1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see routing::router::get_route for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
27 use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
30 use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
31 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
35 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
36 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
41 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator};
42 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
43 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
44 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
45 // construct one themselves.
46 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
47 pub use ln::channel::CounterpartyForwardingInfo;
48 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus};
49 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
50 use routing::router::{Route, RouteHop};
52 use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
54 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, OptionalField};
55 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
56 use util::config::UserConfig;
57 use util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
58 use util::{byte_utils, events};
59 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer};
60 use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader};
61 use util::logger::Logger;
62 use util::errors::APIError;
66 use core::cell::RefCell;
67 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
68 use std::io::{Cursor, Read};
69 use std::sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
70 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
71 use core::time::Duration;
72 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
73 use std::time::Instant;
75 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
77 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
79 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
80 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
81 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
83 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
84 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
85 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
86 // before we forward it.
88 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
89 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
90 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
91 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
92 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
94 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
95 enum PendingHTLCRouting {
97 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
98 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
101 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
102 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
106 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
107 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
108 routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
109 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
110 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
111 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
112 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
115 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
116 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
117 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
118 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
121 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
122 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
123 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
124 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
125 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
128 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
130 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
132 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
133 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
134 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
136 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
138 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
142 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
146 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
147 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
148 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
149 short_channel_id: u64,
151 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
153 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
154 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
158 struct ClaimableHTLC {
159 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
161 /// Contains a total_msat (which may differ from value if this is a Multi-Path Payment) and a
162 /// payment_secret which prevents path-probing attacks and can associate different HTLCs which
163 /// are part of the same payment.
164 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
168 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
169 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
170 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
171 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
174 session_priv: SecretKey,
175 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
176 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
177 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
182 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
183 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
185 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
186 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
191 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
192 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
194 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
202 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
204 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
205 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
206 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
207 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
208 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
210 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
211 err: msgs::LightningError,
212 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
214 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
216 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
218 err: LightningError {
220 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
221 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
227 shutdown_finish: None,
231 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
233 err: LightningError {
235 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
237 shutdown_finish: None,
241 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
242 Self { err, shutdown_finish: None }
245 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
247 err: LightningError {
249 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
250 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
256 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
260 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
263 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
265 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
267 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
269 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
270 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
276 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => LightningError {
278 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
279 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
286 shutdown_finish: None,
291 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
292 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
293 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
294 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
295 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
297 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
298 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
299 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
300 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
301 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
302 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
303 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
305 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
309 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
310 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
311 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
312 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
313 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
314 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
315 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
316 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
317 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
318 /// Map from payment hash to any HTLCs which are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user.
319 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
320 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
322 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
323 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
324 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
325 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
328 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
329 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
330 /// quite some time lag.
331 enum BackgroundEvent {
332 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
333 /// commitment transaction.
334 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
337 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
338 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
340 latest_features: InitFeatures,
343 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
344 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
346 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
348 struct PendingInboundPayment {
349 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
350 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
351 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
352 /// this payment being removed.
354 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
355 user_payment_id: u64,
356 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
357 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
358 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
361 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
362 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
363 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
364 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
365 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
366 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
367 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
368 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
370 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
371 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
372 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
373 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
374 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
375 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
376 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
377 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
378 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
380 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
381 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
383 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
384 /// to individual Channels.
386 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
387 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
388 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
389 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
391 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
392 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
393 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
394 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
395 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
396 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
397 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
399 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
400 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
401 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
402 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
405 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
406 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
407 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
408 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
409 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
411 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
412 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
413 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
414 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
415 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
416 pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
417 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
418 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
419 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
420 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
423 default_configuration: UserConfig,
424 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
430 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
432 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
433 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
435 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
436 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
437 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
438 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
440 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
441 /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
442 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
443 /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
444 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
445 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
447 /// The session_priv bytes of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
448 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
449 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
450 /// PaymentSent/PaymentFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
451 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
452 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
453 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
454 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
456 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
457 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashSet<[u8; 32]>>,
459 our_network_key: SecretKey,
460 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
462 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
463 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
464 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
466 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
467 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
468 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
469 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
471 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
472 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
473 /// are currently open with that peer.
474 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
475 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
477 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
479 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
480 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
481 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
482 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
483 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
484 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
485 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
486 /// PersistenceNotifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
487 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
489 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier,
496 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
498 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
499 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
500 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
501 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
502 pub struct ChainParameters {
503 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
504 pub network: Network,
506 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
508 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
509 pub best_block: BestBlock,
512 /// The best known block as identified by its hash and height.
513 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
514 pub struct BestBlock {
515 block_hash: BlockHash,
520 /// Returns the best block from the genesis of the given network.
521 pub fn from_genesis(network: Network) -> Self {
523 block_hash: genesis_block(network).header.block_hash(),
528 /// Returns the best block as identified by the given block hash and height.
529 pub fn new(block_hash: BlockHash, height: u32) -> Self {
530 BestBlock { block_hash, height }
533 /// Returns the best block hash.
534 pub fn block_hash(&self) -> BlockHash { self.block_hash }
536 /// Returns the best block height.
537 pub fn height(&self) -> u32 { self.height }
540 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
546 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
547 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
548 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
549 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
550 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
551 /// updates are ready for persistence).
553 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
554 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
555 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
556 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
557 persistence_notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier,
559 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
560 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
563 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
564 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
565 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
568 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
569 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
571 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
572 persistence_notifier: notifier,
573 should_persist: persist_check,
574 _read_guard: read_guard,
579 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
581 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
582 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
587 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
588 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
590 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
592 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
593 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
594 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
595 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
596 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
598 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
599 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
601 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
603 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
604 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
605 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
606 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
607 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
608 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
609 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
611 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
612 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
614 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
615 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
616 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
617 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
619 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
620 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
621 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
622 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
623 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
624 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
627 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
629 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
630 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
633 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
635 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
637 pub struct ChannelDetails {
638 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
639 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
640 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
641 /// lifetime of the channel.
642 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
643 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
644 /// our counterparty already.
646 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
647 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
648 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
649 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
650 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
651 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
652 /// The node_id of our counterparty
653 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
654 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
655 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
656 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
657 pub counterparty_features: InitFeatures,
658 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
659 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
660 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
662 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
663 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
664 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
665 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
666 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
667 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
668 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
669 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
670 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
671 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
672 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
673 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
674 pub is_outbound: bool,
675 /// True if the channel is confirmed, funding_locked messages have been exchanged, and the
676 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `funding_locked` message exchange implies the
677 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
678 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations).
679 pub is_funding_locked: bool,
680 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
681 /// the peer is connected, (c) no monitor update failure is pending resolution, and (d) the
682 /// channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
684 /// This is a strict superset of `is_funding_locked`.
686 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
688 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
689 /// payments to us through this channel.
690 pub counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
693 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
694 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
696 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
697 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
698 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
699 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
700 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
701 ParameterError(APIError),
702 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
703 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
704 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
707 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
709 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
710 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
711 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
712 /// paths than the ones selected).
713 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
714 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
715 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
716 /// in over-/re-payment.
718 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
719 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
720 /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
722 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
723 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
724 /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
725 /// with the latest update_id.
726 PartialFailure(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
729 macro_rules! handle_error {
730 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
733 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish }) => {
734 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
736 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
737 // entering the macro.
