1 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
3 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
4 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
5 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
7 //! It does not manage routing logic (see ln::router for that) nor does it manage constructing
8 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
9 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
13 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
14 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
15 use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash;
17 use bitcoin_hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
18 use bitcoin_hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
19 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
20 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
21 use bitcoin_hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
23 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
24 use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
25 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
28 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,FeeEstimator};
29 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
30 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
31 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, ManyChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
32 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
33 use ln::router::{Route, RouteHop};
36 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
37 use chain::keysinterface::{ChannelKeys, KeysInterface, InMemoryChannelKeys};
38 use util::config::UserConfig;
39 use util::{byte_utils, events};
40 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
41 use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader};
42 use util::logger::Logger;
43 use util::errors::APIError;
46 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
47 use std::io::{Cursor, Read};
48 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock};
49 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
50 use std::time::Duration;
51 use std::marker::{Sync, Send};
54 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
56 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
57 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
58 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
60 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
61 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
62 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
63 // before we forward it.
65 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
66 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
67 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
68 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
69 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
71 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
72 enum PendingForwardReceiveHTLCInfo {
74 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
75 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually
78 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
79 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
83 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
84 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
85 type_data: PendingForwardReceiveHTLCInfo,
86 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
87 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
88 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
89 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
92 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
93 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
94 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
95 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
98 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
99 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
100 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
101 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
102 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
105 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
107 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
109 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
113 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
117 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
118 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
119 pub(super) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
120 short_channel_id: u64,
122 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
125 struct ClaimableHTLC {
126 src: HTLCPreviousHopData,
128 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
132 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
133 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
134 pub(super) enum HTLCSource {
135 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
138 session_priv: SecretKey,
139 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
140 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
141 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
146 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
147 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
149 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
150 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
155 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
156 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
158 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
166 /// payment_hash type, use to cross-lock hop
167 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
168 pub struct PaymentHash(pub [u8;32]);
169 /// payment_preimage type, use to route payment between hop
170 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
171 pub struct PaymentPreimage(pub [u8;32]);
173 type ShutdownResult = (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
175 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
176 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
177 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
178 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
179 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
181 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
182 err: msgs::LightningError,
183 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
185 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
187 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
189 err: LightningError {
191 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
192 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
194 data: err.to_string()
198 shutdown_finish: None,
202 fn ignore_no_close(err: &'static str) -> Self {
204 err: LightningError {
206 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
208 shutdown_finish: None,
212 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
213 Self { err, shutdown_finish: None }
216 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
218 err: LightningError {
220 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
221 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
223 data: err.to_string()
227 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
231 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
234 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
236 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
238 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
240 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
241 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
243 data: msg.to_string()
247 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { msg, .. } => LightningError {
249 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
250 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
252 data: msg.to_string()
257 shutdown_finish: None,
262 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
263 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
264 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
265 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
266 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
268 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
269 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
270 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
271 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
272 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
273 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
274 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
276 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
280 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
281 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> {
282 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<ChanSigner>>,
283 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
284 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
285 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
286 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
287 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
288 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
289 /// (payment_hash, payment_secret) -> Vec<HTLCs> for tracking things that
290 /// were to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
291 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
292 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
294 /// TODO: We need to time out HTLCs sitting here which are waiting on other AMP HTLCs to
296 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<(PaymentHash, Option<[u8; 32]>), Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
297 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
298 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
299 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
302 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
303 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
305 latest_features: InitFeatures,
308 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
309 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
311 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
312 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
313 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
314 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
315 /// issues such as overly long function definitions.
316 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M> = Arc<ChannelManager<InMemoryChannelKeys, Arc<M>>>;
318 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
319 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
320 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
321 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
322 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
323 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions.
324 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, M> = ChannelManager<InMemoryChannelKeys, &'a M>;
326 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
327 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
329 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
330 /// to individual Channels.
332 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
333 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
334 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
335 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
337 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
338 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
339 /// returning from ManyChannelMonitor::add_update_monitor, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
340 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
341 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
342 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
343 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
345 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager), which
346 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
347 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
348 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
351 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
352 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
353 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
354 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
355 /// timer_chan_freshness_every_min roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
357 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
358 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
359 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
360 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
361 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
362 pub struct ChannelManager<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref> where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor {
363 default_configuration: UserConfig,
364 genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
365 fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
367 tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
370 pub(super) latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
372 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
373 last_block_hash: Mutex<Sha256dHash>,
374 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
377 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>,
379 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>,
380 our_network_key: SecretKey,
382 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
384 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
385 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
386 /// are currently open with that peer.
387 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
388 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
390 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
392 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
393 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
394 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
395 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
396 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
398 keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>>,
403 /// The amount of time we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time between when
404 /// we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
405 pub(crate) const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
406 /// The amount of time we're willing to wait to claim money back to us
407 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24 * 7;
409 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
410 /// HTLC's CLTV. This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
411 /// ie the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
412 /// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
413 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
414 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 12; //TODO?
415 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
417 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
418 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
419 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
420 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
421 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
422 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
425 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
427 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
428 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
431 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
433 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
434 pub struct ChannelDetails {
435 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
436 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
437 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
438 /// lifetime of the channel.
439 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
440 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
441 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
442 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
443 /// The node_id of our counterparty
444 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
445 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
446 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
447 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
448 pub counterparty_features: InitFeatures,
449 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
450 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
451 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
453 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
454 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
455 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
456 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
457 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
458 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
459 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
460 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
461 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
462 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
463 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
464 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
465 /// the peer is connected, and (c) no monitor update failure is pending resolution.
469 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
470 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
473 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
474 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
475 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
476 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
477 ParameterError(APIError),
478 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
479 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
480 /// paths than the ones selected).
481 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
482 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
483 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
484 /// in over-/re-payment.
486 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
487 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
490 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
491 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment.
