1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::Header;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
23 use bitcoin::key::constants::SECRET_KEY_SIZE;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
28 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
32 use bitcoin::{secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::blinded_path::BlindedPath;
35 use crate::blinded_path::payment::{PaymentConstraints, ReceiveTlvs};
37 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
38 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
39 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, WithChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
40 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
42 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
43 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
44 // construct one themselves.
45 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
46 use crate::ln::channel::{self, Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, WithChannelContext};
47 use crate::ln::features::{Bolt12InvoiceFeatures, ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
48 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
49 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
50 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
51 use crate::ln::onion_payment::{check_incoming_htlc_cltv, create_recv_pending_htlc_info, create_fwd_pending_htlc_info, decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion, InboundHTLCErr, NextPacketDetails};
53 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
54 use crate::ln::onion_utils::{HTLCFailReason, INVALID_ONION_BLINDING};
55 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
57 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
58 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{Bolt12PaymentError, OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs, StaleExpiration};
59 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
60 use crate::offers::invoice::{BlindedPayInfo, Bolt12Invoice, DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY, DerivedSigningPubkey, ExplicitSigningPubkey, InvoiceBuilder};
61 use crate::offers::invoice_error::InvoiceError;
62 use crate::offers::invoice_request::{DerivedPayerId, InvoiceRequestBuilder};
63 use crate::offers::merkle::SignError;
64 use crate::offers::offer::{Offer, OfferBuilder};
65 use crate::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
66 use crate::offers::refund::{Refund, RefundBuilder};
67 use crate::onion_message::messenger::{Destination, MessageRouter, PendingOnionMessage, new_pending_onion_message};
68 use crate::onion_message::offers::{OffersMessage, OffersMessageHandler};
69 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider};
70 use crate::sign::ecdsa::WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner;
71 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
72 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
73 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
74 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
75 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
76 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger, WithContext};
77 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
78 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
80 crate::offers::offer::DerivedMetadata,
81 crate::routing::router::DefaultRouter,
82 crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph,
83 crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters},
84 crate::sign::KeysManager,
88 crate::offers::offer::OfferWithDerivedMetadataBuilder,
89 crate::offers::refund::RefundMaybeWithDerivedMetadataBuilder,
92 use alloc::collections::{btree_map, BTreeMap};
95 use crate::prelude::*;
97 use core::cell::RefCell;
99 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
100 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
101 use core::time::Duration;
102 use core::ops::Deref;
104 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
105 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, ProbeSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
106 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
108 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
110 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
111 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
112 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
114 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
115 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
116 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
117 // before we forward it.
119 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
120 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
121 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
122 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
123 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
125 /// Information about where a received HTLC('s onion) has indicated the HTLC should go.
126 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
127 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
128 pub enum PendingHTLCRouting {
129 /// An HTLC which should be forwarded on to another node.
131 /// The onion which should be included in the forwarded HTLC, telling the next hop what to
132 /// do with the HTLC.
133 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
134 /// The short channel ID of the channel which we were instructed to forward this HTLC to.
136 /// This could be a real on-chain SCID, an SCID alias, or some other SCID which has meaning
137 /// to the receiving node, such as one returned from
138 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] or [`ChannelManager::get_phantom_scid`].
139 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
140 /// Set if this HTLC is being forwarded within a blinded path.
141 blinded: Option<BlindedForward>,
143 /// The onion indicates that this is a payment for an invoice (supposedly) generated by us.
145 /// Note that at this point, we have not checked that the invoice being paid was actually
146 /// generated by us, but rather it's claiming to pay an invoice of ours.
148 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and (potential) proof that this
149 /// is a payment for an invoice we generated. This proof of payment is is also used for
150 /// linking MPP parts of a larger payment.
151 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
152 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
154 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
155 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
156 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
157 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
158 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
160 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
161 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
162 /// If the onion had forwarding instructions to one of our phantom node SCIDs, this will
163 /// provide the onion shared secret used to decrypt the next level of forwarding
165 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
166 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
168 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
169 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
170 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
171 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
172 /// Set if this HTLC is the final hop in a multi-hop blinded path.
173 requires_blinded_error: bool,
175 /// The onion indicates that this is for payment to us but which contains the preimage for
176 /// claiming included, and is unrelated to any invoice we'd previously generated (aka a
177 /// "keysend" or "spontaneous" payment).
179 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and possibly a token to
180 /// associate MPP parts of a larger payment.
182 /// This will only be filled in if receiving MPP keysend payments is enabled, and it being
183 /// present will cause deserialization to fail on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.116.
184 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
185 /// Preimage for this onion payment. This preimage is provided by the sender and will be
186 /// used to settle the spontaneous payment.
187 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
188 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
190 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately bubble back up as
191 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
192 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
193 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
195 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
196 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
197 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
199 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, these will ultimately bubble back up as
200 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
201 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
205 /// Information used to forward or fail this HTLC that is being forwarded within a blinded path.
206 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
207 pub struct BlindedForward {
208 /// The `blinding_point` that was set in the inbound [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC`], or in the inbound
209 /// onion payload if we're the introduction node. Useful for calculating the next hop's
210 /// [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC::blinding_point`].
211 pub inbound_blinding_point: PublicKey,
212 /// If needed, this determines how this HTLC should be failed backwards, based on whether we are
213 /// the introduction node.
214 pub failure: BlindedFailure,
217 impl PendingHTLCRouting {
218 // Used to override the onion failure code and data if the HTLC is blinded.
219 fn blinded_failure(&self) -> Option<BlindedFailure> {
221 Self::Forward { blinded: Some(BlindedForward { failure, .. }), .. } => Some(*failure),
222 Self::Receive { requires_blinded_error: true, .. } => Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode),
228 /// Information about an incoming HTLC, including the [`PendingHTLCRouting`] describing where it
230 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
231 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
232 pub struct PendingHTLCInfo {
233 /// Further routing details based on whether the HTLC is being forwarded or received.
234 pub routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
235 /// The onion shared secret we build with the sender used to decrypt the onion.
237 /// This is later used to encrypt failure packets in the event that the HTLC is failed.
238 pub incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
239 /// Hash of the payment preimage, to lock the payment until the receiver releases the preimage.
240 pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
241 /// Amount received in the incoming HTLC.
243 /// This field was added in LDK 0.0.113 and will be `None` for objects written by prior
245 pub incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>,
246 /// The amount the sender indicated should be forwarded on to the next hop or amount the sender
247 /// intended for us to receive for received payments.
249 /// If the received amount is less than this for received payments, an intermediary hop has
250 /// attempted to steal some of our funds and we should fail the HTLC (the sender should retry
251 /// it along another path).
253 /// Because nodes can take less than their required fees, and because senders may wish to
254 /// improve their own privacy, this amount may be less than [`Self::incoming_amt_msat`] for
255 /// received payments. In such cases, recipients must handle this HTLC as if it had received
256 /// [`Self::outgoing_amt_msat`].
257 pub outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
258 /// The CLTV the sender has indicated we should set on the forwarded HTLC (or has indicated
259 /// should have been set on the received HTLC for received payments).
260 pub outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
261 /// The fee taken for this HTLC in addition to the standard protocol HTLC fees.
263 /// If this is a payment for forwarding, this is the fee we are taking before forwarding the
266 /// If this is a received payment, this is the fee that our counterparty took.
268 /// This is used to allow LSPs to take fees as a part of payments, without the sender having to
270 pub skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
273 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
274 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
275 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
276 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
279 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
280 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
281 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
282 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
283 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
286 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
287 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
288 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
290 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
291 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
292 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
295 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
296 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
298 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
299 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
302 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
303 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
304 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
307 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
312 sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32],
316 /// Whether this blinded HTLC is being failed backwards by the introduction node or a blinded node,
317 /// which determines the failure message that should be used.
318 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
319 pub enum BlindedFailure {
320 /// This HTLC is being failed backwards by the introduction node, and thus should be failed with
321 /// [`msgs::UpdateFailHTLC`] and error code `0x8000|0x4000|24`.
322 FromIntroductionNode,
323 /// This HTLC is being failed backwards by a blinded node within the path, and thus should be
324 /// failed with [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`] and error code `0x8000|0x4000|24`.
328 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
329 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
330 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
331 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
332 short_channel_id: u64,
333 user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
335 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
336 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
337 blinded_failure: Option<BlindedFailure>,
339 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
340 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
345 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
347 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
348 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
349 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
351 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
352 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
355 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
356 struct ClaimableHTLC {
357 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
359 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
361 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
362 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
363 sender_intended_value: u64,
364 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
366 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
367 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
368 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
369 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
371 /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
372 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
375 impl From<&ClaimableHTLC> for events::ClaimedHTLC {
376 fn from(val: &ClaimableHTLC) -> Self {
377 events::ClaimedHTLC {
378 channel_id: val.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
379 user_channel_id: val.prev_hop.user_channel_id.unwrap_or(0),
380 cltv_expiry: val.cltv_expiry,
381 value_msat: val.value,
382 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: val.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0),
387 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
388 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
390 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
391 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
392 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; Self::LENGTH]);
395 /// Number of bytes in the id.
396 pub const LENGTH: usize = 32;
399 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
400 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
405 impl Readable for PaymentId {
406 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
407 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
412 impl core::fmt::Display for PaymentId {
413 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> core::fmt::Result {
414 crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
418 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
420 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
421 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
422 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
424 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
425 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
430 impl Readable for InterceptId {
431 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
432 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
437 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
438 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
439 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
440 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
441 OutboundRoute { session_priv: [u8; SECRET_KEY_SIZE] },
444 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
446 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
447 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
448 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
450 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
451 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: session_priv.secret_bytes() },
455 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
456 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
457 (0, short_channel_id, required),
458 (2, htlc_id, required),
460 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
461 (0, session_priv, required),
466 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
467 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
468 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
469 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
470 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
473 session_priv: SecretKey,
474 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
475 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
476 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
477 payment_id: PaymentId,
480 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
481 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
482 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
484 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
486 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
488 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
491 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
492 payment_id.hash(hasher);
493 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
499 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
501 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
502 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
503 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
504 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
505 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
506 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
510 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
511 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
512 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
513 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
514 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
515 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
517 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
523 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
524 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
526 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
527 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
528 pub enum FailureCode {
529 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
530 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
531 TemporaryNodeFailure,
532 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
533 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
534 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
535 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
536 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
537 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
538 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
539 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
540 /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
541 /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
543 /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
544 /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
545 InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
548 impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
549 fn into(self) -> u16 {
551 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
552 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
553 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
554 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
559 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
560 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
561 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
562 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
563 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
565 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
566 err: msgs::LightningError,
567 closes_channel: bool,
568 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
570 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
572 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
574 err: LightningError {
576 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
577 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
583 closes_channel: false,
584 shutdown_finish: None,
588 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
589 Self { err, closes_channel: false, shutdown_finish: None }
592 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
593 let err_msg = msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: err.clone() };
594 let action = if shutdown_res.monitor_update.is_some() {
595 // We have a closing `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, which means the channel was funded and we
596 // should disconnect our peer such that we force them to broadcast their latest
597 // commitment upon reconnecting.
598 msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(err_msg) }
600 msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: err_msg }
603 err: LightningError { err, action },
604 closes_channel: true,
605 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
609 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
612 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
614 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
615 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
619 log_level: Level::Warn,
622 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
624 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
626 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
628 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
629 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
636 closes_channel: false,
637 shutdown_finish: None,
641 fn closes_channel(&self) -> bool {
646 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
647 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
648 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
649 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
650 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
652 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
653 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
654 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
655 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
656 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
657 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
658 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
660 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
664 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
665 struct ClaimingPayment {
667 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
668 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
669 htlcs: Vec<events::ClaimedHTLC>,
670 sender_intended_value: Option<u64>,
672 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
673 (0, amount_msat, required),
674 (2, payment_purpose, required),
675 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
676 (5, htlcs, optional_vec),
677 (7, sender_intended_value, option),
680 struct ClaimablePayment {
681 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
682 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
683 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
686 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
687 struct ClaimablePayments {
688 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
689 /// failed/claimed by the user.
691 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
692 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
694 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
695 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
696 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
698 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
699 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
700 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
701 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
704 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
705 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
706 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
707 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
709 enum BackgroundEvent {
710 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
711 /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
712 /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
713 /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
715 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
716 /// are regenerated on startup.
717 ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
718 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
719 /// channel to continue normal operation.
721 /// In general this should be used rather than
722 /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
723 /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
724 /// error the other variant is acceptable.
726 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
727 /// are regenerated on startup.
728 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
729 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
730 funding_txo: OutPoint,
731 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
733 /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
734 /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
736 MonitorUpdatesComplete {
737 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
738 channel_id: ChannelId,
743 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
744 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
745 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
746 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
747 /// event can be generated.
748 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
749 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
750 /// operation of another channel.
752 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
753 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
754 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
755 /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
757 EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
758 event: events::Event,
759 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
761 /// Indicates we should immediately resume the operation of another channel, unless there is
762 /// some other reason why the channel is blocked. In practice this simply means immediately
763 /// removing the [`RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction`] provided from the blocking set.
765 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
766 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
767 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. However, we use this variant
768 /// instead of [`Self::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel`] when we discover that the claim was in
769 /// fact duplicative and we simply want to resume the outbound edge channel immediately.
771 /// This variant should thus never be written to disk, as it is processed inline rather than
772 /// stored for later processing.
773 FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
774 downstream_counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
775 downstream_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
776 blocking_action: RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
780 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
781 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
782 // Note that FreeOtherChannelImmediately should never be written - we were supposed to free
783 // *immediately*. However, for simplicity we implement read/write here.
784 (1, FreeOtherChannelImmediately) => {
785 (0, downstream_counterparty_node_id, required),
786 (2, downstream_funding_outpoint, required),
787 (4, blocking_action, required),
789 (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
790 (0, event, upgradable_required),
791 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
792 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
793 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
794 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
795 // downgrades to prior versions.
796 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
800 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
801 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
802 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
803 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
804 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
807 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
808 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
809 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
810 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
814 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
815 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
816 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
817 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
818 /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
819 /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
821 ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
822 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
823 channel_id: ChannelId,
824 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
829 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
830 fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
831 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
832 channel_id: prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
833 htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
838 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
839 (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
843 /// State we hold per-peer.
844 pub(super) struct PeerState<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
845 /// `channel_id` -> `ChannelPhase`
847 /// Holds all channels within corresponding `ChannelPhase`s where the peer is the counterparty.
848 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>,
849 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundChannelRequest`.
851 /// When manual channel acceptance is enabled, this holds all unaccepted inbound channels where
852 /// the peer is the counterparty. If the channel is accepted, then the entry in this table is
853 /// removed, and an InboundV1Channel is created and placed in the `inbound_v1_channel_by_id` table. If
854 /// the channel is rejected, then the entry is simply removed.
855 pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, InboundChannelRequest>,
856 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
857 latest_features: InitFeatures,
858 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
859 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
860 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
861 /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
862 /// user but which have not yet completed.
864 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
865 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
866 /// for a missing channel.
867 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
868 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
869 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
871 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
872 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
873 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
874 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
876 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
877 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
878 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
879 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
880 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
881 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
882 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
883 /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
884 /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
885 /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
886 /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
887 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
888 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
889 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
890 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
894 impl <SP: Deref> PeerState<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
895 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
896 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
897 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
898 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
899 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
902 self.channel_by_id.iter().filter(|(_, phase)| matches!(phase, ChannelPhase::Funded(_))).count() == 0
903 && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
904 && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
907 // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
908 fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
909 self.channel_by_id.len() + self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
912 // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
913 fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId) -> bool {
914 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
915 self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
919 /// A not-yet-accepted inbound (from counterparty) channel. Once
920 /// accepted, the parameters will be used to construct a channel.
921 pub(super) struct InboundChannelRequest {
922 /// The original OpenChannel message.
923 pub open_channel_msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
924 /// The number of ticks remaining before the request expires.
925 pub ticks_remaining: i32,
928 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unaccepted inbound channel to be
929 /// accepted. An unaccepted channel that exceeds this limit will be abandoned.
930 const UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: i32 = 2;
932 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
933 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
935 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
938 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
939 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
940 struct PendingInboundPayment {
941 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
942 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
943 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
944 /// this payment being removed.
946 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
947 user_payment_id: u64,
948 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
949 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
950 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
953 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
954 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
955 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
956 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
957 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
958 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
959 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
960 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
962 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
963 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
964 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
972 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
974 Arc<RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
975 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
976 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
981 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
982 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
983 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
984 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
985 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
986 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
987 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
988 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
989 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
991 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
992 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
993 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
1002 &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
1004 &'h RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
1005 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
1006 ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
1011 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`].
1013 /// This is not exported to bindings users as general cover traits aren't useful in other
1015 pub trait AChannelManager {
1016 /// A type implementing [`chain::Watch`].
1017 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
1018 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Watch`].
1019 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
1020 /// A type implementing [`BroadcasterInterface`].
1021 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
1022 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Broadcaster`].
1023 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
1024 /// A type implementing [`EntropySource`].
1025 type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
1026 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::EntropySource`].
1027 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
1028 /// A type implementing [`NodeSigner`].
1029 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
1030 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::NodeSigner`].
1031 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
1032 /// A type implementing [`WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner`].
1033 type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
1034 /// A type implementing [`SignerProvider`] for [`Self::Signer`].
1035 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<EcdsaSigner= Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
1036 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::SignerProvider`].
1037 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
1038 /// A type implementing [`FeeEstimator`].
1039 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
1040 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::FeeEstimator`].
1041 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
1042 /// A type implementing [`Router`].
1043 type Router: Router + ?Sized;
1044 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Router`].
1045 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
1046 /// A type implementing [`Logger`].
1047 type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
1048 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Logger`].
1049 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
1050 /// Returns a reference to the actual [`ChannelManager`] object.
1051 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
1054 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
1055 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1057 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1058 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1059 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1060 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1061 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1062 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1066 type Watch = M::Target;
1068 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
1070 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
1072 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
1074 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner;
1075 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
1077 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
1079 type Router = R::Target;
1081 type Logger = L::Target;
1083 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
1086 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
1087 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
1089 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
1090 /// to individual Channels.
1092 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
1093 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
1094 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
1095 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
1097 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
1098 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST durably write each
1099 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] before returning from
1100 /// [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`] or before completing async writes. With
1101 /// `ChannelManager`s, writing updates happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other
1102 /// `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during the serialization process). If the
1103 /// deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to
1104 /// [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds
1105 /// will be lost (modulo on-chain transaction fees).
1107 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
1108 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
1109 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
1111 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
1112 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
1113 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
1114 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
1115 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
1117 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
1118 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
1119 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
1120 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
1122 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
1123 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
1124 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
1126 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
1127 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
1128 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
1129 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
1130 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
1132 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
1133 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
1134 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
1135 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
1136 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
1137 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
1138 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
1139 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
1142 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
1143 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
1144 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
1145 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
1146 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
1150 // `pending_offers_messages`
1152 // `total_consistency_lock`
1154 // |__`forward_htlcs`
1156 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
1158 // |__`per_peer_state`
1160 // |__`pending_inbound_payments`
1162 // |__`claimable_payments`
1164 // |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
1168 // |__`outpoint_to_peer`
1170 // |__`short_to_chan_info`
1172 // |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
1176 // |__`pending_events`
1178 // |__`pending_background_events`
1180 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
1182 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1183 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1184 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1185 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1186 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1187 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1191 default_configuration: UserConfig,
1192 chain_hash: ChainHash,
1193 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1199 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1201 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1203 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1204 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1206 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
1207 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
1208 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
1209 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
1211 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1212 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
1214 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
1215 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
1216 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
1217 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
1218 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
1219 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
1220 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
1221 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
1223 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
1225 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1226 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
1228 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
1230 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1231 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1232 /// and via the classic SCID.
1234 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1235 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
1237 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1239 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1241 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1242 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
1243 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
1245 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1246 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
1248 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
1249 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1251 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1252 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1254 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1255 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1256 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1257 /// active channel list on load.
1259 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1260 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1262 /// Channel funding outpoint -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1264 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1265 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1266 /// the handling of the events.
1268 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1269 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1272 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1273 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1274 /// would break backwards compatability.
1275 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1276 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1277 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1279 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1281 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, PublicKey>>,
1283 pub(crate) outpoint_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, PublicKey>>,
1285 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1287 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1288 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1289 /// confirmation depth.
1291 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1292 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1293 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1295 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1297 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1299 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1301 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
1303 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
1305 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
1306 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
1307 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
1309 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
1310 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1312 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
1313 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
1314 /// keeping additional state.
1315 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
1317 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1318 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1319 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1320 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1322 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
1323 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
1325 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1326 /// are currently open with that peer.
1328 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1329 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
1332 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
1334 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1335 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1336 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1337 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1338 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1340 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
1341 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
1342 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
1343 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
1344 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
1346 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
1347 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
1349 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1350 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1351 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1352 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1353 pub(crate) pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1355 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
1356 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
1358 /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
1359 /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
1360 /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
1361 /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
1362 /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
1364 /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
1366 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1368 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1369 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1370 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1371 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1372 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1373 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1374 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1375 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1376 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1377 /// Tracks the progress of channels going through batch funding by whether funding_signed was
1378 /// received and the monitor has been persisted.