738 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
741 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
743 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
744 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
745 if let Some(update) = update_option {
746 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
752 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
753 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
755 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
756 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
757 action: err.action.clone()
761 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
762 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
765 // Return error in case higher-API need one
772 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
773 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
774 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
776 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
777 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
779 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
780 log_trace!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
781 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
782 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
784 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
785 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
787 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => {
788 log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
789 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
790 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
792 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(false);
793 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
799 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
800 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
804 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
806 $entry.remove_entry();
814 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
815 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
819 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
821 $entry.remove_entry();
829 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
830 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
831 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
833 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
835 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
836 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
837 if let Some(short_id) = $chan.get_short_channel_id() {
838 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
840 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
841 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
842 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
843 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
844 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
845 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
846 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
847 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
848 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
849 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id,
850 $chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
853 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
854 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards and {} fails",
855 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
856 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
858 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
859 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
861 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
862 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
864 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
865 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len());
866 if !$resend_commitment {
867 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
870 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
872 $chan.monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
873 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
877 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => { {
878 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $entry.key());
880 $entry.remove_entry();
886 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
887 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
888 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
890 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
891 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
895 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
896 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
897 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
898 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
899 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
902 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
907 macro_rules! handle_chan_restoration_locked {
908 ($self: ident, $channel_lock: expr, $channel_state: expr, $channel_entry: expr,
909 $raa: expr, $commitment_update: expr, $order: expr, $chanmon_update: expr,
910 $pending_forwards: expr, $funding_broadcastable: expr, $funding_locked: expr) => { {
911 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
912 let counterparty_node_id = $channel_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
914 let chanmon_update: Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> = $chanmon_update; // Force type-checking to resolve
915 let chanmon_update_is_none = chanmon_update.is_none();
917 let forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)> = $pending_forwards; // Force type-checking to resolve
918 if !forwards.is_empty() {
919 htlc_forwards = Some(($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"),
920 $channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), forwards));
923 if chanmon_update.is_some() {
924 // On reconnect, we, by definition, only resend a funding_locked if there have been
925 // no commitment updates, so the only channel monitor update which could also be
926 // associated with a funding_locked would be the funding_created/funding_signed
927 // monitor update. That monitor update failing implies that we won't send
928 // funding_locked until it's been updated, so we can't have a funding_locked and a
929 // monitor update here (so we don't bother to handle it correctly below).
930 assert!($funding_locked.is_none());
931 // A channel monitor update makes no sense without either a funding_locked or a
932 // commitment update to process after it. Since we can't have a funding_locked, we
933 // only bother to handle the monitor-update + commitment_update case below.
934 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
937 if let Some(msg) = $funding_locked {
938 // Similar to the above, this implies that we're letting the funding_locked fly
939 // before it should be allowed to.
940 assert!(chanmon_update.is_none());
941 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
942 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
945 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = $self.get_announcement_sigs($channel_entry.get()) {
946 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
947 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
948 msg: announcement_sigs,
951 $channel_state.short_to_id.insert($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), $channel_entry.get().channel_id());
954 let funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction> = $funding_broadcastable; // Force type-checking to resolve
955 if let Some(monitor_update) = chanmon_update {
956 // We only ever broadcast a funding transaction in response to a funding_signed
957 // message and the resulting monitor update. Thus, on channel_reestablish
958 // message handling we can't have a funding transaction to broadcast. When
959 // processing a monitor update finishing resulting in a funding broadcast, we
960 // cannot have a second monitor update, thus this case would indicate a bug.
961 assert!(funding_broadcastable.is_none());
962 // Given we were just reconnected or finished updating a channel monitor, the
963 // only case where we can get a new ChannelMonitorUpdate would be if we also
964 // have some commitment updates to send as well.
965 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
966 if let Err(e) = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
967 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
968 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
969 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
970 let mut order = $order;
972 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
974 break handle_monitor_err!($self, e, $channel_state, $channel_entry, order, $raa.is_some(), true);
978 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
979 if let Some(update) = $commitment_update {
980 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
981 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
986 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
987 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = $raa {
988 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
989 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
995 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
999 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1004 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
1005 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
1006 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1011 if chanmon_update_is_none {
1012 // If there was no ChannelMonitorUpdate, we should never generate an Err in the res loop
1013 // above. Doing so would imply calling handle_err!() from channel_monitor_updated() which
1014 // should *never* end up calling back to `chain_monitor.update_channel()`.
1015 assert!(res.is_ok());
1018 (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id)
1022 macro_rules! post_handle_chan_restoration {
1023 ($self: ident, $locked_res: expr) => { {
1024 let (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id) = $locked_res;
1026 let _ = handle_error!($self, res, counterparty_node_id);
1028 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1029 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1034 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
1035 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
1036 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1037 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1038 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1041 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1043 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1044 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1046 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1048 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
1050 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1051 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1052 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1053 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1054 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1055 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1058 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1059 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1060 fee_estimator: fee_est,
1064 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1066 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1067 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1068 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
1069 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1070 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1071 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1073 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1074 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1076 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
1077 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
1080 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1081 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1083 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1085 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1086 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1087 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1088 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
1096 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels, as
1097 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1098 &self.default_configuration
1101 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1103 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady events to allow
1104 /// tracking of which events correspond with which create_channel call. Note that the
1105 /// user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for
1106 /// user_id here. user_id has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and
1107 /// otherwise ignored.
1109 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
1110 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
1112 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
1113 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
1114 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1115 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1116 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1119 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1120 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, config)?;
1121 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1123 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1124 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1125 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1127 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1128 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
1129 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1130 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
1131 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1133 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1136 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1138 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1139 node_id: their_network_key,
1145 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1146 let mut res = Vec::new();
1148 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1149 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1150 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1151 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
1152 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1153 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1154 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1155 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1156 remote_network_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1157 counterparty_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1158 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1159 inbound_capacity_msat,
1160 outbound_capacity_msat,
1161 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1162 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1163 is_funding_locked: channel.is_usable(),
1164 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1165 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1166 counterparty_forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1170 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1171 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1172 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.remote_network_id) {
1173 chan.counterparty_features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1179 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1180 /// more information.
1181 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1182 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1185 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1186 /// get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1188 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1189 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1191 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1192 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1193 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1194 // really wanted anyway.
1195 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1198 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1199 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1200 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1202 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1203 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1204 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1206 let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
1207 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1208 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1209 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1210 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1211 let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
1212 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1213 node_id: chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
1216 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1217 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1218 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1220 (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1221 } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
1223 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1226 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1227 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1229 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1230 self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok()
1233 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
1234 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1235 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1244 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1245 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1246 log_trace!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1247 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1248 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1250 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1251 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1252 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1253 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1254 // ignore the result here.
1255 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
1259 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1261 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1262 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1263 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1264 if let Some(node_id) = peer_node_id {
1265 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *node_id {
1266 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1269 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1270 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1272 chan.remove_entry().1
1274 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1277 log_trace!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1278 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
1279 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
1280 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1281 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1286 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
1289 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
1290 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if channel_id is unknown to the manager.
