
5963 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
5969 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
5970 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5971 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
5972 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
5976 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
5977 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
5978 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5979 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5980 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5981 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
5982 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.get_funding_txo(), chan.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
5983 res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
5990 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
5991 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5992 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
5993 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
5994 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
5995 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
5996 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5997 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6002 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6004 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6005 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6006 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6007 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6008 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6009 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6013 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
6014 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
6016 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
6017 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
6018 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6019 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6020 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6022 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6023 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
6025 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6026 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6027 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6028 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6029 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6030 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
6031 let res = f(channel);
6032 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
6033 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
6034 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
6035 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
6036 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.channel_id() }));
6038 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
6039 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
6040 if channel.is_usable() {
6041 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6042 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
6043 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6044 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6049 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6054 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6055 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
6058 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
6059 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6060 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6061 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6062 msg: announcement_sigs,
6064 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6065 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
6066 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6068 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6069 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6070 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
6075 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
6076 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
6077 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
6078 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
6079 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
6080 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
6081 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
6082 // is always consistent.
6083 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
6084 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
6085 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()),
6086 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
6087 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
6090 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
6091 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, channel);
6092 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
6093 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
6094 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
6095 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
6096 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6100 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
6101 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
6102 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6103 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6104 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
6105 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6106 data: reason_message,
6116 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6117 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
6118 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
6119 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
6120 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
6121 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
6122 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
6123 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6124 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
6125 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
6127 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
6128 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
6129 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
6133 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
6136 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6137 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
6138 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6139 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6140 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
6141 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
6142 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6143 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6144 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
6147 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
6148 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6149 _ => unreachable!(),
6151 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
6152 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
6153 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
6154 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
6160 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
6162 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
6163 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
6167 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
6169 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
6170 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
6172 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
6173 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
6176 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6177 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
6178 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
6181 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
6182 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
6183 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
6184 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
6187 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6188 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6189 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6190 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6193 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6194 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6196 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6197 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6198 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6199 pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6200 provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
6203 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6204 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6205 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
6206 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
6209 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6210 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6211 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6212 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
6215 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6216 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6217 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
6218 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6222 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
6223 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6225 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6226 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6227 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6228 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6229 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6230 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6234 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
6235 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6236 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6239 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
6240 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6241 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6244 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
6245 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6246 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6249 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
6250 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6251 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6254 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
6255 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6256 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6259 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
6260 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6261 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6264 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
6265 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6266 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6269 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
6270 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6271 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6274 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
6275 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6276 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6279 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
6280 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6281 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6284 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
6285 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6286 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6289 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
6290 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6291 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6294 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
6295 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6296 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6299 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
6300 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6301 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6304 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
6305 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6306 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6309 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
6310 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6311 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
6314 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
6319 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
6320 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6321 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6324 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
6325 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6326 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6327 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6329 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
6330 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6331 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
6332 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6333 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6334 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6335 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6336 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
6337 if chan.is_shutdown() {
6338 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
6339 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
6344 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
6346 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
6347 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
6348 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
6349 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
6350 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
6351 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
6352 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
6353 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
6354 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
6355 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
6356 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
6357 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
6358 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6359 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
6360 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6361 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
6362 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
6363 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
6364 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
6365 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
