1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`find_route`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 //! [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
24 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
25 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
30 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
35 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
38 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
39 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
40 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
41 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
42 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
43 // construct one themselves.
44 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
45 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
46 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
47 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
48 use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
49 use crate::routing::router::{InFlightHtlcs, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RoutePath, RouteParameters};
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
53 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
54 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, Recipient};
55 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig};
56 use crate::util::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
57 use crate::util::{byte_utils, events};
58 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
59 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
60 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
61 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
62 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
65 use crate::prelude::*;
67 use core::cell::RefCell;
69 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock};
70 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
71 use core::time::Duration;
74 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
76 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
77 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
78 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
80 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
81 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
82 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
83 // before we forward it.
85 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
86 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
87 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
88 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
89 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
91 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
92 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
94 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
95 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a "real" SCID, an
96 /// outbound SCID alias, or a phantom node SCID.
97 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
100 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
101 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
102 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
105 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
106 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
110 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
111 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
112 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
113 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
114 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
115 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
116 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
117 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
120 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
121 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
122 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
123 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
126 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
127 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
128 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
129 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
130 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
133 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
134 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
136 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
137 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
138 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
141 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
142 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
144 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
145 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
148 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
149 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
152 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
156 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
157 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
158 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
159 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
160 short_channel_id: u64,
162 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
163 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
165 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
166 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
171 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
173 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
174 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
175 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
177 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
178 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
181 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
182 struct ClaimableHTLC {
183 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
185 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
187 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
189 /// The sum total of all MPP parts
193 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
194 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
195 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
196 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
198 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
199 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
204 impl Readable for PaymentId {
205 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
206 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
210 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
211 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
212 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
213 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
214 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
217 session_priv: SecretKey,
218 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
219 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
220 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
221 payment_id: PaymentId,
222 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
223 payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters>,
226 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
227 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
228 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
230 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
232 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
234 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat, payment_params } => {
237 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
238 payment_id.hash(hasher);
239 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
240 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
241 payment_params.hash(hasher);
246 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
249 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
250 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
252 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
253 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
254 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
255 payment_secret: None,
256 payment_params: None,
261 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
262 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
264 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
272 struct ReceiveError {
278 /// Return value for claim_funds_from_hop
279 enum ClaimFundsFromHop {
281 MonitorUpdateFail(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal, Option<u64>),
286 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>);
288 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
289 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
290 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
291 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
292 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
294 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
295 err: msgs::LightningError,
296 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
297 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
299 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
301 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
303 err: LightningError {
305 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
306 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
313 shutdown_finish: None,
317 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
319 err: LightningError {
321 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
324 shutdown_finish: None,
328 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
329 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
332 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
334 err: LightningError {
336 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
337 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
343 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
344 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
348 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
351 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
353 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
354 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
358 log_level: Level::Warn,
361 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
363 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
365 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
367 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
368 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
376 shutdown_finish: None,
381 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
382 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
383 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
384 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
385 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
387 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
388 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
389 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
390 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
391 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
392 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
393 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
395 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
399 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
400 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
401 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
402 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
403 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
404 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
407 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
408 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
409 /// quite some time lag.
410 enum BackgroundEvent {
411 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
412 /// commitment transaction.
413 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
416 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
417 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
419 latest_features: InitFeatures,
422 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
423 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
425 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
428 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
429 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
430 struct PendingInboundPayment {
431 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
432 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
433 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
434 /// this payment being removed.
436 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
437 user_payment_id: u64,
438 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
439 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
440 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
443 /// Stores the session_priv for each part of a payment that is still pending. For versions 0.0.102
444 /// and later, also stores information for retrying the payment.
445 pub(crate) enum PendingOutboundPayment {
447 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
450 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
451 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
452 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
453 pending_amt_msat: u64,
454 /// Used to track the fee paid. Only present if the payment was serialized on 0.0.103+.
455 pending_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
456 /// The total payment amount across all paths, used to verify that a retry is not overpaying.
458 /// Our best known block height at the time this payment was initiated.
459 starting_block_height: u32,
461 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
462 /// been resolved. This ensures we don't look up pending payments in ChannelMonitors on restart
463 /// and add a pending payment that was already fulfilled.
465 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
466 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
467 timer_ticks_without_htlcs: u8,
469 /// When a payer gives up trying to retry a payment, they inform us, letting us generate a
470 /// `PaymentFailed` event when all HTLCs have irrevocably failed. This avoids a number of race
471 /// conditions in MPP-aware payment retriers (1), where the possibility of multiple
472 /// `PaymentPathFailed` events with `all_paths_failed` can be pending at once, confusing a
473 /// downstream event handler as to when a payment has actually failed.
475 /// (1) https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1164
477 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
478 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
482 impl PendingOutboundPayment {
483 fn is_fulfilled(&self) -> bool {
485 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => true,
489 fn abandoned(&self) -> bool {
491 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => true,
495 fn get_pending_fee_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
497 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { pending_fee_msat, .. } => pending_fee_msat.clone(),
502 fn payment_hash(&self) -> Option<PaymentHash> {
504 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None,
505 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
506 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => *payment_hash,
507 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
511 fn mark_fulfilled(&mut self) {
512 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
513 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
514 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
515 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
516 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
517 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. }
520 let payment_hash = self.payment_hash();
521 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, payment_hash, timer_ticks_without_htlcs: 0 };
524 fn mark_abandoned(&mut self) -> Result<(), ()> {
525 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
526 let our_payment_hash;
527 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
528 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } |
529 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } =>
531 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } |
532 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } => {
533 our_payment_hash = *payment_hash;
537 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash: our_payment_hash };
541 /// panics if path is None and !self.is_fulfilled
542 fn remove(&mut self, session_priv: &[u8; 32], path: Option<&Vec<RouteHop>>) -> bool {
543 let remove_res = match self {
544 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
545 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
546 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
547 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
548 session_privs.remove(session_priv)
552 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
553 let path = path.expect("Fulfilling a payment should always come with a path");
554 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
555 *pending_amt_msat -= path_last_hop.fee_msat;
556 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
557 *fee_msat -= path.get_path_fees();
564 fn insert(&mut self, session_priv: [u8; 32], path: &Vec<RouteHop>) -> bool {
565 let insert_res = match self {
566 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
567 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
568 session_privs.insert(session_priv)
570 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => false,
571 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => false,
574 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
575 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
576 *pending_amt_msat += path_last_hop.fee_msat;
577 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
578 *fee_msat += path.get_path_fees();
585 fn remaining_parts(&self) -> usize {
587 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
588 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
589 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
590 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
597 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
598 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
599 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
600 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
601 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
602 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
603 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
605 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
606 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
608 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
609 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
610 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
611 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
612 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
613 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
614 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
615 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
617 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
618 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<&'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
620 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
621 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
623 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
624 /// to individual Channels.
626 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
627 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
628 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
629 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
631 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
632 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
633 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
634 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
635 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
636 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
637 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
639 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
640 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
641 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
642 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
645 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
646 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
647 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
648 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
649 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
651 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
652 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
653 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
654 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
655 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
658 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
659 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
660 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
661 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
662 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
666 // `total_consistency_lock`
668 // |__`forward_htlcs`
670 // |__`pending_inbound_payments`
672 // | |__`claimable_htlcs`
674 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments`
676 // | |__`channel_state`
680 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
682 // | |__`per_peer_state`
684 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
688 // | |__`pending_events`
690 // | |__`pending_background_events`
692 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
693 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
694 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
695 K::Target: KeysInterface,
696 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
699 default_configuration: UserConfig,
700 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
701 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
705 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
707 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
709 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
710 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
712 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
713 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
714 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>,
715 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
716 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>,
718 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
719 /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
720 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
721 /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
723 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
724 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
726 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
727 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
728 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
729 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
730 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
731 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
732 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
733 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
735 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
737 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
738 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment>>,
740 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
742 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
743 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
744 /// and via the classic SCID.
746 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
747 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
749 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
751 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
753 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
755 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
756 /// failed/claimed by the user.
758 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
759 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
761 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
762 claimable_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, (events::PaymentPurpose, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>)>>,
764 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
765 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
766 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
767 /// active channel list on load.
769 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
770 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
772 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
774 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
775 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
776 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
778 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
779 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
780 /// the handling of the events.
783 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
784 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
785 /// would break backwards compatability.
786 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
787 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
788 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
790 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
791 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
793 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
795 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
796 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
797 /// confirmation depth.
799 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
800 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
801 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
803 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
805 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
807 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
809 our_network_key: SecretKey,
810 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
812 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
814 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
815 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
816 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
818 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
819 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
821 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
822 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
823 /// keeping additional state.
824 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
826 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
827 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
828 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
829 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
831 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
832 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
833 /// are currently open with that peer.
834 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
835 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
838 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
839 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
841 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
842 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
843 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
844 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
845 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
846 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
847 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
848 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
849 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
850 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
851 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
853 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
860 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
862 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
863 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
864 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
865 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
866 pub struct ChainParameters {
867 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
868 pub network: Network,
870 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
872 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
873 pub best_block: BestBlock,
876 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
882 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
883 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
884 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
885 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
886 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
887 /// updates are ready for persistence).
889 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
890 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
891 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
892 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
893 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
895 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
896 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
899 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
900 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
901 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
904 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
905 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
907 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
908 persistence_notifier: notifier,
909 should_persist: persist_check,
910 _read_guard: read_guard,
915 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
917 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
918 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
923 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
924 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
926 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
928 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
929 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
930 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
931 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
932 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
934 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
935 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
937 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
939 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
940 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
941 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
942 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
943 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
944 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
945 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
946 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
947 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
948 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
949 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
950 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
951 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
953 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
954 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
956 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
957 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
958 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
959 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
961 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
962 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
963 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
964 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
965 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
966 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
969 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
971 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
972 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
975 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
977 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
978 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
980 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
981 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
982 /// [`ChannelManager::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
983 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
985 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
986 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
987 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
988 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
989 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
990 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
991 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
992 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
993 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
994 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
995 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
998 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
999 /// to better separate parameters.
1000 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1001 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1002 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1003 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1004 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1005 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1006 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1007 pub features: InitFeatures,
1008 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1009 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1010 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1012 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1014 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1015 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1016 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1017 /// payments to us through this channel.
1018 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1019 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1020 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1021 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1022 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1023 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1024 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1027 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
1028 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1029 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1030 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1031 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1032 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1033 /// lifetime of the channel.
1034 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1035 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1036 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1037 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1038 /// our counterparty already.
1040 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1041 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1042 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1043 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1045 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1046 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1047 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1048 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1050 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1051 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1053 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1054 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1056 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1057 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1058 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1059 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1060 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1061 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1062 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1063 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1064 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1067 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1069 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1070 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1071 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1072 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1073 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1074 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1075 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1077 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1078 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1080 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1081 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1082 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1083 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1084 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1085 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1086 /// this value on chain.
1088 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1090 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1092 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1093 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1094 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or a random value if the channel was
1095 /// inbound. This may be zero for inbound channels serialized with LDK versions prior to
1097 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1098 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1099 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1100 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1102 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1103 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1104 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1105 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1107 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1108 pub balance_msat: u64,
1109 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1110 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1111 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1112 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1114 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1116 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1117 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1118 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1119 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1120 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1121 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1122 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1123 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1125 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1126 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1127 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1128 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1129 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1130 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1131 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1133 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1134 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1135 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1136 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1137 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1138 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1139 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1140 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1141 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1143 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1145 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1146 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1147 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1148 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1149 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1151 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1152 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1153 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1154 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1155 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1156 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1157 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1159 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1160 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1161 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1162 pub is_outbound: bool,
1163 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1164 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1165 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1166 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1167 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1169 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1170 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1171 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1172 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1174 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1175 pub is_usable: bool,
1176 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1177 pub is_public: bool,
1178 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1179 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1180 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1181 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1182 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1183 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1185 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1186 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1189 impl ChannelDetails {
1190 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1191 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1192 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1194 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1195 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1196 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1197 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1200 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1201 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1202 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1204 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1205 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1206 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1207 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1211 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
1212 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
1213 /// states for more.