1380 /// This information does not need to be persisted as funding nodes can forget
1381 /// unfunded channels upon disconnection.
1382 funding_batch_states: Mutex<BTreeMap<Txid, Vec<(ChannelId, PublicKey, bool)>>>,
1384 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
1386 event_persist_notifier: Notifier,
1387 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool,
1389 pending_offers_messages: Mutex<Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>>>,
1393 signer_provider: SP,
1398 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1400 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1401 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1402 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1403 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1404 pub struct ChainParameters {
1405 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1406 pub network: Network,
1408 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1410 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1411 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1414 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1418 SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1419 SkipPersistNoEvents,
1422 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1423 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1424 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1425 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1426 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1427 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1429 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1430 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1431 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1432 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1433 event_persist_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1434 needs_persist_flag: &'a AtomicBool,
1436 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1437 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1440 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1441 /// Notifies any waiters and indicates that we need to persist, in addition to possibly having
1442 /// events to handle.
1444 /// This must always be called if the changes included a `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, as well as in
1445 /// other cases where losing the changes on restart may result in a force-close or otherwise
1447 fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1448 Self::optionally_notify(cm, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
1451 fn optionally_notify<F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C, mut persist_check: F)
1452 -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1453 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1454 let force_notify = cm.get_cm().process_background_events();
1456 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1457 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1458 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1459 should_persist: move || {
1460 // Pick the "most" action between `persist_check` and the background events
1461 // processing and return that.
1462 let notify = persist_check();
1463 match (notify, force_notify) {
1464 (NotifyOption::DoPersist, _) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1465 (_, NotifyOption::DoPersist) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1466 (NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents, _) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1467 (_, NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1468 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
1471 _read_guard: read_guard,
1475 /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
1476 /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first (or
1477 /// [`Self::optionally_notify`] used).
1478 fn optionally_notify_skipping_background_events<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>
1479 (cm: &'a C, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1480 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1482 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1483 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1484 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1485 should_persist: persist_check,
1486 _read_guard: read_guard,
1491 impl<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1492 fn drop(&mut self) {
1493 match (self.should_persist)() {
1494 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
1495 self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
1496 self.event_persist_notifier.notify()
1498 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
1499 self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
1500 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
1505 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1506 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1508 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1510 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1511 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1512 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1513 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1514 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1516 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1517 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1519 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1521 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1522 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1523 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1524 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1525 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1526 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1527 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1528 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1529 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1530 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1531 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1532 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1533 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1535 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1536 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1538 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1539 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1540 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1541 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1543 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1544 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1545 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1546 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1547 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1548 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1550 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1552 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1553 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1555 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1557 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1558 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1560 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1561 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1562 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1564 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1565 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1566 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1568 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1569 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1570 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1571 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1573 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1574 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1575 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1577 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1578 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1579 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1581 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1582 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1583 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1584 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1585 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1586 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1587 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1588 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1589 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1590 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1591 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1594 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1595 /// to better separate parameters.
1596 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1597 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1598 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1599 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1600 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1601 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1602 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1603 pub features: InitFeatures,
1604 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1605 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1606 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1608 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1610 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1611 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1612 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1613 /// payments to us through this channel.
1614 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1615 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1616 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1617 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1618 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1619 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1620 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1623 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1624 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1625 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1626 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1627 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1628 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1629 /// lifetime of the channel.
1630 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
1631 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1632 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1633 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1634 /// our counterparty already.
1636 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1637 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1638 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1639 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1641 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1642 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1643 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1644 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1646 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1647 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1649 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1650 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1652 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1653 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1654 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1655 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1656 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1657 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1658 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1659 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1660 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1663 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1665 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1666 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1667 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1668 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1669 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1670 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1671 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1673 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1674 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1676 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1677 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1678 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1679 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1680 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1681 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1682 /// this value on chain.
1684 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1686 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1688 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1689 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1690 /// The `user_channel_id` value passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound
1691 /// channels, or to [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
1692 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] config flag is set to true. Otherwise
1693 /// `user_channel_id` will be randomized for an inbound channel. This may be zero for objects
1694 /// serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1696 /// [`ChannelManager::create_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_channel
1697 /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
1698 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels
1699 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1700 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1701 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1703 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1704 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1705 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1706 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1707 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1709 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1710 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1711 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1712 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1714 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1715 pub balance_msat: u64,
1716 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1717 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1718 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1719 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1721 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1723 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1724 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1725 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1726 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1727 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1728 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1729 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1730 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1732 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`],
1733 /// [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`], and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1734 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1735 /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
1736 /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
1737 /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
1738 /// route which is valid.
1739 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1740 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1741 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1742 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1743 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1744 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1746 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1747 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1748 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1749 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1750 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1751 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1752 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1753 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1754 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1756 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1758 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1759 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1760 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1761 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1762 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1764 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1765 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1766 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1767 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1768 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1769 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1770 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1772 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1773 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1774 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1775 pub is_outbound: bool,
1776 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1777 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1778 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1779 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1780 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1782 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1783 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1784 /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
1785 /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
1786 pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
1787 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1788 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1790 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1791 pub is_usable: bool,
1792 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1793 pub is_public: bool,
1794 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1795 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1796 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1797 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1798 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1799 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1801 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1802 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1805 impl ChannelDetails {
1806 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1807 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1808 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1810 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1811 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1812 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1813 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1816 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1817 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1818 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1820 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1821 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1822 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1823 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1826 fn from_channel_context<SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
1827 context: &ChannelContext<SP>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
1828 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
1831 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1832 F::Target: FeeEstimator
1834 let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
1835 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1836 context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1838 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
1839 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1840 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1841 features: latest_features,
1842 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1843 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1844 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1845 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1846 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1847 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1848 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1849 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
1850 Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1851 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1853 funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
1854 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1855 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1856 channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1857 short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
1858 outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1859 inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1860 channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
1861 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1862 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1863 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1864 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1865 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1866 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1867 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1868 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
1869 confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
1870 confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1871 force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1872 is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
1873 is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
1874 is_usable: context.is_live(),
1875 is_public: context.should_announce(),
1876 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1877 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1878 config: Some(context.config()),
1879 channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
1884 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1885 /// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
1886 /// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
1887 /// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
1888 /// the channel will be removed shortly.
1889 /// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
1890 /// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
1891 pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
1892 /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
1894 /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
1896 /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
1897 /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
1899 /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
1900 NegotiatingClosingFee,
1901 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
1902 /// to drop the channel.
1906 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1907 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1908 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1909 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1910 /// When an invoice was requested and thus a payment has not yet been sent.
1912 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1913 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1914 payment_id: PaymentId,
1916 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1918 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1919 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1920 payment_id: PaymentId,
1921 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1923 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1924 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1925 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1928 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1929 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1930 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1932 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1933 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1934 payment_id: PaymentId,
1935 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1936 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1937 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1939 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1940 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1941 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1943 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1944 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1945 payment_id: PaymentId,
1946 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1947 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1951 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1953 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
1955 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1956 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1957 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1958 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1960 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1961 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1962 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1965 macro_rules! handle_error {
1966 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1967 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1968 // entering the macro.
1969 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1970 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1974 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish, .. }) => {
1975 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1977 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1978 let counterparty_node_id = shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id;
1979 let channel_id = shutdown_res.channel_id;
1980 let logger = WithContext::from(
1981 &$self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_id),
1983 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel: {}", err.err);
1985 $self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1986 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1987 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1992 log_error!($self.logger, "Got non-closing error: {}", err.err);
1995 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1997 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1998 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1999 action: err.action.clone()
2003 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
2004 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2005 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
2006 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2007 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
2011 // Return error in case higher-API need one
2018 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
2019 ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
2020 if let Some(outpoint) = $channel_context.get_funding_txo() {
2021 $self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&outpoint);
2023 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2024 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
2025 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
2027 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
2028 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
2029 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
2030 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
2031 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
2033 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
2034 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
2036 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
2040 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
2041 macro_rules! convert_chan_phase_err {
2042 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, $channel_update: expr) => {
2044 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
2045 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), *$channel_id))
2047 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
2048 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), *$channel_id))
2050 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
2051 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$channel.context);
2052 log_error!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", $channel_id, msg);
2053 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel.context);
2054 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: msg.clone() };
2055 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true, reason);
2057 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $channel_update);
2062 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, FUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2063 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, { $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast($channel).ok() })
2065 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2066 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, None)
2068 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_phase: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
2069 match $channel_phase {
2070 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
2071 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL)
2073 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel) => {
2074 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2076 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel) => {
2077 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2083 macro_rules! break_chan_phase_entry {
2084 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2088 let key = *$entry.key();
2089 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2091 $entry.remove_entry();
2099 macro_rules! try_chan_phase_entry {
2100 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2104 let key = *$entry.key();
2105 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2107 $entry.remove_entry();
2115 macro_rules! remove_channel_phase {
2116 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2118 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
2119 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context());
2125 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
2126 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
2127 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
2128 node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2129 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
2131 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
2132 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
2133 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2134 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2135 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2136 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2137 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
2138 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2139 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2140 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2145 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
2146 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2147 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
2148 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
2149 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2150 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
2151 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2152 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2153 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
2155 $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
2160 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
2161 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2162 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
2163 debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
2164 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
2165 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2166 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2167 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2168 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
2170 $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
2175 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
2176 ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2177 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context);
2178 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&&logger,
2179 &$self.node_signer, $self.chain_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
2180 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
2181 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
2182 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
2183 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
2184 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
2185 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
2186 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
2188 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
2189 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2190 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2196 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
2197 .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
2199 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
2200 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
2201 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
2202 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
2203 updates.announcement_sigs);
2204 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
2205 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
2208 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
2209 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = $chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2210 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
2211 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
2213 // If the channel belongs to a batch funding transaction, the progress of the batch
2214 // should be updated as we have received funding_signed and persisted the monitor.
2215 if let Some(txid) = unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2216 let mut funding_batch_states = $self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2217 let mut batch_completed = false;
2218 if let Some(batch_state) = funding_batch_states.get_mut(&txid) {
2219 let channel_state = batch_state.iter_mut().find(|(chan_id, pubkey, _)| (
2220 *chan_id == channel_id &&
2221 *pubkey == counterparty_node_id
2223 if let Some(channel_state) = channel_state {
2224 channel_state.2 = true;
2226 debug_assert!(false, "Missing channel batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2228 batch_completed = batch_state.iter().all(|(_, _, completed)| *completed);
2230 debug_assert!(false, "Missing batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2233 // When all channels in a batched funding transaction have become ready, it is not necessary
2234 // to track the progress of the batch anymore and the state of the channels can be updated.
2235 if batch_completed {
2236 let removed_batch_state = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2237 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2238 let mut batch_funding_tx = None;
2239 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, _) in removed_batch_state {
2240 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2241 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2242 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2243 batch_funding_tx = batch_funding_tx.or_else(|| chan.context.unbroadcasted_funding());
2244 chan.set_batch_ready();
2245 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2246 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, chan);
2250 if let Some(tx) = batch_funding_tx {
2251 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting batch funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
2252 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
2257 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
2259 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
2260 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
2262 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
2263 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2264 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2265 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
2270 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
2271 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $completed: expr) => { {
2272 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
2273 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context);
2275 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::UnrecoverableError => {
2276 let err_str = "ChannelMonitor[Update] persistence failed unrecoverably. This indicates we cannot continue normal operation and must shut down.";
2277 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
2278 panic!("{}", err_str);
2280 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
2281 log_debug!(logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
2282 &$chan.context.channel_id());
2285 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
2291 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
2292 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $chan, _internal,
2293 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
2295 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2296 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
2297 .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
2298 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
2299 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
2300 // filter for uniqueness here.
2301 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
2302 .unwrap_or_else(|| {
2303 in_flight_updates.push($update);
2304 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
2306 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
2307 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $chan, _internal,
2309 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
2310 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
2311 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
2317 macro_rules! process_events_body {
2318 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
2319 let mut processed_all_events = false;
2320 while !processed_all_events {
2321 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
2328 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
2329 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
2330 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2332 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
2333 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
2334 result = $self.process_background_events();
2336 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
2337 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
2338 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
2339 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2343 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
2344 let num_events = pending_events.len();
2345 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
2346 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2349 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
2351 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
2352 $event_to_handle = event;
2354 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
2355 post_event_actions.push(action);
2360 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2361 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
2362 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
2363 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
2364 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
2365 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
2368 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
2369 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
2370 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
2371 processed_all_events = false;
2375 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
2376 $self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
2377 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify();
2379 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
2380 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
2381 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
2387 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
2389 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
2390 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2391 ES::Target: EntropySource,
2392 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2393 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2394 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2398 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
2400 /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
2402 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
2403 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
2405 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
2407 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
2408 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
2409 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
2412 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
2413 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
2414 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
2416 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
2417 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
2418 current_timestamp: u32,
2420 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2421 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
2422 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
2423 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
2425 default_configuration: config.clone(),
2426 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(params.network),
2427 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
2432 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
2434 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
2435 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2436 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
2437 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2438 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
2439 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2440 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2441 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2443 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
2446 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
2447 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2449 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2451 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
2453 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2455 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2456 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
2457 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2458 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2459 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
2460 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
2461 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
2462 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
2464 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2474 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
2475 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
2476 &self.default_configuration
2479 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2480 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2481 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
2484 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
2485 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
2487 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
2489 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
2493 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
2498 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2500 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2501 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2502 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2503 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2504 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2506 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2507 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2509 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2510 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2511 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2513 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2514 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2515 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2517 /// If `temporary_channel_id` is specified, it will be used as the temporary channel ID of the
2518 /// channel. Otherwise, a random one will be generated for you.
2520 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2521 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2522 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2523 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2524 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2525 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2527 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2528 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2529 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2530 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<ChannelId, APIError> {
2531 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2532 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2535 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2536 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2537 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2539 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2541 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2542 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2544 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2546 if let Some(temporary_channel_id) = temporary_channel_id {
2547 if peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(&temporary_channel_id) {
2548 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Channel with temporary channel ID {} already exists!", temporary_channel_id)});
2553 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2554 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2555 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2556 match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2557 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2558 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias, temporary_channel_id)
2562 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
2567 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash);
2569 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
2570 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
2571 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2573 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
2575 panic!("RNG is bad???");
2578 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel)); }
2581 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
2582 node_id: their_network_key,
2585 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
2588 fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&ChannelId, &Channel<SP>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2589 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2590 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2591 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `outpoint_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2592 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2593 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2594 // the same channel.
2595 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2597 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2598 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2599 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2600 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2601 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2602 res.extend(peer_state.channel_by_id.iter()
2603 .filter_map(|(chan_id, phase)| match phase {
2604 // Only `Channels` in the `ChannelPhase::Funded` phase can be considered funded.
2605 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => Some((chan_id, chan)),
2609 .map(|(_channel_id, channel)| {
2610 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2611 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2619 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
2620 /// more information.
2621 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2622 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2623 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2624 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `outpoint_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2625 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2626 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2627 // the same channel.
2628 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2630 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2631 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2632 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2633 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2634 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2635 for context in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, phase)| phase.context()) {
2636 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height,
2637 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2645 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
2646 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
2648 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
2649 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
2651 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2652 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2653 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2654 // really wanted anyway.
2655 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
2658 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2659 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2660 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2661 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2663 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2664 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2665 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2666 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2667 let context_to_details = |context| {
2668 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2670 return peer_state.channel_by_id
2672 .map(|(_, phase)| phase.context())
2673 .map(context_to_details)
2679 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2680 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2682 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2683 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2684 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2686 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2687 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2688 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2689 .filter_map(|(payment_id, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2690 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {
2691 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2693 // InvoiceReceived is an intermediate state and doesn't need to be exposed
2694 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {
2695 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2697 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2698 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2699 payment_id: *payment_id,
2700 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2701 total_msat: *total_msat,
2704 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2705 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2707 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2708 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2710 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2715 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2716 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2718 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
2719 let mut shutdown_result = None;
2722 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2724 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2725 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2727 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2728 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2730 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2731 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
2732 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
2733 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
2734 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2735 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) =
2736 chan.get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2737 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2739 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2740 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2741 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2742 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2743 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2747 debug_assert!(monitor_update_opt.is_none() || !chan.is_shutdown(),
2748 "We can't both complete shutdown and generate a monitor update");
2750 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2751 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2752 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
2753 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
2756 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
2757 shutdown_result = Some(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
2760 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2761 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2763 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
2764 channel_id, counterparty_node_id,
2771 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2772 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2773 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2774 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2777 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
2778 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2784 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2785 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2786 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2788 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] and
2789 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
2791 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2792 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] feerate or the feerate which
2793 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2794 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2796 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2798 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2799 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2800 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2803 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2804 /// [`ChannelCloseMinimum`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum
2805 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
2806 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2807 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2808 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2811 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2812 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2813 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2815 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2816 /// the channel being closed or not:
2817 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2818 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2819 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
2820 /// fee estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2821 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2822 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2823 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2825 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2826 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2827 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2828 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2830 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2832 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2833 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2834 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2837 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2838 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
2839 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2840 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2841 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2844 fn finish_close_channel(&self, mut shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2845 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2846 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2847 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
2848 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2851 let logger = WithContext::from(
2852 &self.logger, Some(shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id), Some(shutdown_res.channel_id),
2855 log_debug!(logger, "Finishing closure of channel due to {} with {} HTLCs to fail",
2856 shutdown_res.closure_reason, shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.len());
2857 for htlc_source in shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.drain(..) {
2858 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2859 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2860 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2861 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2863 if let Some((_, funding_txo, monitor_update)) = shutdown_res.monitor_update {
2864 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2865 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2866 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2867 // ignore the result here.
2868 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2870 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
2871 if let Some(txid) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2872 let mut funding_batch_states = self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2873 let affected_channels = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2874 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2875 let mut has_uncompleted_channel = None;
2876 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, state) in affected_channels {
2877 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2878 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2879 if let Some(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id) {
2880 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
2881 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::FundingBatchClosure));
2884 has_uncompleted_channel = Some(has_uncompleted_channel.map_or(!state, |v| v || !state));
2887 has_uncompleted_channel.unwrap_or(true),
2888 "Closing a batch where all channels have completed initial monitor update",
2893 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2894 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2895 channel_id: shutdown_res.channel_id,
2896 user_channel_id: shutdown_res.user_channel_id,
2897 reason: shutdown_res.closure_reason,
2898 counterparty_node_id: Some(shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id),
2899 channel_capacity_sats: Some(shutdown_res.channel_capacity_satoshis),
2900 channel_funding_txo: shutdown_res.channel_funding_txo,
2903 if let Some(transaction) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_funding_tx {
2904 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2905 channel_id: shutdown_res.channel_id, transaction
2909 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
2910 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2914 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2915 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2916 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2917 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2918 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2919 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2920 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2921 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
2922 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2923 let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2924 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
2926 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
2928 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*peer_node_id), Some(*channel_id));
2929 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2930 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", channel_id);
2931 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
2932 mem::drop(peer_state);
2933 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
2935 ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) => {
2936 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast, closure_reason));
2937 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2939 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
2940 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
2941 // Unfunded channel has no update
2942 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
2945 } else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
2946 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
2947 // N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
2948 // don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
2950 (None, *peer_node_id)
2952 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, peer_node_id) });
2955 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
2956 // Try to send the `BroadcastChannelUpdate` to the peer we just force-closed on, but if
2957 // not try to broadcast it via whatever peer we have.
2958 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2959 let a_peer_state_opt = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2960 .ok_or(per_peer_state.values().next());
2961 if let Ok(a_peer_state_mutex) = a_peer_state_opt {
2962 let mut a_peer_state = a_peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2963 a_peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2969 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
2972 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2973 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2974 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2975 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2976 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2977 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2978 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2979 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2980 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2981 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2982 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
2983 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
2994 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2995 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2996 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2998 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2999 -> Result<(), APIError> {
3000 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
3003 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
3004 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
3005 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
3007 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
3008 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
3009 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
3010 -> Result<(), APIError> {
3011 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
3014 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
3015 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
3016 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
3017 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3018 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
3022 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
3023 /// local transaction(s).
3024 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
3025 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3026 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
3030 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
3031 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey,
3033 (onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg
3035 let (next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_details_opt) = decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion(
3036 msg, &self.node_signer, &self.logger, &self.secp_ctx
3039 let is_intro_node_forward = match next_hop {
3040 onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
3041 next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedForward {
3042 intro_node_blinding_point: Some(_), ..
3048 macro_rules! return_err {
3049 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3052 WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id)),
3053 "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg
3055 // If `msg.blinding_point` is set, we must always fail with malformed.
3056 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
3057 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3058 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3059 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3060 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
3061 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
3065 let (err_code, err_data) = if is_intro_node_forward {
3066 (INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, &[0; 32][..])
3067 } else { ($err_code, $data) };
3068 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3069 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3070 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3071 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason(err_code, err_data.to_vec())
3072 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3078 let NextPacketDetails {
3079 next_packet_pubkey, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_scid, outgoing_cltv_value
3080 } = match next_packet_details_opt {
3081 Some(next_packet_details) => next_packet_details,
3082 // it is a receive, so no need for outbound checks
3083 None => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
3086 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
3087 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
3088 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
3089 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid).cloned();
3090 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
3091 None => { // unknown_next_peer
3092 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
3093 // phantom or an intercept.