1291 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1292 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1293 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, None) {
1294 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
1295 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1296 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1297 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1298 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
1299 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
1309 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
1310 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
1311 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
1312 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1313 let _ = self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
1317 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>) {
1318 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
1319 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
1321 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1322 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
1323 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1324 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1325 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
1326 failure_code: $err_code,
1327 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1332 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
1333 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
1336 let shared_secret = {
1337 let mut arr = [0; 32];
1338 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
1341 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1343 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
1344 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
1345 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
1346 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
1347 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
1348 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
1349 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
1350 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
1353 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
1354 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
1355 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
1356 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
1357 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
1360 let mut channel_state = None;
1361 macro_rules! return_err {
1362 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
1364 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1365 if channel_state.is_none() {
1366 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1368 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1369 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1370 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1371 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
1372 })), channel_state.unwrap());
1377 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
1378 let mut chacha_stream = ChaChaReader { chacha: &mut chacha, read: Cursor::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..]) };
1379 let (next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac) = {
1380 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut chacha_stream) {
1382 let error_code = match err {
1383 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
1384 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature|
1385 msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue|
1386 msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead => 0x4000 | 22, // invalid_onion_payload
1387 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
1389 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
1392 let mut hmac = [0; 32];
1393 if let Err(_) = chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut hmac[..]) {
1394 return_err!("Unable to decode hop data", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1401 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_hmac == [0; 32] {
1404 // In tests, make sure that the initial onion pcket data is, at least, non-0.
1405 // We could do some fancy randomness test here, but, ehh, whatever.
1406 // This checks for the issue where you can calculate the path length given the
1407 // onion data as all the path entries that the originator sent will be here
1408 // as-is (and were originally 0s).
1409 // Of course reverse path calculation is still pretty easy given naive routing
1410 // algorithms, but this fixes the most-obvious case.
1411 let mut next_bytes = [0; 32];
1412 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1413 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1414 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1415 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1419 // final_expiry_too_soon
1420 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure we have at least
1421 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
1422 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown payment hash, our payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward
1423 // before our onchain logic triggers a channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational).
1424 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
1425 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
1427 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
1428 if next_hop_data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
1429 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1431 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1432 if next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1433 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1436 let payment_data = match next_hop_data.format {
1437 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => None,
1438 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => return_err!("Got non final data with an HMAC of 0", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]),
1439 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data } => payment_data,
1442 if payment_data.is_none() {
1443 return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]);
1446 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1447 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1448 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1449 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1451 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1452 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
1453 payment_data: payment_data.unwrap(),
1454 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1456 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1457 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1458 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1459 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1462 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1463 let read_pos = chacha_stream.read(&mut new_packet_data).unwrap();
1464 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1466 // Check two things:
1467 // a) that the behavior of our stream here will return Ok(0) even if the TLV
1468 // read above emptied out our buffer and the unwrap() wont needlessly panic
1469 // b) that we didn't somehow magically end up with extra data.
1471 debug_assert!(chacha_stream.read(&mut t).unwrap() == 0);
1473 // Once we've emptied the set of bytes our peer gave us, encrypt 0 bytes until we
1474 // fill the onion hop data we'll forward to our next-hop peer.
1475 chacha_stream.chacha.process_in_place(&mut new_packet_data[read_pos..]);
1477 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1479 let blinding_factor = {
1480 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
1481 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1482 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1483 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
1486 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
1488 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
1490 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1493 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1494 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
1497 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
1498 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1499 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1500 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
1501 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1505 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1506 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
1507 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
1510 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1511 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1512 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1513 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1517 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1518 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1519 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
1520 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
1521 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
1522 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
1523 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1524 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1525 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1526 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
1528 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1530 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1531 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1533 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1534 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1535 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1536 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1537 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1538 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1539 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1541 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1542 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1544 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_holder_fee_base_msat(&self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
1545 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1546 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1548 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta() as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1549 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1551 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1552 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now, but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty
1553 // packet sanitization (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational)
1554 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1555 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1557 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1558 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1560 // In theory, we would be safe against unitentional channel-closure, if we only required a margin of LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1561 // But, to be safe against policy reception, we use a longuer delay.
1562 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER) as u64 {
1563 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1569 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1570 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1571 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1572 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1574 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1575 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1577 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
1578 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
1579 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
1581 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1583 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1588 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1591 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
1592 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
1593 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
1595 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1596 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1597 if !chan.should_announce() {
1598 return Err(LightningError {
1599 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
1600 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
1603 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
1606 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
1607 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
1608 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
1609 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
1610 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1611 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1612 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1613 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1617 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
1619 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1620 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1622 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
1623 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
1624 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
1625 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1626 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()),
1627 fee_base_msat: chan.get_holder_fee_base_msat(&self.fee_estimator),
1628 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
1629 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1632 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1633 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
1635 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1641 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
1642 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1643 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
1644 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
1645 let session_priv_bytes = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
1646 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
1648 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
1649 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
1650 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height)?;
1651 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
1652 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
1654 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
1656 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1657 assert!(self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().insert(session_priv_bytes));
1659 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
1660 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1661 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1662 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
1663 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1666 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1667 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
1669 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1670 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1672 if !chan.get().is_live() {
1673 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
1675 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1677 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1678 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1679 }, onion_packet, &self.logger), channel_state, chan)
1681 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
1682 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1683 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
1684 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
1685 // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
1686 // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
1687 // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
1688 // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
1689 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1692 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1693 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1694 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1695 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1696 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1697 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1698 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1706 } else { unreachable!(); }
1710 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
1711 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1713 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
1718 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1720 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1721 /// fields for more info.
1723 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1724 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1725 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1726 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1727 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1728 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1730 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
1732 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
1733 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
1734 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
1736 /// In general, a path may raise:
1737 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
1738 /// node public key) is specified.
1739 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
1740 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
1742 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
1743 /// relevant updates.
1745 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
1746 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
1747 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
1749 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
1750 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
1751 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
1752 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
1754 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
1755 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
1756 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
1757 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
1758 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
1759 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
1761 if route.paths.len() > 10 {
1762 // This limit is completely arbitrary - there aren't any real fundamental path-count
1763 // limits. After we support retrying individual paths we should likely bump this, but
1764 // for now more than 10 paths likely carries too much one-path failure.
1765 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Sending over more than 10 paths is not currently supported"}));
1767 let mut total_value = 0;
1768 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1769 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
1770 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
1771 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
1772 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
1773 continue 'path_check;
1775 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
1776 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1777 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
1778 continue 'path_check;
1781 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
1782 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
1784 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
1785 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
1788 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1789 let mut results = Vec::new();
1790 for path in route.paths.iter() {
1791 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height));
1793 let mut has_ok = false;
1794 let mut has_err = false;
1795 for res in results.iter() {
1796 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
1797 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
1798 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
1799 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
1806 if has_err && has_ok {
1807 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure(results))
1809 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
1815 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
1816 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
1817 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>
1818 (&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1820 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1822 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
1824 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
1825 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
1826 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
1827 } else { unreachable!(); })
1830 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
1832 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
1833 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1836 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
1837 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
1842 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1843 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
1844 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1847 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1848 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1849 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1851 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1859 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1860 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
1861 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
1865 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1867 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
1868 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
1870 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1872 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
1873 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
1874 /// keys per-channel).
1876 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
1877 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
1878 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
1880 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
1881 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
1882 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
1884 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
1885 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1886 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1888 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
1889 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
1890 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
1891 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
1895 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
1896 let mut output_index = None;
1897 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
1898 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1899 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
1900 if output_index.is_some() {
1901 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
1902 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
1905 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
1906 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
1907 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
1910 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
1913 if output_index.is_none() {
1914 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
1915 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
1918 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
1922 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1923 if !chan.should_announce() {
1924 log_trace!(self.logger, "Can't send announcement_signatures for private channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
1928 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1930 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1932 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1933 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1935 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1936 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1937 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1938 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1939 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1944 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
1945 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
1946 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
1948 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::core::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
1951 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
1952 // smaller than 500:
1953 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
1955 /// Regenerates channel_announcements and generates a signed node_announcement from the given
1956 /// arguments, providing them in corresponding events via
1957 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`], if at least one public channel has been confirmed
1958 /// on-chain. This effectively re-broadcasts all channel announcements and sends our node
1959 /// announcement to ensure that the lightning P2P network is aware of the channels we have and
1960 /// our network addresses.