1214 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
1215 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
1216 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
1217 /// send the payment at all.
1219 /// You can freely resend the payment in full (with the parameter error fixed).
1221 /// Because the payment failed outright, no payment tracking is done, you do not need to call
1222 /// [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] and [`ChannelManager::retry_payment`] will *not* work
1223 /// for this payment.
1224 ParameterError(APIError),
1225 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
1226 /// from attempting to send the payment at all.
1228 /// You can freely resend the payment in full (with the parameter error fixed).
1230 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1233 /// Because the payment failed outright, no payment tracking is done, you do not need to call
1234 /// [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] and [`ChannelManager::retry_payment`] will *not* work
1235 /// for this payment.
1236 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
1237 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
1238 /// You can freely resend the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
1239 /// paths than the ones selected).
1241 /// Because the payment failed outright, no payment tracking is done, you do not need to call
1242 /// [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] and [`ChannelManager::retry_payment`] will *not* work
1243 /// for this payment.
1244 AllFailedResendSafe(Vec<APIError>),
1245 /// Indicates that a payment for the provided [`PaymentId`] is already in-flight and has not
1246 /// yet completed (i.e. generated an [`Event::PaymentSent`]) or been abandoned (via
1247 /// [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`]).
1249 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
1251 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
1252 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
1253 /// in over-/re-payment.
1255 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1256 /// send_payment, and any `Err`s which are not [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] can be
1257 /// safely retried via [`ChannelManager::retry_payment`].
1259 /// Any entries which contain `Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInprogress)` or `Ok(())` MUST NOT be
1260 /// retried as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent
1261 /// (in the case of `Ok(())`) or will send once a [`MonitorEvent::Completed`] is provided for
1262 /// the next-hop channel with the latest update_id.
1264 /// The errors themselves, in the same order as the route hops.
1265 results: Vec<Result<(), APIError>>,
1266 /// If some paths failed without irrevocably committing to the new HTLC(s), this will
1267 /// contain a [`RouteParameters`] object which can be used to calculate a new route that
1268 /// will pay all remaining unpaid balance.
1269 failed_paths_retry: Option<RouteParameters>,
1270 /// The payment id for the payment, which is now at least partially pending.
1271 payment_id: PaymentId,
1275 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1277 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
1279 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1280 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1281 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1282 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1284 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1285 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1286 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1289 macro_rules! handle_error {
1290 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
1293 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1294 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1296 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1297 // entering the macro.
1298 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
1299 assert!($self.pending_events.try_lock().is_ok());
1302 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1304 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1305 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1306 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1307 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1311 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1312 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1313 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1314 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1319 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1320 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1322 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1323 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1324 action: err.action.clone()
1328 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1329 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1332 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1339 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1340 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {{
1341 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.channel_id());
1342 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1343 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1344 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1346 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1347 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1348 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1349 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1350 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1352 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1353 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1355 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1359 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1360 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1361 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1363 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1364 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1366 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1367 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1369 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1370 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1371 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel);
1372 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1373 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1374 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1380 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1381 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1385 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1387 $entry.remove_entry();
1395 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1396 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1400 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1402 $entry.remove_entry();
1410 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1411 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1413 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1414 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, channel);
1420 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_res {
1421 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
1423 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1424 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
1425 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $chan);
1426 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
1427 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
1428 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
1429 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
1430 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
1431 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
1432 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
1433 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
1434 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
1435 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.get_user_id(),
1436 $chan.force_shutdown(false), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
1439 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1440 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update in progress. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations",
1441 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
1442 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
1443 match $action_type {
1444 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
1445 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
1447 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
1448 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
1450 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
1451 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len(),
1452 (&$failed_finalized_fulfills as &Vec<HTLCSource>).len());
1453 if !$resend_commitment {
1454 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
1457 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
1459 $chan.monitor_updating_paused($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
1460 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
1462 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
1467 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
1468 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
1470 $entry.remove_entry();
1474 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY) => { {
1475 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
1476 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1478 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, NO_UPDATE) => {
1479 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1481 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_channel_ready: expr, OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED) => {
1482 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, false, $resend_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1484 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1485 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1487 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1488 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new())
1492 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1493 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1494 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1495 node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1496 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1498 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1499 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1500 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1501 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1502 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1503 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1504 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1505 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1506 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1507 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1512 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1513 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1514 if $channel.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1516 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1517 pending_events.push(events::Event::ChannelReady {
1518 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1519 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1520 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1521 channel_type: $channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
1524 $channel.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1529 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
1530 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
1531 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1532 K::Target: KeysInterface,
1533 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1536 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1538 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1539 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1541 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1543 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1544 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1545 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1546 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1547 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1548 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1549 let inbound_pmt_key_material = keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1550 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1552 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1553 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1554 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
1558 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1560 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1561 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1562 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1564 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1565 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1566 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1567 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1568 claimable_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1569 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1570 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1572 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1573 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap()),
1576 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1577 fake_scid_rand_bytes: keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1579 probing_cookie_secret: keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1581 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1583 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1585 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1586 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1587 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1588 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
1596 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
1597 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1598 &self.default_configuration
1601 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1602 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1603 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1606 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1607 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1609 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
1611 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1615 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1620 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1622 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1623 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1624 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
1625 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
1626 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
1628 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1629 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1631 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1632 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1633 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1635 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1636 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1637 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1638 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1639 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1640 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1642 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1643 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1644 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1645 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1646 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1647 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1651 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1652 match per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) {
1653 Some(peer_state) => {
1654 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
1655 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1656 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1657 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1658 match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key,
1659 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
1660 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
1664 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
1669 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }),
1672 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1674 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1675 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1676 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1678 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1679 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1680 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1681 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1683 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1685 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1688 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1690 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1691 node_id: their_network_key,
1694 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1697 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1698 let mut res = Vec::new();
1700 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1701 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1702 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1703 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1704 let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
1705 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1706 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1707 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1708 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1709 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1710 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1711 features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1712 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1713 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1714 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1715 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1716 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1717 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1718 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1719 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
1720 Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1721 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1723 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1724 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1725 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1726 channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1727 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1728 outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1729 inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1730 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1731 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1732 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1733 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1734 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1735 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1736 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1737 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1738 confirmations: Some(channel.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1739 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1740 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1741 is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(),
1742 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1743 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1744 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1745 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1746 config: Some(channel.config()),
1750 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1751 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1752 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
1753 chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1759 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1760 /// more information.
1761 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1762 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1765 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to [`find_route`]
1766 /// to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1768 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1769 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1772 /// [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
1773 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1774 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1775 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1776 // really wanted anyway.
1777 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1780 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1781 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1782 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1783 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1784 Some(transaction) => {
1785 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1789 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1790 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1791 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1792 reason: closure_reason
1796 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1797 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1799 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1800 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1801 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1802 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1803 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1804 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1805 if *counterparty_node_id != chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id(){
1806 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The passed counterparty_node_id doesn't match the channel's counterparty node_id".to_owned() });
1808 let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = {
1809 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1810 match per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
1811 Some(peer_state) => {
1812 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1813 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1814 chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?
1816 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", counterparty_node_id) }),
1819 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1821 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1822 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1823 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
1824 let (result, is_permanent) =
1825 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
1827 remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
1832 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1833 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
1837 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1838 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
1839 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1840 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1844 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1848 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1852 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1853 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
1854 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
1857 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
1861 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1862 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1863 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1865 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1866 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1868 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1869 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1870 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1871 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1873 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1875 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1876 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1877 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1878 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1879 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None)
1882 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1883 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1884 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1886 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1887 /// the channel being closed or not:
1888 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1889 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1890 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1891 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1892 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1893 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1894 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1896 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1898 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1899 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1900 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1901 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1902 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1906 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1907 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1908 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1909 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1910 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
1911 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1912 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
1914 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1915 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1916 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1917 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1918 // ignore the result here.
1919 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
1923 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
1924 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
1925 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
1926 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1928 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1929 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1930 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1931 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *peer_node_id {
1932 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1934 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
1935 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
1937 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1939 remove_channel!(self, chan)
1941 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1944 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1945 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(broadcast));
1946 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
1947 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1948 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1953 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
1956 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1957 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1958 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
1959 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
1960 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1961 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1962 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1963 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
1964 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
1974 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
1975 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
1976 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
1978 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
1979 -> Result<(), APIError> {
1980 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
1983 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
1984 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
1985 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
1987 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
1988 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
1989 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
1990 -> Result<(), APIError> {
1991 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
1994 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
1995 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
1996 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
1997 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1998 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2002 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2003 /// local transaction(s).
2004 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2005 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2006 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2010 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2011 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
2013 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2014 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != cltv_expiry {
2015 return Err(ReceiveError {
2016 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value",
2018 err_data: byte_utils::be32_to_array(cltv_expiry).to_vec()
2021 // final_expiry_too_soon
2022 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2023 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2024 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2025 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2026 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2027 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2028 return Err(ReceiveError {
2030 err_data: Vec::new(),
2031 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2034 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
2035 return Err(ReceiveError {
2037 err_data: byte_utils::be64_to_array(amt_msat).to_vec(),
2038 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2042 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2043 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2044 return Err(ReceiveError {
2045 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2046 err_data: Vec::new(),
2047 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2050 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
2051 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2052 return Err(ReceiveError {
2053 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2054 err_data: Vec::new(),
2055 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2057 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2058 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2060 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2061 phantom_shared_secret,
2063 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2064 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2065 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2066 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2067 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2068 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2069 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2070 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2071 return Err(ReceiveError {
2072 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2073 err_data: Vec::new(),
2074 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2078 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2080 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2083 return Err(ReceiveError {
2084 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2085 err_data: Vec::new(),
2086 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2091 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2094 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2095 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2096 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_msat,
2097 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2101 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
2102 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2103 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2105 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2106 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2107 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2108 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2109 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2110 failure_code: $err_code,
2116 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2117 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2120 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key).secret_bytes();
2122 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2123 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2124 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2125 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2126 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2127 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2128 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2129 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2131 macro_rules! return_err {
2132 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2134 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2135 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2136 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2137 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2138 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
2144 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2146 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2147 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2149 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2150 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2154 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2155 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2157 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2159 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2160 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2161 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2162 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2163 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2165 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2168 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2169 let new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2170 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2172 public_key: onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx, new_pubkey, &shared_secret),
2173 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2174 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2177 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2178 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2179 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2180 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2184 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2185 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2186 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2189 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2190 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2191 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2192 outgoing_amt_msat: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2193 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2198 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref outgoing_amt_msat, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2199 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2200 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2201 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2202 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2203 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
2204 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
2205 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2206 let forwarding_id_opt = match id_option {
2207 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2208 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2210 if fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
2213 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2216 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => Some(chan_id.clone()),
2218 let chan_update_opt = if let Some(forwarding_id) = forwarding_id_opt {
2219 let chan = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2221 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and by_id maps have
2222 // no consistency guarantees.
