1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see routing::router::get_route for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
27 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
29 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
37 use chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, Watch, BestBlock};
38 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator};
39 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
40 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
41 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
42 // construct one themselves.
43 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
44 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
45 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
46 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RoutePath, RouteParameters};
48 use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
50 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT, OptionalField};
51 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner, Recipient};
52 use util::config::UserConfig;
53 use util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
54 use util::{byte_utils, events};
55 use util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
56 use util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer};
57 use util::logger::{Level, Logger};
58 use util::errors::APIError;
63 use core::cell::RefCell;
65 use sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
66 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
67 use core::time::Duration;
70 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
71 use std::time::Instant;
74 use alloc::string::ToString;
75 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
76 use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
77 use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
78 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
79 use chain::keysinterface::{KeyMaterial, KeysInterface, Sign};
80 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
81 use ln::channelmanager::APIError;
83 use ln::msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
84 use util::chacha20::ChaCha20;
85 use util::crypto::hkdf_extract_expand_thrice;
86 use util::logger::Logger;
88 use core::convert::TryInto;
91 const IV_LEN: usize = 16;
92 const METADATA_LEN: usize = 16;
93 const METADATA_KEY_LEN: usize = 32;
94 const AMT_MSAT_LEN: usize = 8;
95 // Used to shift the payment type bits to take up the top 3 bits of the metadata bytes, or to
96 // retrieve said payment type bits.
97 const METHOD_TYPE_OFFSET: usize = 5;
99 /// A set of keys that were HKDF-expanded from an initial call to
100 /// [`KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material`].
102 /// [`KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material`]: crate::chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material
103 pub(super) struct ExpandedKey {
104 /// The key used to encrypt the bytes containing the payment metadata (i.e. the amount and
105 /// expiry, included for payment verification on decryption).
106 metadata_key: [u8; 32],
107 /// The key used to authenticate an LDK-provided payment hash and metadata as previously
108 /// registered with LDK.
109 ldk_pmt_hash_key: [u8; 32],
110 /// The key used to authenticate a user-provided payment hash and metadata as previously
111 /// registered with LDK.
112 user_pmt_hash_key: [u8; 32],
116 pub(super) fn new(key_material: &KeyMaterial) -> ExpandedKey {
117 let (metadata_key, ldk_pmt_hash_key, user_pmt_hash_key) =
118 hkdf_extract_expand_thrice(b"LDK Inbound Payment Key Expansion", &key_material.0);
133 fn from_bits(bits: u8) -> Result<Method, u8> {
135 bits if bits == Method::LdkPaymentHash as u8 => Ok(Method::LdkPaymentHash),
136 bits if bits == Method::UserPaymentHash as u8 => Ok(Method::UserPaymentHash),
137 unknown => Err(unknown),
142 pub(super) fn create<Signer: Sign, K: Deref>(keys: &ExpandedKey, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, keys_manager: &K, highest_seen_timestamp: u64) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()>
143 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>
145 let metadata_bytes = construct_metadata_bytes(min_value_msat, Method::LdkPaymentHash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, highest_seen_timestamp)?;
147 let mut iv_bytes = [0 as u8; IV_LEN];
148 let rand_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
149 iv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&rand_bytes[..IV_LEN]);
151 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&keys.ldk_pmt_hash_key);
152 hmac.input(&iv_bytes);
153 hmac.input(&metadata_bytes);
154 let payment_preimage_bytes = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
156 let ldk_pmt_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_bytes).into_inner());
157 let payment_secret = construct_payment_secret(&iv_bytes, &metadata_bytes, &keys.metadata_key);
158 Ok((ldk_pmt_hash, payment_secret))
161 pub(super) fn create_from_hash(keys: &ExpandedKey, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, payment_hash: PaymentHash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, highest_seen_timestamp: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
162 let metadata_bytes = construct_metadata_bytes(min_value_msat, Method::UserPaymentHash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, highest_seen_timestamp)?;
164 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&keys.user_pmt_hash_key);
165 hmac.input(&metadata_bytes);
166 hmac.input(&payment_hash.0);
167 let hmac_bytes = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
169 let mut iv_bytes = [0 as u8; IV_LEN];
170 iv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&hmac_bytes[..IV_LEN]);
172 Ok(construct_payment_secret(&iv_bytes, &metadata_bytes, &keys.metadata_key))
175 fn construct_metadata_bytes(min_value_msat: Option<u64>, payment_type: Method, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, highest_seen_timestamp: u64) -> Result<[u8; METADATA_LEN], ()> {
176 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
180 let mut min_amt_msat_bytes: [u8; AMT_MSAT_LEN] = match min_value_msat {
181 Some(amt) => amt.to_be_bytes(),
182 None => [0; AMT_MSAT_LEN],
184 min_amt_msat_bytes[0] |= (payment_type as u8) << METHOD_TYPE_OFFSET;
186 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time - it's updated when
187 // we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in a header. It should never be more
188 // than two hours in the future. Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we
189 // absolutely never fail a payment too early.
190 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date timestamps.
191 let expiry_bytes = (highest_seen_timestamp + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200).to_be_bytes();
193 let mut metadata_bytes: [u8; METADATA_LEN] = [0; METADATA_LEN];
194 metadata_bytes[..AMT_MSAT_LEN].copy_from_slice(&min_amt_msat_bytes);
195 metadata_bytes[AMT_MSAT_LEN..].copy_from_slice(&expiry_bytes);
200 fn construct_payment_secret(iv_bytes: &[u8; IV_LEN], metadata_bytes: &[u8; METADATA_LEN], metadata_key: &[u8; METADATA_KEY_LEN]) -> PaymentSecret {
201 let mut payment_secret_bytes: [u8; 32] = [0; 32];
202 let (iv_slice, encrypted_metadata_slice) = payment_secret_bytes.split_at_mut(IV_LEN);
203 iv_slice.copy_from_slice(iv_bytes);
205 let chacha_block = ChaCha20::get_single_block(metadata_key, iv_bytes);
206 for i in 0..METADATA_LEN {
207 encrypted_metadata_slice[i] = chacha_block[i] ^ metadata_bytes[i];
209 PaymentSecret(payment_secret_bytes)
212 /// Check that an inbound payment's `payment_data` field is sane.
214 /// LDK does not store any data for pending inbound payments. Instead, we construct our payment
215 /// secret (and, if supplied by LDK, our payment preimage) to include encrypted metadata about the
218 /// The metadata is constructed as:
219 /// payment method (3 bits) || payment amount (8 bytes - 3 bits) || expiry (8 bytes)
220 /// and encrypted using a key derived from [`KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material`].
222 /// Then on payment receipt, we verify in this method that the payment preimage and payment secret
223 /// match what was constructed.
225 /// [`create_inbound_payment`] and [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] are called by the user to
226 /// construct the payment secret and/or payment hash that this method is verifying. If the former
227 /// method is called, then the payment method bits mentioned above are represented internally as
228 /// [`Method::LdkPaymentHash`]. If the latter, [`Method::UserPaymentHash`].
230 /// For the former method, the payment preimage is constructed as an HMAC of payment metadata and
231 /// random bytes. Because the payment secret is also encoded with these random bytes and metadata
232 /// (with the metadata encrypted with a block cipher), we're able to authenticate the preimage on
235 /// For the latter, the payment secret instead contains an HMAC of the user-provided payment hash
236 /// and payment metadata (encrypted with a block cipher), allowing us to authenticate the payment
237 /// hash and metadata on payment receipt.
239 /// See [`ExpandedKey`] docs for more info on the individual keys used.
241 /// [`KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material`]: crate::chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material
242 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_inbound_payment
243 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
244 pub(super) fn verify<L: Deref>(payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData, highest_seen_timestamp: u64, keys: &ExpandedKey, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<PaymentPreimage>, ()>
245 where L::Target: Logger
247 let (iv_bytes, metadata_bytes) = decrypt_metadata(payment_data.payment_secret, keys);
249 let payment_type_res = Method::from_bits((metadata_bytes[0] & 0b1110_0000) >> METHOD_TYPE_OFFSET);
250 let mut amt_msat_bytes = [0; AMT_MSAT_LEN];
251 amt_msat_bytes.copy_from_slice(&metadata_bytes[..AMT_MSAT_LEN]);
252 // Zero out the bits reserved to indicate the payment type.
253 amt_msat_bytes[0] &= 0b00011111;
254 let min_amt_msat: u64 = u64::from_be_bytes(amt_msat_bytes.into());
255 let expiry = u64::from_be_bytes(metadata_bytes[AMT_MSAT_LEN..].try_into().unwrap());
257 // Make sure to check to check the HMAC before doing the other checks below, to mitigate timing
259 let mut payment_preimage = None;
260 match payment_type_res {
261 Ok(Method::UserPaymentHash) => {
262 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&keys.user_pmt_hash_key);
263 hmac.input(&metadata_bytes[..]);
264 hmac.input(&payment_hash.0);
265 if !fixed_time_eq(&iv_bytes, &Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner().split_at_mut(IV_LEN).0) {
266 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash {}: unexpected payment_secret", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
270 Ok(Method::LdkPaymentHash) => {
271 match derive_ldk_payment_preimage(payment_hash, &iv_bytes, &metadata_bytes, keys) {
272 Ok(preimage) => payment_preimage = Some(preimage),
273 Err(bad_preimage_bytes) => {
274 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} due to mismatching preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(bad_preimage_bytes));
279 Err(unknown_bits) => {
280 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment hash {} due to unknown payment type {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), unknown_bits);
285 if payment_data.total_msat < min_amt_msat {
286 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} due to total_msat {} being less than the minimum amount of {} msat", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, min_amt_msat);
290 if expiry < highest_seen_timestamp {
291 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {}: expired payment", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
298 pub(super) fn get_payment_preimage(payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret, keys: &ExpandedKey) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
299 let (iv_bytes, metadata_bytes) = decrypt_metadata(payment_secret, keys);
301 match Method::from_bits((metadata_bytes[0] & 0b1110_0000) >> METHOD_TYPE_OFFSET) {
302 Ok(Method::LdkPaymentHash) => {
303 derive_ldk_payment_preimage(payment_hash, &iv_bytes, &metadata_bytes, keys)
304 .map_err(|bad_preimage_bytes| APIError::APIMisuseError {
305 err: format!("Payment hash {} did not match decoded preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(bad_preimage_bytes))
308 Ok(Method::UserPaymentHash) => Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
309 err: "Expected payment type to be LdkPaymentHash, instead got UserPaymentHash".to_string()
311 Err(other) => Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Unknown payment type: {}", other) }),
315 fn decrypt_metadata(payment_secret: PaymentSecret, keys: &ExpandedKey) -> ([u8; IV_LEN], [u8; METADATA_LEN]) {
316 let mut iv_bytes = [0; IV_LEN];
317 let (iv_slice, encrypted_metadata_bytes) = payment_secret.0.split_at(IV_LEN);
318 iv_bytes.copy_from_slice(iv_slice);
320 let chacha_block = ChaCha20::get_single_block(&keys.metadata_key, &iv_bytes);
321 let mut metadata_bytes: [u8; METADATA_LEN] = [0; METADATA_LEN];
322 for i in 0..METADATA_LEN {
323 metadata_bytes[i] = chacha_block[i] ^ encrypted_metadata_bytes[i];
326 (iv_bytes, metadata_bytes)
329 // Errors if the payment preimage doesn't match `payment_hash`. Returns the bad preimage bytes in
331 fn derive_ldk_payment_preimage(payment_hash: PaymentHash, iv_bytes: &[u8; IV_LEN], metadata_bytes: &[u8; METADATA_LEN], keys: &ExpandedKey) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, [u8; 32]> {
332 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&keys.ldk_pmt_hash_key);
333 hmac.input(iv_bytes);
334 hmac.input(metadata_bytes);
335 let decoded_payment_preimage = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
336 if !fixed_time_eq(&payment_hash.0, &Sha256::hash(&decoded_payment_preimage).into_inner()) {
337 return Err(decoded_payment_preimage);
339 return Ok(PaymentPreimage(decoded_payment_preimage))
343 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
345 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
346 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
347 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
349 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
350 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
351 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
352 // before we forward it.