1962 /// `rgb` is a node "color" and `alias` is a printable human-readable string to describe this
1963 /// node to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
1965 /// `addresses` represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node
1966 /// accepts incoming connections. These will be included in the node_announcement, publicly
1967 /// tying these addresses together and to this node. If you wish to preserve user privacy,
1968 /// addresses should likely contain only Tor Onion addresses.
1970 /// Panics if `addresses` is absurdly large (more than 500).
1972 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
1973 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], mut addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
1974 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1976 if addresses.len() > 500 {
1977 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
1980 // While all existing nodes handle unsorted addresses just fine, the spec requires that
1981 // addresses be sorted for future compatibility.
1982 addresses.sort_by_key(|addr| addr.get_id());
1984 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1985 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1986 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
1987 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
1988 rgb, alias, addresses,
1989 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
1990 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1992 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1993 let node_announce_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1995 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1996 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1998 let mut announced_chans = false;
1999 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2000 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
2001 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2003 update_msg: match self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
2008 announced_chans = true;
2010 // If the channel is not public or has not yet reached funding_locked, check the
2011 // next channel. If we don't yet have any public channels, we'll skip the broadcast
2012 // below as peers may not accept it without channels on chain first.
2016 if announced_chans {
2017 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
2018 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
2019 signature: node_announce_sig,
2020 contents: announcement
2026 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
2028 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
2029 /// Will likely generate further events.
2030 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
2031 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2033 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2034 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
2035 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
2037 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2038 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2040 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
2041 if short_chan_id != 0 {
2042 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
2043 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
2045 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
2046 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2047 match forward_info {
2048 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info,
2049 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2050 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2051 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2052 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2053 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2054 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
2056 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
2057 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() }
2060 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2061 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
2062 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
2063 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
2064 // problem, not ours.
2071 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
2072 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2073 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2074 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2075 match forward_info {
2076 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2077 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2079 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
2080 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2081 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), prev_short_channel_id, short_chan_id);
2082 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2083 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2084 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2085 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2086 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2088 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet) {
2090 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
2091 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
2093 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
2095 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap();
2096 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
2097 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }
2103 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
2105 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
2106 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
2107 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
2108 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
2109 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
2110 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
2111 // this channel currently :/.
2117 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
2118 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
2120 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
2121 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} after delay", short_chan_id);
2122 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
2124 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
2125 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail backwards to short_id {}: {}", short_chan_id, msg);
2127 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
2129 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
2130 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
2131 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
2134 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
2136 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
2137 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
2138 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
2139 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
2140 // messages when we can.
2141 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
2142 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
2143 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
2150 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
2151 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
2154 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
2155 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
2156 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
2157 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
2158 ChannelError::Ignore(_) => {
2159 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
2161 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
2162 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
2163 let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
2164 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2165 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2167 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
2169 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
2171 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
2175 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2176 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
2179 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2180 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
2181 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2182 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
2183 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2184 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
2185 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2187 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
2195 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2196 match forward_info {
2197 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2198 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry },
2199 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
2200 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2201 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
2202 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
2203 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2204 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2205 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2206 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2208 value: amt_to_forward,
2209 payment_data: payment_data.clone(),
2210 cltv_expiry: incoming_cltv_expiry,
2213 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
2215 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
2216 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
2217 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
2219 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2220 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
2221 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2222 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
2223 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
2225 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
2230 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
2231 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
2232 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
2233 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
2234 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
2235 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
2236 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2237 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
2238 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2239 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we didn't have a corresponding inbound payment.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2240 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2242 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
2243 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
2244 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2245 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2246 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
2247 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
2248 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
2249 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2251 let mut total_value = 0;
2252 let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
2253 .or_insert(Vec::new());
2254 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
2255 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
2256 total_value += htlc.value;
2257 if htlc.payment_data.total_msat != payment_data.total_msat {
2258 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
2259 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, htlc.payment_data.total_msat);
2260 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
2262 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
2264 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > payment_data.total_msat {
2265 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
2266 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, payment_data.total_msat);
2267 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
2270 } else if total_value == payment_data.total_msat {
2271 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
2273 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
2274 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
2276 user_payment_id: inbound_payment.get().user_payment_id,
2278 // Only ever generate at most one PaymentReceived
2279 // per registered payment_hash, even if it isn't
2281 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
2283 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
2284 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
2291 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
2292 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
2294 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2295 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
2303 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
2304 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
2307 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
2308 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
2311 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
2312 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2313 events.append(&mut new_events);
2316 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
2318 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
2319 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
2321 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
2322 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
2323 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
2324 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
2325 if background_events.is_empty() {
2329 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
2331 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
2332 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
2333 // monitor updating completing.
2334 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
2341 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
2342 /// Process background events, for functional testing
2343 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
2344 self.process_background_events();
2347 /// If a peer is disconnected we mark any channels with that peer as 'disabled'.
2348 /// After some time, if channels are still disabled we need to broadcast a ChannelUpdate
2349 /// to inform the network about the uselessness of these channels.
2351 /// This method handles all the details, and must be called roughly once per minute.
2353 /// Note that in some rare cases this may generate a `chain::Watch::update_channel` call.
2354 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
2355 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
2356 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
2357 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
2359 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2360 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2361 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter_mut() {
2362 match chan.channel_update_status() {
2363 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
2364 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
2365 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
2366 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
2367 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
2368 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2369 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2373 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2374 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
2376 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
2377 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2378 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2382 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2383 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
2393 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
2394 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
2395 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
2396 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
2397 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
2398 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
2399 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2401 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2402 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
2403 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
2404 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
2405 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
2406 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
2407 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
2408 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
2409 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
2410 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
2411 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
2417 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
2418 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
2419 // be surfaced to the user.
2420 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(&self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
2421 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
2423 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
2424 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
2425 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
2426 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
2427 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&chan_entry.get()) {
2428 (0x1000|7, upd.encode_with_len())
2430 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
2433 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
2435 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2436 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
2437 htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
2439 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } => {
2441 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
2442 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
2443 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().remove(&session_priv_bytes)
2445 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2446 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2448 rejected_by_dest: false,
2456 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2463 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
2464 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
2465 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
2466 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
2467 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
2468 /// still-available channels.