492 PartialFailure(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
495 macro_rules! handle_error {
496 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $their_node_id: expr) => {
499 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish }) => {
500 let mut channel_state = None;
501 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
502 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
503 if let Some(update) = update_option {
504 channel_state = Some($self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
505 channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
510 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
512 // In testing, we always lock here to ensure there are no deadlocks where we
513 // were holding the lock coming into the macro but didn't catch it because we
514 // didn't generate an action and didn't have any HTLCs to fail backwards in the
515 // finish_force_close_channel.
516 if channel_state.is_none() {
517 channel_state = Some($self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
520 log_error!($self, "{}", err.err);
521 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
523 if channel_state.is_none() {
524 channel_state = Some($self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
526 channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id: $their_node_id, action: err.action.clone() });
528 // Return error in case higher-API need one
535 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
536 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
539 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
540 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
542 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
543 log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
544 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
545 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
546 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
548 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
550 Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { .. }) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
555 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
556 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
559 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
560 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
562 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
563 log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
564 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
565 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
566 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
568 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
570 Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { msg, update }) => {
571 log_error!($self, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
572 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
573 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
574 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
576 if let Some(update) = update {
577 if let Err(e) = $self.monitor.add_update_monitor(update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update) {
579 // Upstream channel is dead, but we want at least to fail backward HTLCs to save
580 // downstream channels. In case of PermanentFailure, we are not going to be able
581 // to claim back to_remote output on remote commitment transaction. Doesn't
582 // make a difference here, we are concern about HTLCs circuit, not onchain funds.
583 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {},
584 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {},
588 let mut shutdown_res = chan.force_shutdown();
589 if shutdown_res.0.len() >= 1 {
590 log_error!($self, "You have a toxic local commitment transaction {} avaible in channel monitor, read comment in ChannelMonitor::get_latest_local_commitment_txn to be informed of manual action to take", shutdown_res.0[0].txid());
592 shutdown_res.0.clear();
593 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
599 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
600 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
601 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
603 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
605 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
606 log_error!($self, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]));
607 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
608 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
609 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
611 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
612 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
613 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
614 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
615 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
616 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
617 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
618 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
619 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
620 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()));
623 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
624 log_info!($self, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards and {} fails",
625 log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]),
626 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
628 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
629 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
631 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
632 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
634 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
635 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len());
636 if !$resend_commitment {
637 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
640 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
642 $entry.get_mut().monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
643 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor"), *$entry.key()))
649 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
650 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
651 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
653 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
654 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
658 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
659 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
660 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
661 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
662 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
665 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
670 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref> ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M> where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor {
671 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
673 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
674 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
676 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
678 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
680 /// Users must provide the current blockchain height from which to track onchain channel
681 /// funding outpoints and send payments with reliable timelocks.
683 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
684 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods.
685 /// However, rather than calling these methods directly, the user should register
686 /// the ChannelManager as a listener to the BlockNotifier and call the BlockNotifier's
687 /// `block_(dis)connected` methods, which will notify all registered listeners in one
689 pub fn new(network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>,keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>>, config: UserConfig, current_blockchain_height: usize) -> Result<ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M>, secp256k1::Error> {
690 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
692 let res = ChannelManager {
693 default_configuration: config.clone(),
694 genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
695 fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
699 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(current_blockchain_height),
700 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(Default::default()),
703 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
704 by_id: HashMap::new(),
705 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
706 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
707 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
708 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
710 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
712 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
714 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
716 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
717 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
727 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
729 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
730 /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
731 /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
732 /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
734 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
735 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
737 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
738 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
739 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
740 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
741 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "channel_value must be at least 1000 satoshis" });
744 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)?;
745 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator);
747 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
748 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
749 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
750 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
751 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
752 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG" });
754 panic!("RNG is bad???");
757 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
759 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
760 node_id: their_network_key,
766 fn list_channels_with_filter<F: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<ChanSigner>)) -> bool>(&self, f: F) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
767 let mut res = Vec::new();
769 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
770 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
771 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
772 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
773 res.push(ChannelDetails {
774 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
775 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
776 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
777 counterparty_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
778 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
779 inbound_capacity_msat,
780 outbound_capacity_msat,
781 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
782 is_live: channel.is_live(),
786 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
787 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
788 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.remote_network_id) {
789 chan.counterparty_features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
795 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
796 /// more information.
797 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
798 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
801 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
802 /// Router::get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
804 /// These are guaranteed to have their is_live value set to true, see the documentation for
805 /// ChannelDetails::is_live for more info on exactly what the criteria are.
806 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
807 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
808 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
809 // really wanted anyway.
810 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
813 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
814 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
815 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
817 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
818 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
819 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
821 let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
822 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
823 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
824 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
825 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
826 let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
827 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
828 node_id: chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(),
831 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
832 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
833 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
835 (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
836 } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
838 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel"})
841 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
842 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
844 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
845 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
850 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
851 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
852 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
861 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
862 let (local_txn, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
863 log_trace!(self, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} transactions to broadcast and {} HTLCs to fail", local_txn.len(), failed_htlcs.len());
864 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
865 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
867 for tx in local_txn {
868 log_trace!(self, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(tx));
869 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
873 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
874 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
875 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
876 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
879 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
880 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
881 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
882 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
883 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
890 log_trace!(self, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
891 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
892 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
893 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
894 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
900 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
901 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
902 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
903 for chan in self.list_channels() {
904 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
908 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>) {
909 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
910 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
912 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
913 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
914 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
915 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
916 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
917 failure_code: $err_code,
918 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
923 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
924 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
927 let shared_secret = {
928 let mut arr = [0; 32];
929 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
932 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
934 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
935 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
936 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
937 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
938 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
939 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
940 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
941 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
944 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
945 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
946 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
947 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
948 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
951 let mut channel_state = None;
952 macro_rules! return_err {
953 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
955 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
956 if channel_state.is_none() {
957 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
959 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
960 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
961 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
962 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
963 })), channel_state.unwrap());
968 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
969 let mut chacha_stream = ChaChaReader { chacha: &mut chacha, read: Cursor::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..]) };
970 let (next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac) = {
971 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut chacha_stream) {
973 let error_code = match err {
974 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
975 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature|
976 msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue|
977 msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead => 0x4000 | 22, // invalid_onion_payload
978 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
980 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
983 let mut hmac = [0; 32];
984 if let Err(_) = chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut hmac[..]) {
985 return_err!("Unable to decode hop data", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
992 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_hmac == [0; 32] {
995 // In tests, make sure that the initial onion pcket data is, at least, non-0.