354 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
355 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
356 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
357 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
358 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
360 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
361 enum PendingHTLCRouting {
363 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
364 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
367 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
368 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
369 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
372 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
373 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
377 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
378 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
379 routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
380 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
381 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
382 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
383 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
386 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
387 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
388 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
389 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
392 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
393 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
394 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
395 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
396 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
399 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
401 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
403 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
404 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
405 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
407 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
409 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
413 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
417 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
418 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
419 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
420 short_channel_id: u64,
422 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
423 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
425 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
426 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
431 /// Contains a total_msat (which may differ from value if this is a Multi-Path Payment) and a
432 /// payment_secret which prevents path-probing attacks and can associate different HTLCs which
433 /// are part of the same payment.
434 Invoice(msgs::FinalOnionHopData),
435 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
436 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
439 struct ClaimableHTLC {
440 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
443 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
446 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
447 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
448 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
449 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
451 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
452 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
457 impl Readable for PaymentId {
458 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
459 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
463 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
464 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
465 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
466 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
467 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
470 session_priv: SecretKey,
471 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
472 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
473 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
474 payment_id: PaymentId,
475 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
476 payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters>,
479 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
480 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
481 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
483 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
485 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
487 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat, payment_params } => {
490 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
491 payment_id.hash(hasher);
492 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
493 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
494 payment_params.hash(hasher);
501 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
502 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
504 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
505 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
506 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
507 payment_secret: None,
508 payment_params: None,
513 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
514 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
516 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
524 struct ReceiveError {
530 /// Return value for claim_funds_from_hop
531 enum ClaimFundsFromHop {
533 MonitorUpdateFail(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal, Option<u64>),
538 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
540 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
541 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
542 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
543 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
544 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
546 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
547 err: msgs::LightningError,
548 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u64)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
549 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
551 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
553 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
555 err: LightningError {
557 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
558 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
565 shutdown_finish: None,
569 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
571 err: LightningError {
573 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
576 shutdown_finish: None,
580 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
581 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
584 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u64, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
586 err: LightningError {
588 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
589 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
595 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
596 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
600 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
603 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
605 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
606 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
610 log_level: Level::Warn,
613 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
615 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
617 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
619 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
620 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
626 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => LightningError {
628 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
629 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
637 shutdown_finish: None,
642 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
643 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
644 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
645 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
646 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
648 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
649 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
650 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
651 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
652 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
653 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
654 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
656 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
660 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
661 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
662 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
663 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
664 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
665 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
666 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
667 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
668 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
669 /// Map from payment hash to any HTLCs which are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user.
670 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
671 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
673 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
674 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
675 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
676 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
679 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
680 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
681 /// quite some time lag.
682 enum BackgroundEvent {
683 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
684 /// commitment transaction.
685 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
688 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
689 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
691 latest_features: InitFeatures,
694 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
695 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
697 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
700 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
701 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
702 struct PendingInboundPayment {
703 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
704 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
705 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
706 /// this payment being removed.
708 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
709 user_payment_id: u64,
710 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
711 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
712 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
715 /// Stores the session_priv for each part of a payment that is still pending. For versions 0.0.102
716 /// and later, also stores information for retrying the payment.
717 pub(crate) enum PendingOutboundPayment {
719 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
722 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
723 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
724 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
725 pending_amt_msat: u64,
726 /// Used to track the fee paid. Only present if the payment was serialized on 0.0.103+.
727 pending_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
728 /// The total payment amount across all paths, used to verify that a retry is not overpaying.
730 /// Our best known block height at the time this payment was initiated.
731 starting_block_height: u32,
733 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
734 /// been resolved. This ensures we don't look up pending payments in ChannelMonitors on restart
735 /// and add a pending payment that was already fulfilled.
737 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
738 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
740 /// When a payer gives up trying to retry a payment, they inform us, letting us generate a
741 /// `PaymentFailed` event when all HTLCs have irrevocably failed. This avoids a number of race
742 /// conditions in MPP-aware payment retriers (1), where the possibility of multiple
743 /// `PaymentPathFailed` events with `all_paths_failed` can be pending at once, confusing a
744 /// downstream event handler as to when a payment has actually failed.
746 /// (1) https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1164
748 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
749 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
753 impl PendingOutboundPayment {
754 fn is_retryable(&self) -> bool {
756 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { .. } => true,
760 fn is_fulfilled(&self) -> bool {
762 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => true,
766 fn abandoned(&self) -> bool {
768 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => true,
772 fn get_pending_fee_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
774 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { pending_fee_msat, .. } => pending_fee_msat.clone(),
779 fn payment_hash(&self) -> Option<PaymentHash> {
781 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None,
782 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
783 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => *payment_hash,
784 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
788 fn mark_fulfilled(&mut self) {
789 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
790 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
791 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
792 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
793 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
794 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. }
797 let payment_hash = self.payment_hash();
798 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, payment_hash };
801 fn mark_abandoned(&mut self) -> Result<(), ()> {
802 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
803 let our_payment_hash;
804 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
805 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } |
806 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } =>
808 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } |
809 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } => {
810 our_payment_hash = *payment_hash;
814 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash: our_payment_hash };
818 /// panics if path is None and !self.is_fulfilled
819 fn remove(&mut self, session_priv: &[u8; 32], path: Option<&Vec<RouteHop>>) -> bool {
820 let remove_res = match self {
821 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
822 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
823 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
824 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
825 session_privs.remove(session_priv)
829 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
830 let path = path.expect("Fulfilling a payment should always come with a path");
831 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
832 *pending_amt_msat -= path_last_hop.fee_msat;
833 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
834 *fee_msat -= path.get_path_fees();
841 fn insert(&mut self, session_priv: [u8; 32], path: &Vec<RouteHop>) -> bool {
842 let insert_res = match self {
843 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
844 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
845 session_privs.insert(session_priv)
847 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => false,
848 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => false,
851 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
852 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
853 *pending_amt_msat += path_last_hop.fee_msat;
854 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
855 *fee_msat += path.get_path_fees();
862 fn remaining_parts(&self) -> usize {
864 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
865 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
866 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
867 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
874 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
875 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
876 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
877 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
878 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
879 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
880 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
881 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
883 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
884 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
885 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
886 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
887 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
888 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
889 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
890 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
891 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
893 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
894 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
896 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
897 /// to individual Channels.
899 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
900 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
901 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
902 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
904 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
905 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
906 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
907 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
908 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
909 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
910 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
912 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
913 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
914 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
915 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
918 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
919 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
920 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
921 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
922 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
924 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
925 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
926 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
927 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
928 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
929 pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
930 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
931 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
932 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
933 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
936 default_configuration: UserConfig,
937 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
943 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
945 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
946 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
948 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
949 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
950 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
951 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
953 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
954 /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
955 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
956 /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
957 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
958 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
960 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
961 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
962 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
963 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
964 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
965 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
966 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
967 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
969 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
971 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
972 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment>>,
974 our_network_key: SecretKey,
975 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
977 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
979 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
980 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
981 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
983 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
984 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
986 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
987 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
988 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
990 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
991 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
992 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
993 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
995 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
996 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
997 /// are currently open with that peer.
998 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
999 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
1002 /// If also holding `channel_state` lock, must lock `channel_state` prior to `per_peer_state`.
1003 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
1005 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
1006 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1007 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1008 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1009 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1010 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1011 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1012 /// PersistenceNotifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1013 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1015 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier,
1022 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1024 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1025 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1026 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1027 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1028 pub struct ChainParameters {
1029 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1030 pub network: Network,
1032 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1034 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1035 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1038 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1044 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1045 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1046 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1047 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1048 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1049 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1051 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1052 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1053 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1054 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1055 persistence_notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier,
1057 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1058 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1061 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1062 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1063 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
1066 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1067 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
1069 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1070 persistence_notifier: notifier,
1071 should_persist: persist_check,
1072 _read_guard: read_guard,
1077 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1078 fn drop(&mut self) {
1079 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
1080 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
1085 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1086 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1088 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1090 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1091 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1092 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1093 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1094 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1096 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1097 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1099 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1101 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1102 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1103 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1104 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1105 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1106 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1107 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
1109 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1110 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
1112 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1113 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1114 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1115 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
1117 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1118 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1119 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1120 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1121 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1122 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1125 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1127 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1128 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1131 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1133 /// The number of blocks before we consider an outbound payment for expiry if it doesn't have any
1134 /// pending HTLCs in flight.
1135 pub(crate) const PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
1137 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1138 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1139 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1140 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1141 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1142 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1143 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1144 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1145 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1146 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1147 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1150 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1151 /// to better separate parameters.
1152 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1153 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1154 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1155 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1156 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1157 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1158 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1159 pub features: InitFeatures,
1160 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1161 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1162 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1164 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1166 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1167 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1168 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1169 /// payments to us through this channel.
1170 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1173 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
1174 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1175 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1176 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1177 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1178 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1179 /// lifetime of the channel.
1180 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1181 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1182 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1183 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1184 /// our counterparty already.
1186 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1187 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1188 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1189 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1190 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1191 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1192 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1193 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1194 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1195 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1196 /// this value on chain.
1198 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1200 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1202 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1203 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1204 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
1205 pub user_channel_id: u64,
1206 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1207 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1208 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1210 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1211 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1212 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1213 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1215 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1216 pub balance_msat: u64,
1217 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1218 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1219 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1220 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1222 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1224 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1225 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1226 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1227 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1228 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1229 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1230 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1231 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1232 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1234 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1235 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1236 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1237 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1238 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1239 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1240 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1241 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1242 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1244 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1246 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1247 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1248 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1249 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1250 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1251 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1252 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1253 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1254 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1256 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1257 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1258 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1259 pub is_outbound: bool,
1260 /// True if the channel is confirmed, funding_locked messages have been exchanged, and the
1261 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `funding_locked` message exchange implies the
1262 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1263 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1264 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1266 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1267 pub is_funding_locked: bool,
1268 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
1269 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1271 /// This is a strict superset of `is_funding_locked`.
1272 pub is_usable: bool,
1273 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1274 pub is_public: bool,
1277 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
1278 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
1279 /// states for more.
1280 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
1281 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
1282 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
1283 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
1284 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
1285 ParameterError(APIError),
1286 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
1287 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
1288 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
1289 /// payment in full.
1291 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1293 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
1294 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
1295 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
1296 /// paths than the ones selected).
1297 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
1298 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
1299 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
1300 /// in over-/re-payment.
1302 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1303 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
1304 /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
1306 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
1307 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
1308 /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
1309 /// with the latest update_id.
1311 /// The errors themselves, in the same order as the route hops.
1312 results: Vec<Result<(), APIError>>,
1313 /// If some paths failed without irrevocably committing to the new HTLC(s), this will
1314 /// contain a [`RouteParameters`] object which can be used to calculate a new route that
1315 /// will pay all remaining unpaid balance.
1316 failed_paths_retry: Option<RouteParameters>,
1317 /// The payment id for the payment, which is now at least partially pending.
