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[rust-lightning] / lightning / src / ln / channelmanager.rs
1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
2 // history.
3 //
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
8 // licenses.
9
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
11 //!
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
15 //!
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
19
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::Header;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
23 use bitcoin::key::constants::SECRET_KEY_SIZE;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25
26 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
28 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
29
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
32 use bitcoin::{secp256k1, Sequence};
33
34 use crate::blinded_path::BlindedPath;
35 use crate::blinded_path::payment::{PaymentConstraints, ReceiveTlvs};
36 use crate::chain;
37 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
38 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
39 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
40 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
41 use crate::events;
42 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
43 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
44 // construct one themselves.
45 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
46 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel};
47 use crate::ln::features::{Bolt12InvoiceFeatures, ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
48 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
49 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
50 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
51 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
52 use crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters};
53 use crate::ln::msgs;
54 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
55 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
56 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
57 #[cfg(test)]
58 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
59 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{Bolt12PaymentError, OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs, StaleExpiration};
60 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
61 use crate::offers::invoice::{BlindedPayInfo, Bolt12Invoice, DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY, DerivedSigningPubkey, InvoiceBuilder};
62 use crate::offers::invoice_error::InvoiceError;
63 use crate::offers::merkle::SignError;
64 use crate::offers::offer::{DerivedMetadata, Offer, OfferBuilder};
65 use crate::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
66 use crate::offers::refund::{Refund, RefundBuilder};
67 use crate::onion_message::{Destination, OffersMessage, OffersMessageHandler, PendingOnionMessage, new_pending_onion_message};
68 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider};
69 use crate::sign::ecdsa::WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner;
70 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
71 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
72 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
73 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
74 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
75 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
76 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
77
78 use alloc::collections::{btree_map, BTreeMap};
79
80 use crate::io;
81 use crate::prelude::*;
82 use core::{cmp, mem};
83 use core::cell::RefCell;
84 use crate::io::Read;
85 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
86 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
87 use core::time::Duration;
88 use core::ops::Deref;
89
90 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
91 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, ProbeSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
92 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
93
94 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
95 //
96 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
97 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
98 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
99 //
100 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
101 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
102 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
103 // before we forward it.
104 //
105 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
106 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
107 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
108 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
109 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
110
111 /// Routing info for an inbound HTLC onion.
112 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
113 pub enum PendingHTLCRouting {
114         /// A forwarded HTLC.
115         Forward {
116                 /// BOLT 4 onion packet.
117                 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
118                 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
119                 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
120                 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
121         },
122         /// An HTLC paid to an invoice we generated.
123         Receive {
124                 /// Payment secret and total msat received.
125                 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
126                 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`] for more info.
127                 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
128                 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
129                 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
130                 /// Optional shared secret for phantom node.
131                 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
132                 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
133                 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
134         },
135         /// Incoming keysend (sender provided the preimage in a TLV).
136         ReceiveKeysend {
137                 /// This was added in 0.0.116 and will break deserialization on downgrades.
138                 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
139                 /// Preimage for this onion payment.
140                 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
141                 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`] for more info.
142                 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
143                 /// CLTV expiry of the incoming HTLC.
144                 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
145                 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
146                 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
147         },
148 }
149
150 /// Full details of an incoming HTLC, including routing info.
151 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
152 pub struct PendingHTLCInfo {
153         /// Further routing details based on whether the HTLC is being forwarded or received.
154         pub routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
155         /// Shared secret from the previous hop.
156         pub incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
157         payment_hash: PaymentHash,
158         /// Amount received
159         pub incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
160         /// Sender intended amount to forward or receive (actual amount received
161         /// may overshoot this in either case)
162         pub outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
163         /// Outgoing CLTV height.
164         pub outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
165         /// The fee being skimmed off the top of this HTLC. If this is a forward, it'll be the fee we are
166         /// skimming. If we're receiving this HTLC, it's the fee that our counterparty skimmed.
167         pub skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
168 }
169
170 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
171 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
172         Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
173         Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
174 }
175
176 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
177 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
178 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
179         Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
180         Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
181 }
182
183 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
184         pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
185
186         // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
187         // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
188         // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
189         // HTLCs.
