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[rust-lightning] / lightning / src / ln / channelmanager.rs
1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
2 // history.
3 //
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
8 // licenses.
9
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
11 //!
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
15 //!
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
19
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::Header;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
23 use bitcoin::key::constants::SECRET_KEY_SIZE;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25
26 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
28 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
29
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
32 use bitcoin::{secp256k1, Sequence};
33
34 use crate::blinded_path::BlindedPath;
35 use crate::blinded_path::payment::{PaymentConstraints, ReceiveTlvs};
36 use crate::chain;
37 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
38 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
39 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, WithChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
40 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
41 use crate::events;
42 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
43 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
44 // construct one themselves.
45 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
46 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, WithChannelContext};
47 use crate::ln::features::{Bolt12InvoiceFeatures, ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
48 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
49 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
50 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
51 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
52 use crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters};
53 use crate::ln::onion_payment::{check_incoming_htlc_cltv, create_recv_pending_htlc_info, create_fwd_pending_htlc_info, decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion, InboundOnionErr, NextPacketDetails};
54 use crate::ln::msgs;
55 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
56 use crate::ln::onion_utils::{HTLCFailReason, INVALID_ONION_BLINDING};
57 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
58 #[cfg(test)]
59 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
60 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{Bolt12PaymentError, OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs, StaleExpiration};
61 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
62 use crate::offers::invoice::{BlindedPayInfo, Bolt12Invoice, DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY, DerivedSigningPubkey, InvoiceBuilder};
63 use crate::offers::invoice_error::InvoiceError;
64 use crate::offers::merkle::SignError;
65 use crate::offers::offer::{DerivedMetadata, Offer, OfferBuilder};
66 use crate::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
67 use crate::offers::refund::{Refund, RefundBuilder};
68 use crate::onion_message::{Destination, OffersMessage, OffersMessageHandler, PendingOnionMessage, new_pending_onion_message};
69 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider};
70 use crate::sign::ecdsa::WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner;
71 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
72 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
73 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
74 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
75 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
76 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger, WithContext};
77 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
78
79 use alloc::collections::{btree_map, BTreeMap};
80
81 use crate::io;
82 use crate::prelude::*;
83 use core::{cmp, mem};
84 use core::cell::RefCell;
85 use crate::io::Read;
86 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
87 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
88 use core::time::Duration;
89 use core::ops::Deref;
90
91 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
92 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, ProbeSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
93 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
94
95 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
96 //
97 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
98 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
99 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
100 //
101 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
102 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
103 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
104 // before we forward it.
105 //
106 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
107 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
108 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
109 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
110 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
111
112 /// Routing info for an inbound HTLC onion.
113 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
114 pub enum PendingHTLCRouting {
115         /// A forwarded HTLC.
116         Forward {
117                 /// BOLT 4 onion packet.
118                 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
119                 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
120                 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
121                 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
122                 /// Set if this HTLC is being forwarded within a blinded path.
123                 blinded: Option<BlindedForward>,
124         },
125         /// An HTLC paid to an invoice (supposedly) generated by us.
126         /// At this point, we have not checked that the invoice being paid was actually generated by us,
127         /// but rather it's claiming to pay an invoice of ours.
128         Receive {
129                 /// Payment secret and total msat received.
130                 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
131                 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`] for more info.
132                 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
133                 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
134                 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
135                 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
136                 /// Shared secret derived using a phantom node secret key. If this field is Some, the
137                 /// payment was sent to a phantom node (one hop beyond the current node), but can be
138                 /// settled by this node.
139                 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
140                 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
141                 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
142         },
143         /// Incoming keysend (sender provided the preimage in a TLV).
144         ReceiveKeysend {
145                 /// This was added in 0.0.116 and will break deserialization on downgrades.
146                 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
147                 /// Preimage for this onion payment. This preimage is provided by the sender and will be
148                 /// used to settle the spontaneous payment.
149                 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
150                 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`] for more info.
151                 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
152                 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
153                 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
154                 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
155                 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
156                 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
157         },
158 }
159
160 /// Information used to forward or fail this HTLC that is being forwarded within a blinded path.
161 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
162 pub struct BlindedForward {
163         /// The `blinding_point` that was set in the inbound [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC`], or in the inbound
164         /// onion payload if we're the introduction node. Useful for calculating the next hop's
165         /// [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC::blinding_point`].
166         pub inbound_blinding_point: PublicKey,
167         // Another field will be added here when we support forwarding as a non-intro node.
168 }
169
170 impl PendingHTLCRouting {
171         // Used to override the onion failure code and data if the HTLC is blinded.
172         fn blinded_failure(&self) -> Option<BlindedFailure> {
173                 // TODO: needs update when we support receiving to multi-hop blinded paths
174                 if let Self::Forward { blinded: Some(_), .. } = self {
175                         Some(BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode)
176                 } else {
177                         None
178                 }
179         }
180 }
181
182 /// Full details of an incoming HTLC, including routing info.
183 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
184 pub struct PendingHTLCInfo {
185         /// Further routing details based on whether the HTLC is being forwarded or received.
186         pub routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
187         /// Shared secret from the previous hop.
188         /// Used encrypt failure packets in the event that the HTLC needs to be failed backwards.
189         pub incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
190         /// Hash of the payment preimage, to lock the payment until the receiver releases the preimage.
191         pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
192         /// Amount offered by this HTLC.
193         pub incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
194         /// Sender intended amount to forward or receive (actual amount received
195         /// may overshoot this in either case)
196         pub outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
197         /// Outgoing timelock expiration blockheight.
198         pub outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
199         /// The fee being skimmed off the top of this HTLC. If this is a forward, it'll be the fee we are
200         /// skimming. If we're receiving this HTLC, it's the fee that our counterparty skimmed.
201         pub skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
202 }
203
204 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
205 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
206         Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
207         Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
208 }
209
210 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
211 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
212 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
213         Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
214         Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
215 }
216
217 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
218         pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
219
220         // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
221         // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
222         // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
223         // HTLCs.
224         //
225         // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
226         prev_short_channel_id: u64,
227         prev_htlc_id: u64,
228         prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
229         prev_user_channel_id: u128,
230 }
231
232 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
233         AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
234         FailHTLC {
235                 htlc_id: u64,
236                 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
237         },
238 }
239
240 // Used for failing blinded HTLCs backwards correctly.
241 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
242 enum BlindedFailure {
243         FromIntroductionNode,
244         // Another variant will be added here for non-intro nodes.
245 }
246
247 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
248 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
249 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
250         // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
251         short_channel_id: u64,
252         user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
253         htlc_id: u64,
254         incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
255         phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
256         blinded_failure: Option<BlindedFailure>,
257
258         // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
259         // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
260         outpoint: OutPoint,
261 }
262
263 enum OnionPayload {
264         /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
265         Invoice {
266                 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
267                 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
268                 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
269         },
270         /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
271         Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
272 }
273
274 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
275 struct ClaimableHTLC {
276         prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
277         cltv_expiry: u32,
278         /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
279         value: u64,
280         /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
281         /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
282         sender_intended_value: u64,
283         onion_payload: OnionPayload,
284         timer_ticks: u8,
285         /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
286         /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
287         total_value_received: Option<u64>,
288         /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
289         total_msat: u64,
290         /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
291         counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
292 }
293
294 impl From<&ClaimableHTLC> for events::ClaimedHTLC {
295         fn from(val: &ClaimableHTLC) -> Self {
296                 events::ClaimedHTLC {
297                         channel_id: val.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
298                         user_channel_id: val.prev_hop.user_channel_id.unwrap_or(0),
299                         cltv_expiry: val.cltv_expiry,
300                         value_msat: val.value,
301                         counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: val.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0),
302                 }
303         }
304 }
305
306 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
307 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
308 ///
309 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
310 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
311 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; Self::LENGTH]);
312
313 impl PaymentId {
314         /// Number of bytes in the id.
315         pub const LENGTH: usize = 32;
316 }
317
318 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
319         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
320                 self.0.write(w)
321         }
322 }
323
324 impl Readable for PaymentId {
325         fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
326                 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
327                 Ok(PaymentId(buf))
328         }
329 }
330
331 impl core::fmt::Display for PaymentId {
332         fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> core::fmt::Result {
333                 crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
334         }
335 }
336
337 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
338 ///
339 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
340 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
341 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
342
343 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
344         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
345                 self.0.write(w)
346         }
347 }
348
349 impl Readable for InterceptId {
350         fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
351                 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
352                 Ok(InterceptId(buf))
353         }
354 }
355
356 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
357 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
358 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
359         PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
360         OutboundRoute { session_priv: [u8; SECRET_KEY_SIZE] },
361 }
362 impl SentHTLCId {
363         pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
364                 match source {
365                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
366                                 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
367                                 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
368                         },
369                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
370                                 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: session_priv.secret_bytes() },
371                 }
372         }
373 }
374 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
375         (0, PreviousHopData) => {
376                 (0, short_channel_id, required),
377                 (2, htlc_id, required),
378         },
379         (2, OutboundRoute) => {
380                 (0, session_priv, required),
381         };
382 );
383
384
385 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
386 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
387 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
388 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
389         PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
390         OutboundRoute {
391                 path: Path,
392                 session_priv: SecretKey,
393                 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
394                 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
395                 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
396                 payment_id: PaymentId,
397         },
398 }
399 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
400 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
401         fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
402                 match self {
403                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
404                                 0u8.hash(hasher);
405                                 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
406                         },
407                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
408                                 1u8.hash(hasher);
409                                 path.hash(hasher);
410                                 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
411                                 payment_id.hash(hasher);
412                                 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
413                         },
414                 }
415         }
416 }
417 impl HTLCSource {
418         #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
419         #[cfg(test)]
420         pub fn dummy() -> Self {
421                 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
422                         path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
423                         session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
424                         first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
425                         payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
426                 }
427         }
428
429         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
430         /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
431         /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
432         pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
433                 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
434                         *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
435                 } else {
436                         // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
437                         true
438                 }
439         }
440 }
441
442 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
443 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
444 ///
445 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
446 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
447 pub enum FailureCode {
448         /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
449         /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
450         TemporaryNodeFailure,
451         /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
452         /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
453         RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
454         /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
455         /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
456         /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
457         /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
458         IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
459         /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
460         /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
461         ///
462         /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
463         /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
464         InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
465 }
466
467 impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
468     fn into(self) -> u16 {
469                 match self {
470                         FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
471                         FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
472                         FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
473                         FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
474                 }
475         }
476 }
477
478 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
479 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
480 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
481 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
482 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
483
484 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
485         err: msgs::LightningError,
486         chan_id: Option<(ChannelId, u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
487         shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
488         channel_capacity: Option<u64>,
489 }
490 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
491         #[inline]
492         fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
493                 Self {
494                         err: LightningError {
495                                 err: err.clone(),
496                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
497                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
498                                                 channel_id,
499                                                 data: err
500                                         },
501                                 },
502                         },
503                         chan_id: None,
504                         shutdown_finish: None,
505                         channel_capacity: None,
506                 }
507         }
508         #[inline]
509         fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
510                 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None, channel_capacity: None }
511         }
512         #[inline]
513         fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId, user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>, channel_capacity: u64) -> Self {
514                 let err_msg = msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: err.clone() };
515                 let action = if shutdown_res.monitor_update.is_some() {
516                         // We have a closing `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, which means the channel was funded and we
517                         // should disconnect our peer such that we force them to broadcast their latest
518                         // commitment upon reconnecting.
519                         msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(err_msg) }
520                 } else {
521                         msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: err_msg }
522                 };
523                 Self {
524                         err: LightningError { err, action },
525                         chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
526                         shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
527                         channel_capacity: Some(channel_capacity)
528                 }
529         }
530         #[inline]
531         fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
532                 Self {
533                         err: match err {
534                                 ChannelError::Warn(msg) =>  LightningError {
535                                         err: msg.clone(),
536                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
537                                                 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
538                                                         channel_id,
539                                                         data: msg
540                                                 },
541                                                 log_level: Level::Warn,
542                                         },
543                                 },
544                                 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
545                                         err: msg,
546                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
547                                 },
548                                 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
549                                         err: msg.clone(),
550                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
551                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
552                                                         channel_id,
553                                                         data: msg
554                                                 },
555                                         },
556                                 },
557                         },
558                         chan_id: None,
559                         shutdown_finish: None,
560                         channel_capacity: None,
561                 }
562         }
563
564         fn closes_channel(&self) -> bool {
565                 self.chan_id.is_some()
566         }
567 }
568
569 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
570 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
571 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
572 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
573 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
574
575 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
576 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
577 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
578 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
579 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
580 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
581         /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
582         CommitmentFirst,
583         /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
584         RevokeAndACKFirst,
585 }
586
587 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
588 struct ClaimingPayment {
589         amount_msat: u64,
590         payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
591         receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
592         htlcs: Vec<events::ClaimedHTLC>,
593         sender_intended_value: Option<u64>,
594 }
595 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
596         (0, amount_msat, required),
597         (2, payment_purpose, required),
598         (4, receiver_node_id, required),
599         (5, htlcs, optional_vec),
600         (7, sender_intended_value, option),
601 });
602
603 struct ClaimablePayment {
604         purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
605         onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
606         htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
607 }
608
609 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
610 struct ClaimablePayments {
611         /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
612         /// failed/claimed by the user.
613         ///
614         /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
615         /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
616         ///
617         /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
618         /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
619         claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
620
621         /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
622         /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
623         /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
624         pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
625 }
626
627 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
628 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
629 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
630 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
631 #[derive(Debug)]
632 enum BackgroundEvent {
633         /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
634         /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
635         /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
636         /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
637         ///
638         /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
639         /// are regenerated on startup.
640         ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
641         /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
642         /// channel to continue normal operation.
643         ///
644         /// In general this should be used rather than
645         /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
646         /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
647         /// error the other variant is acceptable.
648         ///
649         /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
650         /// are regenerated on startup.
651         MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
652                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
653                 funding_txo: OutPoint,
654                 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
655         },
656         /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
657         /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
658         /// on a channel.
659         MonitorUpdatesComplete {
660                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
661                 channel_id: ChannelId,
662         },
663 }
664
665 #[derive(Debug)]
666 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
667         /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
668         /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
669         /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
670         /// event can be generated.
671         PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
672         /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
673         /// operation of another channel.
674         ///
675         /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
676         /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
677         /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
678         /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
679         /// outbound edge.
680         EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
681                 event: events::Event,
682                 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
683         },
684         /// Indicates we should immediately resume the operation of another channel, unless there is
685         /// some other reason why the channel is blocked. In practice this simply means immediately
686         /// removing the [`RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction`] provided from the blocking set.
687         ///
688         /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
689         /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
690         /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. However, we use this variant
691         /// instead of [`Self::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel`] when we discover that the claim was in
692         /// fact duplicative and we simply want to resume the outbound edge channel immediately.
693         ///
694         /// This variant should thus never be written to disk, as it is processed inline rather than
695         /// stored for later processing.
696         FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
697                 downstream_counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
698                 downstream_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
699                 blocking_action: RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
700         },
701 }
702
703 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
704         (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
705         // Note that FreeOtherChannelImmediately should never be written - we were supposed to free
706         // *immediately*. However, for simplicity we implement read/write here.
707         (1, FreeOtherChannelImmediately) => {
708                 (0, downstream_counterparty_node_id, required),
709                 (2, downstream_funding_outpoint, required),
710                 (4, blocking_action, required),
711         },
712         (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
713                 (0, event, upgradable_required),
714                 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
715                 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
716                 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
717                 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
718                 // downgrades to prior versions.
719                 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
720         },
721 );
722
723 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
724 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
725         ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
726                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
727                 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
728         },
729 }
730 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
731         (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
732                 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
733                 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
734         };
735 );
736
737 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
738 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
739 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
740 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
741         /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
742         /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
743         /// durably to disk.
744         ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
745                 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
746                 channel_id: ChannelId,
747                 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
748                 htlc_id: u64,
749         },
750 }
751
752 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
753         fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
754                 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
755                         channel_id: prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
756                         htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
757                 }
758         }
759 }
760
761 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
762         (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
763 ;);
764
765
766 /// State we hold per-peer.
767 pub(super) struct PeerState<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
768         /// `channel_id` -> `ChannelPhase`
769         ///
770         /// Holds all channels within corresponding `ChannelPhase`s where the peer is the counterparty.
771         pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>,
772         /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundChannelRequest`.
773         ///
774         /// When manual channel acceptance is enabled, this holds all unaccepted inbound channels where
775         /// the peer is the counterparty. If the channel is accepted, then the entry in this table is
776         /// removed, and an InboundV1Channel is created and placed in the `inbound_v1_channel_by_id` table. If
777         /// the channel is rejected, then the entry is simply removed.
778         pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, InboundChannelRequest>,
779         /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
780         latest_features: InitFeatures,
781         /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
782         /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
783         pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
784         /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
785         /// user but which have not yet completed.
786         ///
787         /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
788         /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
789         /// for a missing channel.
790         in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
791         /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
792         /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
793         ///
794         /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
795         /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
796         /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
797         /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
798         ///
799         /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
800         /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
801         /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
802         /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
803         /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
804         /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
805         monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
806         /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
807         /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
808         /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
809         /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
810         actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
811         /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
812         /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
813         /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
814         is_connected: bool,
815 }
816
817 impl <SP: Deref> PeerState<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
818         /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
819         /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
820         /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
821         fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
822                 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
823                         return false
824                 }
825                 self.channel_by_id.iter().filter(|(_, phase)| matches!(phase, ChannelPhase::Funded(_))).count() == 0
826                         && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
827                         && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
828         }
829
830         // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
831         fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
832                 self.channel_by_id.len() + self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
833         }
834
835         // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
836         fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId) -> bool {
837                 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
838                         self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
839         }
840 }
841
842 /// A not-yet-accepted inbound (from counterparty) channel. Once
843 /// accepted, the parameters will be used to construct a channel.
844 pub(super) struct InboundChannelRequest {
845         /// The original OpenChannel message.
846         pub open_channel_msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
847         /// The number of ticks remaining before the request expires.
848         pub ticks_remaining: i32,
849 }
850
851 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unaccepted inbound channel to be
852 /// accepted. An unaccepted channel that exceeds this limit will be abandoned.
853 const UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: i32 = 2;
854
855 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
856 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
857 ///
858 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
859 /// here.
860 ///
861 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
862 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
863 struct PendingInboundPayment {
864         /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
865         payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
866         /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
867         /// this payment being removed.
868         expiry_time: u64,
869         /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
870         user_payment_id: u64,
871         // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
872         payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
873         min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
874 }
875
876 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
877 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
878 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
879 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
880 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
881 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
882 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
883 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
884 ///
885 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
886 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
887 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
888         Arc<M>,
889         Arc<T>,
890         Arc<KeysManager>,
891         Arc<KeysManager>,
892         Arc<KeysManager>,
893         Arc<F>,
894         Arc<DefaultRouter<
895                 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
896                 Arc<L>,
897                 Arc<RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
898                 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
899                 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
900         >>,
901         Arc<L>
902 >;
903
904 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
905 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
906 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
907 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
908 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
909 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
910 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
911 /// or, respectively, [`Router`]  for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
912 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
913 ///
914 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
915 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
916 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
917         ChannelManager<
918                 &'a M,
919                 &'b T,
920                 &'c KeysManager,
921                 &'c KeysManager,
922                 &'c KeysManager,
923                 &'d F,
924                 &'e DefaultRouter<
925                         &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
926                         &'g L,
927                         &'h RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
928                         ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
929                         ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
930                 >,
931                 &'g L
932         >;
933
934 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`].
935 ///
936 /// This is not exported to bindings users as general cover traits aren't useful in other
937 /// languages.
938 pub trait AChannelManager {
939         /// A type implementing [`chain::Watch`].
940         type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
941         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Watch`].
942         type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
943         /// A type implementing [`BroadcasterInterface`].
944         type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
945         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Broadcaster`].
946         type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
947         /// A type implementing [`EntropySource`].
948         type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
949         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::EntropySource`].
950         type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
951         /// A type implementing [`NodeSigner`].
952         type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
953         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::NodeSigner`].
954         type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
955         /// A type implementing [`WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner`].
956         type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
957         /// A type implementing [`SignerProvider`] for [`Self::Signer`].
958         type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<EcdsaSigner= Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
959         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::SignerProvider`].
960         type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
961         /// A type implementing [`FeeEstimator`].
962         type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
963         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::FeeEstimator`].
964         type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
965         /// A type implementing [`Router`].
966         type Router: Router + ?Sized;
967         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Router`].
968         type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
969         /// A type implementing [`Logger`].
970         type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
971         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Logger`].
972         type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
973         /// Returns a reference to the actual [`ChannelManager`] object.
974         fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
975 }
976
977 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
978 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
979 where
980         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
981         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
982         ES::Target: EntropySource,
983         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
984         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
985         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
986         R::Target: Router,
987         L::Target: Logger,
988 {
989         type Watch = M::Target;
990         type M = M;
991         type Broadcaster = T::Target;
992         type T = T;
993         type EntropySource = ES::Target;
994         type ES = ES;
995         type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
996         type NS = NS;
997         type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner;
998         type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
999         type SP = SP;
1000         type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
1001         type F = F;
1002         type Router = R::Target;
1003         type R = R;
1004         type Logger = L::Target;
1005         type L = L;
1006         fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
1007 }
1008
1009 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
1010 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
1011 ///
1012 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
1013 /// to individual Channels.
1014 ///
1015 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
1016 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
1017 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
1018 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
1019 ///
1020 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
1021 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST durably write each
1022 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] before returning from
1023 /// [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`] or before completing async writes. With
1024 /// `ChannelManager`s, writing updates happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other
1025 /// `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during the serialization process). If the
1026 /// deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to
1027 /// [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds
1028 /// will be lost (modulo on-chain transaction fees).
1029 ///
1030 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
1031 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
1032 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
1033 ///
1034 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
1035 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
1036 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
1037 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
1038 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
1039 ///
1040 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
1041 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
1042 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
1043 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
1044 ///
1045 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
1046 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
1047 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
1048 ///
1049 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
1050 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
1051 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
1052 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
1053 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
1054 ///
1055 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
1056 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
1057 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
1058 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
1059 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
1060 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
1061 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
1062 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
1063 //
1064 // Lock order:
1065 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
1066 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
1067 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
1068 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
1069 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
1070 //
1071 // Lock order tree:
1072 //
1073 // `pending_offers_messages`
1074 //
1075 // `total_consistency_lock`
1076 //  |
1077 //  |__`forward_htlcs`
1078 //  |   |
1079 //  |   |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
1080 //  |
1081 //  |__`per_peer_state`
1082 //      |
1083 //      |__`pending_inbound_payments`
1084 //          |
1085 //          |__`claimable_payments`
1086 //          |
1087 //          |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
1088 //              |
1089 //              |__`peer_state`
1090 //                  |
1091 //                  |__`id_to_peer`
1092 //                  |
1093 //                  |__`short_to_chan_info`
1094 //                  |
1095 //                  |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
1096 //                  |
1097 //                  |__`best_block`
1098 //                  |
1099 //                  |__`pending_events`
1100 //                      |
1101 //                      |__`pending_background_events`
1102 //
1103 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
1104 where
1105         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1106         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1107         ES::Target: EntropySource,
1108         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1109         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1110         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1111         R::Target: Router,
1112         L::Target: Logger,
1113 {
1114         default_configuration: UserConfig,
1115         chain_hash: ChainHash,
1116         fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1117         chain_monitor: M,
1118         tx_broadcaster: T,
1119         #[allow(unused)]
1120         router: R,
1121
1122         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1123         #[cfg(test)]
1124         pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1125         #[cfg(not(test))]
1126         best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1127         secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1128
1129         /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
1130         /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
1131         /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
1132         /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
1133         ///
1134         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1135         pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
1136
1137         /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
1138         /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
1139         /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
1140         /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
1141         /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
1142         /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
1143         /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
1144         /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
1145         ///
1146         /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
1147         ///
1148         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1149         pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
1150
1151         /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
1152         ///
1153         /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1154         /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1155         /// and via the classic SCID.
1156         ///
1157         /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1158         /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
1159         ///
1160         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1161         #[cfg(test)]
1162         pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1163         #[cfg(not(test))]
1164         forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1165         /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
1166         /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
1167         ///
1168         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1169         pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
1170
1171         /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
1172         /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1173         ///
1174         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1175         claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1176
1177         /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1178         /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1179         /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1180         /// active channel list on load.
1181         ///
1182         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1183         outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1184
1185         /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1186         ///
1187         /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
1188         /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
1189         /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
1190         ///
1191         /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1192         /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1193         /// the handling of the events.
1194         ///
1195         /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1196         /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1197         ///
1198         /// TODO:
1199         /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1200         /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1201         /// would break backwards compatability.
1202         /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1203         /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1204         /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1205         ///
1206         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1207         id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<ChannelId, PublicKey>>,
1208
1209         /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1210         ///
1211         /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1212         /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1213         /// confirmation depth.
1214         ///
1215         /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1216         /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1217         /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1218         ///
1219         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1220         #[cfg(test)]
1221         pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1222         #[cfg(not(test))]
1223         short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1224
1225         our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
1226
1227         inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
1228
1229         /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
1230         /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
1231         /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
1232         ///
1233         /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
1234         fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1235
1236         /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
1237         /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
1238         /// keeping additional state.
1239         probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
1240
1241         /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1242         /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1243         /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1244         highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1245
1246         /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
1247         /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
1248         ///
1249         /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1250         /// are currently open with that peer.
1251         ///
1252         /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1253         /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
1254         /// channels.
1255         ///
1256         /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
1257         ///
1258         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1259         #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1260         per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1261         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1262         pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1263
1264         /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
1265         /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
1266         /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
1267         /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
1268         /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
1269         ///
1270         /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
1271         /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
1272         ///
1273         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1274         #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1275         pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1276         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1277         pub(crate) pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1278
1279         /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
1280         pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
1281
1282         /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
1283         /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
1284         /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
1285         /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
1286         /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
1287         ///
1288         /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
1289         ///
1290         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1291         ///
1292         /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1293         pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1294         /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1295         /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1296         /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1297         /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1298         /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1299         /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1300         total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1301         /// Tracks the progress of channels going through batch funding by whether funding_signed was
1302         /// received and the monitor has been persisted.
1303         ///
1304         /// This information does not need to be persisted as funding nodes can forget
1305         /// unfunded channels upon disconnection.
1306         funding_batch_states: Mutex<BTreeMap<Txid, Vec<(ChannelId, PublicKey, bool)>>>,
1307
1308         background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
1309
1310         event_persist_notifier: Notifier,
1311         needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool,
1312
1313         pending_offers_messages: Mutex<Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>>>,
1314
1315         entropy_source: ES,
1316         node_signer: NS,
1317         signer_provider: SP,
1318
1319         logger: L,
1320 }
1321
1322 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1323 ///
1324 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1325 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1326 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1327 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1328 pub struct ChainParameters {
1329         /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1330         pub network: Network,
1331
1332         /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1333         ///
1334         /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1335         pub best_block: BestBlock,
1336 }
1337
1338 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1339 #[must_use]
1340 enum NotifyOption {
1341         DoPersist,
1342         SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1343         SkipPersistNoEvents,
1344 }
1345
1346 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1347 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1348 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1349 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1350 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1351 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1352 ///
1353 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1354 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1355 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1356 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1357         event_persist_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1358         needs_persist_flag: &'a AtomicBool,
1359         should_persist: F,
1360         // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1361         _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1362 }
1363
1364 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1365         /// Notifies any waiters and indicates that we need to persist, in addition to possibly having
1366         /// events to handle.
1367         ///
1368         /// This must always be called if the changes included a `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, as well as in
1369         /// other cases where losing the changes on restart may result in a force-close or otherwise
1370         /// isn't ideal.
1371         fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1372                 Self::optionally_notify(cm, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
1373         }
1374
1375         fn optionally_notify<F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C, mut persist_check: F)
1376         -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1377                 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1378                 let force_notify = cm.get_cm().process_background_events();
1379
1380                 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1381                         event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1382                         needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1383                         should_persist: move || {
1384                                 // Pick the "most" action between `persist_check` and the background events
1385                                 // processing and return that.
1386                                 let notify = persist_check();
1387                                 match (notify, force_notify) {
1388                                         (NotifyOption::DoPersist, _) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1389                                         (_, NotifyOption::DoPersist) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1390                                         (NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents, _) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1391                                         (_, NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1392                                         _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
1393                                 }
1394                         },
1395                         _read_guard: read_guard,
1396                 }
1397         }
1398
1399         /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
1400         /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first (or
1401         /// [`Self::optionally_notify`] used).
1402         fn optionally_notify_skipping_background_events<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>
1403         (cm: &'a C, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1404                 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1405
1406                 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1407                         event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1408                         needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1409                         should_persist: persist_check,
1410                         _read_guard: read_guard,
1411                 }
1412         }
1413 }
1414
1415 impl<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1416         fn drop(&mut self) {
1417                 match (self.should_persist)() {
1418                         NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
1419                                 self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
1420                                 self.event_persist_notifier.notify()
1421                         },
1422                         NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
1423                                 self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
1424                         NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
1425                 }
1426         }
1427 }
1428
1429 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1430 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1431 ///
1432 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1433 ///
1434 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1435 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1436 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1437 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1438 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1439
1440 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1441 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1442 ///
1443 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1444 ///
1445 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1446 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1447 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1448 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1449 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1450 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1451 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1452 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1453 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1454 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1455 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1456 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1457 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1458
1459 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1460 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1461 /// this value.
1462 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1463 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1464 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1465 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1466
1467 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1468 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1469 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1470 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1471 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1472 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1473 #[deny(const_err)]
1474 #[allow(dead_code)]
1475 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1476
1477 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1478 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1479 #[deny(const_err)]
1480 #[allow(dead_code)]
1481 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1482
1483 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1484 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1485
1486 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1487 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1488 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1489
1490 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1491 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1492 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1493
1494 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1495 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1496 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1497 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1498
1499 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1500 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1501 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1502
1503 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1504 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1505 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1506
1507 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1508 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1509 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1510         /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1511         pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1512         /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1513         pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1514         /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1515         /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1516         /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1517         pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1518 }
1519
1520 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1521 /// to better separate parameters.
1522 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1523 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1524         /// The node_id of our counterparty
1525         pub node_id: PublicKey,
1526         /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1527         /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1528         /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1529         pub features: InitFeatures,
1530         /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1531         /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1532         /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1533         ///
1534         /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1535         ///
1536         /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1537         pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1538         /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1539         /// payments to us through this channel.
1540         pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1541         /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1542         /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1543         /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1544         pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1545         /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1546         pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1547 }
1548
1549 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1550 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1551 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1552         /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1553         /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1554         /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1555         /// lifetime of the channel.
1556         pub channel_id: ChannelId,
1557         /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1558         pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1559         /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1560         /// our counterparty already.
1561         ///
1562         /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1563         /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1564         pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1565         /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1566         ///
1567         /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1568         pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1569         /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1570         /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1571         ///
1572         /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1573         /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1574         ///
1575         /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1576         /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1577         ///
1578         /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1579         /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1580         /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1581         /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1582         /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1583         pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1584         /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1585         /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1586         /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1587         /// `Some(0)`).
1588         ///
1589         /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1590         ///
1591         /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1592         /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1593         pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1594         /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1595         /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1596         /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1597         /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1598         ///
1599         /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1600         /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1601         ///
1602         /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1603         pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1604         /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1605         pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1606         /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1607         /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1608         /// this value on chain.