6366 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
6369 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
6370 peer_state.is_connected = false;
6371 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
6372 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
6375 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
6377 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6379 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6380 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6384 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
6385 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
6386 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6390 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6392 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
6393 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
6394 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
6395 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
6396 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
6397 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
6400 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6401 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
6402 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6403 if inbound_peer_limited {
6406 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
6407 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
6408 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
6409 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
6410 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
6414 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
6415 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
6416 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
6418 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6419 if inbound_peer_limited &&
6420 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
6421 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
6426 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
6427 peer_state.is_connected = true;
6432 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6434 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6435 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6436 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6437 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6438 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6439 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6440 let retain = if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6441 if !chan.have_received_message() {
6442 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
6443 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
6444 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
6448 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6449 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6450 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
6455 if retain && chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6456 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.default_configuration) {
6457 if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
6458 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
6459 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6468 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
6472 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
6473 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6475 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
6476 let channel_ids: Vec<[u8; 32]> = {
6477 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6478 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6479 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
6480 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6481 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6482 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
6484 for channel_id in channel_ids {
6485 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6486 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6490 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
6491 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6492 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6493 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
6494 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6495 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6496 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
6497 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
6498 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
6499 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6507 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6508 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6512 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6513 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6516 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
6517 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6521 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6522 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6523 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
6524 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6527 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6528 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6530 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6531 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6532 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6533 pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6534 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6537 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6538 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6539 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
6540 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6543 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6544 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6545 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6546 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
6549 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6550 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6551 pub fn provided_init_features(_config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
6552 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
6553 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
6554 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
6555 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
6556 features.set_data_loss_protect_optional();
6557 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
6558 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
6559 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
6560 features.set_payment_secret_required();
6561 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
6562 features.set_wumbo_optional();
6563 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
6564 features.set_channel_type_optional();
6565 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
6566 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
6568 { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
6569 if _config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
6570 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
6576 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6577 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6579 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
6580 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
6581 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
6582 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
6585 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
6586 (2, node_id, required),
6587 (4, features, required),
6588 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
6589 (8, forwarding_info, option),
6590 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6591 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6594 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
6595 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6596 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6597 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6598 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
6599 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
6600 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6601 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
6602 (2, self.channel_id, required),
6603 (3, self.channel_type, option),
6604 (4, self.counterparty, required),
6605 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
6606 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
6607 (7, self.config, option),
6608 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
6609 (9, self.confirmations, option),
6610 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
6611 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6612 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6613 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
6614 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6615 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6616 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6617 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6618 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6619 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
6620 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
6621 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
6622 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
6623 (30, self.is_usable, required),
6624 (32, self.is_public, required),
6625 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6626 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6627 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6628 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
6634 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
6635 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6636 _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6637 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
6638 (2, channel_id, required),
6639 (3, channel_type, option),
6640 (4, counterparty, required),
6641 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6642 (6, funding_txo, option),
6643 (7, config, option),
6644 (8, short_channel_id, option),
6645 (9, confirmations, option),
6646 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
6647 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6648 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6649 (16, balance_msat, required),
6650 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6651 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6652 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6653 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6654 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6655 (22, confirmations_required, option),
6656 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
6657 (26, is_outbound, required),
6658 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
6659 (30, is_usable, required),
6660 (32, is_public, required),
6661 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6662 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6663 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6664 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
6667 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6668 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6669 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
6670 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
6671 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
6675 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
6677 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
6678 outbound_scid_alias,
6682 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
6683 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
6685 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
6686 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6687 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
6688 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6689 confirmations_required,
6691 force_close_spend_delay,
6692 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
6693 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
6694 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
6695 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
6696 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
6697 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
6698 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
6703 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
6704 (2, channels, vec_type),
6705 (4, phantom_scid, required),
6706 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
6709 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
6711 (0, onion_packet, required),
6712 (2, short_channel_id, required),
6715 (0, payment_data, required),
6716 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6717 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6719 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
6720 (0, payment_preimage, required),
6721 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6725 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
6726 (0, routing, required),
6727 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
6728 (4, payment_hash, required),
6729 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
6730 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
6731 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
6735 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6736 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6738 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
6740 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6741 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6742 reason.write(writer)?;
6744 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6745 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
6748 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6749 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6750 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
6751 failure_code.write(writer)?;
6758 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6759 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6760 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6763 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6764 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6765 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6766 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
6770 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6771 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6772 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6773 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
6774 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
6777 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
6778 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
6779 // messages contained in the variants.