1318 payment_id: PaymentId,
1322 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1324 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
1325 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1326 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1327 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1328 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1330 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1331 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1332 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1335 macro_rules! handle_error {
1336 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
1339 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1340 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1342 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1343 // entering the macro.
1344 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
1345 assert!($self.pending_events.try_lock().is_ok());
1348 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1350 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1351 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1352 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1353 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1357 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1358 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1359 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1360 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1365 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1366 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1368 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1369 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1370 action: err.action.clone()
1374 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1375 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1378 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1385 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1386 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1387 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1389 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1390 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1392 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1393 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1395 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1396 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1397 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1398 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1400 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1401 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1402 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1404 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => {
1405 log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1406 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1407 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1409 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(false);
1410 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1411 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1417 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1418 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1422 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1424 $entry.remove_entry();
1432 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1433 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1437 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1439 $entry.remove_entry();
1447 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1448 ($channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1450 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1451 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1452 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1459 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
1460 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1461 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1463 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
1465 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1466 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
1467 if let Some(short_id) = $chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1468 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1470 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
1471 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
1472 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
1473 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
1474 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
1475 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
1476 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
1477 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
1478 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
1479 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.get_user_id(),
1480 $chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
1483 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
1484 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations",
1485 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
1486 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
1487 match $action_type {
1488 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
1489 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
1491 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
1492 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
1494 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
1495 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len(),
1496 (&$failed_finalized_fulfills as &Vec<HTLCSource>).len());
1497 if !$resend_commitment {
1498 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
1501 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
1503 $chan.monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
1504 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
1508 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
1509 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
1511 $entry.remove_entry();
1515 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1516 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new())
1520 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
1521 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1522 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
1524 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1525 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
1529 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
1530 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
1531 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1532 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
1533 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
1536 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
1541 macro_rules! handle_chan_restoration_locked {
1542 ($self: ident, $channel_lock: expr, $channel_state: expr, $channel_entry: expr,
1543 $raa: expr, $commitment_update: expr, $order: expr, $chanmon_update: expr,
1544 $pending_forwards: expr, $funding_broadcastable: expr, $funding_locked: expr, $announcement_sigs: expr) => { {
1545 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
1546 let counterparty_node_id = $channel_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1548 let chanmon_update: Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> = $chanmon_update; // Force type-checking to resolve
1549 let chanmon_update_is_none = chanmon_update.is_none();
1551 let forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)> = $pending_forwards; // Force type-checking to resolve
1552 if !forwards.is_empty() {
1553 htlc_forwards = Some(($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"),
1554 $channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), forwards));
1557 if chanmon_update.is_some() {
1558 // On reconnect, we, by definition, only resend a funding_locked if there have been
1559 // no commitment updates, so the only channel monitor update which could also be
1560 // associated with a funding_locked would be the funding_created/funding_signed
1561 // monitor update. That monitor update failing implies that we won't send
1562 // funding_locked until it's been updated, so we can't have a funding_locked and a
1563 // monitor update here (so we don't bother to handle it correctly below).
1564 assert!($funding_locked.is_none());
1565 // A channel monitor update makes no sense without either a funding_locked or a
1566 // commitment update to process after it. Since we can't have a funding_locked, we
1567 // only bother to handle the monitor-update + commitment_update case below.
1568 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1571 if let Some(msg) = $funding_locked {
1572 // Similar to the above, this implies that we're letting the funding_locked fly
1573 // before it should be allowed to.
1574 assert!(chanmon_update.is_none());
1575 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
1576 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1579 $channel_state.short_to_id.insert($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), $channel_entry.get().channel_id());
1581 if let Some(msg) = $announcement_sigs {
1582 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1583 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1588 let funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction> = $funding_broadcastable; // Force type-checking to resolve
1589 if let Some(monitor_update) = chanmon_update {
1590 // We only ever broadcast a funding transaction in response to a funding_signed
1591 // message and the resulting monitor update. Thus, on channel_reestablish
1592 // message handling we can't have a funding transaction to broadcast. When
1593 // processing a monitor update finishing resulting in a funding broadcast, we
1594 // cannot have a second monitor update, thus this case would indicate a bug.
1595 assert!(funding_broadcastable.is_none());
1596 // Given we were just reconnected or finished updating a channel monitor, the
1597 // only case where we can get a new ChannelMonitorUpdate would be if we also
1598 // have some commitment updates to send as well.
1599 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1600 if let Err(e) = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1601 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
1602 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
1603 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
1604 let mut order = $order;
1606 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
1608 break handle_monitor_err!($self, e, $channel_state, $channel_entry, order, $raa.is_some(), true);
1612 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1613 if let Some(update) = $commitment_update {
1614 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1615 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1620 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1621 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = $raa {
1622 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1623 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1624 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1629 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1633 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1638 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
1639 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
1640 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1645 if chanmon_update_is_none {
1646 // If there was no ChannelMonitorUpdate, we should never generate an Err in the res loop
1647 // above. Doing so would imply calling handle_err!() from channel_monitor_updated() which
1648 // should *never* end up calling back to `chain_monitor.update_channel()`.
1649 assert!(res.is_ok());
1652 (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id)
1656 macro_rules! post_handle_chan_restoration {
1657 ($self: ident, $locked_res: expr) => { {
1658 let (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id) = $locked_res;
1660 let _ = handle_error!($self, res, counterparty_node_id);
1662 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1663 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1668 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
1669 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
1670 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1671 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1672 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1675 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1677 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1678 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1680 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1682 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
1684 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1685 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1686 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1687 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1688 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1689 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1690 let inbound_pmt_key_material = keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1691 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1693 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1694 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1695 fee_estimator: fee_est,
1699 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1701 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1702 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1703 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
1704 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1705 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1706 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1708 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1709 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1711 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1712 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap()),
1715 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1716 fake_scid_rand_bytes: keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1718 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1719 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1721 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1723 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1724 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1725 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1726 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
1734 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels, as
1735 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1736 &self.default_configuration
1739 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1741 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1742 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1743 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to 0
1744 /// for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for `user_channel_id` here.
1745 /// `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and otherwise
1748 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1749 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1751 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1752 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1753 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1755 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1756 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1757 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1758 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1759 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1760 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1762 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1763 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1764 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1765 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1766 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1767 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1771 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1772 match per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) {
1773 Some(peer_state) => {
1774 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1775 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1776 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1777 Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, their_features,
1778 channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height())?
1780 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }),
1783 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1785 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1786 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1787 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1789 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1790 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1791 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1792 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1793 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
1794 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1796 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1799 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1801 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1802 node_id: their_network_key,
1805 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1808 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1809 let mut res = Vec::new();
1811 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1812 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1813 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1814 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
1815 let balance_msat = channel.get_balance_msat();
1816 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1817 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1818 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1819 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1820 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1821 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1822 features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1823 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1824 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1826 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1827 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1828 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1829 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1831 inbound_capacity_msat,
1832 outbound_capacity_msat,
1833 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1834 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1835 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1836 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1837 is_funding_locked: channel.is_usable(),
1838 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1839 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1843 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1844 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1845 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
1846 chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1852 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1853 /// more information.
1854 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1855 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1858 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1859 /// get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1861 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1862 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1864 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1865 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1866 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1867 // really wanted anyway.
1868 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1871 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1872 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1873 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1874 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1875 Some(transaction) => {
1876 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1880 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1881 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1882 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1883 reason: closure_reason
1887 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1888 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1890 let counterparty_node_id;
1891 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1892 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1893 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1894 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1895 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1896 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1897 counterparty_node_id = chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1898 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1899 let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = match per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
1900 Some(peer_state) => {
1901 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1902 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1903 chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?
1905 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", counterparty_node_id) }),
1907 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1909 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1910 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1911 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1912 let (result, is_permanent) =
1913 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_entry.key());
1915 remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
1921 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1922 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1926 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1927 let channel = remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
1928 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1929 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1933 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1937 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1941 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1942 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1945 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, counterparty_node_id);
1949 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1950 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1951 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1953 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1954 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1956 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1957 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1958 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1959 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1961 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1963 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1964 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1965 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1966 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1967 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, None)
1970 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1971 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1972 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1974 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1975 /// the channel being closed or not:
1976 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1977 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1978 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1979 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1980 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1981 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1982 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1984 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1986 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1987 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1988 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1989 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1990 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1994 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1995 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1996 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1997 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1998 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2000 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
2001 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2002 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2003 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2004 // ignore the result here.
2005 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
2009 /// `peer_node_id` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2010 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2011 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>, peer_msg: Option<&String>) -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2013 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2014 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2015 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2016 if let Some(node_id) = peer_node_id {
2017 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *node_id {
2018 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
2021 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2022 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2024 if peer_node_id.is_some() {
2025 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2026 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
2029 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2031 chan.remove_entry().1
2033 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
2036 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2037 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
2038 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2039 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2040 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2045 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
2048 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
2049 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if channel_id is unknown to the manager.
2050 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2051 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2052 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, None, None) {
2053 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2054 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
2055 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2056 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2057 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2058 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2068 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2069 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2070 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
2071 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2072 let _ = self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
2076 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2077 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
2079 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2080 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != cltv_expiry {
2081 return Err(ReceiveError {
2082 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value",
2084 err_data: byte_utils::be32_to_array(cltv_expiry).to_vec()
2087 // final_expiry_too_soon
2088 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2089 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2090 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2091 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2092 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2093 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2094 return Err(ReceiveError {
2096 err_data: Vec::new(),
2097 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2100 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
2101 return Err(ReceiveError {
2103 err_data: byte_utils::be64_to_array(amt_msat).to_vec(),
2104 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2108 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2109 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => {
2110 return Err(ReceiveError {
2111 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2112 err_data: Vec::new(),
2113 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2116 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2117 return Err(ReceiveError {
2118 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2119 err_data: Vec::new(),
2120 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2123 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
2124 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2125 return Err(ReceiveError {
2126 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2127 err_data: Vec::new(),
2128 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2130 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2131 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2133 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2134 phantom_shared_secret,
2136 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2137 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2138 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2139 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2140 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2141 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2142 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2143 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2144 return Err(ReceiveError {
2145 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2146 err_data: Vec::new(),
2147 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2151 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2153 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2156 return Err(ReceiveError {
2157 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2158 err_data: Vec::new(),
2159 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2164 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2167 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2168 amt_to_forward: amt_msat,
2169 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2173 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>) {
2174 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2175 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2177 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2178 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2179 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2180 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2181 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2182 failure_code: $err_code,
2183 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2188 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2189 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2192 let shared_secret = {
2193 let mut arr = [0; 32];
2194 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
2198 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2199 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2200 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2201 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2202 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2203 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2204 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2205 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2208 let mut channel_state = None;
2209 macro_rules! return_err {
2210 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2212 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2213 if channel_state.is_none() {
2214 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2216 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2217 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2218 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2219 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
2220 })), channel_state.unwrap());
2225 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2227 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2228 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2230 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2231 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2235 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2236 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2238 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2240 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2241 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2242 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2243 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2244 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2246 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2249 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2250 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2252 let blinding_factor = {
2253 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
2254 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
2255 sha.input(&shared_secret);
2256 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
2259 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
2261 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
2263 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2266 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2267 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2270 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2271 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2272 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2273 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2274 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2278 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2279 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2280 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2283 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2284 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2285 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2286 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2291 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2292 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2293 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2294 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2295 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2296 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2297 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
2298 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
2299 let forwarding_id_opt = match id_option {
2300 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2301 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2303 if fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id) {
2306 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2309 Some(id) => Some(id.clone()),
2311 let (chan_update_opt, forwardee_cltv_expiry_delta) = if let Some(forwarding_id) = forwarding_id_opt {
2312 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
2313 // Leave channel updates as None for private channels.