1609         ///
1610         /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1611         ///
1612         /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1613         ///
1614         /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1615         pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1616         /// The `user_channel_id` value passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound
1617         /// channels, or to [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
1618         /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] config flag is set to true. Otherwise
1619         /// `user_channel_id` will be randomized for an inbound channel.  This may be zero for objects
1620         /// serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1621         ///
1622         /// [`ChannelManager::create_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_channel
1623         /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
1624         /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels
1625         pub user_channel_id: u128,
1626         /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1627         /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1628         ///
1629         /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1630         pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1631         /// Our total balance.  This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1632         /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1633         /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1634         ///
1635         /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1636         /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1637         /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1638         /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1639         ///
1640         /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1641         pub balance_msat: u64,
1642         /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1643         /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1644         /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1645         /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1646         ///
1647         /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1648         ///
1649         /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1650         /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1651         /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1652         pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1653         /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1654         /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1655         /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1656         /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1657         ///
1658         /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`],
1659         /// [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`], and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1660         pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1661         /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
1662         /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
1663         /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
1664         /// route which is valid.
1665         pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1666         /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1667         /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1668         /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1669         /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1670         /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1671         ///
1672         /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1673         /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1674         /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1675         pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1676         /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1677         /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1678         /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1679         /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1680         /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1681         ///
1682         /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1683         ///
1684         /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1685         /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1686         /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1687         pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1688         /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1689         ///
1690         /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1691         pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1692         /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1693         /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1694         /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1695         /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1696         /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1697         ///
1698         /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1699         pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1700         /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1701         pub is_outbound: bool,
1702         /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1703         /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1704         /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1705         /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1706         /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1707         ///
1708         /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1709         pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1710         /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
1711         /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
1712         pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
1713         /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1714         /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1715         ///
1716         /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1717         pub is_usable: bool,
1718         /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1719         pub is_public: bool,
1720         /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1721         /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1722         pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1723         /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1724         pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1725         /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1726         ///
1727         /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1728         pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1729 }
1730
1731 impl ChannelDetails {
1732         /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1733         /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1734         /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1735         ///
1736         /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1737         /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1738         pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1739                 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1740         }
1741
1742         /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1743         /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1744         /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1745         ///
1746         /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1747         /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1748         pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1749                 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1750         }
1751
1752         fn from_channel_context<SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
1753                 context: &ChannelContext<SP>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
1754                 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
1755         ) -> Self
1756         where
1757                 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1758                 F::Target: FeeEstimator
1759         {
1760                 let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
1761                 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1762                         context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1763                 ChannelDetails {
1764                         channel_id: context.channel_id(),
1765                         counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1766                                 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1767                                 features: latest_features,
1768                                 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1769                                 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1770                                 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1771                                 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1772                                 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1773                                 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1774                                 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1775                                 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
1776                                         Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1777                                 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1778                         },
1779                         funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
1780                         // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1781                         // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1782                         channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1783                         short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
1784                         outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1785                         inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1786                         channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
1787                         feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1788                         unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1789                         balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1790                         inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1791                         outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1792                         next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1793                         next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1794                         user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
1795                         confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
1796                         confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1797                         force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1798                         is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
1799                         is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
1800                         is_usable: context.is_live(),
1801                         is_public: context.should_announce(),
1802                         inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1803                         inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1804                         config: Some(context.config()),
1805                         channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
1806                 }
1807         }
1808 }
1809
1810 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1811 /// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
1812 /// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
1813 /// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
1814 /// the channel will be removed shortly.
1815 /// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
1816 /// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
1817 pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
1818         /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
1819         NotShuttingDown,
1820         /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
1821         ShutdownInitiated,
1822         /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
1823         /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
1824         ResolvingHTLCs,
1825         /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
1826         NegotiatingClosingFee,
1827         /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
1828         /// to drop the channel.
1829         ShutdownComplete,
1830 }
1831
1832 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1833 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1834 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1835 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1836         /// When an invoice was requested and thus a payment has not yet been sent.
1837         AwaitingInvoice {
1838                 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1839                 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1840                 payment_id: PaymentId,
1841         },
1842         /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1843         Pending {
1844                 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1845                 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1846                 payment_id: PaymentId,
1847                 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1848                 /// abandoned.
1849                 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1850                 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1851                 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1852                 total_msat: u64,
1853         },
1854         /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1855         /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1856         /// payment is removed from tracking.
1857         Fulfilled {
1858                 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1859                 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1860                 payment_id: PaymentId,
1861                 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1862                 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1863                 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1864         },
1865         /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1866         /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1867         /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1868         Abandoned {
1869                 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1870                 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1871                 payment_id: PaymentId,
1872                 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1873                 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1874         },
1875 }
1876
1877 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1878 ///
1879 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
1880 #[derive(Clone)]
1881 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1882         /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1883         pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1884         /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1885         /// route hints.
1886         pub phantom_scid: u64,
1887         /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1888         pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1889 }
1890
1891 macro_rules! handle_error {
1892         ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1893                 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1894                 // entering the macro.
1895                 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1896                 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1897
1898                 match $internal {
1899                         Ok(msg) => Ok(msg),
1900                         Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish, channel_capacity }) => {
1901                                 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1902
1903                                 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1904                                         $self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1905                                         if let Some(update) = update_option {
1906                                                 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1907                                                         msg: update
1908                                                 });
1909                                         }
1910                                         if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1911                                                 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1912                                                         channel_id, user_channel_id,
1913                                                         reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() },
1914                                                         counterparty_node_id: Some($counterparty_node_id),
1915                                                         channel_capacity_sats: channel_capacity,
1916                                                 }, None));
1917                                         }
1918                                 }
1919
1920                                 let logger = WithContext::from(
1921                                         &$self.logger, Some($counterparty_node_id), chan_id.map(|(chan_id, _)| chan_id)
1922                                 );
1923                                 log_error!(logger, "{}", err.err);
1924                                 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1925                                 } else {
1926                                         msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1927                                                 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1928                                                 action: err.action.clone()
1929                                         });
1930                                 }
1931
1932                                 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1933                                         let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1934                                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1935                                                 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1936                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1937                                         }
1938                                 }
1939
1940                                 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1941                                 Err(err)
1942                         },
1943                 }
1944         } };
1945 }
1946
1947 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1948         ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
1949                 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.channel_id());
1950                 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1951                 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
1952                         short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1953                 } else {
1954                         // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1955                         // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1956                         // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1957                         // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1958                         // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1959                         // stage.
1960                         let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1961                         debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1962                 }
1963                 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1964         }}
1965 }
1966
1967 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1968 macro_rules! convert_chan_phase_err {
1969         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, $channel_update: expr) => {
1970                 match $err {
1971                         ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1972                                 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), *$channel_id))
1973                         },
1974                         ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1975                                 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), *$channel_id))
1976                         },
1977                         ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1978                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$channel.context);
1979                                 log_error!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", $channel_id, msg);
1980                                 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel.context);
1981                                 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
1982                                 let user_id = $channel.context.get_user_id();
1983                                 let channel_capacity_satoshis = $channel.context.get_value_satoshis();
1984
1985                                 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, user_id,
1986                                         shutdown_res, $channel_update, channel_capacity_satoshis))
1987                         },
1988                 }
1989         };
1990         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, FUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
1991                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, { $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast($channel).ok() })
1992         };
1993         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
1994                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, None)
1995         };
1996         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_phase: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1997                 match $channel_phase {
1998                         ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
1999                                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL)
2000                         },
2001                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel) => {
2002                                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2003                         },
2004                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel) => {
2005                                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2006                         },
2007                 }
2008         };
2009 }
2010
2011 macro_rules! break_chan_phase_entry {
2012         ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2013                 match $res {
2014                         Ok(res) => res,
2015                         Err(e) => {
2016                                 let key = *$entry.key();
2017                                 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2018                                 if drop {
2019                                         $entry.remove_entry();
2020                                 }
2021                                 break Err(res);
2022                         }
2023                 }
2024         }
2025 }
2026
2027 macro_rules! try_chan_phase_entry {
2028         ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2029                 match $res {
2030                         Ok(res) => res,
2031                         Err(e) => {
2032                                 let key = *$entry.key();
2033                                 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2034                                 if drop {
2035                                         $entry.remove_entry();
2036                                 }
2037                                 return Err(res);
2038                         }
2039                 }
2040         }
2041 }
2042
2043 macro_rules! remove_channel_phase {
2044         ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2045                 {
2046                         let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
2047                         update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context());
2048                         channel
2049                 }
2050         }
2051 }
2052
2053 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
2054         ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
2055                 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
2056                         node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2057                         msg: $channel_ready_msg,
2058                 });
2059                 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
2060                 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
2061                 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2062                 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2063                 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2064                         "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2065                 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
2066                         let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2067                         assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2068                                 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2069                 }
2070         }}
2071 }
2072
2073 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
2074         ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2075                 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
2076                         $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
2077                                 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2078                                 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
2079                                 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2080                                 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2081                                 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
2082                         }, None));
2083                         $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
2084                 }
2085         }
2086 }
2087
2088 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
2089         ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2090                 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
2091                         debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
2092                         $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
2093                                 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2094                                 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2095                                 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2096                                 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
2097                         }, None));
2098                         $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
2099                 }
2100         }
2101 }
2102
2103 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
2104         ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2105                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context);
2106                 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&&logger,
2107                         &$self.node_signer, $self.chain_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
2108                         $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
2109                 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
2110                 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
2111                         // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
2112                         // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
2113                         // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
2114                         // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
2115                         // now.
2116                         if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
2117                                 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2118                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2119                                         msg,
2120                                 })
2121                         } else { None }
2122                 } else { None };
2123
2124                 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
2125                         .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
2126
2127                 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
2128                         &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
2129                         updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
2130                         updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
2131                         updates.announcement_sigs);
2132                 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
2133                         $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
2134                 }
2135
2136                 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
2137                 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = $chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2138                 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
2139                 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
2140
2141                 // If the channel belongs to a batch funding transaction, the progress of the batch
2142                 // should be updated as we have received funding_signed and persisted the monitor.
2143                 if let Some(txid) = unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2144                         let mut funding_batch_states = $self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2145                         let mut batch_completed = false;
2146                         if let Some(batch_state) = funding_batch_states.get_mut(&txid) {
2147                                 let channel_state = batch_state.iter_mut().find(|(chan_id, pubkey, _)| (
2148                                         *chan_id == channel_id &&
2149                                         *pubkey == counterparty_node_id
2150                                 ));
2151                                 if let Some(channel_state) = channel_state {
2152                                         channel_state.2 = true;
2153                                 } else {
2154                                         debug_assert!(false, "Missing channel batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2155                                 }
2156                                 batch_completed = batch_state.iter().all(|(_, _, completed)| *completed);
2157                         } else {
2158                                 debug_assert!(false, "Missing batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2159                         }
2160
2161                         // When all channels in a batched funding transaction have become ready, it is not necessary
2162                         // to track the progress of the batch anymore and the state of the channels can be updated.
2163                         if batch_completed {
2164                                 let removed_batch_state = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2165                                 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2166                                 let mut batch_funding_tx = None;
2167                                 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, _) in removed_batch_state {
2168                                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2169                                                 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2170                                                 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2171                                                         batch_funding_tx = batch_funding_tx.or_else(|| chan.context.unbroadcasted_funding());
2172                                                         chan.set_batch_ready();
2173                                                         let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2174                                                         emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, chan);
2175                                                 }
2176                                         }
2177                                 }
2178                                 if let Some(tx) = batch_funding_tx {
2179                                         log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting batch funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
2180                                         $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
2181                                 }
2182                         }
2183                 }
2184
2185                 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
2186
2187                 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
2188                         $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
2189                 }
2190                 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
2191                 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2192                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2193                         $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
2194                 }
2195         } }
2196 }
2197
2198 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
2199         ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $completed: expr) => { {
2200                 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
2201                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context);
2202                 match $update_res {
2203                         ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::UnrecoverableError => {
2204                                 let err_str = "ChannelMonitor[Update] persistence failed unrecoverably. This indicates we cannot continue normal operation and must shut down.";
2205                                 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
2206                                 panic!("{}", err_str);
2207                         },
2208                         ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
2209                                 log_debug!(logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
2210                                         &$chan.context.channel_id());
2211                                 false
2212                         },
2213                         ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
2214                                 $completed;
2215                                 true
2216                         },
2217                 }
2218         } };
2219         ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
2220                 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $chan, _internal,
2221                         handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
2222         };
2223         ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2224                 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
2225                         .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
2226                 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
2227                 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
2228                 // filter for uniqueness here.
2229                 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
2230                         .unwrap_or_else(|| {
2231                                 in_flight_updates.push($update);
2232                                 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
2233                         });
2234                 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
2235                 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $chan, _internal,
2236                         {
2237                                 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
2238                                 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
2239                                         handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
2240                                 }
2241                         })
2242         } };
2243 }
2244
2245 macro_rules! process_events_body {
2246         ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
2247                 let mut processed_all_events = false;
2248                 while !processed_all_events {
2249                         if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
2250                                 return;
2251                         }
2252
2253                         let mut result;
2254
2255                         {
2256                                 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
2257                                 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
2258                                 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2259
2260                                 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
2261                                 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
2262                                 result = $self.process_background_events();
2263
2264                                 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
2265                                 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
2266                                 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
2267                                         result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2268                                 }
2269                         }
2270
2271                         let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
2272                         let num_events = pending_events.len();
2273                         if !pending_events.is_empty() {
2274                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2275                         }
2276
2277                         let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
2278
2279                         for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
2280                                 $event_to_handle = event;
2281                                 $handle_event;
2282                                 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
2283                                         post_event_actions.push(action);
2284                                 }
2285                         }
2286
2287                         {
2288                                 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2289                                 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
2290                                 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
2291                                 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
2292                                 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
2293                                 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
2294                         }
2295
2296                         if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
2297                                 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
2298                                 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
2299                                 processed_all_events = false;
2300                         }
2301
2302                         match result {
2303                                 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
2304                                         $self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
2305                                         $self.event_persist_notifier.notify();
2306                                 },
2307                                 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
2308                                         $self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
2309                                 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
2310                         }
2311                 }
2312         }
2313 }
2314
2315 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
2316 where
2317         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
2318         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2319         ES::Target: EntropySource,
2320         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2321         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2322         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2323         R::Target: Router,
2324         L::Target: Logger,
2325 {
2326         /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
2327         ///
2328         /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
2329         ///
2330         /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
2331         /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
2332         ///
2333         /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
2334         ///
2335         /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
2336         /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
2337         /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
2338         /// more details.
2339         ///
2340         /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
2341         /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
2342         /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
2343         pub fn new(
2344                 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
2345                 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
2346                 current_timestamp: u32,
2347         ) -> Self {
2348                 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2349                 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
2350                 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
2351                 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
2352                 ChannelManager {
2353                         default_configuration: config.clone(),
2354                         chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(params.network),
2355                         fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
2356                         chain_monitor,
2357                         tx_broadcaster,
2358                         router,
2359
2360                         best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
2361
2362                         outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
2363                         pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2364                         pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
2365                         forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2366                         claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
2367                         pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2368                         id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2369                         short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2370
2371                         our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
2372                         secp_ctx,
2373
2374                         inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
2375                         fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2376
2377                         probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2378
2379                         highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
2380
2381                         per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2382
2383                         pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2384                         pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
2385                         pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2386                         total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2387                         background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
2388                         event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
2389                         needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
2390                         funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
2391
2392                         pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2393
2394                         entropy_source,
2395                         node_signer,
2396                         signer_provider,
2397
2398                         logger,
2399                 }
2400         }
2401
2402         /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
2403         pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
2404                 &self.default_configuration
2405         }
2406
2407         fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2408                 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2409                 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
2410                 let mut i = 0;
2411                 loop {
2412                         if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
2413                                 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
2414                         } else {
2415                                 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
2416                         }
2417                         if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
2418                                 break;
2419                         }
2420                         i += 1;
2421                         if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
2422                 }
2423                 outbound_scid_alias
2424         }
2425
2426         /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2427         ///
2428         /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2429         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2430         /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2431         /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2432         /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2433         ///
2434         /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2435         /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2436         ///
2437         /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2438         /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2439         /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2440         ///
2441         /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2442         /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2443         /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2444         ///
2445         /// If `temporary_channel_id` is specified, it will be used as the temporary channel ID of the
2446         /// channel. Otherwise, a random one will be generated for you.
2447         ///
2448         /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2449         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2450         /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2451         /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2452         /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2453         /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2454         ///
2455         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2456         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2457         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2458         pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<ChannelId, APIError> {
2459                 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2460                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2461                 }
2462
2463                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2464                 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2465                 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2466
2467                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2468
2469                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2470                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2471
2472                 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2473
2474                 if let Some(temporary_channel_id) = temporary_channel_id {
2475                         if peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(&temporary_channel_id) {
2476                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Channel with temporary channel ID {} already exists!", temporary_channel_id)});
2477                         }
2478                 }
2479
2480                 let channel = {
2481                         let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2482                         let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2483                         let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2484                         match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2485                                 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2486                                 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias, temporary_channel_id)
2487                         {
2488                                 Ok(res) => res,
2489                                 Err(e) => {
2490                                         self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
2491                                         return Err(e);
2492                                 },
2493                         }
2494                 };
2495                 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash);
2496
2497                 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
2498                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
2499                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2500                                 if cfg!(fuzzing) {
2501                                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
2502                                 } else {
2503                                         panic!("RNG is bad???");
2504                                 }
2505                         },
2506                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel)); }
2507                 }
2508
2509                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
2510                         node_id: their_network_key,
2511                         msg: res,
2512                 });
2513                 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
2514         }
2515
2516         fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&ChannelId, &Channel<SP>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2517                 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2518                 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2519                 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2520                 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2521                 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2522                 // the same channel.
2523                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2524                 {
2525                         let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2526                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2527                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2528                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2529                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2530                                 res.extend(peer_state.channel_by_id.iter()
2531                                         .filter_map(|(chan_id, phase)| match phase {
2532                                                 // Only `Channels` in the `ChannelPhase::Funded` phase can be considered funded.
2533                                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => Some((chan_id, chan)),
2534                                                 _ => None,
2535                                         })
2536                                         .filter(f)
2537                                         .map(|(_channel_id, channel)| {
2538                                                 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2539                                                         peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2540                                         })
2541                                 );
2542                         }
2543                 }
2544                 res
2545         }
2546
2547         /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
2548         /// more information.
2549         pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2550                 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2551                 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2552                 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2553                 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2554                 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2555                 // the same channel.
2556                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2557                 {
2558                         let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2559                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2560                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2561                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2562                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2563                                 for context in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, phase)| phase.context()) {
2564                                         let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height,
2565                                                 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2566                                         res.push(details);
2567                                 }
2568                         }
2569                 }
2570                 res
2571         }
2572
2573         /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
2574         /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
2575         ///
2576         /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
2577         /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
2578         /// are.
2579         pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2580                 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2581                 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2582                 // really wanted anyway.
2583                 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
2584         }
2585
2586         /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2587         pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2588                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2589                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2590
2591                 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2592                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2593                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2594                         let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2595                         let context_to_details = |context| {
2596                                 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2597                         };
2598                         return peer_state.channel_by_id
2599                                 .iter()
2600                                 .map(|(_, phase)| phase.context())
2601                                 .map(context_to_details)
2602                                 .collect();
2603                 }
2604                 vec![]
2605         }
2606
2607         /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2608         /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2609         ///
2610         /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2611         /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2612         /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2613         ///
2614         /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2615         pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2616                 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2617                         .filter_map(|(payment_id, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2618                                 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {
2619                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2620                                 },
2621                                 // InvoiceReceived is an intermediate state and doesn't need to be exposed
2622                                 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {
2623                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2624                                 },
2625                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2626                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2627                                                 payment_id: *payment_id,
2628                                                 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2629                                                 total_msat: *total_msat,
2630                                         })
2631                                 },
2632                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2633                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2634                                 },
2635                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2636                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2637                                 },
2638                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2639                         })
2640                         .collect()
2641         }
2642
2643         /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
2644         fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, context: &ChannelContext<SP>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
2645                 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2646                 match context.unbroadcasted_funding() {
2647                         Some(transaction) => {
2648                                 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2649                                         channel_id: context.channel_id(), transaction
2650                                 }, None));
2651                         },
2652                         None => {},
2653                 }
2654                 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2655                         channel_id: context.channel_id(),
2656                         user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
2657                         reason: closure_reason,
2658                         counterparty_node_id: Some(context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
2659                         channel_capacity_sats: Some(context.get_value_satoshis()),
2660                 }, None));
2661         }
2662
2663         fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2664                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2665
2666                 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
2667                 let shutdown_result;
2668                 loop {
2669                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2670
2671                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2672                                 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2673
2674                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2675                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2676
2677                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2678                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
2679                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
2680                                                 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
2681                                                 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2682                                                 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs, local_shutdown_result) =
2683                                                         chan.get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2684                                                 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2685                                                 shutdown_result = local_shutdown_result;
2686                                                 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
2687
2688                                                 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2689                                                 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2690                                                 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2691                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2692                                                         node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2693                                                         msg: shutdown_msg,
2694                                                 });
2695
2696                                                 debug_assert!(monitor_update_opt.is_none() || !chan.is_shutdown(),
2697                                                         "We can't both complete shutdown and generate a monitor update");
2698
2699                                                 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2700                                                 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2701                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
2702                                                                 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
2703                                                         break;
2704                                                 }
2705
2706                                                 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2707                                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
2708                                                                 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2709                                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2710                                                                                 msg: channel_update
2711                                                                         });
2712                                                                 }
2713                                                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2714                                                         }
2715                                                 }
2716                                                 break;
2717                                         }
2718                                 },
2719                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2720                                         // If we reach this point, it means that the channel_id either refers to an unfunded channel or
2721                                         // it does not exist for this peer. Either way, we can attempt to force-close it.
2722                                         //
2723                                         // An appropriate error will be returned for non-existence of the channel if that's the case.
2724                                         mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
2725                                         mem::drop(per_peer_state);
2726                                         return self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, false).map(|_| ())
2727                                 },
2728                         }
2729                 }
2730
2731                 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2732                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2733                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2734                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2735                 }
2736
2737                 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
2738                         self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2739                 }
2740
2741                 Ok(())
2742         }
2743
2744         /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2745         /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2746         /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2747         ///
2748         ///  * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] and
2749         ///    [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
2750         ///    fee estimate.
2751         ///  * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2752         ///    transaction feerate of at least our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] feerate or the feerate which
2753         ///    would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2754         ///    counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2755         ///
2756         /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2757         ///
2758         /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2759         /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2760         /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2761         /// channel.
2762         ///
2763         /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2764         /// [`ChannelCloseMinimum`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum
2765         /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
2766         /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2767         pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2768                 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2769         }
2770
2771         /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2772         /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2773         /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2774         ///
2775         /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2776         /// the channel being closed or not:
2777         ///  * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2778         ///    transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2779         ///    [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
2780         ///    fee estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2781         ///  * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2782         ///    transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2783         ///    will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2784         ///
2785         /// The `shutdown_script` provided  will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2786         /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2787         /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2788         /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2789         ///
2790         /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2791         ///
2792         /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2793         /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2794         /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2795         /// channel.
2796         ///
2797         /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2798         /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
2799         /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2800         pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2801                 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2802         }
2803
2804         fn finish_close_channel(&self, mut shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2805                 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2806                 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2807                 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
2808                         debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2809                 }
2810
2811                 let logger = WithContext::from(
2812                         &self.logger, Some(shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id), Some(shutdown_res.channel_id),
2813                 );
2814                 log_debug!(logger, "Finishing closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.len());
2815                 for htlc_source in shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.drain(..) {
2816                         let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2817                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2818                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2819                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2820                 }
2821                 if let Some((_, funding_txo, monitor_update)) = shutdown_res.monitor_update {
2822                         // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2823                         // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2824                         // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2825                         // ignore the result here.
2826                         let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2827                 }
2828                 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
2829                 if let Some(txid) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2830                         let mut funding_batch_states = self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2831                         let affected_channels = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2832                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2833                         let mut has_uncompleted_channel = None;
2834                         for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, state) in affected_channels {
2835                                 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2836                                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2837                                         if let Some(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id) {
2838                                                 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
2839                                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context(), ClosureReason::FundingBatchClosure);
2840                                                 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
2841                                         }
2842                                 }
2843                                 has_uncompleted_channel = Some(has_uncompleted_channel.map_or(!state, |v| v || !state));
2844                         }
2845                         debug_assert!(
2846                                 has_uncompleted_channel.unwrap_or(true),
2847                                 "Closing a batch where all channels have completed initial monitor update",
2848                         );
2849                 }
2850                 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
2851                         self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2852                 }
2853         }
2854
2855         /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2856         /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2857         fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2858         -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2859                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2860                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2861                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2862                 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
2863                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2864                         let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2865                                 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
2866                         } else {
2867                                 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
2868                         };
2869                         let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*peer_node_id), Some(*channel_id));
2870                         if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2871                                 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", channel_id);
2872                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan_phase_entry.get().context(), closure_reason);
2873                                 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
2874                                 mem::drop(peer_state);
2875                                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
2876                                 match chan_phase {
2877                                         ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) => {
2878                                                 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2879                                                 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2880                                         },
2881                                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
2882                                                 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
2883                                                 // Unfunded channel has no update
2884                                                 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
2885                                         },
2886                                 }
2887                         } else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
2888                                 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
2889                                 // N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
2890                                 // don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
2891                                 // events anyway.
2892                                 (None, *peer_node_id)
2893                         } else {
2894                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, peer_node_id) });
2895                         }
2896                 };
2897                 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
2898                         // Try to send the `BroadcastChannelUpdate` to the peer we just force-closed on, but if
2899                         // not try to broadcast it via whatever peer we have.
2900                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2901                         let a_peer_state_opt = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2902                                 .ok_or(per_peer_state.values().next());
2903                         if let Ok(a_peer_state_mutex) = a_peer_state_opt {
2904                                 let mut a_peer_state = a_peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2905                                 a_peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2906                                         msg: update
2907                                 });
2908                         }
2909                 }
2910
2911                 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
2912         }
2913
2914         fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2915                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2916                 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2917                         Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2918                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2919                                 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2920                                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2921                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2922                                                 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2923                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2924                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
2925                                                                 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
2926                                                         },
2927                                                 }
2928                                         );
2929                                 }
2930                                 Ok(())
2931                         },
2932                         Err(e) => Err(e)
2933                 }
2934         }
2935
2936         /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2937         /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2938         /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2939         /// channel.
2940         pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2941         -> Result<(), APIError> {
2942                 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2943         }
2944
2945         /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2946         /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2947         /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2948         ///
2949         /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2950         /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2951         pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2952         -> Result<(), APIError> {
2953                 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2954         }
2955
2956         /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2957         /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2958         pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2959                 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2960                         let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2961                 }
2962         }
2963
2964         /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2965         /// local transaction(s).
2966         pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2967                 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2968                         let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2969                 }
2970         }
2971
2972         fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
2973                 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey,
2974         ) -> Result<
2975                 (onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg
2976         > {
2977                 let (next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_details_opt) = decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion(
2978                         msg, &self.node_signer, &self.logger, &self.secp_ctx
2979                 )?;
2980
2981                 let is_blinded = match next_hop {
2982                         onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
2983                                 next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedForward { .. }, ..
2984                         } => true,
2985                         _ => false, // TODO: update this when we support receiving to multi-hop blinded paths
2986                 };
2987
2988                 macro_rules! return_err {
2989                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2990                                 {
2991                                         log_info!(
2992                                                 WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id)),
2993                                                 "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg
2994                                         );
2995                                         let (err_code, err_data) = if is_blinded {
2996                                                 (INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, &[0; 32][..])
2997                                         } else { ($err_code, $data) };
2998                                         return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2999                                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3000                                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3001                                                 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason(err_code, err_data.to_vec())
3002                                                         .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3003                                         }));
3004                                 }
3005                         }
3006                 }
3007
3008                 let NextPacketDetails {
3009                         next_packet_pubkey, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_scid, outgoing_cltv_value
3010                 } = match next_packet_details_opt {
3011                         Some(next_packet_details) => next_packet_details,
3012                         // it is a receive, so no need for outbound checks
3013                         None => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
3014                 };
3015
3016                 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
3017                 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
3018                 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
3019                         let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid).cloned();
3020                         let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
3021                                 None => { // unknown_next_peer
3022                                         // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
3023                                         // phantom or an intercept.
3024                                         if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
3025                                                 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)) ||
3026                                                 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)
3027                                         {
3028                                                 None
3029                                         } else {
3030                                                 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3031                                         }
3032                                 },
3033                                 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
3034                         };
3035                         let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
3036                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3037                                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3038                                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3039                                         break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3040                                 }
3041                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3042                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3043                                 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).map(
3044                                         |chan_phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
3045                                 ).flatten() {
3046                                         None => {
3047                                                 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
3048                                                 // have no consistency guarantees.
3049                                                 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3050                                         },
3051                                         Some(chan) => chan
3052                                 };
3053                                 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
3054                                         // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
3055                                         // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
3056                                         // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
3057                                         break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3058                                 }
3059                                 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
3060                                         // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
3061                                         // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
3062                                         // we don't have the channel here.
3063                                         break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3064                                 }
3065                                 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3066
3067                                 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
3068                                 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
3069                                 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
3070                                 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
3071                                 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
3072                                 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
3073                                         // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
3074                                         // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
3075                                         // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
3076                                         if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
3077                                                 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
3078                                         } else {
3079                                                 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
3080                                         }
3081                                 }
3082                                 if outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
3083                                         break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
3084                                 }
3085                                 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value) {
3086                                         break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
3087                                 }
3088                                 chan_update_opt
3089                         } else {
3090                                 None
3091                         };
3092
3093                         let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3094
3095                         if let Err((err_msg, code)) = check_incoming_htlc_cltv(
3096                                 cur_height, outgoing_cltv_value, msg.cltv_expiry
3097                         ) {
3098                                 if code & 0x1000 != 0 && chan_update_opt.is_none() {
3099                                         // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
3100                                         // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
3101                                         // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
3102                                         break Some((err_msg, 0x2000 | 2, None))
3103                                 }
3104                                 let chan_update_opt = if code & 0x1000 != 0 { chan_update_opt } else { None };
3105                                 break Some((err_msg, code, chan_update_opt));
3106                         }
3107
3108                         break None;
3109                 }
3110                 {
3111                         let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
3112                         if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
3113                                 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
3114                                         msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3115                                 }
3116                                 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
3117                                         msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3118                                 }
3119                                 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3120                                         // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3121                                         0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3122                                 }
3123                                 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3124                                 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3125                                 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3126                         } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3127                                 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
3128                                 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
3129                                 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
3130                                 // instead.
3131                                 code = 0x2000 | 2;
3132                         }
3133                         return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
3134                 }
3135                 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, Some(next_packet_pubkey)))
3136         }
3137
3138         fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
3139                 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
3140                 decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop, allow_underpay: bool,
3141                 next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>,
3142         ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
3143                 macro_rules! return_err {
3144                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3145                                 {
3146                                         let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id));
3147                                         log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3148                                         return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3149                                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3150                                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3151                                                 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3152                                                         .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3153                                         }));
3154                                 }
3155                         }
3156                 }
3157                 match decoded_hop {
3158                         onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
3159                                 // OUR PAYMENT!