996 // We could do some fancy randomness test here, but, ehh, whatever.
997 // This checks for the issue where you can calculate the path length given the
998 // onion data as all the path entries that the originator sent will be here
999 // as-is (and were originally 0s).
1000 // Of course reverse path calculation is still pretty easy given naive routing
1001 // algorithms, but this fixes the most-obvious case.
1002 let mut next_bytes = [0; 32];
1003 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1004 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1005 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1006 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1010 // final_expiry_too_soon
1011 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + (CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
1012 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
1014 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
1015 if next_hop_data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
1016 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1018 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1019 if next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1020 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1023 let payment_data = match next_hop_data.format {
1024 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => None,
1025 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => return_err!("Got non final data with an HMAC of 0", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]),
1026 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data } => payment_data,
1029 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1030 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1031 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1032 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1034 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1035 type_data: PendingForwardReceiveHTLCInfo::Receive {
1037 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1039 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1040 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1041 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1042 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1045 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1046 let read_pos = chacha_stream.read(&mut new_packet_data).unwrap();
1047 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1049 // Check two things:
1050 // a) that the behavior of our stream here will return Ok(0) even if the TLV
1051 // read above emptied out our buffer and the unwrap() wont needlessly panic
1052 // b) that we didn't somehow magically end up with extra data.
1054 debug_assert!(chacha_stream.read(&mut t).unwrap() == 0);
1056 // Once we've emptied the set of bytes our peer gave us, encrypt 0 bytes until we
1057 // fill the onion hop data we'll forward to our next-hop peer.
1058 chacha_stream.chacha.process_in_place(&mut new_packet_data[read_pos..]);
1060 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1062 let blinding_factor = {
1063 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
1064 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1065 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1066 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
1069 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
1071 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
1073 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1076 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1077 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
1080 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
1081 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1082 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1083 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
1084 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1088 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1089 type_data: PendingForwardReceiveHTLCInfo::Forward {
1090 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
1091 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
1093 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1094 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1095 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1096 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1100 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1101 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref type_data, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1102 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here (which is
1103 // important as various things later assume we are a ::Receive if short_channel_id is
1105 if let &PendingForwardReceiveHTLCInfo::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = type_data {
1106 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1107 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1108 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1109 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
1111 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1113 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1114 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1116 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1117 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1118 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1119 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1120 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1121 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1122 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1124 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_their_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1125 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1127 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
1128 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1129 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1131 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1132 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1134 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1135 // We want to have at least LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS to fail prior to going on chain CLAIM_BUFFER blocks before expiration
1136 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1137 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1139 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1140 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1145 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1146 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1147 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1148 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1150 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1151 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1153 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
1154 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(chan_update.contents.flags));
1156 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1158 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1163 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1166 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
1167 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1168 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel<ChanSigner>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1169 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1170 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1174 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
1176 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1177 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1178 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
1179 timestamp: chan.get_channel_update_count(),
1180 flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
1181 cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
1182 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1183 fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator),
1184 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
1185 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1188 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1189 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
1191 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1197 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1199 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1200 /// fields for more info.
1202 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1203 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1204 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1205 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1206 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1207 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1209 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
1211 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
1212 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths.
1214 /// In general, a path may raise:
1215 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
1216 /// node public key) is specified.
1217 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
1218 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
1220 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
1221 /// relevant updates.
1223 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
1224 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
1225 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
1227 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
1228 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
1229 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
1230 /// must not contain multiple paths as otherwise the multipath data cannot be sent.
1231 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the basic_mpp feature bit
1232 /// set (either as required or as available).
1233 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: Option<&[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
1234 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
1235 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
1237 if route.paths.len() > 10 {
1238 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Sending over more than 10 paths is not currently supported"}));
1240 let mut total_value = 0;
1241 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1242 for path in route.paths.iter() {
1243 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
1244 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
1246 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
1247 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1248 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
1251 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
1253 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1254 let mut results = Vec::new();
1255 'path_loop: for path in route.paths.iter() {
1256 macro_rules! check_res_push {
1257 ($res: expr) => { match $res {
1260 results.push(Err(e));
1261 continue 'path_loop;
1267 log_trace!(self, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
1268 let (session_priv, prng_seed) = self.keys_manager.get_onion_rand();
1270 let onion_keys = check_res_push!(onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
1271 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"}));
1272 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = check_res_push!(onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height));
1273 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
1274 check_res_push!(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route had too large size once"}));
1276 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, &payment_hash);
1278 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1280 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
1281 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1282 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1283 None => check_res_push!(Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!"})),
1284 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1287 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1288 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
1290 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1291 check_res_push!(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"}));
1293 if !chan.get().is_live() {
1294 check_res_push!(Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!"}));
1296 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1298 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1299 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1300 }, onion_packet), channel_state, chan)
1302 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) => {
1303 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1304 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
1305 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
1306 // that we will resent the commitment update once we unfree monitor
1307 // updating, so we have to take special care that we don't return
1308 // something else in case we will resend later!
1309 check_res_push!(Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed));
1312 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1313 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1314 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1315 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1316 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1317 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1318 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1326 } else { unreachable!(); }
1327 results.push(Ok(()));
1328 continue 'path_loop;
1331 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
1332 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1334 check_res_push!(Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err }));
1338 let mut has_ok = false;
1339 let mut has_err = false;
1340 for res in results.iter() {
1341 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
1342 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
1343 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
1344 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
1351 if has_err && has_ok {
1352 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure(results))
1354 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
1360 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1362 /// Note that ALL inputs in the transaction pointed to by funding_txo MUST spend SegWit outputs
1363 /// or your counterparty can steal your funds!