2314 let chan_update_opt = if chan.should_announce() {
2315 Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap()) } else { None };
2316 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2317 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2318 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2319 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2320 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2323 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2324 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2325 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2326 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2327 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2328 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2329 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2331 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2332 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2334 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64)
2335 .and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000)
2336 .checked_add(chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat() as u64) });
2337 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
2338 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, chan_update_opt));
2340 (chan_update_opt, chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta())
2341 } else { (None, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA) };
2343 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + forwardee_cltv_expiry_delta as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2344 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, chan_update_opt));
2346 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2347 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2348 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2349 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2350 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2351 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2353 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2354 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2356 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2357 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2358 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2359 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2360 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2361 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2362 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2363 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2364 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2365 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2371 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
2372 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2373 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2374 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
2376 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2377 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
2379 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2380 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
2381 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
2383 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
2385 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
2390 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
2393 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2394 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2395 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2397 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2398 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2399 if !chan.should_announce() {
2400 return Err(LightningError {
2401 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2402 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2405 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2406 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2409 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2410 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
2411 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2412 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2413 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2414 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2415 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2416 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2417 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2421 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2423 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2424 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2426 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2427 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2428 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2429 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2430 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()),
2431 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2432 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2433 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2436 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
2437 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
2439 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2445 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
2446 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_params: &Option<PaymentParameters>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2447 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2448 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2449 let session_priv_bytes = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2450 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2452 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2453 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
2454 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2455 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2456 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
2458 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2460 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2462 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2463 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2465 let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2466 let payment_entry = pending_outbounds.entry(payment_id);
2467 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(payment) = &payment_entry {
2468 if !payment.get().is_retryable() {
2469 return Err(APIError::RouteError {
2470 err: "Payment already completed"
2475 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2476 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2477 Some(id) => id.clone(),
2480 macro_rules! insert_outbound_payment {
2482 let payment = payment_entry.or_insert_with(|| PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2483 session_privs: HashSet::new(),
2484 pending_amt_msat: 0,
2485 pending_fee_msat: Some(0),
2486 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2487 payment_secret: *payment_secret,
2488 starting_block_height: self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
2489 total_msat: total_value,
2491 assert!(payment.insert(session_priv_bytes, path));
2495 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2496 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
2498 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
2499 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
2501 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2502 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
2504 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(
2505 htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2507 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2508 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2510 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2511 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2512 }, onion_packet, &self.logger),
2513 channel_state, chan)
2515 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
2516 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2517 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
2518 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
2519 // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
2520 // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
2521 // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
2522 // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
2523 insert_outbound_payment!(); // Only do this after possibly break'ing on Perm failure above.
2524 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2526 insert_outbound_payment!();
2528 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2529 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2530 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
2531 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2532 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
2533 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2534 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2535 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2541 None => { insert_outbound_payment!(); },
2543 } else { unreachable!(); }
2547 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2548 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2550 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2555 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2557 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
2558 /// fields for more info.
2560 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
2561 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
2562 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
2563 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
2564 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
2565 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
2567 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
2569 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2570 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2571 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
2573 /// In general, a path may raise:
2574 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2575 /// node public key) is specified.
2576 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2577 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2579 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2580 /// relevant updates.
2582 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2583 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2584 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2586 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
2587 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
2588 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
2589 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
2591 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
2592 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
2593 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2594 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2595 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None, None, None)
2598 fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: Option<PaymentId>, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2599 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
2600 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
2602 if route.paths.len() > 10 {
2603 // This limit is completely arbitrary - there aren't any real fundamental path-count
2604 // limits. After we support retrying individual paths we should likely bump this, but
2605 // for now more than 10 paths likely carries too much one-path failure.
2606 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Sending over more than 10 paths is not currently supported"}));
2608 if payment_secret.is_none() && route.paths.len() > 1 {
2609 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Payment secret is required for multi-path payments".to_string()}));
2611 let mut total_value = 0;
2612 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2613 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2614 let payment_id = if let Some(id) = payment_id { id } else { PaymentId(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()) };
2615 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
2616 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
2617 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
2618 continue 'path_check;
2620 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
2621 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
2622 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
2623 continue 'path_check;
2626 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2627 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
2629 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
2630 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
2632 if let Some(amt_msat) = recv_value_msat {
2633 debug_assert!(amt_msat >= total_value);
2634 total_value = amt_msat;
2637 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2638 let mut results = Vec::new();
2639 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2640 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &route.payment_params, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, &keysend_preimage));
2642 let mut has_ok = false;
2643 let mut has_err = false;
2644 let mut pending_amt_unsent = 0;
2645 let mut max_unsent_cltv_delta = 0;
2646 for (res, path) in results.iter().zip(route.paths.iter()) {
2647 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
2648 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
2649 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
2650 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
2654 } else if res.is_err() {
2655 pending_amt_unsent += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2656 max_unsent_cltv_delta = cmp::max(max_unsent_cltv_delta, path.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta);
2659 if has_err && has_ok {
2660 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure {
2663 failed_paths_retry: if pending_amt_unsent != 0 {
2664 if let Some(payment_params) = &route.payment_params {
2665 Some(RouteParameters {
2666 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2667 final_value_msat: pending_amt_unsent,
2668 final_cltv_expiry_delta: max_unsent_cltv_delta,
2674 // If we failed to send any paths, we shouldn't have inserted the new PaymentId into
2675 // our `pending_outbound_payments` map at all.
2676 debug_assert!(self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().get(&payment_id).is_none());
2677 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
2683 /// Retries a payment along the given [`Route`].
2685 /// Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see
2686 /// [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the
2687 /// retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, if the payment
2688 /// for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success), or if
2689 /// further retries have been disabled with [`abandon_payment`].
2691 /// [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]
2692 /// [`abandon_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`]
2693 pub fn retry_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2694 const RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE: u64 = 10;
2695 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2696 if path.len() == 0 {
2697 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2698 err: "length-0 path in route".to_string()
2703 let (total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret) = {
2704 let outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2705 if let Some(payment) = outbounds.get(&payment_id) {
2707 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2708 total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret, pending_amt_msat, ..
2710 let retry_amt_msat: u64 = route.paths.iter().map(|path| path.last().unwrap().fee_msat).sum();
2711 if retry_amt_msat + *pending_amt_msat > *total_msat * (100 + RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE) / 100 {
2712 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2713 err: format!("retry_amt_msat of {} will put pending_amt_msat (currently: {}) more than 10% over total_payment_amt_msat of {}", retry_amt_msat, pending_amt_msat, total_msat).to_string()
2716 (*total_msat, *payment_hash, *payment_secret)
2718 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => {
2719 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2720 err: "Unable to retry payments that were initially sent on LDK versions prior to 0.0.102".to_string()
2723 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {
2724 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2725 err: "Payment already completed".to_owned()
2728 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {
2729 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2730 err: "Payment already abandoned (with some HTLCs still pending)".to_owned()
2735 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2736 err: format!("Payment with ID {} not found", log_bytes!(payment_id.0)),
2740 return self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &payment_secret, None, Some(payment_id), Some(total_msat)).map(|_| ())
2743 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment will occur.
2745 /// After this method returns, any future calls to [`retry_payment`] for the given `payment_id`
2746 /// will fail with [`PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError`]. If no such event has been generated,
2747 /// an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event will be generated as soon as there are no remaining
2748 /// pending HTLCs for this payment.
2750 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2751 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2752 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2754 /// [`retry_payment`]: Self::retry_payment
2755 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2756 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2757 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2758 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2760 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2761 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
2762 if let Ok(()) = payment.get_mut().mark_abandoned() {
2763 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
2764 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2766 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
2774 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2775 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2776 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2777 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2778 /// never reach the recipient.
2780 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function.
2782 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2783 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2785 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2787 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2788 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2789 let preimage = match payment_preimage {
2791 None => PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()),
2793 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0).into_inner());
2794 match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, Some(preimage), None, None) {
2795 Ok(payment_id) => Ok((payment_hash, payment_id)),
2800 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2801 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2802 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>
2803 (&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2805 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2807 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2809 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2810 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2811 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2812 } else { unreachable!(); })
2815 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
2817 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2818 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2821 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2822 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2827 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2828 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2829 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2832 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2833 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2834 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2836 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2844 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2845 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2846 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2850 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2852 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2853 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2855 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2856 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2858 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2859 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2860 /// keys per-channel).
2862 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2863 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2864 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2866 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2867 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2868 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2870 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2871 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2872 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2873 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2875 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2876 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2877 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2878 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2882 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2883 let mut output_index = None;
2884 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2885 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2886 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2887 if output_index.is_some() {
2888 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2889 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2892 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2893 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2894 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2897 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2900 if output_index.is_none() {
2901 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2902 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2905 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2910 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
2911 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
2912 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
2914 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::core::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
2917 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
2918 // smaller than 500:
2919 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
2921 /// Regenerates channel_announcements and generates a signed node_announcement from the given
2922 /// arguments, providing them in corresponding events via
2923 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`], if at least one public channel has been confirmed
2924 /// on-chain. This effectively re-broadcasts all channel announcements and sends our node
2925 /// announcement to ensure that the lightning P2P network is aware of the channels we have and
2926 /// our network addresses.
2928 /// `rgb` is a node "color" and `alias` is a printable human-readable string to describe this
2929 /// node to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
2931 /// `addresses` represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node
2932 /// accepts incoming connections. These will be included in the node_announcement, publicly
2933 /// tying these addresses together and to this node. If you wish to preserve user privacy,
2934 /// addresses should likely contain only Tor Onion addresses.
2936 /// Panics if `addresses` is absurdly large (more than 500).
2938 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
2939 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], mut addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
2940 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2942 if addresses.len() > 500 {
2943 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
2946 // While all existing nodes handle unsorted addresses just fine, the spec requires that
2947 // addresses be sorted for future compatibility.
2948 addresses.sort_by_key(|addr| addr.get_id());
2950 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2951 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
2952 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
2953 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
2954 rgb, alias, addresses,
2955 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
2956 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2958 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2959 let node_announce_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2961 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2962 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2964 let mut announced_chans = false;
2965 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2966 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()) {
2967 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2969 update_msg: match self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
2974 announced_chans = true;
2976 // If the channel is not public or has not yet reached funding_locked, check the
2977 // next channel. If we don't yet have any public channels, we'll skip the broadcast
2978 // below as peers may not accept it without channels on chain first.
2982 if announced_chans {
2983 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
2984 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
2985 signature: node_announce_sig,
2986 contents: announcement
2992 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
2994 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
2995 /// Will likely generate further events.
2996 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
2997 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2999 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
3000 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3001 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3002 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3004 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3005 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3007 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
3008 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3009 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
3010 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3012 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3013 match forward_info {
3014 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3015 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
3016 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3017 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3018 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3020 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3021 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3022 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3023 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3024 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3025 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3026 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3028 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3029 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: $err_code, data: $err_data }
3035 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3036 let phantom_secret_res = self.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3037 if phantom_secret_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id) {
3038 let phantom_shared_secret = {
3039 let mut arr = [0; 32];
3040 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &phantom_secret_res.unwrap())[..]);
3043 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3045 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3046 fail_forward!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), None);
3048 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3049 fail_forward!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3053 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3054 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
3055 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3056 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => fail_forward!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3062 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3065 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3068 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3069 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3070 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3071 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3072 // problem, not ours.
3074 // `fail_htlc_backwards_internal` is never called for
3075 // phantom payments, so this is unreachable for them.