3160                                 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3161                                 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
3162                                         msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat,
3163                                         current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
3164                                 {
3165                                         Ok(info) => {
3166                                                 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
3167                                                 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
3168                                                 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
3169                                                 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
3170                                                 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
3171                                         },
3172                                         Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3173                                 }
3174                         },
3175                         onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
3176                                 match create_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
3177                                         new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
3178                                         Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
3179                                         Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3180                                 }
3181                         }
3182                 }
3183         }
3184
3185         /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
3186         /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
3187         /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
3188         ///
3189         /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
3190         /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
3191         /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3192         ///
3193         /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3194         /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3195         fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3196                 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
3197                         return Err(LightningError {
3198                                 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
3199                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
3200                         });
3201                 }
3202                 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
3203                         return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
3204                 }
3205                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3206                 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3207                 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
3208         }
3209
3210         /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
3211         /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
3212         /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
3213         /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
3214         ///
3215         /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
3216         /// `peer_state`  corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
3217         /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3218         ///
3219         /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3220         /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3221         fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3222                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3223                 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id().0));
3224                 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
3225                         None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
3226                         Some(id) => id,
3227                 };
3228
3229                 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
3230         }
3231
3232         fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3233                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3234                 log_trace!(logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id().0));
3235                 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3236
3237                 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
3238                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
3239                         ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
3240                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
3241                         ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
3242                 };
3243
3244                 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
3245                         chain_hash: self.chain_hash,
3246                         short_channel_id,
3247                         timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
3248                         flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
3249                         cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
3250                         htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
3251                         htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
3252                         fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
3253                         fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
3254                         excess_data: Vec::new(),
3255                 };
3256                 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
3257                 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
3258                 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
3259                 // channel.
3260                 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
3261
3262                 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
3263                         signature: sig,
3264                         contents: unsigned
3265                 })
3266         }
3267
3268         #[cfg(test)]
3269         pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3270                 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3271                 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
3272                         path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3273                         session_priv_bytes
3274                 })
3275         }
3276
3277         fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3278                 let SendAlongPathArgs {
3279                         path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3280                         session_priv_bytes
3281                 } = args;
3282                 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
3283                 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3284                 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
3285                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
3286
3287                 let (onion_packet, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::create_payment_onion(
3288                         &self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height,
3289                         payment_hash, keysend_preimage, prng_seed
3290                 ).map_err(|e| {
3291                         let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None);
3292                         log_error!(logger, "Failed to build an onion for path for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
3293                         e
3294                 })?;
3295
3296                 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3297                         let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
3298                                 None => {
3299                                         let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None);
3300                                         log_error!(logger, "Failed to find first-hop for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
3301                                         return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()})
3302                                 },
3303                                 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3304                         };
3305
3306                         let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(id));
3307                         log_trace!(logger,
3308                                 "Attempting to send payment with payment hash {} along path with next hop {}",
3309                                 payment_hash, path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
3310
3311                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3312                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3313                                 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
3314                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3315                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3316                         if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
3317                                 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
3318                                         ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
3319                                                 if !chan.context.is_live() {
3320                                                         return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3321                                                 }
3322                                                 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3323                                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3324                                                 let send_res = chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
3325                                                         htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3326                                                                 path: path.clone(),
3327                                                                 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
3328                                                                 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
3329                                                                 payment_id,
3330                                                         }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
3331                                                 match break_chan_phase_entry!(self, send_res, chan_phase_entry) {
3332                                                         Some(monitor_update) => {
3333                                                                 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
3334                                                                         false => {
3335                                                                                 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
3336                                                                                 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
3337                                                                                 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
3338                                                                                 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
3339                                                                                 // which we do in the send_payment check for
3340                                                                                 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
3341                                                                                 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
3342                                                                         },
3343                                                                         true => {},
3344                                                                 }
3345                                                         },
3346                                                         None => {},
3347                                                 }
3348                                         },
3349                                         _ => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel to first hop is unfunded".to_owned()}),
3350                                 };
3351                         } else {
3352                                 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
3353                                 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
3354                                 // `channel_by_id` map.
3355                                 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
3356                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
3357                         }
3358                         return Ok(());
3359                 };
3360                 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
3361                         Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3362                         Err(e) => {
3363                                 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
3364                         },
3365                 }
3366         }
3367
3368         /// Sends a payment along a given route.
3369         ///
3370         /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
3371         /// fields for more info.
3372         ///
3373         /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
3374         /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
3375         ///
3376         /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
3377         ///
3378         /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
3379         /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
3380         /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
3381         /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
3382         /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
3383         ///
3384         /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
3385         /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
3386         /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
3387         /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
3388         /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
3389         ///
3390         /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
3391         /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
3392         /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
3393         /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
3394         ///
3395         /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
3396         ///
3397         /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
3398         /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
3399         /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
3400         ///
3401         /// In general, a path may raise:
3402         ///  * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
3403         ///    node public key) is specified.
3404         ///  * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available as it has been
3405         ///    closed, doesn't exist, or the peer is currently disconnected.
3406         ///  * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
3407         ///    relevant updates.
3408         ///
3409         /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
3410         /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
3411         /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
3412         ///
3413         /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
3414         /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3415         /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3416         /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
3417         /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
3418         /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3419         pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3420                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3421                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3422                 self.pending_outbound_payments
3423                         .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
3424                                 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3425                                 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3426         }
3427
3428         /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
3429         /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3430         pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
3431                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3432                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3433                 self.pending_outbound_payments
3434                         .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
3435                                 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
3436                                 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3437                                 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3438         }
3439
3440         #[cfg(test)]
3441         pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3442                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3443                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3444                 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
3445                         keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
3446                         best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3447         }
3448
3449         #[cfg(test)]
3450         pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
3451                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3452                 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3453         }
3454
3455         #[cfg(test)]
3456         pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3457                 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3458         }
3459
3460         pub(super) fn send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&self, invoice: &Bolt12Invoice, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), Bolt12PaymentError> {
3461                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3462                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3463                 self.pending_outbound_payments
3464                         .send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(
3465                                 invoice, payment_id, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3466                                 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer,
3467                                 best_block_height, &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
3468                                 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args)
3469                         )
3470         }
3471
3472         /// Signals that no further attempts for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
3473         /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
3474         /// retries are exhausted.
3475         ///
3476         /// # Event Generation
3477         ///
3478         /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
3479         /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
3480         ///
3481         /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
3482         /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
3483         /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
3484         ///
3485         /// # Requested Invoices
3486         ///
3487         /// In the case of paying a [`Bolt12Invoice`] via [`ChannelManager::pay_for_offer`], abandoning
3488         /// the payment prior to receiving the invoice will result in an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`]
3489         /// and prevent any attempts at paying it once received. The other events may only be generated
3490         /// once the invoice has been received.
3491         ///
3492         /// # Restart Behavior
3493         ///
3494         /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated and we restart without first persisting the
3495         /// [`ChannelManager`], another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated; likewise for
3496         /// [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
3497         ///
3498         /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
3499         pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
3500                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3501                 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
3502         }
3503
3504         /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
3505         /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
3506         /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
3507         /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
3508         /// never reach the recipient.
3509         ///
3510         /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
3511         /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
3512         ///
3513         /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
3514         /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
3515         ///
3516         /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
3517         pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
3518                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3519                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3520                 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
3521                         route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
3522                         &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3523         }
3524
3525         /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
3526         /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3527         ///
3528         /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
3529         /// payments.
3530         ///
3531         /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
3532         pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
3533                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3534                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3535                 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
3536                         payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3537                         || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),  &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3538                         &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3539         }
3540
3541         /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
3542         /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
3543         /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
3544         pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
3545                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3546                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3547                 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
3548                         &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3549                         |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3550         }
3551
3552         /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
3553         /// payment probe.
3554         #[cfg(test)]
3555         pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
3556                 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
3557         }
3558
3559         /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay the given
3560         /// amount to the given `node_id`.
3561         ///
3562         /// See [`ChannelManager::send_preflight_probes`] for more information.
3563         pub fn send_spontaneous_preflight_probes(
3564                 &self, node_id: PublicKey, amount_msat: u64, final_cltv_expiry_delta: u32,
3565                 liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3566         ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3567                 let payment_params =
3568                         PaymentParameters::from_node_id(node_id, final_cltv_expiry_delta);
3569
3570                 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, amount_msat);
3571
3572                 self.send_preflight_probes(route_params, liquidity_limit_multiplier)
3573         }
3574
3575         /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay a route found
3576         /// according to the given [`RouteParameters`].
3577         ///
3578         /// This may be used to send "pre-flight" probes, i.e., to train our scorer before conducting
3579         /// the actual payment. Note this is only useful if there likely is sufficient time for the
3580         /// probe to settle before sending out the actual payment, e.g., when waiting for user
3581         /// confirmation in a wallet UI.
3582         ///
3583         /// Otherwise, there is a chance the probe could take up some liquidity needed to complete the
3584         /// actual payment. Users should therefore be cautious and might avoid sending probes if
3585         /// liquidity is scarce and/or they don't expect the probe to return before they send the
3586         /// payment. To mitigate this issue, channels with available liquidity less than the required
3587         /// amount times the given `liquidity_limit_multiplier` won't be used to send pre-flight
3588         /// probes. If `None` is given as `liquidity_limit_multiplier`, it defaults to `3`.
3589         pub fn send_preflight_probes(
3590                 &self, route_params: RouteParameters, liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3591         ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3592                 let liquidity_limit_multiplier = liquidity_limit_multiplier.unwrap_or(3);
3593
3594                 let payer = self.get_our_node_id();
3595                 let usable_channels = self.list_usable_channels();
3596                 let first_hops = usable_channels.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>();
3597                 let inflight_htlcs = self.compute_inflight_htlcs();
3598
3599                 let route = self
3600                         .router
3601                         .find_route(&payer, &route_params, Some(&first_hops), inflight_htlcs)
3602                         .map_err(|e| {
3603                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to find path for payment probe: {:?}", e);
3604                                 ProbeSendFailure::RouteNotFound
3605                         })?;
3606
3607                 let mut used_liquidity_map = HashMap::with_capacity(first_hops.len());
3608
3609                 let mut res = Vec::new();
3610
3611                 for mut path in route.paths {
3612                         // If the last hop is probably an unannounced channel we refrain from probing all the
3613                         // way through to the end and instead probe up to the second-to-last channel.
3614                         while let Some(last_path_hop) = path.hops.last() {
3615                                 if last_path_hop.maybe_announced_channel {
3616                                         // We found a potentially announced last hop.
3617                                         break;
3618                                 } else {
3619                                         // Drop the last hop, as it's likely unannounced.
3620                                         log_debug!(
3621                                                 self.logger,
3622                                                 "Avoided sending payment probe all the way to last hop {} as it is likely unannounced.",
3623                                                 last_path_hop.short_channel_id
3624                                         );
3625                                         let final_value_msat = path.final_value_msat();
3626                                         path.hops.pop();
3627                                         if let Some(new_last) = path.hops.last_mut() {
3628                                                 new_last.fee_msat += final_value_msat;
3629                                         }
3630                                 }
3631                         }
3632
3633                         if path.hops.len() < 2 {
3634                                 log_debug!(
3635                                         self.logger,
3636                                         "Skipped sending payment probe over path with less than two hops."
3637                                 );
3638                                 continue;
3639                         }
3640
3641                         if let Some(first_path_hop) = path.hops.first() {
3642                                 if let Some(first_hop) = first_hops.iter().find(|h| {
3643                                         h.get_outbound_payment_scid() == Some(first_path_hop.short_channel_id)
3644                                 }) {
3645                                         let path_value = path.final_value_msat() + path.fee_msat();
3646                                         let used_liquidity =
3647                                                 used_liquidity_map.entry(first_path_hop.short_channel_id).or_insert(0);
3648
3649                                         if first_hop.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat
3650                                                 < (*used_liquidity + path_value) * liquidity_limit_multiplier
3651                                         {
3652                                                 log_debug!(self.logger, "Skipped sending payment probe to avoid putting channel {} under the liquidity limit.", first_path_hop.short_channel_id);
3653                                                 continue;
3654                                         } else {
3655                                                 *used_liquidity += path_value;
3656                                         }
3657                                 }
3658                         }
3659
3660                         res.push(self.send_probe(path).map_err(|e| {
3661                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to send pre-flight probe: {:?}", e);
3662                                 ProbeSendFailure::SendingFailed(e)
3663                         })?);
3664                 }
3665
3666                 Ok(res)
3667         }
3668
3669         /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
3670         /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
3671         fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: FnMut(&OutboundV1Channel<SP>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
3672                 &self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, is_batch_funding: bool,
3673                 mut find_funding_output: FundingOutput,
3674         ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3675                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3676                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3677                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3678
3679                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3680                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3681                 let (chan, msg_opt) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
3682                         Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) => {
3683                                 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
3684
3685                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3686                                 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, is_batch_funding, &&logger)
3687                                         .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
3688                                                 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
3689                                                 let user_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
3690                                                 let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
3691                                                 let channel_capacity = chan.context.get_value_satoshis();
3692                                                 (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, channel_capacity))
3693                                         } else { unreachable!(); });
3694                                 match funding_res {
3695                                         Ok((chan, funding_msg)) => (chan, funding_msg),
3696                                         Err((chan, err)) => {
3697                                                 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3698                                                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3699                                                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
3700                                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3701                                                         err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3702                                                 });
3703                                         },
3704                                 }
3705                         },
3706                         Some(phase) => {
3707                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(*temporary_channel_id, phase);
3708                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3709                                         err: format!(
3710                                                 "Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is not an unfunded, outbound V1 channel",
3711                                                 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3712                                 })
3713                         },
3714                         None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {err: format!(
3715                                 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3716                                 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3717                                 }),
3718                 };
3719
3720                 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
3721                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3722                                 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3723                                 msg,
3724                         });
3725                 }
3726                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
3727                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3728                                 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3729                         },
3730                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3731                                 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3732                                 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.context.channel_id(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
3733                                         panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
3734                                 }
3735                                 e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan));
3736                         }
3737                 }
3738                 Ok(())
3739         }
3740
3741         #[cfg(test)]
3742         pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3743                 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, false, |_, tx| {
3744                         Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3745                 })
3746         }
3747
3748         /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3749         ///
3750         /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3751         /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3752         ///
3753         /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3754         /// across the p2p network.
3755         ///
3756         /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3757         /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3758         ///
3759         /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3760         /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3761         /// keys per-channel).
3762         ///
3763         /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3764         /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3765         /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3766         ///
3767         /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3768         /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3769         /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3770         ///
3771         /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3772         /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3773         /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3774         /// for more details.
3775         ///
3776         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3777         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3778         pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3779                 self.batch_funding_transaction_generated(&[(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id)], funding_transaction)
3780         }
3781
3782         /// Call this upon creation of a batch funding transaction for the given channels.
3783         ///
3784         /// Return values are identical to [`Self::funding_transaction_generated`], respective to
3785         /// each individual channel and transaction output.
3786         ///
3787         /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. This batch funding transaction
3788         /// will only be broadcast when we have safely received and persisted the counterparty's
3789         /// signature for each channel.
3790         ///
3791         /// If there is an error, all channels in the batch are to be considered closed.
3792         pub fn batch_funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channels: &[(&ChannelId, &PublicKey)], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3793                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3794                 let mut result = Ok(());
3795
3796                 if !funding_transaction.is_coin_base() {
3797                         for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3798                                 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3799                                         result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3800                                                 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3801                                         }));
3802                                 }
3803                         }
3804                 }
3805                 if funding_transaction.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
3806                         result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3807                                 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3808                         }));
3809                 }
3810                 {
3811                         let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3812                         // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3813                         // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3814                         // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3815                         // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3816                         if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) &&
3817                                 funding_transaction.lock_time.is_block_height() &&
3818                                 funding_transaction.lock_time.to_consensus_u32() > height + 1
3819                         {
3820                                 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3821                                         err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3822                                 }));
3823                         }
3824                 }
3825
3826                 let txid = funding_transaction.txid();
3827                 let is_batch_funding = temporary_channels.len() > 1;
3828                 let mut funding_batch_states = if is_batch_funding {
3829                         Some(self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap())
3830                 } else {
3831                         None
3832                 };
3833                 let mut funding_batch_state = funding_batch_states.as_mut().and_then(|states| {
3834                         match states.entry(txid) {
3835                                 btree_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3836                                         result = result.clone().and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3837                                                 err: "Batch funding transaction with the same txid already exists".to_owned()
3838                                         }));
3839                                         None
3840                                 },
3841                                 btree_map::Entry::Vacant(vacant) => Some(vacant.insert(Vec::new())),
3842                         }
3843                 });
3844                 for &(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in temporary_channels {
3845                         result = result.and_then(|_| self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(
3846                                 temporary_channel_id,
3847                                 counterparty_node_id,
3848                                 funding_transaction.clone(),
3849                                 is_batch_funding,
3850                                 |chan, tx| {
3851                                         let mut output_index = None;
3852                                         let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3853                                         for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3854                                                 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
3855                                                         if output_index.is_some() {
3856                                                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3857                                                                         err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3858                                                                 });
3859                                                         }
3860                                                         output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3861                                                 }
3862                                         }
3863                                         if output_index.is_none() {
3864                                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3865                                                         err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3866                                                 });
3867                                         }
3868                                         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() };
3869                                         if let Some(funding_batch_state) = funding_batch_state.as_mut() {
3870                                                 funding_batch_state.push((outpoint.to_channel_id(), *counterparty_node_id, false));
3871                                         }
3872                                         Ok(outpoint)
3873                                 })
3874                         );
3875                 }
3876                 if let Err(ref e) = result {
3877                         // Remaining channels need to be removed on any error.
3878                         let e = format!("Error in transaction funding: {:?}", e);
3879                         let mut channels_to_remove = Vec::new();
3880                         channels_to_remove.extend(funding_batch_states.as_mut()
3881                                 .and_then(|states| states.remove(&txid))
3882                                 .into_iter().flatten()
3883                                 .map(|(chan_id, node_id, _state)| (chan_id, node_id))
3884                         );
3885                         channels_to_remove.extend(temporary_channels.iter()
3886                                 .map(|(&chan_id, &node_id)| (chan_id, node_id))
3887                         );
3888                         let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
3889                         {
3890                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3891                                 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in channels_to_remove {
3892                                         per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3893                                                 .map(|peer_state_mutex| peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap())
3894                                                 .and_then(|mut peer_state| peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id))
3895                                                 .map(|mut chan| {
3896                                                         update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
3897                                                         self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context(), ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: e.clone() });
3898                                                         shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
3899                                                 });
3900                                 }
3901                         }
3902                         for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
3903                                 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
3904                         }
3905                 }
3906                 result
3907         }
3908
3909         /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
3910         ///
3911         /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3912         /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3913         /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3914         /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3915         ///
3916         /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3917         /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3918         ///
3919         /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3920         /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3921         ///
3922         /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3923         ///
3924         /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3925         /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3926         /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3927         /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3928         /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3929         /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3930         /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3931         pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
3932                 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
3933         ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3934                 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
3935                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3936                                 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
3937                         });
3938                 }
3939
3940                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3941                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3942                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3943                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3944                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3945                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3946                 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3947                         if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
3948                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3949                                         err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3950                                 });
3951                         };
3952                 }
3953                 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3954                         if let Some(channel_phase) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
3955                                 let mut config = channel_phase.context().config();
3956                                 config.apply(config_update);
3957                                 if !channel_phase.context_mut().update_config(&config) {
3958                                         continue;
3959                                 }
3960                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = channel_phase {
3961                                         if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
3962                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
3963                                         } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
3964                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3965                                                         node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3966                                                         msg,
3967                                                 });
3968                                         }
3969                                 }
3970                                 continue;
3971                         } else {
3972                                 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
3973                                 debug_assert!(false);
3974                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3975                                         err: format!(
3976                                                 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
3977                                                 channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3978                                 });
3979                         };
3980                 }
3981                 Ok(())
3982         }
3983
3984         /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
3985         ///
3986         /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3987         /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3988         /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3989         /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3990         ///
3991         /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3992         /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3993         ///
3994         /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3995         /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3996         ///
3997         /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3998         ///
3999         /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4000         /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4001         /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4002         /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4003         /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4004         /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4005         /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4006         pub fn update_channel_config(
4007                 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config: &ChannelConfig,
4008         ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4009                 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
4010         }
4011
4012         /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
4013         /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
4014         ///
4015         /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
4016         /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
4017         ///
4018         /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
4019         /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
4020         /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
4021         /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
4022         /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
4023         ///
4024         /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
4025         /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
4026         /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
4027         /// than expected.
4028         ///
4029         /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4030         /// backwards.
4031         ///
4032         /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
4033         /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4034         /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
4035         // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
4036         // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
4037         pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &ChannelId, next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4038                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4039
4040                 let next_hop_scid = {
4041                         let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4042                         let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
4043                                 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
4044                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4045                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4046                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
4047                                 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) => {
4048                                         if !chan.context.is_usable() {
4049                                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4050                                                         err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", next_hop_channel_id)
4051                                                 })
4052                                         }
4053                                         chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
4054                                 },
4055                                 Some(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4056                                         err: format!("Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is still opening.",
4057                                                 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
4058                                 }),
4059                                 None => {
4060                                         let error = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
4061                                                 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id);
4062                                         let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(next_node_id), Some(*next_hop_channel_id));
4063                                         log_error!(logger, "{} when attempting to forward intercepted HTLC", error);
4064                                         return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4065                                                 err: error
4066                                         })
4067                                 }
4068                         }
4069                 };
4070
4071                 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4072                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4073                                 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4074                         })?;
4075
4076                 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
4077                         PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, blinded, .. } => {
4078                                 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4079                                         onion_packet, blinded, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid
4080                                 }
4081                         },
4082                         _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4083                 };
4084                 let skimmed_fee_msat =
4085                         payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
4086                 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
4087                         skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
4088                         outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
4089                 };
4090
4091                 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
4092                         payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4093                         payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4094                         payment.prev_user_channel_id,
4095                         vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
4096                 )];
4097                 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
4098                 Ok(())
4099         }
4100
4101         /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
4102         /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
4103         ///
4104         /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4105         /// backwards.
4106         ///
4107         /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4108         pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4109                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4110
4111                 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4112                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4113                                 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4114                         })?;
4115
4116                 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
4117                         let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4118                                 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4119                                 user_channel_id: Some(payment.prev_user_channel_id),
4120                                 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4121                                 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
4122                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4123                                 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4124                                 blinded_failure: payment.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
4125                         });
4126
4127                         let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
4128                         let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
4129                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4130                 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4131
4132                 Ok(())
4133         }
4134
4135         /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
4136         ///
4137         /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
4138         /// Will likely generate further events.
4139         pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
4140                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4141
4142                 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
4143                 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
4144                 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
4145                 {
4146                         let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
4147                         mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
4148
4149                         for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
4150                                 if short_chan_id != 0 {
4151                                         let mut forwarding_counterparty = None;
4152                                         macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
4153                                                 () => {
4154                                                         for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4155                                                                 match forward_info {
4156                                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4157                                                                                 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4158                                                                                 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4159                                                                                         routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4160                                                                                         outgoing_cltv_value, ..
4161                                                                                 }
4162                                                                         }) => {
4163                                                                                 macro_rules! failure_handler {
4164                                                                                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
4165                                                                                                 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, forwarding_counterparty, Some(prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()));
4166                                                                                                 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
4167
4168                                                                                                 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4169                                                                                                         short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4170                                                                                                         user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4171                                                                                                         outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4172                                                                                                         htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4173                                                                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4174                                                                                                         phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
4175                                                                                                         blinded_failure: routing.blinded_failure(),
4176                                                                                                 });
4177
4178                                                                                                 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
4179                                                                                                         HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
4180                                                                                                 } else {
4181                                                                                                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
4182                                                                                                 };
4183
4184                                                                                                 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4185                                                                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
4186                                                                                                         reason
4187                                                                                                 ));
4188                                                                                                 continue;
4189                                                                                         }
4190                                                                                 }
4191                                                                                 macro_rules! fail_forward {
4192                                                                                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4193                                                                                                 {
4194                                                                                                         failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
4195                                                                                                 }
4196                                                                                         }
4197                                                                                 }
4198                                                                                 macro_rules! failed_payment {
4199                                                                                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4200                                                                                                 {
4201                                                                                                         failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
4202                                                                                                 }
4203                                                                                         }
4204                                                                                 }
4205                                                                                 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref onion_packet, .. } = routing {
4206                                                                                         let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
4207                                                                                         if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.chain_hash) {
4208                                                                                                 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4209                                                                                                 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
4210                                                                                                         phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac,
4211                                                                                                         payment_hash, &self.node_signer
4212                                                                                                 ) {
4213                                                                                                         Ok(res) => res,
4214                                                                                                         Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4215                                                                                                                 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).to_byte_array();
4216                                                                                                                 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
4217                                                                                                                 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
4218                                                                                                                 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
4219                                                                                                                 // of the onion.
4220                                                                                                                 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
4221                                                                                                         },
4222                                                                                                         Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4223                                                                                                                 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
4224                                                                                                         },
4225                                                                                                 };
4226                                                                                                 match next_hop {
4227                                                                                                         onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
4228                                                                                                                 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4229                                                                                                                 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
4230                                                                                                                         incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4231                                                                                                                         outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None,
4232                                                                                                                         current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
4233                                                                                                                 {
4234                                                                                                                         Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
4235                                                                                                                         Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
4236                                                                                                                 }
4237                                                                                                         },
4238                                                                                                         _ => panic!(),
4239                                                                                                 }
4240                                                                                         } else {
4241                                                                                                 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4242                                                                                         }
4243                                                                                 } else {
4244                                                                                         fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4245                                                                                 }
4246                                                                         },
4247                                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4248                                                                                 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
4249                                                                                 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
4250                                                                                 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
4251                                                                                 // problem, not ours.
4252                                                                         }
4253                                                                 }
4254                                                         }
4255                                                 }
4256                                         }
4257                                         let chan_info_opt = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id).cloned();
4258                                         let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match chan_info_opt {
4259                                                 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id, chan_id),
4260                                                 None => {
4261                                                         forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4262                                                         continue;
4263                                                 }
4264                                         };
4265                                         forwarding_counterparty = Some(counterparty_node_id);
4266                                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4267                                         let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4268                                         if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
4269                                                 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4270                                                 continue;
4271                                         }
4272                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4273                                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4274                                         if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
4275                                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4276                                                 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4277                                                         match forward_info {
4278                                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4279                                                                         prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4280                                                                         forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4281                                                                                 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
4282                                                                                 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4283                                                                                         onion_packet, blinded, ..
4284                                                                                 }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4285                                                                         },
4286                                                                 }) => {
4287                                                                         log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id);
4288                                                                         let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4289                                                                                 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4290                                                                                 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4291                                                                                 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4292                                                                                 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4293                                                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4294                                                                                 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
4295                                                                                 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4296                                                                                 blinded_failure: blinded.map(|_| BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode),
4297                                                                         });
4298                                                                         let next_blinding_point = blinded.and_then(|b| {
4299                                                                                 let encrypted_tlvs_ss = self.node_signer.ecdh(
4300                                                                                         Recipient::Node, &b.inbound_blinding_point, None
4301                                                                                 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4302                                                                                 onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(
4303                                                                                         &self.secp_ctx, b.inbound_blinding_point, &encrypted_tlvs_ss
4304                                                                                 ).ok()
4305                                                                         });
4306                                                                         if let Err(e) = chan.queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
4307                                                                                 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
4308                                                                                 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, next_blinding_point, &self.fee_estimator,
4309                                                                                 &&logger)
4310                                                                         {
4311                                                                                 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4312                                                                                         log_trace!(logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", &payment_hash, msg);
4313                                                                                 } else {
4314                                                                                         panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
4315                                                                                 }
4316                                                                                 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan);
4317                                                                                 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4318                                                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
4319                                                                                         HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
4320                                                                                 ));
4321                                                                                 continue;
4322                                                                         }
4323                                                                 },
4324                                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
4325                                                                         panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
4326                                                                 },
4327                                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
4328                                                                         log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4329                                                                         if let Err(e) = chan.queue_fail_htlc(
4330                                                                                 htlc_id, err_packet, &&logger
4331                                                                         ) {
4332                                                                                 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4333                                                                                         log_trace!(logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
4334                                                                                 } else {
4335                                                                                         panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
4336                                                                                 }
4337                                                                                 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
4338                                                                                 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
4339                                                                                 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
4340                                                                                 continue;
4341                                                                         }
4342                                                                 },
4343                                                         }
4344                                                 }
4345                                         } else {
4346                                                 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4347                                                 continue;
4348                                         }
4349                                 } else {
4350                                         'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4351                                                 match forward_info {
4352                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4353                                                                 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4354                                                                 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4355                                                                         routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
4356                                                                         skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4357                                                                 }
4358                                                         }) => {
4359                                                                 let blinded_failure = routing.blinded_failure();
4360                                                                 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
4361                                                                         PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret, custom_tlvs } => {
4362                                                                                 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
4363                                                                                 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
4364                                                                                                 payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
4365                                                                                 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
4366                                                                                         Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
4367                                                                         },
4368                                                                         PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs } => {
4369                                                                                 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
4370                                                                                         payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
4371                                                                                         payment_metadata,
4372                                                                                         custom_tlvs,
4373                                                                                 };
4374                                                                                 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
4375                                                                                         payment_data, None, onion_fields)
4376                                                                         },
4377                                                                         _ => {
4378                                                                                 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
4379                                                                         }
4380                                                                 };
4381                                                                 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
4382                                                                         prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
4383                                                                                 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4384                                                                                 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4385                                                                                 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4386                                                                                 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4387                                                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4388                                                                                 phantom_shared_secret,
4389                                                                                 blinded_failure,
4390                                                                         },
4391                                                                         // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
4392                                                                         // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
4393                                                                         // if routing nodes overpay
4394                                                                         value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
4395                                                                         sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
4396                                                                         timer_ticks: 0,
4397                                                                         total_value_received: None,
4398                                                                         total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
4399                                                                         cltv_expiry,
4400                                                                         onion_payload,
4401                                                                         counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
4402                                                                 };
4403
4404                                                                 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
4405
4406                                                                 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
4407                                                                         ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
4408                                                                                 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
4409                                                                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4410                                                                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
4411                                                                                         &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
4412                                                                                 );
4413                                                                                 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4414                                                                                                 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
4415                                                                                                 user_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.user_channel_id,
4416                                                                                                 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4417                                                                                                 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
4418                                                                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
4419                                                                                                 phantom_shared_secret,
4420                                                                                                 blinded_failure: None,
4421                                                                                         }), payment_hash,
4422                                                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
4423                                                                                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
4424                                                                                 ));
4425                                                                                 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
4426                                                                         }
4427                                                                 }
4428                                                                 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
4429                                                                 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4430                                                                 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4431                                                                         receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4432                                                                                 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4433                                                                 }
4434
4435                                                                 macro_rules! check_total_value {
4436                                                                         ($purpose: expr) => {{
4437                                                                                 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
4438                                                                                 let is_keysend = match $purpose {
4439                                                                                         events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(_) => true,
4440                                                                                         events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { .. } => false,
4441                                                                                 };
4442                                                                                 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4443                                                                                 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
4444                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4445                                                                                 }
4446                                                                                 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
4447                                                                                         .entry(payment_hash)
4448                                                                                         // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
4449                                                                                         .or_insert_with(|| {
4450                                                                                                 committed_to_claimable = true;
4451                                                                                                 ClaimablePayment {
4452                                                                                                         purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
4453                                                                                                 }
4454                                                                                         });
4455                                                                                 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
4456                                                                                         let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
4457                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), &payment_hash, log_keysend(!is_keysend));
4458                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4459                                                                                 }
4460                                                                                 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4461                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", &payment_hash);
4462                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4463                                                                                 }
4464                                                                                 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
4465                                                                                         if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
4466                                                                                                 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4467                                                                                         }
4468                                                                                 } else {
4469                                                                                         claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
4470                                                                                 }
4471                                                                                 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
4472                                                                                 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
4473                                                                                 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
4474                                                                                 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
4475                                                                                         total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
4476                                                                                         earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
4477                                                                                         if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4478                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
4479                                                                                                         &payment_hash, claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
4480                                                                                                 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
4481                                                                                         }
4482                                                                                         if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
4483                                                                                 }
4484                                                                                 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
4485                                                                                 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
4486                                                                                 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
4487                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4488                                                                                 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4489                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
4490                                                                                                 &payment_hash);
4491                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4492                                                                                 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4493                                                                                         #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4494                                                                                                 committed_to_claimable = true;
4495                                                                                         }
4496                                                                                         let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
4497                                                                                         htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4498                                                                                         let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
4499                                                                                         htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
4500                                                                                         let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
4501                                                                                                 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
4502                                                                                         debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
4503                                                                                                 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
4504                                                                                         new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
4505                                                                                                 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4506                                                                                                 payment_hash,
4507                                                                                                 purpose: $purpose,
4508                                                                                                 amount_msat,
4509                                                                                                 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
4510                                                                                                 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
4511                                                                                                 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4512                                                                                                 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
4513                                                                                                 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
4514                                                                                         }, None));
4515                                                                                         payment_claimable_generated = true;
4516                                                                                 } else {
4517                                                                                         // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
4518                                                                                         // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
4519                                                                                         // MPP parts.