6780 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
6781 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
6782 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
6784 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6785 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6786 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6787 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6788 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
6791 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6792 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6793 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6794 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6795 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
6797 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6802 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
6807 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
6808 (0, short_channel_id, required),
6809 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6810 (2, outpoint, required),
6811 (4, htlc_id, required),
6812 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
6815 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
6816 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6817 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
6818 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
6819 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
6821 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6822 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
6823 (1, self.total_msat, required),
6824 (2, self.value, required),
6825 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
6826 (4, payment_data, option),
6827 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
6828 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
6829 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
6835 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
6836 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6837 let mut prev_hop = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
6839 let mut sender_intended_value = None;
6840 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
6841 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
6842 let mut total_value_received = None;
6843 let mut total_msat = None;
6844 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
6845 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6846 (0, prev_hop, required),
6847 (1, total_msat, option),
6848 (2, value, required),
6849 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
6850 (4, payment_data, option),
6851 (5, total_value_received, option),
6852 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
6853 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
6855 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
6857 if payment_data.is_some() {
6858 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6860 if total_msat.is_none() {
6861 total_msat = Some(value);
6863 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
6866 if total_msat.is_none() {
6867 if payment_data.is_none() {
6868 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6870 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
6872 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
6876 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
6879 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
6880 total_value_received,
6881 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
6888 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
6889 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6890 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6893 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
6894 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
6895 let mut path: Option<Vec<RouteHop>> = Some(Vec::new());
6896 let mut payment_id = None;
6897 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
6898 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6899 (0, session_priv, required),
6900 (1, payment_id, option),
6901 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6902 (4, path, vec_type),
6903 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
6905 if payment_id.is_none() {
6906 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
6908 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
6910 if path.is_none() || path.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
6911 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6913 let path = path.unwrap();
6914 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
6915 if params.final_cltv_expiry_delta == 0 {
6916 params.final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta;
6919 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6920 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
6921 first_hop_htlc_msat,
6923 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
6926 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6927 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6932 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
6933 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
6935 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
6937 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
6938 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6939 (0, session_priv, required),
6940 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
6941 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6942 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
6943 (4, *path, vec_type),
6944 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
6947 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
6949 field.write(writer)?;
6956 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
6957 (0, forward_info, required),
6958 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
6959 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
6960 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
6961 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
6964 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
6966 (0, htlc_id, required),
6967 (2, err_packet, required),
6972 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
6973 (0, payment_secret, required),
6974 (2, expiry_time, required),
6975 (4, user_payment_id, required),
6976 (6, payment_preimage, required),
6977 (8, min_value_msat, required),
6980 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6982 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6983 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6984 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6985 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6986 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6987 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6991 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6992 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
6994 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6996 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
6998 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6999 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
7000 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
7003 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
7005 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7006 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
7007 let mut number_of_channels = 0;
7008 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7009 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7010 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7011 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
7012 serializable_peer_count += 1;
7014 number_of_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.len();
7015 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
7016 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7017 unfunded_channels += 1;
7022 ((number_of_channels - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
7024 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7025 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7026 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7027 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
7028 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7029 channel.write(writer)?;
7036 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7037 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7038 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
7039 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
7040 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7041 for forward in pending_forwards {
7042 forward.write(writer)?;
7047 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7049 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7050 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
7051 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7053 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
7054 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7055 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
7056 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7057 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7058 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
7059 htlc.write(writer)?;
7061 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
7064 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
7065 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
7066 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7067 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
7068 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
7069 // per_peer_state lock at all.
7070 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
7073 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
7074 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
7075 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
7076 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
7077 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
7079 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
7080 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
7081 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
7082 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
7083 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
7084 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
7085 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
7090 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7091 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7092 for event in events.iter() {
7093 event.write(writer)?;
7096 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
7097 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7098 for event in background_events.iter() {
7100 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
7102 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
7103 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
7108 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
7109 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
7110 // likely to be identical.
7111 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7112 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7114 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7115 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
7116 hash.write(writer)?;
7117 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
7120 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
7121 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
7122 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7123 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
7124 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
7127 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
7128 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7130 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7131 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7132 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
7133 session_priv.write(writer)?;
7136 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
7137 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
7141 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
7142 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
7143 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7145 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7146 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7147 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
7153 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
7154 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7155 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
7156 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
7159 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
7160 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
7161 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
7162 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
7163 pending_claiming_payments = None;
7166 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7167 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
7168 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7169 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
7170 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7171 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
7172 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
7173 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
7174 (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7175 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
7182 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
7184 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
7186 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7187 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
7188 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
7189 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
7190 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
7191 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
7192 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
7193 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
7194 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7195 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
7196 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
7197 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
7198 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
7200 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
7201 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
7203 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
7204 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
7206 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
7207 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
7208 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
7209 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
7210 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
7211 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
7213 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
7214 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7216 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7217 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7218 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7219 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7220 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7221 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7225 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
7226 pub entropy_source: ES,
7228 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
7229 pub node_signer: NS,
7231 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
7232 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
7234 pub signer_provider: SP,
7236 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7238 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
7239 pub fee_estimator: F,
7240 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7242 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
7243 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
7244 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
7245 pub chain_monitor: M,
7247 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
7248 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
7249 /// force-closed during deserialization.
7250 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
7251 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
7252 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
7254 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
7256 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
7257 /// deserialization.