3094 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
3095 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)) ||
3096 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)
3100 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3103 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
3105 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
3106 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3107 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3108 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3109 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3111 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3112 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3113 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).map(
3114 |chan_phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
3117 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
3118 // have no consistency guarantees.
3119 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3123 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
3124 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
3125 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
3126 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
3127 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3129 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
3130 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
3131 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
3132 // we don't have the channel here.
3133 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3135 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3137 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
3138 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
3139 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
3140 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
3141 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
3142 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
3143 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
3144 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
3145 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
3146 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
3147 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
3149 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
3152 if outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
3153 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
3155 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value) {
3156 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
3163 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3165 if let Err((err_msg, code)) = check_incoming_htlc_cltv(
3166 cur_height, outgoing_cltv_value, msg.cltv_expiry
3168 if code & 0x1000 != 0 && chan_update_opt.is_none() {
3169 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
3170 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
3171 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
3172 break Some((err_msg, 0x2000 | 2, None))
3174 let chan_update_opt = if code & 0x1000 != 0 { chan_update_opt } else { None };
3175 break Some((err_msg, code, chan_update_opt));
3181 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
3182 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
3183 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
3184 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3186 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
3187 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3189 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3190 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3191 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3193 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3194 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3195 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3196 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3197 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
3198 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
3199 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
3203 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
3205 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, Some(next_packet_pubkey)))
3208 fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
3209 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
3210 decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop, allow_underpay: bool,
3211 next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>,
3212 ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
3213 macro_rules! return_err {
3214 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3216 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id));
3217 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3218 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
3219 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(
3220 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3221 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3222 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3223 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
3224 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
3228 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3229 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3230 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3231 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3232 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3238 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
3240 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3241 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
3242 msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat,
3243 current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
3246 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
3247 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
3248 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
3249 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
3250 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
3252 Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3255 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
3256 match create_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
3257 new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
3258 Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
3259 Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3265 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
3266 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
3267 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
3269 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
3270 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
3271 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3273 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3274 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3275 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3276 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
3277 return Err(LightningError {
3278 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
3279 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
3282 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
3283 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
3285 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3286 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3287 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
3290 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
3291 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
3292 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
3293 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
3295 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
3296 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
3297 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3299 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3300 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3301 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3302 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3303 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
3304 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
3305 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
3309 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
3312 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3313 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3314 log_trace!(logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
3315 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3317 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
3318 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
3319 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
3320 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
3321 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
3324 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
3325 chain_hash: self.chain_hash,
3327 timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
3328 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
3329 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
3330 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
3331 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
3332 fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
3333 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
3334 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3336 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
3337 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
3338 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
3340 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
3342 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
3349 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3350 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3351 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
3352 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3357 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3358 let SendAlongPathArgs {
3359 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3362 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
3363 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3364 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
3365 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
3367 let (onion_packet, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::create_payment_onion(
3368 &self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height,
3369 payment_hash, keysend_preimage, prng_seed
3371 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None);
3372 log_error!(logger, "Failed to build an onion for path for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
3376 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3377 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
3379 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None);
3380 log_error!(logger, "Failed to find first-hop for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
3381 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()})
3383 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3386 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(id));
3388 "Attempting to send payment with payment hash {} along path with next hop {}",
3389 payment_hash, path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
3391 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3392 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3393 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
3394 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3395 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3396 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
3397 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
3398 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
3399 if !chan.context.is_live() {
3400 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3402 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3403 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3404 let send_res = chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
3405 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3407 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
3408 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
3410 }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
3411 match break_chan_phase_entry!(self, send_res, chan_phase_entry) {
3412 Some(monitor_update) => {
3413 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
3415 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
3416 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
3417 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
3418 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
3419 // which we do in the send_payment check for
3420 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
3421 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
3429 _ => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel to first hop is unfunded".to_owned()}),
3432 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
3433 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
3434 // `channel_by_id` map.
3435 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
3436 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
3440 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
3441 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3443 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
3448 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
3450 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
3451 /// fields for more info.
3453 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
3454 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
3456 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
3458 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
3459 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
3460 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
3461 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
3462 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
3464 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
3465 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
3466 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
3467 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
3468 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
3470 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
3471 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
3472 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
3473 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
3475 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
3477 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
3478 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
3479 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
3481 /// In general, a path may raise:
3482 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
3483 /// node public key) is specified.
3484 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available as it has been
3485 /// closed, doesn't exist, or the peer is currently disconnected.
3486 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
3487 /// relevant updates.
3489 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
3490 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
3491 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
3493 /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
3494 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3495 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3496 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
3497 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
3498 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3499 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3500 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3501 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3502 self.pending_outbound_payments
3503 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
3504 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3505 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3508 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
3509 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3510 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
3511 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3512 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3513 self.pending_outbound_payments
3514 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
3515 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
3516 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3517 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3521 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3522 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3523 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3524 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
3525 keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
3526 best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3530 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
3531 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3532 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3536 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3537 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3540 pub(super) fn send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&self, invoice: &Bolt12Invoice, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), Bolt12PaymentError> {
3541 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3542 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3543 self.pending_outbound_payments
3544 .send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(
3545 invoice, payment_id, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3546 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer,
3547 best_block_height, &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
3548 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args)
3552 /// Signals that no further attempts for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
3553 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
3554 /// retries are exhausted.
3556 /// # Event Generation
3558 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
3559 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
3561 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
3562 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
3563 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
3565 /// # Requested Invoices
3567 /// In the case of paying a [`Bolt12Invoice`] via [`ChannelManager::pay_for_offer`], abandoning
3568 /// the payment prior to receiving the invoice will result in an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`]
3569 /// and prevent any attempts at paying it once received. The other events may only be generated
3570 /// once the invoice has been received.
3572 /// # Restart Behavior
3574 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated and we restart without first persisting the
3575 /// [`ChannelManager`], another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated; likewise for
3576 /// [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
3578 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
3579 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
3580 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3581 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
3584 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
3585 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
3586 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
3587 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
3588 /// never reach the recipient.
3590 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
3591 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
3593 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
3594 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
3596 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
3597 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
3598 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3599 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3600 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
3601 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
3602 &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3605 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
3606 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3608 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
3611 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
3612 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
3613 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3614 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3615 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
3616 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3617 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3618 &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3621 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
3622 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
3623 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
3624 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
3625 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3626 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3627 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
3628 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3629 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3632 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
3635 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
3636 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
3639 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay the given
3640 /// amount to the given `node_id`.
3642 /// See [`ChannelManager::send_preflight_probes`] for more information.
3643 pub fn send_spontaneous_preflight_probes(
3644 &self, node_id: PublicKey, amount_msat: u64, final_cltv_expiry_delta: u32,
3645 liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3646 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3647 let payment_params =
3648 PaymentParameters::from_node_id(node_id, final_cltv_expiry_delta);
3650 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, amount_msat);
3652 self.send_preflight_probes(route_params, liquidity_limit_multiplier)
3655 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay a route found
3656 /// according to the given [`RouteParameters`].
3658 /// This may be used to send "pre-flight" probes, i.e., to train our scorer before conducting
3659 /// the actual payment. Note this is only useful if there likely is sufficient time for the
3660 /// probe to settle before sending out the actual payment, e.g., when waiting for user
3661 /// confirmation in a wallet UI.
3663 /// Otherwise, there is a chance the probe could take up some liquidity needed to complete the
3664 /// actual payment. Users should therefore be cautious and might avoid sending probes if
3665 /// liquidity is scarce and/or they don't expect the probe to return before they send the
3666 /// payment. To mitigate this issue, channels with available liquidity less than the required
3667 /// amount times the given `liquidity_limit_multiplier` won't be used to send pre-flight
3668 /// probes. If `None` is given as `liquidity_limit_multiplier`, it defaults to `3`.
3669 pub fn send_preflight_probes(
3670 &self, route_params: RouteParameters, liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3671 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3672 let liquidity_limit_multiplier = liquidity_limit_multiplier.unwrap_or(3);
3674 let payer = self.get_our_node_id();
3675 let usable_channels = self.list_usable_channels();
3676 let first_hops = usable_channels.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>();
3677 let inflight_htlcs = self.compute_inflight_htlcs();
3681 .find_route(&payer, &route_params, Some(&first_hops), inflight_htlcs)
3683 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to find path for payment probe: {:?}", e);
3684 ProbeSendFailure::RouteNotFound
3687 let mut used_liquidity_map = HashMap::with_capacity(first_hops.len());
3689 let mut res = Vec::new();
3691 for mut path in route.paths {
3692 // If the last hop is probably an unannounced channel we refrain from probing all the
3693 // way through to the end and instead probe up to the second-to-last channel.
3694 while let Some(last_path_hop) = path.hops.last() {
3695 if last_path_hop.maybe_announced_channel {
3696 // We found a potentially announced last hop.
3699 // Drop the last hop, as it's likely unannounced.
3702 "Avoided sending payment probe all the way to last hop {} as it is likely unannounced.",
3703 last_path_hop.short_channel_id
3705 let final_value_msat = path.final_value_msat();
3707 if let Some(new_last) = path.hops.last_mut() {
3708 new_last.fee_msat += final_value_msat;
3713 if path.hops.len() < 2 {
3716 "Skipped sending payment probe over path with less than two hops."
3721 if let Some(first_path_hop) = path.hops.first() {
3722 if let Some(first_hop) = first_hops.iter().find(|h| {
3723 h.get_outbound_payment_scid() == Some(first_path_hop.short_channel_id)
3725 let path_value = path.final_value_msat() + path.fee_msat();
3726 let used_liquidity =
3727 used_liquidity_map.entry(first_path_hop.short_channel_id).or_insert(0);
3729 if first_hop.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat
3730 < (*used_liquidity + path_value) * liquidity_limit_multiplier
3732 log_debug!(self.logger, "Skipped sending payment probe to avoid putting channel {} under the liquidity limit.", first_path_hop.short_channel_id);
3735 *used_liquidity += path_value;
3740 res.push(self.send_probe(path).map_err(|e| {
3741 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to send pre-flight probe: {:?}", e);
3742 ProbeSendFailure::SendingFailed(e)
3749 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
3750 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
3751 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: FnMut(&OutboundV1Channel<SP>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
3752 &self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, is_batch_funding: bool,
3753 mut find_funding_output: FundingOutput,
3754 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3755 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3756 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3757 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3759 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3760 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3762 let (mut chan, msg_opt) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
3763 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(mut chan)) => {
3764 funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
3766 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3767 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, is_batch_funding, &&logger)
3768 .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
3769 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
3770 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: msg.clone() };
3771 let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false, reason);
3772 (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, shutdown_res, None))
3773 } else { unreachable!(); });
3775 Ok(funding_msg) => (chan, funding_msg),
3776 Err((chan, err)) => {
3777 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3778 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3779 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
3780 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3781 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3787 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(*temporary_channel_id, phase);
3788 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3790 "Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is not an unfunded, outbound V1 channel",
3791 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3794 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {err: format!(
3795 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3796 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3800 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
3801 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3802 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3806 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
3807 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3808 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3810 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3811 let mut outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3812 match outpoint_to_peer.entry(funding_txo) {
3813 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => { e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()); },
3814 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(o) => {
3816 "An existing channel using outpoint {} is open with peer {}",
3817 funding_txo, o.get()
3819 mem::drop(outpoint_to_peer);
3820 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3821 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3822 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.clone() };
3823 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(true, reason));
3824 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err });
3827 e.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan));
3834 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3835 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, false, |_, tx| {
3836 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3840 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3842 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3843 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3845 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3846 /// across the p2p network.
3848 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3849 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3851 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3852 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3853 /// keys per-channel).
3855 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3856 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3857 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3859 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3860 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3861 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3863 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3864 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3865 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3866 /// for more details.
3868 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3869 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3870 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3871 self.batch_funding_transaction_generated(&[(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id)], funding_transaction)
3874 /// Call this upon creation of a batch funding transaction for the given channels.
3876 /// Return values are identical to [`Self::funding_transaction_generated`], respective to
3877 /// each individual channel and transaction output.
3879 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. This batch funding transaction
3880 /// will only be broadcast when we have safely received and persisted the counterparty's
3881 /// signature for each channel.
3883 /// If there is an error, all channels in the batch are to be considered closed.
3884 pub fn batch_funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channels: &[(&ChannelId, &PublicKey)], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3885 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3886 let mut result = Ok(());
3888 if !funding_transaction.is_coin_base() {
3889 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3890 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3891 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3892 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3897 if funding_transaction.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
3898 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3899 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3903 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3904 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3905 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3906 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3907 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3908 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) &&
3909 funding_transaction.lock_time.is_block_height() &&
3910 funding_transaction.lock_time.to_consensus_u32() > height + 1
3912 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3913 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3918 let txid = funding_transaction.txid();
3919 let is_batch_funding = temporary_channels.len() > 1;
3920 let mut funding_batch_states = if is_batch_funding {
3921 Some(self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap())
3925 let mut funding_batch_state = funding_batch_states.as_mut().and_then(|states| {
3926 match states.entry(txid) {
3927 btree_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3928 result = result.clone().and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3929 err: "Batch funding transaction with the same txid already exists".to_owned()
3933 btree_map::Entry::Vacant(vacant) => Some(vacant.insert(Vec::new())),
3936 for &(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in temporary_channels {
3937 result = result.and_then(|_| self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(
3938 temporary_channel_id,
3939 counterparty_node_id,
3940 funding_transaction.clone(),
3943 let mut output_index = None;
3944 let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3945 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3946 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
3947 if output_index.is_some() {
3948 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3949 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3952 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3955 if output_index.is_none() {
3956 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3957 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3960 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() };
3961 if let Some(funding_batch_state) = funding_batch_state.as_mut() {
3962 funding_batch_state.push((outpoint.to_channel_id(), *counterparty_node_id, false));
3968 if let Err(ref e) = result {
3969 // Remaining channels need to be removed on any error.
3970 let e = format!("Error in transaction funding: {:?}", e);
3971 let mut channels_to_remove = Vec::new();
3972 channels_to_remove.extend(funding_batch_states.as_mut()
3973 .and_then(|states| states.remove(&txid))
3974 .into_iter().flatten()
3975 .map(|(chan_id, node_id, _state)| (chan_id, node_id))
3977 channels_to_remove.extend(temporary_channels.iter()
3978 .map(|(&chan_id, &node_id)| (chan_id, node_id))
3980 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
3982 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3983 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in channels_to_remove {
3984 per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3985 .map(|peer_state_mutex| peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap())
3986 .and_then(|mut peer_state| peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id))
3988 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
3989 let closure_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: e.clone() };
3990 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
3994 mem::drop(funding_batch_states);
3995 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
3996 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
4002 /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
4004 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4005 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4006 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4007 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4009 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4010 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4012 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4013 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4015 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4017 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4018 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4019 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4020 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4021 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4022 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4023 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4024 pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
4025 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
4026 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4027 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
4028 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4029 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
4033 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4034 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4035 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4036 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4037 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4038 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4039 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4040 if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
4041 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4042 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4046 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4047 if let Some(channel_phase) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
4048 let mut config = channel_phase.context().config();
4049 config.apply(config_update);
4050 if !channel_phase.context_mut().update_config(&config) {
4053 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = channel_phase {
4054 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
4055 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
4056 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
4057 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4058 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4065 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
4066 debug_assert!(false);
4067 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4069 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
4070 channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4077 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
4079 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4080 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4081 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4082 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4084 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4085 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4087 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4088 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4090 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4092 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4093 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4094 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4095 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4096 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4097 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4098 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4099 pub fn update_channel_config(
4100 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config: &ChannelConfig,
4101 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4102 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
4105 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
4106 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
4108 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
4109 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
4111 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
4112 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
4113 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
4114 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
4115 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
4117 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
4118 /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
4119 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
4122 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4125 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
4126 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4127 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
4128 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
4129 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
4130 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &ChannelId, next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4131 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4133 let next_hop_scid = {
4134 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4135 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
4136 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
4137 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4138 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4139 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
4140 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) => {
4141 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
4142 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4143 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", next_hop_channel_id)
4146 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
4148 Some(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4149 err: format!("Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is still opening.",
4150 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
4153 let error = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
4154 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id);
4155 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(next_node_id), Some(*next_hop_channel_id));
4156 log_error!(logger, "{} when attempting to forward intercepted HTLC", error);
4157 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4164 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4165 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4166 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4169 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
4170 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, blinded, .. } => {
4171 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4172 onion_packet, blinded, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid
4175 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4177 let skimmed_fee_msat =
4178 payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
4179 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
4180 skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
4181 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
4184 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
4185 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4186 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4187 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
4188 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
4190 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
4194 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
4195 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
4197 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4200 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4201 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4202 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4204 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4205 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4206 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4209 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
4210 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4211 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4212 user_channel_id: Some(payment.prev_user_channel_id),
4213 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4214 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
4215 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4216 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4217 blinded_failure: payment.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
4220 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
4221 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
4222 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4223 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4228 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
4230 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
4231 /// Will likely generate further events.
4232 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
4233 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4235 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
4236 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
4237 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
4239 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
4240 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
4242 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
4243 if short_chan_id != 0 {
4244 let mut forwarding_counterparty = None;
4245 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
4247 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4248 match forward_info {
4249 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4250 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4251 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4252 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4253 outgoing_cltv_value, ..
4256 macro_rules! failure_handler {
4257 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
4258 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, forwarding_counterparty, Some(prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()));
4259 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
4261 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4262 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4263 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4264 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4265 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4266 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4267 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
4268 blinded_failure: routing.blinded_failure(),
4271 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
4272 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
4274 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
4277 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4278 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
4284 macro_rules! fail_forward {
4285 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4287 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
4291 macro_rules! failed_payment {
4292 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4294 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
4298 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref onion_packet, .. } = routing {
4299 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
4300 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.chain_hash) {
4301 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4302 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
4303 phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac,
4304 payment_hash, None, &self.node_signer
4307 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4308 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).to_byte_array();
4309 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
4310 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
4311 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
4313 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
4315 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4316 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
4320 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
4321 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4322 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
4323 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4324 outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None,
4325 current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
4327 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
4328 Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
4334 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4337 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4340 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } | HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { .. } => {
4341 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
4342 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
4343 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
4344 // problem, not ours.
4350 let chan_info_opt = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id).cloned();
4351 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match chan_info_opt {
4352 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id, chan_id),
4354 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4358 forwarding_counterparty = Some(counterparty_node_id);
4359 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4360 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4361 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
4362 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4365 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4366 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4367 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
4368 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4369 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4370 let queue_fail_htlc_res = match forward_info {
4371 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4372 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4373 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4374 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
4375 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4376 onion_packet, blinded, ..