4520                                                                                         htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4521                                                                                         #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4522                                                                                                 committed_to_claimable = true;
4523                                                                                         }
4524                                                                                 }
4525                                                                                 payment_claimable_generated
4526                                                                         }}
4527                                                                 }
4528
4529                                                                 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
4530                                                                 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
4531                                                                 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
4532                                                                 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
4533                                                                 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
4534                                                                 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
4535                                                                 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4536                                                                 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4537                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4538                                                                                 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4539                                                                                         OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
4540                                                                                                 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4541                                                                                                 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
4542                                                                                                         Ok(result) => result,
4543                                                                                                         Err(()) => {
4544                                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", &payment_hash);
4545                                                                                                                 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4546                                                                                                         }
4547                                                                                                 };
4548                                                                                                 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
4549                                                                                                         let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
4550                                                                                                         if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
4551                                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
4552                                                                                                                         &payment_hash, cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
4553                                                                                                                 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4554                                                                                                         }
4555                                                                                                 }
4556                                                                                                 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4557                                                                                                         payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4558                                                                                                         payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4559                                                                                                 };
4560                                                                                                 check_total_value!(purpose);
4561                                                                                         },
4562                                                                                         OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
4563                                                                                                 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
4564                                                                                                 check_total_value!(purpose);
4565                                                                                         }
4566                                                                                 }
4567                                                                         },
4568                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
4569                                                                                 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4570                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", &payment_hash);
4571                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4572                                                                                 }
4573                                                                                 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4574                                                                                 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
4575                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", &payment_hash);
4576                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4577                                                                                 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
4578                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
4579                                                                                                 &payment_hash, payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
4580                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4581                                                                                 } else {
4582                                                                                         let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4583                                                                                                 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
4584                                                                                                 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4585                                                                                         };
4586                                                                                         let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
4587                                                                                         if payment_claimable_generated {
4588                                                                                                 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
4589                                                                                         }
4590                                                                                 }
4591                                                                         },
4592                                                                 };
4593                                                         },
4594                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4595                                                                 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
4596                                                         }
4597                                                 }
4598                                         }
4599                                 }
4600                         }
4601                 }
4602
4603                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4604                 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
4605                         || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4606                         &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
4607
4608                 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
4609                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4610                 }
4611                 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
4612
4613                 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
4614                 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
4615                 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
4616                 // network stack.
4617                 self.check_free_holding_cells();
4618
4619                 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
4620                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4621                 events.append(&mut new_events);
4622         }
4623
4624         /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
4625         ///
4626         /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
4627         fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
4628                 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
4629
4630                 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
4631
4632                 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
4633                 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
4634                 if background_events.is_empty() {
4635                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4636                 }
4637
4638                 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
4639                         match event {
4640                                 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, update)) => {
4641                                         // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
4642                                         // monitor updating completing.
4643                                         let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4644                                 },
4645                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update } => {
4646                                         let mut updated_chan = false;
4647                                         {
4648                                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4649                                                 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4650                                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4651                                                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4652                                                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4653                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase) => {
4654                                                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase.get_mut() {
4655                                                                                 updated_chan = true;
4656                                                                                 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
4657                                                                                         peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4658                                                                         } else {
4659                                                                                 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't have an update for a non-funded channel");
4660                                                                         }
4661                                                                 },
4662                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {},
4663                                                         }
4664                                                 }
4665                                         }
4666                                         if !updated_chan {
4667                                                 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
4668                                                 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4669                                         }
4670                                 },
4671                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
4672                                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4673                                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4674                                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4675                                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4676                                                 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
4677                                                         handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4678                                                 } else {
4679                                                         let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
4680                                                                 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
4681                                                         mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4682                                                         mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4683                                                         self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
4684                                                 }
4685                                         }
4686                                 },
4687                         }
4688                 }
4689                 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4690         }
4691
4692         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4693         /// Process background events, for functional testing
4694         pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
4695                 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
4696                 let _ = self.process_background_events();
4697         }
4698
4699         fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &ChannelId, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
4700                 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
4701
4702                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4703
4704                 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
4705                 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4706                         if new_feerate != chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4707                                 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4708                                 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4709                         }
4710                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4711                 }
4712                 if !chan.context.is_live() {
4713                         log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
4714                                 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4715                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4716                 }
4717                 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4718                         &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4719
4720                 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
4721                 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4722         }
4723
4724         #[cfg(fuzzing)]
4725         /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
4726         /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
4727         /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
4728         /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
4729         pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
4730                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4731                         let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4732
4733                         let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4734                         let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
4735
4736                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4737                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4738                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4739                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4740                                 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
4741                                         |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
4742                                 ) {
4743                                         let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4744                                                 anchor_feerate
4745                                         } else {
4746                                                 non_anchor_feerate
4747                                         };
4748                                         let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4749                                         if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4750                                 }
4751                         }
4752
4753                         should_persist
4754                 });
4755         }
4756
4757         /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
4758         ///
4759         /// This currently includes:
4760         ///  * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
4761         ///  * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
4762         ///    than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
4763         ///    the channel.
4764         ///  * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
4765         ///    with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
4766         ///  * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
4767         ///  * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
4768         ///  * Forgetting about stale outbound payments, either those that have already been fulfilled
4769         ///    or those awaiting an invoice that hasn't been delivered in the necessary amount of time.
4770         ///    The latter is determined using the system clock in `std` and the highest seen block time
4771         ///    minus two hours in `no-std`.
4772         ///
4773         /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
4774         /// estimate fetches.
4775         ///
4776         /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4777         /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
4778         pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
4779                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4780                         let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4781
4782                         let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4783                         let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
4784
4785                         let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
4786                         let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
4787                         let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
4788                         let mut shutdown_channels = Vec::new();
4789
4790                         let mut process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
4791                                 chan_id: &ChannelId,
4792                                 context: &mut ChannelContext<SP>,
4793                                 unfunded_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
4794                                 pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4795                                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
4796                         | {
4797                                 context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4798                                 if unfunded_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
4799                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context);
4800                                         log_error!(logger,
4801                                                 "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner", chan_id);
4802                                         update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
4803                                         self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4804                                         shutdown_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false));
4805                                         pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4806                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4807                                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4808                                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
4809                                                                 channel_id: *chan_id,
4810                                                                 data: "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake".to_owned(),
4811                                                         },
4812                                                 },
4813                                         });
4814                                         false
4815                                 } else {
4816                                         true
4817                                 }
4818                         };
4819
4820                         {
4821                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4822                                 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4823                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4824                                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4825                                         let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
4826                                         let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
4827                                         peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, phase| {
4828                                                 match phase {
4829                                                         ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
4830                                                                 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4831                                                                         anchor_feerate
4832                                                                 } else {
4833                                                                         non_anchor_feerate
4834                                                                 };
4835                                                                 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4836                                                                 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4837
4838                                                                 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
4839                                                                         let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
4840                                                                         handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
4841                                                                         if needs_close { return false; }
4842                                                                 }
4843
4844                                                                 match chan.channel_update_status() {
4845                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
4846                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
4847                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
4848                                                                                 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
4849                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
4850                                                                                 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
4851                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
4852                                                                                 n += 1;
4853                                                                                 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4854                                                                                         chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
4855                                                                                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4856                                                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4857                                                                                                         msg: update
4858                                                                                                 });
4859                                                                                         }
4860                                                                                         should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4861                                                                                 } else {
4862                                                                                         chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
4863                                                                                 }
4864                                                                         },
4865                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
4866                                                                                 n += 1;
4867                                                                                 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4868                                                                                         chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
4869                                                                                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4870                                                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4871                                                                                                         msg: update
4872                                                                                                 });
4873                                                                                         }
4874                                                                                         should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4875                                                                                 } else {
4876                                                                                         chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
4877                                                                                 }
4878                                                                         },
4879                                                                         _ => {},
4880                                                                 }
4881
4882                                                                 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4883
4884                                                                 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
4885                                                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4886                                                                         log_debug!(logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
4887                                                                                         counterparty_node_id, chan_id);
4888                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4889                                                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4890                                                                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
4891                                                                                         msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
4892                                                                                                 channel_id: *chan_id,
4893                                                                                                 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
4894                                                                                         },
4895                                                                                 },
4896                                                                         });
4897                                                                 }
4898
4899                                                                 true
4900                                                         },
4901                                                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
4902                                                                 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
4903                                                                         pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
4904                                                         },
4905                                                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
4906                                                                 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
4907                                                                         pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
4908                                                         },
4909                                                 }
4910                                         });
4911
4912                                         for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
4913                                                 if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
4914                                                         let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(*chan_id));
4915                                                         log_error!(logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", &chan_id);
4916                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
4917                                                                 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4918                                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4919                                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4920                                                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_id.clone(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
4921                                                                         },
4922                                                                 }
4923                                                         );
4924                                                 }
4925                                         }
4926                                         peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.retain(|_, req| req.ticks_remaining > 0);
4927
4928                                         if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
4929                                                 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
4930                                         }
4931                                 }
4932                         }
4933
4934                         // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
4935                         // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
4936                         // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
4937                         // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
4938                         // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
4939                         // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
4940                         // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
4941                         if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
4942                                 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4943                                 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
4944                                         match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
4945                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
4946                                                         // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
4947                                                         // have no channels to the peer.
4948                                                         let remove_entry = {
4949                                                                 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
4950                                                                 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
4951                                                         };
4952                                                         if remove_entry {
4953                                                                 entry.remove_entry();
4954                                                         }
4955                                                 },
4956                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
4957                                         }
4958                                 }
4959                         }
4960
4961                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
4962                                 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4963                                         // This should be unreachable
4964                                         debug_assert!(false);
4965                                         return false;
4966                                 }
4967                                 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
4968                                         // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
4969                                         // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
4970                                         // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
4971                                         // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
4972                                         if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
4973                                                 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
4974                                         {
4975                                                 return true;
4976                                         } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
4977                                                 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
4978                                                 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
4979                                         }) {
4980                                                 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
4981                                                         .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
4982                                                 return false;
4983                                         }
4984                                 }
4985                                 true
4986                         });
4987
4988                         for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
4989                                 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
4990                                 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
4991                                 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
4992                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
4993                         }
4994
4995                         for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4996                                 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4997                         }
4998
4999                         for shutdown_res in shutdown_channels {
5000                                 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
5001                         }
5002
5003                         #[cfg(feature = "std")]
5004                         let duration_since_epoch = std::time::SystemTime::now()
5005                                 .duration_since(std::time::SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH)
5006                                 .expect("SystemTime::now() should come after SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH");
5007                         #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
5008                         let duration_since_epoch = Duration::from_secs(
5009                                 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire).saturating_sub(7200) as u64
5010                         );
5011
5012                         self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_payments(
5013                                 duration_since_epoch, &self.pending_events
5014                         );
5015
5016                         // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
5017                         // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
5018                         // than block the message queueing pipeline.
5019                         if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5020                                 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5021                         }
5022
5023                         should_persist
5024                 });
5025         }
5026
5027         /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
5028         /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
5029         /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
5030         ///
5031         /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
5032         /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
5033         /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
5034         /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
5035         ///
5036         /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
5037         /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
5038         /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
5039         /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
5040         pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
5041                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
5042         }
5043
5044         /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
5045         /// reason for the failure.
5046         ///
5047         /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
5048         pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
5049                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5050
5051                 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
5052                 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
5053                         for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5054                                 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
5055                                 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5056                                 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
5057                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5058                         }
5059                 }
5060         }
5061
5062         /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
5063         fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
5064                 match failure_code {
5065                         FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5066                         FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5067                         FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
5068                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5069                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
5070                                 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
5071                         },
5072                         FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
5073                                 let fail_data = match data {
5074                                         Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
5075                                         None => Vec::new(),
5076                                 };
5077                                 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
5078                         }
5079                 }
5080         }
5081
5082         /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5083         /// that we want to return and a channel.
5084         ///
5085         /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
5086         /// forwarding
5087         fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5088                 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
5089                 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
5090                 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
5091                 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
5092                 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
5093                         chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
5094                 } else {
5095                         chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
5096                 };
5097                 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
5098                         self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
5099                 } else {
5100                         (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5101                 }
5102         }
5103
5104
5105         /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5106         /// that we want to return and a channel.
5107         fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5108                 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
5109                 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
5110                         let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
5111                         if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
5112                                 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
5113                                 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
5114                                 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5115                         }
5116                         (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5117                         msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5118                         upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5119                         (desired_err_code, enc.0)
5120                 } else {
5121                         // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
5122                         // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
5123                         // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
5124                         // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
5125                         (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5126                 }
5127         }
5128
5129         // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
5130         // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
5131         // be surfaced to the user.
5132         fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
5133                 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: ChannelId,
5134                 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
5135         ) {
5136                 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
5137                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5138                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
5139                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5140                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5141                                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
5142                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
5143                                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get() {
5144                                                         self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan)
5145                                                 } else {
5146                                                         // We shouldn't be trying to fail holding cell HTLCs on an unfunded channel.
5147                                                         debug_assert!(false);
5148                                                         (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5149                                                 }
5150                                         },
5151                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5152                                 }
5153                         } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
5154                 };
5155
5156                 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
5157                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
5158                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
5159                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5160                 }
5161         }
5162
5163         /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
5164         /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
5165         fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
5166                 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
5167                 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
5168                 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
5169                 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
5170                 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5171                 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5172                         debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5173                 }
5174
5175                 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
5176                 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
5177                 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
5178                 //timer handling.
5179
5180                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5181                 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
5182                 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5183                 match source {
5184                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
5185                                 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
5186                                         session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
5187                                         &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
5188                                 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5189                         },
5190                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5191                                 ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret,
5192                                 ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint, ref blinded_failure, ..
5193                         }) => {
5194                                 log_trace!(
5195                                         WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(outpoint.to_channel_id())),
5196                                         "Failing {}HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us: {:?}",
5197                                         if blinded_failure.is_some() { "blinded " } else { "" }, &payment_hash, onion_error
5198                                 );
5199                                 let err_packet = match blinded_failure {
5200                                         Some(BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode) => {
5201                                                 let blinded_onion_error = HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32]);
5202                                                 blinded_onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
5203                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
5204                                                 )
5205                                         },
5206                                         None => {
5207                                                 onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret)
5208                                         }
5209                                 };
5210
5211                                 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
5212                                 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5213                                 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
5214                                         push_forward_ev = true;
5215                                 }
5216                                 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
5217                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5218                                                 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
5219                                         },
5220                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5221                                                 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
5222                                         }
5223                                 }
5224                                 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
5225                                 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5226                                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5227                                 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
5228                                         prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
5229                                         failed_next_destination: destination,
5230                                 }, None));
5231                         },
5232                 }
5233         }
5234
5235         /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
5236         /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
5237         ///
5238         /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
5239         /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
5240         /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
5241         /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
5242         ///
5243         /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
5244         /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
5245         /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
5246         /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
5247         ///
5248         /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
5249         /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
5250         /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
5251         ///
5252         /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5253         /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
5254         /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
5255         /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
5256         /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5257         /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5258         /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
5259         pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5260                 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
5261         }
5262
5263         /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
5264         /// even type numbers.
5265         ///
5266         /// # Note
5267         ///
5268         /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
5269         /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
5270         ///
5271         /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5272         pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5273                 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
5274         }
5275
5276         fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
5277                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
5278
5279                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5280
5281                 let mut sources = {
5282                         let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
5283                         if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
5284                                 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
5285                                 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
5286                                         if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
5287                                                 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
5288                                                         .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
5289                                                 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
5290                                                 break;
5291                                         }
5292                                 }
5293
5294                                 let htlcs = payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect();
5295                                 let sender_intended_value = payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat);
5296                                 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
5297                                         ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
5298                                         payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id, htlcs, sender_intended_value
5299                                 });
5300                                 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
5301                                         debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
5302                                         log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
5303                                                 &payment_hash);
5304                                 }
5305
5306                                 if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = payment.onion_fields {
5307                                         if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
5308                                                 log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
5309                                                         &payment_hash, log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
5310                                                 claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5311                                                 mem::drop(claimable_payments);
5312                                                 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5313                                                         let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
5314                                                         let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5315                                                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5316                                                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5317                                                 }
5318                                                 return;
5319                                         }
5320                                 }
5321
5322                                 payment.htlcs
5323                         } else { return; }
5324                 };
5325                 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
5326
5327                 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
5328                 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
5329                 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
5330                 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
5331                 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
5332                 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
5333                 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
5334                 let mut valid_mpp = true;
5335                 let mut errs = Vec::new();
5336                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5337                 for htlc in sources.iter() {
5338                         if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
5339                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5340                                 debug_assert!(false);
5341                                 valid_mpp = false;
5342                                 break;
5343                         }
5344                         prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
5345
5346                         if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
5347                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5348                                 debug_assert!(false);
5349                                 valid_mpp = false;
5350                                 break;
5351                         }
5352                         expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
5353                         claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
5354                 }
5355                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5356                 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
5357                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5358                         log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
5359                         return;
5360                 }
5361                 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
5362                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5363                         log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
5364                                 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
5365                         return;
5366                 }
5367                 if valid_mpp {
5368                         for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5369                                 let prev_hop_chan_id = htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
5370                                 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
5371                                         htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
5372                                         |_, definitely_duplicate| {
5373                                                 debug_assert!(!definitely_duplicate, "We shouldn't claim duplicatively from a payment");
5374                                                 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash })
5375                                         }
5376                                 ) {
5377                                         if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
5378                                                 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
5379                                                 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
5380                                                 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop_chan_id));
5381                                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
5382                                         } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
5383                                 }
5384                         }
5385                 }
5386                 if !valid_mpp {
5387                         for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5388                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5389                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
5390                                 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5391                                 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
5392                                 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5393                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5394                         }
5395                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5396                 }
5397
5398                 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
5399                 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
5400                         let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5401                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
5402                 }
5403         }
5404
5405         fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>, bool) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
5406                 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
5407         -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
5408                 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
5409
5410                 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
5411                 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
5412                 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
5413                 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5414
5415                 // As we may call handle_monitor_update_completion_actions in rather rare cases, check that
5416                 // the required mutexes are not held before we start.
5417                 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5418                 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5419
5420                 {
5421                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5422                         let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
5423                         let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
5424                                 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
5425                                 None => None
5426                         };
5427
5428                         let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
5429                                 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5430                                         .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
5431                         ).unwrap_or(None);
5432
5433                         if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
5434                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
5435                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5436                                 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5437                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
5438                                                 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5439                                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
5440                                                 let fulfill_res = chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
5441
5442                                                 match fulfill_res {
5443                                                         UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } => {
5444                                                                 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat), false) {
5445                                                                         log_trace!(logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
5446                                                                                 chan_id, action);
5447                                                                         peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
5448                                                                 }
5449                                                                 if !during_init {
5450                                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
5451                                                                                 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5452                                                                 } else {
5453                                                                         // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
5454                                                                         // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
5455                                                                         // monitor update as a background event.
5456                                                                         self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5457                                                                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5458                                                                                         counterparty_node_id,
5459                                                                                         funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
5460                                                                                         update: monitor_update.clone(),
5461                                                                                 });
5462                                                                 }
5463                                                         }
5464                                                         UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => {
5465                                                                 let action = if let Some(action) = completion_action(None, true) {
5466                                                                         action
5467                                                                 } else {
5468                                                                         return Ok(());
5469                                                                 };
5470                                                                 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5471
5472                                                                 log_trace!(logger, "Completing monitor update completion action for channel {} as claim was redundant: {:?}",
5473                                                                         chan_id, action);
5474                                                                 let (node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker) =
5475                                                                 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5476                                                                         downstream_counterparty_node_id: node_id,
5477                                                                         downstream_funding_outpoint: funding_outpoint,
5478                                                                         blocking_action: blocker,
5479                                                                 } = action {
5480                                                                         (node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)
5481                                                                 } else {
5482                                                                         debug_assert!(false,
5483                                                                                 "Duplicate claims should always free another channel immediately");
5484                                                                         return Ok(());
5485                                                                 };
5486                                                                 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
5487                                                                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5488                                                                         if let Some(blockers) = peer_state
5489                                                                                 .actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
5490                                                                                 .get_mut(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
5491                                                                         {
5492                                                                                 let mut found_blocker = false;
5493                                                                                 blockers.retain(|iter| {
5494                                                                                         // Note that we could actually be blocked, in
5495                                                                                         // which case we need to only remove the one
5496                                                                                         // blocker which was added duplicatively.
5497                                                                                         let first_blocker = !found_blocker;
5498                                                                                         if *iter == blocker { found_blocker = true; }
5499                                                                                         *iter != blocker || !first_blocker
5500                                                                                 });
5501                                                                                 debug_assert!(found_blocker);
5502                                                                         }
5503                                                                 } else {
5504                                                                         debug_assert!(false);
5505                                                                 }
5506                                                         }
5507                                                 }
5508                                         }
5509                                         return Ok(());
5510                                 }
5511                         }
5512                 }
5513                 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5514                         update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
5515                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5516                                 payment_preimage,
5517                         }],
5518                 };
5519
5520                 if !during_init {
5521                         // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
5522                         // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
5523                         let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
5524                         if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
5525                                 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
5526                                 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
5527                                 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
5528                                 // again on restart.
5529                                 log_error!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id())), "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
5530                                         payment_preimage, update_res);
5531                         }
5532                 } else {
5533                         // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
5534                         // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
5535                         // event.
5536                         // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
5537                         // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
5538                         // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
5539                         // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
5540                         // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
5541                         // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
5542                         // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
5543                         self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5544                                 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
5545                                         prev_hop.outpoint, preimage_update,
5546                                 )));
5547                 }
5548                 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
5549                 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
5550                 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
5551                 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
5552                 // `PaymentForwarded`).
5553                 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None, false));
5554                 Ok(())
5555         }
5556
5557         fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
5558                 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
5559         }
5560
5561         fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
5562                 forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, startup_replay: bool,
5563                 next_channel_counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>, next_channel_outpoint: OutPoint
5564         ) {
5565                 match source {
5566                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
5567                                 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
5568                                         "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
5569                                 if let Some(pubkey) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5570                                         debug_assert_eq!(pubkey, path.hops[0].pubkey);
5571                                 }
5572                                 let ev_completion_action = EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
5573                                         channel_funding_outpoint: next_channel_outpoint,
5574                                         counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
5575                                 };
5576                                 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage,
5577                                         session_priv, path, from_onchain, ev_completion_action, &self.pending_events,
5578                                         &self.logger);
5579                         },
5580                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
5581                                 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5582                                 let completed_blocker = RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&hop_data);
5583                                 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5584                                 let claiming_chan_funding_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5585                                 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
5586                                         |htlc_claim_value_msat, definitely_duplicate| {
5587                                                 let chan_to_release =
5588                                                         if let Some(node_id) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5589                                                                 Some((node_id, next_channel_outpoint, completed_blocker))
5590                                                         } else {
5591                                                                 // We can only get `None` here if we are processing a
5592                                                                 // `ChannelMonitor`-originated event, in which case we
5593                                                                 // don't care about ensuring we wake the downstream
5594                                                                 // channel's monitor updating - the channel is already
5595                                                                 // closed.
5596                                                                 None
5597                                                         };
5598
5599                                                 if definitely_duplicate && startup_replay {
5600                                                         // On startup we may get redundant claims which are related to
5601                                                         // monitor updates still in flight. In that case, we shouldn't
5602                                                         // immediately free, but instead let that monitor update complete
5603                                                         // in the background.
5604                                                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
5605                                                                 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
5606                                                                 // There should be a `BackgroundEvent` pending...
5607                                                                 assert!(background_events.iter().any(|ev| {
5608                                                                         match ev {
5609                                                                                 // to apply a monitor update that blocked the claiming channel,
5610                                                                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5611                                                                                         funding_txo, update, ..
5612                                                                                 } => {
5613                                                                                         if *funding_txo == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint {
5614                                                                                                 assert!(update.updates.iter().any(|upd|
5615                                                                                                         if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5616                                                                                                                 payment_preimage: update_preimage
5617                                                                                                         } = upd {
5618                                                                                                                 payment_preimage == *update_preimage
5619                                                                                                         } else { false }
5620                                                                                                 ), "{:?}", update);
5621                                                                                                 true
5622                                                                                         } else { false }
5623                                                                                 },
5624                                                                                 // or the channel we'd unblock is already closed,
5625                                                                                 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup(
5626                                                                                         (funding_txo, monitor_update)
5627                                                                                 ) => {
5628                                                                                         if *funding_txo == next_channel_outpoint {
5629                                                                                                 assert_eq!(monitor_update.updates.len(), 1);
5630                                                                                                 assert!(matches!(
5631                                                                                                         monitor_update.updates[0],
5632                                                                                                         ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. }
5633                                                                                                 ));
5634                                                                                                 true
5635                                                                                         } else { false }
5636                                                                                 },
5637                                                                                 // or the monitor update has completed and will unblock
5638                                                                                 // immediately once we get going.
5639                                                                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
5640                                                                                         channel_id, ..
5641                                                                                 } =>
5642                                                                                         *channel_id == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(),
5643                                                                         }
5644                                                                 }), "{:?}", *background_events);
5645                                                         }
5646                                                         None
5647                                                 } else if definitely_duplicate {
5648                                                         if let Some(other_chan) = chan_to_release {
5649                                                                 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5650                                                                         downstream_counterparty_node_id: other_chan.0,
5651                                                                         downstream_funding_outpoint: other_chan.1,
5652                                                                         blocking_action: other_chan.2,
5653                                                                 })
5654                                                         } else { None }
5655                                                 } else {
5656                                                         let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
5657                                                                 if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
5658                                                                         Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
5659                                                                 } else { None }
5660                                                         } else { None };
5661                                                         Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5662                                                                 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
5663                                                                         fee_earned_msat,
5664                                                                         claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
5665                                                                         prev_channel_id: Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5666                                                                         next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5667                                                                         outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
5668                                                                 },
5669                                                                 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: chan_to_release,
5670                                                         })
5671                                                 }
5672                                         });
5673                                 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
5674                                         let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5675                                         let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
5676                                 }
5677                         },
5678                 }
5679         }
5680
5681         /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
5682         pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
5683                 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
5684         }
5685
5686         fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
5687                 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5688                 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5689                 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5690
5691                 for action in actions.into_iter() {
5692                         match action {
5693                                 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
5694                                         let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5695                                         if let Some(ClaimingPayment {
5696                                                 amount_msat,
5697                                                 payment_purpose: purpose,
5698                                                 receiver_node_id,
5699                                                 htlcs,
5700                                                 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_total_msat,
5701                                         }) = payment {
5702                                                 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
5703                                                         payment_hash,
5704                                                         purpose,
5705                                                         amount_msat,
5706                                                         receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
5707                                                         htlcs,
5708                                                         sender_intended_total_msat,
5709                                                 }, None));
5710                                         }
5711                                 },
5712                                 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5713                                         event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
5714                                 } => {
5715                                         self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
5716                                         if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
5717                                                 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, Some(blocker));
5718                                         }
5719                                 },
5720                                 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5721                                         downstream_counterparty_node_id, downstream_funding_outpoint, blocking_action,
5722                                 } => {
5723                                         self.handle_monitor_update_release(
5724                                                 downstream_counterparty_node_id,
5725                                                 downstream_funding_outpoint,
5726                                                 Some(blocking_action),
5727                                         );
5728                                 },
5729                         }
5730                 }
5731         }
5732
5733         /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
5734         /// update completion.
5735         fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5736                 channel: &mut Channel<SP>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
5737                 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
5738                 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
5739                 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
5740         -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
5741                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
5742                 log_trace!(logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
5743                         &channel.context.channel_id(),
5744                         if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
5745                         if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
5746                         if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
5747                         if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
5748                         if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
5749
5750                 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
5751
5752                 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5753                 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5754                         htlc_forwards = Some((channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias()),
5755                                 channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
5756                 }
5757
5758                 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
5759                         send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
5760                 }
5761                 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
5762                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5763                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5764                                 msg,
5765                         });
5766                 }
5767
5768                 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
5769                         if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
5770                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5771                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5772                                         updates: update,
5773                                 });
5774                         }
5775                 } }
5776                 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
5777                         if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
5778                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
5779                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5780                                         msg: revoke_and_ack,
5781                                 });
5782                         }
5783                 } }
5784                 match order {
5785                         RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
5786                                 handle_cs!();
5787                                 handle_raa!();
5788                         },
5789                         RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
5790                                 handle_raa!();
5791                                 handle_cs!();
5792                         },
5793                 }
5794
5795                 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
5796                         log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
5797                         self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
5798                 }
5799
5800                 {
5801                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5802                         emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
5803                         emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
5804                 }
5805
5806                 htlc_forwards
5807         }
5808
5809         fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
5810                 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5811
5812                 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
5813                         Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5814                         None => {
5815                                 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5816                                 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5817                                 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5818                                 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5819                                         Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5820                                         None => return,
5821                                 }
5822                         }
5823                 };
5824                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5825                 let mut peer_state_lock;
5826                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
5827                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
5828                 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5829                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5830                 let channel =
5831                         if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5832                                 chan
5833                         } else {
5834                                 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
5835                                         .remove(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
5836                                 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5837                                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5838                                 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
5839                                 return;
5840                         };
5841                 let remaining_in_flight =
5842                         if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
5843                                 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
5844                                 pending.len()
5845                         } else { 0 };
5846                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
5847                 log_trace!(logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
5848                         highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
5849                         remaining_in_flight);
5850                 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
5851                         return;
5852                 }
5853                 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
5854         }
5855
5856         /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
5857         ///
5858         /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
5859         /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
5860         /// the channel.
5861         ///
5862         /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5863         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5864         /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5865         ///
5866         /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
5867         /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
5868         /// used to accept such channels.
5869         ///
5870         /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5871         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5872         pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5873                 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
5874         }
5875
5876         /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
5877         /// it as confirmed immediately.
5878         ///
5879         /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5880         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5881         /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5882         ///
5883         /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
5884         /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
5885         ///
5886         /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
5887         /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
5888         ///
5889         /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
5890         /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
5891         ///
5892         /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5893         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5894         pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5895                 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
5896         }
5897
5898         fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5899                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5900
5901                 let peers_without_funded_channels =
5902                         self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
5903                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5904                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5905                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
5906                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5907                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5908                 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
5909
5910                 // Find (and remove) the channel in the unaccepted table. If it's not there, something weird is
5911                 // happening and return an error. N.B. that we create channel with an outbound SCID of zero so
5912                 // that we can delay allocating the SCID until after we're sure that the checks below will
5913                 // succeed.
5914                 let mut channel = match peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
5915                         Some(unaccepted_channel) => {
5916                                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5917                                 InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
5918                                         counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
5919                                         &unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
5920                                         &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|e| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.to_string() })
5921                         }
5922                         _ => Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() })
5923                 }?;
5924
5925                 if accept_0conf {
5926                         // This should have been correctly configured by the call to InboundV1Channel::new.