2469 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
2470 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
2471 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
2472 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
2475 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
2476 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
2477 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
2479 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, .. } => {
2481 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
2482 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
2483 !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().remove(&session_priv_bytes)
2485 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2488 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2489 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2490 match &onion_error {
2491 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
2493 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
2495 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
2496 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
2497 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
2498 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
2499 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
2500 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
2501 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
2506 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2507 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2508 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
2509 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
2511 error_code: onion_error_code,
2513 error_data: onion_error_data
2517 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
2523 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
2524 // TODO: We'd like to generate a PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate for temporary
2525 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as get_route
2526 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
2528 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
2529 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
2530 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2531 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2532 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
2533 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
2535 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
2537 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
2543 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, .. }) => {
2544 let err_packet = match onion_error {
2545 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
2546 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
2547 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
2548 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
2550 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
2551 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2552 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
2556 let mut forward_event = None;
2557 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2558 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
2560 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
2561 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2562 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
2564 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2565 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
2568 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2569 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
2570 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2571 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2572 time_forwardable: time
2579 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
2580 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
2581 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
2583 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
2584 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
2585 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
2586 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
2588 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
2590 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
2591 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
2592 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
2593 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2595 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2597 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2598 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
2599 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
2600 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
2602 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
2603 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
2604 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
2605 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
2607 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
2608 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
2609 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
2610 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
2611 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
2613 let mut valid_mpp = true;
2614 for htlc in sources.iter() {
2615 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
2621 let mut errs = Vec::new();
2622 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
2623 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
2625 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
2626 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
2627 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
2628 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
2629 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
2630 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
2631 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
2633 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
2635 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = e.1.err.action {
2636 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
2637 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
2638 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", e.1.err.err);
2639 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
2640 } else { errs.push(e); }
2642 Err(None) => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
2643 Ok(()) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
2648 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
2649 // which were generated.
2650 channel_state.take();
2652 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
2653 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
2654 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
2661 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> Result<(), Option<(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)>> {
2662 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
2663 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
2664 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
2665 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
2671 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
2672 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
2673 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
2674 Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
2675 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_option {
2676 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2677 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
2678 assert!(msgs.is_none());
2680 return Err(Some((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err())));
2684 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
2685 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2686 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
2687 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2688 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2689 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
2690 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2691 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2700 // TODO: Do something with e?
2701 // This should only occur if we are claiming an HTLC at the same time as the
2702 // HTLC is being failed (eg because a block is being connected and this caused
2703 // an HTLC to time out). This should, of course, only occur if the user is the
2704 // one doing the claiming (as it being a part of a peer claim would imply we're
2705 // about to lose funds) and only if the lock in claim_funds was dropped as a
2706 // previous HTLC was failed (thus not for an MPP payment).
2707 debug_assert!(false, "This shouldn't be reachable except in absurdly rare cases between monitor updates and HTLC timeouts: {:?}", e);
2711 } else { unreachable!(); }
2714 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
2716 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } => {
2717 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2719 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
2720 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
2721 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().remove(&session_priv_bytes)
2723 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2724 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
2728 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
2731 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
2732 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
2733 if let Err((counterparty_node_id, err)) = match self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage) {
2736 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2737 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
2738 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2739 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
2742 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
2743 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
2744 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
2745 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) {
2746 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
2747 payment_preimage, e);
2751 Err(Some(res)) => Err(res),
2753 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2754 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
2755 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
2761 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
2762 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
2763 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
2766 /// Restores a single, given channel to normal operation after a
2767 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
2770 /// All ChannelMonitor updates up to and including highest_applied_update_id must have been
2771 /// fully committed in every copy of the given channels' ChannelMonitors.
2773 /// Note that there is no effect to calling with a highest_applied_update_id other than the
2774 /// current latest ChannelMonitorUpdate and one call to this function after multiple
2775 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures is fine. The highest_applied_update_id field
2776 /// exists largely only to prevent races between this and concurrent update_monitor calls.
2778 /// Thus, the anticipated use is, at a high level:
2779 /// 1) You register a chain::Watch with this ChannelManager,
2780 /// 2) it stores each update to disk, and begins updating any remote (eg watchtower) copies of
2781 /// said ChannelMonitors as it can, returning ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures
2782 /// any time it cannot do so instantly,
2783 /// 3) update(s) are applied to each remote copy of a ChannelMonitor,
2784 /// 4) once all remote copies are updated, you call this function with the update_id that
2785 /// completed, and once it is the latest the Channel will be re-enabled.
2786 pub fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
2787 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2789 let chan_restoration_res;
2790 let mut pending_failures = {
2791 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2792 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2793 let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
2794 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
2795 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
2797 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
2801 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, pending_failures, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked) = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger);
2802 let channel_update = if funding_locked.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() {
2803 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2804 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
2805 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()).unwrap(),
2808 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, raa, commitment_update, order, None, pending_forwards, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked);
2809 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
2810 // If we closed the channel due to a failed monitor update in
2811 // handle_chan_restoration_locked this will send a bogus channel_update immediately
2812 // after closure, but our direct peer should be fine with that, given they know the
2813 // channel state as well. Further, we'll broadcast a channel_disabled channel_update
2814 // in post_handle_chan_restoration below for public channels.
2815 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
2819 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
2820 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
2821 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2825 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2826 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
2827 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
2830 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, counterparty_node_id.clone(), their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration)
2831 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
2832 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2833 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2834 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
2835 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
2836 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2837 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
2838 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2839 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
2841 entry.insert(channel);
2847 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2848 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
2849 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2850 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2851 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
2852 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2853 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2854 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
2856 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, their_features), channel_state, chan);
2857 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
2859 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
2862 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2863 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
2864 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
2865 channel_value_satoshis: value,
2867 user_channel_id: user_id,
2872 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2873 let ((funding_msg, monitor), mut chan) = {
2874 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
2875 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2876 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2877 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
2878 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2879 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2880 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
2882 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
2884 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
2887 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
2888 // lock before watch_channel
2889 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
2891 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
2892 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
2893 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
2894 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
2895 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
2896 // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for
2897 // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we
2898 // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
2899 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
2900 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
2901 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
2903 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
2904 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
2905 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
2906 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
2907 // until we have persisted our monitor.
2908 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2912 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2913 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2914 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
2915 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2916 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
2918 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2919 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
2920 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2929 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2931 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
2932 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2933 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2934 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2935 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2936 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2937 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2939 let (monitor, funding_tx) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
2940 Ok(update) => update,
2941 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
2943 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
2944 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
2948 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2951 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
2952 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
2956 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2957 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2958 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2959 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2960 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2961 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2962 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2964 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg), channel_state, chan);
2965 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
2966 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for {} in response to funding_locked", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2967 // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our
2968 // announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote
2969 // funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking
2970 // block connection. We should guanrantee to broadcast announcement_sigs to our peer whatever
2971 // the order of the events but our peer may not receive it due to disconnection. The specs
2972 // lacking an acknowledgement for announcement_sigs we may have to re-send them at peer
2973 // connection in the future if simultaneous misses by both peers due to network/hardware
2974 // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs
2975 // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network.
2976 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2977 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2978 msg: announcement_sigs,
2980 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
2981 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2982 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2983 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
2988 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2992 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2993 let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
2994 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2995 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2997 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
2998 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2999 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3000 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3002 let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.fee_estimator, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
3003 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
3004 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
3005 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3009 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
3010 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
3011 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3015 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
3016 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
3017 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3019 (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
3020 } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
3022 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3025 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
3026 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
3028 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
3029 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3030 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3031 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3039 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3040 let (tx, chan_option) = {
3041 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3042 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3043 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
3044 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
3045 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3046 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3048 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
3049 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
3050 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
3051 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3056 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
3057 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
3058 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
3059 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
3060 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
3061 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
3062 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3064 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
3065 } else { (tx, None) }
3067 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3070 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
3071 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
3072 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
3074 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
3075 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3076 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3077 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3085 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3086 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
3087 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
3088 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
3090 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
3091 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
3092 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
3093 //but we should prevent it anyway.
3095 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
3096 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3098 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3099 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3100 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3101 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3104 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
3105 // Ensure error_code has the UPDATE flag set, since by default we send a
3106 // channel update along as part of failing the HTLC.