2223 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2227 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2228 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2229 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2230 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2231 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2233 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2234 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2235 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2236 // we don't have the channel here.
2237 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2239 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2241 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2242 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2243 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2244 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2245 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2246 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2247 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2249 if *outgoing_amt_msat < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2250 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2252 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, *outgoing_amt_msat, *outgoing_cltv_value) {
2253 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2257 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2259 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2266 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2267 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2268 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2269 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2270 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2271 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2273 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2274 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2276 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2277 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2278 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2279 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2280 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2281 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2282 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2283 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2284 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2285 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2291 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2292 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2293 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2294 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2296 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2297 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2299 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2300 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2301 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2303 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2304 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2305 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2307 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2312 pending_forward_info
2315 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2316 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2317 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2319 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2320 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2321 if !chan.should_announce() {
2322 return Err(LightningError {
2323 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2324 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2327 if chan.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2328 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2330 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2331 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2334 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2335 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
2336 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2337 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2338 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2339 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2340 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2341 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
2342 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2346 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2348 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2349 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2350 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2352 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2353 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2355 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2356 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2357 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2358 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2359 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
2360 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2361 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2362 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2365 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
2366 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
2368 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2374 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
2375 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_params: &Option<PaymentParameters>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2376 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2377 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2378 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2380 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2381 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
2382 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2383 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2384 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
2386 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2388 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2390 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2391 let id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2392 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2393 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
2396 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2397 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2398 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
2400 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
2401 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
2403 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2404 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
2406 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(
2407 htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2409 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2410 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2412 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2413 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2414 }, onion_packet, &self.logger),
2417 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
2418 let update_err = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
2419 let chan_id = chan.get().channel_id();
2421 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_err, chan,
2422 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true))
2424 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure, Err(e)) => break Err(e),
2425 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed, Ok(())) => {},
2426 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress, Err(_)) => {
2427 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
2428 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
2429 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
2430 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
2431 // which we do in the send_payment check for
2432 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
2433 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
2435 _ => unreachable!(),
2438 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan_id));
2439 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2440 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
2441 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2442 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
2443 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2444 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2445 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2454 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
2455 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the `by_id` map.
2456 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
2457 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
2462 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2463 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2465 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2470 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2472 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
2473 /// fields for more info.
2475 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
2476 /// method will error with an [`APIError::RouteError`]. Note, however, that once a payment
2477 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
2478 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a second payment with the same
2481 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
2482 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
2483 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
2484 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
2485 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
2487 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
2488 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
2490 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2491 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2492 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
2494 /// In general, a path may raise:
2495 /// * [`APIError::RouteError`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2496 /// node public key) is specified.
2497 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2498 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2500 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2501 /// relevant updates.
2503 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2504 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2505 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2507 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
2508 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
2509 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
2510 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
2513 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
2514 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
2515 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2517 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2518 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
2519 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2520 let onion_session_privs = self.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, *payment_secret, payment_id, route)?;
2521 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None, payment_id, None, onion_session_privs)
2525 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
2526 self.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, route)
2529 fn add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
2530 let mut onion_session_privs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2531 for _ in 0..route.paths.len() {
2532 onion_session_privs.push(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
2535 let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2536 match pending_outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
2537 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => Err(PaymentSendFailure::DuplicatePayment),
2538 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2539 let payment = entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2540 session_privs: HashSet::new(),
2541 pending_amt_msat: 0,
2542 pending_fee_msat: Some(0),
2545 starting_block_height: self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
2546 total_msat: route.get_total_amount(),
2549 for (path, session_priv_bytes) in route.paths.iter().zip(onion_session_privs.iter()) {
2550 assert!(payment.insert(*session_priv_bytes, path));
2553 Ok(onion_session_privs)
2558 fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2559 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
2560 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
2562 if payment_secret.is_none() && route.paths.len() > 1 {
2563 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Payment secret is required for multi-path payments".to_string()}));
2565 let mut total_value = 0;
2566 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2567 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2568 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
2569 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
2570 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
2571 continue 'path_check;
2573 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
2574 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
2575 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
2576 continue 'path_check;
2579 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2580 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
2582 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
2583 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
2585 if let Some(amt_msat) = recv_value_msat {
2586 debug_assert!(amt_msat >= total_value);
2587 total_value = amt_msat;
2590 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2591 let mut results = Vec::new();
2592 debug_assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), onion_session_privs.len());
2593 for (path, session_priv) in route.paths.iter().zip(onion_session_privs.into_iter()) {
2594 let mut path_res = self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &route.payment_params, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, &keysend_preimage, session_priv);
2597 Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress) => {
2598 // While a MonitorUpdateInProgress is an Err(_), the payment is still
2599 // considered "in flight" and we shouldn't remove it from the
2600 // PendingOutboundPayment set.
2603 let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2604 if let Some(payment) = pending_outbounds.get_mut(&payment_id) {
2605 let removed = payment.remove(&session_priv, Some(path));
2606 debug_assert!(removed, "This can't happen as the payment has an entry for this path added by callers");
2608 debug_assert!(false, "This can't happen as the payment was added by callers");
2609 path_res = Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Internal error: payment disappeared during processing. Please report this bug!".to_owned() });
2613 results.push(path_res);
2615 let mut has_ok = false;
2616 let mut has_err = false;
2617 let mut pending_amt_unsent = 0;
2618 let mut max_unsent_cltv_delta = 0;
2619 for (res, path) in results.iter().zip(route.paths.iter()) {
2620 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
2621 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
2622 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress) = res {
2623 // MonitorUpdateInProgress is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
2627 } else if res.is_err() {
2628 pending_amt_unsent += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2629 max_unsent_cltv_delta = cmp::max(max_unsent_cltv_delta, path.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta);
2632 if has_err && has_ok {
2633 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure {
2636 failed_paths_retry: if pending_amt_unsent != 0 {
2637 if let Some(payment_params) = &route.payment_params {
2638 Some(RouteParameters {
2639 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2640 final_value_msat: pending_amt_unsent,
2641 final_cltv_expiry_delta: max_unsent_cltv_delta,
2647 // If we failed to send any paths, we should remove the new PaymentId from the
2648 // `pending_outbound_payments` map, as the user isn't expected to `abandon_payment`.
2649 let removed = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().remove(&payment_id).is_some();
2650 debug_assert!(removed, "We should always have a pending payment to remove here");
2651 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedResendSafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
2657 /// Retries a payment along the given [`Route`].
2659 /// Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see
2660 /// [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the
2661 /// retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, if the payment
2662 /// for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success), or if
2663 /// further retries have been disabled with [`abandon_payment`].
2665 /// [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]
2666 /// [`abandon_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`]
2667 pub fn retry_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2668 const RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE: u64 = 10;
2669 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2670 if path.len() == 0 {
2671 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2672 err: "length-0 path in route".to_string()
2677 let mut onion_session_privs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2678 for _ in 0..route.paths.len() {
2679 onion_session_privs.push(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
2682 let (total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret) = {
2683 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2684 match outbounds.get_mut(&payment_id) {
2686 let res = match payment {
2687 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2688 total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret, pending_amt_msat, ..
2690 let retry_amt_msat: u64 = route.paths.iter().map(|path| path.last().unwrap().fee_msat).sum();
2691 if retry_amt_msat + *pending_amt_msat > *total_msat * (100 + RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE) / 100 {
2692 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2693 err: format!("retry_amt_msat of {} will put pending_amt_msat (currently: {}) more than 10% over total_payment_amt_msat of {}", retry_amt_msat, pending_amt_msat, total_msat).to_string()
2696 (*total_msat, *payment_hash, *payment_secret)
2698 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => {
2699 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2700 err: "Unable to retry payments that were initially sent on LDK versions prior to 0.0.102".to_string()
2703 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {
2704 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2705 err: "Payment already completed".to_owned()
2708 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {
2709 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2710 err: "Payment already abandoned (with some HTLCs still pending)".to_owned()
2714 for (path, session_priv_bytes) in route.paths.iter().zip(onion_session_privs.iter()) {
2715 assert!(payment.insert(*session_priv_bytes, path));
2720 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2721 err: format!("Payment with ID {} not found", log_bytes!(payment_id.0)),
2725 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &payment_secret, None, payment_id, Some(total_msat), onion_session_privs)
2728 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment will occur.
2730 /// After this method returns, any future calls to [`retry_payment`] for the given `payment_id`
2731 /// will fail with [`PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError`]. If no such event has been generated,
2732 /// an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event will be generated as soon as there are no remaining
2733 /// pending HTLCs for this payment.
2735 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2736 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2737 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2739 /// [`retry_payment`]: Self::retry_payment
2740 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2741 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2742 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2743 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2745 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2746 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
2747 if let Ok(()) = payment.get_mut().mark_abandoned() {
2748 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
2749 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2751 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
2759 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2760 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2761 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2762 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2763 /// never reach the recipient.
2765 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
2766 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
2768 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2769 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2771 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2773 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2774 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
2775 let preimage = match payment_preimage {
2777 None => PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()),
2779 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0).into_inner());
2780 let onion_session_privs = self.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, None, payment_id, &route)?;
2782 match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, Some(preimage), payment_id, None, onion_session_privs) {
2783 Ok(()) => Ok(payment_hash),
2788 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
2789 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
2790 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
2791 pub fn send_probe(&self, hops: Vec<RouteHop>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2792 let payment_id = PaymentId(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
2794 let payment_hash = self.probing_cookie_from_id(&payment_id);
2797 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2798 err: "No need probing a path with less than two hops".to_string()
2802 let route = Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None };
2803 let onion_session_privs = self.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, None, payment_id, &route)?;
2805 match self.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &None, None, payment_id, None, onion_session_privs) {
2806 Ok(()) => Ok((payment_hash, payment_id)),
2811 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
2813 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
2814 let target_payment_hash = self.probing_cookie_from_id(payment_id);
2815 target_payment_hash == *payment_hash
2818 /// Returns the 'probing cookie' for the given [`PaymentId`].
2819 fn probing_cookie_from_id(&self, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> PaymentHash {
2820 let mut preimage = [0u8; 64];
2821 preimage[..32].copy_from_slice(&self.probing_cookie_secret);
2822 preimage[32..].copy_from_slice(&payment_id.0);
2823 PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage).into_inner())
2826 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2827 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2828 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
2829 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], _counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
2830 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2832 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2834 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2836 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2837 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2838 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2839 } else { unreachable!(); })
2842 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
2844 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2845 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2848 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2849 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2854 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2855 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2856 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2859 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2860 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2861 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2863 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2864 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
2865 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
2866 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
2875 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2876 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2877 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2881 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2883 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2884 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2886 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
2887 /// across the p2p network.
2889 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2890 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2892 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2893 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2894 /// keys per-channel).
2896 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2897 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2898 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2900 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2901 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2902 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2904 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
2905 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
2906 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
2907 /// for more details.
2909 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2910 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2911 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2912 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2914 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2915 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2916 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2917 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2922 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2923 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools at the next block. However, the modules
2924 // constituting our Lightning node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if
2925 // the wallet module is in advance on the LDK view, allow one more block of headroom.