5927                         debug_assert!(channel.context.minimum_depth().unwrap() == 0);
5928                 } else if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
5929                         let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5930                                 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5931                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5932                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
5933                                 }
5934                         };
5935                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5936                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
5937                 } else {
5938                         // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
5939                         // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
5940                         // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
5941                         if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
5942                                 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5943                                         node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5944                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5945                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
5946                                         }
5947                                 };
5948                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5949                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
5950                         }
5951                 }
5952
5953                 // Now that we know we have a channel, assign an outbound SCID alias.
5954                 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
5955                 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
5956
5957                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
5958                         node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5959                         msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
5960                 });
5961
5962                 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(temporary_channel_id.clone(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
5963
5964                 Ok(())
5965         }
5966
5967         /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
5968         /// or 0-conf channels.
5969         ///
5970         /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
5971         /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
5972         fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
5973         where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<SP>) -> bool {
5974                 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
5975                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5976                 {
5977                         let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5978                         for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
5979                                 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5980                                 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
5981                                 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
5982                                 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
5983                                         peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
5984                                 }
5985                         }
5986                 }
5987                 return peers_without_funded_channels;
5988         }
5989
5990         fn unfunded_channel_count(
5991                 peer: &PeerState<SP>, best_block_height: u32
5992         ) -> usize {
5993                 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
5994                 for (_, phase) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
5995                         match phase {
5996                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
5997                                         // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
5998                                         // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
5999                                         if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
6000                                                 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
6001                                         {
6002                                                 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6003                                         }
6004                                 },
6005                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
6006                                         if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
6007                                                 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6008                                         }
6009                                 },
6010                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6011                                         // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
6012                                         continue;
6013                                 }
6014                         }
6015                 }
6016                 num_unfunded_channels + peer.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
6017         }
6018
6019         fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6020                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6021                 // likely to be lost on restart!
6022                 if msg.chain_hash != self.chain_hash {
6023                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6024                 }
6025
6026                 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
6027                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6028                 }
6029
6030                 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
6031                 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
6032                 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
6033                 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
6034                         self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
6035
6036                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6037                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6038                     .ok_or_else(|| {
6039                                 debug_assert!(false);
6040                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
6041                         })?;
6042                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6043                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6044
6045                 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6046                 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
6047                 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6048                 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
6049                         channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
6050                         !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
6051                 {
6052                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6053                                 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
6054                                 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6055                 }
6056
6057                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6058                 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
6059                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6060                                 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
6061                                 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6062                 }
6063
6064                 let channel_id = msg.temporary_channel_id;
6065                 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
6066                 if channel_exists {
6067                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6068                 }
6069
6070                 // If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
6071                 if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
6072                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6073                         pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
6074                                 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
6075                                 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6076                                 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
6077                                 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
6078                                 channel_type: msg.channel_type.clone().unwrap(),
6079                         }, None));
6080                         peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
6081                                 open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
6082                                 ticks_remaining: UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS,
6083                         });
6084                         return Ok(());
6085                 }
6086
6087                 // Otherwise create the channel right now.
6088                 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
6089                 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
6090                 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
6091                 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6092                         counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
6093                         &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
6094                 {
6095                         Err(e) => {
6096                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
6097                         },
6098                         Ok(res) => res
6099                 };
6100
6101                 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
6102                 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
6103                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6104                 }
6105                 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6106                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6107                 }
6108
6109                 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6110                 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6111
6112                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6113                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6114                         msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6115                 });
6116                 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6117                 Ok(())
6118         }
6119
6120         fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6121                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6122                 // likely to be lost on restart!
6123                 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
6124                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6125                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6126                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
6127                                         debug_assert!(false);
6128                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6129                                 })?;
6130                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6131                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6132                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6133                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut phase) => {
6134                                         match phase.get_mut() {
6135                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
6136                                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), phase);
6137                                                         (chan.context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.context.get_user_id())
6138                                                 },
6139                                                 _ => {
6140                                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected accept_channel message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id));
6141                                                 }
6142                                         }
6143                                 },
6144                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6145                         }
6146                 };
6147                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6148                 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
6149                         temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6150                         counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6151                         channel_value_satoshis: value,
6152                         output_script,
6153                         user_channel_id: user_id,
6154                 }, None));
6155                 Ok(())
6156         }
6157
6158         fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6159                 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6160
6161                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6162                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6163                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6164                                 debug_assert!(false);
6165                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6166                         })?;
6167
6168                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6169                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6170                 let (chan, funding_msg_opt, monitor) =
6171                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6172                                 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan)) => {
6173                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &inbound_chan.context);
6174                                         match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger) {
6175                                                 Ok(res) => res,
6176                                                 Err((mut inbound_chan, err)) => {
6177                                                         // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
6178                                                         // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
6179                                                         // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
6180                                                         update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &inbound_chan.context);
6181                                                         let user_id = inbound_chan.context.get_user_id();
6182                                                         let shutdown_res = inbound_chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
6183                                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(format!("{}", err),
6184                                                                 msg.temporary_channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, inbound_chan.context.get_value_satoshis()));
6185                                                 },
6186                                         }
6187                                 },
6188                                 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(_)) | Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_)) => {
6189                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected funding_created message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id));
6190                                 },
6191                                 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6192                         };
6193
6194                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
6195                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6196                                 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6197                                         "Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(),
6198                                         chan.context.channel_id()
6199                                 ))
6200                         },
6201                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6202                                 let mut id_to_peer_lock = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6203                                 match id_to_peer_lock.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
6204                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6205                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6206                                                         "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
6207                                                         chan.context.channel_id()))
6208                                         },
6209                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
6210                                                 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
6211                                                 if let Ok(persist_state) = monitor_res {
6212                                                         i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
6213                                                         mem::drop(id_to_peer_lock);
6214
6215                                                         // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
6216                                                         // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
6217                                                         // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
6218                                                         // until we have persisted our monitor.
6219                                                         if let Some(msg) = funding_msg_opt {
6220                                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
6221                                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6222                                                                         msg,
6223                                                                 });
6224                                                         }
6225
6226                                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) {
6227                                                                 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_state, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
6228                                                                         per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6229                                                         } else {
6230                                                                 unreachable!("This must be a funded channel as we just inserted it.");
6231                                                         }
6232                                                         Ok(())
6233                                                 } else {
6234                                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6235                                                         log_error!(logger, "Persisting initial ChannelMonitor failed, implying the funding outpoint was duplicated");
6236                                                         let channel_id = match funding_msg_opt {
6237                                                                 Some(msg) => msg.channel_id,
6238                                                                 None => chan.context.channel_id(),
6239                                                         };
6240                                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6241                                                                 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
6242                                                                 channel_id));
6243                                                 }
6244                                         }
6245                                 }
6246                         }
6247                 }
6248         }
6249
6250         fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6251                 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6252                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6253                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6254                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6255                                 debug_assert!(false);
6256                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6257                         })?;
6258
6259                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6260                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6261                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6262                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6263                                 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6264                                         ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => {
6265                                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6266                                                 let monitor = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6267                                                         chan.funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6268                                                 if let Ok(persist_status) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
6269                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_status, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6270                                                         Ok(())
6271                                                 } else {
6272                                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel funding outpoint was a duplicate".to_owned())), chan_phase_entry)
6273                                                 }
6274                                         },
6275                                         _ => {
6276                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
6277                                         },
6278                                 }
6279                         },
6280                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
6281                 }
6282         }
6283
6284         fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6285                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6286                 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6287                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6288                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6289                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6290                                 debug_assert!(false);
6291                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6292                         })?;
6293                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6294                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6295                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6296                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6297                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6298                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6299                                         let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
6300                                                 self.chain_hash, &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6301                                         if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
6302                                                 log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6303                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6304                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6305                                                         msg: announcement_sigs,
6306                                                 });
6307                                         } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
6308                                                 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
6309                                                 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
6310                                                 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
6311                                                 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
6312                                                 // announcement_signatures.
6313                                                 log_trace!(logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6314                                                 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
6315                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6316                                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6317                                                                 msg,
6318                                                         });
6319                                                 }
6320                                         }
6321
6322                                         {
6323                                                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6324                                                 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan);
6325                                         }
6326
6327                                         Ok(())
6328                                 } else {
6329                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6330                                                 "Got a channel_ready message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry)
6331                                 }
6332                         },
6333                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
6334                                 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6335                         }
6336                 }
6337         }
6338
6339         fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6340                 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
6341                 let mut finish_shutdown = None;
6342                 {
6343                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6344                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6345                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
6346                                         debug_assert!(false);
6347                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6348                                 })?;
6349                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6350                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6351                         if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6352                                 let phase = chan_phase_entry.get_mut();
6353                                 match phase {
6354                                         ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6355                                                 if !chan.received_shutdown() {
6356                                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6357                                                         log_info!(logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
6358                                                                 msg.channel_id,
6359                                                                 if chan.sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
6360                                                 }
6361
6362                                                 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6363                                                 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6364                                                         chan.shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6365                                                 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
6366
6367                                                 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
6368                                                         // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
6369                                                         // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
6370                                                         // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
6371                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6372                                                                 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6373                                                                 msg,
6374                                                         });
6375                                                 }
6376                                                 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
6377                                                 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6378                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
6379                                                                 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6380                                                 }
6381                                         },
6382                                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6383                                                 let context = phase.context_mut();
6384                                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context);
6385                                                 log_error!(logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
6386                                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel);
6387                                                 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
6388                                                 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
6389                                         },
6390                                 }
6391                         } else {
6392                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6393                         }
6394                 }
6395                 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
6396                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
6397                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
6398                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
6399                 }
6400                 if let Some(shutdown_res) = finish_shutdown {
6401                         self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
6402                 }
6403
6404                 Ok(())
6405         }
6406
6407         fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6408                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6409                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6410                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6411                                 debug_assert!(false);
6412                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6413                         })?;
6414                 let (tx, chan_option, shutdown_result) = {
6415                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6416                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6417                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6418                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6419                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6420                                                 let (closing_signed, tx, shutdown_result) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6421                                                 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
6422                                                 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
6423                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
6424                                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6425                                                                 msg,
6426                                                         });
6427                                                 }
6428                                                 if tx.is_some() {
6429                                                         // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
6430                                                         // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
6431                                                         // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
6432                                                         // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
6433                                                         // watch for old state broadcasts)!
6434                                                         (tx, Some(remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry)), shutdown_result)
6435                                                 } else { (tx, None, shutdown_result) }
6436                                         } else {
6437                                                 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6438                                                         "Got a closing_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6439                                         }
6440                                 },
6441                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6442                         }
6443                 };
6444                 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
6445                         let channel_id = chan_option.as_ref().map(|channel| channel.context().channel_id());
6446                         log_info!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id), "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
6447                         self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
6448                 }
6449                 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = chan_option {
6450                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6451                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6452                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6453                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6454                                         msg: update
6455                                 });
6456                         }
6457                         self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
6458                 }
6459                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6460                 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
6461                         self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
6462                 }
6463                 Ok(())
6464         }
6465
6466         fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6467                 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
6468                 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
6469                 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
6470                 //
6471                 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
6472                 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
6473                 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
6474                 //but we should prevent it anyway.
6475
6476                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6477                 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6478
6479                 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg, counterparty_node_id);
6480                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6481                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6482                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6483                                 debug_assert!(false);
6484                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6485                         })?;
6486                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6487                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6488                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6489                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6490                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6491                                         let pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
6492                                                 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
6493                                                         self.construct_pending_htlc_status(
6494                                                                 msg, counterparty_node_id, shared_secret, next_hop,
6495                                                                 chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt,
6496                                                         ),
6497                                                 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
6498                                         };
6499                                         let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<SP>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
6500                                                 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
6501                                                 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
6502                                                 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
6503                                                 match pending_forward_info {
6504                                                         PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
6505                                                                 ref incoming_shared_secret, ref routing, ..
6506                                                         }) => {
6507                                                                 let reason = if routing.blinded_failure().is_some() {
6508                                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32])
6509                                                                 } else if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
6510                                                                         let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
6511                                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
6512                                                                 } else {
6513                                                                         HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
6514                                                                 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
6515                                                                 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6516                                                                         channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6517                                                                         htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
6518                                                                         reason
6519                                                                 };
6520                                                                 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
6521                                                         },
6522                                                         _ => pending_forward_info
6523                                                 }
6524                                         };
6525                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6526                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6527                                 } else {
6528                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6529                                                 "Got an update_add_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6530                                 }
6531                         },
6532                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6533                 }
6534                 Ok(())
6535         }
6536
6537         fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6538                 let funding_txo;
6539                 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
6540                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6541                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6542                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
6543                                         debug_assert!(false);
6544                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6545                                 })?;
6546                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6547                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6548                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6549                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6550                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6551                                                 let res = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6552                                                 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop) = &res.0 {
6553                                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6554                                                         log_trace!(logger,
6555                                                                 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
6556                                                                 msg.channel_id);
6557                                                         peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates.entry(msg.channel_id)
6558                                                                 .or_insert_with(Vec::new)
6559                                                                 .push(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&prev_hop));
6560                                                 }
6561                                                 // Note that we do not need to push an `actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates`
6562                                                 // entry here, even though we *do* need to block the next RAA monitor update.
6563                                                 // We do this instead in the `claim_funds_internal` by attaching a
6564                                                 // `ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate` action to the event generated when the
6565                                                 // outbound HTLC is claimed. This is guaranteed to all complete before we
6566                                                 // process the RAA as messages are processed from single peers serially.
6567                                                 funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().expect("We won't accept a fulfill until funded");
6568                                                 res
6569                                         } else {
6570                                                 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6571                                                         "Got an update_fulfill_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6572                                         }
6573                                 },
6574                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6575                         }
6576                 };
6577                 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, false, Some(*counterparty_node_id), funding_txo);
6578                 Ok(())
6579         }
6580
6581         fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6582                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6583                 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6584                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6585                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6586                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6587                                 debug_assert!(false);
6588                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6589                         })?;
6590                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6591                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6592                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6593                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6594                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6595                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan_phase_entry);
6596                                 } else {
6597                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6598                                                 "Got an update_fail_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6599                                 }
6600                         },
6601                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6602                 }
6603                 Ok(())
6604         }
6605
6606         fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6607                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6608                 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6609                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6610                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6611                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6612                                 debug_assert!(false);
6613                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6614                         })?;
6615                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6616                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6617                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6618                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6619                                 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
6620                                         let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
6621                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan_phase_entry);
6622                                 }
6623                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6624                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan_phase_entry);
6625                                 } else {
6626                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6627                                                 "Got an update_fail_malformed_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6628                                 }
6629                                 Ok(())
6630                         },
6631                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6632                 }
6633         }
6634
6635         fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6636                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6637                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6638                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6639                                 debug_assert!(false);
6640                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6641                         })?;
6642                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6643                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6644                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6645                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6646                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6647                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6648                                         let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6649                                         let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6650                                         if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6651                                                 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
6652                                                         peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6653                                         }
6654                                         Ok(())
6655                                 } else {
6656                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6657                                                 "Got a commitment_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6658                                 }
6659                         },
6660                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6661                 }
6662         }
6663
6664         #[inline]
6665         fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
6666                 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
6667                         let mut push_forward_event = false;
6668                         let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
6669                         let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
6670                         if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
6671                                 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
6672                                         let scid = match forward_info.routing {
6673                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6674                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
6675                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
6676                                         };
6677                                         // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
6678                                         let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
6679
6680                                         let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6681                                         let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
6682                                         match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
6683                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6684                                                         entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6685                                                                 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
6686                                                 },
6687                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6688                                                         if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
6689                                                            fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.chain_hash)
6690                                                         {
6691                                                                 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).to_byte_array());
6692                                                                 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6693                                                                 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
6694                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6695                                                                                 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
6696                                                                                         requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
6697                                                                                         payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
6698                                                                                         inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
6699                                                                                         expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
6700                                                                                         intercept_id
6701                                                                                 }, None));
6702                                                                                 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6703                                                                                         prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
6704                                                                         },
6705                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6706                                                                                 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()));
6707                                                                                 log_info!(logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
6708                                                                                 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6709                                                                                         short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
6710                                                                                         user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
6711                                                                                         outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
6712                                                                                         htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
6713                                                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6714                                                                                         phantom_shared_secret: None,
6715                                                                                         blinded_failure: forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
6716                                                                                 });
6717
6718                                                                                 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
6719                                                                                                 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
6720                                                                                                 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
6721                                                                                 ));
6722                                                                         }
6723                                                                 }
6724                                                         } else {
6725                                                                 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
6726                                                                 // payments are being processed.
6727                                                                 if forward_htlcs_empty {
6728                                                                         push_forward_event = true;
6729                                                                 }
6730                                                                 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6731                                                                         prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
6732                                                         }
6733                                                 }
6734                                         }
6735                                 }
6736                         }
6737
6738                         for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
6739                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
6740                         }
6741
6742                         if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
6743                                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6744                                 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
6745                         }
6746                         if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
6747                 }
6748         }
6749
6750         fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
6751                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6752                 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6753                 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
6754                         if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
6755                 ).count();
6756                 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
6757                 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
6758                 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
6759                 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
6760                 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
6761                 // real by taking more time.
6762                 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
6763                         pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6764                                 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
6765                         }, None));
6766                 }
6767         }
6768
6769         /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
6770         /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
6771         /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
6772         /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
6773         fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6774                 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
6775                 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
6776         ) -> bool {
6777                 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6778                         .get(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
6779                 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
6780                         action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6781                                 channel_funding_outpoint,
6782                                 counterparty_node_id,
6783                         })
6784                 })
6785         }
6786
6787         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6788         pub(crate) fn test_raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6789                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_id: ChannelId
6790         ) -> bool {
6791                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6792                 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6793                         let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6794                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
6795
6796                         if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id) {
6797                                 return self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
6798                                         chan.context().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), counterparty_node_id);
6799                         }
6800                 }
6801                 false
6802         }
6803
6804         fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6805                 let htlcs_to_fail = {
6806                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6807                         let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6808                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
6809                                         debug_assert!(false);
6810                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6811                                 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
6812                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6813                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6814                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6815                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6816                                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6817                                                 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6818                                                 let mon_update_blocked = if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_opt {
6819                                                         self.raa_monitor_updates_held(
6820                                                                 &peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates, funding_txo,
6821                                                                 *counterparty_node_id)
6822                                                 } else { false };
6823                                                 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6824                                                         chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger, mon_update_blocked), chan_phase_entry);
6825                                                 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6826                                                         let funding_txo = funding_txo_opt
6827                                                                 .expect("Funding outpoint must have been set for RAA handling to succeed");
6828                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update,
6829                                                                 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6830                                                 }
6831                                                 htlcs_to_fail
6832                                         } else {
6833                                                 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6834                                                         "Got a revoke_and_ack message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6835                                         }
6836                                 },
6837                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6838                         }
6839                 };
6840                 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
6841                 Ok(())
6842         }
6843
6844         fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6845                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6846                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6847                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6848                                 debug_assert!(false);
6849                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6850                         })?;
6851                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6852                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6853                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6854                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6855                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6856                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6857                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6858                                 } else {
6859                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6860                                                 "Got an update_fee message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6861                                 }
6862                         },
6863                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6864                 }
6865                 Ok(())
6866         }
6867
6868         fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6869                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6870                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6871                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6872                                 debug_assert!(false);
6873                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6874                         })?;
6875                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6876                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6877                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6878                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6879                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6880                                         if !chan.context.is_usable() {
6881                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
6882                                         }
6883
6884                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6885                                                 msg: try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.announcement_signatures(
6886                                                         &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
6887                                                         msg, &self.default_configuration
6888                                                 ), chan_phase_entry),
6889                                                 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6890                                                 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6891                                                 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan).unwrap()),
6892                                         });
6893                                 } else {
6894                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6895                                                 "Got an announcement_signatures message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6896                                 }
6897                         },
6898                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6899                 }
6900                 Ok(())
6901         }
6902
6903         /// Returns DoPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersistNoEvents or an Err.
6904         fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6905                 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
6906                         Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
6907                         None => {
6908                                 // It's not a local channel
6909                                 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6910                         }
6911                 };
6912                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6913                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
6914                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
6915                         return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6916                 }
6917                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6918                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6919                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
6920                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6921                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6922                                         if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6923                                                 if chan.context.should_announce() {
6924                                                         // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
6925                                                         // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
6926                                                         // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
6927                                                         return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
6928                                                 }
6929                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
6930                                         }
6931                                         let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
6932                                         let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
6933                                         if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
6934                                                 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
6935                                         } else {
6936                                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6937                                                 log_debug!(logger, "Received channel_update {:?} for channel {}.", msg, chan_id);
6938                                                 let did_change = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_update(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6939                                                 // If nothing changed after applying their update, we don't need to bother
6940                                                 // persisting.
6941                                                 if !did_change {
6942                                                         return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
6943                                                 }
6944                                         }
6945                                 } else {
6946                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6947                                                 "Got a channel_update for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6948                                 }
6949                         },
6950                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6951                 }
6952                 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
6953         }
6954
6955         fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6956                 let htlc_forwards;
6957                 let need_lnd_workaround = {
6958                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6959
6960                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6961                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
6962                                         debug_assert!(false);
6963                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6964                                                 format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
6965                                                 msg.channel_id
6966                                         )
6967                                 })?;
6968                         let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id));
6969                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6970                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6971                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6972                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6973                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6974                                                 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
6975                                                 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
6976                                                 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
6977                                                 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
6978                                                 let responses = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_reestablish(
6979                                                         msg, &&logger, &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash,
6980                                                         &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan_phase_entry);
6981                                                 let mut channel_update = None;
6982                                                 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
6983                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6984                                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6985                                                                 msg,
6986                                                         });
6987                                                 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
6988                                                         // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
6989                                                         // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
6990                                                         // they have the latest channel parameters.
6991                                                         if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
6992                                                                 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6993                                                                         node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6994                                                                         msg,
6995                                                                 });
6996                                                         }
6997                                                 }
6998                                                 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
6999                                                 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
7000                                                         &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
7001                                                         Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
7002                                                 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
7003                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
7004                                                 }
7005                                                 need_lnd_workaround
7006                                         } else {
7007                                                 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7008                                                         "Got a channel_reestablish message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7009                                         }
7010                                 },
7011                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
7012                                         log_debug!(logger, "Sending bogus ChannelReestablish for unknown channel {} to force channel closure",
7013                                                 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id.0));
7014                                         // Unfortunately, lnd doesn't force close on errors
7015                                         // (https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/blob/abb1e3463f3a83bbb843d5c399869dbe930ad94f/htlcswitch/link.go#L2119).
7016                                         // One of the few ways to get an lnd counterparty to force close is by
7017                                         // replicating what they do when restoring static channel backups (SCBs). They
7018                                         // send an invalid `ChannelReestablish` with `0` commitment numbers and an
7019                                         // invalid `your_last_per_commitment_secret`.
7020                                         //
7021                                         // Since we received a `ChannelReestablish` for a channel that doesn't exist, we
7022                                         // can assume it's likely the channel closed from our point of view, but it
7023                                         // remains open on the counterparty's side. By sending this bogus
7024                                         // `ChannelReestablish` message now as a response to theirs, we trigger them to
7025                                         // force close broadcasting their latest state. If the closing transaction from
7026                                         // our point of view remains unconfirmed, it'll enter a race with the
7027                                         // counterparty's to-be-broadcast latest commitment transaction.
7028                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
7029                                                 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7030                                                 msg: msgs::ChannelReestablish {
7031                                                         channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7032                                                         next_local_commitment_number: 0,
7033                                                         next_remote_commitment_number: 0,
7034                                                         your_last_per_commitment_secret: [1u8; 32],
7035                                                         my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_slice(&[2u8; 33]).unwrap(),
7036                                                         next_funding_txid: None,
7037                                                 },
7038                                         });
7039                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7040                                                 format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}",
7041                                                         counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7042                                         )
7043                                 }
7044                         }
7045                 };
7046
7047                 let mut persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
7048                 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
7049                         self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
7050                         persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7051                 }
7052
7053                 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
7054                         self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
7055                 }
7056                 Ok(persist)
7057         }
7058
7059         /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
7060         fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
7061                 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
7062
7063                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7064                 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
7065                 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
7066                 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
7067                         for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
7068                                 match monitor_event {
7069                                         MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
7070                                                 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, counterparty_node_id, Some(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()));
7071                                                 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
7072                                                         log_trace!(logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", preimage);
7073                                                         self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, false, counterparty_node_id, funding_outpoint);
7074                                                 } else {
7075                                                         log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash);
7076                                                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
7077                                                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7078                                                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7079                                                 }
7080                                         },
7081                                         MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(funding_outpoint) => {
7082                                                 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
7083                                                         Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
7084                                                         None => {
7085                                                                 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
7086                                                                 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
7087                                                                 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7088                                                                 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
7089                                                         }
7090                                                 };
7091                                                 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
7092                                                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7093                                                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7094                                                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7095                                                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7096                                                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7097                                                                 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
7098                                                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
7099                                                                                 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
7100                                                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7101                                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7102                                                                                                 msg: update
7103                                                                                         });
7104                                                                                 }
7105                                                                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
7106                                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7107                                                                                         node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7108                                                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
7109                                                                                                 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
7110                                                                                         },
7111                                                                                 });
7112                                                                         }
7113                                                                 }
7114                                                         }
7115                                                 }
7116                                         },
7117                                         MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
7118                                                 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
7119                                         },
7120                                 }
7121                         }
7122                 }
7123
7124                 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7125                         self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7126                 }
7127
7128                 has_pending_monitor_events
7129         }
7130
7131         /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
7132         /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
7133         /// update events as a separate process method here.
7134         #[cfg(fuzzing)]
7135         pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
7136                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7137                 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
7138         }
7139
7140         /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
7141         /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
7142         /// update was applied.
7143         fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
7144                 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
7145                 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7146
7147                 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
7148                 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
7149                 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
7150                 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
7151                 'peer_loop: loop {
7152                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7153                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7154                                 'chan_loop: loop {
7155                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7156                                         let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7157                                         for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
7158                                                 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
7159                                         ) {
7160                                                 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
7161                                                 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7162                                                 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
7163                                                         chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context));
7164                                                 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
7165                                                         failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
7166                                                 }
7167                                                 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
7168                                                         has_monitor_update = true;
7169
7170                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
7171                                                                 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7172                                                         continue 'peer_loop;
7173                                                 }
7174                                         }
7175                                         break 'chan_loop;
7176                                 }
7177                         }
7178                         break 'peer_loop;
7179                 }
7180
7181                 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty();
7182                 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7183                         self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
7184                 }
7185
7186                 has_update
7187         }
7188
7189         /// When a call to a [`ChannelSigner`] method returns an error, this indicates that the signer
7190         /// is (temporarily) unavailable, and the operation should be retried later.
7191         ///
7192         /// This method allows for that retry - either checking for any signer-pending messages to be
7193         /// attempted in every channel, or in the specifically provided channel.
7194         ///
7195         /// [`ChannelSigner`]: crate::sign::ChannelSigner
7196         #[cfg(test)] // This is only implemented for one signer method, and should be private until we
7197                      // actually finish implementing it fully.
7198         pub fn signer_unblocked(&self, channel_opt: Option<(PublicKey, ChannelId)>) {
7199                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7200
7201                 let unblock_chan = |phase: &mut ChannelPhase<SP>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>| {
7202                         let node_id = phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id();
7203                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
7204                                 let msgs = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger);
7205                                 if let Some(updates) = msgs.commitment_update {
7206                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
7207                                                 node_id,
7208                                                 updates,
7209                                         });
7210                                 }
7211                                 if let Some(msg) = msgs.funding_signed {
7212                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
7213                                                 node_id,
7214                                                 msg,
7215                                         });
7216                                 }
7217                                 if let Some(msg) = msgs.funding_created {
7218                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
7219                                                 node_id,
7220                                                 msg,
7221                                         });
7222                                 }
7223                                 if let Some(msg) = msgs.channel_ready {
7224                                         send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
7225                                 }
7226                         }
7227                 };
7228
7229                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7230                 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, channel_id)) = channel_opt {
7231                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7232                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7233                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7234                                 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
7235                                         unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7236                                 }
7237                         }
7238                 } else {
7239                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7240                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7241                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7242                                 for (_, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
7243                                         unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7244                                 }
7245                         }
7246                 }
7247         }
7248
7249         /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
7250         /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
7251         /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
7252         fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
7253                 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
7254                 let mut has_update = false;
7255                 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
7256                 {
7257                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7258
7259                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7260                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7261                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7262                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7263                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, phase| {
7264                                         match phase {
7265                                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7266                                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7267                                                         match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &&logger) {
7268                                                                 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt, shutdown_result_opt)) => {
7269                                                                         if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
7270                                                                                 has_update = true;
7271                                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
7272                                                                                         node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
7273                                                                                 });
7274                                                                         }
7275                                                                         debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result_opt.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
7276                                                                         if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result_opt {
7277                                                                                 shutdown_results.push(shutdown_result);
7278                                                                         }
7279                                                                         if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
7280                                                                                 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
7281                                                                                 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
7282                                                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7283                                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7284                                                                                                 msg: update
7285                                                                                         });
7286                                                                                 }
7287
7288                                                                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
7289
7290                                                                                 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
7291                                                                                 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
7292                                                                                 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7293                                                                                 false
7294                                                                         } else { true }
7295                                                                 },
7296                                                                 Err(e) => {
7297                                                                         has_update = true;
7298                                                                         let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
7299                                                                         handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
7300                                                                         !close_channel
7301                                                                 }
7302                                                         }
7303                                                 },
7304                                                 _ => true, // Retain unfunded channels if present.
7305                                         }
7306                                 });
7307                         }
7308                 }
7309
7310                 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
7311                         let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
7312                 }
7313
7314                 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
7315                         self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
7316                 }
7317
7318                 has_update
7319         }
7320
7321         /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
7322         /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
7323         /// Channel object.
7324         fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
7325                 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7326                         // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
7327                         // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
7328                         // reorganized out of the main chain.
7329                         // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
7330                         // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
7331                         // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
7332                         // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
7333                         if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = failure.monitor_update.take() {
7334                                 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
7335                                 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
7336                                         assert!(should_broadcast);
7337                                 } else { unreachable!(); }
7338                                 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
7339                                         BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
7340                                                 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
7341                                         });
7342                         }
7343                         self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7344                 }
7345         }
7346
7347         /// Creates an [`OfferBuilder`] such that the [`Offer`] it builds is recognized by the
7348         /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`InvoiceRequest`] messages for the offer. The offer will
7349         /// not have an expiration unless otherwise set on the builder.
7350         ///
7351         /// # Privacy
7352         ///
7353         /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the offer with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the
7354         /// introduction node and a derived signing pubkey for recipient privacy. As such, currently,
7355         /// the node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction
7356         /// node in order to send the [`InvoiceRequest`].
7357         ///
7358         /// # Limitations
7359         ///
7360         /// Requires a direct connection to the introduction node in the responding [`InvoiceRequest`]'s
7361         /// reply path.
7362         ///
7363         /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
7364         ///
7365         /// [`Offer`]: crate::offers::offer::Offer
7366         /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
7367         pub fn create_offer_builder(
7368                 &self, description: String
7369         ) -> OfferBuilder<DerivedMetadata, secp256k1::All> {
7370                 let node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7371                 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7372                 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7373                 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7374                 let path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7375
7376                 OfferBuilder::deriving_signing_pubkey(description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx)
7377                         .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)
7378                         .path(path)
7379         }
7380
7381         /// Creates a [`RefundBuilder`] such that the [`Refund`] it builds is recognized by the
7382         /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`Bolt12Invoice`] messages for the refund.
7383         ///
7384         /// # Payment
7385         ///
7386         /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the refund.
7387         /// See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has been sent.
7388         ///
7389         /// The builder will have the provided expiration set. Any changes to the expiration on the
7390         /// returned builder will not be honored by [`ChannelManager`]. For `no-std`, the highest seen
7391         /// block time minus two hours is used for the current time when determining if the refund has
7392         /// expired.