3107 assert!((error_code & 0x1000) != 0);
3108 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
3109 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
3110 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
3111 match pending_forward_info {
3112 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
3113 let reason = if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
3114 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &{
3115 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
3116 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
3117 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
3118 res.extend_from_slice(&upd.encode_with_len()[..]);
3122 // The only case where we'd be unable to
3123 // successfully get a channel update is if the
3124 // channel isn't in the fully-funded state yet,
3125 // implying our counterparty is trying to route
3126 // payments over the channel back to themselves
3127 // (cause no one else should know the short_id
3128 // is a lightning channel yet). We should have
3129 // no problem just calling this
3130 // unknown_next_peer (0x4000|10).
3131 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
3133 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3134 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3135 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3138 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
3140 _ => pending_forward_info
3143 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3145 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3150 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3151 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3153 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3154 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3155 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3156 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3157 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3159 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
3161 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3164 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
3168 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3169 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3170 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3171 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3172 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3173 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3174 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3176 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
3178 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3183 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3184 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3185 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3186 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3187 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3188 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3189 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3191 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
3192 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
3193 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
3195 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
3198 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3202 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3203 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3204 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3205 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3206 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3207 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3208 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3210 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, monitor_update) =
3211 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
3212 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
3213 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
3214 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
3215 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
3216 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
3221 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3222 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
3223 //TODO: Rebroadcast closing_signed if present on monitor update restoration
3225 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
3226 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3227 msg: revoke_and_ack,
3229 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
3230 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3231 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3232 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3233 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3234 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3235 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3236 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3238 commitment_signed: msg,
3242 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
3243 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
3244 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3250 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3255 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
3256 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
3257 let mut forward_event = None;
3258 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
3259 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3260 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3261 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
3263 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3264 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
3265 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
3266 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
3268 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3269 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
3270 prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
3272 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3273 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
3274 prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
3279 match forward_event {
3281 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3282 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3283 time_forwardable: time
3291 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3292 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3294 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3295 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3296 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3297 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3298 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3299 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3301 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
3302 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail_in) =
3303 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3304 htlcs_to_fail = htlcs_to_fail_in;
3305 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3306 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
3307 assert!(commitment_update.is_none() && closing_signed.is_none() && pending_forwards.is_empty() && pending_failures.is_empty());
3308 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
3310 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, commitment_update.is_some(), pending_forwards, pending_failures) {
3312 } else { unreachable!(); }
3315 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
3316 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3317 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3321 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
3322 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
3323 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3327 break Ok((pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"), chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
3329 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3332 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id);
3334 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) => {
3335 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
3336 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
3338 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
3345 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3346 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3347 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3348 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3349 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3350 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3351 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3353 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
3355 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3360 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3361 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3362 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3364 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3365 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3366 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3367 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3369 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
3370 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
3373 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
3374 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), msg), channel_state, chan),
3375 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
3376 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
3377 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
3380 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3385 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3386 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3387 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3388 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
3389 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3391 // It's not a local channel
3395 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
3396 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3397 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3398 // TODO: see issue #153, need a consistent behavior on obnoxious behavior from random node
3399 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), chan_id));
3401 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
3403 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!()
3408 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3409 let chan_restoration_res;
3410 let htlcs_failed_forward = {
3411 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3412 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3414 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3415 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3416 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3417 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3419 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
3420 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
3421 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
3422 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
3423 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, monitor_update_opt, order, htlcs_failed_forward, shutdown) =
3424 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3425 let mut channel_update = None;
3426 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
3427 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
3428 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3431 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
3432 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3433 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3434 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
3437 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_state_lock, channel_state, chan, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, order, monitor_update_opt, Vec::new(), None, funding_locked);
3438 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
3439 // If we closed the channel due to a failed monitor update in
3440 // handle_chan_restoration_locked this will send a bogus channel_update immediately
3441 // after closure, but our direct peer should be fine with that, given they know the
3442 // channel state as well. Further, we'll broadcast a channel_disabled channel_update
3443 // in post_handle_chan_restoration below for public channels.
3444 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
3446 htlcs_failed_forward
3448 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3451 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
3452 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_failed_forward, msg.channel_id);
3456 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
3457 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
3458 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
3459 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
3460 /// (C-not exported) Cause its doc(hidden) anyway
3462 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3463 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3464 let counterparty_node_id;
3465 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3466 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3467 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3469 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3470 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("Failed to find corresponding channel for id {}", channel_id.to_hex())}),
3471 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3472 if !chan.get().is_outbound() {
3473 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel".to_owned()});
3475 if chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
3476 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
3478 if !chan.get().is_live() {
3479 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3481 counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3482 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) =
3483 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw, &self.logger), channel_state, chan)
3485 if let Err(_e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3488 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3489 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3490 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3491 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3492 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3493 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3494 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3495 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
3505 match handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id) {
3506 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3507 Err(e) => { Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: e.err })}
3511 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
3512 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
3513 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3514 let pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
3515 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
3516 for monitor_event in pending_monitor_events {
3517 match monitor_event {
3518 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
3519 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
3520 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
3521 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
3523 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
3524 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
3527 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(funding_outpoint) => {
3528 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3529 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3530 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
3531 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3532 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3533 if let Some(mut chan) = by_id.remove(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
3534 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3535 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3537 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
3538 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3539 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3543 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
3544 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3545 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
3546 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
3554 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3555 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3558 has_pending_monitor_events
3561 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
3562 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
3563 /// update was applied.
3565 /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
3566 /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
3567 /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
3568 /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
3569 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
3570 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
3571 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3572 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3574 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3575 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3576 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
3577 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3578 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3580 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
3581 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
3582 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
3583 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
3584 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id));
3586 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
3587 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3588 has_monitor_update = true;
3589 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), channel_id);
3590 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
3591 if close_channel { return false; }
3593 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3594 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3595 updates: commitment_update,
3602 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
3603 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
3610 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty();
3611 for (failures, channel_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
3612 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id);
3615 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3616 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3622 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
3623 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
3625 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
3626 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3627 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
3628 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
3629 // reorganized out of the main chain.
3630 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
3631 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
3632 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
3633 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
3634 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
3635 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
3636 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
3637 assert!(should_broadcast);
3638 } else { unreachable!(); }
3639 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
3641 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3645 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
3646 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
3648 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
3650 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3651 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3652 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3653 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3654 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
3655 payment_secret, min_value_msat, user_payment_id, payment_preimage,
3656 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
3657 // its updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
3658 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
3659 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
3660 // never fail a payment too early.
3661 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
3663 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
3666 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
3671 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
3674 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
3675 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you, returning the first and storing the second.
3677 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
3678 /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
3679 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
3681 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
3683 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
3684 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
3685 /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
3686 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3687 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> (PaymentHash, PaymentSecret) {
3688 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
3689 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3692 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, user_payment_id)
3693 .expect("RNG Generated Duplicate PaymentHash"))
3696 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
3697 /// stored external to LDK.
3699 /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
3700 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
3701 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
3703 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) must be globally unique. This
3704 /// method may return an Err if another payment with the same payment_hash is still pending.
3706 /// `user_payment_id` will be provided back in [`PaymentReceived::user_payment_id`] events to
3707 /// allow tracking of which events correspond with which calls to this and
3708 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]. `user_payment_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply
3709 /// copied to events and otherwise ignored. It may be used to correlate PaymentReceived events
3710 /// with invoice metadata stored elsewhere.