4377 }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4380 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id);
4381 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4382 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4383 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4384 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4385 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4386 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4387 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
4388 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4389 blinded_failure: blinded.map(|b| b.failure),
4391 let next_blinding_point = blinded.and_then(|b| {
4392 let encrypted_tlvs_ss = self.node_signer.ecdh(
4393 Recipient::Node, &b.inbound_blinding_point, None
4394 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4395 onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(
4396 &self.secp_ctx, b.inbound_blinding_point, &encrypted_tlvs_ss
4399 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
4400 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
4401 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, next_blinding_point, &self.fee_estimator,
4404 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4405 log_trace!(logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", &payment_hash, msg);
4407 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
4409 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan);
4410 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4411 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
4412 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
4418 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
4419 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
4421 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
4422 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4423 Some((chan.queue_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &&logger), htlc_id))
4425 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
4426 log_trace!(logger, "Failing malformed HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4427 let res = chan.queue_fail_malformed_htlc(
4428 htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion, &&logger
4430 Some((res, htlc_id))
4433 if let Some((queue_fail_htlc_res, htlc_id)) = queue_fail_htlc_res {
4434 if let Err(e) = queue_fail_htlc_res {
4435 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4436 log_trace!(logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
4438 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_{{malformed_}}htlc() were not met");
4440 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
4441 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
4442 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
4448 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4452 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4453 match forward_info {
4454 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4455 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4456 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4457 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
4458 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4461 let blinded_failure = routing.blinded_failure();
4462 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
4463 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
4464 payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret,
4465 custom_tlvs, requires_blinded_error: _
4467 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
4468 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
4469 payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
4470 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
4471 Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
4473 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs } => {
4474 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
4475 payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
4479 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
4480 payment_data, None, onion_fields)
4483 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
4486 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
4487 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
4488 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4489 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4490 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4491 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4492 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4493 phantom_shared_secret,
4496 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
4497 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
4498 // if routing nodes overpay
4499 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
4500 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
4502 total_value_received: None,
4503 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
4506 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
4509 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
4511 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
4512 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
4513 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
4514 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4515 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
4516 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
4518 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4519 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
4520 user_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.user_channel_id,
4521 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4522 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
4523 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
4524 phantom_shared_secret,
4527 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
4528 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
4530 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
4533 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
4534 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4535 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4536 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4537 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4540 macro_rules! check_total_value {
4541 ($purpose: expr) => {{
4542 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
4543 let is_keysend = match $purpose {
4544 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(_) => true,
4545 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { .. } => false,
4547 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4548 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
4549 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4551 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
4552 .entry(payment_hash)
4553 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
4554 .or_insert_with(|| {
4555 committed_to_claimable = true;
4557 purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
4560 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
4561 let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
4562 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), &payment_hash, log_keysend(!is_keysend));
4563 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4565 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4566 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", &payment_hash);
4567 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4569 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
4570 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
4571 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4574 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
4576 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
4577 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
4578 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
4579 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
4580 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
4581 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
4582 if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4583 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
4584 &payment_hash, claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
4585 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
4587 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
4589 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
4590 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
4591 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
4592 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4593 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4594 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
4596 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4597 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4598 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4599 committed_to_claimable = true;
4601 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
4602 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4603 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
4604 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
4605 let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
4606 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
4607 debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
4608 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
4609 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
4610 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4614 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
4615 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
4616 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4617 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
4618 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
4620 payment_claimable_generated = true;
4622 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
4623 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
4625 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4626 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4627 committed_to_claimable = true;
4630 payment_claimable_generated
4634 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
4635 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
4636 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
4637 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
4638 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
4639 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
4640 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4641 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4642 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4643 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4644 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
4645 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4646 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
4647 Ok(result) => result,
4649 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", &payment_hash);
4650 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4653 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
4654 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
4655 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
4656 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
4657 &payment_hash, cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
4658 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4661 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4662 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4663 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4665 check_total_value!(purpose);
4667 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
4668 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
4669 check_total_value!(purpose);
4673 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
4674 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4675 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", &payment_hash);
4676 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4678 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4679 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
4680 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", &payment_hash);
4681 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4682 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
4683 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
4684 &payment_hash, payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
4685 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4687 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4688 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
4689 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4691 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
4692 if payment_claimable_generated {
4693 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
4699 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } | HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { .. } => {
4700 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
4708 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4709 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
4710 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4711 &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
4713 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
4714 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4716 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
4718 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
4719 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
4720 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
4722 self.check_free_holding_cells();
4724 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
4725 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4726 events.append(&mut new_events);
4729 /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
4731 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
4732 fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
4733 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
4735 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
4737 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
4738 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
4739 if background_events.is_empty() {
4740 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4743 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
4745 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, update)) => {
4746 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
4747 // monitor updating completing.
4748 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4750 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update } => {
4751 let mut updated_chan = false;
4753 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4754 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4755 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4756 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4757 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4758 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase) => {
4759 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase.get_mut() {
4760 updated_chan = true;
4761 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
4762 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4764 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't have an update for a non-funded channel");
4767 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {},
4772 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
4773 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4776 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
4777 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4778 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4779 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4780 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4781 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
4782 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4784 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
4785 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
4786 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4787 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4788 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
4794 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4797 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4798 /// Process background events, for functional testing
4799 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
4800 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
4801 let _ = self.process_background_events();
4804 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &ChannelId, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
4805 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
4807 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4809 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
4810 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4811 if new_feerate != chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4812 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4813 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4815 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4817 if !chan.context.is_live() {
4818 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
4819 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4820 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4822 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4823 &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4825 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
4826 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4830 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
4831 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
4832 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
4833 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
4834 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
4835 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4836 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4838 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4839 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
4841 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4842 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4843 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4844 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4845 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
4846 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
4848 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4853 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4854 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4862 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
4864 /// This currently includes:
4865 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
4866 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
4867 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
4869 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
4870 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
4871 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
4872 /// * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
4873 /// * Forgetting about stale outbound payments, either those that have already been fulfilled
4874 /// or those awaiting an invoice that hasn't been delivered in the necessary amount of time.
4875 /// The latter is determined using the system clock in `std` and the highest seen block time
4876 /// minus two hours in `no-std`.
4878 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
4879 /// estimate fetches.
4881 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4882 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
4883 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
4884 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4885 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4887 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4888 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
4890 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
4891 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
4892 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
4893 let mut shutdown_channels = Vec::new();
4895 let mut process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
4896 chan_id: &ChannelId,
4897 context: &mut ChannelContext<SP>,
4898 unfunded_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
4899 pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4900 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
4902 context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4903 if unfunded_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
4904 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context);
4906 "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner", chan_id);
4907 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
4908 shutdown_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
4909 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4910 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4911 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4912 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
4913 channel_id: *chan_id,
4914 data: "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake".to_owned(),
4925 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4926 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4927 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4928 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4929 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
4930 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
4931 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, phase| {
4933 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
4934 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4939 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4940 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4942 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
4943 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
4944 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
4945 if needs_close { return false; }
4948 match chan.channel_update_status() {
4949 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
4950 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
4951 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
4952 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
4953 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
4954 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
4955 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
4957 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4958 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
4959 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4960 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4964 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4966 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
4969 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
4971 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4972 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
4973 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4974 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4978 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4980 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
4986 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4988 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
4989 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4990 log_debug!(logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
4991 counterparty_node_id, chan_id);
4992 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4993 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4994 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
4995 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
4996 channel_id: *chan_id,
4997 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
5005 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
5006 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5007 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5009 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
5010 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5011 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5016 for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
5017 if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
5018 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(*chan_id));
5019 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", &chan_id);
5020 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
5021 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5022 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5023 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5024 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_id.clone(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5030 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.retain(|_, req| req.ticks_remaining > 0);
5032 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
5033 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
5038 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
5039 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
5040 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
5041 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
5042 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
5043 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
5044 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
5045 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
5046 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5047 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
5048 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
5049 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
5050 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
5051 // have no channels to the peer.
5052 let remove_entry = {
5053 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
5054 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
5057 entry.remove_entry();
5060 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
5065 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
5066 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
5067 // This should be unreachable
5068 debug_assert!(false);
5071 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
5072 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
5073 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
5074 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
5075 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
5076 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
5077 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
5080 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
5081 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
5082 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
5084 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
5085 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
5092 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
5093 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
5094 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
5095 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
5096 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5099 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5100 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5103 for shutdown_res in shutdown_channels {
5104 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
5107 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
5108 let duration_since_epoch = std::time::SystemTime::now()
5109 .duration_since(std::time::SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH)
5110 .expect("SystemTime::now() should come after SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH");
5111 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
5112 let duration_since_epoch = Duration::from_secs(
5113 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire).saturating_sub(7200) as u64
5116 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_payments(
5117 duration_since_epoch, &self.pending_events
5120 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
5121 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
5122 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
5123 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5124 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5131 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
5132 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
5133 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
5135 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
5136 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
5137 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
5138 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
5140 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
5141 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
5142 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
5143 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
5144 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
5145 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
5148 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
5149 /// reason for the failure.
5151 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
5152 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
5153 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5155 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
5156 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
5157 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5158 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
5159 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5160 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
5161 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5166 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
5167 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
5168 match failure_code {
5169 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5170 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5171 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
5172 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5173 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
5174 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
5176 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
5177 let fail_data = match data {
5178 Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
5181 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
5186 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5187 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5189 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
5191 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5192 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
5193 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
5194 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
5195 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
5196 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
5197 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
5199 chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
5201 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
5202 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
5204 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5209 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5210 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5211 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5212 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
5213 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
5214 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
5215 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
5216 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
5217 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
5218 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5220 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5221 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5222 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5223 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
5225 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
5226 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
5227 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
5228 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
5229 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5233 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
5234 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
5235 // be surfaced to the user.
5236 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
5237 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: ChannelId,
5238 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
5240 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
5241 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5242 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
5243 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5244 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5245 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
5246 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
5247 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get() {
5248 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan)
5250 // We shouldn't be trying to fail holding cell HTLCs on an unfunded channel.
5251 debug_assert!(false);
5252 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5255 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5257 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
5260 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
5261 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
5262 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
5263 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5267 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
5268 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
5269 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
5270 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
5271 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
5272 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
5273 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
5274 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5275 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5276 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5279 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
5280 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
5281 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
5284 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5285 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
5286 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5288 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
5289 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
5290 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
5291 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
5292 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5294 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5295 ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret,
5296 ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint, ref blinded_failure, ..
5299 WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(outpoint.to_channel_id())),
5300 "Failing {}HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us: {:?}",
5301 if blinded_failure.is_some() { "blinded " } else { "" }, &payment_hash, onion_error
5303 let failure = match blinded_failure {
5304 Some(BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode) => {
5305 let blinded_onion_error = HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32]);
5306 let err_packet = blinded_onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
5307 incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
5309 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }
5311 Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode) => {
5312 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC {
5314 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
5315 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32]
5319 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
5320 incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
5322 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }
5326 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
5327 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5328 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
5329 push_forward_ev = true;
5331 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
5332 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5333 entry.get_mut().push(failure);
5335 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5336 entry.insert(vec!(failure));
5339 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
5340 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5341 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5342 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
5343 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
5344 failed_next_destination: destination,
5350 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
5351 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
5353 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
5354 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
5355 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
5356 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
5358 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
5359 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
5360 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
5361 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
5363 /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
5364 /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
5365 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
5367 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5368 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
5369 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
5370 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
5371 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5372 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5373 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
5374 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5375 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
5378 /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
5379 /// even type numbers.
5383 /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
5384 /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
5386 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5387 pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5388 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
5391 fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
5392 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
5394 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5397 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
5398 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
5399 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
5400 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
5401 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
5402 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
5403 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
5404 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
5409 let htlcs = payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect();
5410 let sender_intended_value = payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat);
5411 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
5412 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
5413 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id, htlcs, sender_intended_value
5415 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
5416 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
5417 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
5421 if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = payment.onion_fields {
5422 if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
5423 log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
5424 &payment_hash, log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
5425 claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5426 mem::drop(claimable_payments);
5427 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5428 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
5429 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5430 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5431 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5440 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
5442 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
5443 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
5444 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
5445 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
5446 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
5447 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
5448 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
5449 let mut valid_mpp = true;
5450 let mut errs = Vec::new();
5451 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5452 for htlc in sources.iter() {
5453 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
5454 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5455 debug_assert!(false);
5459 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
5461 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
5462 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5463 debug_assert!(false);
5467 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
5468 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
5470 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5471 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
5472 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5473 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
5476 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
5477 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5478 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
5479 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
5483 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5484 let prev_hop_chan_id = htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
5485 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
5486 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
5487 |_, definitely_duplicate| {
5488 debug_assert!(!definitely_duplicate, "We shouldn't claim duplicatively from a payment");
5489 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash })
5492 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
5493 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
5494 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
5495 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop_chan_id));
5496 log_error!(logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
5497 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
5502 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5503 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5504 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
5505 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5506 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
5507 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5508 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5510 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5513 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
5514 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
5515 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5516 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
5520 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>, bool) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
5521 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
5522 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
5523 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
5525 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
5526 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
5527 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
5528 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5530 // As we may call handle_monitor_update_completion_actions in rather rare cases, check that
5531 // the required mutexes are not held before we start.
5532 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5533 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5536 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5537 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
5538 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
5539 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
5543 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
5544 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5545 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
5548 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
5549 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
5550 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5551 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5552 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
5553 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5554 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
5555 let fulfill_res = chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
5558 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } => {
5559 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat), false) {
5560 log_trace!(logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
5562 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
5565 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
5566 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5568 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
5569 // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
5570 // monitor update as a background event.
5571 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5572 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5573 counterparty_node_id,
5574 funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
5575 update: monitor_update.clone(),
5579 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => {
5580 let action = if let Some(action) = completion_action(None, true) {
5585 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5587 log_trace!(logger, "Completing monitor update completion action for channel {} as claim was redundant: {:?}",
5589 let (node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker) =
5590 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5591 downstream_counterparty_node_id: node_id,
5592 downstream_funding_outpoint: funding_outpoint,
5593 blocking_action: blocker,
5595 (node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)
5597 debug_assert!(false,
5598 "Duplicate claims should always free another channel immediately");
5601 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
5602 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5603 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state
5604 .actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
5605 .get_mut(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
5607 let mut found_blocker = false;
5608 blockers.retain(|iter| {
5609 // Note that we could actually be blocked, in
5610 // which case we need to only remove the one
5611 // blocker which was added duplicatively.
5612 let first_blocker = !found_blocker;
5613 if *iter == blocker { found_blocker = true; }
5614 *iter != blocker || !first_blocker
5616 debug_assert!(found_blocker);
5619 debug_assert!(false);
5628 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5629 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
5630 counterparty_node_id: None,
5631 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5637 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
5638 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
5639 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
5640 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
5641 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
5642 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
5643 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
5644 // again on restart.
5645 log_error!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id())), "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
5646 payment_preimage, update_res);
5649 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
5650 // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
5652 // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
5653 // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
5654 // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
5655 // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
5656 // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
5657 // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
5658 // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
5659 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5660 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
5661 prev_hop.outpoint, preimage_update,
5664 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
5665 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
5666 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
5667 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
5668 // `PaymentForwarded`).
5669 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None, false));
5673 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
5674 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
5677 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
5678 forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, startup_replay: bool,
5679 next_channel_counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>, next_channel_outpoint: OutPoint
5682 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
5683 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
5684 "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
5685 if let Some(pubkey) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5686 debug_assert_eq!(pubkey, path.hops[0].pubkey);
5688 let ev_completion_action = EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
5689 channel_funding_outpoint: next_channel_outpoint,
5690 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
5692 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage,
5693 session_priv, path, from_onchain, ev_completion_action, &self.pending_events,
5696 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
5697 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5698 let completed_blocker = RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&hop_data);
5699 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5700 let claiming_chan_funding_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5701 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
5702 |htlc_claim_value_msat, definitely_duplicate| {
5703 let chan_to_release =
5704 if let Some(node_id) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5705 Some((node_id, next_channel_outpoint, completed_blocker))
5707 // We can only get `None` here if we are processing a
5708 // `ChannelMonitor`-originated event, in which case we
5709 // don't care about ensuring we wake the downstream
5710 // channel's monitor updating - the channel is already
5715 if definitely_duplicate && startup_replay {
5716 // On startup we may get redundant claims which are related to
5717 // monitor updates still in flight. In that case, we shouldn't
5718 // immediately free, but instead let that monitor update complete
5719 // in the background.
5720 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
5721 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
5722 // There should be a `BackgroundEvent` pending...
5723 assert!(background_events.iter().any(|ev| {
5725 // to apply a monitor update that blocked the claiming channel,
5726 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5727 funding_txo, update, ..
5729 if *funding_txo == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint {
5730 assert!(update.updates.iter().any(|upd|
5731 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5732 payment_preimage: update_preimage
5734 payment_preimage == *update_preimage
5740 // or the channel we'd unblock is already closed,
5741 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup(
5742 (funding_txo, monitor_update)
5744 if *funding_txo == next_channel_outpoint {
5745 assert_eq!(monitor_update.updates.len(), 1);
5747 monitor_update.updates[0],
5748 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. }
5753 // or the monitor update has completed and will unblock
5754 // immediately once we get going.
5755 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
5758 *channel_id == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(),
5760 }), "{:?}", *background_events);
5763 } else if definitely_duplicate {
5764 if let Some(other_chan) = chan_to_release {
5765 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5766 downstream_counterparty_node_id: other_chan.0,
5767 downstream_funding_outpoint: other_chan.1,
5768 blocking_action: other_chan.2,
5772 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
5773 if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
5774 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
5777 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5778 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
5780 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
5781 prev_channel_id: Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5782 next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5783 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
5785 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: chan_to_release,
5789 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
5790 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5791 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
5797 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
5798 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
5799 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
5802 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
5803 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5804 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5805 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5807 for action in actions.into_iter() {
5809 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
5810 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5811 if let Some(ClaimingPayment {
5813 payment_purpose: purpose,
5816 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_total_msat,
5818 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
5822 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
5824 sender_intended_total_msat,
5828 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5829 event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
5831 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
5832 if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
5833 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, Some(blocker));
5836 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5837 downstream_counterparty_node_id, downstream_funding_outpoint, blocking_action,
5839 self.handle_monitor_update_release(
5840 downstream_counterparty_node_id,
5841 downstream_funding_outpoint,
5842 Some(blocking_action),
5849 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
5850 /// update completion.
5851 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5852 channel: &mut Channel<SP>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
5853 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
5854 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
5855 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
5856 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
5857 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
5858 log_trace!(logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
5859 &channel.context.channel_id(),
5860 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
5861 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
5862 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
5863 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
5864 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
5866 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
5868 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5869 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5870 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias()),
5871 channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
5874 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
5875 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
5877 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
5878 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5879 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5884 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
5885 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
5886 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5887 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5892 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
5893 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
5894 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
5895 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5896 msg: revoke_and_ack,
5901 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
5905 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
5911 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
5912 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
5913 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
5917 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5918 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
5919 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
5925 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
5926 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5928 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
5929 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5931 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5932 // monitor event, this and the outpoint_to_peer map should be removed.
5933 let outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5934 match outpoint_to_peer.get(&funding_txo) {
5935 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5940 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5941 let mut peer_state_lock;
5942 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
5943 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
5944 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5945 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5947 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5950 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
5951 .remove(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
5952 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5953 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5954 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
5957 let remaining_in_flight =
5958 if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
5959 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
5962 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
5963 log_trace!(logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
5964 highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
5965 remaining_in_flight);
5966 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
5969 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
5972 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
5974 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
5975 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
5978 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5979 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5980 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5982 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
5983 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
5984 /// used to accept such channels.
5986 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5987 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5988 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5989 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
5992 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
5993 /// it as confirmed immediately.
5995 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5996 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5997 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5999 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
6000 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
6002 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
6003 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
6005 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
6006 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
6008 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
6009 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
6010 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6011 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
6014 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6016 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(*temporary_channel_id));
6017 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6019 let peers_without_funded_channels =
6020 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
6021 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6022 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6024 let err_str = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id);
6025 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6027 APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: err_str }
6029 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6030 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6031 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
6033 // Find (and remove) the channel in the unaccepted table. If it's not there, something weird is
6034 // happening and return an error. N.B. that we create channel with an outbound SCID of zero so
6035 // that we can delay allocating the SCID until after we're sure that the checks below will
6037 let mut channel = match peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
6038 Some(unaccepted_channel) => {
6039 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6040 InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6041 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
6042 &unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
6043 &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|e| {
6044 let err_str = e.to_string();
6045 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6047 APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: err_str }
6051 let err_str = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned();
6052 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6054 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str })
6059 // This should have been correctly configured by the call to InboundV1Channel::new.
6060 debug_assert!(channel.context.minimum_depth().unwrap() == 0);
6061 } else if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
6062 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6063 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6064 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
6065 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
6068 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
6069 let err_str = "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned();
6070 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6072 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
6074 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6075 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
6076 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6077 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
6078 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6079 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6080 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
6081 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
6084 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
6085 let err_str = "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned();
6086 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6088 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
6092 // Now that we know we have a channel, assign an outbound SCID alias.
6093 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6094 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6096 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6097 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6098 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6101 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(temporary_channel_id.clone(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6106 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
6107 /// or 0-conf channels.
6109 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
6110 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
6111 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
6112 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<SP>) -> bool {
6113 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
6114 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6116 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6117 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
6118 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6119 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
6120 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
6121 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
6122 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
6126 return peers_without_funded_channels;
6129 fn unfunded_channel_count(
6130 peer: &PeerState<SP>, best_block_height: u32
6132 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
6133 for (_, phase) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
6135 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6136 // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
6137 // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
6138 if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
6139 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
6141 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6144 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
6145 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
6146 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6149 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6150 // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
6155 num_unfunded_channels + peer.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
6158 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6159 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6160 // likely to be lost on restart!
6161 if msg.chain_hash != self.chain_hash {
6162 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6165 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
6166 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6169 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
6170 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
6171 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
6172 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
6173 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
6175 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6176 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6178 debug_assert!(false);
6179 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
6181 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6182 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6184 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6185 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
6186 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6187 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
6188 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
6189 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
6191 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6192 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
6193 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6196 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6197 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
6198 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6199 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
6200 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6203 let channel_id = msg.temporary_channel_id;
6204 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
6206 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6209 // If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
6210 if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
6211 let channel_type = channel::channel_type_from_open_channel(
6212 &msg, &peer_state.latest_features, &self.channel_type_features()
6214 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id)
6216 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6217 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
6218 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
6219 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6220 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
6221 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
6224 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
6225 open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
6226 ticks_remaining: UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS,
6231 // Otherwise create the channel right now.
6232 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
6233 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
6234 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
6235 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6236 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
6237 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
6240 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
6245 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
6246 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
6247 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6249 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6250 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6253 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6254 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6256 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6257 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6258 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6260 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6264 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6265 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6266 // likely to be lost on restart!