7393         ///
7394         /// To revoke the refund, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
7395         /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received before expiration, the payment will fail
7396         /// with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
7397         ///
7398         /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
7399         /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
7400         ///
7401         /// # Privacy
7402         ///
7403         /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the refund with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as
7404         /// the introduction node and a derived payer id for payer privacy. As such, currently, the
7405         /// node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node
7406         /// in order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
7407         ///
7408         /// # Limitations
7409         ///
7410         /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in the responding
7411         /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
7412         ///
7413         /// # Errors
7414         ///
7415         /// Errors if a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link
7416         /// or if `amount_msats` is invalid.
7417         ///
7418         /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
7419         ///
7420         /// [`Refund`]: crate::offers::refund::Refund
7421         /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7422         /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
7423         pub fn create_refund_builder(
7424                 &self, description: String, amount_msats: u64, absolute_expiry: Duration,
7425                 payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
7426         ) -> Result<RefundBuilder<secp256k1::All>, Bolt12SemanticError> {
7427                 let node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7428                 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7429                 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7430                 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7431                 let path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7432
7433                 let builder = RefundBuilder::deriving_payer_id(
7434                         description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, amount_msats, payment_id
7435                 )?
7436                         .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)
7437                         .absolute_expiry(absolute_expiry)
7438                         .path(path);
7439
7440                 let expiration = StaleExpiration::AbsoluteTimeout(absolute_expiry);
7441                 self.pending_outbound_payments
7442                         .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
7443                                 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat,
7444                         )
7445                         .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
7446
7447                 Ok(builder)
7448         }
7449
7450         /// Pays for an [`Offer`] using the given parameters by creating an [`InvoiceRequest`] and
7451         /// enqueuing it to be sent via an onion message. [`ChannelManager`] will pay the actual
7452         /// [`Bolt12Invoice`] once it is received.
7453         ///
7454         /// Uses [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`] such that the [`InvoiceRequest`] it builds is recognized by
7455         /// the [`ChannelManager`] when handling a [`Bolt12Invoice`] message in response to the request.
7456         /// The optional parameters are used in the builder, if `Some`:
7457         /// - `quantity` for [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`] which must be set if
7458         ///   [`Offer::expects_quantity`] is `true`.
7459         /// - `amount_msats` if overpaying what is required for the given `quantity` is desired, and
7460         /// - `payer_note` for [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`].
7461         ///
7462         /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
7463         /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
7464         ///
7465         /// # Payment
7466         ///
7467         /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the request
7468         /// when received. See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has
7469         /// been sent.
7470         ///
7471         /// To revoke the request, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
7472         /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received in a reasonable amount of time, the
7473         /// payment will fail with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
7474         ///
7475         /// # Privacy
7476         ///
7477         /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the reply path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`]
7478         /// as the introduction node and a derived payer id for payer privacy. As such, currently, the
7479         /// node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node
7480         /// in order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
7481         ///
7482         /// # Limitations
7483         ///
7484         /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Offer::paths`] or to
7485         /// [`Offer::signing_pubkey`], if empty. A similar restriction applies to the responding
7486         /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
7487         ///
7488         /// # Errors
7489         ///
7490         /// Errors if a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link
7491         /// or if the provided parameters are invalid for the offer.
7492         ///
7493         /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
7494         /// [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::quantity
7495         /// [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::payer_note
7496         /// [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequestBuilder
7497         /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7498         /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
7499         /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
7500         pub fn pay_for_offer(
7501                 &self, offer: &Offer, quantity: Option<u64>, amount_msats: Option<u64>,
7502                 payer_note: Option<String>, payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry,
7503                 max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
7504         ) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
7505                 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7506                 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7507                 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7508
7509                 let builder = offer
7510                         .request_invoice_deriving_payer_id(expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, payment_id)?
7511                         .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)?;
7512                 let builder = match quantity {
7513                         None => builder,
7514                         Some(quantity) => builder.quantity(quantity)?,
7515                 };
7516                 let builder = match amount_msats {
7517                         None => builder,
7518                         Some(amount_msats) => builder.amount_msats(amount_msats)?,
7519                 };
7520                 let builder = match payer_note {
7521                         None => builder,
7522                         Some(payer_note) => builder.payer_note(payer_note),
7523                 };
7524
7525                 let invoice_request = builder.build_and_sign()?;
7526                 let reply_path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7527
7528                 let expiration = StaleExpiration::TimerTicks(1);
7529                 self.pending_outbound_payments
7530                         .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
7531                                 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat
7532                         )
7533                         .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
7534
7535                 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
7536                 if offer.paths().is_empty() {
7537                         let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7538                                 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request),
7539                                 Destination::Node(offer.signing_pubkey()),
7540                                 Some(reply_path),
7541                         );
7542                         pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7543                 } else {
7544                         // Send as many invoice requests as there are paths in the offer (with an upper bound).
7545                         // Using only one path could result in a failure if the path no longer exists. But only
7546                         // one invoice for a given payment id will be paid, even if more than one is received.
7547                         const REQUEST_LIMIT: usize = 10;
7548                         for path in offer.paths().into_iter().take(REQUEST_LIMIT) {
7549                                 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7550                                         OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request.clone()),
7551                                         Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
7552                                         Some(reply_path.clone()),
7553                                 );
7554                                 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7555                         }
7556                 }
7557
7558                 Ok(())
7559         }
7560
7561         /// Creates a [`Bolt12Invoice`] for a [`Refund`] and enqueues it to be sent via an onion
7562         /// message.
7563         ///
7564         /// The resulting invoice uses a [`PaymentHash`] recognized by the [`ChannelManager`] and a
7565         /// [`BlindedPath`] containing the [`PaymentSecret`] needed to reconstruct the corresponding
7566         /// [`PaymentPreimage`].
7567         ///
7568         /// # Limitations
7569         ///
7570         /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Refund::paths`] or to
7571         /// [`Refund::payer_id`], if empty. This request is best effort; an invoice will be sent to each
7572         /// node meeting the aforementioned criteria, but there's no guarantee that they will be
7573         /// received and no retries will be made.
7574         ///
7575         /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7576         pub fn request_refund_payment(&self, refund: &Refund) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
7577                 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7578                 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7579                 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7580
7581                 let amount_msats = refund.amount_msats();
7582                 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
7583
7584                 match self.create_inbound_payment(Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None) {
7585                         Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => {
7586                                 let payment_paths = vec![
7587                                         self.create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(payment_secret),
7588                                 ];
7589                                 #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
7590                                 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys(
7591                                         payment_paths, payment_hash, expanded_key, entropy
7592                                 )?;
7593                                 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
7594                                 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
7595                                         self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
7596                                 );
7597                                 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
7598                                 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
7599                                         payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at, expanded_key, entropy
7600                                 )?;
7601                                 let invoice = builder.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)?;
7602                                 let reply_path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7603
7604                                 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
7605                                 if refund.paths().is_empty() {
7606                                         let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7607                                                 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice),
7608                                                 Destination::Node(refund.payer_id()),
7609                                                 Some(reply_path),
7610                                         );
7611                                         pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7612                                 } else {
7613                                         for path in refund.paths() {
7614                                                 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7615                                                         OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice.clone()),
7616                                                         Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
7617                                                         Some(reply_path.clone()),
7618                                                 );
7619                                                 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7620                                         }
7621                                 }
7622
7623                                 Ok(())
7624                         },
7625                         Err(()) => Err(Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount),
7626                 }
7627         }
7628
7629         /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
7630         /// to pay us.
7631         ///
7632         /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
7633         /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
7634         ///
7635         /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
7636         /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
7637         /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
7638         /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
7639         ///
7640         /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
7641         ///
7642         /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
7643         /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
7644         ///
7645         /// # Note
7646         ///
7647         /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
7648         /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
7649         ///
7650         /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
7651         ///
7652         /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
7653         /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
7654         ///
7655         /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
7656         /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
7657         /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
7658         /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
7659         /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
7660         /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
7661         pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
7662                 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
7663                 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
7664                         &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
7665                         min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
7666         }
7667
7668         /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
7669         /// stored external to LDK.
7670         ///
7671         /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
7672         /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
7673         /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
7674         ///
7675         /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
7676         /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
7677         /// payments.
7678         ///
7679         /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
7680         /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
7681         /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
7682         /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
7683         ///
7684         /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
7685         /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
7686         /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
7687         /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
7688         /// invoices when no timeout is set.
7689         ///
7690         /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
7691         /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
7692         /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
7693         /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
7694         /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
7695         ///
7696         /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
7697         /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
7698         ///
7699         /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
7700         /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
7701         ///
7702         /// # Note
7703         ///
7704         /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
7705         /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
7706         ///
7707         /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
7708         ///
7709         /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
7710         /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
7711         ///
7712         /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
7713         /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
7714         pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
7715                 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
7716                 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
7717                         invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
7718                         min_final_cltv_expiry)
7719         }
7720
7721         /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
7722         /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
7723         ///
7724         /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
7725         pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
7726                 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
7727         }
7728
7729         /// Creates a one-hop blinded path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction
7730         /// node.
7731         fn create_one_hop_blinded_path(&self) -> BlindedPath {
7732                 let entropy_source = self.entropy_source.deref();
7733                 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7734                 BlindedPath::one_hop_for_message(self.get_our_node_id(), entropy_source, secp_ctx).unwrap()
7735         }
7736
7737         /// Creates a one-hop blinded path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction
7738         /// node.
7739         fn create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(
7740                 &self, payment_secret: PaymentSecret
7741         ) -> (BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath) {
7742                 let entropy_source = self.entropy_source.deref();
7743                 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7744
7745                 let payee_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7746                 let max_cltv_expiry = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
7747                 let payee_tlvs = ReceiveTlvs {
7748                         payment_secret,
7749                         payment_constraints: PaymentConstraints {
7750                                 max_cltv_expiry,
7751                                 htlc_minimum_msat: 1,
7752                         },
7753                 };
7754                 // TODO: Err for overflow?
7755                 BlindedPath::one_hop_for_payment(
7756                         payee_node_id, payee_tlvs, entropy_source, secp_ctx
7757                 ).unwrap()
7758         }
7759
7760         /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
7761         /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
7762         ///
7763         /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
7764         pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
7765                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7766                 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
7767                 loop {
7768                         let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
7769                         // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
7770                         match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
7771                                 Some(_) => continue,
7772                                 None => return scid_candidate
7773                         }
7774                 }
7775         }
7776
7777         /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
7778         ///
7779         /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
7780         pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
7781                 PhantomRouteHints {
7782                         channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
7783                         phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
7784                         real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
7785                 }
7786         }
7787
7788         /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
7789         /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
7790         /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
7791         ///
7792         /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
7793         /// times to get a unique scid.
7794         pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
7795                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7796                 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
7797                 loop {
7798                         let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
7799                         // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
7800                         if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
7801                         return scid_candidate
7802                 }
7803         }
7804
7805         /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
7806         /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
7807         pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
7808                 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
7809
7810                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7811                 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7812                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7813                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7814                         for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(
7815                                 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
7816                         ) {
7817                                 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7818                                         if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
7819                                                 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
7820                                         }
7821                                 }
7822                         }
7823                 }
7824
7825                 inflight_htlcs
7826         }
7827
7828         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7829         pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
7830                 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
7831                 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
7832                 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
7833                 events.into_inner()
7834         }
7835
7836         #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
7837         pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
7838                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7839                 events.push_back((event, None));
7840         }
7841
7842         #[cfg(test)]
7843         pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
7844                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7845                 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
7846         }
7847
7848         #[cfg(test)]
7849         pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
7850                 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
7851         }
7852
7853         #[cfg(test)]
7854         pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
7855                 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
7856         }
7857
7858         /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
7859         /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
7860         /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
7861         /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
7862         fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
7863                 let logger = WithContext::from(
7864                         &self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
7865                 );
7866                 loop {
7867                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7868                         if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7869                                 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
7870                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
7871                                 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
7872                                         // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
7873                                         if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
7874                                                 .get_mut(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
7875                                         {
7876                                                 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
7877                                         }
7878                                 }
7879
7880                                 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
7881                                         channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id) {
7882                                         // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
7883                                         // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
7884                                         // update(s) when those blockers complete.
7885                                         log_trace!(logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
7886                                                 &channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7887                                         break;
7888                                 }
7889
7890                                 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
7891                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7892                                                 debug_assert_eq!(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
7893                                                 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
7894                                                         log_debug!(logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
7895                                                                 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7896                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
7897                                                                 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7898                                                         if further_update_exists {
7899                                                                 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
7900                                                                 // top of the loop.
7901                                                                 continue;
7902                                                         }
7903                                                 } else {
7904                                                         log_trace!(logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
7905                                                                 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7906                                                 }
7907                                         }
7908                                 }
7909                         } else {
7910                                 log_debug!(logger,
7911                                         "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
7912                                         log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7913                         }
7914                         break;
7915                 }
7916         }
7917
7918         fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
7919                 for action in actions {
7920                         match action {
7921                                 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
7922                                         channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
7923                                 } => {
7924                                         self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, None);
7925                                 }
7926                         }
7927                 }
7928         }
7929
7930         /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
7931         /// using the given event handler.
7932         ///
7933         /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
7934         pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
7935                 &self, handler: H
7936         ) {
7937                 let mut ev;
7938                 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
7939         }
7940 }
7941
7942 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7943 where
7944         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
7945         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7946         ES::Target: EntropySource,
7947         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7948         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7949         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7950         R::Target: Router,
7951         L::Target: Logger,
7952 {
7953         /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
7954         /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
7955         /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
7956         /// is always placed next to each other.
7957         ///
7958         /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
7959         /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
7960         /// `MessageSendEvent`s  for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
7961         /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
7962         ///
7963         /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
7964         /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
7965         /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
7966         fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
7967                 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
7968                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7969                         let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
7970
7971                         // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
7972                         // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
7973                         if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
7974                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7975                         }
7976
7977                         if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
7978                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7979                         }
7980                         if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
7981                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7982                         }
7983
7984                         let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
7985                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7986                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7987                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7988                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7989                                 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
7990                                         pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7991                                 }
7992                         }
7993
7994                         if !pending_events.is_empty() {
7995                                 events.replace(pending_events);
7996                         }
7997
7998                         result
7999                 });
8000                 events.into_inner()
8001         }
8002 }
8003
8004 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8005 where
8006         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8007         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8008         ES::Target: EntropySource,
8009         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8010         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8011         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8012         R::Target: Router,
8013         L::Target: Logger,
8014 {
8015         /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
8016         ///
8017         /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
8018         /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
8019         fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
8020                 let mut ev;
8021                 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
8022         }
8023 }
8024
8025 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8026 where
8027         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8028         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8029         ES::Target: EntropySource,
8030         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8031         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8032         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8033         R::Target: Router,
8034         L::Target: Logger,
8035 {
8036         fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
8037                 {
8038                         let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
8039                         assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
8040                                 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
8041                         assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
8042                                 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
8043                 }
8044
8045                 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
8046                 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
8047         }
8048
8049         fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
8050                 let _persistence_guard =
8051                         PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8052                                 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8053                 let new_height = height - 1;
8054                 {
8055                         let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
8056                         assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
8057                                 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
8058                         assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
8059                                 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
8060                         *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
8061                 }
8062
8063                 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8064         }
8065 }
8066
8067 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8068 where
8069         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8070         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8071         ES::Target: EntropySource,
8072         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8073         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8074         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8075         R::Target: Router,
8076         L::Target: Logger,
8077 {
8078         fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
8079                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8080                 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8081                 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8082
8083                 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
8084                 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
8085
8086                 let _persistence_guard =
8087                         PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8088                                 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8089                 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context))
8090                         .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
8091
8092                 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
8093                 if height < last_best_block_height {
8094                         let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
8095                         self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8096                 }
8097         }
8098
8099         fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
8100                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8101                 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8102                 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8103
8104                 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
8105                 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
8106
8107                 let _persistence_guard =
8108                         PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8109                                 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8110                 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
8111
8112                 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8113
8114                 macro_rules! max_time {
8115                         ($timestamp: expr) => {
8116                                 loop {
8117                                         // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
8118                                         // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
8119                                         // having an explicit local time source.
8120                                         // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
8121                                         // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
8122                                         let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
8123                                         if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
8124                                         if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
8125                                                 break;
8126                                         }
8127                                 }
8128                         }
8129                 }
8130                 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
8131                 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8132                 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
8133                         inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
8134                 });
8135         }
8136
8137         fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, u32, Option<BlockHash>)> {
8138                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
8139                 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
8140                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8141                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8142                         for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(|phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }) {
8143                                 let txid_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
8144                                 let height_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmation_height();
8145                                 let hash_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in();
8146                                 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(conf_height), Some(block_hash)) = (txid_opt, height_opt, hash_opt) {
8147                                         res.push((funding_txo.txid, conf_height, Some(block_hash)));
8148                                 }
8149                         }
8150                 }
8151                 res
8152         }
8153
8154         fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
8155                 let _persistence_guard =
8156                         PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8157                                 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8158                 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
8159                         if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
8160                                 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
8161                                         channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
8162                                 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8163                         } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8164                 });
8165         }
8166 }
8167
8168 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8169 where
8170         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8171         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8172         ES::Target: EntropySource,
8173         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8174         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8175         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8176         R::Target: Router,
8177         L::Target: Logger,
8178 {
8179         /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
8180         /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
8181         /// the function.
8182         fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
8183                         (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
8184                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8185                 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8186                 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8187
8188                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8189                 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
8190                 {
8191                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8192                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8193                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8194                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8195                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8196                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
8197                                         match phase {
8198                                                 // Retain unfunded channels.
8199                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => true,
8200                                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
8201                                                         let res = f(channel);
8202                                                         if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
8203                                                                 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
8204                                                                         let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
8205                                                                         timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
8206                                                                                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
8207                                                                 }
8208                                                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
8209                                                                 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
8210                                                                         send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
8211                                                                         if channel.context.is_usable() {
8212                                                                                 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8213                                                                                 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
8214                                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
8215                                                                                                 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8216                                                                                                 msg,
8217                                                                                         });
8218                                                                                 }
8219                                                                         } else {
8220                                                                                 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8221                                                                         }
8222                                                                 }
8223
8224                                                                 {
8225                                                                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8226                                                                         emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
8227                                                                 }
8228
8229                                                                 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
8230                                                                         log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8231                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
8232                                                                                 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8233                                                                                 msg: announcement_sigs,
8234                                                                         });
8235                                                                         if let Some(height) = height_opt {
8236                                                                                 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
8237                                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
8238                                                                                                 msg: announcement,
8239                                                                                                 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
8240                                                                                                 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
8241                                                                                                 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
8242                                                                                         });
8243                                                                                 }
8244                                                                         }
8245                                                                 }
8246                                                                 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
8247                                                                         if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
8248                                                                                 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
8249                                                                                 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
8250                                                                                 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
8251                                                                                 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
8252                                                                                 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
8253                                                                                 // is always consistent.
8254                                                                                 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
8255                                                                                 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8256                                                                                 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
8257                                                                                         "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
8258                                                                                         fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
8259                                                                         }
8260                                                                 }
8261                                                         } else if let Err(reason) = res {
8262                                                                 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
8263                                                                 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
8264                                                                 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
8265                                                                 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true));
8266                                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
8267                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
8268                                                                                 msg: update
8269                                                                         });
8270                                                                 }
8271                                                                 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
8272                                                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, reason);
8273                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
8274                                                                         node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8275                                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
8276                                                                                 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage {
8277                                                                                         channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8278                                                                                         data: reason_message,
8279                                                                                 })
8280                                                                         },
8281                                                                 });
8282                                                                 return false;
8283                                                         }
8284                                                         true
8285                                                 }
8286                                         }
8287                                 });
8288                         }
8289                 }
8290
8291                 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
8292                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
8293                                 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
8294                                         // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
8295                                         // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
8296                                         // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
8297                                         // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
8298                                         if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8299                                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
8300                                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
8301
8302                                                 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
8303                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
8304                                                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
8305                                                 false
8306                                         } else { true }
8307                                 });
8308                                 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
8309                         });
8310
8311                         let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8312                         intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
8313                                 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8314                                         let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
8315                                                 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
8316                                                 user_channel_id: Some(htlc.prev_user_channel_id),
8317                                                 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
8318                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
8319                                                 phantom_shared_secret: None,
8320                                                 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
8321                                                 blinded_failure: htlc.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
8322                                         });
8323
8324                                         let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
8325                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
8326                                                 _ => unreachable!(),
8327                                         };
8328                                         timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
8329                                                         HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
8330                                                         HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
8331                                         let logger = WithContext::from(
8332                                                 &self.logger, None, Some(htlc.prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
8333                                         );
8334                                         log_trace!(logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
8335                                         false
8336                                 } else { true }
8337                         });
8338                 }
8339
8340                 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
8341
8342                 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
8343                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
8344                 }
8345         }
8346
8347         /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] may need to be persisted or
8348         /// may have events that need processing.
8349         ///
8350         /// In order to check if this [`ChannelManager`] needs persisting, call
8351         /// [`Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence`].
8352         ///
8353         /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
8354         /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
8355         pub fn get_event_or_persistence_needed_future(&self) -> Future {
8356                 self.event_persist_notifier.get_future()
8357         }
8358
8359         /// Returns true if this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
8360         pub fn get_and_clear_needs_persistence(&self) -> bool {
8361                 self.needs_persist_flag.swap(false, Ordering::AcqRel)
8362         }
8363
8364         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
8365         pub fn get_event_or_persist_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
8366                 self.event_persist_notifier.notify_pending()
8367         }
8368
8369         /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
8370         /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
8371         pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
8372                 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
8373         }
8374
8375         /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8376         /// [`ChannelManager`].
8377         pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
8378                 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
8379         }
8380
8381         /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8382         /// [`ChannelManager`].
8383         ///
8384         /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
8385         /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
8386         #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
8387         pub fn bolt11_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
8388                 provided_bolt11_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
8389         }
8390
8391         /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8392         /// [`ChannelManager`].
8393         fn bolt12_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
8394                 provided_bolt12_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
8395         }
8396
8397         /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8398         /// [`ChannelManager`].
8399         pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
8400                 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
8401         }
8402
8403         /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8404         /// [`ChannelManager`].
8405         pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
8406                 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
8407         }
8408
8409         /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8410         /// [`ChannelManager`].
8411         pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
8412                 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
8413         }
8414 }
8415
8416 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8417         ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8418 where
8419         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8420         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8421         ES::Target: EntropySource,
8422         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8423         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8424         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8425         R::Target: Router,
8426         L::Target: Logger,
8427 {
8428         fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
8429                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8430                 // open_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
8431                 // change to the contents.
8432                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8433                         let res = self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8434                         let persist = match &res {
8435                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => {
8436                                         debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't close a new channel");
8437                                         NotifyOption::DoPersist
8438                                 },
8439                                 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8440                         };
8441                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8442                         persist
8443                 });
8444         }
8445
8446         fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
8447                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8448                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8449                          msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8450         }
8451
8452         fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
8453                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8454                 // accept_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
8455                 // change to the contents.
8456                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8457                         let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8458                         NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents
8459                 });
8460         }
8461
8462         fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
8463                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8464                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8465                          msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8466         }
8467
8468         fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
8469                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8470                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8471         }
8472
8473         fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
8474                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8475                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8476         }
8477
8478         fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
8479                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8480                 // channel_ready message - while the channel's state will change, any channel_ready message
8481                 // will ultimately be re-sent on startup and the `ChannelMonitor` won't be updated so we
8482                 // will not force-close the channel on startup.
8483                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8484                         let res = self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8485                         let persist = match &res {
8486                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8487                                 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8488                         };
8489                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8490                         persist
8491                 });
8492         }
8493
8494         fn handle_stfu(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Stfu) {
8495                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8496                         "Quiescence not supported".to_owned(),
8497                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8498         }
8499
8500         fn handle_splice(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Splice) {
8501                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8502                         "Splicing not supported".to_owned(),
8503                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8504         }
8505
8506         fn handle_splice_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceAck) {
8507                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8508                         "Splicing not supported (splice_ack)".to_owned(),
8509                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8510         }
8511
8512         fn handle_splice_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceLocked) {
8513                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8514                         "Splicing not supported (splice_locked)".to_owned(),
8515                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8516         }
8517
8518         fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
8519                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8520                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8521         }
8522
8523         fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
8524                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8525                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8526         }
8527
8528         fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
8529                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8530                 // update_add_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8531                 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8532                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8533                         let res = self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8534                         let persist = match &res {
8535                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8536                                 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8537                                 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8538                         };
8539                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8540                         persist
8541                 });
8542         }
8543
8544         fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
8545                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8546                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8547         }
8548
8549         fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
8550                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8551                 // update_fail_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8552                 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8553                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8554                         let res = self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8555                         let persist = match &res {
8556                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8557                                 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8558                                 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8559                         };
8560                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8561                         persist
8562                 });
8563         }
8564
8565         fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
8566                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8567                 // update_fail_malformed_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state
8568                 // only the `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8569                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8570                         let res = self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8571                         let persist = match &res {
8572                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8573                                 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8574                                 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8575                         };
8576                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8577                         persist
8578                 });
8579         }
8580
8581         fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
8582                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8583                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8584         }
8585
8586         fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
8587                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8588                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8589         }
8590
8591         fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
8592                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8593                 // update_fee message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8594                 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8595                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8596                         let res = self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8597                         let persist = match &res {
8598                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8599                                 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8600                                 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8601                         };
8602                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8603                         persist
8604                 });
8605         }
8606
8607         fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
8608                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8609                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8610         }
8611
8612         fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
8613                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8614                         if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
8615                                 persist
8616                         } else {
8617                                 NotifyOption::DoPersist
8618                         }
8619                 });
8620         }
8621
8622         fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
8623                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8624                         let res = self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8625                         let persist = match &res {
8626                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8627                                 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8628                                 Ok(persist) => *persist,
8629                         };
8630                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8631                         persist
8632                 });
8633         }
8634
8635         fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
8636                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
8637                         self, || NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents);
8638                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8639                 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8640                 let remove_peer = {
8641                         log_debug!(
8642                                 WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None),
8643                                 "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
8644                                 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id)
8645                         );
8646                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
8647                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8648                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8649                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8650                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
8651                                         let context = match phase {
8652                                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
8653                                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
8654                                                         if chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok() {
8655                                                                 // We only retain funded channels that are not shutdown.
8656                                                                 return true;
8657                                                         }
8658                                                         &mut chan.context
8659                                                 },
8660                                                 // Unfunded channels will always be removed.
8661                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
8662                                                         &mut chan.context
8663                                                 },
8664                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
8665                                                         &mut chan.context
8666                                                 },
8667                                         };
8668                                         // Clean up for removal.
8669                                         update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
8670                                         self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
8671                                         failed_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false));
8672                                         false
8673                                 });
8674                                 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
8675                                 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
8676                                 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
8677                                 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
8678                                         match msg {
8679                                                 // V1 Channel Establishment
8680                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
8681                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
8682                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
8683                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
8684                                                 // V2 Channel Establishment
8685                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
8686                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
8687                                                 // Common Channel Establishment
8688                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
8689                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
8690                                                 // Quiescence
8691                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendStfu { .. } => false,
8692                                                 // Splicing
8693                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSplice { .. } => false,
8694                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceAck { .. } => false,
8695                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceLocked { .. } => false,
8696                                                 // Interactive Transaction Construction
8697                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
8698                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
8699                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
8700                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
8701                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
8702                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
8703                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
8704                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
8705                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
8706                                                 // Channel Operations
8707                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
8708                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
8709                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
8710                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
8711                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
8712                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
8713                                                 // Gossip
8714                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
8715                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
8716                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
8717                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
8718                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
8719                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
8720                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
8721                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
8722                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
8723                                         }
8724                                 });
8725                                 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
8726                                 peer_state.is_connected = false;
8727                                 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
8728                         } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
8729                 };
8730                 if remove_peer {
8731                         per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
8732                 }
8733                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
8734
8735                 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
8736                         self.finish_close_channel(failure);
8737                 }
8738         }
8739
8740         fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
8741                 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None);
8742                 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
8743                         log_debug!(logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8744                         return Err(());
8745                 }
8746
8747                 let mut res = Ok(());
8748
8749                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8750                         // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
8751                         // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
8752                         // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
8753                         // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
8754                         let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
8755                         let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
8756
8757                         {
8758                                 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8759                                 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
8760                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
8761                                                 if inbound_peer_limited {
8762                                                         res = Err(());
8763                                                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8764                                                 }
8765                                                 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
8766                                                         channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8767                                                         inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8768                                                         latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
8769                                                         pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
8770                                                         in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8771                                                         monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
8772                                                         actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8773                                                         is_connected: true,
8774                                                 }));
8775                                         },
8776                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
8777                                                 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
8778                                                 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
8779
8780                                                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
8781                                                 if inbound_peer_limited &&
8782                                                         Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
8783                                                         peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
8784                                                 {
8785                                                         res = Err(());
8786                                                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8787                                                 }
8788
8789                                                 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
8790                                                 peer_state.is_connected = true;
8791                                         },
8792                                 }
8793                         }
8794
8795                         log_debug!(logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8796
8797                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8798                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
8799                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8800                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8801                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8802
8803                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(|(_, phase)|
8804                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else {
8805                                                 // Since unfunded channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer, and they're not persisted
8806                                                 // (so won't be recovered after a crash), they shouldn't exist here and we would never need to
8807                                                 // worry about closing and removing them.
8808                                                 debug_assert!(false);
8809                                                 None
8810                                         }
8811                                 ).for_each(|chan| {
8812                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
8813                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
8814                                                 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8815                                                 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger),
8816                                         });
8817                                 });
8818                         }
8819
8820                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
8821                         //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
8822                 });
8823                 res
8824         }
8825
8826         fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
8827                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8828
8829                 match &msg.data as &str {
8830                         "cannot co-op close channel w/ active htlcs"|
8831                         "link failed to shutdown" =>
8832                         {
8833                                 // LND hasn't properly handled shutdown messages ever, and force-closes any time we
8834                                 // send one while HTLCs are still present. The issue is tracked at
8835                                 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/6039 and has had multiple patches
8836                                 // to fix it but none so far have managed to land upstream. The issue appears to be
8837                                 // very low priority for the LND team despite being marked "P1".
8838                                 // We're not going to bother handling this in a sensible way, instead simply
8839                                 // repeating the Shutdown message on repeat until morale improves.