3082 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3083 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
3084 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
3085 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3086 match forward_info {
3087 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3088 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
3090 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
3091 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3092 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3093 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3094 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3095 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3096 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3097 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3098 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3099 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3101 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet, &self.logger) {
3103 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3104 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3106 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3108 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap();
3109 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3110 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }
3116 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3118 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3119 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
3120 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
3121 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
3122 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
3123 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
3124 // this channel currently :/.
3130 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3131 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3133 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3134 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3135 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
3137 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3138 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3140 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
3142 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3143 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3144 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3147 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3149 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3150 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
3151 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
3152 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
3153 // messages when we can.
3154 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
3155 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
3156 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
3163 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
3164 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
3167 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
3168 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
3169 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3170 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
3171 ChannelError::Ignore(_) | ChannelError::Warn(_) => {
3172 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
3174 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
3175 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
3176 let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
3177 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3178 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3180 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us.
3181 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.get_user_id(), channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
3183 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
3185 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
3189 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3190 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
3193 log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
3194 add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3195 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3196 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3197 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3198 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
3199 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3200 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
3201 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3203 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
3211 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3212 match forward_info {
3213 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3214 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
3215 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3216 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, phantom_shared_secret) = match routing {
3217 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } =>
3218 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret),
3219 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3220 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage), None),
3222 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3225 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3226 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3227 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3228 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3229 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3230 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3231 phantom_shared_secret,
3233 value: amt_to_forward,
3238 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3240 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
3241 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3242 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
3244 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3245 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3246 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3247 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3248 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3249 phantom_shared_secret,
3251 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
3256 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3257 ($payment_data_total_msat: expr, $payment_secret: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3258 let mut total_value = 0;
3259 let mut payment_received_generated = false;
3260 let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
3261 .or_insert(Vec::new());
3262 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3263 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3264 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3265 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3269 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3270 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3271 total_value += htlc.value;
3272 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3273 OnionPayload::Invoice(htlc_payment_data) => {
3274 if htlc_payment_data.total_msat != $payment_data_total_msat {
3275 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3276 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data_total_msat, htlc_payment_data.total_msat);
3277 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3279 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3281 _ => unreachable!(),
3284 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > $payment_data_total_msat {
3285 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
3286 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, $payment_data_total_msat);
3287 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3290 } else if total_value == $payment_data_total_msat {
3291 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3293 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3294 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3295 payment_secret: $payment_secret,
3299 payment_received_generated = true;
3301 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3302 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3305 payment_received_generated
3309 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3310 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3311 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3312 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3313 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3314 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3315 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3316 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3317 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3318 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3319 OnionPayload::Invoice(ref payment_data) => {
3320 let payment_preimage = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, payment_data.clone(), self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3321 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
3323 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3327 let payment_data_total_msat = payment_data.total_msat;
3328 let payment_secret = payment_data.payment_secret.clone();
3329 check_total_value!(payment_data_total_msat, payment_secret, payment_preimage);
3331 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3332 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
3333 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3334 e.insert(vec![claimable_htlc]);
3335 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3337 amt: amt_to_forward,
3338 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage),
3341 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3342 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3343 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3349 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3351 if let OnionPayload::Invoice(ref data) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3354 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3355 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3358 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3359 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3360 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3361 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3362 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3363 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3364 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3366 let payment_received_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data.total_msat, payment_data.payment_secret, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3367 if payment_received_generated {
3368 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3374 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3375 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3383 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3384 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
3386 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3388 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3389 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3392 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3393 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3394 events.append(&mut new_events);
3397 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3399 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3400 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3402 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3403 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3404 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3405 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3406 if background_events.is_empty() {
3410 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3412 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3413 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3414 // monitor updating completing.
3415 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
3422 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3423 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3424 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3425 self.process_background_events();
3428 fn update_channel_fee(&self, short_to_id: &mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> (bool, NotifyOption, Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>) {
3429 if !chan.is_outbound() { return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(())); }
3430 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3431 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
3432 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3433 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3434 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3436 if !chan.is_live() {
3437 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3438 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3439 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3441 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3442 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3444 let mut retain_channel = true;
3445 let res = match chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(new_feerate, &self.logger) {
3448 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
3449 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3453 let ret_err = match res {
3454 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update))) => {
3455 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3456 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_id);
3457 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3460 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3461 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3462 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3463 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3464 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3465 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3466 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3467 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
3477 (retain_channel, NotifyOption::DoPersist, ret_err)
3481 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3482 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3483 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3484 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3485 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3486 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3487 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3489 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3491 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3493 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3494 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3495 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3496 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3497 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3498 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3499 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3501 handle_errors.push(err);
3511 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3513 /// This currently includes:
3514 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3515 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3516 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3519 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
3520 /// estimate fetches.
3521 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3522 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3523 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3524 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3526 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3528 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3530 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3531 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3532 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3533 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3534 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3535 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
3536 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3537 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3539 handle_errors.push((err, counterparty_node_id));
3541 if !retain_channel { return false; }
3543 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3544 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
3545 handle_errors.push((Err(err), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()));
3546 if needs_close { return false; }
3549 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3550 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3551 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3552 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3553 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3554 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3555 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3556 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3560 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3561 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3563 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3564 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3565 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3569 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3570 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3579 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3580 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3586 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3587 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3588 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3589 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
3590 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
3591 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
3592 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3594 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3595 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
3596 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
3597 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3598 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3599 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3600 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3601 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3602 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3603 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
3604 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
3610 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3611 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3612 // be surfaced to the user.
3613 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(&self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
3614 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3616 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
3617 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
3618 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3619 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3620 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&chan_entry.get()) {
3621 (0x1000|7, upd.encode_with_len())
3623 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3626 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3628 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3629 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
3630 htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
3632 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, payment_params, .. } => {
3633 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3634 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3635 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3636 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3637 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) && !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3638 let retry = if let Some(payment_params_data) = payment_params {
3639 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3640 Some(RouteParameters {
3641 payment_params: payment_params_data,
3642 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3643 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3646 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3647 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3648 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3650 rejected_by_dest: false,
3651 network_update: None,
3652 all_paths_failed: payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0,
3654 short_channel_id: None,
3661 if payment.get().abandoned() && payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3662 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
3664 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
3670 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3677 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3678 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
3679 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
3680 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
3681 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
3682 /// still-available channels.
3683 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
3684 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3685 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3686 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3689 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3690 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3691 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3693 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, payment_id, ref payment_params, .. } => {
3694 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3695 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3696 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3697 let mut all_paths_failed = false;
3698 let mut full_failure_ev = None;
3699 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3700 if !payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
3701 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3704 if payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3705 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received failure of HTLC with payment_hash {} after payment completion", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3708 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3709 all_paths_failed = true;
3710 if payment.get().abandoned() {
3711 full_failure_ev = Some(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
3713 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
3719 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3722 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3723 let retry = if let Some(payment_params_data) = payment_params {
3724 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3725 Some(RouteParameters {
3726 payment_params: payment_params_data.clone(),
3727 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3728 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3731 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3733 let path_failure = match &onion_error {
3734 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
3736 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3738 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3739 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
3740 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
3741 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
3742 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3743 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3744 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3745 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
3752 error_code: onion_error_code,
3754 error_data: onion_error_data
3757 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3763 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
3764 // TODO: We'd like to generate a NetworkUpdate for temporary
3765 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as get_route
3766 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
3768 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
3769 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
3770 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3771 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3772 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3773 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
3774 network_update: None,
3777 short_channel_id: Some(path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id),
3780 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
3782 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
3786 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3787 pending_events.push(path_failure);
3788 if let Some(ev) = full_failure_ev { pending_events.push(ev); }
3790 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, .. }) => {
3791 let err_packet = match onion_error {
3792 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
3793 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
3794 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
3795 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
3797 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
3798 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3799 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
3803 let mut forward_event = None;
3804 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3805 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
3807 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
3808 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3809 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
3811 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3812 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
3815 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3816 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
3817 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3818 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3819 time_forwardable: time
3826 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentReceived`], generating any
3827 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
3829 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
3830 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
3831 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
3832 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
3834 /// Returns whether any HTLCs were claimed, and thus if any new [`MessageSendEvent`]s are now
3835 /// pending for processing via [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`].
3837 /// [`Event::PaymentReceived`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentReceived
3838 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3839 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3840 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
3841 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
3842 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3844 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3846 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3847 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
3848 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
3849 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
3851 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
3852 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
3853 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
3854 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
3856 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
3857 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
3858 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
3859 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
3860 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
3862 let mut valid_mpp = true;
3863 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3864 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3870 let mut errs = Vec::new();
3871 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
3872 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3874 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3875 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3876 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3877 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3878 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3879 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
3880 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
3882 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
3883 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) => {
3884 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
3885 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
3886 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
3887 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
3888 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
3889 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
3891 ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
3892 ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim => {
3893 // While we should never get here in most cases, if we do, it likely
3894 // indicates that the HTLC was timed out some time ago and is no longer
3895 // available to be claimed. Thus, it does not make sense to set
3896 // `claimed_any_htlcs`.
3898 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(_) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
3903 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
3904 // which were generated.
3905 channel_state.take();
3907 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
3908 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3909 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
3916 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> ClaimFundsFromHop {
3917 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
3918 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
3919 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3920 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3922 return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed
3926 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
3927 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
3928 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
3929 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
3930 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3931 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
3932 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3933 payment_preimage, e);
3934 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(
3935 chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3936 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(),
3937 Some(htlc_value_msat)
3940 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
3941 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
3942 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3943 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3944 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3945 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3946 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3947 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
3948 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3949 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3955 return ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(htlc_value_msat);
3957 return ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim;
3960 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
3961 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3962 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
3963 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
3964 payment_preimage, e);
3966 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3967 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
3969 chan.remove_entry();
3971 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(counterparty_node_id, res, None);
3974 } else { unreachable!(); }
3977 fn finalize_claims(&self, mut sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
3978 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3979 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3980 for source in sources.drain(..) {
3981 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } = source {
3982 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3983 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3984 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3985 assert!(payment.get().is_fulfilled());
3986 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, None) {
3987 pending_events.push(
3988 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
3990 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash(),
3995 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
4003 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool) {
4005 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4006 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4007 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
4008 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
4009 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4010 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
4011 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4012 if !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
4013 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4014 let fee_paid_msat = payment.get().get_pending_fee_msat();
4015 pending_events.push(
4016 events::Event::PaymentSent {
4017 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
4023 payment.get_mut().mark_fulfilled();
4027 // We currently immediately remove HTLCs which were fulfilled on-chain.
4028 // This could potentially lead to removing a pending payment too early,
4029 // with a reorg of one block causing us to re-add the fulfilled payment on
4031 // TODO: We should have a second monitor event that informs us of payments
4032 // irrevocably fulfilled.
4033 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
4034 let payment_hash = Some(PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner()));
4035 pending_events.push(
4036 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
4044 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
4049 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
4052 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4053 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4054 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage);
4055 let claimed_htlc = if let ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim = res { false } else { true };
4056 let htlc_claim_value_msat = match res {
4057 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(_, _, amt_opt) => amt_opt,
4058 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(amt) => Some(amt),
4061 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed = res {
4062 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4063 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4064 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4065 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4068 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4069 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
4070 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
4071 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) {
4072 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4073 payment_preimage, e);
4075 // Note that we do *not* set `claimed_htlc` to false here. In fact, this
4076 // totally could be a duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing
4077 // without interrogating the `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above
4078 // update to. Instead, we simply document in `PaymentForwarded` that this
4081 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4082 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) = res {
4083 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4084 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4088 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4089 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4090 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4093 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4094 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4096 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4104 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4105 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4106 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4109 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
4110 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4112 let chan_restoration_res;
4113 let (mut pending_failures, finalized_claims) = {
4114 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4115 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4116 let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4117 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4118 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4120 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4124 let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
4125 let channel_update = if updates.funding_locked.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() {
4126 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
4127 // funding_locked and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
4128 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
4129 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
4131 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4132 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4133 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()).unwrap(),
4136 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, None, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.funding_locked, updates.announcement_sigs);
4137 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4138 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4140 (updates.failed_htlcs, updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs)
4142 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
4143 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claims);
4144 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4145 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
4149 /// Called to accept a request to open a channel after [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`] has been
4152 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted.