7259 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
7260 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
7261 pub default_config: UserConfig,
7263 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
7264 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
7266 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
7267 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
7268 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
7269 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
7271 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
7274 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
7275 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
7278 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7279 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7281 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7282 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7283 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7284 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7285 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7286 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7290 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
7291 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
7292 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
7293 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
7294 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
7296 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
7297 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
7302 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
7303 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
7304 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7305 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
7307 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7308 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7309 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7310 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7311 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7312 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7316 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7317 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
7318 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
7322 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7323 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
7325 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7326 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7327 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7328 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7329 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7330 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7334 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7335 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7337 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7338 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7339 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7341 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7343 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7344 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7345 let mut peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7346 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7347 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7348 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
7349 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
7350 for _ in 0..channel_count {
7351 let mut channel: Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (
7352 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
7354 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7355 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
7356 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
7357 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7358 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7359 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7360 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7361 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
7362 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
7363 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7364 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7365 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7366 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7367 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7368 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7369 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7370 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7371 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7372 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7373 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7374 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
7375 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
7376 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
7377 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7378 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7379 let (monitor_update, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
7380 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
7381 pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate(monitor_update));
7383 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
7384 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7385 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7386 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7387 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
7389 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7390 let mut found_htlc = false;
7391 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7392 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
7395 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
7396 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
7397 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
7398 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
7399 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
7400 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
7401 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
7402 log_info!(args.logger,
7403 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
7404 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7405 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7409 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7410 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
7411 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7413 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7414 id_to_peer.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel.get_counterparty_node_id());
7416 match peer_channels.entry(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
7417 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7418 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
7419 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7421 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7422 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
7423 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7424 entry.insert(by_id_map);
7428 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
7429 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
7430 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
7431 // safely discard the channel.
7432 let _ = channel.force_shutdown(false);
7433 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7434 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7435 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7436 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
7439 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7440 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7441 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7442 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7443 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7444 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7448 for (funding_txo, _) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7449 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
7450 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
7451 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
7452 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
7454 pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
7458 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
7459 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7460 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7461 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
7462 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7463 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7464 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
7465 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
7466 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
7468 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
7471 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7472 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7473 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
7474 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7475 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7476 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
7477 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
7478 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
7480 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
7483 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7484 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>)>()));
7485 for _ in 0..peer_count {
7486 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7487 let peer_state = PeerState {
7488 channel_by_id: peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new()),
7489 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
7490 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7491 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
7492 is_connected: false,
7494 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
7497 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7498 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
7499 for _ in 0..event_count {
7500 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
7501 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
7506 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7507 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
7508 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7510 let (funding_txo, monitor_update): (OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate) = (Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?);
7511 if pending_background_events.iter().find(|e| {
7512 let BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((pending_funding_txo, pending_monitor_update)) = e;
7513 *pending_funding_txo == funding_txo && *pending_monitor_update == monitor_update
7515 pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)));
7518 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7522 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
7523 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7525 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7526 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
7527 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
7528 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
7529 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7533 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7534 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
7535 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
7536 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
7537 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
7538 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
7539 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
7541 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
7542 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7546 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
7547 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
7548 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
7549 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
7550 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
7551 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7552 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7553 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
7554 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
7555 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = Some(Vec::new());
7556 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7557 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
7558 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7559 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
7560 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7561 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
7562 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
7563 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
7564 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7565 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
7567 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
7568 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7571 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
7572 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7575 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
7576 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
7579 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
7580 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
7581 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
7582 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
7583 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
7584 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
7586 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
7588 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
7589 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
7590 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
7594 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
7595 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
7596 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
7597 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
7598 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
7599 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
7600 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
7602 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7603 if id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
7604 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
7605 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
7606 if path.is_empty() {
7607 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
7608 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7611 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
7612 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
7613 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
7614 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
7615 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7616 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
7617 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
7618 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
7620 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7621 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
7622 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
7623 retry_strategy: None,
7624 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
7625 payment_params: None,
7626 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
7627 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
7628 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
7629 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
7630 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
7631 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
7632 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
7633 total_msat: path_amt,
7634 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
7636 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
7637 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
7642 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7644 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
7645 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
7646 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
7647 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
7649 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
7650 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
7651 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
7652 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
7653 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
7654 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
7655 forwards.retain(|forward| {
7656 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
7657 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
7658 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7659 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7664 !forwards.is_empty()
7666 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
7667 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