3712 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
3713 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
3714 /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
3715 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
3717 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
3718 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
3719 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
3720 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
3721 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
3723 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
3724 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
3725 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
3726 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
3727 /// [`PaymentReceived`].
3729 /// Pending inbound payments are stored in memory and in serialized versions of this
3730 /// [`ChannelManager`]. If potentially unbounded numbers of inbound payments may exist and
3731 /// space is limited, you may wish to rate-limit inbound payment creation.
3733 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
3735 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
3736 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
3738 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3739 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
3740 /// [`PaymentReceived::user_payment_id`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::user_payment_id
3741 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
3742 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, user_payment_id)
3745 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"))]
3746 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
3747 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
3748 let event_handler = |event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
3749 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
3754 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3755 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3756 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3757 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3758 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3761 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
3762 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
3763 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3764 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3766 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
3767 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
3768 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
3769 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3772 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
3773 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3776 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
3777 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3778 mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
3780 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
3781 events.replace(pending_events);
3790 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3792 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3793 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3794 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3795 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3798 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
3800 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
3801 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
3803 /// Pending events are persisted as part of [`ChannelManager`]. While these events are cleared
3804 /// when processed, an [`EventHandler`] must be able to handle previously seen events when
3805 /// restarting from an old state.
3806 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
3807 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3808 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3810 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
3811 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
3812 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
3813 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3816 let mut pending_events = std::mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
3817 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
3818 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3821 for event in pending_events.drain(..) {
3822 handler.handle_event(event);
3830 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3832 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3833 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3834 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3835 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3838 fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
3840 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
3841 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), block.header.prev_blockhash,
3842 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
3843 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
3844 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
3847 let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
3848 self.transactions_confirmed(&block.header, &txdata, height);
3849 self.best_block_updated(&block.header, height);
3852 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
3853 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3854 let new_height = height - 1;
3856 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
3857 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
3858 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
3859 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
3860 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
3861 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
3864 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time));
3868 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3870 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3871 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3872 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3873 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3876 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
3877 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3878 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
3879 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3881 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
3882 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
3884 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3885 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, &self.logger).map(|a| (a, Vec::new())));
3888 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
3889 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3890 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
3891 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3893 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
3894 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
3896 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3898 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
3900 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time));
3902 macro_rules! max_time {
3903 ($timestamp: expr) => {
3905 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
3906 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
3907 // having an explicit local time source.
3908 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
3909 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
3910 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
3911 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
3912 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
3918 max_time!(self.last_node_announcement_serial);
3919 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
3920 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3921 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
3922 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
3926 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
3927 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3928 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.short_to_id.len());
3929 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
3930 if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() {
3931 res.push(funding_txo.txid);
3937 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
3938 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3939 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
3940 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
3941 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
3942 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed().map(|_| (None, Vec::new()))
3943 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
3944 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
3949 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3951 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3952 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3953 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3954 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3957 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
3958 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
3960 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), msgs::ErrorMessage>>
3961 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
3962 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3963 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
3964 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3966 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3967 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
3969 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3970 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3971 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3972 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3973 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
3974 let res = f(channel);
3975 if let Ok((chan_res, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs)) = res {
3976 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
3977 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&channel).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
3978 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3979 failure_code: 0x1000 | 14, // expiry_too_soon, or at least it is now
3983 if let Some(funding_locked) = chan_res {
3984 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
3985 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3986 msg: funding_locked,
3988 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
3989 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked and announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
3990 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
3991 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3992 msg: announcement_sigs,
3994 } else if channel.is_usable() {
3995 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures but with channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
3996 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3997 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3998 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel).unwrap(),
4001 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4003 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
4005 } else if let Err(e) = res {
4006 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
4007 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4009 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
4010 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
4011 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
4012 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
4013 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4017 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4018 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4019 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e },
4026 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
4027 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, htlcs| {
4028 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4029 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
4030 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
4031 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
4032 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
4033 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
4034 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
4035 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
4036 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
4037 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
4038 data: htlc_msat_height_data
4043 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
4048 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
4050 for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
4051 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
4055 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
4056 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
4057 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
4059 /// Note that the feature `allow_wallclock_use` must be enabled to use this function.
4060 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
4061 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
4062 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
4065 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
4066 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
4068 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
4069 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
4072 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4073 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
4074 let mutcond = &self.persistence_notifier.persistence_lock;
4075 let &(ref mtx, _) = mutcond;
4076 let guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
4081 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref , T: Deref , K: Deref , F: Deref , L: Deref >
4082 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4083 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4084 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4085 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4086 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4089 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
4090 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4091 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4094 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
4095 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4096 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4099 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
4100 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4101 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4104 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
4105 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4106 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4109 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
4110 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4111 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4114 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
4115 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4116 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4119 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
4120 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4121 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4124 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
4125 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4126 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4129 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
4130 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4131 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4134 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
4135 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4136 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4139 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
4140 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4141 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4144 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
4145 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4146 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4149 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
4150 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4151 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4154 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
4155 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4156 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4159 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
4160 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4161 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4164 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
4165 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4166 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4169 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
4170 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4171 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4174 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
4175 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4176 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4177 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
4179 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4180 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4181 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4182 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4183 if no_connection_possible {
4184 log_debug!(self.logger, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
4185 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
4186 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
4187 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4188 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4190 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(true));
4191 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4192 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4202 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
4203 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
4204 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
4205 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
4206 if chan.is_shutdown() {
4207 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4208 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4212 no_channels_remain = false;
4218 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
4220 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4221 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4222 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4223 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4224 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4225 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4226 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4227 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4228 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4229 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4230 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4231 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
4232 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
4233 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
4234 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4235 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4236 &events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => true,
4237 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
4238 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
4239 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
4243 if no_channels_remain {
4244 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
4247 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4248 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4252 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
4253 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
4255 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4258 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4259 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
4260 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4261 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
4262 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
4265 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
4266 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
4271 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4272 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4273 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4274 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
4275 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
4276 if !chan.have_received_message() {
4277 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
4278 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
4279 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
4283 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
4284 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4285 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
4291 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
4294 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
4295 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4297 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
4298 for chan in self.list_channels() {
4299 if chan.remote_network_id == *counterparty_node_id {
4300 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
4301 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id));
4305 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
4306 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id));
4311 /// Used to signal to the ChannelManager persister that the manager needs to be re-persisted to
4312 /// disk/backups, through `await_persistable_update_timeout` and `await_persistable_update`.
4313 struct PersistenceNotifier {
4314 /// Users won't access the persistence_lock directly, but rather wait on its bool using
4315 /// `wait_timeout` and `wait`.
4316 persistence_lock: (Mutex<bool>, Condvar),
4319 impl PersistenceNotifier {
4322 persistence_lock: (Mutex::new(false), Condvar::new()),
4328 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
4329 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
4334 guard = cvar.wait(guard).unwrap();
4335 let result = *guard;
4343 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
4344 fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
4345 let current_time = Instant::now();
4347 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
4348 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
4353 guard = cvar.wait_timeout(guard, max_wait).unwrap().0;
4354 // Due to spurious wakeups that can happen on `wait_timeout`, here we need to check if the
4355 // desired wait time has actually passed, and if not then restart the loop with a reduced wait
4356 // time. Note that this logic can be highly simplified through the use of
4357 // `Condvar::wait_while` and `Condvar::wait_timeout_while`, if and when our MSRV is raised to
4359 let elapsed = current_time.elapsed();
4360 let result = *guard;
4361 if result || elapsed >= max_wait {
4365 match max_wait.checked_sub(elapsed) {
4366 None => return result,
4372 // Signal to the ChannelManager persister that there are updates necessitating persisting to disk.