4154 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: crate::util::events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4155 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4156 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4158 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4159 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4160 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4161 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4162 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4163 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4165 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4166 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4167 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(),
4170 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4171 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Can't accept a channel that doesn't exist".to_owned() });
4177 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4178 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4179 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4182 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4183 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4186 let mut channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4187 &their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.logger)
4188 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
4189 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4190 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4191 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4192 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
4193 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4194 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4195 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4196 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4197 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
4200 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4201 pending_events.push(
4202 events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4203 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4204 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4205 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4206 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4211 entry.insert(channel);
4217 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4218 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4219 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4220 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4221 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4222 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4223 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4224 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4226 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.peer_channel_config_limits, &their_features), channel_state, chan);
4227 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4229 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4232 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4233 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4234 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4235 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4237 user_channel_id: user_id,
4242 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4243 let ((funding_msg, monitor), mut chan) = {
4244 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4245 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4246 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4247 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4248 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4249 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4250 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4252 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
4254 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4257 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
4258 // lock before watch_channel
4259 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
4261 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
4262 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4263 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4264 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4265 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4266 // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for
4267 // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we
4268 // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4269 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
4270 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4271 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
4273 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
4274 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4275 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4276 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
4277 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4278 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4282 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4283 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4284 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4285 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4286 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4288 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4289 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4290 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4299 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4301 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4302 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4303 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4304 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4305 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4306 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4307 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4309 let (monitor, funding_tx) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
4310 Ok(update) => update,
4311 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
4313 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
4314 let mut res = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
4315 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4316 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4317 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4318 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4319 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4320 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4327 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4330 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
4331 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
4335 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4336 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4337 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4338 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4339 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4340 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4341 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4343 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg, self.get_our_node_id(),
4344 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4345 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4346 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4347 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4348 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4349 msg: announcement_sigs,
4351 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4352 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4353 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4354 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4355 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4356 // announcement_signatures.
4357 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4358 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4359 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4360 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4365 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4369 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4370 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4371 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4372 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4373 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4375 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4376 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4377 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4378 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4381 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4382 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4383 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4384 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4387 let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
4388 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4390 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4391 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
4392 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4393 let (result, is_permanent) =
4394 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_entry.key());
4396 remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
4402 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4403 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4404 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4411 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4414 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4415 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
4418 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
4422 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4423 let (tx, chan_option) = {
4424 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4425 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4426 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4427 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4428 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4429 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4431 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
4432 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
4433 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4434 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4439 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
4440 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
4441 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
4442 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
4443 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
4444 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
4445 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4447 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
4448 } else { (tx, None) }
4450 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4453 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
4454 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
4455 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
4457 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
4458 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4459 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4460 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4464 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4469 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4470 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
4471 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
4472 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
4474 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
4475 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
4476 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
4477 //but we should prevent it anyway.
4479 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
4480 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4482 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4483 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4484 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4485 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4488 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
4489 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
4490 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
4491 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
4492 match pending_forward_info {
4493 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
4494 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
4495 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
4496 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &{
4497 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
4498 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
4499 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
4500 res.extend_from_slice(&upd.encode_with_len()[..]);
4504 // The only case where we'd be unable to
4505 // successfully get a channel update is if the
4506 // channel isn't in the fully-funded state yet,
4507 // implying our counterparty is trying to route
4508 // payments over the channel back to themselves
4509 // (because no one else should know the short_id
4510 // is a lightning channel yet). We should have
4511 // no problem just calling this
4512 // unknown_next_peer (0x4000|10).
4513 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
4516 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &[])
4518 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4519 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
4520 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4523 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
4525 _ => pending_forward_info
4528 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4530 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4535 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4536 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4537 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
4538 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4539 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4540 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4541 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4542 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4544 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
4546 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4549 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false);
4553 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4554 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4555 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4556 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4557 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4558 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4559 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4561 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
4563 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4568 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4569 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4570 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4571 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4572 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4573 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4574 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4576 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
4577 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
4578 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
4580 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
4583 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4587 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4588 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4589 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4590 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4591 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4592 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4593 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4595 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
4596 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
4597 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
4598 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
4599 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
4600 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
4601 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
4606 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4607 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
4609 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4610 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4611 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4613 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
4614 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4615 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4616 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4617 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4618 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4619 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4620 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4622 commitment_signed: msg,
4628 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4633 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
4634 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
4635 let mut forward_event = None;
4636 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4637 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4638 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4639 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
4641 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4642 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
4643 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
4644 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
4645 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
4647 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4648 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4649 prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
4651 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4652 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4653 prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
4658 match forward_event {
4660 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4661 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
4662 time_forwardable: time
4670 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4671 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
4673 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4674 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4675 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4676 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4677 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4678 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4680 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
4681 let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self,
4682 chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4683 htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs;
4684 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), raa_updates.monitor_update) {
4685 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
4686 assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none());
4687 assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty());
4688 assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4689 assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty());
4690 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
4692 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan,
4693 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
4694 raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(),
4695 raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4696 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
4698 } else { unreachable!(); }
4701 if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update {
4702 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4703 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4707 break Ok((raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4708 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs,
4709 chan.get().get_short_channel_id()
4710 .expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"),
4711 chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
4713 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4716 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id);
4718 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, finalized_claim_htlcs,
4719 short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) =>
4721 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4722 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
4724 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
4725 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claim_htlcs);
4732 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4733 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4734 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4735 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4736 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4737 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4738 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4740 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
4742 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4747 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4748 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4749 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4751 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4752 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4753 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4754 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4756 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
4757 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
4760 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
4761 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
4762 self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), msg), channel_state, chan),
4763 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
4764 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
4765 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4768 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4773 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
4774 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4775 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4776 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4777 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
4778 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
4780 // It's not a local channel
4781 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
4784 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4785 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4786 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4787 if chan.get().should_announce() {
4788 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
4789 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
4790 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
4791 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4793 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
4795 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
4796 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
4797 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
4798 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4800 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
4803 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!()
4805 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
4808 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4809 let chan_restoration_res;
4810 let (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround) = {
4811 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4812 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4814 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4815 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4816 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4817 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4819 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
4820 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
4821 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
4822 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
4823 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
4824 msg, &self.logger, self.our_network_pubkey.clone(), self.genesis_hash,
4825 &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), channel_state, chan);
4826 let mut channel_update = None;
4827 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
4828 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4829 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4832 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4833 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
4834 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
4835 // they have the latest channel parameters.
4836 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4837 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4838 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4841 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
4842 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(
4843 self, channel_state_lock, channel_state, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
4844 responses.mon_update, Vec::new(), None, responses.funding_locked, responses.announcement_sigs);
4845 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4846 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4848 (responses.holding_cell_failed_htlcs, need_lnd_workaround)
4850 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4853 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
4854 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_failed_forward, msg.channel_id);
4856 if let Some(funding_locked_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
4857 self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, &funding_locked_msg)?;
4862 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
4863 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
4864 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4865 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
4866 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
4867 for monitor_event in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
4868 match monitor_event {
4869 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
4870 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
4871 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
4872 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.onchain_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true);
4874 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
4875 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
4878 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
4879 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
4880 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4881 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4882 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4883 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4884 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4885 if let Some(mut chan) = by_id.remove(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
4886 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4887 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4889 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
4890 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4891 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4895 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
4896 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
4898 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
4900 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
4901 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4902 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4903 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4904 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
4909 MonitorEvent::UpdateCompleted { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
4910 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id);
4915 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4916 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4919 has_pending_monitor_events
4922 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
4923 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
4924 /// update events as a separate process method here.
4925 #[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")]
4926 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
4927 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
4930 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
4931 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
4932 /// update was applied.
4934 /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
4935 /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
4936 /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
4937 /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
4938 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
4939 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
4940 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4941 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
4943 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4944 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4945 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4946 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4947 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4949 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
4950 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
4951 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
4952 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
4953 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id));
4955 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
4956 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4957 has_monitor_update = true;
4958 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), channel_id);
4959 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
4960 if close_channel { return false; }
4962 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4963 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4964 updates: commitment_update,
4971 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
4972 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
4973 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
4980 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
4981 for (failures, channel_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
4982 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id);
4985 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4986 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4992 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
4993 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
4994 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
4995 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
4996 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
4997 let mut has_update = false;
4999 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5000 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5001 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5002 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5003 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5005 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5006 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5007 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5008 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5010 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5011 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5014 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5015 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5016 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5017 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
5018 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
5021 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5022 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5027 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5029 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5030 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
5036 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
5037 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5044 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5045 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5051 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5052 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5054 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5055 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5056 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5057 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5058 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5059 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5060 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5061 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5062 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5063 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5064 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5065 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5066 assert!(should_broadcast);
5067 } else { unreachable!(); }
5068 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
5070 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5074 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5075 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5077 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5078 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5081 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5083 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5084 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5085 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5086 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5087 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5088 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5089 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5090 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5091 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5092 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5093 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5094 // never fail a payment too early.
5095 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5097 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5100 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5105 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5108 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5109 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5111 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
5112 /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5113 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5115 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5117 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5118 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5122 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5123 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5125 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5127 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5128 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5129 /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
5130 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5131 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5132 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, &self.keys_manager, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5135 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5136 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5139 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5141 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5143 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5144 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5145 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5146 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5147 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5150 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5151 /// stored external to LDK.
5153 /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5154 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5155 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5157 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5158 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5161 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5162 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5163 /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5164 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5166 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5167 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5168 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5169 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5170 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5172 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5173 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5174 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
5175 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5176 /// [`PaymentReceived`].
5178 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5180 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
5181 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
5183 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5184 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5188 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5189 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5191 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5193 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5194 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5195 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5196 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5199 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5200 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5203 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5205 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5207 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5208 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5211 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5212 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5214 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5215 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5216 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5219 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5220 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5222 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5223 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5224 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5225 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5227 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::get_phantom_scid(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, best_block.height(), &self.genesis_hash, &self.keys_manager);
5228 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5229 match channel_state.short_to_id.entry(scid_candidate) {
5230 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => continue,
5231 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return scid_candidate
5236 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5238 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5239 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5241 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5242 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5243 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5247 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"))]
5248 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5249 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5250 let event_handler = |event: &events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event.clone());
5251 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5256 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5257 !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().is_empty()
5261 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5262 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().clear()
5266 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5267 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5268 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5269 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5270 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5273 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5274 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5275 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5276 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5278 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5279 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5280 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5281 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5284 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5285 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5287 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
5288 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5291 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
5292 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5293 mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
5295 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5296 events.replace(pending_events);
5305 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5307 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5308 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5309 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5310 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5313 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
5315 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
5316 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
5318 /// Pending events are persisted as part of [`ChannelManager`]. While these events are cleared
5319 /// when processed, an [`EventHandler`] must be able to handle previously seen events when
5320 /// restarting from an old state.