6267 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
6268 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6269 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6271 debug_assert!(false);
6272 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6274 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6275 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6276 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6277 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut phase) => {
6278 match phase.get_mut() {
6279 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
6280 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), phase);
6281 (chan.context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.context.get_user_id())
6284 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected accept_channel message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id));
6288 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6291 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6292 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
6293 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6294 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6295 channel_value_satoshis: value,
6297 user_channel_id: user_id,
6302 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6303 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6305 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6306 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6308 debug_assert!(false);
6309 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6312 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6313 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6314 let (mut chan, funding_msg_opt, monitor) =
6315 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6316 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan)) => {
6317 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &inbound_chan.context);
6318 match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger) {
6320 Err((inbound_chan, err)) => {
6321 // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
6322 // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
6323 // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
6324 debug_assert!(matches!(err, ChannelError::Close(_)));
6325 // Really we should be returning the channel_id the peer expects based
6326 // on their funding info here, but they're horribly confused anyway, so
6327 // there's not a lot we can do to save them.
6328 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, &mut ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan), &msg.temporary_channel_id).1);
6332 Some(mut phase) => {
6333 let err_msg = format!("Got an unexpected funding_created message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id);
6334 let err = ChannelError::Close(err_msg);
6335 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, &mut phase, &msg.temporary_channel_id).1);
6337 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6340 let funded_channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
6342 macro_rules! fail_chan { ($err: expr) => { {
6343 // Note that at this point we've filled in the funding outpoint on our
6344 // channel, but its actually in conflict with another channel. Thus, if
6345 // we call `convert_chan_phase_err` immediately (thus calling
6346 // `update_maps_on_chan_removal`), we'll remove the existing channel
6347 // from `outpoint_to_peer`. Thus, we must first unset the funding outpoint
6349 let err = ChannelError::Close($err.to_owned());
6350 chan.unset_funding_info(msg.temporary_channel_id);
6351 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, chan, &funded_channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL).1);
6354 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funded_channel_id) {
6355 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6356 fail_chan!("Already had channel with the new channel_id");
6358 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6359 let mut outpoint_to_peer_lock = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6360 match outpoint_to_peer_lock.entry(monitor.get_funding_txo().0) {
6361 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6362 fail_chan!("The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible");
6364 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
6365 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
6366 if let Ok(persist_state) = monitor_res {
6367 i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
6368 mem::drop(outpoint_to_peer_lock);
6370 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
6371 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
6372 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
6373 // until we have persisted our monitor.
6374 if let Some(msg) = funding_msg_opt {
6375 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
6376 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6381 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) {
6382 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_state, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
6383 per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6385 unreachable!("This must be a funded channel as we just inserted it.");
6389 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6390 log_error!(logger, "Persisting initial ChannelMonitor failed, implying the funding outpoint was duplicated");
6391 fail_chan!("Duplicate funding outpoint");
6399 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6400 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6401 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6402 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6404 debug_assert!(false);
6405 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6408 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6409 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6410 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6411 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
6412 if matches!(chan_phase_entry.get(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_)) {
6413 let chan = if let ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) = chan_phase_entry.remove() { chan } else { unreachable!() };
6414 let logger = WithContext::from(
6416 Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
6417 Some(chan.context.channel_id())
6420 chan.funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger);
6422 Ok((mut chan, monitor)) => {
6423 if let Ok(persist_status) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
6424 // We really should be able to insert here without doing a second
6425 // lookup, but sadly rust stdlib doesn't currently allow keeping
6426 // the original Entry around with the value removed.
6427 let mut chan = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id).or_insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan));
6428 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) = &mut chan {
6429 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_status, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6430 } else { unreachable!(); }
6433 let e = ChannelError::Close("Channel funding outpoint was a duplicate".to_owned());
6434 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no
6435 // updates should be made on it. Previously, full_stack_target
6436 // found an (unreachable) panic when the monitor update contained
6437 // within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
6438 chan.unset_funding_info(msg.channel_id);
6439 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::Funded(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
6443 debug_assert!(matches!(e, ChannelError::Close(_)),
6444 "We don't have a channel anymore, so the error better have expected close");
6445 // We've already removed this outbound channel from the map in
6446 // `PeerState` above so at this point we just need to clean up any
6447 // lingering entries concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
6448 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
6452 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
6455 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
6459 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6460 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6461 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6462 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6463 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6465 debug_assert!(false);
6466 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6468 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6469 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6470 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6471 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6472 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6473 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6474 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
6475 self.chain_hash, &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6476 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
6477 log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6478 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6479 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6480 msg: announcement_sigs,
6482 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
6483 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
6484 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
6485 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
6486 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
6487 // announcement_signatures.
6488 log_trace!(logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6489 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
6490 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6491 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6498 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6499 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan);
6504 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6505 "Got a channel_ready message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry)
6508 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
6509 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6514 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6515 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
6516 let mut finish_shutdown = None;
6518 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6519 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6521 debug_assert!(false);
6522 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6524 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6525 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6526 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6527 let phase = chan_phase_entry.get_mut();
6529 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6530 if !chan.received_shutdown() {
6531 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6532 log_info!(logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
6534 if chan.sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
6537 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6538 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6539 chan.shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6540 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
6542 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
6543 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
6544 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
6545 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
6546 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6547 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6551 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
6552 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6553 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
6554 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6557 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6558 let context = phase.context_mut();
6559 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context);
6560 log_error!(logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
6561 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
6562 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel));
6566 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6569 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
6570 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
6571 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
6572 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
6574 if let Some(shutdown_res) = finish_shutdown {
6575 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
6581 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6582 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6583 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6585 debug_assert!(false);
6586 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6588 let (tx, chan_option, shutdown_result) = {
6589 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6590 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6591 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6592 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6593 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6594 let (closing_signed, tx, shutdown_result) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6595 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
6596 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
6597 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
6598 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6603 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
6604 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
6605 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
6606 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
6607 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
6608 (tx, Some(remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry)), shutdown_result)
6609 } else { (tx, None, shutdown_result) }
6611 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6612 "Got a closing_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6615 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6618 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
6619 let channel_id = chan_option.as_ref().map(|channel| channel.context().channel_id());
6620 log_info!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id), "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
6621 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
6623 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = chan_option {
6624 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6625 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6626 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6627 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6632 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6633 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
6634 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
6639 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6640 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
6641 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
6642 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
6644 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
6645 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
6646 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
6647 //but we should prevent it anyway.
6649 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6650 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6652 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg, counterparty_node_id);
6653 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6654 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6656 debug_assert!(false);
6657 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6659 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6660 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6661 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6662 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6663 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6664 let pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
6665 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
6666 self.construct_pending_htlc_status(
6667 msg, counterparty_node_id, shared_secret, next_hop,
6668 chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt,
6670 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
6672 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<SP>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
6673 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
6674 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(
6675 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6676 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6677 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
6678 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
6679 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
6683 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
6684 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
6685 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
6686 match pending_forward_info {
6687 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
6688 ref incoming_shared_secret, ref routing, ..
6690 let reason = if routing.blinded_failure().is_some() {
6691 HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32])
6692 } else if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
6693 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
6694 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
6696 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
6697 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
6698 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6699 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6700 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
6703 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
6705 _ => pending_forward_info
6708 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6709 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6711 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6712 "Got an update_add_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6715 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6720 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6722 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
6723 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6724 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6726 debug_assert!(false);
6727 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6729 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6730 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6731 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6732 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6733 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6734 let res = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6735 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop) = &res.0 {
6736 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6738 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
6740 peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates.entry(msg.channel_id)
6741 .or_insert_with(Vec::new)
6742 .push(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&prev_hop));
6744 // Note that we do not need to push an `actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates`
6745 // entry here, even though we *do* need to block the next RAA monitor update.
6746 // We do this instead in the `claim_funds_internal` by attaching a
6747 // `ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate` action to the event generated when the
6748 // outbound HTLC is claimed. This is guaranteed to all complete before we
6749 // process the RAA as messages are processed from single peers serially.
6750 funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().expect("We won't accept a fulfill until funded");
6753 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6754 "Got an update_fulfill_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6757 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6760 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, false, Some(*counterparty_node_id), funding_txo);
6764 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6765 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6766 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6767 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6768 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6770 debug_assert!(false);
6771 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6773 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6774 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6775 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6776 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6777 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6778 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan_phase_entry);
6780 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6781 "Got an update_fail_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6784 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6789 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6790 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6791 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6792 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6793 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6795 debug_assert!(false);
6796 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6798 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6799 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6800 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6801 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6802 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
6803 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
6804 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan_phase_entry);
6806 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6807 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan_phase_entry);
6809 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6810 "Got an update_fail_malformed_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6814 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6818 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6819 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6820 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6822 debug_assert!(false);
6823 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6825 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6826 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6827 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6828 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6829 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6830 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6831 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6832 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6833 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6834 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
6835 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6839 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6840 "Got a commitment_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6843 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6848 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
6849 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
6850 let mut push_forward_event = false;
6851 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
6852 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
6853 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
6854 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
6855 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
6856 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6857 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
6858 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
6860 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
6861 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
6863 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6864 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
6865 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
6866 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6867 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6868 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
6870 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6871 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
6872 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.chain_hash)
6874 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).to_byte_array());
6875 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6876 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
6877 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6878 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
6879 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
6880 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
6881 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
6882 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
6885 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6886 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
6888 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6889 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()));
6890 log_info!(logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
6891 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6892 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
6893 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
6894 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
6895 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
6896 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6897 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6898 blinded_failure: forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
6901 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
6902 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
6903 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
6908 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
6909 // payments are being processed.
6910 if forward_htlcs_empty {
6911 push_forward_event = true;
6913 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6914 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
6921 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
6922 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
6925 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
6926 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6927 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
6929 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
6933 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
6934 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6935 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6936 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
6937 if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
6939 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
6940 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
6941 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
6942 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
6943 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
6944 // real by taking more time.
6945 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
6946 pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6947 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
6952 /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
6953 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
6954 /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
6955 /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
6956 fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6957 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
6958 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
6960 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6961 .get(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
6962 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
6963 action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6964 channel_funding_outpoint,
6965 counterparty_node_id,
6970 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6971 pub(crate) fn test_raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6972 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_id: ChannelId
6974 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6975 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6976 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6977 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
6979 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id) {
6980 return self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
6981 chan.context().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), counterparty_node_id);
6987 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6988 let htlcs_to_fail = {
6989 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6990 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6992 debug_assert!(false);
6993 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6994 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
6995 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6996 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6997 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6998 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6999 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7000 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7001 let mon_update_blocked = if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_opt {
7002 self.raa_monitor_updates_held(
7003 &peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates, funding_txo,
7004 *counterparty_node_id)
7006 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
7007 chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger, mon_update_blocked), chan_phase_entry);
7008 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
7009 let funding_txo = funding_txo_opt
7010 .expect("Funding outpoint must have been set for RAA handling to succeed");
7011 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update,
7012 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7016 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7017 "Got a revoke_and_ack message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7020 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7023 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
7027 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7028 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7029 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7031 debug_assert!(false);
7032 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7034 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7035 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7036 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7037 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7038 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7039 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7040 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
7042 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7043 "Got an update_fee message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7046 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7051 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7052 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7053 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7055 debug_assert!(false);
7056 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7058 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7059 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7060 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7061 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7062 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7063 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
7064 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
7067 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
7068 msg: try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.announcement_signatures(
7069 &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
7070 msg, &self.default_configuration
7071 ), chan_phase_entry),
7072 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
7073 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
7074 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan).unwrap()),
7077 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7078 "Got an announcement_signatures message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7081 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7086 /// Returns DoPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersistNoEvents or an Err.
7087 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7088 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7089 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
7091 // It's not a local channel
7092 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7095 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7096 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
7097 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
7098 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7100 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7101 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7102 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
7103 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7104 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7105 if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
7106 if chan.context.should_announce() {
7107 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
7108 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
7109 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
7110 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7112 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
7114 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
7115 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
7116 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
7117 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7119 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7120 log_debug!(logger, "Received channel_update {:?} for channel {}.", msg, chan_id);
7121 let did_change = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_update(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
7122 // If nothing changed after applying their update, we don't need to bother
7125 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7129 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7130 "Got a channel_update for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7133 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7135 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
7138 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7140 let need_lnd_workaround = {
7141 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7143 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7145 debug_assert!(false);
7146 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7147 format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
7151 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id));
7152 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7153 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7154 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7155 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7156 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7157 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
7158 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
7159 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
7160 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
7161 let responses = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_reestablish(
7162 msg, &&logger, &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash,
7163 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan_phase_entry);
7164 let mut channel_update = None;
7165 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
7166 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
7167 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7170 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
7171 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
7172 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
7173 // they have the latest channel parameters.
7174 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
7175 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
7176 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7181 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
7182 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
7183 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
7184 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
7185 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
7186 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
7190 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7191 "Got a channel_reestablish message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7194 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
7195 log_debug!(logger, "Sending bogus ChannelReestablish for unknown channel {} to force channel closure",
7197 // Unfortunately, lnd doesn't force close on errors
7198 // (https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/blob/abb1e3463f3a83bbb843d5c399869dbe930ad94f/htlcswitch/link.go#L2119).
7199 // One of the few ways to get an lnd counterparty to force close is by
7200 // replicating what they do when restoring static channel backups (SCBs). They
7201 // send an invalid `ChannelReestablish` with `0` commitment numbers and an
7202 // invalid `your_last_per_commitment_secret`.
7204 // Since we received a `ChannelReestablish` for a channel that doesn't exist, we
7205 // can assume it's likely the channel closed from our point of view, but it
7206 // remains open on the counterparty's side. By sending this bogus
7207 // `ChannelReestablish` message now as a response to theirs, we trigger them to
7208 // force close broadcasting their latest state. If the closing transaction from
7209 // our point of view remains unconfirmed, it'll enter a race with the
7210 // counterparty's to-be-broadcast latest commitment transaction.
7211 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
7212 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7213 msg: msgs::ChannelReestablish {
7214 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7215 next_local_commitment_number: 0,
7216 next_remote_commitment_number: 0,
7217 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [1u8; 32],
7218 my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_slice(&[2u8; 33]).unwrap(),
7219 next_funding_txid: None,
7222 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7223 format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}",
7224 counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7230 let mut persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
7231 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
7232 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
7233 persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7236 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
7237 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
7242 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
7243 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
7244 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
7246 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7247 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
7248 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
7249 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
7250 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
7251 match monitor_event {
7252 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
7253 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, counterparty_node_id, Some(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()));
7254 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
7255 log_trace!(logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", preimage);
7256 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, false, counterparty_node_id, funding_outpoint);
7258 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash);
7259 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
7260 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7261 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7264 MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(funding_outpoint) => {
7265 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
7266 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
7268 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
7269 // monitor event, this and the outpoint_to_peer map should be removed.
7270 let outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7271 outpoint_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint).cloned()
7274 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
7275 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7276 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7277 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7278 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7279 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7280 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
7281 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
7282 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
7283 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7284 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7288 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7289 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7290 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
7291 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
7299 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
7300 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
7306 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7307 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7310 has_pending_monitor_events
7313 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
7314 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
7315 /// update events as a separate process method here.
7317 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
7318 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7319 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
7322 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
7323 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
7324 /// update was applied.
7325 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
7326 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
7327 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7329 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
7330 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
7331 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
7332 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
7334 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7335 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7337 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7338 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7339 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
7340 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
7342 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
7343 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7344 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
7345 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context));
7346 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
7347 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
7349 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
7350 has_monitor_update = true;
7352 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
7353 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7354 continue 'peer_loop;
7363 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty();
7364 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7365 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
7371 /// When a call to a [`ChannelSigner`] method returns an error, this indicates that the signer
7372 /// is (temporarily) unavailable, and the operation should be retried later.
7374 /// This method allows for that retry - either checking for any signer-pending messages to be
7375 /// attempted in every channel, or in the specifically provided channel.
7377 /// [`ChannelSigner`]: crate::sign::ChannelSigner
7378 #[cfg(async_signing)]
7379 pub fn signer_unblocked(&self, channel_opt: Option<(PublicKey, ChannelId)>) {
7380 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7382 let unblock_chan = |phase: &mut ChannelPhase<SP>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>| {
7383 let node_id = phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id();
7385 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7386 let msgs = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger);
7387 if let Some(updates) = msgs.commitment_update {
7388 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
7393 if let Some(msg) = msgs.funding_signed {
7394 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
7399 if let Some(msg) = msgs.channel_ready {
7400 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
7403 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
7404 if let Some(msg) = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger) {
7405 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
7411 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {},
7415 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7416 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, channel_id)) = channel_opt {
7417 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7418 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7419 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7420 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
7421 unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7425 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7426 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7427 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7428 for (_, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
7429 unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7435 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
7436 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
7437 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
7438 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
7439 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
7440 let mut has_update = false;
7441 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
7443 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7445 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7446 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7447 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7448 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7449 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, phase| {
7451 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7452 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7453 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &&logger) {
7454 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt, shutdown_result_opt)) => {
7455 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
7457 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
7458 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
7461 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result_opt.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
7462 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result_opt {
7463 shutdown_results.push(shutdown_result);
7465 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
7466 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
7467 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
7468 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7469 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7474 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
7475 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
7476 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7482 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
7483 handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
7488 _ => true, // Retain unfunded channels if present.
7494 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
7495 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
7498 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
7499 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
7505 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
7506 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
7508 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
7509 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7510 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
7511 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
7512 // reorganized out of the main chain.
7513 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
7514 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
7515 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
7516 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
7517 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = failure.monitor_update.take() {
7518 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
7519 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
7520 assert!(should_broadcast);
7521 } else { unreachable!(); }
7522 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
7523 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
7524 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
7527 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7532 macro_rules! create_offer_builder { ($self: ident, $builder: ty) => {
7533 /// Creates an [`OfferBuilder`] such that the [`Offer`] it builds is recognized by the
7534 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`InvoiceRequest`] messages for the offer. The offer will
7535 /// not have an expiration unless otherwise set on the builder.
7539 /// Uses [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`] to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the offer.
7540 /// However, if one is not found, uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] with
7541 /// [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction node instead. In the latter case,
7542 /// the node must be announced, otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction in
7543 /// order to send the [`InvoiceRequest`].
7545 /// Also, uses a derived signing pubkey in the offer for recipient privacy.
7549 /// Requires a direct connection to the introduction node in the responding [`InvoiceRequest`]'s
7554 /// Errors if the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded path for the offer.
7556 /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
7558 /// [`Offer`]: crate::offers::offer::Offer
7559 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
7560 pub fn create_offer_builder(
7561 &$self, description: String
7562 ) -> Result<$builder, Bolt12SemanticError> {
7563 let node_id = $self.get_our_node_id();
7564 let expanded_key = &$self.inbound_payment_key;
7565 let entropy = &*$self.entropy_source;
7566 let secp_ctx = &$self.secp_ctx;
7568 let path = $self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7569 let builder = OfferBuilder::deriving_signing_pubkey(
7570 description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx
7572 .chain_hash($self.chain_hash)
7579 macro_rules! create_refund_builder { ($self: ident, $builder: ty) => {
7580 /// Creates a [`RefundBuilder`] such that the [`Refund`] it builds is recognized by the
7581 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`Bolt12Invoice`] messages for the refund.
7585 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the refund.
7586 /// See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has been sent.
7588 /// The builder will have the provided expiration set. Any changes to the expiration on the
7589 /// returned builder will not be honored by [`ChannelManager`]. For `no-std`, the highest seen
7590 /// block time minus two hours is used for the current time when determining if the refund has
7593 /// To revoke the refund, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
7594 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received before expiration, the payment will fail
7595 /// with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
7597 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
7598 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
7602 /// Uses [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`] to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the refund.
7603 /// However, if one is not found, uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] with
7604 /// [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction node instead. In the latter case,
7605 /// the node must be announced, otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction in
7606 /// order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
7608 /// Also, uses a derived payer id in the refund for payer privacy.
7612 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in the responding
7613 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
7618 /// - a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link,
7619 /// - `amount_msats` is invalid, or
7620 /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded path for the refund.
7622 /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
7624 /// [`Refund`]: crate::offers::refund::Refund
7625 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7626 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
7627 /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
7628 pub fn create_refund_builder(
7629 &$self, description: String, amount_msats: u64, absolute_expiry: Duration,
7630 payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
7631 ) -> Result<$builder, Bolt12SemanticError> {
7632 let node_id = $self.get_our_node_id();
7633 let expanded_key = &$self.inbound_payment_key;
7634 let entropy = &*$self.entropy_source;
7635 let secp_ctx = &$self.secp_ctx;
7637 let path = $self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7638 let builder = RefundBuilder::deriving_payer_id(
7639 description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, amount_msats, payment_id
7641 .chain_hash($self.chain_hash)
7642 .absolute_expiry(absolute_expiry)
7645 let expiration = StaleExpiration::AbsoluteTimeout(absolute_expiry);
7646 $self.pending_outbound_payments
7647 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
7648 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat,
7650 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
7656 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7658 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
7659 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7660 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7661 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7662 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7663 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7667 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
7668 create_offer_builder!(self, OfferBuilder<DerivedMetadata, secp256k1::All>);
7669 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
7670 create_refund_builder!(self, RefundBuilder<secp256k1::All>);
7673 create_offer_builder!(self, OfferWithDerivedMetadataBuilder);
7675 create_refund_builder!(self, RefundMaybeWithDerivedMetadataBuilder);
7677 /// Pays for an [`Offer`] using the given parameters by creating an [`InvoiceRequest`] and
7678 /// enqueuing it to be sent via an onion message. [`ChannelManager`] will pay the actual
7679 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`] once it is received.