2926 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 2 {
2927 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2928 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
2932 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2933 let mut output_index = None;
2934 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2935 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2936 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2937 if output_index.is_some() {
2938 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2939 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2942 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2943 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2944 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2947 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2950 if output_index.is_none() {
2951 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2952 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2955 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2959 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
2961 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
2962 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
2963 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
2964 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
2966 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
2967 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
2969 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
2970 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
2972 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
2974 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
2975 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
2976 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
2977 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
2978 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2979 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
2980 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
2981 pub fn update_channel_config(
2982 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
2983 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2984 if config.cltv_expiry_delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA {
2985 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2986 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
2990 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(
2991 &self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier,
2994 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2995 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2996 for channel_id in channel_ids {
2997 let channel_counterparty_node_id = channel_state.by_id.get(channel_id)
2998 .ok_or(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2999 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found", log_bytes!(*channel_id)),
3001 .get_counterparty_node_id();
3002 if channel_counterparty_node_id != *counterparty_node_id {
3003 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3004 err: "counterparty node id mismatch".to_owned(),
3008 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3009 let channel = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
3010 if !channel.update_config(config) {
3013 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
3014 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
3015 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
3016 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3017 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3026 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3028 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3029 /// Will likely generate further events.
3030 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3031 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3033 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
3034 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3035 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3036 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3038 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
3039 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
3041 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
3042 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3043 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
3045 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3046 match forward_info {
3047 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3048 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3049 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3050 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3051 outgoing_cltv_value, incoming_amt_msat: _
3054 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3055 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3056 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3058 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3059 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3060 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3061 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3062 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3063 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3066 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3067 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3069 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3072 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3073 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: $err_code, data: $err_data },
3079 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3080 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3082 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3086 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3087 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3089 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3093 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3094 let phantom_secret_res = self.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3095 if phantom_secret_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
3096 let phantom_shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &phantom_secret_res.unwrap()).secret_bytes();
3097 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3099 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3100 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3101 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3102 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3103 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3105 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3107 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3108 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3112 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3113 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
3114 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3115 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3121 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3124 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3127 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3128 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3129 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3130 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3131 // problem, not ours.
3137 let forward_chan_id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
3138 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
3140 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3144 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3145 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3146 match channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3147 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3148 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3151 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3152 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
3153 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
3154 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3155 match forward_info {
3156 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3157 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id: _,
3158 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3159 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
3160 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, incoming_amt_msat: _,
3163 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3164 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3165 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3166 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3167 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3168 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3169 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3170 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3172 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet, &self.logger) {
3174 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3175 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3177 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3179 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3180 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3181 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data },
3182 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3188 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3190 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3191 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
3192 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
3193 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
3194 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
3195 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
3196 // this channel currently :/.
3202 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3203 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3205 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3206 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3207 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
3209 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3210 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3212 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
3214 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3215 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3216 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3219 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3221 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3222 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
3223 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
3224 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
3225 // messages when we can.
3226 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
3227 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
3228 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
3235 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
3236 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
3239 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
3240 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
3241 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3242 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
3243 ChannelError::Ignore(_) | ChannelError::Warn(_) => {
3244 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
3246 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
3247 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
3248 let mut channel = remove_channel!(self, chan);
3249 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us.
3250 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel.channel_id(), channel.get_user_id(), channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
3253 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
3257 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3258 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
3260 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
3264 log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
3265 add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3266 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3267 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3268 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3269 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
3270 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3271 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
3272 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3274 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
3281 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3282 match forward_info {
3283 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3284 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3285 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3286 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, ..
3289 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret) = match routing {
3290 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3291 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3292 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data }, Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret)
3294 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3295 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage), None, None),
3297 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3300 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3301 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3302 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3303 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3304 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3305 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3306 phantom_shared_secret,
3308 value: outgoing_amt_msat,
3310 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
3315 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3316 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
3317 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
3318 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3319 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
3321 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3322 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3323 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3324 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3325 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3326 phantom_shared_secret,
3328 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data },
3329 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
3333 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
3334 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3335 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3336 receiver_node_id = self.keys_manager.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3337 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3340 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3341 ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3342 let mut payment_received_generated = false;
3344 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3345 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3346 payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
3349 let mut claimable_htlcs = self.claimable_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
3350 let (_, htlcs) = claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
3351 .or_insert_with(|| (purpose(), Vec::new()));
3352 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3353 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3354 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3355 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3359 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.value;
3360 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3361 total_value += htlc.value;
3362 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3363 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3364 if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat {
3365 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3366 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3367 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3369 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3371 _ => unreachable!(),
3374 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > $payment_data.total_msat {
3375 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
3376 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, $payment_data.total_msat);
3377 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3378 } else if total_value == $payment_data.total_msat {
3379 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3380 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3381 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3382 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3385 amount_msat: total_value,
3386 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3387 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3389 payment_received_generated = true;
3391 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3392 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3394 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3396 payment_received_generated
3400 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3401 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3402 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3403 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3404 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3405 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3406 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3407 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3408 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3409 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3410 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3411 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3412 let payment_preimage = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3413 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
3415 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3419 check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
3421 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3422 match self.claimable_htlcs.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_hash) {
3423 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3424 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
3425 e.insert((purpose.clone(), vec![claimable_htlc]));
3426 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3427 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3428 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3430 amount_msat: outgoing_amt_msat,
3432 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3433 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3436 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3437 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3438 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3444 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3445 if payment_data.is_none() {
3446 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3447 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3450 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3451 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3452 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3453 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3454 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3455 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3456 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3457 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3459 let payment_received_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3460 if payment_received_generated {
3461 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3467 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3468 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3476 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3477 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason, destination);
3479 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3481 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3482 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3485 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3486 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3487 events.append(&mut new_events);
3490 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3492 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3493 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3495 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3496 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3497 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3498 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3499 if background_events.is_empty() {
3503 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3505 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3506 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3507 // monitor updating completing.
3508 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
3515 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3516 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3517 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3518 self.process_background_events();
3521 fn update_channel_fee(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> (bool, NotifyOption, Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>) {
3522 if !chan.is_outbound() { return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(())); }
3523 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3524 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
3525 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3526 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3527 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3529 if !chan.is_live() {
3530 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3531 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3532 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3534 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3535 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3537 let mut retain_channel = true;
3538 let res = match chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(new_feerate, &self.logger) {
3541 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
3542 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3546 let ret_err = match res {
3547 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update))) => {
3548 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3549 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
3550 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3551 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3552 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3553 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3554 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3555 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3556 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3557 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
3564 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
3565 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3573 (retain_channel, NotifyOption::DoPersist, ret_err)
3577 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3578 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3579 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3580 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3581 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3582 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3583 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3585 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3587 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3589 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3590 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3591 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3592 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3593 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3594 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3596 handle_errors.push(err);
3606 fn remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self) {
3607 // If an outbound payment was completed, and no pending HTLCs remain, we should remove it
3608 // from the map. However, if we did that immediately when the last payment HTLC is claimed,
3609 // this could race the user making a duplicate send_payment call and our idempotency
3610 // guarantees would be violated. Instead, we wait a few timer ticks to do the actual
3611 // removal. This should be more than sufficient to ensure the idempotency of any
3612 // `send_payment` calls that were made at the same time the `PaymentSent` event was being
3614 let mut pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3615 let pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3616 pending_outbound_payments.retain(|payment_id, payment| {
3617 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, timer_ticks_without_htlcs, .. } = payment {
3618 let mut no_remaining_entries = session_privs.is_empty();
3619 if no_remaining_entries {
3620 for ev in pending_events.iter() {
3622 events::Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: Some(ev_payment_id), .. } |
3623 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ev_payment_id, .. } |
3624 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_id: Some(ev_payment_id), .. } => {
3625 if payment_id == ev_payment_id {
3626 no_remaining_entries = false;
3634 if no_remaining_entries {
3635 *timer_ticks_without_htlcs += 1;
3636 *timer_ticks_without_htlcs <= IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3638 *timer_ticks_without_htlcs = 0;
3645 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3647 /// This currently includes:
3648 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3649 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3650 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3652 /// * Expiring a channel's previous `ChannelConfig` if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
3653 /// with the current `ChannelConfig`.
3655 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
3656 /// estimate fetches.
3657 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3658 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3659 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3660 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3662 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3664 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3665 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
3667 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3668 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3669 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3670 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3671 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
3672 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3673 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3675 handle_errors.push((err, counterparty_node_id));
3677 if !retain_channel { return false; }
3679 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3680 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
3681 handle_errors.push((Err(err), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()));
3682 if needs_close { return false; }
3685 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3686 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3687 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3688 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3689 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3690 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3691 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3692 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3696 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3697 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3699 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3700 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3701 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3705 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3706 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3711 chan.maybe_expire_prev_config();
3717 self.claimable_htlcs.lock().unwrap().retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
3718 if htlcs.is_empty() {
3719 // This should be unreachable
3720 debug_assert!(false);
3723 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3724 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
3725 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
3726 if htlcs[0].total_msat == htlcs.iter().fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.value) {
3728 } else if htlcs.into_iter().any(|htlc| {
3729 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
3730 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3732 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(htlcs.into_iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.prev_hop.clone(), payment_hash.clone())));
3739 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
3740 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
3741 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone()), &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 23, data: Vec::new() }, receiver );
3744 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3745 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3748 self.remove_stale_resolved_payments();
3754 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3755 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3756 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3758 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
3759 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
3760 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentReceived`] event. Alternatively, the payment
3761 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
3763 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
3764 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
3765 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
3766 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
3767 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
3768 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3770 let removed_source = self.claimable_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(payment_hash);
3771 if let Some((_, mut sources)) = removed_source {
3772 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3773 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3774 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3775 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3776 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(
3777 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
3778 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data },
3779 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash });
3784 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3785 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3787 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
3789 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3790 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
3791 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
3792 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
3793 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
3794 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
3795 chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
3797 chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
3799 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
3800 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
3802 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3807 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3808 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3809 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3810 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
3811 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
3812 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
3813 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3814 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
3815 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
3816 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3818 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3819 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3820 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3821 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
3823 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
3824 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
3825 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
3826 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
3827 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3831 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3832 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3833 // be surfaced to the user.
3834 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
3835 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
3836 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
3838 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3839 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
3840 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3841 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3842 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
3844 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3847 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
3848 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data }, receiver);
3852 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3853 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
3854 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason,destination: HTLCDestination) {
3855 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
3857 // Ensure that the `channel_state` lock is not held when calling this function.
3858 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock_order requirement for
3859 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `channel_state` lock, which calling this
3860 // function with the `channel_state` locked would.
3861 assert!(self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
3864 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3865 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3866 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3869 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3870 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3871 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3873 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, payment_id, ref payment_params, .. } => {
3874 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3875 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3876 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3877 let mut all_paths_failed = false;
3878 let mut full_failure_ev = None;
3879 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3880 if !payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
3881 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3884 if payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3885 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received failure of HTLC with payment_hash {} after payment completion", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3888 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3889 all_paths_failed = true;
3890 if payment.get().abandoned() {
3891 full_failure_ev = Some(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
3893 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
3899 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3902 let mut retry = if let Some(payment_params_data) = payment_params {
3903 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3904 Some(RouteParameters {
3905 payment_params: payment_params_data.clone(),
3906 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3907 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3910 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3912 let path_failure = match &onion_error {
3913 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
3915 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3917 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3919 if self.payment_is_probe(payment_hash, &payment_id) {
3920 if !payment_retryable {
3921 events::Event::ProbeSuccessful {
3923 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3927 events::Event::ProbeFailed {
3929 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3935 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
3936 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
3937 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
3938 if let Some(scid) = short_channel_id {
3939 retry.as_mut().map(|r| r.payment_params.previously_failed_channels.push(scid));
3941 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3942 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3943 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3944 payment_failed_permanently: !payment_retryable,
3951 error_code: onion_error_code,
3953 error_data: onion_error_data
3957 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3963 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
3964 // TODO: We'd like to generate a NetworkUpdate for temporary
3965 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as find_route
3966 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
3968 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
3969 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
3970 let scid = path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id;
3971 retry.as_mut().map(|r| r.payment_params.previously_failed_channels.push(scid));
3973 if self.payment_is_probe(payment_hash, &payment_id) {
3974 events::Event::ProbeFailed {
3976 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3978 short_channel_id: Some(scid),
3981 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3982 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3983 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3984 payment_failed_permanently: false,
3985 network_update: None,
3988 short_channel_id: Some(scid),
3991 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
3993 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
3998 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3999 pending_events.push(path_failure);
4000 if let Some(ev) = full_failure_ev { pending_events.push(ev); }
4002 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret, outpoint }) => {
4003 let err_packet = match onion_error {
4004 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
4005 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
4006 if let Some(phantom_ss) = phantom_shared_secret {
4007 let phantom_packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&phantom_ss, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
4008 let encrypted_phantom_packet = onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&phantom_ss, &phantom_packet);
4009 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &encrypted_phantom_packet.data[..])