7668 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7669 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7670 pending_events_read.retain(|event| {
7671 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
7672 intercepted_id != ev_id
7679 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
7680 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
7681 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
7682 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
7683 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
7684 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
7685 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
7686 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
7687 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
7688 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
7689 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
7690 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv, path, false, &pending_events, &args.logger);
7691 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
7700 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
7701 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
7702 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
7703 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
7704 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
7705 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
7706 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
7707 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
7711 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
7712 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
7714 let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
7715 if let Some(mut purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
7716 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
7717 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7719 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.drain(..).zip(claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..)) {
7720 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
7723 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
7726 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
7727 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
7728 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
7729 if htlcs.is_empty() {
7730 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7732 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
7733 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
7734 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
7735 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
7736 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
7737 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
7738 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
7739 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
7741 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7742 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7746 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
7748 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
7750 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
7751 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
7753 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
7759 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7760 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7762 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
7764 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7766 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
7767 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
7768 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
7769 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7773 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
7774 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
7775 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7776 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7777 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
7778 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
7779 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
7781 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
7782 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
7783 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
7785 chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
7786 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
7787 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7788 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7789 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7790 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7792 if chan.is_usable() {
7793 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
7794 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7795 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7796 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7797 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7803 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
7805 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7806 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
7807 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
7808 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7809 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
7810 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
7811 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
7812 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
7813 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
7814 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
7815 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
7817 for claimable_htlc in payment.htlcs {
7818 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
7820 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
7821 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
7822 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
7823 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
7825 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
7826 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
7827 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
7828 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
7830 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
7831 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
7832 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
7833 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
7835 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
7836 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
7837 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
7838 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7839 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7840 if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
7841 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
7844 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
7845 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
7848 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
7851 purpose: payment.purpose,
7852 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
7858 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
7859 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get_mut(&node_id) {
7860 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
7862 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
7863 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7867 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
7869 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
7870 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
7871 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
7872 router: args.router,
7874 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
7876 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
7877 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
7878 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
7879 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
7881 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
7882 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
7883 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
7884 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
7885 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
7886 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
7888 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
7893 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
7895 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
7897 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
7898 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
7899 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
7900 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
7902 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
7903 node_signer: args.node_signer,
7904 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
7906 logger: args.logger,
7907 default_configuration: args.default_config,
7910 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7911 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
7912 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
7913 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7914 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7917 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
7918 //connection or two.
7920 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
7926 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7927 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7928 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
7929 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
7930 use core::time::Duration;
7931 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
7932 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
7933 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
7934 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
7935 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7936 use crate::ln::msgs;
7937 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
7938 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
7939 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7940 use crate::util::test_utils;
7941 use crate::util::config::ChannelConfig;
7942 use crate::chain::keysinterface::EntropySource;
7945 fn test_notify_limits() {
7946 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
7947 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
7948 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7949 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7950 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7951 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7953 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
7954 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
7955 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7956 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7957 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7959 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7961 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
7962 // to connect messages with new values
7963 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7964 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7965 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
7966 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
7967 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
7968 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
7970 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
7971 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7972 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7973 // ... but the last node should not.
7974 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7975 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
7976 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7977 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7979 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
7980 // about the channel.
7981 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7982 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7983 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7985 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
7987 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7988 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7989 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7990 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7991 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7992 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7994 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
7995 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7996 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7998 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
7999 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
8000 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
8001 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
8002 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
8003 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
8005 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
8006 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
8007 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
8008 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
8009 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8010 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8011 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8012 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8014 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
8015 // the channel info has updated.
8016 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
8017 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
8018 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8019 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8020 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8021 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8025 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
8026 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
8028 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8029 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8030 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8031 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8032 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8034 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
8035 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8036 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
8037 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
8039 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
8040 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
8041 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
8042 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
8043 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
8044 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
8045 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
8046 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
8047 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8048 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8049 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8050 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
8052 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
8053 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
8054 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8055 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8056 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8057 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8058 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8059 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8060 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8061 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8062 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8063 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8064 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
8065 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8066 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8067 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8068 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8069 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8070 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8071 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8072 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8073 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8074 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
8076 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
8077 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
8078 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
8079 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8080 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8081 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8082 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
8084 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
8085 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
8086 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
8087 // lightning messages manually.