7681 /// Uses [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`] such that the [`InvoiceRequest`] it builds is recognized by
7682 /// the [`ChannelManager`] when handling a [`Bolt12Invoice`] message in response to the request.
7683 /// The optional parameters are used in the builder, if `Some`:
7684 /// - `quantity` for [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`] which must be set if
7685 /// [`Offer::expects_quantity`] is `true`.
7686 /// - `amount_msats` if overpaying what is required for the given `quantity` is desired, and
7687 /// - `payer_note` for [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`].
7689 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
7690 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
7694 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the request
7695 /// when received. See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has
7698 /// To revoke the request, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
7699 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received in a reasonable amount of time, the
7700 /// payment will fail with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
7704 /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the reply path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`]
7705 /// as the introduction node and a derived payer id for payer privacy. As such, currently, the
7706 /// node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node
7707 /// in order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
7711 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Offer::paths`] or to
7712 /// [`Offer::signing_pubkey`], if empty. A similar restriction applies to the responding
7713 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
7718 /// - a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link,
7719 /// - the provided parameters are invalid for the offer,
7720 /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded reply path for the invoice
7723 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
7724 /// [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::quantity
7725 /// [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::payer_note
7726 /// [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequestBuilder
7727 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7728 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
7729 /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
7730 pub fn pay_for_offer(
7731 &self, offer: &Offer, quantity: Option<u64>, amount_msats: Option<u64>,
7732 payer_note: Option<String>, payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry,
7733 max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
7734 ) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
7735 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7736 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7737 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7739 let builder: InvoiceRequestBuilder<DerivedPayerId, secp256k1::All> = offer
7740 .request_invoice_deriving_payer_id(expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, payment_id)?
7742 let builder = builder.chain_hash(self.chain_hash)?;
7744 let builder = match quantity {
7746 Some(quantity) => builder.quantity(quantity)?,
7748 let builder = match amount_msats {
7750 Some(amount_msats) => builder.amount_msats(amount_msats)?,
7752 let builder = match payer_note {
7754 Some(payer_note) => builder.payer_note(payer_note),
7756 let invoice_request = builder.build_and_sign()?;
7757 let reply_path = self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7759 let expiration = StaleExpiration::TimerTicks(1);
7760 self.pending_outbound_payments
7761 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
7762 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat
7764 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
7766 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
7767 if offer.paths().is_empty() {
7768 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7769 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request),
7770 Destination::Node(offer.signing_pubkey()),
7773 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7775 // Send as many invoice requests as there are paths in the offer (with an upper bound).
7776 // Using only one path could result in a failure if the path no longer exists. But only
7777 // one invoice for a given payment id will be paid, even if more than one is received.
7778 const REQUEST_LIMIT: usize = 10;
7779 for path in offer.paths().into_iter().take(REQUEST_LIMIT) {
7780 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7781 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request.clone()),
7782 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
7783 Some(reply_path.clone()),
7785 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7792 /// Creates a [`Bolt12Invoice`] for a [`Refund`] and enqueues it to be sent via an onion
7795 /// The resulting invoice uses a [`PaymentHash`] recognized by the [`ChannelManager`] and a
7796 /// [`BlindedPath`] containing the [`PaymentSecret`] needed to reconstruct the corresponding
7797 /// [`PaymentPreimage`].
7801 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Refund::paths`] or to
7802 /// [`Refund::payer_id`], if empty. This request is best effort; an invoice will be sent to each
7803 /// node meeting the aforementioned criteria, but there's no guarantee that they will be
7804 /// received and no retries will be made.
7808 /// Errors if the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded payment path or reply
7809 /// path for the invoice.
7811 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7812 pub fn request_refund_payment(&self, refund: &Refund) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
7813 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7814 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7815 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7817 let amount_msats = refund.amount_msats();
7818 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
7820 match self.create_inbound_payment(Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None) {
7821 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => {
7822 let payment_paths = self.create_blinded_payment_paths(amount_msats, payment_secret)
7823 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7825 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
7826 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys(
7827 payment_paths, payment_hash, expanded_key, entropy
7829 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
7830 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
7831 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
7833 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
7834 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
7835 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at, expanded_key, entropy
7837 let builder: InvoiceBuilder<DerivedSigningPubkey> = builder.into();
7838 let invoice = builder.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)?;
7839 let reply_path = self.create_blinded_path()
7840 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7842 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
7843 if refund.paths().is_empty() {
7844 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7845 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice),
7846 Destination::Node(refund.payer_id()),
7849 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7851 for path in refund.paths() {
7852 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7853 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice.clone()),
7854 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
7855 Some(reply_path.clone()),
7857 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7863 Err(()) => Err(Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount),
7867 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
7870 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
7871 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
7873 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
7874 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
7875 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
7876 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
7878 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
7880 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
7881 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
7885 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
7886 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
7888 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
7890 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
7891 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
7893 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
7894 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
7895 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
7896 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
7897 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
7898 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
7899 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
7900 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
7901 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
7902 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
7903 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
7906 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
7907 /// stored external to LDK.
7909 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
7910 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
7911 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
7913 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
7914 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
7917 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
7918 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
7919 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
7920 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
7922 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
7923 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
7924 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
7925 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
7926 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
7928 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
7929 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
7930 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
7931 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
7932 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
7934 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
7935 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
7937 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
7938 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
7942 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
7943 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
7945 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
7947 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
7948 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
7950 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
7951 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
7952 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
7953 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
7954 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
7955 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
7956 min_final_cltv_expiry)
7959 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
7960 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
7962 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
7963 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
7964 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
7967 /// Creates a blinded path by delegating to [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`].
7969 /// Errors if the `MessageRouter` errors or returns an empty `Vec`.
7970 fn create_blinded_path(&self) -> Result<BlindedPath, ()> {
7971 let recipient = self.get_our_node_id();
7972 let entropy_source = self.entropy_source.deref();
7973 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7975 let peers = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap()
7977 .filter(|(_, peer)| peer.lock().unwrap().latest_features.supports_onion_messages())
7978 .map(|(node_id, _)| *node_id)
7979 .collect::<Vec<_>>();
7982 .create_blinded_paths(recipient, peers, entropy_source, secp_ctx)
7983 .and_then(|paths| paths.into_iter().next().ok_or(()))
7986 /// Creates multi-hop blinded payment paths for the given `amount_msats` by delegating to
7987 /// [`Router::create_blinded_payment_paths`].
7988 fn create_blinded_payment_paths(
7989 &self, amount_msats: u64, payment_secret: PaymentSecret
7990 ) -> Result<Vec<(BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath)>, ()> {
7991 let entropy_source = self.entropy_source.deref();
7992 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7994 let first_hops = self.list_usable_channels();
7995 let payee_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7996 let max_cltv_expiry = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY
7997 + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
7998 let payee_tlvs = ReceiveTlvs {
8000 payment_constraints: PaymentConstraints {
8002 htlc_minimum_msat: 1,
8005 self.router.create_blinded_payment_paths(
8006 payee_node_id, first_hops, payee_tlvs, amount_msats, entropy_source, secp_ctx
8010 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
8011 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
8013 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
8014 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
8015 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
8016 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
8018 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
8019 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
8020 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
8021 Some(_) => continue,
8022 None => return scid_candidate
8027 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
8029 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
8030 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
8032 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
8033 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
8034 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
8038 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
8039 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
8040 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
8042 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
8043 /// times to get a unique scid.
8044 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
8045 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
8046 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
8048 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
8049 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
8050 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
8051 return scid_candidate
8055 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
8056 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
8057 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
8058 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
8060 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8061 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8062 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8063 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8064 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(
8065 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
8067 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
8068 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
8069 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
8078 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
8079 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
8080 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
8081 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
8082 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
8086 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
8087 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
8088 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8089 events.push_back((event, None));
8093 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
8094 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8095 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
8099 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
8100 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
8104 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
8105 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
8108 /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
8109 /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
8110 /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
8111 /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
8112 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
8113 let logger = WithContext::from(
8114 &self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
8117 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8118 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
8119 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
8120 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
8121 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
8122 // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
8123 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
8124 .get_mut(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
8126 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
8130 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
8131 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id) {
8132 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
8133 // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
8134 // update(s) when those blockers complete.
8135 log_trace!(logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
8136 &channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
8140 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
8141 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
8142 debug_assert_eq!(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
8143 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
8144 log_debug!(logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
8145 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
8146 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
8147 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
8148 if further_update_exists {
8149 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
8154 log_trace!(logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
8155 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
8161 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
8162 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8168 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
8169 for action in actions {
8171 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
8172 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
8174 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, None);
8180 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
8181 /// using the given event handler.
8183 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
8184 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
8188 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
8192 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8194 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8195 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8196 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8197 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8198 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8199 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8203 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
8204 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
8205 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
8206 /// is always placed next to each other.
8208 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
8209 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
8210 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
8211 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
8213 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
8214 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
8215 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
8216 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
8217 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
8218 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8219 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8221 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
8222 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
8223 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
8224 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8227 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
8228 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8230 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
8231 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8234 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
8235 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8236 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8237 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8238 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8239 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
8240 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
8244 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
8245 events.replace(pending_events);
8254 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8256 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8257 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8258 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8259 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8260 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8261 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8265 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
8267 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
8268 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
8269 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
8271 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
8275 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8277 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8278 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8279 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8280 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8281 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8282 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8286 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
8288 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
8289 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
8290 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
8291 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
8292 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
8295 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
8296 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
8299 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
8300 let _persistence_guard =
8301 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8302 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8303 let new_height = height - 1;
8305 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
8306 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
8307 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
8308 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
8309 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
8310 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
8313 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8317 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8319 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8320 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8321 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8322 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8323 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8324 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8328 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
8329 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8330 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8331 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8333 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
8334 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
8336 let _persistence_guard =
8337 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8338 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8339 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context))
8340 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
8342 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
8343 if height < last_best_block_height {
8344 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
8345 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8349 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
8350 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8351 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8352 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8354 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
8355 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
8357 let _persistence_guard =
8358 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8359 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8360 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
8362 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8364 macro_rules! max_time {
8365 ($timestamp: expr) => {
8367 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
8368 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
8369 // having an explicit local time source.
8370 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
8371 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
8372 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
8373 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
8374 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
8380 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
8381 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8382 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
8383 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
8387 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, u32, Option<BlockHash>)> {
8388 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
8389 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
8390 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8391 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8392 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(|phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }) {
8393 let txid_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
8394 let height_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmation_height();
8395 let hash_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in();
8396 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(conf_height), Some(block_hash)) = (txid_opt, height_opt, hash_opt) {
8397 res.push((funding_txo.txid, conf_height, Some(block_hash)));
8404 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
8405 let _persistence_guard =
8406 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8407 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8408 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
8409 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
8410 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
8411 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
8412 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8413 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8418 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8420 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8421 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8422 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8423 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8424 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8425 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8429 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
8430 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
8432 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
8433 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
8434 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8435 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8436 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8438 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8439 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
8441 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8442 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8443 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8444 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8445 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8446 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
8448 // Retain unfunded channels.
8449 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => true,
8450 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
8451 let res = f(channel);
8452 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
8453 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
8454 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
8455 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
8456 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
8458 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
8459 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
8460 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
8461 if channel.context.is_usable() {
8462 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8463 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
8464 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
8465 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8470 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8475 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8476 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
8479 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
8480 log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8481 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
8482 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8483 msg: announcement_sigs,
8485 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
8486 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
8487 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
8489 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
8490 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
8491 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
8496 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
8497 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
8498 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
8499 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
8500 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
8501 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
8502 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
8503 // is always consistent.
8504 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
8505 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8506 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
8507 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
8508 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
8511 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
8512 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
8513 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
8514 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
8515 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
8516 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true, reason));
8517 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
8518 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
8522 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
8523 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8524 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
8525 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage {
8526 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8527 data: reason_message,
8540 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
8541 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
8542 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
8543 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
8544 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
8545 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
8546 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
8547 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8548 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
8549 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
8551 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
8552 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
8553 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
8557 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
8560 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8561 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
8562 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8563 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
8564 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
8565 user_channel_id: Some(htlc.prev_user_channel_id),
8566 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
8567 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
8568 phantom_shared_secret: None,
8569 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
8570 blinded_failure: htlc.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
8573 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
8574 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
8575 _ => unreachable!(),
8577 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
8578 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
8579 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
8580 let logger = WithContext::from(
8581 &self.logger, None, Some(htlc.prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
8583 log_trace!(logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
8589 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
8591 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
8592 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
8596 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] may need to be persisted or
8597 /// may have events that need processing.
8599 /// In order to check if this [`ChannelManager`] needs persisting, call
8600 /// [`Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence`].
8602 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
8603 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
8604 pub fn get_event_or_persistence_needed_future(&self) -> Future {
8605 self.event_persist_notifier.get_future()
8608 /// Returns true if this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
8609 pub fn get_and_clear_needs_persistence(&self) -> bool {
8610 self.needs_persist_flag.swap(false, Ordering::AcqRel)
8613 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
8614 pub fn get_event_or_persist_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
8615 self.event_persist_notifier.notify_pending()
8618 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
8619 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
8620 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
8621 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
8624 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8625 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8626 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
8627 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
8630 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8631 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8633 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
8634 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
8635 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
8636 pub fn bolt11_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
8637 provided_bolt11_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
8640 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8641 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8642 fn bolt12_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
8643 provided_bolt12_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
8646 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8647 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8648 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
8649 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
8652 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8653 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8654 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
8655 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
8658 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8659 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8660 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
8661 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
8665 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8666 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8668 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8669 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8670 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8671 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8672 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8673 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8677 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
8678 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8679 // open_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
8680 // change to the contents.
8681 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8682 let res = self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8683 let persist = match &res {
8684 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => {
8685 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't close a new channel");
8686 NotifyOption::DoPersist
8688 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8690 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8695 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
8696 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8697 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8698 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8701 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
8702 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8703 // accept_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
8704 // change to the contents.
8705 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8706 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8707 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents
8711 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
8712 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8713 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8714 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8717 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
8718 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8719 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8722 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
8723 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8724 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8727 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
8728 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8729 // channel_ready message - while the channel's state will change, any channel_ready message
8730 // will ultimately be re-sent on startup and the `ChannelMonitor` won't be updated so we
8731 // will not force-close the channel on startup.
8732 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8733 let res = self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8734 let persist = match &res {
8735 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8736 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8738 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8743 fn handle_stfu(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Stfu) {
8744 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8745 "Quiescence not supported".to_owned(),
8746 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8749 fn handle_splice(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Splice) {
8750 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8751 "Splicing not supported".to_owned(),
8752 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8755 fn handle_splice_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceAck) {
8756 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8757 "Splicing not supported (splice_ack)".to_owned(),
8758 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8761 fn handle_splice_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceLocked) {
8762 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8763 "Splicing not supported (splice_locked)".to_owned(),
8764 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8767 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
8768 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8769 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8772 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
8773 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8774 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8777 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
8778 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8779 // update_add_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8780 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8781 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8782 let res = self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8783 let persist = match &res {
8784 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8785 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8786 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8788 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8793 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
8794 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8795 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8798 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
8799 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8800 // update_fail_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8801 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8802 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8803 let res = self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8804 let persist = match &res {
8805 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8806 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8807 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8809 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8814 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
8815 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8816 // update_fail_malformed_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state
8817 // only the `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8818 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8819 let res = self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8820 let persist = match &res {
8821 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8822 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8823 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8825 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8830 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
8831 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8832 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8835 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
8836 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8837 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8840 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
8841 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8842 // update_fee message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8843 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8844 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8845 let res = self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8846 let persist = match &res {
8847 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8848 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8849 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8851 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8856 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
8857 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8858 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8861 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
8862 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8863 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
8866 NotifyOption::DoPersist
8871 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
8872 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8873 let res = self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8874 let persist = match &res {
8875 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8876 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8877 Ok(persist) => *persist,
8879 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8884 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
8885 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
8886 self, || NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents);
8887 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8888 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8891 WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None),
8892 "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
8893 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id)
8895 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
8896 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8897 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8898 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8899 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
8900 let context = match phase {
8901 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
8902 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
8903 if chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok() {
8904 // We only retain funded channels that are not shutdown.
8909 // Unfunded channels will always be removed.
8910 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
8913 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
8917 // Clean up for removal.
8918 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
8919 failed_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer));
8922 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
8923 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
8924 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
8925 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
8927 // V1 Channel Establishment
8928 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
8929 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
8930 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
8931 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
8932 // V2 Channel Establishment
8933 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
8934 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
8935 // Common Channel Establishment
8936 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
8937 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
8939 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendStfu { .. } => false,
8941 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSplice { .. } => false,
8942 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceAck { .. } => false,
8943 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceLocked { .. } => false,
8944 // Interactive Transaction Construction
8945 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
8946 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
8947 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
8948 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
8949 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
8950 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
8951 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
8952 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
8953 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
8954 // Channel Operations
8955 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
8956 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
8957 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
8958 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
8959 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
8960 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
8962 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
8963 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
8964 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
8965 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
8966 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
8967 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
8968 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
8969 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
8970 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
8973 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
8974 peer_state.is_connected = false;
8975 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
8976 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
8979 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
8981 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
8983 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
8984 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
8988 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
8989 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None);
8990 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
8991 log_debug!(logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8995 let mut res = Ok(());
8997 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8998 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
8999 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
9000 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
9001 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
9002 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
9003 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
9006 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
9007 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
9008 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
9009 if inbound_peer_limited {
9011 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
9013 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
9014 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
9015 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
9016 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
9017 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
9018 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
9019 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
9020 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
9024 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
9025 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
9026 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
9028 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
9029 if inbound_peer_limited &&
9030 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
9031 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
9034 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
9037 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
9038 peer_state.is_connected = true;
9043 log_debug!(logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
9045 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9046 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
9047 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9048 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9049 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
9051 peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(|(_, phase)|
9052 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
9054 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
9055 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
9056 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9057 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger),
9062 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
9063 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
9068 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
9069 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9071 match &msg.data as &str {
9072 "cannot co-op close channel w/ active htlcs"|
9073 "link failed to shutdown" =>
9075 // LND hasn't properly handled shutdown messages ever, and force-closes any time we
9076 // send one while HTLCs are still present. The issue is tracked at
9077 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/6039 and has had multiple patches
9078 // to fix it but none so far have managed to land upstream. The issue appears to be
9079 // very low priority for the LND team despite being marked "P1".
9080 // We're not going to bother handling this in a sensible way, instead simply
9081 // repeating the Shutdown message on repeat until morale improves.