4374 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &self.persistence_lock;
4375 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
4376 *persistence_lock = true;
4377 mem::drop(persistence_lock);
4382 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4383 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4385 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
4388 (2, short_channel_id),
4392 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry),
4396 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
4398 (2, incoming_shared_secret),
4400 (6, amt_to_forward),
4401 (8, outgoing_cltv_value)
4404 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailureMsg, ;
4408 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
4413 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
4414 (0, short_channel_id),
4417 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret)
4420 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimableHTLC, {
4427 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCSource,
4428 (0, OutboundRoute) => {
4430 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat),
4434 (1, PreviousHopData)
4437 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason,
4438 (0, LightningError) => {
4448 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
4451 (2, prev_short_channel_id),
4453 (6, prev_funding_outpoint),
4461 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
4462 (0, payment_secret),
4464 (4, user_payment_id),
4465 (6, payment_preimage),
4466 (8, min_value_msat),
4469 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4470 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4471 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4472 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4473 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4476 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4477 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
4479 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
4481 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
4483 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4484 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
4485 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
4488 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4489 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
4490 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
4491 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
4492 unfunded_channels += 1;
4495 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
4496 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
4497 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
4498 channel.write(writer)?;
4502 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4503 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
4504 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
4505 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4506 for forward in pending_forwards {
4507 forward.write(writer)?;
4511 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4512 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
4513 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4514 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4515 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
4516 htlc.write(writer)?;
4520 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4521 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4522 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4523 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
4524 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4525 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
4528 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4529 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4530 for event in events.iter() {
4531 event.write(writer)?;
4534 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
4535 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4536 for event in background_events.iter() {
4538 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
4540 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
4541 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
4546 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
4547 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
4549 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4550 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4551 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
4552 hash.write(writer)?;
4553 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
4556 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4557 (pending_outbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4558 for session_priv in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
4559 session_priv.write(writer)?;
4562 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {}, {});
4568 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
4570 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
4572 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
4573 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling:
4574 /// <(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)
4575 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
4576 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
4577 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints the same
4578 /// way you would handle a `chain::Filter` call using ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch() and
4579 /// ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
4580 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
4581 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
4582 /// 6) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local chain::Watch.
4584 /// Note that the ordering of #4-6 is not of importance, however all three must occur before you
4585 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized ChannelManager.
4587 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
4588 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
4589 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
4590 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
4591 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
4592 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
4593 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4594 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4595 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4596 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4597 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4600 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
4601 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
4603 pub keys_manager: K,
4605 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
4607 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
4608 pub fee_estimator: F,
4609 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
4611 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
4612 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
4613 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
4614 pub chain_monitor: M,
4616 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
4617 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
4618 /// force-closed during deserialization.
4619 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
4620 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
4621 /// deserialization.
4623 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
4624 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
4625 pub default_config: UserConfig,
4627 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
4628 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
4630 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
4631 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
4632 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
4633 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
4635 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
4638 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
4639 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
4642 impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4643 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4644 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4645 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4646 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4647 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4650 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
4651 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
4652 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
4653 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
4654 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
4656 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
4657 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
4662 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
4663 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
4664 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4665 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
4666 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4667 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4668 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4669 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4672 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4673 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
4674 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
4678 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4679 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
4680 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4681 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4682 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4683 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4686 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4687 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
4689 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
4690 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4691 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
4693 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4695 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4696 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
4697 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
4698 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
4699 for _ in 0..channel_count {
4700 let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, &args.keys_manager)?;
4701 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
4702 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
4703 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
4704 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
4705 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
4706 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
4707 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
4708 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
4709 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4710 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
4711 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
4712 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
4713 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
4714 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
4715 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
4716 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
4717 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
4719 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
4720 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
4722 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
4725 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4729 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
4730 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
4731 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
4735 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
4736 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4737 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
4738 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
4739 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4740 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4741 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
4742 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
4743 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
4745 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
4748 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4749 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
4750 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
4751 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
4752 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4753 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
4754 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
4755 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
4757 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
4760 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4761 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
4762 for _ in 0..peer_count {
4763 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
4764 let peer_state = PeerState {
4765 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
4767 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
4770 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4771 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
4772 for _ in 0..event_count {
4773 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
4774 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
4779 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4780 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
4781 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
4782 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4783 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
4784 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4788 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4789 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4791 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4792 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
4793 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
4794 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
4795 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4799 let pending_outbound_payments_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4800 let mut pending_outbound_payments: HashSet<[u8; 32]> = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
4801 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count {
4802 if !pending_outbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?) {
4803 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4807 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {}, {});
4809 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4810 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
4812 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
4814 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
4815 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
4816 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
4818 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
4820 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
4825 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
4827 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
4828 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments),
4830 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
4831 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &args.keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
4834 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
4835 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
4837 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
4839 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
4840 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
4841 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
4842 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
4844 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
4845 logger: args.logger,
4846 default_configuration: args.default_config,
4849 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
4850 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
4853 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
4854 //connection or two.
4856 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
4862 use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier;
4864 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering};
4866 use core::time::Duration;
4869 fn test_wait_timeout() {
4870 let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new());
4871 let thread_notifier = Arc::clone(&persistence_notifier);
4873 let exit_thread = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
4874 let exit_thread_clone = exit_thread.clone();
4875 thread::spawn(move || {
4877 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &thread_notifier.persistence_lock;
4878 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
4879 *persistence_lock = true;
4882 if exit_thread_clone.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
4888 // Check that we can block indefinitely until updates are available.
4889 let _ = persistence_notifier.wait();
4891 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration if updates are
4894 if persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
4899 exit_thread.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
4901 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration even if no updates
4904 if !persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
4911 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "unstable"))]
4914 use chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor;
4915 use chain::channelmonitor::Persist;
4916 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
4917 use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
4918 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
4919 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
4920 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
4921 use routing::network_graph::NetworkGraph;
4922 use routing::router::get_route;
4923 use util::test_utils;
4924 use util::config::UserConfig;
4925 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
4927 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
4928 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
4929 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, Transaction, TxOut};
4931 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
4935 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
4936 node: &'a ChannelManager<InMemorySigner,
4937 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
4938 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
4939 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
4940 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
4941 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>
4946 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
4947 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
4950 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
4951 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
4952 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
4954 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
4955 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
4957 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
4958 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 };
4960 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
4961 config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
4963 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
4964 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
4965 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
4966 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
4967 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
4969 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
4971 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
4973 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
4974 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
4975 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
4976 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
4977 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
4979 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
4981 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
4983 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
4984 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
4985 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
4988 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
4989 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
4990 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
4992 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
4993 } else { panic!(); }
4995 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
4996 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
4998 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
5001 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5004 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
5005 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
5007 node_a.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
5008 node_b.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
5010 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
5012 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
5013 macro_rules! send_payment {
5014 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
5015 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
5016 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &dummy_graph, &$node_b.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()),
5017 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), &[], 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a).unwrap();
5019 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
5020 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
5022 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
5023 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, 0).unwrap();
5025 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
5026 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
5027 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5028 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
5029 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
5030 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5031 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
5032 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
5034 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
5035 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
5036 assert!($node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
5038 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
5039 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
5040 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
5041 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5042 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
5044 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
5047 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
5048 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5049 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
5050 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
5052 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
5057 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
5058 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);