8088 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8089 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
8090 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8092 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8093 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8094 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
8095 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8096 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8097 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
8098 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8099 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8100 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
8101 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8102 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8103 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8104 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8105 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8106 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8107 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
8108 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8109 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8110 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
8111 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8112 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8113 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8114 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8115 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
8116 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8118 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
8119 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
8120 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8121 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
8123 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
8124 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
8125 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
8126 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
8128 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8131 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8132 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8133 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8134 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8136 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8139 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8140 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8141 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8142 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8144 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8149 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
8150 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
8151 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
8152 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
8153 // fails as expected.
8154 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8155 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8156 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8157 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8158 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8159 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8160 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8162 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
8163 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
8164 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
8166 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
8167 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8168 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV),
8169 final_value_msat: 100_000,
8171 let route = find_route(
8172 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8173 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8175 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
8176 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8177 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8178 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8179 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8180 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8181 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8182 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8183 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8184 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8185 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
8186 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
8187 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8188 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8189 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8190 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8191 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8192 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8193 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8194 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8195 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8196 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8197 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8198 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8200 // Finally, claim the original payment.
8201 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8203 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
8204 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8205 let route = find_route(
8206 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8207 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8209 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
8210 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8211 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8212 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8213 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8214 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
8215 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
8216 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
8218 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
8219 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8220 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
8221 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8222 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8223 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8224 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8225 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8226 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8227 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8228 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8229 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8230 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8231 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8232 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8233 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8234 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8235 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8236 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8237 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8238 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8239 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8240 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8241 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8243 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
8244 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8248 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
8249 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
8250 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
8251 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8252 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8253 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8254 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8256 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8257 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8259 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8260 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8261 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
8262 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8264 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
8265 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8266 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8267 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8268 let route = find_route(
8269 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8270 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8273 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8274 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
8275 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
8276 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8277 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
8278 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8279 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8281 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8282 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8283 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8284 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8285 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8286 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8287 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8289 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
8293 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
8294 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
8295 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8296 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8297 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8298 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8300 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8301 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8303 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8304 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8305 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
8306 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8308 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
8309 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8310 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8311 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8312 let route = find_route(
8313 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8314 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8317 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8318 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8319 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
8320 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
8321 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8322 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
8323 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
8324 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8325 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8327 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8328 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8329 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8330 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8331 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8332 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8333 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8335 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
8339 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
8340 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8341 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8342 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8343 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8345 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8346 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8347 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8348 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8350 // Marshall an MPP route.
8351 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8352 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8353 route.paths.push(path);
8354 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8355 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8356 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8357 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8358 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8359 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8361 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
8362 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
8364 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
8365 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
8367 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
8372 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
8373 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8374 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8375 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8376 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8378 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8380 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8381 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8383 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8384 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8385 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8386 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8389 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
8390 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
8391 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8392 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
8393 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
8394 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
8397 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
8400 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
8401 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
8406 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
8407 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
8408 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8409 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8410 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8411 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8413 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
8414 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
8416 total_msat: 100_000,
8419 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
8420 // payment verification fails as expected.
8421 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
8422 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
8423 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
8424 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
8426 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
8430 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
8431 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
8435 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
8436 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
8437 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
8438 // the channel is successfully closed.
8439 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8440 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8441 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8442 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8444 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8445 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8446 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
8447 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8448 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
8450 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
8451 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
8453 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
8454 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
8455 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8456 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8459 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8461 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8462 // as it has the funding transaction.
8463 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8464 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8465 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8468 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8470 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8472 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8474 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8475 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8476 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8478 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8481 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8482 // as it has the funding transaction.
8483 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8484 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8485 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8487 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8488 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8489 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
8490 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8491 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8492 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8493 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
8494 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
8496 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8497 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8498 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8499 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
8501 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8502 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
8504 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
8505 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
8506 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
8507 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
8508 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8509 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8510 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8514 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
8515 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
8516 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
8517 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
8518 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8519 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8520 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8523 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8525 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
8526 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
8527 // closing transaction).
8528 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
8529 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
8530 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8532 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
8533 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
8534 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8535 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8536 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8539 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8541 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
8543 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
8544 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
8545 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8547 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8549 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8550 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8553 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
8554 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
8555 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
8558 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
8559 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
8560 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
8563 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
8565 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
8566 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
8568 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
8569 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
8571 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
8572 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8577 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
8578 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
8579 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
8580 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
8581 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8582 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
8583 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
8584 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
8587 let channel_id = [4; 32];
8588 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8589 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
8591 // Test the API functions.