4011 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
4012 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
4015 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
4016 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4017 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
4021 let mut forward_event = None;
4022 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4023 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4024 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
4026 match forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
4027 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4028 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
4030 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4031 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
4034 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
4035 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4036 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
4037 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
4038 time_forwardable: time
4041 pending_events.push(events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
4042 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
4043 failed_next_destination: destination
4049 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentReceived`], generating any
4050 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
4052 /// Note that calling this method does *not* guarantee that the payment has been claimed. You
4053 /// *must* wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] event which upon a successful claim will be
4054 /// provided to your [`EventHandler`] when [`process_pending_events`] is next called.
4056 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
4057 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
4058 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
4059 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
4061 /// [`Event::PaymentReceived`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentReceived
4062 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
4063 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
4064 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4065 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4066 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
4067 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4068 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4070 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4072 let removed_source = self.claimable_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&payment_hash);
4073 if let Some((payment_purpose, mut sources)) = removed_source {
4074 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
4076 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
4077 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
4078 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
4079 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
4081 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
4082 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
4083 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
4084 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
4085 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
4087 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
4088 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
4089 let mut valid_mpp = true;
4090 let mut errs = Vec::new();
4091 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
4092 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4093 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4094 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(self.our_network_pubkey);
4095 for htlc in sources.iter() {
4096 let chan_id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4097 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
4104 if let None = channel_state.by_id.get(&chan_id) {
4109 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
4110 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4111 debug_assert!(false);
4115 expected_amt_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
4116 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload {
4117 // We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check
4118 // that there's one payment here and move on.
4119 if sources.len() != 1 {
4120 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP spontaneous payment - this should not be reachable!");
4121 debug_assert!(false);
4126 let phantom_shared_secret = htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
4127 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4128 let phantom_pubkey = self.keys_manager.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4129 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4130 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
4133 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
4135 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
4136 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
4139 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
4140 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
4141 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
4145 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4146 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
4147 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) => {
4148 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
4149 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
4150 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
4151 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
4152 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
4153 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
4155 ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
4156 ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim => {
4157 // While we should never get here in most cases, if we do, it likely
4158 // indicates that the HTLC was timed out some time ago and is no longer
4159 // available to be claimed. Thus, it does not make sense to set
4160 // `claimed_any_htlcs`.
4162 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(_) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
4166 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4168 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4169 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
4170 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
4171 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
4172 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(
4173 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
4174 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data },
4175 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash } );
4179 if claimed_any_htlcs {
4180 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
4183 purpose: payment_purpose,
4184 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
4188 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
4189 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
4190 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4191 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4196 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> ClaimFundsFromHop {
4197 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
4199 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
4200 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
4201 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4202 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
4203 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
4204 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
4205 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4206 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4208 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
4209 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4210 payment_preimage, e);
4211 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(
4212 chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4213 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(),
4214 Some(htlc_value_msat)
4218 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
4219 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
4220 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4221 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4222 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4223 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4224 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4225 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
4226 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4227 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4233 return ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(htlc_value_msat);
4235 return ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim;
4238 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
4239 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4240 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4242 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
4243 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
4244 payment_preimage, e);
4247 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4248 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
4250 chan.remove_entry();
4252 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(counterparty_node_id, res, None);
4255 } else { return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed }
4258 fn finalize_claims(&self, mut sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4259 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4260 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4261 for source in sources.drain(..) {
4262 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } = source {
4263 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
4264 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
4265 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
4266 assert!(payment.get().is_fulfilled());
4267 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, None) {
4268 pending_events.push(
4269 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
4271 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash(),
4281 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
4283 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4284 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4285 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
4286 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
4287 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4288 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
4289 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4290 if !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
4291 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4292 let fee_paid_msat = payment.get().get_pending_fee_msat();
4293 pending_events.push(
4294 events::Event::PaymentSent {
4295 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
4301 payment.get_mut().mark_fulfilled();
4305 // We currently immediately remove HTLCs which were fulfilled on-chain.
4306 // This could potentially lead to removing a pending payment too early,
4307 // with a reorg of one block causing us to re-add the fulfilled payment on
4309 // TODO: We should have a second monitor event that informs us of payments
4310 // irrevocably fulfilled.
4311 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
4312 let payment_hash = Some(PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner()));
4313 pending_events.push(
4314 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
4323 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
4326 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4327 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4328 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage);
4329 let claimed_htlc = if let ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim = res { false } else { true };
4330 let htlc_claim_value_msat = match res {
4331 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(_, _, amt_opt) => amt_opt,
4332 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(amt) => Some(amt),
4335 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed = res {
4336 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4337 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4338 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4339 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4342 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4343 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
4344 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
4345 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update);
4346 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
4347 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
4348 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
4349 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
4350 // again on restart.
4351 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4352 payment_preimage, update_res);
4354 // Note that we do *not* set `claimed_htlc` to false here. In fact, this
4355 // totally could be a duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing
4356 // without interrogating the `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above
4357 // update to. Instead, we simply document in `PaymentForwarded` that this
4360 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4361 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) = res {
4362 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4363 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4367 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4368 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4369 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4372 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4373 let prev_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
4374 let next_channel_id = Some(next_channel_id);
4376 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4378 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4388 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4389 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4390 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4393 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
4394 /// update completion.
4395 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4396 channel: &mut Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
4397 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
4398 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
4399 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
4400 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
4401 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
4403 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get_counterparty_node_id();
4404 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4405 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.outbound_scid_alias()),
4406 channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
4409 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4410 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
4412 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
4413 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4414 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4419 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel);
4421 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
4422 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
4423 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4424 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4429 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
4430 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
4431 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4432 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4433 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4438 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
4442 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
4448 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
4449 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
4450 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4456 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
4457 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4460 let (mut pending_failures, finalized_claims, counterparty_node_id) = {
4461 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4462 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4463 let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4464 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4465 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4467 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4471 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4472 let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
4473 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() {
4474 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
4475 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
4476 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
4477 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
4479 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()) {
4480 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4481 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4486 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(&mut channel_state.pending_msg_events, channel.get_mut(), updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready, updates.announcement_sigs);
4487 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4488 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4491 (updates.failed_htlcs, updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs, counterparty_node_id)
4493 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
4494 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
4496 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claims);
4497 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4498 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id: funding_txo.to_channel_id() };
4499 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2, receiver);
4503 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4505 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4506 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4509 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4510 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4511 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4513 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
4514 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
4515 /// used to accept such channels.
4517 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4518 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4519 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4520 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4523 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4524 /// it as confirmed immediately.
4526 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4527 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4528 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4530 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4531 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
4533 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
4534 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
4536 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
4537 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
4539 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4540 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4541 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4542 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
4545 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4546 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4548 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4549 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4550 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4551 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4552 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4553 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4555 if *counterparty_node_id != channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id() {
4556 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The passed counterparty_node_id doesn't match the channel's counterparty node_id".to_owned() });
4559 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
4560 } else if channel.get().get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4561 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4562 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4563 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4564 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
4567 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4568 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4569 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
4572 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4573 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4574 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4577 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4578 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Can't accept a channel that doesn't exist".to_owned() });
4584 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4585 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4586 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4589 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4590 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4593 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
4594 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
4595 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
4597 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4598 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager,
4599 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &their_features, msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration,
4600 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4603 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4604 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4608 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4609 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4610 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4611 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4612 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4613 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4615 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4616 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4617 if channel.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4618 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4620 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4621 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4622 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4625 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4626 pending_events.push(
4627 events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4628 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4629 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4630 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4631 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4632 channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4637 entry.insert(channel);
4643 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4644 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4645 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4646 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4647 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4648 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4649 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4650 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4652 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &their_features), chan);
4653 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4655 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4658 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4659 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4660 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4661 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4662 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4664 user_channel_id: user_id,
4669 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4670 let ((funding_msg, monitor, mut channel_ready), mut chan) = {
4671 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4672 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4673 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4674 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4675 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4676 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4677 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4679 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), chan), chan.remove())
4681 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4684 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
4685 // lock before watch_channel
4686 match self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
4687 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4688 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
4689 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4690 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4691 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4692 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4693 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
4694 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
4695 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4696 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(false);
4697 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4698 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
4700 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
4701 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4702 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4703 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
4704 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4705 chan.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, channel_ready.is_some(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4706 channel_ready = None; // Don't send the channel_ready now
4709 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4710 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4711 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4712 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4713 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4715 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4716 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4717 match id_to_peer.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
4718 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4719 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4720 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
4721 funding_msg.channel_id))
4723 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
4724 i_e.insert(chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
4727 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4728 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4731 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4732 send_channel_ready!(self, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
4740 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4742 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4743 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4744 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4745 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4746 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4747 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4748 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4750 let (monitor, funding_tx, channel_ready) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
4751 Ok(update) => update,
4752 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan),
4754 match self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
4755 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4757 let mut res = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, channel_ready.is_some(), OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED);
4758 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4759 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4760 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4761 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4762 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4763 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4769 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4770 send_channel_ready!(self, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get(), msg);
4774 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4777 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
4778 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
4782 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4783 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4784 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4785 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4786 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4787 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4788 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4790 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, self.get_our_node_id(),
4791 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
4792 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4793 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4794 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4795 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4796 msg: announcement_sigs,
4798 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4799 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4800 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4801 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4802 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4803 // announcement_signatures.
4804 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4805 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4806 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4807 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4813 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, chan.get_mut());
4817 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4821 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4822 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4823 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4824 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4825 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4827 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4828 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4829 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4830 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4833 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4834 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4835 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4836 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4839 let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), chan_entry);
4840 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4842 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4843 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
4844 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
4845 let (result, is_permanent) =
4846 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
4848 remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
4853 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4854 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4855 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4862 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4865 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4866 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
4867 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
4870 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
4874 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4875 let (tx, chan_option) = {
4876 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4877 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4878 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4879 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4880 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4881 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4883 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
4884 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
4885 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4886 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4891 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
4892 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
4893 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
4894 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
4895 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
4896 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
4897 } else { (tx, None) }
4899 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4902 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
4903 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
4904 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
4906 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
4907 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4908 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4909 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4913 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4918 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4919 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
4920 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
4921 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
4923 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
4924 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
4925 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
4926 //but we should prevent it anyway.