1365 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1367 /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1368 /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1369 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1370 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1372 let (mut chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
1373 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1375 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo)
1376 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
1377 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(), None)
1378 } else { unreachable!(); })
1383 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_their_node_id()) {
1384 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1385 (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
1387 Err(_) => { return; }
1390 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1391 // lock before add_update_monitor
1392 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1394 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1395 match handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", *temporary_channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), None)), chan.get_their_node_id()) {
1396 Err(_) => { return; },
1397 Ok(()) => unreachable!(),
1400 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
1401 // Its completely fine to continue with a FundingCreated until the monitor
1402 // update is persisted, as long as we don't generate the FundingBroadcastSafe
1403 // until the monitor has been safely persisted (as funding broadcast is not,
1405 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
1410 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1411 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
1412 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1415 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1416 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1417 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1419 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1425 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel<ChanSigner>) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1426 if !chan.should_announce() { return None }
1428 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1430 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1432 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1433 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1435 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1436 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1437 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1438 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1439 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1443 /// Generates a signed node_announcement from the given arguments and creates a
1444 /// BroadcastNodeAnnouncement event.
1446 /// RGB is a node "color" and alias a printable human-readable string to describe this node to
1447 /// humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
1449 /// addresses represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node accepts
1450 /// incoming connections.
1451 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], addresses: msgs::NetAddressSet) {
1452 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1454 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1455 features: NodeFeatures::supported(),
1456 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
1457 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
1459 addresses: addresses.to_vec(),
1460 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
1461 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1463 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1465 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1466 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
1467 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
1468 signature: self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key),
1469 contents: announcement
1474 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1476 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1477 /// Will likely generate further events.
1478 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1479 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1481 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1482 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1483 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
1485 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1486 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1488 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1489 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1490 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1491 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1493 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1494 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1495 match forward_info {
1496 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => {
1497 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1498 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1499 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1500 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1502 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
1503 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: Vec::new() }
1506 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1507 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
1508 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
1509 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
1510 // problem, not ours.
1517 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
1518 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1519 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1520 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1521 match forward_info {
1522 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
1523 type_data: PendingForwardReceiveHTLCInfo::Forward {
1525 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value }, } => {
1526 log_trace!(self, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), prev_short_channel_id, short_chan_id);
1527 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1528 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1529 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1530 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
1532 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet) {
1534 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1535 log_trace!(self, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
1537 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
1539 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap();
1540 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
1541 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }
1547 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1549 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1550 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1551 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1552 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1553 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1554 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1555 // this channel currently :/.
1561 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
1562 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
1564 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
1565 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} after delay", short_chan_id);
1566 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1568 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1569 log_trace!(self, "Failed to fail backwards to short_id {}: {}", short_chan_id, msg);
1571 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
1573 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
1574 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
1575 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
1578 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1580 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1581 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
1582 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
1583 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
1584 // messages when we can.
1585 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
1586 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
1587 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
1594 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1595 let (commitment_msg, monitor) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment() {
1598 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
1599 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
1600 let their_node_id = chan.get().get_their_node_id();
1601 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
1602 ChannelError::Ignore(_) => {
1603 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1605 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1606 log_trace!(self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
1607 let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
1608 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1609 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1611 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.force_shutdown(), self.get_channel_update(&channel).ok()))
1613 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { .. } => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
1615 handle_errors.push((their_node_id, err));
1619 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1620 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_their_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
1623 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1624 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
1625 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1626 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1627 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1628 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
1629 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1631 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1639 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1640 match forward_info {
1641 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
1642 type_data: PendingForwardReceiveHTLCInfo::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry },
1643 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. }, } => {
1644 let prev_hop_data = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1645 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1646 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1647 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
1650 let mut total_value = 0;
1651 let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry((payment_hash, if let &Some(ref data) = &payment_data {
1652 Some(data.payment_secret.clone()) } else { None }))
1653 .or_insert(Vec::new());
1654 htlcs.push(ClaimableHTLC {
1656 value: amt_to_forward,
1657 payment_data: payment_data.clone(),
1658 cltv_expiry: incoming_cltv_expiry,
1660 if let &Some(ref data) = &payment_data {
1661 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
1662 total_value += htlc.value;
1663 if htlc.payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat != data.total_msat {
1664 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
1666 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
1668 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
1669 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
1670 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1671 short_channel_id: htlc.src.short_channel_id,
1672 htlc_id: htlc.src.htlc_id,
1673 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.src.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
1675 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec() }
1678 } else if total_value >= data.total_msat {
1679 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1680 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1681 payment_secret: Some(data.payment_secret),
1686 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1687 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1688 payment_secret: None,
1689 amt: amt_to_forward,
1693 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
1694 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
1696 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1697 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
1705 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1706 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
1709 for (their_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
1710 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id);
1713 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1714 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1715 events.append(&mut new_events);
1718 /// If a peer is disconnected we mark any channels with that peer as 'disabled'.
1719 /// After some time, if channels are still disabled we need to broadcast a ChannelUpdate
1720 /// to inform the network about the uselessness of these channels.
1722 /// This method handles all the details, and must be called roughly once per minute.
1723 pub fn timer_chan_freshness_every_min(&self) {
1724 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1725 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1726 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1727 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter_mut() {
1728 if chan.is_disabled_staged() && !chan.is_live() {
1729 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1730 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1735 } else if chan.is_disabled_staged() && chan.is_live() {
1737 } else if chan.is_disabled_marked() {
1738 chan.to_disabled_staged();
1743 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
1744 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
1745 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
1746 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
1747 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
1748 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<[u8; 32]>) -> bool {
1749 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1751 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1752 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&(*payment_hash, *payment_secret));
1753 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1754 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
1755 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1756 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
1757 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.src), payment_hash,
1758 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec() });
1764 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
1765 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
1766 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
1767 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
1768 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
1769 /// still-available channels.