9082 if !msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
9083 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9084 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9085 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
9086 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9087 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&msg.channel_id) {
9088 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_outbound_shutdown() {
9089 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
9090 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9094 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
9095 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9096 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
9097 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
9098 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
9099 data: "You appear to be exhibiting LND bug 6039, we'll keep sending you shutdown messages until you handle them correctly".to_owned()
9101 log_level: Level::Trace,
9111 if msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
9112 let channel_ids: Vec<ChannelId> = {
9113 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9114 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9115 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
9116 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9117 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9118 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
9119 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
9120 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
9121 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
9123 for channel_id in channel_ids {
9124 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
9125 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
9129 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
9130 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9131 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9132 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
9133 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9134 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9135 if let Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
9136 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
9137 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
9138 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9146 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
9147 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
9151 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
9152 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
9155 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
9156 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
9159 fn get_chain_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
9160 Some(vec![self.chain_hash])
9163 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
9164 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9165 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9166 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9169 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
9170 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9171 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9172 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9175 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
9176 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9177 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9178 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9181 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
9182 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9183 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9184 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9187 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
9188 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9189 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9190 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9193 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
9194 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9195 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9196 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9199 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
9200 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9201 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9202 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9205 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
9206 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9207 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9208 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9211 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
9212 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9213 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9214 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9218 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9219 OffersMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9221 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9222 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9223 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9224 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9225 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9226 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9230 fn handle_message(&self, message: OffersMessage) -> Option<OffersMessage> {
9231 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
9232 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
9235 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request) => {
9236 let amount_msats = match InvoiceBuilder::<DerivedSigningPubkey>::amount_msats(
9239 Ok(amount_msats) => amount_msats,
9240 Err(error) => return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
9242 let invoice_request = match invoice_request.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
9243 Ok(invoice_request) => invoice_request,
9245 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidMetadata;
9246 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
9250 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
9251 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = match self.create_inbound_payment(
9252 Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None
9254 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => (payment_hash, payment_secret),
9256 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount;
9257 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
9261 let payment_paths = match self.create_blinded_payment_paths(
9262 amount_msats, payment_secret
9264 Ok(payment_paths) => payment_paths,
9266 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths;
9267 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
9271 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
9272 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
9273 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
9276 if invoice_request.keys.is_some() {
9277 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
9278 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys(
9279 payment_paths, payment_hash
9281 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
9282 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
9283 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
9285 let builder: Result<InvoiceBuilder<DerivedSigningPubkey>, _> =
9286 builder.map(|b| b.into());
9287 match builder.and_then(|b| b.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)) {
9288 Ok(invoice) => Some(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
9289 Err(error) => Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
9292 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
9293 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with(payment_paths, payment_hash);
9294 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
9295 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with_no_std(
9296 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
9298 let builder: Result<InvoiceBuilder<ExplicitSigningPubkey>, _> =
9299 builder.map(|b| b.into());
9300 let response = builder.and_then(|builder| builder.allow_mpp().build())
9301 .map_err(|e| OffersMessage::InvoiceError(e.into()))
9302 .and_then(|invoice| {
9304 let mut invoice = invoice;
9305 match invoice.sign(|invoice| self.node_signer.sign_bolt12_invoice(invoice)) {
9306 Ok(invoice) => Ok(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
9307 Err(SignError::Signing(())) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
9308 InvoiceError::from_string("Failed signing invoice".to_string())
9310 Err(SignError::Verification(_)) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
9311 InvoiceError::from_string("Failed invoice signature verification".to_string())
9316 Ok(invoice) => Some(invoice),
9317 Err(error) => Some(error),
9321 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice) => {
9322 match invoice.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
9324 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string("Unrecognized invoice".to_owned())))
9326 Ok(_) if invoice.invoice_features().requires_unknown_bits_from(&self.bolt12_invoice_features()) => {
9327 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(Bolt12SemanticError::UnknownRequiredFeatures.into()))
9330 if let Err(e) = self.send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&invoice, payment_id) {
9331 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed paying invoice: {:?}", e);
9332 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string(format!("{:?}", e))))
9339 OffersMessage::InvoiceError(invoice_error) => {
9340 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received invoice_error: {}", invoice_error);
9346 fn release_pending_messages(&self) -> Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>> {
9347 core::mem::take(&mut self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap())
9351 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9352 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9353 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
9354 let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
9355 node_features.set_keysend_optional();
9359 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9360 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9362 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
9363 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
9364 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
9365 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt11_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
9366 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9369 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9370 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9371 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt12_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
9372 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9375 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9376 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9377 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
9378 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9381 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9382 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9383 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
9384 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
9387 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9388 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9389 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
9390 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
9391 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
9392 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
9393 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
9394 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
9395 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
9396 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
9397 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
9398 features.set_payment_secret_required();
9399 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
9400 features.set_wumbo_optional();
9401 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
9402 features.set_channel_type_optional();
9403 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
9404 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
9405 features.set_route_blinding_optional();
9406 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
9407 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
9412 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
9413 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
9415 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
9416 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
9417 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
9418 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
9421 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
9422 (2, node_id, required),
9423 (4, features, required),
9424 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
9425 (8, forwarding_info, option),
9426 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9427 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9430 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
9431 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9432 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
9433 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
9434 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
9435 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
9436 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9437 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
9438 (2, self.channel_id, required),
9439 (3, self.channel_type, option),
9440 (4, self.counterparty, required),
9441 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
9442 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
9443 (7, self.config, option),
9444 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
9445 (9, self.confirmations, option),
9446 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
9447 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
9448 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
9449 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
9450 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
9451 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
9452 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
9453 (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
9454 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
9455 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
9456 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
9457 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
9458 (30, self.is_usable, required),
9459 (32, self.is_public, required),
9460 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9461 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9462 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
9463 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
9464 (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
9470 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
9471 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9472 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9473 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
9474 (2, channel_id, required),
9475 (3, channel_type, option),
9476 (4, counterparty, required),
9477 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
9478 (6, funding_txo, option),
9479 (7, config, option),
9480 (8, short_channel_id, option),
9481 (9, confirmations, option),
9482 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
9483 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
9484 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
9485 (16, balance_msat, required),
9486 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
9487 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
9488 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
9489 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
9490 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
9491 (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
9492 (22, confirmations_required, option),
9493 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
9494 (26, is_outbound, required),
9495 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
9496 (30, is_usable, required),
9497 (32, is_public, required),
9498 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9499 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9500 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
9501 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
9502 (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
9505 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
9506 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
9507 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
9508 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
9509 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
9513 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
9515 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
9516 outbound_scid_alias,
9520 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
9521 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
9523 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
9524 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
9525 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
9526 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
9527 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
9528 confirmations_required,
9530 force_close_spend_delay,
9531 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
9532 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
9533 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
9534 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
9535 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
9536 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
9537 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
9538 channel_shutdown_state,
9543 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
9544 (2, channels, required_vec),
9545 (4, phantom_scid, required),
9546 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
9549 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(BlindedForward, {
9550 (0, inbound_blinding_point, required),
9551 (1, failure, (default_value, BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode)),
9554 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
9556 (0, onion_packet, required),
9557 (1, blinded, option),
9558 (2, short_channel_id, required),
9561 (0, payment_data, required),
9562 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
9563 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
9564 (3, payment_metadata, option),
9565 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
9566 (7, requires_blinded_error, (default_value, false)),
9568 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
9569 (0, payment_preimage, required),
9570 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
9571 (3, payment_metadata, option),
9572 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
9573 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
9577 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
9578 (0, routing, required),
9579 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
9580 (4, payment_hash, required),
9581 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
9582 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
9583 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
9584 (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9588 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
9589 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9591 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
9593 channel_id.write(writer)?;
9594 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
9595 reason.write(writer)?;
9597 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
9598 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
9601 channel_id.write(writer)?;
9602 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
9603 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
9604 failure_code.write(writer)?;
9611 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
9612 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9613 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9616 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
9617 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9618 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9619 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
9623 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
9624 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9625 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9626 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
9627 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
9630 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
9631 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
9632 // messages contained in the variants.
9633 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
9634 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
9635 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
9637 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
9638 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
9639 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
9640 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
9641 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
9644 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
9645 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
9646 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
9647 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
9648 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
9650 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
9655 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
9660 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(BlindedFailure,
9661 (0, FromIntroductionNode) => {},
9662 (2, FromBlindedNode) => {}, ;
9665 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
9666 (0, short_channel_id, required),
9667 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
9668 (2, outpoint, required),
9669 (3, blinded_failure, option),
9670 (4, htlc_id, required),
9671 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required),
9672 (7, user_channel_id, option),
9675 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
9676 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9677 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
9678 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
9679 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
9681 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9682 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
9683 (1, self.total_msat, required),
9684 (2, self.value, required),
9685 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
9686 (4, payment_data, option),
9687 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
9688 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
9689 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
9690 (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9696 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
9697 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9698 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9699 (0, prev_hop, required),
9700 (1, total_msat, option),
9701 (2, value_ser, required),
9702 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
9703 (4, payment_data_opt, option),
9704 (5, total_value_received, option),
9705 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
9706 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
9707 (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9709 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
9710 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
9711 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
9713 if payment_data.is_some() {
9714 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9716 if total_msat.is_none() {
9717 total_msat = Some(value);
9719 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
9722 if total_msat.is_none() {
9723 if payment_data.is_none() {
9724 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9726 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
9728 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
9732 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
9735 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
9736 total_value_received,
9737 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
9739 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
9740 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
9745 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
9746 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9747 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9750 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
9751 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
9752 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
9753 let mut payment_id = None;
9754 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
9755 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
9756 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9757 (0, session_priv, required),
9758 (1, payment_id, option),
9759 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
9760 (4, path_hops, required_vec),
9761 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
9762 (6, blinded_tail, option),
9764 if payment_id.is_none() {
9765 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
9767 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
9769 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
9770 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
9771 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9773 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
9774 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
9775 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
9776 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9780 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
9781 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
9782 first_hop_htlc_msat,
9784 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
9787 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
9788 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
9793 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
9794 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
9796 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
9798 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
9799 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9800 (0, session_priv, required),
9801 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
9802 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
9803 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
9804 (4, path.hops, required_vec),
9805 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
9806 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
9809 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
9811 field.write(writer)?;
9818 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
9819 (0, forward_info, required),
9820 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
9821 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
9822 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
9823 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
9826 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
9827 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9828 const FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID: u8 = 1;
9830 Self::AddHTLC(info) => {
9834 Self::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
9835 FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID.write(w)?;
9836 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
9837 (0, htlc_id, required),
9838 (2, err_packet, required),
9841 Self::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
9842 // Since this variant was added in 0.0.119, write this as `::FailHTLC` with an empty error
9843 // packet so older versions have something to fail back with, but serialize the real data as
9844 // optional TLVs for the benefit of newer versions.
9845 FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID.write(w)?;
9846 let dummy_err_packet = msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new() };
9847 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
9848 (0, htlc_id, required),
9849 (1, failure_code, required),
9850 (2, dummy_err_packet, required),
9851 (3, sha256_of_onion, required),
9859 impl Readable for HTLCForwardInfo {
9860 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9861 let id: u8 = Readable::read(r)?;
9863 0 => Self::AddHTLC(Readable::read(r)?),
9865 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(r, {
9866 (0, htlc_id, required),
9867 (1, malformed_htlc_failure_code, option),
9868 (2, err_packet, required),
9869 (3, sha256_of_onion, option),
9871 if let Some(failure_code) = malformed_htlc_failure_code {
9872 Self::FailMalformedHTLC {
9873 htlc_id: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_id, required),
9875 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?,
9879 htlc_id: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_id, required),
9880 err_packet: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(err_packet, required),
9884 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
9889 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
9890 (0, payment_secret, required),
9891 (2, expiry_time, required),
9892 (4, user_payment_id, required),
9893 (6, payment_preimage, required),
9894 (8, min_value_msat, required),
9897 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9899 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9900 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9901 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9902 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9903 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9904 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9908 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9909 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
9911 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
9913 self.chain_hash.write(writer)?;
9915 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
9916 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
9917 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
9920 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
9922 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9923 let mut number_of_funded_channels = 0;
9924 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9925 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9926 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9927 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
9928 serializable_peer_count += 1;
9931 number_of_funded_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(
9932 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { chan.context.is_funding_broadcast() } else { false }
9936 (number_of_funded_channels as u64).write(writer)?;
9938 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9939 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9940 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9941 for channel in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter_map(
9942 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = phase {
9943 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() { Some(channel) } else { None }
9946 channel.write(writer)?;
9952 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
9953 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9954 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
9955 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
9956 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9957 for forward in pending_forwards {
9958 forward.write(writer)?;
9963 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
9965 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
9966 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
9967 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
9969 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
9970 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
9971 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9972 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
9973 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
9974 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9975 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
9976 htlc.write(writer)?;
9978 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
9979 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
9982 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
9983 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
9984 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9985 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
9986 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
9987 // per_peer_state lock at all.
9988 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
9991 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
9992 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
9993 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
9994 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
9995 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
9997 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
9998 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
9999 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
10000 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
10001 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
10002 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
10003 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
10008 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
10009 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
10010 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
10011 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
10012 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
10013 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
10014 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
10015 // well save the space and not write any events here.
10016 0u64.write(writer)?;
10018 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10019 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
10020 event.write(writer)?;
10024 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
10025 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
10026 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
10027 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
10028 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
10029 0u64.write(writer)?;
10031 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
10032 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
10033 // likely to be identical.
10034 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
10035 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
10037 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10038 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
10039 hash.write(writer)?;
10040 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
10043 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
10044 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
10045 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
10046 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
10047 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
10050 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
10051 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
10053 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
10054 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
10055 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
10056 session_priv.write(writer)?;
10059 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {},
10060 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {},
10061 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
10062 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
10066 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
10067 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
10068 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
10070 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
10071 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
10072 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
10078 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
10079 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
10080 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
10081 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
10084 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
10085 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
10086 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
10087 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
10088 pending_claiming_payments = None;
10091 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
10092 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
10093 for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
10094 if !updates.is_empty() {
10095 if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(HashMap::new()); }
10096 in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
10101 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10102 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
10103 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
10104 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
10105 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
10106 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
10107 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
10108 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
10109 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
10110 (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
10111 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
10112 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
10113 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
10120 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
10121 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10122 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
10123 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
10126 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
10127 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
10128 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
10129 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
10130 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
10131 // check that the event is sane here.
10132 let event_encoded = event.encode();
10133 let event_read: Option<Event> =
10134 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
10135 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
10141 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
10142 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10143 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10144 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
10145 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
10146 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
10149 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
10150 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
10151 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
10152 events.push_back((ev, action));
10153 } else if action.is_some() {
10154 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10161 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
10162 (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
10163 (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
10164 (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
10165 (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
10166 (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
10169 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
10171 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
10173 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
10174 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
10175 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
10176 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
10177 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
10178 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
10179 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
10180 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
10181 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
10182 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
10183 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
10184 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
10185 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
10187 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
10188 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
10190 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
10191 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
10193 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
10194 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
10195 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
10196 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
10197 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
10198 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
10200 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
10201 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10203 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10204 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10205 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10206 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10207 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10208 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10212 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
10213 pub entropy_source: ES,
10215 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
10216 pub node_signer: NS,
10218 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
10219 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
10221 pub signer_provider: SP,
10223 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
10225 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
10226 pub fee_estimator: F,
10227 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
10229 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
10230 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
10231 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
10232 pub chain_monitor: M,
10234 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
10235 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
10236 /// force-closed during deserialization.
10237 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
10238 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
10239 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
10241 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
10243 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
10244 /// deserialization.
10246 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
10247 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
10248 pub default_config: UserConfig,
10250 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
10251 /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
10253 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
10254 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
10255 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
10256 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
10258 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
10261 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
10262 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>,
10265 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10266 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
10268 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10269 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10270 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10271 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10272 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10273 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10277 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
10278 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
10279 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
10280 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
10281 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>) -> Self {
10283 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
10284 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
10289 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
10290 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
10291 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10292 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
10294 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10295 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10296 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10297 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10298 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10299 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10303 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10304 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
10305 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
10309 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10310 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
10312 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10313 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10314 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10315 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10316 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10317 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10321 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10322 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
10324 let chain_hash: ChainHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10325 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10326 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10328 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
10330 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10331 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10332 let mut funded_peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10333 let mut outpoint_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10334 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10335 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
10336 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
10337 for _ in 0..channel_count {
10338 let mut channel: Channel<SP> = Channel::read(reader, (
10339 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
10341 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context);
10342 let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10343 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
10344 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
10345 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
10346 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
10347 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
10348 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
10349 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
10350 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
10351 log_error!(logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
10352 if channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
10353 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
10354 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
10356 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() {
10357 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at holder commitment number {} but the ChannelManager is at holder commitment number {}.",
10358 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number());
10360 if channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() {
10361 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at revoked counterparty transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at revoked counterparty transaction number {}.",
10362 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
10364 if channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() {
10365 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at counterparty commitment transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at counterparty commitment transaction number {}.",
10366 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
10368 let mut shutdown_result = channel.context.force_shutdown(true, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
10369 if shutdown_result.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid.is_some() {
10370 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10372 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = shutdown_result.monitor_update {
10373 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
10374 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
10377 failed_htlcs.append(&mut shutdown_result.dropped_outbound_htlcs);
10378 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
10379 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
10380 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
10381 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
10382 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10383 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
10384 channel_funding_txo: channel.context.get_funding_txo(),
10386 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
10387 let mut found_htlc = false;
10388 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
10389 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
10392 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
10393 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
10394 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
10395 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
10396 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
10397 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
10398 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
10400 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
10401 &channel.context.channel_id(), &payment_hash);
10402 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
10406 log_info!(logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
10407 &channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
10408 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
10409 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
10410 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
10412 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
10413 outpoint_to_peer.insert(funding_txo, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
10415 match funded_peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
10416 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
10417 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
10418 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
10420 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
10421 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
10422 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
10423 entry.insert(by_id_map);
10427 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
10428 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
10429 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
10430 // safely discard the channel.
10431 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
10432 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
10433 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
10434 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
10435 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
10436 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10437 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
10438 channel_funding_txo: channel.context.get_funding_txo(),
10441 log_error!(logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", &channel.context.channel_id());
10442 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10443 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10444 log_error!(logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10445 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10446 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10450 for (funding_txo, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10451 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
10452 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor);
10453 log_info!(logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
10454 &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10455 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
10456 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
10457 counterparty_node_id: None,
10458 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
10460 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
10464 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
10465 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10466 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
10467 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
10468 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
10469 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10470 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
10471 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
10472 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
10474 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
10477 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10478 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
10479 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
10480 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10481 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10482 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
10483 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
10484 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
10486 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
10489 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
10492 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
10493 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
10494 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
10495 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10496 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
10497 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10498 is_connected: false,
10502 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10503 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>)>()));
10504 for _ in 0..peer_count {
10505 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
10506 let peer_chans = funded_peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new());
10507 let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
10508 peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
10509 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
10512 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10513 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
10514 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
10515 for _ in 0..event_count {
10516 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
10517 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
10522 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10523 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
10524 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
10526 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
10527 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
10528 // on-startup monitor updates.
10529 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
10530 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
10532 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
10536 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
10537 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10539 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10540 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
10541 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
10542 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
10543 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10547 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10548 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
10549 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
10550 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
10551 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
10552 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
10553 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
10555 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
10556 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10560 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
10561 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
10562 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
10563 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
10564 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
10565 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
10566 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
10567 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
10568 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
10569 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
10570 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
10571 let mut events_override = None;
10572 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
10573 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10574 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
10575 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
10576 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
10577 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
10578 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
10579 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
10580 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
10581 (8, events_override, option),
10582 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
10583 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
10584 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
10585 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
10587 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
10588 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10591 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
10592 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10595 if let Some(events) = events_override {
10596 pending_events_read = events;
10599 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
10600 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
10603 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
10604 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
10605 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
10606 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
10607 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
10608 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
10610 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
10612 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
10613 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
10614 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
10617 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
10618 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
10619 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
10620 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
10621 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
10623 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
10624 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
10625 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
10627 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
10628 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
10629 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
10630 ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
10631 $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $logger: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
10633 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
10634 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
10635 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
10636 log_trace!($logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
10637 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, &$funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10638 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
10639 pending_background_events.push(
10640 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
10641 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
10642 funding_txo: $funding_txo,
10643 update: update.clone(),
10646 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
10647 // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
10648 // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
10649 // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
10650 pending_background_events.push(
10651 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
10652 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
10653 channel_id: $funding_txo.to_channel_id(),
10656 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
10657 log_error!($logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
10658 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10660 max_in_flight_update_id
10664 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
10665 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
10666 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10667 for phase in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
10668 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
10669 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context);
10671 // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
10673 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10674 let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
10675 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
10676 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
10677 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
10678 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
10679 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
10680 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
10681 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, ""));
10684 if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
10685 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
10686 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
10687 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
10688 chan.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
10689 log_error!(logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
10690 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10691 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10692 log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10693 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10694 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10697 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
10698 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
10699 debug_assert!(false);
10700 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10705 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
10706 for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
10707 let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(counterparty_id), Some(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
10708 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
10709 // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
10710 // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
10711 // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
10712 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
10713 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(HashMap::new()))
10715 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10716 handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
10717 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, "closed ");
10719 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
10720 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.",
10721 &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10722 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10723 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10724 log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10725 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10726 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10731 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
10732 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
10734 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
10735 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
10736 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
10737 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
10740 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
10741 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
10742 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
10743 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
10744 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
10745 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
10746 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
10748 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10749 let counterparty_opt = outpoint_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0);
10750 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
10751 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor);
10752 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
10753 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
10754 if path.hops.is_empty() {
10755 log_error!(logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
10756 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10759 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
10760 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
10761 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
10762 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
10763 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
10764 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
10765 log_info!(logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
10766 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), htlc.payment_hash);
10768 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
10769 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
10770 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
10771 retry_strategy: None,
10772 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
10773 payment_params: None,
10774 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
10775 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
10776 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10777 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10778 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10779 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10780 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
10781 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
10782 total_msat: path_amt,
10783 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
10784 remaining_max_total_routing_fee_msat: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10786 log_info!(logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
10787 path_amt, &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
10792 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
10793 match htlc_source {
10794 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
10795 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
10796 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
10797 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
10799 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
10800 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
10801 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
10802 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
10803 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
10804 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
10805 forwards.retain(|forward| {
10806 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
10807 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
10808 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
10809 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
10814 !forwards.is_empty()
10816 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
10817 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
10818 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
10819 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
10820 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
10821 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
10822 intercepted_id != ev_id
10829 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
10830 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
10831 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
10832 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
10833 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
10834 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
10835 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
10836 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
10837 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
10838 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
10839 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
10841 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
10842 channel_funding_outpoint: monitor.get_funding_txo().0,
10843 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
10845 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv,
10846 path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &&logger);
10847 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
10854 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
10855 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
10857 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
10859 .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
10860 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
10861 if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
10862 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
10863 // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
10864 // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
10865 // channel_id -> peer map entry).
10866 counterparty_opt.is_none(),
10867 counterparty_opt.cloned().or(monitor.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10868 monitor.get_funding_txo().0))
10871 // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
10872 // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
10873 // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
10874 // channel still live case here.