4928 let pending_forward_info = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
4929 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4930 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4932 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4933 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4934 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4935 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4938 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
4939 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
4940 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
4941 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
4942 match pending_forward_info {
4943 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
4944 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
4945 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
4946 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, real_code, &error_data)
4948 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &[])
4950 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4951 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
4952 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4955 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
4957 _ => pending_forward_info
4960 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), chan);
4962 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4967 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4968 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4969 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
4970 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4971 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4972 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4973 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4974 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4976 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan)
4978 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4981 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
4985 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4986 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4987 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4988 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4989 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4990 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4991 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4993 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), chan);
4995 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5000 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5001 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5002 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5003 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5004 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5005 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5006 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5008 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
5009 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
5010 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
5012 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), chan);
5015 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5019 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5020 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5021 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5022 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5023 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5024 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5025 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5027 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
5028 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
5029 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan),
5030 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
5031 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
5032 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
5033 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan);
5038 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
5039 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some()) {
5043 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
5044 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5045 msg: revoke_and_ack,
5047 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
5048 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5049 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5050 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
5051 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5052 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5053 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5054 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5056 commitment_signed: msg,
5062 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5067 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
5068 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
5069 let mut forward_event = None;
5070 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5071 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5072 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
5073 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
5075 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
5076 match forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
5077 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
5078 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
5079 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
5081 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5082 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5083 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
5085 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5086 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5087 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
5092 match forward_event {
5094 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5095 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
5096 time_forwardable: time
5104 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5105 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
5107 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5108 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5109 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5110 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5111 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5112 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5114 let was_paused_for_mon_update = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
5115 let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self,
5116 chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5117 htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs;
5118 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), raa_updates.monitor_update);
5119 if was_paused_for_mon_update {
5120 assert!(update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
5121 assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none());
5122 assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty());
5123 assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty());
5124 assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty());
5125 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Existing pending monitor update prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
5127 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
5128 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan,
5129 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
5130 raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(), false,
5131 raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
5132 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
5134 } else { unreachable!(); }
5136 if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update {
5137 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5138 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5142 break Ok((raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
5143 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs,
5144 chan.get().get_short_channel_id()
5145 .unwrap_or(chan.get().outbound_scid_alias()),
5146 chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(),
5147 chan.get().get_user_id()))
5149 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5152 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
5154 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, finalized_claim_htlcs,
5155 short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, user_channel_id)) =>
5157 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
5158 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: channel_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5159 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2, receiver);
5161 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, user_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
5162 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claim_htlcs);
5169 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5170 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5171 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5172 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5173 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5174 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5175 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5177 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
5179 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5184 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5185 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5186 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5188 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5189 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5190 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5191 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5193 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
5194 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
5197 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5198 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
5199 self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), msg), chan),
5200 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5201 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5202 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
5205 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5210 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
5211 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5212 let chan_id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
5213 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
5215 // It's not a local channel
5216 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5219 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5220 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5221 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5222 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5223 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5224 if chan.get().should_announce() {
5225 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
5226 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
5227 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
5228 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5230 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
5232 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
5233 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
5234 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
5235 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5237 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
5238 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
5241 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5243 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
5246 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5248 let need_lnd_workaround = {
5249 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5250 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5252 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5253 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5254 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5255 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5257 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
5258 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
5259 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
5260 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
5261 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
5262 msg, &self.logger, self.our_network_pubkey.clone(), self.genesis_hash,
5263 &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
5264 let mut channel_update = None;
5265 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
5266 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5267 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5270 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
5271 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
5272 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
5273 // they have the latest channel parameters.
5274 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5275 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5276 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
5281 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
5282 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
5283 &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
5284 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
5285 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
5286 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
5290 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5294 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
5295 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
5298 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
5299 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
5304 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
5305 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
5306 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5307 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5308 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5309 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5310 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
5311 match monitor_event {
5312 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5313 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5314 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5315 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
5317 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5318 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5319 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
5322 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5323 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5324 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5325 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5326 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5327 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5328 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5329 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5330 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
5331 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5332 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5336 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5337 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5339 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5341 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
5342 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5343 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5344 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5345 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5350 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5351 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id);
5357 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5358 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5361 has_pending_monitor_events
5364 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5365 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5366 /// update events as a separate process method here.
5368 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5369 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
5372 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5373 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5374 /// update was applied.
5376 /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
5377 /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
5378 /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
5379 /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
5380 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5381 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5382 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5383 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5385 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5386 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5387 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5388 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5390 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5391 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
5392 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
5393 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5395 holding_cell_failed_htlcs,
5397 chan.get_counterparty_node_id()
5400 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
5401 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
5402 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
5403 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5404 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5405 updates: commitment_update,
5409 has_monitor_update = true;
5410 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, channel_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
5411 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
5412 if close_channel { return false; }
5419 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5420 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5421 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
5428 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5429 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5430 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
5433 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5434 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5440 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5441 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5442 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5443 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5444 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5445 let mut has_update = false;
5447 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5448 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5449 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5450 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5452 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5453 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5454 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5455 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5457 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5458 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5461 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5462 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5463 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5464 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5465 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5470 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5472 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5473 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
5474 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
5480 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5481 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5488 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5489 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5495 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5496 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5498 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5499 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5500 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5501 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5502 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5503 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5504 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5505 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5506 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5507 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5508 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5509 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5510 assert!(should_broadcast);
5511 } else { unreachable!(); }
5512 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
5514 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5518 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5519 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5521 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5522 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5525 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5527 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5528 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5529 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5530 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5531 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5532 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5533 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5534 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5535 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5536 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5537 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5538 // never fail a payment too early.
5539 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5541 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5544 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5549 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5552 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5553 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5555 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
5556 /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5557 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5559 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5561 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5562 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5566 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5567 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5569 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5571 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5572 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5573 /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
5574 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5575 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5576 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, &self.keys_manager, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5579 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5580 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5582 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5585 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5587 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5589 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5590 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5591 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5592 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5593 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5596 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5597 /// stored external to LDK.
5599 /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5600 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5601 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5603 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5604 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5607 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5608 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5609 /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5610 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5612 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5613 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5614 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5615 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5616 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5618 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5619 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5620 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
5621 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5622 /// [`PaymentReceived`].
5624 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
5625 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
5627 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5628 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5632 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5633 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5635 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5637 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5638 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5639 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5640 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5643 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5644 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5646 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5649 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5651 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5653 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5654 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5657 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5658 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5660 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5661 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5662 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5665 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5666 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5668 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5669 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5670 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5671 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5673 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
5674 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5675 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
5676 Some(_) => continue,
5677 None => return scid_candidate
5682 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5684 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5685 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5687 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5688 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5689 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5693 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
5694 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
5695 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
5696 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
5698 for chan in self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.values() {
5699 for htlc_source in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
5700 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
5701 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
5709 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5710 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5711 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5712 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
5713 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5718 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5719 !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().is_empty()
5723 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5724 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().clear()
5727 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
5728 /// using the given event handler.
5730 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
5731 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
5734 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock until the returned future completes so that
5735 // we can be sure no other persists happen while processing events.
5736 let _read_guard = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
5738 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5740 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5741 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5742 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5743 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5746 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5747 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5748 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5751 for event in pending_events {
5752 handler(event).await;
5755 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
5756 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
5761 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
5762 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
5763 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5764 K::Target: KeysInterface,
5765 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5768 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5769 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5770 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5771 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5773 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5774 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5775 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5776 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5779 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5780 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5782 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
5783 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5786 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
5787 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5788 mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
5790 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5791 events.replace(pending_events);
5800 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
5802 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
5803 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5804 K::Target: KeysInterface,
5805 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5808 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
5810 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
5811 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
5812 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
5813 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5814 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5816 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5817 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5818 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5819 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5822 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5823 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5824 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5827 for event in pending_events {
5828 handler.handle_event(event);
5836 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
5838 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
5839 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5840 K::Target: KeysInterface,
5841 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5844 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5846 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5847 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
5848 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
5849 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
5850 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
5853 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
5854 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
5857 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5858 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5859 let new_height = height - 1;
5861 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
5862 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
5863 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
5864 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
5865 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
5866 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
5869 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5873 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
5875 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
5876 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5877 K::Target: KeysInterface,
5878 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5881 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5882 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5883 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5884 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5886 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5887 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
5889 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5890 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger)
5891 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
5893 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5894 if height < last_best_block_height {
5895 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5896 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5900 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5901 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5902 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5903 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5905 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5906 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
5908 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5910 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
5912 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5914 macro_rules! max_time {
5915 ($timestamp: expr) => {
5917 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
5918 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
5919 // having an explicit local time source.
5920 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
5921 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
5922 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5923 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
5924 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
5930 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
5931 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5932 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
5933 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
5937 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
5938 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5939 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
5940 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
5941 if let (Some(funding_txo), block_hash) = (chan.get_funding_txo(), chan.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
5942 res.push((funding_txo.txid, block_hash));
5948 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
5949 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5950 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
5951 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
5952 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
5953 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
5954 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5955 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5960 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
5962 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
5963 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5964 K::Target: KeysInterface,
5965 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5968 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
5969 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
5971 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
5972 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
5973 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5974 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5975 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5977 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5978 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5980 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5981 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5982 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5983 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
5984 let res = f(channel);
5985 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
5986 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
5987 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
5988 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
5990 }, HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.channel_id() }));
5992 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
5993 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
5994 if channel.is_usable() {
5995 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5996 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
5997 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5998 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6003 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6007 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel);
6009 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
6010 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6011 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6012 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6013 msg: announcement_sigs,
6015 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6016 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, height) {
6017 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6019 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6020 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6021 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap(),
6026 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
6027 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
6028 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
6029 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
6030 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
6031 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
6032 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
6033 // is always consistent.
6034 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
6035 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
6036 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()),
6037 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
6038 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
6041 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
6042 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, channel);
6043 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
6044 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
6045 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
6046 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
6047 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6051 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
6052 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
6053 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6054 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6055 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
6056 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6057 data: reason_message,
6066 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6067 self.claimable_htlcs.lock().unwrap().retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
6068 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
6069 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
6070 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
6071 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
6072 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
6073 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6074 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
6075 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
6077 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
6078 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
6079 data: htlc_msat_height_data
6080 }, HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
6084 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
6088 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
6090 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
6091 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(source, &payment_hash, reason, destination);
6095 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
6096 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
6097 /// [`await_persistable_update`], [`await_persistable_update_timeout`], or a future returned by
6098 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`] is guaranteed to be woken up.
6100 /// Note that this method is not available with the `no-std` feature.
6102 /// [`await_persistable_update`]: Self::await_persistable_update
6103 /// [`await_persistable_update_timeout`]: Self::await_persistable_update_timeout
6104 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`]: Self::get_persistable_update_future
6105 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
6106 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
6107 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
6110 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
6111 /// [`await_persistable_update`], `await_persistable_update_timeout`, or a future returned by
6112 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`] is guaranteed to be woken up.
6114 /// [`await_persistable_update`]: Self::await_persistable_update
6115 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`]: Self::get_persistable_update_future
6116 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
6117 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
6120 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when a persistable update is available. Note that
6121 /// callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this [`ChannelManager`] and
6122 /// should instead register actions to be taken later.