1770 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
1771 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
1772 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
1773 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
1776 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, .. } => {
1777 log_trace!(self, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1778 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1779 match &onion_error {
1780 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
1782 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
1784 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
1785 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
1786 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
1787 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
1788 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
1789 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1790 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
1795 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1796 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1797 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1798 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
1800 error_code: onion_error_code
1804 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
1808 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
1809 // TODO: We'd like to generate a PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate for temporary
1810 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as Router::get_route
1811 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
1813 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
1814 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
1815 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1816 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1817 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1818 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
1820 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
1826 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => {
1827 let err_packet = match onion_error {
1828 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
1829 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
1830 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
1831 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
1833 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
1834 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1835 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
1839 let mut forward_event = None;
1840 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
1841 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
1843 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
1844 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1845 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
1847 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1848 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
1851 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1852 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
1853 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1854 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
1855 time_forwardable: time
1862 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
1863 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
1864 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
1866 /// You must specify the expected amounts for this HTLC, and we will only claim HTLCs
1867 /// available within a few percent of the expected amount. This is critical for several
1868 /// reasons : a) it avoids providing senders with `proof-of-payment` (in the form of the
1869 /// payment_preimage without having provided the full value and b) it avoids certain
1870 /// privacy-breaking recipient-probing attacks which may reveal payment activity to
1871 /// motivated attackers.
1873 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
1874 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, payment_secret: &Option<[u8; 32]>, expected_amount: u64) -> bool {
1875 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
1877 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1879 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1880 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&(payment_hash, *payment_secret));
1881 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1882 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
1883 let passes_value = if let &Some(ref data) = &sources[0].payment_data {
1884 assert!(payment_secret.is_some());
1885 if data.total_msat == expected_amount { true } else { false }
1887 assert!(payment_secret.is_none());
1891 let mut one_claimed = false;
1892 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
1893 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1894 if !passes_value && (htlc.value < expected_amount || htlc.value > expected_amount * 2) {
1895 let mut htlc_msat_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
1896 let mut height_data = byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).to_vec();
1897 htlc_msat_data.append(&mut height_data);
1898 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
1899 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.src), &payment_hash,
1900 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_data });
1902 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.src), payment_preimage);
1909 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
1910 let (their_node_id, err) = loop {
1912 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1913 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1914 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1915 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
1919 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, .. }) => {
1920 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
1921 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1923 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1924 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1926 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1927 // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
1928 // why it's missing.
1933 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
1934 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
1935 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, payment_preimage) {
1936 Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
1937 if let Some(chan_monitor) = monitor_option {
1938 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1939 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
1940 assert!(msgs.is_none());
1942 break (chan.get().get_their_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()));
1946 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
1947 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1948 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
1949 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1950 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1951 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
1952 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1953 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1961 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1962 // learn the preimage as the channel may be about to hit the chain.
1963 //TODO: Do something with e?
1967 } else { unreachable!(); }
1973 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1974 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id);
1977 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
1978 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1979 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
1982 /// Used to restore channels to normal operation after a
1983 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
1985 pub fn test_restore_channel_monitor(&self) {
1986 let mut close_results = Vec::new();
1987 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
1988 let mut htlc_failures = Vec::new();
1989 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
1990 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1993 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1994 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1995 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
1996 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
1997 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
1998 if channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
1999 let chan_monitor = channel.channel_monitor().clone();
2000 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2002 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
2003 // TODO: There may be some pending HTLCs that we intended to fail
2004 // backwards when a monitor update failed. We should make sure
2005 // knowledge of those gets moved into the appropriate in-memory
2006 // ChannelMonitor and they get failed backwards once we get
2007 // on-chain confirmations.
2008 // Note I think #198 addresses this, so once it's merged a test
2009 // should be written.
2010 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2011 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2013 close_results.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2014 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2015 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2021 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => true,
2024 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, needs_broadcast_safe, funding_locked) = channel.monitor_updating_restored();
2025 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2026 htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), pending_forwards));
2028 htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures);
2030 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
2031 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
2032 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2033 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2038 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
2039 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
2040 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2041 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2042 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2047 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2051 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2056 if needs_broadcast_safe {
2057 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
2058 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(),
2059 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
2062 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
2063 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2064 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2067 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
2068 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2069 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2070 msg: announcement_sigs,
2073 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2081 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().append(&mut pending_events);
2083 for failure in htlc_failures.drain(..) {
2084 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2086 self.forward_htlcs(&mut htlc_forwards[..]);
2088 for res in close_results.drain(..) {
2089 self.finish_force_close_channel(res);
2093 fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2094 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
2095 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
2098 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_node_id.clone(), their_features, msg, 0, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)
2099 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
2100 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2101 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2102 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
2103 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
2104 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2105 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
2106 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2107 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
2109 entry.insert(channel);
2115 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2116 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
2117 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2118 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2119 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
2120 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2121 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2122 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
2124 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, their_features), channel_state, chan);
2125 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
2127 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
2130 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2131 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
2132 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
2133 channel_value_satoshis: value,
2134 output_script: output_script,
2135 user_channel_id: user_id,
2140 fn internal_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2141 let ((funding_msg, monitor_update), mut chan) = {
2142 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2143 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2144 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
2145 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2146 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2147 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
2149 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
2151 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
2154 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
2155 // lock before add_update_monitor
2156 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2158 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
2159 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
2160 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
2161 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
2162 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
2163 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", funding_msg.channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), None));
2165 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
2166 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
2167 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
2168 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
2169 // until we have persisted our monitor.