10878 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
10879 pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
10884 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
10885 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
10886 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
10887 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
10888 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
10889 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
10890 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
10891 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
10895 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
10896 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
10898 let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
10899 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
10900 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
10901 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10903 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
10904 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
10905 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10907 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
10908 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
10910 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10911 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
10913 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10916 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
10917 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10918 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
10920 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10924 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
10925 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
10926 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
10927 if htlcs.is_empty() {
10928 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10930 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
10931 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
10932 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
10933 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
10934 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
10935 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
10936 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
10937 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
10939 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", &payment_hash);
10940 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10944 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
10946 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10948 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
10949 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
10951 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10952 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
10957 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10958 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10960 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
10962 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10964 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
10965 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
10966 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
10967 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10971 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
10972 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
10973 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10974 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10975 for (chan_id, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
10976 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
10977 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context);
10978 if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
10979 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
10981 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
10982 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &chain_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
10983 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
10985 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
10986 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
10987 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
10988 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
10989 log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
10990 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10992 if chan.context.is_usable() {
10993 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
10994 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
10995 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
10996 log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
10997 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11001 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
11002 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
11003 debug_assert!(false);
11004 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11009 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
11011 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
11012 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
11013 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
11014 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", &payment_hash);
11015 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
11016 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
11017 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
11018 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
11019 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
11020 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
11021 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
11023 for claimable_htlc in &payment.htlcs {
11024 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
11026 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
11027 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
11028 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
11029 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
11031 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
11032 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
11033 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
11034 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
11036 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
11037 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
11038 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
11039 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
11041 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
11042 if let Some(peer_node_id) = outpoint_to_peer.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
11043 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
11044 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
11045 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
11046 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(channel)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
11047 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context);
11048 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
11051 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
11052 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
11055 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
11058 purpose: payment.purpose,
11059 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
11060 htlcs: payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect(),
11061 sender_intended_total_msat: payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat),
11067 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
11068 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
11069 for (channel_id, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
11070 let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), Some(*channel_id));
11071 for action in actions.iter() {
11072 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
11073 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
11074 Some((blocked_node_id, blocked_channel_outpoint, blocking_action)), ..
11076 if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&blocked_node_id) {
11078 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
11079 blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id());
11080 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
11081 .entry(blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id())
11082 .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
11084 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
11085 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
11086 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
11087 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
11091 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately { .. } = action {
11092 debug_assert!(false, "Non-event-generating channel freeing should not appear in our queue");
11096 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
11098 log_error!(WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), None), "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
11099 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11103 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
11105 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
11106 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
11107 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
11108 router: args.router,
11110 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
11112 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
11113 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
11114 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
11115 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
11117 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
11118 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
11119 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
11120 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex::new(outpoint_to_peer),
11121 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
11122 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
11124 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
11126 our_network_pubkey,
11129 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
11131 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
11133 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
11134 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
11135 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
11136 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
11137 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
11139 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
11140 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
11142 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
11144 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
11146 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
11147 node_signer: args.node_signer,
11148 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
11150 logger: args.logger,
11151 default_configuration: args.default_config,
11154 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
11155 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
11156 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
11157 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
11158 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
11161 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding) in pending_claims_to_replay {
11162 // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
11163 // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
11164 // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
11165 channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value),
11166 downstream_closed, true, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding);
11169 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
11170 //connection or two.
11172 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
11178 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
11179 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
11180 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
11181 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
11182 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
11183 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
11184 use crate::ln::ChannelId;
11185 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{create_recv_pending_htlc_info, HTLCForwardInfo, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
11186 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
11187 use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
11188 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
11189 use crate::prelude::*;
11190 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
11191 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
11192 use crate::util::ser::Writeable;
11193 use crate::util::test_utils;
11194 use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
11195 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
11198 fn test_notify_limits() {
11199 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
11200 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
11201 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
11202 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
11203 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
11204 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11206 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
11207 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
11208 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11209 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11210 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11212 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11214 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
11215 // to connect messages with new values
11216 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
11217 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
11218 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
11219 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
11220 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
11221 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
11223 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
11224 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11225 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11226 // ... but the last node should not.
11227 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11228 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
11229 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11230 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11232 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
11233 // about the channel.
11234 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
11235 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
11236 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11238 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
11240 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
11241 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
11242 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
11243 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
11244 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11245 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11247 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
11248 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11249 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11251 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
11252 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
11253 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
11254 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
11255 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
11256 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
11258 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
11259 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
11260 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
11261 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
11262 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11263 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11264 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11265 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11267 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
11268 // the channel info has updated.
11269 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
11270 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
11271 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11272 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11273 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11274 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11278 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
11279 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
11281 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11282 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11283 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11284 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11285 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11287 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
11288 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
11289 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
11290 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
11292 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
11293 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
11294 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
11295 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
11296 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
11297 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
11298 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
11299 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
11300 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11301 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11302 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11303 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
11305 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
11306 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11307 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11308 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11309 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11310 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11311 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11312 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11313 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11314 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11315 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11316 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11317 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
11318 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11319 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11320 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11321 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11322 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11323 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11324 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11325 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11326 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11327 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
11329 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
11330 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
11331 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
11332 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11333 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11334 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11335 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
11337 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
11338 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
11339 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
11340 // lightning messages manually.
11341 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
11342 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
11343 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
11345 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11346 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
11347 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
11348 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
11349 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11350 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11351 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
11352 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11353 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11354 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
11355 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11356 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11357 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
11358 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
11359 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11360 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11361 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
11362 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11363 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11364 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
11365 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11366 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
11367 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11368 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11369 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
11370 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11372 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
11373 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
11374 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11375 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
11377 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
11378 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
11379 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
11380 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
11382 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11385 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
11386 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
11387 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
11388 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
11390 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11395 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
11396 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
11397 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
11400 fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
11401 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
11402 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
11403 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
11404 // fails as expected.
11405 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
11406 // payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
11407 // reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
11408 // secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
11409 // `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
11410 // payment secrets and reject otherwise.
11411 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11412 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11413 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11414 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
11415 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
11416 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11417 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11418 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11419 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11421 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
11422 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
11423 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
11425 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
11426 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11427 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(),
11428 TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false), 100_000);
11429 let route = find_route(
11430 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11431 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11433 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11434 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11435 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11436 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11437 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11438 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11439 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11440 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11441 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11442 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11443 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
11444 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
11445 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11446 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11447 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11448 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11449 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11450 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11451 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11452 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11453 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11454 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11455 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11456 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11458 // Finally, claim the original payment.
11459 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11461 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
11462 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11463 let route = find_route(
11464 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11465 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11467 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11468 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11469 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11470 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11471 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11472 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
11473 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
11474 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
11476 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
11477 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
11478 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
11479 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
11480 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11481 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11482 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11483 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11484 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11485 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11486 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11487 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11488 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11489 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11490 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11491 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11492 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11493 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11494 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11495 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11496 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11497 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11498 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11499 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11501 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
11502 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11504 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
11505 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
11506 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11507 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
11508 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11509 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11510 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11511 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
11512 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
11513 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
11515 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
11516 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11517 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
11520 let route = find_route(
11521 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11522 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11524 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
11525 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11526 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
11527 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11528 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11529 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11530 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11531 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11532 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11533 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11534 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11535 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11536 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11537 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11538 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11539 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11540 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11541 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11542 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11543 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11544 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11545 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11546 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11548 // Finally, claim the original payment.
11549 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11553 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
11554 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
11555 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
11556 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11557 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11558 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11559 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11561 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
11562 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11564 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
11565 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11566 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
11567 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
11568 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
11569 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11570 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11571 let route = find_route(
11572 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
11573 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11576 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11577 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
11578 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
11579 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
11580 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
11581 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
11582 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11584 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11585 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
11586 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11587 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
11588 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11589 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11590 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
11592 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
11596 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
11597 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
11598 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
11599 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11600 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
11601 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11602 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11603 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
11604 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11606 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
11607 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11609 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
11610 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11611 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
11612 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
11613 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
11614 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11615 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11616 let route = find_route(
11617 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
11618 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11621 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11622 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
11623 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
11624 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
11625 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
11626 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
11627 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
11628 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
11629 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11631 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11632 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
11633 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11634 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
11635 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11636 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11637 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
11639 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
11643 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
11644 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
11645 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
11646 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
11647 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11649 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11650 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11651 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11652 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11654 // Marshall an MPP route.
11655 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
11656 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
11657 route.paths.push(path);
11658 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11659 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
11660 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
11661 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
11662 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
11663 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
11665 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
11666 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
11668 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
11669 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
11671 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
11676 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
11677 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11678 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11679 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11680 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11682 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11684 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11685 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11687 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11688 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
11689 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11690 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
11693 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
11694 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
11695 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
11696 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
11697 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
11698 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
11701 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
11704 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
11705 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
11710 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
11711 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
11712 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11713 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11714 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11715 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11717 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
11718 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11720 total_msat: 100_000,
11723 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
11724 // payment verification fails as expected.
11725 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
11726 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
11727 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
11728 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
11730 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
11734 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
11735 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
11739 fn test_outpoint_to_peer_coverage() {
11740 // Test that the `ChannelManager:outpoint_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
11741 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
11742 // the channel is successfully closed.
11743 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11744 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11745 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11746 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11748 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11749 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11750 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
11751 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11752 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
11754 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
11755 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.txid().to_byte_array());
11757 // Ensure that the `outpoint_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
11758 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
11759 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11760 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11763 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
11765 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
11766 // as it has the funding transaction.
11767 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11768 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11769 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
11772 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11774 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11776 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
11778 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11779 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11780 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
11782 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11785 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as
11786 // soon as it has the funding transaction.
11787 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11788 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11789 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
11791 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11792 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11793 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
11794 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11795 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11796 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
11797 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
11798 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
11800 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11801 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
11802 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11803 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
11805 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11806 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
11808 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `outpoint_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
11809 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
11810 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
11811 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
11812 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11813 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11814 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
11818 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
11819 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
11820 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
11821 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map.
11822 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11823 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11824 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
11827 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
11829 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
11830 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
11831 // closing transaction).
11832 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map as it can be
11833 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
11834 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11836 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
11837 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
11838 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11839 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11840 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
11843 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11845 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
11847 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `outpoint_to_peer` map once
11848 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
11849 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11851 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11853 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
11854 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
11857 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
11858 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
11859 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11862 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
11863 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
11864 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11867 fn check_channel_unavailable_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_channel_id: ChannelId, peer_node_id: PublicKey) {
11868 let expected_message = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_channel_id, peer_node_id);
11869 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11872 fn check_api_misuse_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
11873 let expected_message = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_string();
11874 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11877 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
11879 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
11880 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
11882 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
11883 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
11885 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
11886 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
11891 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
11892 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
11893 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
11894 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
11895 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11896 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11897 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
11898 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11901 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
11902 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
11903 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
11905 // Test the API functions.
11906 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None), unkown_public_key);
11908 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
11910 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11912 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11914 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11916 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
11918 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
11922 fn test_api_calls_with_unavailable_channel() {
11923 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` and a `channel_id`
11924 // as input, behaves as expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is a known peer in the
11925 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map, but the peer state doesn't contain a channel with
11926 // the given `channel_id`.
11927 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11928 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11929 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
11930 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11932 let counterparty_node_id = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11935 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
11937 // Test the API functions.
11938 check_api_misuse_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, 42));
11940 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11942 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11944 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11946 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(InterceptId([0; 32]), &channel_id, counterparty_node_id, 1_000_000), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11948 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&counterparty_node_id, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11952 fn test_connection_limiting() {
11953 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
11954 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11955 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11956 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11957 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11959 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11961 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11962 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11964 let mut funding_tx = None;
11965 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
11966 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11967 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11970 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
11971 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
11972 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
11973 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
11974 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11976 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
11977 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11978 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11980 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11982 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
11983 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11984 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11986 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11989 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
11990 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11991 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11992 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11993 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11995 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
11996 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
11998 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
11999 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
12000 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12001 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12002 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
12003 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12004 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12007 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12008 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12009 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12010 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12011 }, true).unwrap_err();
12013 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
12014 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
12015 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12016 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12017 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
12018 for ev in chan_closed_events {
12019 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
12021 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12022 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12024 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12025 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12026 }, true).unwrap_err();
12028 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
12029 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12030 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12031 }, false).unwrap();
12032 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12034 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
12035 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
12037 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
12038 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
12039 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
12040 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
12041 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12043 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12044 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
12045 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
12047 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
12048 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12049 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
12051 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
12052 // "protected" and can connect again.
12053 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
12054 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12055 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12057 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12059 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
12061 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12062 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
12066 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
12067 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
12068 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12069 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12070 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12071 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12073 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
12075 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12076 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12078 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
12079 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12080 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12081 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12084 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
12086 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12087 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
12088 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
12090 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
12091 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12092 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12094 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
12095 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12096 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
12097 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
12101 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
12102 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
12103 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
12104 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12105 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12106 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
12107 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
12108 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
12109 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12111 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
12113 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12114 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12116 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
12117 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
12118 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12119 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12120 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12121 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12124 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12125 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12127 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12128 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
12130 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12132 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
12133 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12136 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
12137 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12138 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12139 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12140 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12142 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12143 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12145 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12146 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
12147 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
12148 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
12152 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12154 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
12155 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
12157 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
12158 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12159 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12161 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12162 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
12164 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12166 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
12170 fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
12171 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
12172 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
12173 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
12174 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12175 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
12176 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
12177 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
12178 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
12179 cltv_expiry_height: 42,
12180 payment_metadata: None,
12181 keysend_preimage: None,
12182 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12183 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
12185 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
12187 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
12188 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
12189 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
12190 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundHTLCErr { err_code, .. }) =
12191 create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
12192 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
12193 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
12195 assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
12196 } else { panic!(); }
12198 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
12199 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
12200 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
12201 cltv_expiry_height: 42,
12202 payment_metadata: None,
12203 keysend_preimage: None,
12204 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12205 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
12207 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
12209 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
12210 assert!(create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
12211 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
12212 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend).is_ok());
12216 fn test_final_incorrect_cltv(){
12217 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
12218 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
12219 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
12220 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12222 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
12223 let result = create_recv_pending_htlc_info(msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
12224 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
12225 cltv_expiry_height: 22,
12226 payment_metadata: None,
12227 keysend_preimage: None,
12228 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12229 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: 100,
12231 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
12232 }, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]), 100, 23, None, true, None, current_height,
12233 node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend);
12235 // Should not return an error as this condition:
12236 // https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/4dcc377209509b13cf89a4b91fde7d478f5b46d8/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L334
12237 // is not satisfied.
12238 assert!(result.is_ok());
12242 fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
12243 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
12244 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
12245 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
12246 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
12248 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
12249 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
12251 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
12252 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
12253 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
12254 &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
12255 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12257 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12258 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12260 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12261 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
12262 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12263 match &msg_events[0] {
12264 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
12265 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12267 ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
12268 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
12269 _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
12272 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12275 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12276 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12278 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
12279 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
12280 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12282 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12286 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
12287 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
12288 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
12289 // the channel without the anchors feature.
12290 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12291 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12292 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
12293 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
12294 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
12295 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
12296 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12298 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None, None).unwrap();
12299 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12300 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
12302 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12303 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12305 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12306 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12308 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12311 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12312 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
12314 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12315 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
12317 // Since nodes[1] should not have accepted the channel, it should
12318 // not have generated any events.
12319 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
12323 fn test_update_channel_config() {
12324 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12325 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12326 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
12327 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
12328 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12329 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12330 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
12332 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
12333 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12334 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12336 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
12337 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
12338 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
12339 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12340 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12342 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12343 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12346 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
12347 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12348 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12350 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
12351 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12352 cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
12353 ..Default::default()
12355 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
12356 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12357 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12359 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12360 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12363 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
12364 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12365 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
12366 ..Default::default()
12368 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
12369 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
12370 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12371 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12373 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12374 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12377 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
12378 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
12379 let bad_channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_txid(&[10; 32], 10);
12380 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
12381 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
12384 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12385 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
12386 ..Default::default()
12388 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
12391 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
12392 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
12393 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12394 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12398 fn test_payment_display() {
12399 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
12400 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12401 let payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
12402 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_hash), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12403 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12404 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_preimage), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12408 fn test_trigger_lnd_force_close() {
12409 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12410 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12411 let user_config = test_default_channel_config();
12412 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
12413 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12415 // Open a channel, immediately disconnect each other, and broadcast Alice's latest state.
12416 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12417 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12418 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12419 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12420 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
12421 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
12422 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12424 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
12425 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
12426 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
12429 // Since they're disconnected, Bob won't receive Alice's `Error` message. Reconnect them
12430 // such that Bob sends a `ChannelReestablish` to Alice since the channel is still open from
12432 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12433 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12435 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12436 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12437 }, false).unwrap();
12438 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
12439 let channel_reestablish = get_event_msg!(
12440 nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()
12442 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channel_reestablish);
12444 // Alice should respond with an error since the channel isn't known, but a bogus
12445 // `ChannelReestablish` should be sent first, such that we actually trigger Bob to force
12446 // close even if it was an lnd node.
12447 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12448 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
12449 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { node_id, msg } = &msg_events[0] {
12450 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12451 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 0);
12452 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
12453 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
12454 } else { panic!() };
12455 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
12456 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
12457 let expected_close_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
12458 err: "Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_string()
12460 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, expected_close_reason, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12462 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
12463 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
12464 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
12469 fn test_malformed_forward_htlcs_ser() {
12470 // Ensure that `HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC`s are (de)serialized properly.
12471 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
12472 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
12475 let chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
12476 let deserialized_chanmgr;
12477 let mut nodes = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &chanmgrs);
12479 let dummy_failed_htlc = |htlc_id| {
12480 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: vec![42] }, }
12482 let dummy_malformed_htlc = |htlc_id| {
12483 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code: 0x4000, sha256_of_onion: [0; 32] }
12486 let dummy_htlcs_1: Vec<HTLCForwardInfo> = (1..10).map(|htlc_id| {
12487 if htlc_id % 2 == 0 {
12488 dummy_failed_htlc(htlc_id)
12490 dummy_malformed_htlc(htlc_id)
12494 let dummy_htlcs_2: Vec<HTLCForwardInfo> = (1..10).map(|htlc_id| {
12495 if htlc_id % 2 == 1 {
12496 dummy_failed_htlc(htlc_id)
12498 dummy_malformed_htlc(htlc_id)
12503 let (scid_1, scid_2) = (42, 43);
12504 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
12505 forward_htlcs.insert(scid_1, dummy_htlcs_1.clone());
12506 forward_htlcs.insert(scid_2, dummy_htlcs_2.clone());
12508 let mut chanmgr_fwd_htlcs = nodes[0].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
12509 *chanmgr_fwd_htlcs = forward_htlcs.clone();
12510 core::mem::drop(chanmgr_fwd_htlcs);
12512 reload_node!(nodes[0], nodes[0].node.encode(), &[], persister, chain_monitor, deserialized_chanmgr);
12514 let mut deserialized_fwd_htlcs = nodes[0].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
12515 for scid in [scid_1, scid_2].iter() {
12516 let deserialized_htlcs = deserialized_fwd_htlcs.remove(scid).unwrap();
12517 assert_eq!(forward_htlcs.remove(scid).unwrap(), deserialized_htlcs);
12519 assert!(deserialized_fwd_htlcs.is_empty());
12520 core::mem::drop(deserialized_fwd_htlcs);
12522 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
12528 use crate::chain::Listen;
12529 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
12530 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
12531 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
12532 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
12533 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
12534 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
12535 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
12536 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
12537 use crate::util::test_utils;
12538 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
12540 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
12541 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
12542 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
12543 use bitcoin::{Transaction, TxOut};
12545 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
12547 use criterion::Criterion;
12549 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
12550 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
12551 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
12552 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
12553 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
12554 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
12555 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
12557 struct ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
12558 node: &'node_cfg Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>,
12560 impl<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg, P> {
12561 type CM = Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>;
12563 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P> { self.node }
12565 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
12568 pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
12569 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
12572 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
12573 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
12574 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
12576 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
12577 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
12579 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
12580 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
12581 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
12582 let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
12583 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &logger_a, &scorer);
12585 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
12586 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
12587 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
12589 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
12590 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
12591 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
12592 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
12594 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
12595 }, genesis_block.header.time);
12596 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
12598 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
12599 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
12600 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
12601 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
12602 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
12604 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
12605 }, genesis_block.header.time);
12606 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
12608 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
12609 features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12611 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
12612 features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12613 }, false).unwrap();
12614 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12615 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12616 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12619 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
12620 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
12621 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
12623 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
12624 } else { panic!(); }
12626 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12627 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12628 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
12629 match events_b[0] {
12630 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12631 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12633 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12636 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12637 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12638 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
12639 match events_a[0] {
12640 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12641 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
12643 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12646 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
12648 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), 42, vec![tx]);
12649 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
12650 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
12652 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12653 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12654 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
12655 match msg_events[0] {
12656 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
12657 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
12658 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12662 match msg_events[1] {
12663 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12667 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12668 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
12669 match events_a[0] {
12670 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12671 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
12673 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12676 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12677 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
12678 match events_b[0] {
12679 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12680 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12682 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12685 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
12686 macro_rules! send_payment {
12687 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
12688 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
12689 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
12690 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
12691 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
12692 payment_count += 1;
12693 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
12694 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
12696 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
12697 PaymentId(payment_hash.0),
12698 RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000),
12699 Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
12700 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
12701 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12702 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
12703 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
12704 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
12705 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
12706 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12708 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
12709 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
12710 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
12711 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
12713 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
12714 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
12715 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
12716 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
12717 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
12719 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
12722 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
12723 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
12724 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
12725 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12727 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
12731 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
12732 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
12733 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);