6123 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
6124 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
6127 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6128 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
6129 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
6132 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
6133 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
6134 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
6135 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
6139 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref >
6140 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
6141 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
6142 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6143 K::Target: KeysInterface,
6144 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6147 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
6148 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6149 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6152 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
6153 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6154 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6157 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
6158 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6159 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6162 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
6163 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6164 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6167 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
6168 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6169 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6172 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
6173 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6174 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6177 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
6178 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6179 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6182 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
6183 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6184 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6187 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
6188 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6189 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6192 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
6193 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6194 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6197 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
6198 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6199 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6202 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
6203 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6204 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6207 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
6208 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6209 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6212 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
6213 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6214 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6217 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
6218 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6219 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6222 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
6223 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6224 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
6227 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
6232 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
6233 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6234 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6237 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
6238 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6239 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6240 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
6242 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6243 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
6244 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
6245 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates. We believe we {} make future connections to this peer.",
6246 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id), if no_connection_possible { "cannot" } else { "can" });
6247 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6248 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6249 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
6250 if chan.is_shutdown() {
6251 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
6252 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
6255 no_channels_remain = false;
6260 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
6262 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6263 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6264 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6265 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6266 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6267 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6268 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6269 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6270 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6271 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6272 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6273 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6274 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6275 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
6276 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6277 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6278 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
6279 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
6280 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
6281 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
6285 if no_channels_remain {
6286 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
6289 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6290 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6294 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) -> Result<(), ()> {
6295 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
6296 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting with no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6300 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6302 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6305 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6306 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
6307 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6308 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
6309 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
6312 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
6313 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
6318 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6319 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
6320 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
6321 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6322 let retain = if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6323 if !chan.have_received_message() {
6324 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
6325 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
6326 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
6330 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6331 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6332 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
6337 if retain && chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6338 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()) {
6339 if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
6340 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
6341 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6349 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
6353 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
6354 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6356 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
6357 for chan in self.list_channels() {
6358 if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
6359 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6360 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6365 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
6366 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6367 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
6368 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6371 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
6372 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
6373 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6381 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6382 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6386 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6387 provided_node_features()
6390 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
6391 provided_init_features()
6395 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6396 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6397 pub fn provided_node_features() -> NodeFeatures {
6398 provided_init_features().to_context()
6401 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6402 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6404 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6405 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6406 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6407 pub fn provided_invoice_features() -> InvoiceFeatures {
6408 provided_init_features().to_context()
6411 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6412 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6413 pub fn provided_channel_features() -> ChannelFeatures {
6414 provided_init_features().to_context()
6417 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6418 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6419 pub fn provided_init_features() -> InitFeatures {
6420 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
6421 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the ChannelMessageHandler impl for
6422 // ErroringMessageHandler.
6423 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
6424 features.set_data_loss_protect_optional();
6425 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
6426 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
6427 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
6428 features.set_payment_secret_required();
6429 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
6430 features.set_wumbo_optional();
6431 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
6432 features.set_channel_type_optional();
6433 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
6434 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
6438 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6439 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6441 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
6442 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
6443 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
6444 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
6447 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
6448 (2, node_id, required),
6449 (4, features, required),
6450 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
6451 (8, forwarding_info, option),
6452 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6453 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6456 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
6457 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6458 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6459 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6460 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
6461 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
6462 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6463 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
6464 (2, self.channel_id, required),
6465 (3, self.channel_type, option),
6466 (4, self.counterparty, required),
6467 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
6468 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
6469 (7, self.config, option),
6470 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
6471 (9, self.confirmations, option),
6472 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
6473 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6474 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6475 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
6476 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6477 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6478 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6479 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6480 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6481 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
6482 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
6483 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
6484 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
6485 (30, self.is_usable, required),
6486 (32, self.is_public, required),
6487 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6488 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6489 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6495 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
6496 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6497 init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6498 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
6499 (2, channel_id, required),
6500 (3, channel_type, option),
6501 (4, counterparty, required),
6502 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6503 (6, funding_txo, option),
6504 (7, config, option),
6505 (8, short_channel_id, option),
6506 (9, confirmations, option),
6507 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
6508 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6509 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6510 (16, balance_msat, required),
6511 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6512 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6513 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6514 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6515 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6516 (22, confirmations_required, option),
6517 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
6518 (26, is_outbound, required),
6519 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
6520 (30, is_usable, required),
6521 (32, is_public, required),
6522 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6523 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6524 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6527 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6528 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6529 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
6530 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
6531 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
6535 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
6537 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
6538 outbound_scid_alias,
6542 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
6543 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
6545 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
6546 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6547 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
6548 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6549 confirmations_required,
6551 force_close_spend_delay,
6552 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
6553 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
6554 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
6555 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
6556 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
6557 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
6562 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
6563 (2, channels, vec_type),
6564 (4, phantom_scid, required),
6565 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
6568 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
6570 (0, onion_packet, required),
6571 (2, short_channel_id, required),
6574 (0, payment_data, required),
6575 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6576 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6578 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
6579 (0, payment_preimage, required),
6580 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6584 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
6585 (0, routing, required),
6586 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
6587 (4, payment_hash, required),
6588 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
6589 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
6590 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
6594 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6595 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6597 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
6599 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6600 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6601 reason.write(writer)?;
6603 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6604 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
6607 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6608 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6609 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
6610 failure_code.write(writer)?;
6617 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6618 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6619 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6622 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6623 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6624 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6625 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
6629 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6630 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6631 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6632 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
6633 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
6636 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
6637 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
6638 // messages contained in the variants.
6639 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
6640 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
6641 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
6643 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6644 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6645 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6646 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6647 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
6650 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6651 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6652 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6653 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6654 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
6656 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6661 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
6666 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
6667 (0, short_channel_id, required),
6668 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6669 (2, outpoint, required),
6670 (4, htlc_id, required),
6671 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
6674 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
6675 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6676 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
6677 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
6678 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
6680 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6681 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
6682 (1, self.total_msat, required),
6683 (2, self.value, required),
6684 (4, payment_data, option),
6685 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
6686 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
6692 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
6693 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6694 let mut prev_hop = crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6696 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
6697 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
6698 let mut total_msat = None;
6699 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
6700 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6701 (0, prev_hop, required),
6702 (1, total_msat, option),
6703 (2, value, required),
6704 (4, payment_data, option),
6705 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
6706 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
6708 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
6710 if payment_data.is_some() {
6711 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6713 if total_msat.is_none() {
6714 total_msat = Some(value);
6716 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
6719 if total_msat.is_none() {
6720 if payment_data.is_none() {
6721 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6723 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
6725 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
6729 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
6732 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
6739 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
6740 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6741 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6744 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6745 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
6746 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
6747 let mut payment_id = None;
6748 let mut payment_secret = None;
6749 let mut payment_params = None;
6750 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6751 (0, session_priv, required),
6752 (1, payment_id, option),
6753 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6754 (3, payment_secret, option),
6755 (4, path, vec_type),
6756 (5, payment_params, option),
6758 if payment_id.is_none() {
6759 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
6761 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
6763 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6764 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
6765 first_hop_htlc_msat,
6766 path: path.unwrap(),
6767 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
6772 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6773 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6778 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
6779 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
6781 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payment_params } => {
6783 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
6784 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6785 (0, session_priv, required),
6786 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
6787 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6788 (3, payment_secret, option),
6789 (4, *path, vec_type),
6790 (5, payment_params, option),
6793 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
6795 field.write(writer)?;
6802 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason,
6803 (0, LightningError) => {
6807 (0, failure_code, required),
6808 (2, data, vec_type),
6812 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
6813 (0, forward_info, required),
6814 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
6815 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
6816 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
6817 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
6820 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
6822 (0, htlc_id, required),
6823 (2, err_packet, required),
6828 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
6829 (0, payment_secret, required),
6830 (2, expiry_time, required),
6831 (4, user_payment_id, required),
6832 (6, payment_preimage, required),
6833 (8, min_value_msat, required),
6836 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(PendingOutboundPayment,
6838 (0, session_privs, required),
6841 (0, session_privs, required),
6842 (1, payment_hash, option),
6843 (3, timer_ticks_without_htlcs, (default_value, 0)),
6846 (0, session_privs, required),
6847 (1, pending_fee_msat, option),
6848 (2, payment_hash, required),
6849 (4, payment_secret, option),
6850 (6, total_msat, required),
6851 (8, pending_amt_msat, required),
6852 (10, starting_block_height, required),
6855 (0, session_privs, required),
6856 (2, payment_hash, required),
6860 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
6861 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
6862 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6863 K::Target: KeysInterface,
6864 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6867 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6868 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
6870 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6872 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
6874 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6875 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
6876 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
6880 // Take `channel_state` lock temporarily to avoid creating a lock order that requires
6881 // that the `forward_htlcs` lock is taken after `channel_state`
6882 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6883 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
6884 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6885 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6886 unfunded_channels += 1;
6889 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
6890 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6891 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6892 channel.write(writer)?;
6898 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6899 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6900 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
6901 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6902 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6903 for forward in pending_forwards {
6904 forward.write(writer)?;
6909 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6910 let claimable_htlcs = self.claimable_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6911 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6913 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
6914 (claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6915 for (payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops)) in claimable_htlcs.iter() {
6916 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6917 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6918 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
6919 htlc.write(writer)?;
6921 htlc_purposes.push(purpose);
6924 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6925 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6926 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6927 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
6928 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6929 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
6932 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6933 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6934 for event in events.iter() {
6935 event.write(writer)?;
6938 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
6939 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6940 for event in background_events.iter() {
6942 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
6944 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
6945 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
6950 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
6951 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
6952 // likely to be identical.
6953 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6954 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6956 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6957 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
6958 hash.write(writer)?;
6959 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
6962 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
6963 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
6964 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6965 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
6966 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
6969 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
6970 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6972 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6973 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6974 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
6975 session_priv.write(writer)?;
6978 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
6979 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
6983 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
6984 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
6985 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6987 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6988 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6989 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
6994 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6995 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
6996 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
6997 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
6998 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
6999 (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7000 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
7007 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
7009 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
7011 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7012 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
7013 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
7014 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
7015 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
7016 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
7017 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
7018 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
7019 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7020 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
7021 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
7022 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
7023 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
7025 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
7026 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
7028 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
7029 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
7031 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
7032 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
7033 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
7034 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
7035 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
7036 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
7038 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
7039 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
7040 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
7041 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7042 K::Target: KeysInterface,
7043 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7046 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
7047 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
7049 pub keys_manager: K,
7051 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7053 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
7054 pub fee_estimator: F,
7055 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7057 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
7058 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
7059 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
7060 pub chain_monitor: M,
7062 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
7063 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
7064 /// force-closed during deserialization.
7065 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
7066 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
7067 /// deserialization.
7069 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
7070 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
7071 pub default_config: UserConfig,
7073 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
7074 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
7076 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
7077 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
7078 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
7079 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
7081 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
7084 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
7085 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>,
7088 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
7089 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, L>
7090 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
7091 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7092 K::Target: KeysInterface,
7093 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7096 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
7097 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
7098 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
7099 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
7100 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>) -> Self {
7102 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
7103 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
7108 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
7109 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
7110 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
7111 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>>)
7112 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
7113 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7114 K::Target: KeysInterface,
7115 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7118 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7119 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
7120 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
7124 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
7125 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>)
7126 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
7127 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7128 K::Target: KeysInterface,
7129 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7132 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7133 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7135 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7136 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7137 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7139 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7141 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7142 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7143 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7144 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7145 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7146 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
7147 for _ in 0..channel_count {
7148 let mut channel: Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (&args.keys_manager, best_block_height))?;
7149 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7150 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
7151 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
7152 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7153 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7154 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7155 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7156 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
7157 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
7158 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7159 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7160 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7161 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7162 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7163 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7164 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7165 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7166 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7167 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7168 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7169 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
7170 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
7171 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
7172 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7173 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7174 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
7175 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
7176 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
7177 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7178 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7179 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7180 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
7183 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7184 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
7185 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7187 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7188 id_to_peer.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel.get_counterparty_node_id());
7190 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7192 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
7193 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
7194 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
7195 // safely discard the channel.