2170 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2174 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2175 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2176 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
2177 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2178 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id", funding_msg.channel_id))
2180 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2181 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
2182 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2191 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2192 let (funding_txo, user_id) = {
2193 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2194 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2195 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2196 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2197 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2198 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2200 let chan_monitor = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg), channel_state, chan);
2201 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2202 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
2204 (chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get().get_user_id())
2206 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2209 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2210 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
2211 funding_txo: funding_txo,
2212 user_channel_id: user_id,
2217 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2218 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2219 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2220 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2221 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2222 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2223 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2225 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg), channel_state, chan);
2226 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
2227 // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our
2228 // announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote
2229 // funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking
2230 // block connection. We should guanrantee to broadcast announcement_sigs to our peer whatever
2231 // the order of the events but our peer may not receive it due to disconnection. The specs
2232 // lacking an acknowledgement for announcement_sigs we may have to re-send them at peer
2233 // connection in the future if simultaneous misses by both peers due to network/hardware
2234 // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs
2235 // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network.
2236 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2237 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2238 msg: announcement_sigs,
2243 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2247 fn internal_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2248 let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
2249 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2250 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2252 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
2253 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2254 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2255 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2257 let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
2258 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2259 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2260 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2264 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2265 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2266 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2270 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
2271 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2272 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2274 (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2275 } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
2277 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2280 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
2281 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2283 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2284 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2285 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2286 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2294 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2295 let (tx, chan_option) = {
2296 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2297 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2298 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
2299 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2300 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2301 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2303 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
2304 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2305 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2306 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2311 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
2312 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
2313 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
2314 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
2315 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
2316 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2317 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2319 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2320 } else { (tx, None) }
2322 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2325 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
2326 log_trace!(self, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
2327 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
2329 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2330 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2331 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2332 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2340 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2341 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
2342 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
2343 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
2345 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
2346 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
2347 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
2348 //but we should prevent it anyway.
2350 let (mut pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
2351 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2353 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2354 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2355 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2356 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2358 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2359 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
2360 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
2361 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
2362 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { incoming_shared_secret, .. }) = pending_forward_info {
2363 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get());
2364 pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2365 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2366 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2367 reason: if let Ok(update) = chan_update {
2368 // TODO: Note that |20 is defined as "channel FROM the processing
2369 // node has been disabled" (emphasis mine), which seems to imply
2370 // that we can't return |20 for an inbound channel being disabled.
2371 // This probably needs a spec update but should definitely be
2373 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x1000|20, &{
2374 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
2375 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(update.contents.flags));
2376 res.extend_from_slice(&update.encode_with_len()[..]);
2380 // This can only happen if the channel isn't in the fully-funded
2381 // state yet, implying our counterparty is trying to route payments
2382 // over the channel back to themselves (cause no one else should
2383 // know the short_id is a lightning channel yet). We should have no
2384 // problem just calling this unknown_next_peer
2385 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
2390 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info), channel_state, chan);
2392 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2397 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2398 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2400 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2401 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2402 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2403 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2404 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2406 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
2408 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2411 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
2415 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2416 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2417 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2418 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2419 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2420 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2421 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2423 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
2425 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2430 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2431 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2432 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2433 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2434 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2435 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2436 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2438 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
2439 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set")), channel_state, chan);
2441 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
2444 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2448 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2449 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2450 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2451 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2452 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2453 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2454 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2456 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, chan_monitor) =
2457 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
2458 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2459 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
2460 //TODO: Rebroadcast closing_signed if present on monitor update restoration
2462 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2463 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2464 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2466 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
2467 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2468 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2469 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2470 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2471 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2472 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2473 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2475 commitment_signed: msg,
2479 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2480 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2481 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2487 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2492 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
2493 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
2494 let mut forward_event = None;
2495 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2496 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2497 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2498 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
2500 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2501 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.type_data {
2502 PendingForwardReceiveHTLCInfo::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
2503 PendingForwardReceiveHTLCInfo::Receive { .. } => 0,
2505 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2506 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
2508 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2509 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
2514 match forward_event {
2516 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2517 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2518 time_forwardable: time
2526 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2527 let (pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id) = {
2528 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2529 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2530 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2531 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2532 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2533 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2535 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
2536 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, chan_monitor) =
2537 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
2538 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2539 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
2540 assert!(commitment_update.is_none() && closing_signed.is_none() && pending_forwards.is_empty() && pending_failures.is_empty());
2541 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA"));
2543 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, commitment_update.is_some(), pending_forwards, pending_failures);
2546 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2547 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2548 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2552 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2553 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2554 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2558 (pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"))
2560 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2563 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
2564 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2566 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
2571 fn internal_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2572 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2573 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2574 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2575 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2576 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2577 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2579 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
2581 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2586 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2587 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2588 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2590 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2591 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2592 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2593 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2595 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2596 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
2599 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2600 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) =
2601 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone()), channel_state, chan);
2603 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
2604 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2605 if self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }).is_err() ||
2606 self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }).is_err() {
2607 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature")), channel_state, chan);
2610 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2612 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2613 msg: msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
2614 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
2615 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
2616 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
2617 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
2618 contents: announcement,
2620 update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
2623 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2628 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2629 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2630 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2632 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2633 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2634 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2635 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2637 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, channel_monitor, mut order, shutdown) =
2638 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg), channel_state, chan);
2639 if let Some(monitor) = channel_monitor {