8592 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
8594 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
8596 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8598 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8600 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8602 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
8604 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
8608 fn test_connection_limiting() {
8609 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
8610 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8611 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8612 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8613 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8615 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
8617 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8618 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8620 let mut funding_tx = None;
8621 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
8622 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8623 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8626 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
8627 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
8628 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
8629 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
8630 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8632 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8633 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8634 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8636 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8638 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
8639 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8640 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8642 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8645 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
8646 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8647 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8648 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
8649 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8651 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
8652 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
8654 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
8655 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
8656 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8657 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8658 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
8659 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8660 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8662 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8663 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8664 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8665 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap_err();
8667 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
8668 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
8669 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8670 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8671 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
8672 for ev in chan_closed_events {
8673 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
8675 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8676 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8677 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
8678 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap_err();
8680 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
8681 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
8682 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
8683 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8685 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
8686 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
8688 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
8689 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
8690 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
8691 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
8692 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8694 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8695 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
8696 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8698 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
8699 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8700 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
8702 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
8703 // "protected" and can connect again.
8704 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
8705 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
8706 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8707 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8709 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
8711 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8712 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
8716 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
8717 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
8718 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8719 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8720 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8721 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8723 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
8725 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8726 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8728 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
8729 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8730 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8731 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8734 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
8736 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8737 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
8738 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8740 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
8741 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8742 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8744 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
8745 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8746 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
8747 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8751 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
8752 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
8753 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
8754 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8755 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8756 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
8757 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8758 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
8759 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8761 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
8763 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8764 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8766 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
8767 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
8768 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8769 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8770 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8771 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8773 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8774 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8776 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8777 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
8779 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8781 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
8782 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8785 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
8786 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8787 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8788 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8789 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8790 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8791 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8793 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8794 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
8795 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
8796 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
8800 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8802 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
8803 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8805 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
8806 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8807 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8809 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8810 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
8812 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8814 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
8819 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
8820 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
8821 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
8822 // the channel without the anchors feature.
8823 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8824 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8825 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
8826 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8827 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8828 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
8829 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8831 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
8832 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8833 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8835 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8836 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8838 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8839 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8841 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8844 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8845 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
8847 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8848 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8850 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8854 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
8856 use crate::chain::Listen;
8857 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
8858 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
8859 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
8860 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
8861 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
8862 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
8863 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
8864 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
8865 use crate::util::test_utils;
8866 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
8868 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8869 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8870 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
8872 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
8876 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
8877 node: &'a ChannelManager<
8878 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
8879 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
8880 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
8881 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
8882 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
8883 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>,
8888 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
8889 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
8892 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
8893 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
8894 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
8896 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
8898 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
8899 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
8900 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8901 let scorer = Mutex::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
8902 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
8904 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
8905 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
8907 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
8908 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
8909 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
8910 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8912 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
8914 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
8916 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8917 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
8918 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
8919 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
8920 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8922 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
8924 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
8926 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_b.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8927 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_a.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
8928 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8929 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8930 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8933 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
8934 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8935 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
8937 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8938 } else { panic!(); }
8940 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8941 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8942 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
8944 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8945 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8947 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8950 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8951 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8952 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
8954 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8955 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
8957 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8960 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
8963 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8966 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
8967 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
8969 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8970 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8971 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
8972 match msg_events[0] {
8973 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
8974 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
8975 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8979 match msg_events[1] {
8980 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8984 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8985 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
8987 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8988 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
8990 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8993 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8994 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
8996 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8997 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8999 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9002 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
9003 macro_rules! send_payment {
9004 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
9005 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
9006 .with_features($node_b.invoice_features());
9007 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
9008 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
9010 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
9011 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
9013 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
9014 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), RouteParameters {
9015 payment_params, final_value_msat: 10_000,
9016 }, Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
9017 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
9018 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9019 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
9020 let (raa, cs) = do_get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
9021 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
9022 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
9023 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
9025 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
9026 expect_payment_claimable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
9027 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9028 expect_payment_claimed!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
9030 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
9031 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
9032 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
9033 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9034 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
9036 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
9039 let (raa, cs) = do_get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
9040 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
9041 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
9042 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9044 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
9049 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
9050 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);