5321 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
5322 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5323 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5325 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5326 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5327 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5328 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5331 let mut pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5332 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5333 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5336 for event in pending_events.drain(..) {
5337 handler.handle_event(&event);
5345 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5347 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5348 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5349 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5350 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5353 fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
5355 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5356 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), block.header.prev_blockhash,
5357 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
5358 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
5359 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
5362 let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
5363 self.transactions_confirmed(&block.header, &txdata, height);
5364 self.best_block_updated(&block.header, height);
5367 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5368 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5369 let new_height = height - 1;
5371 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
5372 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
5373 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
5374 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
5375 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
5376 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
5379 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5383 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5385 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5386 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5387 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5388 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5391 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5392 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5393 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5394 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5396 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5397 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
5399 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5400 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger)
5401 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
5404 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5405 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5406 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5407 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5409 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5410 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
5412 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5414 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
5416 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5418 macro_rules! max_time {
5419 ($timestamp: expr) => {
5421 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
5422 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
5423 // having an explicit local time source.
5424 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
5425 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
5426 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5427 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
5428 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
5434 max_time!(self.last_node_announcement_serial);
5435 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
5436 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5437 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
5438 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
5441 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5442 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5443 outbounds.retain(|payment_id, payment| {
5444 if payment.remaining_parts() != 0 { return true }
5445 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { starting_block_height, payment_hash, .. } = payment {
5446 if *starting_block_height + PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS <= height {
5447 log_info!(self.logger, "Timing out payment with id {} and hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_id.0), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
5448 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
5449 payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash,
5457 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
5458 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5459 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.short_to_id.len());
5460 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
5461 if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() {
5462 res.push(funding_txo.txid);
5468 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
5469 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5470 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
5471 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
5472 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
5473 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
5474 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5475 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5480 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5482 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5483 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5484 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5485 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5488 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
5489 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
5491 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
5492 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
5493 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5494 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5495 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5497 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5498 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5500 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5501 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5502 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5503 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5504 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
5505 let res = f(channel);
5506 if let Ok((funding_locked_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
5507 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
5508 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&channel).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
5509 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
5510 failure_code: 0x1000 | 14, // expiry_too_soon, or at least it is now
5514 if let Some(funding_locked) = funding_locked_opt {
5515 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
5516 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5517 msg: funding_locked,
5519 if channel.is_usable() {
5520 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5521 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5522 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5523 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel).unwrap(),
5526 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5528 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
5530 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
5531 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5532 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5533 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5534 msg: announcement_sigs,
5536 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5537 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, height) {
5538 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5540 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5541 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5542 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap(),
5547 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
5548 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
5549 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
5551 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
5552 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
5553 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
5554 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
5555 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5559 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
5560 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
5561 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5562 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5563 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
5564 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
5565 data: reason_message,
5573 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5574 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, htlcs| {
5575 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
5576 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
5577 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
5578 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
5579 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
5580 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
5581 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
5582 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
5583 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
5584 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
5585 data: htlc_msat_height_data
5590 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
5595 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
5597 for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
5598 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
5602 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
5603 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
5604 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
5607 /// Note that this method is not available with the `no-std` feature.
5608 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
5609 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
5610 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
5613 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
5614 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
5616 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
5617 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
5620 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5621 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
5622 let mutcond = &self.persistence_notifier.persistence_lock;
5623 let &(ref mtx, _) = mutcond;
5624 let guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5628 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
5629 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
5630 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
5631 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
5635 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref , T: Deref , K: Deref , F: Deref , L: Deref >
5636 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5637 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5638 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5639 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5640 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5643 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
5644 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5645 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5648 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
5649 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5650 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5653 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
5654 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5655 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5658 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
5659 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5660 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5663 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
5664 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5665 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5668 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
5669 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5670 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5673 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
5674 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5675 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5678 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
5679 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5680 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5683 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
5684 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5685 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5688 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
5689 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5690 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5693 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
5694 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5695 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5698 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
5699 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5700 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5703 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
5704 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5705 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5708 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
5709 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5710 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5713 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
5714 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5715 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5718 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
5719 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5720 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
5723 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
5728 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
5729 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5730 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5733 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
5734 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5735 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5736 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
5738 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5739 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5740 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5741 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5742 if no_connection_possible {
5743 log_debug!(self.logger, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5744 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5745 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5746 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
5747 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
5749 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(true));
5750 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5751 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5755 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
5762 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5763 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5764 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5765 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
5766 if chan.is_shutdown() {
5767 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
5768 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
5770 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
5773 no_channels_remain = false;
5779 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
5781 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5782 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5783 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5784 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5785 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5786 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5787 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5788 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5789 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5790 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5791 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5792 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
5793 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
5794 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
5795 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5796 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5797 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
5798 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
5799 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
5803 if no_channels_remain {
5804 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
5807 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5808 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5812 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
5813 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5815 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5818 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5819 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
5820 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5821 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
5822 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
5825 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
5826 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
5831 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5832 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5833 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5834 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5835 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5836 if !chan.have_received_message() {
5837 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
5838 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
5839 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
5843 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
5844 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5845 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
5851 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
5854 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
5855 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5857 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
5858 for chan in self.list_channels() {
5859 if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
5860 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
5861 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(&msg.data));
5865 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
5866 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(&msg.data));
5871 /// Used to signal to the ChannelManager persister that the manager needs to be re-persisted to
5872 /// disk/backups, through `await_persistable_update_timeout` and `await_persistable_update`.
5873 struct PersistenceNotifier {
5874 /// Users won't access the persistence_lock directly, but rather wait on its bool using
5875 /// `wait_timeout` and `wait`.
5876 persistence_lock: (Mutex<bool>, Condvar),
5879 impl PersistenceNotifier {
5882 persistence_lock: (Mutex::new(false), Condvar::new()),
5888 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
5889 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5894 guard = cvar.wait(guard).unwrap();
5895 let result = *guard;
5903 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
5904 fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
5905 let current_time = Instant::now();
5907 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
5908 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5913 guard = cvar.wait_timeout(guard, max_wait).unwrap().0;
5914 // Due to spurious wakeups that can happen on `wait_timeout`, here we need to check if the
5915 // desired wait time has actually passed, and if not then restart the loop with a reduced wait
5916 // time. Note that this logic can be highly simplified through the use of
5917 // `Condvar::wait_while` and `Condvar::wait_timeout_while`, if and when our MSRV is raised to
5919 let elapsed = current_time.elapsed();
5920 let result = *guard;
5921 if result || elapsed >= max_wait {
5925 match max_wait.checked_sub(elapsed) {
5926 None => return result,
5932 // Signal to the ChannelManager persister that there are updates necessitating persisting to disk.
5934 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &self.persistence_lock;
5935 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5936 *persistence_lock = true;
5937 mem::drop(persistence_lock);
5942 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
5943 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
5945 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
5946 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
5947 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
5948 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
5951 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
5952 (2, node_id, required),
5953 (4, features, required),
5954 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
5955 (8, forwarding_info, option),
5958 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelDetails, {
5959 (2, channel_id, required),
5960 (4, counterparty, required),
5961 (6, funding_txo, option),
5962 (8, short_channel_id, option),
5963 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
5964 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
5965 (14, user_channel_id, required),
5966 (16, balance_msat, required),
5967 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
5968 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
5969 (22, confirmations_required, option),
5970 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
5971 (26, is_outbound, required),
5972 (28, is_funding_locked, required),
5973 (30, is_usable, required),
5974 (32, is_public, required),
5977 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
5978 (2, channels, vec_type),
5979 (4, phantom_scid, required),
5980 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
5983 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
5985 (0, onion_packet, required),
5986 (2, short_channel_id, required),
5989 (0, payment_data, required),
5990 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
5991 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
5993 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
5994 (0, payment_preimage, required),
5995 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
5999 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
6000 (0, routing, required),
6001 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
6002 (4, payment_hash, required),
6003 (6, amt_to_forward, required),
6004 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required)
6008 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6009 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6011 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
6013 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6014 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6015 reason.write(writer)?;
6017 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6018 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
6021 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6022 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6023 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
6024 failure_code.write(writer)?;
6031 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6032 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6033 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6036 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6037 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6038 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6039 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
6043 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6044 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6045 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6046 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
6047 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
6050 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
6051 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
6052 // messages contained in the variants.
6053 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
6054 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
6055 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
6057 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6058 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6059 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6060 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6061 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
6064 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6065 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6066 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6067 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6068 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
6070 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6075 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
6080 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
6081 (0, short_channel_id, required),
6082 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6083 (2, outpoint, required),
6084 (4, htlc_id, required),
6085 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
6088 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
6089 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6090 let payment_data = match &self.onion_payload {
6091 OnionPayload::Invoice(data) => Some(data.clone()),
6094 let keysend_preimage = match self.onion_payload {
6095 OnionPayload::Invoice(_) => None,
6096 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => Some(preimage.clone()),
6101 (0, self.prev_hop, required), (2, self.value, required),
6102 (4, payment_data, option), (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
6103 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
6109 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
6110 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6111 let mut prev_hop = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6113 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
6114 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
6115 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
6119 (0, prev_hop, required), (2, value, required),
6120 (4, payment_data, option), (6, cltv_expiry, required),
6121 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
6123 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
6125 if payment_data.is_some() {
6126 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6128 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
6131 if payment_data.is_none() {
6132 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6134 OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data.unwrap())
6138 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
6146 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
6147 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6148 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6151 let mut session_priv: ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6152 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
6153 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
6154 let mut payment_id = None;
6155 let mut payment_secret = None;
6156 let mut payment_params = None;
6157 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6158 (0, session_priv, required),
6159 (1, payment_id, option),
6160 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6161 (3, payment_secret, option),
6162 (4, path, vec_type),
6163 (5, payment_params, option),
6165 if payment_id.is_none() {
6166 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
6168 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
6170 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6171 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
6172 first_hop_htlc_msat: first_hop_htlc_msat,
6173 path: path.unwrap(),
6174 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
6179 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6180 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6185 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
6186 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::io::Error> {
6188 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payment_params } => {
6190 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
6191 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6192 (0, session_priv, required),
6193 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
6194 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6195 (3, payment_secret, option),
6196 (4, path, vec_type),
6197 (5, payment_params, option),
6200 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
6202 field.write(writer)?;
6209 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason,
6210 (0, LightningError) => {
6214 (0, failure_code, required),
6215 (2, data, vec_type),
6219 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
6221 (0, forward_info, required),
6222 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
6223 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
6224 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
6227 (0, htlc_id, required),
6228 (2, err_packet, required),
6232 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
6233 (0, payment_secret, required),
6234 (2, expiry_time, required),
6235 (4, user_payment_id, required),
6236 (6, payment_preimage, required),
6237 (8, min_value_msat, required),
6240 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(PendingOutboundPayment,
6242 (0, session_privs, required),
6245 (0, session_privs, required),
6246 (1, payment_hash, option),
6249 (0, session_privs, required),
6250 (1, pending_fee_msat, option),
6251 (2, payment_hash, required),
6252 (4, payment_secret, option),
6253 (6, total_msat, required),
6254 (8, pending_amt_msat, required),
6255 (10, starting_block_height, required),
6258 (0, session_privs, required),
6259 (2, payment_hash, required),
6263 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
6264 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6265 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6266 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6267 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6270 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6271 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
6273 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6275 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
6277 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6278 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
6279 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
6282 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6283 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
6284 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6285 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6286 unfunded_channels += 1;
6289 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
6290 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6291 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6292 channel.write(writer)?;
6296 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6297 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
6298 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6299 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6300 for forward in pending_forwards {
6301 forward.write(writer)?;
6305 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6306 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
6307 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6308 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6309 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
6310 htlc.write(writer)?;
6314 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6315 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6316 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6317 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
6318 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6319 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
6322 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6323 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6324 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6325 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6326 for event in events.iter() {
6327 event.write(writer)?;
6330 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
6331 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6332 for event in background_events.iter() {
6334 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
6336 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
6337 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
6342 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6343 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6345 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6346 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
6347 hash.write(writer)?;
6348 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
6351 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
6352 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
6353 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6354 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
6355 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
6358 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
6359 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6361 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6362 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6363 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
6364 session_priv.write(writer)?;
6367 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
6368 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
6372 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
6373 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
6374 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6376 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6377 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6378 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
6383 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6384 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
6385 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
6386 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
6387 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
6394 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
6396 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
6398 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6399 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
6400 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
6401 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
6402 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
6403 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
6404 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
6405 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
6406 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6407 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
6408 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
6409 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
6410 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
6412 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
6413 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
6415 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
6416 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
6418 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
6419 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
6420 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
6421 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
6422 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
6423 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
6425 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
6426 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6427 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6428 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6429 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6430 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6433 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
6434 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
6436 pub keys_manager: K,
6438 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6440 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
6441 pub fee_estimator: F,
6442 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6444 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
6445 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
6446 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
6447 pub chain_monitor: M,
6449 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
6450 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
6451 /// force-closed during deserialization.