8840                                 if !msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
8841                                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8842                                         let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
8843                                         if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
8844                                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8845                                         if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&msg.channel_id) {
8846                                                 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_outbound_shutdown() {
8847                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
8848                                                                 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8849                                                                 msg,
8850                                                         });
8851                                                 }
8852                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
8853                                                         node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8854                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
8855                                                                 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
8856                                                                         channel_id: msg.channel_id,
8857                                                                         data: "You appear to be exhibiting LND bug 6039, we'll keep sending you shutdown messages until you handle them correctly".to_owned()
8858                                                                 },
8859                                                                 log_level: Level::Trace,
8860                                                         }
8861                                                 });
8862                                         }
8863                                 }
8864                                 return;
8865                         }
8866                         _ => {}
8867                 }
8868
8869                 if msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
8870                         let channel_ids: Vec<ChannelId> = {
8871                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8872                                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
8873                                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
8874                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8875                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8876                                 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
8877                                 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
8878                                 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
8879                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
8880                         };
8881                         for channel_id in channel_ids {
8882                                 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
8883                                 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
8884                         }
8885                 } else {
8886                         {
8887                                 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
8888                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8889                                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
8890                                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
8891                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8892                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8893                                 if let Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
8894                                         if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
8895                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
8896                                                         node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8897                                                         msg,
8898                                                 });
8899                                                 return;
8900                                         }
8901                                 }
8902                         }
8903
8904                         // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
8905                         let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
8906                 }
8907         }
8908
8909         fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
8910                 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
8911         }
8912
8913         fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
8914                 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
8915         }
8916
8917         fn get_chain_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
8918                 Some(vec![self.chain_hash])
8919         }
8920
8921         fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
8922                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8923                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8924                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8925         }
8926
8927         fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
8928                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8929                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8930                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8931         }
8932
8933         fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
8934                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8935                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8936                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8937         }
8938
8939         fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
8940                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8941                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8942                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8943         }
8944
8945         fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
8946                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8947                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8948                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8949         }
8950
8951         fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
8952                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8953                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8954                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8955         }
8956
8957         fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
8958                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8959                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8960                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8961         }
8962
8963         fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
8964                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8965                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8966                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8967         }
8968
8969         fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
8970                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8971                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8972                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8973         }
8974 }
8975
8976 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8977 OffersMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8978 where
8979         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8980         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8981         ES::Target: EntropySource,
8982         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8983         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8984         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8985         R::Target: Router,
8986         L::Target: Logger,
8987 {
8988         fn handle_message(&self, message: OffersMessage) -> Option<OffersMessage> {
8989                 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8990                 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
8991
8992                 match message {
8993                         OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request) => {
8994                                 let amount_msats = match InvoiceBuilder::<DerivedSigningPubkey>::amount_msats(
8995                                         &invoice_request
8996                                 ) {
8997                                         Ok(amount_msats) => Some(amount_msats),
8998                                         Err(error) => return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
8999                                 };
9000                                 let invoice_request = match invoice_request.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
9001                                         Ok(invoice_request) => invoice_request,
9002                                         Err(()) => {
9003                                                 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidMetadata;
9004                                                 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
9005                                         },
9006                                 };
9007                                 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
9008
9009                                 match self.create_inbound_payment(amount_msats, relative_expiry, None) {
9010                                         Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) if invoice_request.keys.is_some() => {
9011                                                 let payment_paths = vec![
9012                                                         self.create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(payment_secret),
9013                                                 ];
9014                                                 #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
9015                                                 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys(
9016                                                         payment_paths, payment_hash
9017                                                 );
9018                                                 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
9019                                                 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
9020                                                         self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
9021                                                 );
9022                                                 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
9023                                                 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
9024                                                         payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
9025                                                 );
9026                                                 match builder.and_then(|b| b.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)) {
9027                                                         Ok(invoice) => Some(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
9028                                                         Err(error) => Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
9029                                                 }
9030                                         },
9031                                         Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => {
9032                                                 let payment_paths = vec![
9033                                                         self.create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(payment_secret),
9034                                                 ];
9035                                                 #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
9036                                                 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with(payment_paths, payment_hash);
9037                                                 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
9038                                                 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
9039                                                         self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
9040                                                 );
9041                                                 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
9042                                                 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with_no_std(
9043                                                         payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
9044                                                 );
9045                                                 let response = builder.and_then(|builder| builder.allow_mpp().build())
9046                                                         .map_err(|e| OffersMessage::InvoiceError(e.into()))
9047                                                         .and_then(|invoice|
9048                                                                 match invoice.sign(|invoice| self.node_signer.sign_bolt12_invoice(invoice)) {
9049                                                                         Ok(invoice) => Ok(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
9050                                                                         Err(SignError::Signing(())) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
9051                                                                                         InvoiceError::from_string("Failed signing invoice".to_string())
9052                                                                         )),
9053                                                                         Err(SignError::Verification(_)) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
9054                                                                                         InvoiceError::from_string("Failed invoice signature verification".to_string())
9055                                                                         )),
9056                                                                 });
9057                                                 match response {
9058                                                         Ok(invoice) => Some(invoice),
9059                                                         Err(error) => Some(error),
9060                                                 }
9061                                         },
9062                                         Err(()) => {
9063                                                 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount.into()))
9064                                         },
9065                                 }
9066                         },
9067                         OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice) => {
9068                                 match invoice.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
9069                                         Err(()) => {
9070                                                 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string("Unrecognized invoice".to_owned())))
9071                                         },
9072                                         Ok(_) if invoice.invoice_features().requires_unknown_bits_from(&self.bolt12_invoice_features()) => {
9073                                                 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(Bolt12SemanticError::UnknownRequiredFeatures.into()))
9074                                         },
9075                                         Ok(payment_id) => {
9076                                                 if let Err(e) = self.send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&invoice, payment_id) {
9077                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed paying invoice: {:?}", e);
9078                                                         Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string(format!("{:?}", e))))
9079                                                 } else {
9080                                                         None
9081                                                 }
9082                                         },
9083                                 }
9084                         },
9085                         OffersMessage::InvoiceError(invoice_error) => {
9086                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received invoice_error: {}", invoice_error);
9087                                 None
9088                         },
9089                 }
9090         }
9091
9092         fn release_pending_messages(&self) -> Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>> {
9093                 core::mem::take(&mut self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap())
9094         }
9095 }
9096
9097 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9098 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9099 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
9100         let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
9101         node_features.set_keysend_optional();
9102         node_features
9103 }
9104
9105 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9106 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9107 ///
9108 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
9109 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
9110 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
9111 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt11_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
9112         provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9113 }
9114
9115 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9116 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9117 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt12_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
9118         provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9119 }
9120
9121 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9122 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9123 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
9124         provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9125 }
9126
9127 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9128 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9129 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
9130         ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
9131 }
9132
9133 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9134 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9135 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
9136         // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
9137         // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
9138         // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
9139         let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
9140         features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
9141         features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
9142         features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
9143         features.set_static_remote_key_required();
9144         features.set_payment_secret_required();
9145         features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
9146         features.set_wumbo_optional();
9147         features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
9148         features.set_channel_type_optional();
9149         features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
9150         features.set_zero_conf_optional();
9151         if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
9152                 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
9153         }
9154         features
9155 }
9156
9157 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
9158 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
9159
9160 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
9161         (2, fee_base_msat, required),
9162         (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
9163         (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
9164 });
9165
9166 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
9167         (2, node_id, required),
9168         (4, features, required),
9169         (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
9170         (8, forwarding_info, option),
9171         (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9172         (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9173 });
9174
9175 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
9176         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9177                 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
9178                 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
9179                 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
9180                 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
9181                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9182                         (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
9183                         (2, self.channel_id, required),
9184                         (3, self.channel_type, option),
9185                         (4, self.counterparty, required),
9186                         (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
9187                         (6, self.funding_txo, option),
9188                         (7, self.config, option),
9189                         (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
9190                         (9, self.confirmations, option),
9191                         (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
9192                         (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
9193                         (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
9194                         (16, self.balance_msat, required),
9195                         (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
9196                         (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
9197                         (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
9198                         (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
9199                         (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
9200                         (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
9201                         (26, self.is_outbound, required),
9202                         (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
9203                         (30, self.is_usable, required),
9204                         (32, self.is_public, required),
9205                         (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9206                         (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9207                         (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
9208                         (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
9209                         (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
9210                 });
9211                 Ok(())
9212         }
9213 }
9214
9215 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
9216         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9217                 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9218                         (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
9219                         (2, channel_id, required),
9220                         (3, channel_type, option),
9221                         (4, counterparty, required),
9222                         (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
9223                         (6, funding_txo, option),
9224                         (7, config, option),
9225                         (8, short_channel_id, option),
9226                         (9, confirmations, option),
9227                         (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
9228                         (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
9229                         (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
9230                         (16, balance_msat, required),
9231                         (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
9232                         // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
9233                         // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
9234                         (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
9235                         (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
9236                         (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
9237                         (22, confirmations_required, option),
9238                         (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
9239                         (26, is_outbound, required),
9240                         (28, is_channel_ready, required),
9241                         (30, is_usable, required),
9242                         (32, is_public, required),
9243                         (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9244                         (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9245                         (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
9246                         (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
9247                         (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
9248                 });
9249
9250                 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
9251                 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
9252                 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
9253                 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
9254                         ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
9255
9256                 Ok(Self {
9257                         inbound_scid_alias,
9258                         channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
9259                         channel_type,
9260                         counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
9261                         outbound_scid_alias,
9262                         funding_txo,
9263                         config,
9264                         short_channel_id,
9265                         channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
9266                         unspendable_punishment_reserve,
9267                         user_channel_id,
9268                         balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
9269                         outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
9270                         next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
9271                         next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
9272                         inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
9273                         confirmations_required,
9274                         confirmations,
9275                         force_close_spend_delay,
9276                         is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
9277                         is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
9278                         is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
9279                         is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
9280                         inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
9281                         inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
9282                         feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
9283                         channel_shutdown_state,
9284                 })
9285         }
9286 }
9287
9288 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
9289         (2, channels, required_vec),
9290         (4, phantom_scid, required),
9291         (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
9292 });
9293
9294 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(BlindedForward, {
9295         (0, inbound_blinding_point, required),
9296 });
9297
9298 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
9299         (0, Forward) => {
9300                 (0, onion_packet, required),
9301                 (1, blinded, option),
9302                 (2, short_channel_id, required),
9303         },
9304         (1, Receive) => {
9305                 (0, payment_data, required),
9306                 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
9307                 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
9308                 (3, payment_metadata, option),
9309                 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
9310         },
9311         (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
9312                 (0, payment_preimage, required),
9313                 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
9314                 (3, payment_metadata, option),
9315                 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
9316                 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
9317         },
9318 ;);
9319
9320 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
9321         (0, routing, required),
9322         (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
9323         (4, payment_hash, required),
9324         (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
9325         (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
9326         (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
9327         (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9328 });
9329
9330
9331 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
9332         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9333                 match self {
9334                         HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
9335                                 0u8.write(writer)?;
9336                                 channel_id.write(writer)?;
9337                                 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
9338                                 reason.write(writer)?;
9339                         },
9340                         HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
9341                                 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
9342                         }) => {
9343                                 1u8.write(writer)?;
9344                                 channel_id.write(writer)?;
9345                                 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
9346                                 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
9347                                 failure_code.write(writer)?;
9348                         },
9349                 }
9350                 Ok(())
9351         }
9352 }
9353
9354 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
9355         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9356                 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9357                 match id {
9358                         0 => {
9359                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
9360                                         channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9361                                         htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9362                                         reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
9363                                 }))
9364                         },
9365                         1 => {
9366                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
9367                                         channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9368                                         htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9369                                         sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
9370                                         failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
9371                                 }))
9372                         },
9373                         // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
9374                         // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
9375                         // messages contained in the variants.
9376                         // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
9377                         // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
9378                         // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
9379                         2 => {
9380                                 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
9381                                 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
9382                                 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
9383                                 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
9384                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
9385                         },
9386                         3 => {
9387                                 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
9388                                 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
9389                                 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
9390                                 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
9391                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
9392                         },
9393                         _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
9394                 }
9395         }
9396 }
9397
9398 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
9399         (0, Forward),
9400         (1, Fail),
9401 );
9402
9403 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(BlindedFailure,
9404         (0, FromIntroductionNode) => {}, ;
9405 );
9406
9407 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
9408         (0, short_channel_id, required),
9409         (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
9410         (2, outpoint, required),
9411         (3, blinded_failure, option),
9412         (4, htlc_id, required),
9413         (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required),
9414         (7, user_channel_id, option),
9415 });
9416
9417 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
9418         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9419                 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
9420                         OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
9421                         OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
9422                 };
9423                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9424                         (0, self.prev_hop, required),
9425                         (1, self.total_msat, required),
9426                         (2, self.value, required),
9427                         (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
9428                         (4, payment_data, option),
9429                         (5, self.total_value_received, option),
9430                         (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
9431                         (8, keysend_preimage, option),
9432                         (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9433                 });
9434                 Ok(())
9435         }
9436 }
9437
9438 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
9439         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9440                 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9441                         (0, prev_hop, required),
9442                         (1, total_msat, option),
9443                         (2, value_ser, required),
9444                         (3, sender_intended_value, option),
9445                         (4, payment_data_opt, option),
9446                         (5, total_value_received, option),
9447                         (6, cltv_expiry, required),
9448                         (8, keysend_preimage, option),
9449                         (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9450                 });
9451                 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
9452                 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
9453                 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
9454                         Some(p) => {
9455                                 if payment_data.is_some() {
9456                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9457                                 }
9458                                 if total_msat.is_none() {
9459                                         total_msat = Some(value);
9460                                 }
9461                                 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
9462                         },
9463                         None => {
9464                                 if total_msat.is_none() {
9465                                         if payment_data.is_none() {
9466                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9467                                         }
9468                                         total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
9469                                 }
9470                                 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
9471                         },
9472                 };
9473                 Ok(Self {
9474                         prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
9475                         timer_ticks: 0,
9476                         value,
9477                         sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
9478                         total_value_received,
9479                         total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
9480                         onion_payload,
9481                         cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
9482                         counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
9483                 })
9484         }
9485 }
9486
9487 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
9488         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9489                 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9490                 match id {
9491                         0 => {
9492                                 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
9493                                 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
9494                                 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
9495                                 let mut payment_id = None;
9496                                 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
9497                                 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
9498                                 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9499                                         (0, session_priv, required),
9500                                         (1, payment_id, option),
9501                                         (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
9502                                         (4, path_hops, required_vec),
9503                                         (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
9504                                         (6, blinded_tail, option),
9505                                 });
9506                                 if payment_id.is_none() {
9507                                         // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
9508                                         // instead.
9509                                         payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
9510                                 }
9511                                 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
9512                                 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
9513                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9514                                 }
9515                                 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
9516                                         if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
9517                                                 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
9518                                                         *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9519                                                 }
9520                                         }
9521                                 }
9522                                 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
9523                                         session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
9524                                         first_hop_htlc_msat,
9525                                         path,
9526                                         payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
9527                                 })
9528                         }
9529                         1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
9530                         _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
9531                 }
9532         }
9533 }
9534
9535 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
9536         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
9537                 match self {
9538                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
9539                                 0u8.write(writer)?;
9540                                 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
9541                                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9542                                         (0, session_priv, required),
9543                                         (1, payment_id_opt, option),
9544                                         (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
9545                                         // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
9546                                         (4, path.hops, required_vec),
9547                                         (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
9548                                         (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
9549                                  });
9550                         }
9551                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
9552                                 1u8.write(writer)?;
9553                                 field.write(writer)?;
9554                         }
9555                 }
9556                 Ok(())
9557         }
9558 }
9559
9560 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
9561         (0, forward_info, required),
9562         (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
9563         (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
9564         (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
9565         (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
9566 });
9567
9568 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
9569         (1, FailHTLC) => {
9570                 (0, htlc_id, required),
9571                 (2, err_packet, required),
9572         };
9573         (0, AddHTLC)
9574 );
9575
9576 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
9577         (0, payment_secret, required),
9578         (2, expiry_time, required),
9579         (4, user_payment_id, required),
9580         (6, payment_preimage, required),
9581         (8, min_value_msat, required),
9582 });
9583
9584 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9585 where
9586         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9587         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9588         ES::Target: EntropySource,
9589         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9590         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9591         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9592         R::Target: Router,
9593         L::Target: Logger,
9594 {
9595         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9596                 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
9597
9598                 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
9599
9600                 self.chain_hash.write(writer)?;
9601                 {
9602                         let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
9603                         best_block.height().write(writer)?;
9604                         best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
9605                 }
9606
9607                 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
9608                 {
9609                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9610                         let mut number_of_funded_channels = 0;
9611                         for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9612                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9613                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9614                                 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
9615                                         serializable_peer_count += 1;
9616                                 }
9617
9618                                 number_of_funded_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(
9619                                         |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { chan.context.is_funding_broadcast() } else { false }
9620                                 ).count();
9621                         }
9622
9623                         (number_of_funded_channels as u64).write(writer)?;
9624
9625                         for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9626                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9627                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9628                                 for channel in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter_map(
9629                                         |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = phase {
9630                                                 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() { Some(channel) } else { None }
9631                                         } else { None }
9632                                 ) {
9633                                         channel.write(writer)?;
9634                                 }
9635                         }
9636                 }
9637
9638                 {
9639                         let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
9640                         (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9641                         for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
9642                                 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
9643                                 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9644                                 for forward in pending_forwards {
9645                                         forward.write(writer)?;
9646                                 }
9647                         }
9648                 }
9649
9650                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
9651
9652                 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
9653                 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
9654                 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
9655
9656                 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
9657                 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
9658                 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9659                 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
9660                         payment_hash.write(writer)?;
9661                         (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9662                         for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
9663                                 htlc.write(writer)?;
9664                         }
9665                         htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
9666                         htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
9667                 }
9668
9669                 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
9670                 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
9671                 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9672                         // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
9673                         // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
9674                         // per_peer_state lock at all.
9675                         peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
9676                 }
9677
9678                 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
9679                 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
9680                         // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
9681                         // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
9682                         // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
9683                         // no channels.
9684                         if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
9685                                 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
9686                                 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
9687                                 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
9688                                         monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
9689                                                 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
9690                                                 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
9691                                 }
9692                         }
9693                 }
9694
9695                 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
9696                 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
9697                 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
9698                 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
9699                 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
9700                 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
9701                         // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
9702                         // well save the space and not write any events here.
9703                         0u64.write(writer)?;
9704                 } else {
9705                         (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9706                         for (event, _) in events.iter() {
9707                                 event.write(writer)?;
9708                         }
9709                 }
9710
9711                 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
9712                 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
9713                 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
9714                 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
9715                 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
9716                 0u64.write(writer)?;
9717
9718                 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
9719                 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
9720                 // likely to be identical.
9721                 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
9722                 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
9723
9724                 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9725                 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
9726                         hash.write(writer)?;
9727                         pending_payment.write(writer)?;
9728                 }
9729
9730                 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
9731                 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
9732                 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
9733                         if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
9734                                 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
9735                         }
9736                 }
9737                 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
9738                 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
9739                         match outbound {
9740                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
9741                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
9742                                         for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
9743                                                 session_priv.write(writer)?;
9744                                         }
9745                                 }
9746                                 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {},
9747                                 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {},
9748                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
9749                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
9750                         }
9751                 }
9752
9753                 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
9754                 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
9755                 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
9756                         match outbound {
9757                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
9758                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
9759                                         pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
9760                                 },
9761                                 _ => {},
9762                         }
9763                 }
9764
9765                 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
9766                 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
9767                 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
9768                         pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
9769                 }
9770
9771                 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
9772                 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
9773                         // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
9774                         // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
9775                         pending_claiming_payments = None;
9776                 }
9777
9778                 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
9779                 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
9780                         for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
9781                                 if !updates.is_empty() {
9782                                         if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(HashMap::new()); }
9783                                         in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
9784                                 }
9785                         }
9786                 }
9787
9788                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9789                         (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
9790                         (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
9791                         (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
9792                         (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
9793                         (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
9794                         (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
9795                         (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
9796                         (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
9797                         (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
9798                         (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
9799                         (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
9800                         (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
9801                 });
9802
9803                 Ok(())
9804         }
9805 }
9806
9807 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
9808         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9809                 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
9810                 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
9811                         event.write(w)?;
9812                         action.write(w)?;
9813                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
9814                                 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
9815                                 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
9816                                 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
9817                                 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
9818                                 // check that the event is sane here.
9819                                 let event_encoded = event.encode();
9820                                 let event_read: Option<Event> =
9821                                         MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
9822                                 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
9823                         }
9824                 }
9825                 Ok(())
9826         }
9827 }
9828 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
9829         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9830                 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9831                 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
9832                 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
9833                         MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
9834                         len) as usize);
9835                 for _ in 0..len {
9836                         let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
9837                         let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
9838                         if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
9839                                 events.push_back((ev, action));
9840                         } else if action.is_some() {
9841                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9842                         }
9843                 }
9844                 Ok(events)
9845         }
9846 }
9847
9848 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
9849         (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
9850         (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
9851         (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
9852         (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
9853         (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
9854 );
9855
9856 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
9857 ///
9858 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
9859 /// is:
9860 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
9861 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
9862 ///    `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
9863 ///    This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
9864 ///    [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
9865 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
9866 ///    same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
9867 ///    [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
9868 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
9869 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
9870 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
9871 ///    Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
9872 ///    will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
9873 ///    the next step.
9874 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
9875 ///    [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
9876 ///
9877 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
9878 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
9879 ///
9880 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
9881 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
9882 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
9883 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
9884 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
9885 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
9886 ///
9887 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
9888 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9889 where
9890         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9891         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9892         ES::Target: EntropySource,
9893         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9894         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9895         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9896         R::Target: Router,
9897         L::Target: Logger,
9898 {
9899         /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
9900         pub entropy_source: ES,
9901
9902         /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
9903         pub node_signer: NS,
9904
9905         /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
9906         /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
9907         /// signing data.
9908         pub signer_provider: SP,
9909
9910         /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
9911         ///
9912         /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
9913         pub fee_estimator: F,
9914         /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
9915         ///
9916         /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
9917         /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
9918         /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
9919         pub chain_monitor: M,
9920
9921         /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
9922         /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
9923         /// force-closed during deserialization.
9924         pub tx_broadcaster: T,
9925         /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
9926         /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
9927         ///
9928         /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
9929         pub router: R,
9930         /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
9931         /// deserialization.
9932         pub logger: L,
9933         /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
9934         /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
9935         pub default_config: UserConfig,
9936
9937         /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
9938         /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
9939         ///
9940         /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
9941         /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
9942         /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
9943         /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
9944         ///
9945         /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
9946         /// this struct.
9947         ///
9948         /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
9949         pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>,
9950 }
9951
9952 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9953                 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9954 where
9955         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9956         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9957         ES::Target: EntropySource,
9958         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9959         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9960         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9961         R::Target: Router,
9962         L::Target: Logger,
9963 {
9964         /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
9965         /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
9966         /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
9967         pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
9968                         mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>) -> Self {
9969                 Self {
9970                         entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
9971                         channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
9972                 }
9973         }
9974 }
9975
9976 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
9977 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
9978 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9979         ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
9980 where
9981         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9982         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9983         ES::Target: EntropySource,
9984         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9985         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9986         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9987         R::Target: Router,
9988         L::Target: Logger,
9989 {
9990         fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9991                 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
9992                 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
9993         }
9994 }
9995
9996 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9997         ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
9998 where
9999         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10000         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10001         ES::Target: EntropySource,
10002         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10003         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10004         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10005         R::Target: Router,
10006         L::Target: Logger,
10007 {
10008         fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10009                 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
10010
10011                 let chain_hash: ChainHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10012                 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10013                 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10014
10015                 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
10016
10017                 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10018                 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10019                 let mut funded_peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10020                 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10021                 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10022                 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
10023                 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
10024                 for _ in 0..channel_count {
10025                         let mut channel: Channel<SP> = Channel::read(reader, (
10026                                 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
10027                         ))?;
10028                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context);
10029                         let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10030                         funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
10031                         if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
10032                                 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
10033                                                 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
10034                                                 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
10035                                                 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
10036                                         // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
10037                                         log_error!(logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
10038                                         log_error!(logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
10039                                         if channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
10040                                                 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
10041                                                         &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
10042                                         }
10043                                         if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() {
10044                                                 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at holder commitment number {} but the ChannelManager is at holder commitment number {}.",
10045                                                         &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number());
10046                                         }
10047                                         if channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() {
10048                                                 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at revoked counterparty transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at revoked counterparty transaction number {}.",
10049                                                         &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
10050                                         }
10051                                         if channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() {
10052                                                 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at counterparty commitment transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at counterparty commitment transaction number {}.",
10053                                                         &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
10054                                         }
10055                                         let mut shutdown_result = channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
10056                                         if shutdown_result.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid.is_some() {
10057                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10058                                         }
10059                                         if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = shutdown_result.monitor_update {
10060                                                 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
10061                                                         counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
10062                                                 });
10063                                         }
10064                                         failed_htlcs.append(&mut shutdown_result.dropped_outbound_htlcs);
10065                                         channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
10066                                                 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
10067                                                 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
10068                                                 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
10069                                                 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10070                                                 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
10071                                         }, None));
10072                                         for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
10073                                                 let mut found_htlc = false;
10074                                                 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
10075                                                         if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
10076                                                 }
10077                                                 if !found_htlc {
10078                                                         // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
10079                                                         // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
10080                                                         // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
10081                                                         // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
10082                                                         // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
10083                                                         // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
10084                                                         // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
10085                                                         log_info!(logger,
10086                                                                 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
10087                                                                 &channel.context.channel_id(), &payment_hash);
10088                                                         failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
10089                                                 }
10090                                         }
10091                                 } else {
10092                                         log_info!(logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
10093                                                 &channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
10094                                                 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
10095                                         if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
10096                                                 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
10097                                         }
10098                                         if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() {
10099                                                 id_to_peer.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
10100                                         }
10101                                         match funded_peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
10102                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
10103                                                         let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
10104                                                         by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
10105                                                 },
10106                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
10107                                                         let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
10108                                                         by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
10109                                                         entry.insert(by_id_map);
10110                                                 }
10111                                         }
10112                                 }
10113                         } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
10114                                 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
10115                                 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
10116                                 // safely discard the channel.
10117                                 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false);
10118                                 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
10119                                         channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
10120                                         user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
10121                                         reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
10122                                         counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10123                                         channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
10124                                 }, None));
10125                         } else {
10126                                 log_error!(logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", &channel.context.channel_id());
10127                                 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10128                                 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10129                                 log_error!(logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10130                                 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10131                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10132                         }
10133                 }
10134
10135                 for (funding_txo, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10136                         if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
10137                                 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor);
10138                                 log_info!(logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
10139                                         &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10140                                 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
10141                                         update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
10142                                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
10143                                 };
10144                                 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
10145                         }
10146                 }
10147
10148                 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
10149                 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10150                 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
10151                 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
10152                         let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
10153                         let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10154                         let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
10155                         for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
10156                                 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
10157                         }
10158                         forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
10159                 }
10160
10161                 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10162                 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
10163                 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
10164                         let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10165                         let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10166                         let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
10167                         for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
10168                                 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
10169                         }
10170                         claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
10171                 }
10172
10173                 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
10174                         PeerState {
10175                                 channel_by_id,
10176                                 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
10177                                 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
10178                                 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
10179                                 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10180                                 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
10181                                 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10182                                 is_connected: false,
10183                         }
10184                 };
10185
10186                 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10187                 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>)>()));
10188                 for _ in 0..peer_count {
10189                         let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
10190                         let peer_chans = funded_peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new());
10191                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
10192                         peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
10193                         per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
10194                 }
10195
10196                 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10197                 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
10198                         VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
10199                 for _ in 0..event_count {
10200                         match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
10201                                 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
10202                                 None => continue,
10203                         }
10204                 }
10205
10206                 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10207                 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
10208                         match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
10209                                 0 => {
10210                                         // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
10211                                         // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
10212                                         // on-startup monitor updates.
10213                                         let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
10214                                         let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
10215                                 }
10216                                 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
10217                         }
10218                 }
10219
10220                 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
10221                 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10222
10223                 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10224                 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
10225                 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
10226                         if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
10227                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10228                         }
10229                 }
10230
10231                 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10232                 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
10233                         HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
10234                 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
10235                         let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
10236                         let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
10237                                 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
10238                         };
10239                         if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
10240                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10241                         };
10242                 }
10243
10244                 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
10245                 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
10246                 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
10247                 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
10248                 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
10249                 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
10250                 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
10251                 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
10252                 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
10253                 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
10254                 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
10255                 let mut events_override = None;
10256                 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
10257                 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10258                         (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
10259                         (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
10260                         (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
10261                         (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
10262                         (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
10263                         (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
10264                         (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
10265                         (8, events_override, option),
10266                         (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
10267                         (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
10268                         (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
10269                         (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
10270                 });
10271                 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
10272                         fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10273                 }
10274
10275                 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
10276                         probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10277                 }
10278
10279                 if let Some(events) = events_override {
10280                         pending_events_read = events;
10281                 }
10282
10283                 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
10284                         pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
10285                 }
10286
10287                 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
10288                         pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
10289                 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
10290                         let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
10291                         for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
10292                                 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
10293                         }
10294                         pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
10295                 }
10296                 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
10297                         pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
10298                         retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
10299                 };
10300
10301                 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
10302                 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
10303                 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
10304                 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
10305                 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
10306                 //
10307                 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
10308                 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
10309                 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
10310                 //
10311                 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
10312                 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
10313                 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
10314                         ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
10315                          $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $logger: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
10316                         ) => { {
10317                                 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
10318                                 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
10319                                 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
10320                                         log_trace!($logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
10321                                                 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, &$funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10322                                         max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
10323                                         pending_background_events.push(
10324                                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
10325                                                         counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
10326                                                         funding_txo: $funding_txo,
10327                                                         update: update.clone(),
10328                                                 });
10329                                 }
10330                                 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
10331                                         // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
10332                                         // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
10333                                         // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
10334                                         pending_background_events.push(
10335                                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
10336                                                         counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
10337                                                         channel_id: $funding_txo.to_channel_id(),
10338                                                 });
10339                                 }
10340                                 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
10341                                         log_error!($logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
10342                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10343                                 }
10344                                 max_in_flight_update_id
10345                         } }
10346                 }
10347
10348                 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
10349                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
10350                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10351                         for phase in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
10352                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
10353                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context);
10354
10355                                         // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
10356                                         // discarded.
10357                                         let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10358                                         let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
10359                                                 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
10360                                         let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
10361                                         if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
10362                                                 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
10363                                                         max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
10364                                                                 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
10365                                                                         funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, ""));
10366                                                 }
10367                                         }
10368                                         if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
10369                                                 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
10370                                                 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
10371                                                 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
10372                                                         chan.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
10373                                                 log_error!(logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
10374                                                 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10375                                                 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10376                                                 log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10377                                                 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10378                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10379                                         }
10380                                 } else {
10381                                         // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
10382                                         // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
10383                                         debug_assert!(false);
10384                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10385                                 }
10386                         }
10387                 }
10388
10389                 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
10390                         for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
10391                                 let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(counterparty_id), Some(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
10392                                 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
10393                                         // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
10394                                         // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
10395                                         // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
10396                                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
10397                                                 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(HashMap::new()))
10398                                         });
10399                                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10400                                         handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
10401                                                 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, "closed ");
10402                                 } else {
10403                                         log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
10404                                         log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.",
10405                                                 &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10406                                         log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10407                                         log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10408                                         log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10409                                         log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10410                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10411                                 }
10412                         }
10413                 }
10414
10415                 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
10416                 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
10417
10418                 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
10419                 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
10420                 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
10421                 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
10422
10423                 {
10424                         // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
10425                         // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
10426                         // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
10427                         // corresponding `Channel` at all).