2640 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
2641 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
2642 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
2643 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
2644 if revoke_and_ack.is_none() {
2645 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
2647 if commitment_update.is_none() {
2648 order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
2650 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, order, revoke_and_ack.is_some(), commitment_update.is_some());
2651 //TODO: Resend the funding_locked if needed once we get the monitor running again
2654 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
2655 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2656 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2660 macro_rules! send_raa { () => {
2661 if let Some(msg) = revoke_and_ack {
2662 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2663 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2668 macro_rules! send_cu { () => {
2669 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2670 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2671 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2677 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2681 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2686 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2687 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2688 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2694 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2698 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
2699 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
2700 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
2701 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
2703 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2704 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2706 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2707 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2708 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2710 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id) {
2711 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel"}),
2712 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2713 if !chan.get().is_outbound() {
2714 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel"});
2716 if chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
2717 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2719 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2720 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected"});
2722 their_node_id = chan.get().get_their_node_id();
2723 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) =
2724 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw), channel_state, chan)
2726 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2729 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2730 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
2731 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2732 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2733 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2734 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2735 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2736 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2746 match handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id) {
2747 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2748 Err(e) => { Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: e.err })}
2753 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref> events::MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M> where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor {
2754 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<events::MessageSendEvent> {
2755 // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: it's very easy for a
2756 // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
2757 // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
2759 //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
2760 for htlc_update in self.monitor.fetch_pending_htlc_updated() {
2761 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
2762 log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
2763 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
2765 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
2766 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2771 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2772 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2773 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
2778 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref> events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M> where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor {
2779 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
2780 // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: it's very easy for a
2781 // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
2782 // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
2784 //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
2785 for htlc_update in self.monitor.fetch_pending_htlc_updated() {
2786 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
2787 log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
2788 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
2790 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
2791 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2796 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2797 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2798 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
2803 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref + Sync + Send> ChainListener for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M> where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor {
2804 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
2805 let header_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
2806 log_trace!(self, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", header_hash, height, txn_matched.len());
2807 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2808 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2809 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
2811 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2812 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2813 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2814 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2815 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
2816 let res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
2817 if let Ok((chan_res, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs)) = res {
2818 timed_out_htlcs.reserve(timed_out_pending_htlcs.len());
2819 for (htlc_src, payment_hash, value) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
2820 timed_out_htlcs.push((htlc_src, payment_hash, value));
2822 if let Some(funding_locked) = chan_res {
2823 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2824 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2825 msg: funding_locked,
2827 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
2828 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2829 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2830 msg: announcement_sigs,
2833 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2835 } else if let Err(e) = res {
2836 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2837 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2838 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e },
2842 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
2843 for tx in txn_matched {
2844 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
2845 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
2846 log_trace!(self, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
2847 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2848 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2850 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
2851 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
2852 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
2853 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2854 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2855 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2864 if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
2865 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2866 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2868 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2869 // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
2870 // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
2871 // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
2872 failed_channels.last_mut().unwrap().0 = Vec::new();
2873 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2874 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2883 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|&(ref payment_hash, _), htlcs| {
2884 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2885 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS {
2886 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.src.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), htlc.value));
2893 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2894 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2897 for (source, payment_hash, value) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
2898 // Call it preimage_unknown as the issue, ultimately, is that the user failed to
2899 // provide us a preimage within the cltv_expiry time window.
2900 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
2901 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
2902 data: byte_utils::be64_to_array(value).to_vec()
2905 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
2906 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header_hash;
2909 /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
2910 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, _: u32) {
2911 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2912 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2914 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2915 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2916 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2917 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2918 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| {
2919 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
2920 if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
2921 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2923 failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown());
2924 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
2925 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2935 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2936 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2938 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
2939 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header.bitcoin_hash();
2943 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref + Sync + Send> ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M> where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor {
2944 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
2945 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2946 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, their_features, msg), *their_node_id);
2949 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
2950 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2951 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, their_features, msg), *their_node_id);
2954 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
2955 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2956 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
2959 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
2960 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2961 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
2964 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
2965 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2966 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
2969 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
2970 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2971 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
2974 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
2975 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2976 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
2979 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
2980 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2981 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
2984 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
2985 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2986 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
2989 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
2990 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2991 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
2994 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
2995 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2996 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
2999 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
3000 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3001 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
3004 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
3005 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3006 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
3009 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
3010 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3011 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
3014 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
3015 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3016 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
3019 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
3020 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3021 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
3024 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
3025 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3026 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3027 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
3028 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
3030 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3031 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3032 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3033 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3034 if no_connection_possible {
3035 log_debug!(self, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
3036 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
3037 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
3038 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3039 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3041 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown());
3042 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
3043 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3053 log_debug!(self, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
3054 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
3055 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
3056 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused();
3057 chan.to_disabled_marked();
3058 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
3059 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
3060 failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
3062 if chan.is_shutdown() {
3063 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3064 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3068 no_channels_remain = false;
3074 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
3076 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3077 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3078 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3079 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3080 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3081 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3082 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3083 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3084 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3085 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3086 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3087 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
3088 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
3089 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
3090 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3091 &events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => true,
3095 if no_channels_remain {
3096 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(their_node_id);
3099 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3100 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3102 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
3103 for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
3104 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
3109 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
3110 log_debug!(self, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
3112 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3115 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3116 match peer_state_lock.entry(their_node_id.clone()) {
3117 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3118 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
3119 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
3122 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