6452 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
6453 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
6454 /// deserialization.
6456 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
6457 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
6458 pub default_config: UserConfig,
6460 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
6461 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
6463 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
6464 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
6465 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
6466 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
6468 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
6471 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
6472 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
6475 impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6476 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
6477 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6478 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6479 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6480 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6483 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
6484 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
6485 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
6486 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
6487 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
6489 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
6490 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
6495 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
6496 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
6497 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6498 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
6499 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6500 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6501 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6502 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6505 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6506 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
6507 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
6511 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6512 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
6513 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6514 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6515 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6516 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6519 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6520 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6522 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6523 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6524 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6526 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
6528 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6529 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6530 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6531 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6532 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
6533 for _ in 0..channel_count {
6534 let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (&args.keys_manager, best_block_height))?;
6535 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
6536 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
6537 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
6538 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
6539 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
6540 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
6541 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
6542 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
6543 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
6544 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
6545 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
6546 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
6547 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
6548 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
6549 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
6550 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6551 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
6552 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
6553 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
6554 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
6555 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
6556 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
6557 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
6558 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
6559 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
6560 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
6561 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
6562 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
6563 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
6564 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6565 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
6566 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
6569 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6570 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
6571 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
6573 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
6576 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6577 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
6578 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
6579 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
6580 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
6581 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6585 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
6586 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
6587 log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
6588 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
6592 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
6593 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6594 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
6595 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
6596 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6597 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6598 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
6599 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
6600 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
6602 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
6605 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6606 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
6607 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
6608 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6609 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6610 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
6611 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
6612 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
6614 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
6617 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6618 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
6619 for _ in 0..peer_count {
6620 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6621 let peer_state = PeerState {
6622 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
6624 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
6627 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6628 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
6629 for _ in 0..event_count {
6630 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
6631 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
6635 if forward_htlcs_count > 0 {
6636 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
6637 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
6638 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
6639 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
6640 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
6641 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6642 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
6646 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6647 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
6648 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
6649 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6650 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
6651 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6655 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6656 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6658 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6659 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
6660 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
6661 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
6662 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6666 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6667 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
6668 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
6669 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
6670 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
6671 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
6672 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
6674 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
6675 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6679 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
6680 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
6681 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
6682 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
6683 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
6684 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6685 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
6686 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
6687 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
6688 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
6690 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
6691 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
6694 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
6695 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
6696 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
6697 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
6698 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
6699 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
6701 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
6703 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
6704 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
6705 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
6706 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
6707 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
6708 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
6709 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
6711 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors {
6712 if by_id.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
6713 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() {
6714 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
6715 if path.is_empty() {
6716 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
6717 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6719 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
6720 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
6721 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
6722 match pending_outbound_payments.as_mut().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
6723 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6724 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
6725 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
6726 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
6728 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6729 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
6730 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
6731 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
6732 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
6734 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
6735 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
6736 total_msat: path_amt,
6737 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
6739 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
6740 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
6749 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6750 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
6752 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
6753 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
6756 let our_network_key = match args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node) {
6758 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6760 let our_network_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &our_network_key);
6761 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
6762 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
6763 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
6764 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6768 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
6769 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
6770 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
6772 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
6773 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
6774 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
6776 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
6778 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
6783 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
6785 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
6786 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
6787 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
6788 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
6794 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
6795 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
6797 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
6799 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
6800 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
6801 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
6802 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
6804 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
6805 logger: args.logger,
6806 default_configuration: args.default_config,
6809 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
6810 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
6813 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
6814 //connection or two.
6816 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
6822 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
6823 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
6824 use core::time::Duration;
6825 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
6826 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
6827 use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure};
6828 use ln::channelmanager::inbound_payment;
6829 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
6830 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
6832 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
6833 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
6834 use util::errors::APIError;
6835 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
6836 use util::test_utils;
6838 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
6840 fn test_wait_timeout() {
6841 use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier;
6843 use core::sync::atomic::AtomicBool;
6846 let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new());
6847 let thread_notifier = Arc::clone(&persistence_notifier);
6849 let exit_thread = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
6850 let exit_thread_clone = exit_thread.clone();
6851 thread::spawn(move || {
6853 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &thread_notifier.persistence_lock;
6854 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6855 *persistence_lock = true;
6858 if exit_thread_clone.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
6864 // Check that we can block indefinitely until updates are available.
6865 let _ = persistence_notifier.wait();
6867 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration if updates are
6870 if persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
6875 exit_thread.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
6877 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration even if no updates
6880 if !persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
6887 fn test_notify_limits() {
6888 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
6889 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
6890 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6891 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6892 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6893 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6895 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
6896 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
6897 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6898 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6899 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6901 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6903 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
6904 // to connect messages with new values
6905 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
6906 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
6907 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
6908 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
6910 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
6911 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6912 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6913 // ... but the last node should not.
6914 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6915 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
6916 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6917 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6919 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
6920 // about the channel.
6921 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6922 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6923 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6925 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
6927 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6928 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6929 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6930 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6931 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6932 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6934 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
6935 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6936 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6938 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
6939 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
6940 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
6941 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
6942 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
6943 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
6945 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
6946 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
6947 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
6948 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
6949 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6950 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6951 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6952 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6954 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
6955 // the channel info has updated.
6956 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
6957 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
6958 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6959 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6960 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6961 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6965 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
6966 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
6968 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6969 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6970 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6971 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6972 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6974 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
6975 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
6976 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
6977 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
6978 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
6979 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
6980 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
6981 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6982 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6983 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6984 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
6986 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
6987 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
6988 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6989 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6990 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6991 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
6992 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
6993 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6994 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6995 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6996 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6997 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6998 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6999 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7000 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7001 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7002 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7003 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7004 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7005 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7006 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7007 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
7009 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
7010 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
7011 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7012 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7013 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7014 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
7016 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
7017 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
7018 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
7019 // lightning messages manually.
7020 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
7021 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7022 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7023 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7024 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
7025 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7026 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7027 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
7028 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7029 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7030 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
7031 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7032 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7033 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7034 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7035 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7036 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7037 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
7038 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7039 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7040 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
7041 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7042 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7043 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7044 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7045 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
7046 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7048 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
7049 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
7050 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7051 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
7053 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
7054 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
7055 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
7056 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
7058 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7061 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7062 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7063 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7064 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7066 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7069 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7070 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7071 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7072 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7074 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7079 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
7080 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
7081 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
7082 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
7083 // fails as expected.
7084 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7085 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7086 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7087 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7088 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7089 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7091 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
7092 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
7093 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
7095 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
7096 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7097 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id()),
7098 final_value_msat: 100_000,
7099 final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
7101 let route = find_route(
7102 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, nodes[0].network_graph, None,
7103 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
7105 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
7106 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7107 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7108 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7109 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7110 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7111 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7112 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7113 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7114 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7115 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7116 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7117 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7118 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7119 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7120 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7121 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7122 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7123 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7124 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7125 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7127 // Finally, claim the original payment.
7128 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7130 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
7131 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7132 let route = find_route(
7133 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, nodes[0].network_graph, None,
7134 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
7136 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
7137 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7138 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7139 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7140 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
7141 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
7142 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
7144 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
7145 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7146 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
7147 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7148 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7149 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7150 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7151 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7152 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7153 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7154 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7155 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7156 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7157 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7158 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7159 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7160 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7161 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7162 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7163 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7164 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7165 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7166 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7168 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
7169 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7173 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
7174 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
7175 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
7176 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7177 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7178 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7179 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7181 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7182 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7183 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7184 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7186 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7187 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7188 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7189 final_value_msat: 10000,
7190 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7192 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
7193 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7194 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7195 let route = find_route(
7196 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7197 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
7200 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7201 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
7202 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
7203 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7205 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7206 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7207 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7208 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7209 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7210 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7211 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7213 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
7217 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
7218 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
7219 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7220 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7221 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7222 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7224 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7225 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7226 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7227 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7229 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7230 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7231 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7232 final_value_msat: 10000,
7233 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7235 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
7236 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7237 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7238 let route = find_route(
7239 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7240 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
7243 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7244 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7245 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
7246 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
7247 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7249 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7250 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7251 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7252 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7253 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7254 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7255 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7257 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
7261 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
7262 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
7263 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
7264 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
7265 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7267 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7268 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7269 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7270 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7272 // Marshall an MPP route.
7273 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
7274 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
7275 route.paths.push(path);
7276 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7277 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
7278 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
7279 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
7280 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
7281 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
7283 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None).unwrap_err() {
7284 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
7285 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
7286 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
7291 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
7292 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
7293 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7294 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7295 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7296 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7298 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
7299 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
7301 total_msat: 100_000,
7304 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
7305 // payment verification fails as expected.
7306 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
7307 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
7308 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, payment_data.clone(), nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
7309 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
7311 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager::inbound_payment".to_string(), "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash".to_string(), 1);
7315 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
7316 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
7320 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
7323 use chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
7324 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
7325 use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
7326 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
7327 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7328 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
7329 use routing::network_graph::NetworkGraph;
7330 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, get_route};
7331 use util::test_utils;
7332 use util::config::UserConfig;
7333 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
7335 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7336 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7337 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, Transaction, TxOut};
7339 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
7343 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
7344 node: &'a ChannelManager<InMemorySigner,
7345 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
7346 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
7347 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
7348 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
7349 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>
7354 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
7355 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
7358 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
7359 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
7360 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
7362 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
7363 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7365 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
7366 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
7368 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
7369 config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
7371 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
7372 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
7373 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
7374 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
7375 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
7377 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
7379 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
7381 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
7382 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
7383 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
7384 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
7385 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
7387 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
7389 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
7391 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7392 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7393 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
7394 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7395 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7398 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
7399 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7400 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
7402 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
7403 } else { panic!(); }
7405 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7406 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7408 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
7411 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
7414 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
7415 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
7417 node_a.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7418 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7419 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
7420 match msg_events[0] {
7421 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref msg, .. } => {
7422 node_b.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
7423 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
7427 match msg_events[1] {
7428 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7432 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
7434 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
7435 macro_rules! send_payment {
7436 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
7437 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
7438 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id())
7439 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7440 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7441 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &dummy_graph,
7442 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer).unwrap();
7444 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
7445 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
7447 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
7448 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
7450 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
7451 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
7452 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7453 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
7454 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
7455 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
7456 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
7457 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7459 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
7460 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
7461 assert!($node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
7463 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
7464 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
7465 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
7466 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7467 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
7469 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
7472 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
7473 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
7474 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
7475 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7477 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
7482 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
7483 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);