10428                         // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
10429                         // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
10430                         // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
10431                         // 0.0.102+
10432                         for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10433                                 let counterparty_opt = id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
10434                                 let chan_id = monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id();
10435                                 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
10436                                         let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor);
10437                                         for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
10438                                                 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
10439                                                         if path.hops.is_empty() {
10440                                                                 log_error!(logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
10441                                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10442                                                         }
10443
10444                                                         let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
10445                                                         let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
10446                                                         session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
10447                                                         match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
10448                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
10449                                                                         let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
10450                                                                         log_info!(logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
10451                                                                                 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
10452                                                                 },
10453                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
10454                                                                         let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
10455                                                                         entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
10456                                                                                 retry_strategy: None,
10457                                                                                 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
10458                                                                                 payment_params: None,
10459                                                                                 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
10460                                                                                 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
10461                                                                                 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10462                                                                                 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10463                                                                                 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10464                                                                                 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10465                                                                                 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
10466                                                                                 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
10467                                                                                 total_msat: path_amt,
10468                                                                                 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
10469                                                                                 remaining_max_total_routing_fee_msat: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10470                                                                         });
10471                                                                         log_info!(logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
10472                                                                                 path_amt, &htlc.payment_hash,  log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
10473                                                                 }
10474                                                         }
10475                                                 }
10476                                         }
10477                                         for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
10478                                                 match htlc_source {
10479                                                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
10480                                                                 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
10481                                                                         info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
10482                                                                                 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
10483                                                                 };
10484                                                                 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
10485                                                                 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
10486                                                                 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
10487                                                                 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
10488                                                                 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
10489                                                                 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
10490                                                                         forwards.retain(|forward| {
10491                                                                                 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
10492                                                                                         if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
10493                                                                                                 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
10494                                                                                                         &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
10495                                                                                                 false
10496                                                                                         } else { true }
10497                                                                                 } else { true }
10498                                                                         });
10499                                                                         !forwards.is_empty()
10500                                                                 });
10501                                                                 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
10502                                                                         if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
10503                                                                                 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
10504                                                                                         &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
10505                                                                                 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
10506                                                                                         if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
10507                                                                                                 intercepted_id != ev_id
10508                                                                                         } else { true }
10509                                                                                 });
10510                                                                                 false
10511                                                                         } else { true }
10512                                                                 });
10513                                                         },
10514                                                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
10515                                                                 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
10516                                                                         let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
10517                                                                         // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
10518                                                                         // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
10519                                                                         // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
10520                                                                         // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
10521                                                                         // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
10522                                                                         // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
10523                                                                         // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
10524                                                                         // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
10525                                                                         let compl_action =
10526                                                                                 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
10527                                                                                         channel_funding_outpoint: monitor.get_funding_txo().0,
10528                                                                                         counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
10529                                                                                 };
10530                                                                         pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv,
10531                                                                                 path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &&logger);
10532                                                                         pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
10533                                                                 }
10534                                                         },
10535                                                 }
10536                                         }
10537                                 }
10538
10539                                 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
10540                                 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
10541                                 // payments.
10542                                 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
10543                                         .into_iter()
10544                                         .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
10545                                                 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
10546                                                         if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
10547                                                                 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
10548                                                                         // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
10549                                                                         // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
10550                                                                         // channel_id -> peer map entry).
10551                                                                         counterparty_opt.is_none(),
10552                                                                         counterparty_opt.cloned().or(monitor.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10553                                                                         monitor.get_funding_txo().0))
10554                                                         } else { None }
10555                                                 } else {
10556                                                         // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
10557                                                         // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
10558                                                         // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
10559                                                         // channel still live case here.
10560                                                         None
10561                                                 }
10562                                         });
10563                                 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
10564                                         pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
10565                                 }
10566                         }
10567                 }
10568
10569                 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
10570                         // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
10571                         // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
10572                         // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
10573                         // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
10574                         // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
10575                         pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
10576                                 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
10577                         }, None));
10578                 }
10579
10580                 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
10581                 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
10582
10583                 let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
10584                 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
10585                         if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
10586                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10587                         }
10588                         if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
10589                                 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
10590                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10591                                 }
10592                                 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
10593                                         purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
10594                                 {
10595                                         let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10596                                                 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
10597                                         });
10598                                         if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10599                                 }
10600                         } else {
10601                                 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
10602                                         let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10603                                                 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
10604                                         });
10605                                         if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10606                                 }
10607                         }
10608                 } else {
10609                         // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
10610                         // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
10611                         for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
10612                                 if htlcs.is_empty() {
10613                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10614                                 }
10615                                 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
10616                                         OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
10617                                                 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
10618                                                         events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
10619                                                                 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
10620                                                                         Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
10621                                                                         None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
10622                                                                                 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
10623                                                                                 Err(()) => {
10624                                                                                         log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", &payment_hash);
10625                                                                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10626                                                                                 }
10627                                                                         }
10628                                                                 },
10629                                                                 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
10630                                                         }
10631                                                 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10632                                         },
10633                                         OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
10634                                                 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
10635                                 };
10636                                 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10637                                         purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
10638                                 });
10639                         }
10640                 }
10641
10642                 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10643                 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10644
10645                 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
10646                         Ok(key) => key,
10647                         Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10648                 };
10649                 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
10650                         if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
10651                                 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
10652                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10653                         }
10654                 }
10655
10656                 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
10657                 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
10658                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10659                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10660                         for (chan_id, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
10661                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
10662                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context);
10663                                         if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
10664                                                 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
10665                                                 loop {
10666                                                         outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
10667                                                                 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &chain_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
10668                                                         if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
10669                                                 }
10670                                                 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
10671                                         } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
10672                                                 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
10673                                                 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
10674                                                 log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
10675                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10676                                         }
10677                                         if chan.context.is_usable() {
10678                                                 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
10679                                                         // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
10680                                                         // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
10681                                                         log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
10682                                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10683                                                 }
10684                                         }
10685                                 } else {
10686                                         // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
10687                                         // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
10688                                         debug_assert!(false);
10689                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10690                                 }
10691                         }
10692                 }
10693
10694                 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
10695
10696                 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10697                         for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
10698                                 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
10699                                         log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", &payment_hash);
10700                                         let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
10701                                         let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
10702                                         let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
10703                                         if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
10704                                                 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
10705                                                         .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
10706                                                 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
10707                                         }
10708                                         for claimable_htlc in &payment.htlcs {
10709                                                 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
10710
10711                                                 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
10712                                                 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
10713                                                 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
10714                                                 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
10715                                                 //
10716                                                 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
10717                                                 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
10718                                                 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
10719                                                 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
10720                                                 // reason to.
10721                                                 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
10722                                                 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
10723                                                 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
10724                                                 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
10725                                                 // restart.
10726                                                 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
10727                                                 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
10728                                                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
10729                                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10730                                                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10731                                                         if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(channel)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
10732                                                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context);
10733                                                                 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
10734                                                         }
10735                                                 }
10736                                                 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
10737                                                         let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, previous_hop_monitor);
10738                                                         previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &&logger);
10739                                                 }
10740                                         }
10741                                         pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
10742                                                 receiver_node_id,
10743                                                 payment_hash,
10744                                                 purpose: payment.purpose,
10745                                                 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
10746                                                 htlcs: payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect(),
10747                                                 sender_intended_total_msat: payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat),
10748                                         }, None));
10749                                 }
10750                         }
10751                 }
10752
10753                 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
10754                         if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
10755                                 for (channel_id, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
10756                                         let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), Some(*channel_id));
10757                                         for action in actions.iter() {
10758                                                 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
10759                                                         downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
10760                                                                 Some((blocked_node_id, blocked_channel_outpoint, blocking_action)), ..
10761                                                 } = action {
10762                                                         if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&blocked_node_id) {
10763                                                                 log_trace!(logger,
10764                                                                         "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
10765                                                                         blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id());
10766                                                                 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
10767                                                                         .entry(blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id())
10768                                                                         .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
10769                                                         } else {
10770                                                                 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
10771                                                                 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
10772                                                                 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
10773                                                                 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
10774                                                                 // anymore.
10775                                                         }
10776                                                 }
10777                                                 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately { .. } = action {
10778                                                         debug_assert!(false, "Non-event-generating channel freeing should not appear in our queue");
10779                                                 }
10780                                         }
10781                                 }
10782                                 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
10783                         } else {
10784                                 log_error!(WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), None), "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
10785                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10786                         }
10787                 }
10788
10789                 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
10790                         chain_hash,
10791                         fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
10792                         chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
10793                         tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
10794                         router: args.router,
10795
10796                         best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
10797
10798                         inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
10799                         pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
10800                         pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
10801                         pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
10802
10803                         forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
10804                         claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
10805                         outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
10806                         id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
10807                         short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
10808                         fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
10809
10810                         probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
10811
10812                         our_network_pubkey,
10813                         secp_ctx,
10814
10815                         highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
10816
10817                         per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
10818
10819                         pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
10820                         pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
10821                         pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
10822                         total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
10823                         background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
10824
10825                         event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
10826                         needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
10827
10828                         funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
10829
10830                         pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
10831
10832                         entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
10833                         node_signer: args.node_signer,
10834                         signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
10835
10836                         logger: args.logger,
10837                         default_configuration: args.default_config,
10838                 };
10839
10840                 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
10841                         let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
10842                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
10843                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
10844                         channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
10845                 }
10846
10847                 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding) in pending_claims_to_replay {
10848                         // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
10849                         // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
10850                         // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
10851                         channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value),
10852                                 downstream_closed, true, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding);
10853                 }
10854
10855                 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
10856                 //connection or two.
10857
10858                 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
10859         }
10860 }
10861
10862 #[cfg(test)]
10863 mod tests {
10864         use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
10865         use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
10866         use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
10867         use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
10868         use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
10869         use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
10870         use crate::ln::ChannelId;
10871         use crate::ln::channelmanager::{create_recv_pending_htlc_info, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
10872         use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
10873         use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
10874         use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
10875         use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
10876         use crate::util::errors::APIError;
10877         use crate::util::test_utils;
10878         use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
10879         use crate::sign::EntropySource;
10880
10881         #[test]
10882         fn test_notify_limits() {
10883                 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
10884                 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
10885                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
10886                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
10887                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
10888                 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10889
10890                 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
10891                 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
10892                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10893                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10894                 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10895
10896                 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10897
10898                 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
10899                 // to connect messages with new values
10900                 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
10901                 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
10902                 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
10903                         &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
10904                 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
10905                         &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
10906
10907                 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
10908                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10909                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10910                 // ... but the last node should not.
10911                 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10912                 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
10913                 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10914                 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10915
10916                 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
10917                 // about the channel.
10918                 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
10919                 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
10920                 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10921
10922                 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
10923                 // parties.
10924                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
10925                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
10926                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
10927                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
10928                 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10929                 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10930
10931                 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
10932                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
10933                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
10934
10935                 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
10936                 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
10937                 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
10938                 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
10939                 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
10940                 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
10941
10942                 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
10943                 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
10944                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
10945                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
10946                 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10947                 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10948                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
10949                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
10950
10951                 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
10952                 // the channel info has updated.
10953                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
10954                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
10955                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10956                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10957                 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
10958                 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
10959         }
10960
10961         #[test]
10962         fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
10963                 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
10964                 // expected.
10965                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10966                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10967                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10968                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10969                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10970
10971                 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
10972                 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
10973                 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
10974                 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
10975
10976                 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
10977                 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
10978                 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
10979                 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
10980                 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
10981                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
10982                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
10983                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
10984                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10985                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10986                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10987                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
10988
10989                 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
10990                 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
10991                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
10992                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10993                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10994                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10995                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
10996                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
10997                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10998                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
10999                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11000                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11001                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
11002                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11003                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11004                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11005                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11006                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11007                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11008                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11009                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11010                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11011                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
11012
11013                 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
11014                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
11015                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
11016                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11017                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11018                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11019                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
11020
11021                 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
11022                 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
11023                 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
11024                 // lightning messages manually.
11025                 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
11026                 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
11027                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
11028
11029                 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11030                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
11031                 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
11032                 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
11033                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11034                 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11035                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
11036                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11037                 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11038                 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
11039                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11040                 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11041                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
11042                 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
11043                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11044                 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11045                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
11046                 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11047                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11048                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
11049                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11050                 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
11051                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11052                 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11053                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
11054                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11055
11056                 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
11057                 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
11058                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11059                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
11060                 match events[0] {
11061                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
11062                                 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
11063                                 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
11064                                 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
11065                         },
11066                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11067                 }
11068                 match events[1] {
11069                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
11070                                 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
11071                                 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
11072                                 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
11073                         },
11074                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11075                 }
11076         }
11077
11078         #[test]
11079         fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
11080                 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
11081                 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
11082         }
11083
11084         fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
11085                 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
11086                 //      outbound regular payment fails as expected.
11087                 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
11088                 //      fails as expected.
11089                 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
11090                 //      payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
11091                 //      reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
11092                 //      secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
11093                 //      `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
11094                 //      payment secrets and reject otherwise.
11095                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11096                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11097                 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11098                 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
11099                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
11100                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11101                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11102                 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11103                 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11104
11105                 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
11106                 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
11107                 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
11108
11109                 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
11110                 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11111                         PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(),
11112                         TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false), 100_000);
11113                 let route = find_route(
11114                         &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11115                         None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11116                 ).unwrap();
11117                 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11118                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11119                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11120                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11121                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11122                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11123                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11124                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11125                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11126                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11127                 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
11128                 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
11129                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11130                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11131                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11132                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11133                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11134                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11135                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11136                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11137                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11138                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11139                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11140                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11141
11142                 // Finally, claim the original payment.
11143                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11144
11145                 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
11146                 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11147                 let route = find_route(
11148                         &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11149                         None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11150                 ).unwrap();
11151                 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11152                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11153                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11154                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11155                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11156                 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
11157                 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
11158                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
11159
11160                 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
11161                 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
11162                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
11163                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
11164                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11165                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11166                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11167                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11168                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11169                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11170                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11171                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11172                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11173                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11174                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11175                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11176                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11177                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11178                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11179                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11180                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11181                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11182                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11183                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11184
11185                 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
11186                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11187
11188                 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
11189                 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
11190                 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11191                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
11192                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11193                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11194                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11195                 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
11196                 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
11197                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
11198
11199                 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
11200                 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11201                         PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
11202                         100_000
11203                 );
11204                 let route = find_route(
11205                         &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11206                         None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11207                 ).unwrap();
11208                 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
11209                 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11210                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
11211                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11212                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11213                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11214                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11215                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11216                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11217                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11218                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11219                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11220                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11221                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11222                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11223                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11224                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11225                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11226                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11227                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11228                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11229                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11230                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11231
11232                 // Finally, claim the original payment.
11233                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11234         }
11235
11236         #[test]
11237         fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
11238                 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
11239                 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
11240                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11241                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11242                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11243                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11244
11245                 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
11246                 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11247
11248                 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
11249                 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11250                         PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
11251                 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
11252                 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
11253                 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11254                 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11255                 let route = find_route(
11256                         &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
11257                         nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11258                 ).unwrap();
11259
11260                 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11261                 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
11262                 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
11263                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
11264                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
11265                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
11266                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11267
11268                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11269                 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
11270                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11271                 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
11272                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11273                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11274                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
11275
11276                 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
11277         }
11278
11279         #[test]
11280         fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
11281                 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
11282                 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
11283                 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11284                 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
11285                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11286                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11287                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
11288                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11289
11290                 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
11291                 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11292
11293                 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
11294                 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11295                         PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
11296                 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
11297                 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
11298                 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11299                 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11300                 let route = find_route(
11301                         &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
11302                         nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11303                 ).unwrap();
11304
11305                 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11306                 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
11307                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
11308                 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
11309                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
11310                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
11311                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
11312                         PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
11313                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11314
11315                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11316                 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
11317                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11318                 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
11319                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11320                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11321                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
11322
11323                 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
11324         }
11325
11326         #[test]
11327         fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
11328                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
11329                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
11330                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
11331                 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11332
11333                 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11334                 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11335                 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11336                 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11337
11338                 // Marshall an MPP route.
11339                 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
11340                 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
11341                 route.paths.push(path);
11342                 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11343                 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
11344                 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
11345                 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
11346                 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
11347                 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
11348
11349                 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
11350                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
11351                 .unwrap_err() {
11352                         PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
11353                                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
11354                         },
11355                         _ => panic!("unexpected error")
11356                 }
11357         }
11358
11359         #[test]
11360         fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
11361                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11362                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11363                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11364                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11365
11366                 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11367
11368                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11369                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11370
11371                 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11372                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
11373                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11374                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
11375
11376                 {
11377                         // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
11378                         // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
11379                         let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
11380                         // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
11381                         assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
11382                         assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
11383                 }
11384
11385                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
11386
11387                 {
11388                         // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
11389                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
11390                 }
11391         }
11392
11393         #[test]
11394         fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
11395                 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
11396                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11397                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11398                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11399                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11400
11401                 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
11402                 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11403                         payment_secret,
11404                         total_msat: 100_000,
11405                 };
11406
11407                 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
11408                 // payment verification fails as expected.
11409                 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
11410                 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
11411                 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
11412                         Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
11413                         Err(()) => {
11414                                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
11415                         }
11416                 }
11417
11418                 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
11419                 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
11420         }
11421
11422         #[test]
11423         fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
11424                 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
11425                 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
11426                 // the channel is successfully closed.
11427                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11428                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11429                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11430                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11431
11432                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11433                 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11434                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
11435                 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11436                 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
11437
11438                 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
11439                 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.txid().to_byte_array());
11440                 {
11441                         // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
11442                         // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
11443                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11444                         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11445                 }
11446
11447                 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
11448                 {
11449                         // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
11450                         // as it has the funding transaction.
11451                         let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11452                         assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11453                         assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11454                 }
11455
11456                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11457
11458                 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11459
11460                 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
11461                 {
11462                         let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11463                         assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11464                         assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11465                 }
11466                 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11467
11468                 {
11469                         // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
11470                         // as it has the funding transaction.
11471                         let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11472                         assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11473                         assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11474                 }
11475                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11476                 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11477                 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
11478                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11479                 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11480                 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
11481                 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
11482                 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
11483
11484                 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11485                 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
11486                 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11487                 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
11488
11489                 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11490                 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
11491                 {
11492                         // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
11493                         // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
11494                         // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
11495                         // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
11496                         let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11497                         assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11498                         assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11499                 }
11500
11501                 {
11502                         // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
11503                         // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
11504                         // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
11505                         // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
11506                         let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11507                         assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11508                         assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11509                 }
11510
11511                 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
11512                 {
11513                         // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
11514                         // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
11515                         // closing transaction).
11516                         // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
11517                         // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
11518                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11519
11520                         // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s  `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
11521                         // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
11522                         let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11523                         assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11524                         assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11525                 }
11526
11527                 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11528
11529                 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
11530                 {
11531                         // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
11532                         // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
11533                         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11534                 }
11535                 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11536
11537                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
11538                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
11539         }
11540
11541         fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
11542                 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
11543                 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11544         }
11545
11546         fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
11547                 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
11548                 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11549         }
11550
11551         fn check_channel_unavailable_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_channel_id: ChannelId, peer_node_id: PublicKey) {
11552                 let expected_message = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_channel_id, peer_node_id);
11553                 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11554         }
11555
11556         fn check_api_misuse_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
11557                 let expected_message = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_string();
11558                 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11559         }
11560
11561         fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
11562                 match res_err {
11563                         Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
11564                                 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
11565                         },
11566                         Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
11567                                 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
11568                         },
11569                         Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
11570                         Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
11571                 }
11572         }
11573
11574         #[test]
11575         fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
11576                 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
11577                 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
11578                 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
11579                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11580                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11581                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
11582                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11583
11584                 // Dummy values
11585                 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
11586                 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
11587                 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
11588
11589                 // Test the API functions.
11590                 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None), unkown_public_key);
11591
11592                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
11593
11594                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11595
11596                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11597
11598                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11599
11600                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
11601
11602                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
11603         }
11604
11605         #[test]
11606         fn test_api_calls_with_unavailable_channel() {
11607                 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` and a `channel_id`
11608                 // as input, behaves as expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is a known peer in the
11609                 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map, but the peer state doesn't contain a channel with
11610                 // the given `channel_id`.
11611                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11612                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11613                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
11614                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11615
11616                 let counterparty_node_id = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11617
11618                 // Dummy values
11619                 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
11620
11621                 // Test the API functions.
11622                 check_api_misuse_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, 42));
11623
11624                 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11625
11626                 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11627
11628                 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11629
11630                 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(InterceptId([0; 32]), &channel_id, counterparty_node_id, 1_000_000), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11631
11632                 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&counterparty_node_id, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11633         }
11634
11635         #[test]
11636         fn test_connection_limiting() {
11637                 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
11638                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11639                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11640                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11641                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11642
11643                 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11644
11645                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11646                 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11647
11648                 let mut funding_tx = None;
11649                 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
11650                         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11651                         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11652
11653                         if idx == 0 {
11654                                 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
11655                                 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
11656                                 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
11657                                 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
11658                                 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11659
11660                                 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
11661                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11662                                 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11663
11664                                 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11665
11666                                 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
11667                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11668                                 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11669                         }
11670                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11671                 }
11672
11673                 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
11674                 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11675                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11676                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11677                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11678
11679                 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
11680                 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
11681                 // limit.
11682                 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
11683                 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
11684                         let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11685                                 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11686                         peer_pks.push(random_pk);
11687                         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11688                                 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11689                         }, true).unwrap();
11690                 }
11691                 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11692                         &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11693                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11694                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11695                 }, true).unwrap_err();
11696
11697                 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
11698                 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
11699                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11700                 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11701                 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
11702                 for ev in chan_closed_events {
11703                         if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
11704                 }
11705                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11706                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11707                 }, true).unwrap();
11708                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11709                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11710                 }, true).unwrap_err();
11711
11712                 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
11713                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11714                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11715                 }, false).unwrap();
11716                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11717
11718                 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
11719                 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
11720                 // open channels.
11721                 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
11722                 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
11723                         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
11724                         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
11725                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11726                 }
11727                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11728                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
11729                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11730
11731                 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
11732                 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11733                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
11734
11735                 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
11736                 // "protected" and can connect again.
11737                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
11738                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11739                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11740                 }, true).unwrap();
11741                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11742
11743                 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
11744                 // last_random_pk.
11745                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11746                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
11747         }
11748
11749         #[test]
11750         fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
11751                 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
11752                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11753                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11754                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11755                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11756
11757                 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11758
11759                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11760                 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11761
11762                 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
11763                         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11764                         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11765                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11766                 }
11767
11768                 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
11769                 // rejected.
11770                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11771                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11772                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11773
11774                 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
11775                 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11776                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11777
11778                 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
11779                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11780                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11781                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11782         }
11783
11784         #[test]
11785         fn test_0conf_limiting() {
11786                 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
11787                 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
11788                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11789                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11790                 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
11791                 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
11792                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
11793                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11794
11795                 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11796
11797                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11798                 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11799
11800                 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
11801                 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
11802                         let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11803                                 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11804                         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11805                                 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11806                         }, true).unwrap();
11807
11808                         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11809                         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11810                         match events[0] {
11811                                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11812                                         nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
11813                                 }
11814                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11815                         }
11816                         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
11817                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11818                 }
11819
11820                 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
11821                 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11822                         &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11823                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11824                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11825                 }, true).unwrap();
11826                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11827                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11828                 match events[0] {
11829                         Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11830                                 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
11831                                         Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
11832                                                 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
11833                                         _ => panic!(),
11834                                 }
11835                         }
11836                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11837                 }
11838                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
11839                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11840
11841                 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
11842                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11843                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11844                 match events[0] {
11845                         Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11846                                 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
11847                         }
11848                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11849                 }
11850                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
11851         }
11852
11853         #[test]
11854         fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
11855                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
11856                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
11857                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
11858                 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11859                 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
11860                 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
11861                 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
11862                         amt_msat: 100,
11863                         outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
11864                         payment_metadata: None,
11865                         keysend_preimage: None,
11866                         payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11867                                 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
11868                         }),
11869                         custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
11870                 };
11871                 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
11872                 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
11873                 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
11874                 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundOnionErr { err_code, .. }) =
11875                         create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
11876                                 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
11877                                 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
11878                 {
11879                         assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
11880                 } else { panic!(); }
11881
11882                 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
11883                 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
11884                         amt_msat: 100,
11885                         outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
11886                         payment_metadata: None,
11887                         keysend_preimage: None,
11888                         payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11889                                 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
11890                         }),
11891                         custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
11892                 };
11893                 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
11894                 assert!(create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
11895                         sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
11896                         current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend).is_ok());
11897         }
11898
11899         #[test]
11900         fn test_final_incorrect_cltv(){
11901                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
11902                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
11903                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
11904                 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11905
11906                 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
11907                 let result = create_recv_pending_htlc_info(msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
11908                         amt_msat: 100,
11909                         outgoing_cltv_value: 22,
11910                         payment_metadata: None,
11911                         keysend_preimage: None,
11912                         payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11913                                 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: 100,
11914                         }),
11915                         custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
11916                 }, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]), 100, 23, None, true, None, current_height,
11917                         node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend);
11918
11919                 // Should not return an error as this condition:
11920                 // https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/4dcc377209509b13cf89a4b91fde7d478f5b46d8/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L334
11921                 // is not satisfied.
11922                 assert!(result.is_ok());
11923         }
11924
11925         #[test]
11926         fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
11927                 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
11928                 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
11929                 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11930                 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
11931
11932                 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
11933                 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
11934
11935                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
11936                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
11937                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
11938                         &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
11939                 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11940
11941                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11942                 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11943
11944                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11945                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
11946                 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11947                 match &msg_events[0] {
11948                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
11949                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11950                                 match action {
11951                                         ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
11952                                                 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
11953                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
11954                                 }
11955                         }
11956                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11957                 }
11958
11959                 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11960                 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11961                 match events[0] {
11962                         Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
11963                                 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
11964                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11965                 }
11966                 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11967         }
11968
11969         #[test]
11970         fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
11971                 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
11972                 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
11973                 // the channel without the anchors feature.
11974                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11975                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11976                 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
11977                 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
11978                 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
11979                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
11980                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11981
11982                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None, None).unwrap();
11983                 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11984                 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
11985
11986                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11987                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11988                 match events[0] {
11989                         Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11990                                 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11991                         }
11992                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11993                 }
11994
11995                 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11996                 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
11997
11998                 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11999                 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
12000
12001                 // Since nodes[1] should not have accepted the channel, it should
12002                 // not have generated any events.
12003                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
12004         }
12005
12006         #[test]
12007         fn test_update_channel_config() {
12008                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12009                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12010                 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
12011                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
12012                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12013                 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12014                 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
12015
12016                 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
12017                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12018                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12019
12020                 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
12021                 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
12022                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
12023                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12024                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12025                 match &events[0] {
12026                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12027                         _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12028                 }
12029
12030                 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
12031                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12032                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12033
12034                 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
12035                 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12036                         cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
12037                         ..Default::default()
12038                 }).unwrap();
12039                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
12040                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12041                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12042                 match &events[0] {
12043                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12044                         _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12045                 }
12046
12047                 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
12048                 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12049                         forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
12050                         ..Default::default()
12051                 }).unwrap();
12052                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
12053                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
12054                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12055                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12056                 match &events[0] {
12057                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12058                         _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12059                 }
12060
12061                 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
12062                 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
12063                 let bad_channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_txid(&[10; 32], 10);
12064                 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
12065                 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
12066                 assert!(
12067                         matches!(
12068                                 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12069                                         forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
12070                                         ..Default::default()
12071                                 }),
12072                                 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
12073                         )
12074                 );
12075                 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
12076                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
12077                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12078                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12079         }
12080
12081         #[test]
12082         fn test_payment_display() {
12083                 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
12084                 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12085                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
12086                 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_hash), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12087                 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12088                 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_preimage), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12089         }
12090
12091         #[test]
12092         fn test_trigger_lnd_force_close() {
12093                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12094                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12095                 let user_config = test_default_channel_config();
12096                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
12097                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12098
12099                 // Open a channel, immediately disconnect each other, and broadcast Alice's latest state.
12100                 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12101                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12102                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12103                 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12104                 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
12105                 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
12106                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12107                 {
12108                         let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
12109                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
12110                         check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
12111                 }
12112
12113                 // Since they're disconnected, Bob won't receive Alice's `Error` message. Reconnect them
12114                 // such that Bob sends a `ChannelReestablish` to Alice since the channel is still open from
12115                 // their side.
12116                 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12117                         features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12118                 }, true).unwrap();
12119                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12120                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12121                 }, false).unwrap();
12122                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
12123                 let channel_reestablish = get_event_msg!(
12124                         nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()
12125                 );
12126                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channel_reestablish);
12127
12128                 // Alice should respond with an error since the channel isn't known, but a bogus
12129                 // `ChannelReestablish` should be sent first, such that we actually trigger Bob to force
12130                 // close even if it was an lnd node.
12131                 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12132                 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
12133                 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { node_id, msg } = &msg_events[0] {
12134                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12135                         assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 0);
12136                         assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
12137                         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
12138                 } else { panic!() };
12139                 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
12140                 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
12141                 let expected_close_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
12142                         err: "Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_string()
12143                 };
12144                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, expected_close_reason, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12145                 {
12146                         let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
12147                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
12148                         check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
12149                 }
12150         }
12151 }
12152
12153 #[cfg(ldk_bench)]
12154 pub mod bench {
12155         use crate::chain::Listen;
12156         use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
12157         use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
12158         use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
12159         use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
12160         use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
12161         use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
12162         use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
12163         use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
12164         use crate::util::test_utils;
12165         use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
12166
12167         use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
12168         use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
12169         use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
12170         use bitcoin::{Block, Transaction, TxOut};
12171
12172         use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
12173
12174         use criterion::Criterion;
12175
12176         type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
12177                 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
12178                         &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
12179                         &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
12180                 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
12181                 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
12182                 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
12183
12184         struct ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
12185                 node: &'node_cfg Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>,
12186         }
12187         impl<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg, P> {
12188                 type CM = Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>;
12189                 #[inline]
12190                 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P> { self.node }
12191                 #[inline]
12192                 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
12193         }
12194
12195         pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
12196                 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
12197         }
12198
12199         pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
12200                 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
12201                 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
12202                 // calls per node.
12203                 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
12204                 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
12205
12206                 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
12207                 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
12208                 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
12209                 let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
12210                 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
12211
12212                 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
12213                 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
12214                 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
12215
12216                 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
12217                 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
12218                 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
12219                 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
12220                         network,
12221                         best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
12222                 }, genesis_block.header.time);
12223                 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
12224
12225                 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
12226                 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
12227                 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
12228                 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
12229                 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
12230                         network,
12231                         best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
12232                 }, genesis_block.header.time);
12233                 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
12234
12235                 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
12236                         features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12237                 }, true).unwrap();
12238                 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
12239                         features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12240                 }, false).unwrap();
12241                 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12242                 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12243                 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12244
12245                 let tx;
12246                 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
12247                         tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
12248                                 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
12249                         }]};
12250                         node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
12251                 } else { panic!(); }
12252
12253                 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12254                 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12255                 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
12256                 match events_b[0] {
12257                         Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12258                                 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12259                         },
12260                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12261                 }
12262
12263                 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12264                 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12265                 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
12266                 match events_a[0] {
12267                         Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12268                                 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
12269                         },
12270                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12271                 }
12272
12273                 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
12274
12275                 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), 42, vec![tx]);
12276                 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
12277                 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
12278
12279                 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12280                 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12281                 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
12282                 match msg_events[0] {
12283                         MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
12284                                 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
12285                                 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12286                         },
12287                         _ => panic!(),
12288                 }
12289                 match msg_events[1] {
12290                         MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12291                         _ => panic!(),
12292                 }
12293
12294                 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12295                 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
12296                 match events_a[0] {
12297                         Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12298                                 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
12299                         },
12300                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12301                 }
12302
12303                 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12304                 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
12305                 match events_b[0] {
12306                         Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12307                                 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12308                         },
12309                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12310                 }
12311
12312                 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
12313                 macro_rules! send_payment {
12314                         ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
12315                                 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
12316                                         .with_bolt11_features($node_b.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
12317                                 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
12318                                 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
12319                                 payment_count += 1;
12320                                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
12321                                 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
12322
12323                                 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
12324                                         PaymentId(payment_hash.0),
12325                                         RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000),
12326                                         Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
12327                                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
12328                                 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12329                                 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
12330                                 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
12331                                 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
12332                                 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
12333                                 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12334
12335                                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
12336                                 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
12337                                 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
12338                                 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
12339
12340                                 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
12341                                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
12342                                                 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
12343                                                 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
12344                                                 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
12345                                         },
12346                                         _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
12347                                 }
12348
12349                                 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
12350                                 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
12351                                 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
12352                                 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12353
12354                                 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
12355                         }
12356                 }
12357
12358                 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
12359                         send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
12360                         send_payment!(node_b, node_a);
12361                 }));
12362         }
12363 }