3123 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
3128 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3129 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3130 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3131 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
3132 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
3133 if !chan.have_received_message() {
3134 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
3135 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
3136 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
3140 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
3141 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
3142 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(),
3148 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
3151 fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
3152 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3154 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
3155 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3156 if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id {
3157 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
3161 self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
3166 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
3167 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
3169 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCInfo {
3170 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3171 match &self.type_data {
3172 &PendingForwardReceiveHTLCInfo::Forward { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id } => {
3174 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
3175 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3177 &PendingForwardReceiveHTLCInfo::Receive { ref payment_data, ref incoming_cltv_expiry } => {
3179 payment_data.write(writer)?;
3180 incoming_cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
3183 self.incoming_shared_secret.write(writer)?;
3184 self.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3185 self.amt_to_forward.write(writer)?;
3186 self.outgoing_cltv_value.write(writer)?;
3191 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingHTLCInfo {
3192 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, DecodeError> {
3193 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
3194 type_data: match Readable::read(reader)? {
3195 0u8 => PendingForwardReceiveHTLCInfo::Forward {
3196 onion_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
3197 short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3199 1u8 => PendingForwardReceiveHTLCInfo::Receive {
3200 payment_data: Readable::read(reader)?,
3201 incoming_cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
3203 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3205 incoming_shared_secret: Readable::read(reader)?,
3206 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
3207 amt_to_forward: Readable::read(reader)?,
3208 outgoing_cltv_value: Readable::read(reader)?,
3213 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
3214 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3216 &HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(ref fail_msg) => {
3218 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3220 &HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(ref fail_msg) => {
3222 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3229 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailureMsg {
3230 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailureMsg, DecodeError> {
3231 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3232 0 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3233 1 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3234 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3239 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCStatus {
3240 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3242 &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(ref forward_info) => {
3244 forward_info.write(writer)?;
3246 &PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(ref fail_msg) => {
3248 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3255 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingHTLCStatus {
3256 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCStatus, DecodeError> {
3257 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3258 0 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3259 1 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3260 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3265 impl_writeable!(HTLCPreviousHopData, 0, {
3268 incoming_packet_shared_secret
3271 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
3272 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3274 &HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref hop_data) => {
3276 hop_data.write(writer)?;
3278 &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
3280 path.write(writer)?;
3281 session_priv.write(writer)?;
3282 first_hop_htlc_msat.write(writer)?;
3289 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCSource {
3290 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCSource, DecodeError> {
3291 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3292 0 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3293 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3294 path: Readable::read(reader)?,
3295 session_priv: Readable::read(reader)?,
3296 first_hop_htlc_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
3298 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3303 impl Writeable for HTLCFailReason {
3304 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3306 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
3310 &HTLCFailReason::Reason { ref failure_code, ref data } => {
3312 failure_code.write(writer)?;
3313 data.write(writer)?;
3320 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailReason {
3321 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailReason, DecodeError> {
3322 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3323 0 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: Readable::read(reader)? }),
3324 1 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3325 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
3326 data: Readable::read(reader)?,
3328 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3333 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
3334 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3336 &HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { ref prev_short_channel_id, ref prev_htlc_id, ref forward_info } => {
3338 prev_short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3339 prev_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3340 forward_info.write(writer)?;
3342 &HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3344 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3345 err_packet.write(writer)?;
3352 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCForwardInfo {
3353 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCForwardInfo, DecodeError> {
3354 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3355 0 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC {
3356 prev_short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3357 prev_htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3358 forward_info: Readable::read(reader)?,
3360 1 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC {
3361 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3362 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
3364 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3369 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Writeable, M: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M> where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor {
3370 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3371 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
3373 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3374 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3376 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
3377 (self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
3378 self.last_block_hash.lock().unwrap().write(writer)?;
3380 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3381 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
3382 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3383 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3384 unfunded_channels += 1;
3387 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
3388 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3389 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3390 channel.write(writer)?;
3394 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3395 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
3396 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3397 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3398 for forward in pending_forwards {
3399 forward.write(writer)?;
3403 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3404 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
3405 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3406 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3407 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
3408 htlc.src.write(writer)?;
3409 htlc.value.write(writer)?;
3410 htlc.payment_data.write(writer)?;
3411 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
3415 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3416 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3417 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3418 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
3419 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3420 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
3423 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
3429 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
3431 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
3433 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
3434 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling <(Sha256dHash,
3435 /// ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args).
3436 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
3437 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
3438 /// 3) Register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints with your chain watch mechanism using
3439 /// ChannelMonitor::get_monitored_outpoints and ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
3440 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
3441 /// 5) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local ManyChannelMonitor.
3442 /// 6) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
3443 /// 7) Register the new ChannelManager with your ChainWatchInterface.
3444 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref> where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor {
3445 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
3446 /// deserialization.
3447 pub keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>>,
3449 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3451 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
3452 pub fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
3453 /// The ManyChannelMonitor for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3455 /// No calls to the ManyChannelMonitor will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
3456 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
3457 /// ManyChannelMonitor after deserializing this ChannelManager.
3460 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
3461 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
3462 /// force-closed during deserialization.
3463 pub tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
3464 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
3465 /// deserialization.
3466 pub logger: Arc<Logger>,
3467 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
3468 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
3469 pub default_config: UserConfig,
3471 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
3472 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
3474 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
3475 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
3476 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
3477 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
3479 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
3481 pub channel_monitors: &'a mut HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor>,
3484 impl<'a, R : ::std::io::Read, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable<R>, M: Deref> ReadableArgs<R, ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M>) where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor {
3485 fn read(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3486 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3487 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3488 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
3489 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
3492 let genesis_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3493 let latest_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3494 let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3496 let mut closed_channels = Vec::new();
3498 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3499 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3500 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3501 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3502 for _ in 0..channel_count {
3503 let mut channel: Channel<ChanSigner> = ReadableArgs::read(reader, args.logger.clone())?;
3504 if channel.last_block_connected != last_block_hash {
3505 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3508 let funding_txo = channel.channel_monitor().get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
3509 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
3510 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
3511 if channel.get_cur_local_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_local_commitment_number() ||
3512 channel.get_revoked_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
3513 channel.get_cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_remote_commitment_number() {
3514 let mut force_close_res = channel.force_shutdown();
3515 force_close_res.0 = monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn();
3516 closed_channels.push(force_close_res);
3518 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3519 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
3521 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
3524 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3528 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
3529 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
3530 closed_channels.push((monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn(), Vec::new()));
3534 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3535 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3536 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
3537 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3538 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3539 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, 128));
3540 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
3541 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3543 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
3546 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3547 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3548 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
3549 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3550 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3551 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, 2));
3552 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
3553 previous_hops.push(ClaimableHTLC {
3554 src: Readable::read(reader)?,
3555 value: Readable::read(reader)?,
3556 payment_data: Readable::read(reader)?,
3557 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
3560 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
3563 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3564 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, 128));
3565 for _ in 0..peer_count {
3566 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
3567 let peer_state = PeerState {
3568 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
3570 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
3573 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3575 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
3577 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
3578 monitor: args.monitor,
3579 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
3581 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(latest_block_height as usize),
3582 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(last_block_hash),
3583 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
3585 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
3590 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
3592 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
3594 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
3596 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
3598 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
3599 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
3600 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
3601 logger: args.logger,
3602 default_configuration: args.default_config,
3605 for close_res in closed_channels.drain(..) {
3606 channel_manager.finish_force_close_channel(close_res);
3607 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
3608 //connection or two.
3611 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))