7196 let _ = channel.force_shutdown(false);
7197 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7198 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7199 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7200 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
7203 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7204 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7205 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7206 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7207 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7208 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7212 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
7213 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
7214 log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
7215 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
7219 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
7220 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7221 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7222 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
7223 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7224 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7225 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
7226 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
7227 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
7229 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
7232 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7233 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7234 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
7235 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7236 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7237 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
7238 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
7239 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
7241 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
7244 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7245 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
7246 for _ in 0..peer_count {
7247 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7248 let peer_state = PeerState {
7249 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
7251 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
7254 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7255 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
7256 for _ in 0..event_count {
7257 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
7258 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
7262 if forward_htlcs_count > 0 {
7263 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
7264 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
7265 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
7266 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
7267 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
7268 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
7269 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
7273 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7274 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
7275 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
7276 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7277 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
7278 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7282 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
7283 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7285 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7286 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
7287 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
7288 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
7289 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7293 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7294 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
7295 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
7296 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
7297 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
7298 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
7299 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
7301 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
7302 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7306 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
7307 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
7308 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
7309 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
7310 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7311 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7312 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
7313 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7314 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
7315 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
7316 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
7317 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
7318 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7319 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
7321 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
7322 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
7325 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
7326 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
7329 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
7330 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
7331 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
7332 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
7333 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
7334 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
7336 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
7338 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
7339 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
7340 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
7341 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
7342 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
7343 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
7344 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
7346 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7347 if by_id.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
7348 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() {
7349 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
7350 if path.is_empty() {
7351 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
7352 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7354 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
7355 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
7356 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
7357 match pending_outbound_payments.as_mut().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
7358 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7359 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
7360 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
7361 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
7363 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7364 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
7365 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
7366 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
7367 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
7369 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
7370 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
7371 total_msat: path_amt,
7372 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
7374 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
7375 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
7384 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
7385 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
7387 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
7388 if let Some(mut purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
7389 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
7390 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7392 for (purpose, (payment_hash, previous_hops)) in purposes.drain(..).zip(claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..)) {
7393 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7396 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
7397 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
7398 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
7399 if previous_hops.is_empty() {
7400 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7402 let purpose = match &previous_hops[0].onion_payload {
7403 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
7404 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
7405 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
7406 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
7407 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
7408 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
7409 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
7411 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7412 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7416 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
7418 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
7420 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
7421 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
7423 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7427 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7428 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
7430 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
7431 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
7434 let our_network_key = match args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node) {
7436 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7438 let our_network_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &our_network_key);
7439 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
7440 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
7441 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
7442 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7446 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
7447 for (chan_id, chan) in by_id.iter_mut() {
7448 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
7449 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
7451 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
7452 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.keys_manager);
7453 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
7455 chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
7456 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
7457 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7458 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7459 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7460 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7462 if chan.is_usable() {
7463 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
7464 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7465 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7466 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7467 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7472 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
7474 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7475 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
7476 if let Some((payment_purpose, claimable_htlcs)) = claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
7477 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7478 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
7479 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
7480 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
7481 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
7482 let phantom_pubkey = args.keys_manager.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
7483 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
7484 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
7486 for claimable_htlc in claimable_htlcs {
7487 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
7489 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
7490 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
7491 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
7492 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
7494 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
7495 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
7496 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
7497 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
7499 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
7500 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
7501 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
7502 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
7504 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
7505 if let Some(channel) = by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
7506 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
7508 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
7509 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
7512 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
7515 purpose: payment_purpose,
7516 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
7522 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
7524 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
7525 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
7526 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
7528 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
7530 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
7532 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7534 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
7535 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
7536 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
7538 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
7539 claimable_htlcs: Mutex::new(claimable_htlcs),
7540 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
7541 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
7542 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
7543 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
7545 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
7551 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
7553 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
7555 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
7556 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
7557 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
7558 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
7560 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
7561 logger: args.logger,
7562 default_configuration: args.default_config,
7565 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7566 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
7567 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
7568 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
7571 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
7572 //connection or two.
7574 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
7580 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7581 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7582 use core::time::Duration;
7583 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
7584 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
7585 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure};
7586 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7587 use crate::ln::msgs;
7588 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
7589 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
7590 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7591 use crate::util::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
7592 use crate::util::test_utils;
7593 use crate::chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
7596 fn test_notify_limits() {
7597 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
7598 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
7599 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7600 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7601 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7602 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7604 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
7605 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
7606 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7607 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7608 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7610 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7612 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
7613 // to connect messages with new values
7614 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7615 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7616 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7617 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7619 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
7620 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7621 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7622 // ... but the last node should not.
7623 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7624 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
7625 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7626 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7628 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
7629 // about the channel.
7630 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7631 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7632 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7634 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
7636 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7637 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7638 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7639 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7640 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7641 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7643 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
7644 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7645 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7647 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
7648 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
7649 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
7650 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
7651 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
7652 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
7654 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
7655 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
7656 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7657 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7658 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7659 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7660 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7661 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7663 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
7664 // the channel info has updated.
7665 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7666 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7667 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7668 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7669 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7670 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7674 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
7675 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
7677 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7678 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7679 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7680 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7681 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7683 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
7684 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
7685 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
7686 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
7688 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
7689 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
7690 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
7691 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
7692 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
7693 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
7694 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7695 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7696 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7697 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
7699 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
7700 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
7701 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7702 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7703 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7704 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7705 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7706 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7707 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7708 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7709 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7710 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
7711 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7712 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7713 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7714 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7715 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7716 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7717 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7718 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7719 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7720 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
7722 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
7723 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
7724 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7725 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7726 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7727 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
7729 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
7730 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
7731 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
7732 // lightning messages manually.
7733 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7734 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
7735 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7737 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7738 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7739 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
7740 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7741 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7742 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
7743 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7744 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7745 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
7746 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7747 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7748 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7749 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7750 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7751 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7752 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
7753 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7754 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7755 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
7756 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7757 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7758 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7759 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7760 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
7761 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7763 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
7764 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
7765 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7766 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
7768 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
7769 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
7770 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
7771 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
7773 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7776 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7777 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7778 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7779 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7781 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7784 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7785 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7786 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7787 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7789 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7794 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
7795 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
7796 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
7797 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
7798 // fails as expected.
7799 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7800 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7801 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7802 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7803 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7804 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7805 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7807 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
7808 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
7809 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
7811 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
7812 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7813 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id()),
7814 final_value_msat: 100_000,
7815 final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
7817 let route = find_route(
7818 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
7819 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7821 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
7822 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7823 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7824 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7825 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7826 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7827 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7828 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7829 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7830 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
7831 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
7832 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7833 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
7834 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7835 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7836 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7837 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7838 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7839 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7840 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7841 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7842 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7843 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7845 // Finally, claim the original payment.
7846 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7848 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
7849 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7850 let route = find_route(
7851 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
7852 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7854 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
7855 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7856 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7857 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7858 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
7859 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
7860 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
7862 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
7863 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7864 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
7865 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7866 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7867 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7868 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7869 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7870 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7871 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7872 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7873 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7874 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
7875 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7876 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7877 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7878 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7879 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7880 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7881 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7882 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7883 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7884 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7886 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
7887 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7891 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
7892 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
7893 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
7894 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7895 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7896 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7897 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7899 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7900 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7901 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7902 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7904 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7905 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7906 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7907 final_value_msat: 10_000,
7908 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7910 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
7911 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7912 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7913 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7914 let route = find_route(
7915 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7916 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7919 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7920 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
7921 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash, None, PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
7922 nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
7923 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7925 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7926 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7927 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7928 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7929 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7930 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7931 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7933 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
7937 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
7938 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
7939 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7940 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7941 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7942 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7944 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7945 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7946 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7947 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7949 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7950 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7951 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7952 final_value_msat: 10_000,
7953 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7955 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
7956 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7957 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7958 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7959 let route = find_route(
7960 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7961 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7964 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7965 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7966 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
7967 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, Some(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
7968 nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
7969 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7971 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7972 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7973 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7974 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7975 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7976 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7977 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7979 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
7983 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
7984 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
7985 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
7986 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
7987 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7989 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7990 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7991 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7992 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7994 // Marshall an MPP route.
7995 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
7996 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
7997 route.paths.push(path);
7998 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7999 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8000 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8001 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8002 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8003 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8005 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None, PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap_err() {
8006 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
8007 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
8008 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
8013 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
8014 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
8015 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8016 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8017 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8018 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8020 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
8021 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
8023 total_msat: 100_000,
8026 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
8027 // payment verification fails as expected.
8028 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
8029 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
8030 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
8031 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
8033 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment".to_string(), "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash".to_string(), 1);
8037 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
8038 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
8042 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
8043 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
8044 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
8045 // the channel is successfully closed.
8046 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8047 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8048 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8049 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8051 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8052 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8053 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel);
8054 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8055 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel);
8057 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
8058 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
8060 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
8061 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
8062 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8063 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8066 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8068 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8069 // as it has the funding transaction.
8070 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8071 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8072 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8074 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8077 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8079 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8081 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8082 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8083 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8085 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8086 // as it has the funding transaction.
8087 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8088 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8089 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8091 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8092 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8093 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
8094 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8095 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8096 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
8097 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
8099 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8100 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8101 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8102 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
8104 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8105 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
8107 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
8108 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
8109 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
8110 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
8111 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8112 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8113 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8115 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
8116 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
8117 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
8118 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
8119 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8120 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8121 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8124 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8126 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
8127 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
8128 // closing transaction).
8129 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
8130 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
8131 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8133 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
8134 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
8135 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8136 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8137 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8140 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8142 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
8144 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
8145 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
8146 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8148 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8150 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8151 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8155 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
8157 use crate::chain::Listen;
8158 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
8159 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, KeysInterface, InMemorySigner};
8160 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId};
8161 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
8162 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
8163 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
8164 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, get_route};
8165 use crate::util::test_utils;
8166 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
8167 use crate::util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
8169 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8170 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8171 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
8173 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
8177 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
8178 node: &'a ChannelManager<
8179 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
8180 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
8181 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
8182 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
8183 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>,
8188 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
8189 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
8192 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
8193 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
8194 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
8196 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
8197 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
8199 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
8200 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
8202 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
8203 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
8205 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8206 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
8207 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
8208 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
8209 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8211 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
8213 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
8215 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8216 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
8217 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
8218 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
8219 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8221 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
8223 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
8225 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8226 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8227 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8228 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8229 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8232 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
8233 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8234 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
8236 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8237 } else { panic!(); }
8239 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8240 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8242 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
8245 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8248 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
8249 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
8251 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8252 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8253 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
8254 match msg_events[0] {
8255 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
8256 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
8257 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8261 match msg_events[1] {
8262 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8266 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8267 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
8269 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8270 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
8272 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8275 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8276 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
8278 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8279 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8281 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8284 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger_a);
8286 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
8287 macro_rules! send_payment {
8288 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
8289 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
8290 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id())
8291 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
8292 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
8293 let seed = [3u8; 32];
8294 let keys_manager = KeysManager::new(&seed, 42, 42);
8295 let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8296 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &dummy_graph.read_only(),
8297 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
8299 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
8300 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
8302 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
8303 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
8305 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8306 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
8307 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8308 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
8309 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
8310 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8311 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8312 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8314 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
8315 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
8316 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8317 expect_payment_claimed!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
8319 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
8320 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
8321 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
8322 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8323 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
8325 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
8328 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
8329 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8330 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8331 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8333 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
8338 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
8339 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);