190         //
191         // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
192         prev_short_channel_id: u64,
193         prev_htlc_id: u64,
194         prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
195         prev_user_channel_id: u128,
196 }
197
198 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
199         AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
200         FailHTLC {
201                 htlc_id: u64,
202                 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
203         },
204 }
205
206 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
207 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
208 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
209         // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
210         short_channel_id: u64,
211         user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
212         htlc_id: u64,
213         incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
214         phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
215
216         // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
217         // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
218         outpoint: OutPoint,
219 }
220
221 enum OnionPayload {
222         /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
223         Invoice {
224                 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
225                 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
226                 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
227         },
228         /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
229         Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
230 }
231
232 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
233 struct ClaimableHTLC {
234         prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
235         cltv_expiry: u32,
236         /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
237         value: u64,
238         /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
239         /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
240         sender_intended_value: u64,
241         onion_payload: OnionPayload,
242         timer_ticks: u8,
243         /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
244         /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
245         total_value_received: Option<u64>,
246         /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
247         total_msat: u64,
248         /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
249         counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
250 }
251
252 impl From<&ClaimableHTLC> for events::ClaimedHTLC {
253         fn from(val: &ClaimableHTLC) -> Self {
254                 events::ClaimedHTLC {
255                         channel_id: val.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
256                         user_channel_id: val.prev_hop.user_channel_id.unwrap_or(0),
257                         cltv_expiry: val.cltv_expiry,
258                         value_msat: val.value,
259                         counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: val.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0),
260                 }
261         }
262 }
263
264 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
265 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
266 ///
267 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
268 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
269 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; Self::LENGTH]);
270
271 impl PaymentId {
272         /// Number of bytes in the id.
273         pub const LENGTH: usize = 32;
274 }
275
276 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
277         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
278                 self.0.write(w)
279         }
280 }
281
282 impl Readable for PaymentId {
283         fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
284                 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
285                 Ok(PaymentId(buf))
286         }
287 }
288
289 impl core::fmt::Display for PaymentId {
290         fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> core::fmt::Result {
291                 crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
292         }
293 }
294
295 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
296 ///
297 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
298 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
299 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
300
301 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
302         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
303                 self.0.write(w)
304         }
305 }
306
307 impl Readable for InterceptId {
308         fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
309                 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
310                 Ok(InterceptId(buf))
311         }
312 }
313
314 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
315 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
316 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
317         PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
318         OutboundRoute { session_priv: [u8; SECRET_KEY_SIZE] },
319 }
320 impl SentHTLCId {
321         pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
322                 match source {
323                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
324                                 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
325                                 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
326                         },
327                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
328                                 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: session_priv.secret_bytes() },
329                 }
330         }
331 }
332 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
333         (0, PreviousHopData) => {
334                 (0, short_channel_id, required),
335                 (2, htlc_id, required),
336         },
337         (2, OutboundRoute) => {
338                 (0, session_priv, required),
339         };
340 );
341
342
343 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
344 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
345 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
346 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
347         PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
348         OutboundRoute {
349                 path: Path,
350                 session_priv: SecretKey,
351                 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
352                 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
353                 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
354                 payment_id: PaymentId,
355         },
356 }
357 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
358 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
359         fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
360                 match self {
361                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
362                                 0u8.hash(hasher);
363                                 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
364                         },
365                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
366                                 1u8.hash(hasher);
367                                 path.hash(hasher);
368                                 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
369                                 payment_id.hash(hasher);
370                                 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
371                         },
372                 }
373         }
374 }
375 impl HTLCSource {
376         #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
377         #[cfg(test)]
378         pub fn dummy() -> Self {
379                 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
380                         path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
381                         session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
382                         first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
383                         payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
384                 }
385         }
386
387         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
388         /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
389         /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
390         pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
391                 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
392                         *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
393                 } else {
394                         // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
395                         true
396                 }
397         }
398 }
399
400 /// Invalid inbound onion payment.
401 pub struct InboundOnionErr {
402         /// BOLT 4 error code.
403         pub err_code: u16,
404         /// Data attached to this error.
405         pub err_data: Vec<u8>,
406         /// Error message text.
407         pub msg: &'static str,
408 }
409
410 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
411 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
412 ///
413 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
414 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
415 pub enum FailureCode {
416         /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
417         /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
418         TemporaryNodeFailure,
419         /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
420         /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
421         RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
422         /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
423         /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
424         /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
425         /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
426         IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
427         /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
428         /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
429         ///
430         /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
431         /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
432         InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
433 }
434
435 impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
436     fn into(self) -> u16 {
437                 match self {
438                         FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
439                         FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
440                         FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
441                         FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
442                 }
443         }
444 }
445
446 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
447 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
448 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
449 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
450 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
451
452 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
453         err: msgs::LightningError,
454         chan_id: Option<(ChannelId, u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
455         shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
456         channel_capacity: Option<u64>,
457 }
458 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
459         #[inline]
460         fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
461                 Self {
462                         err: LightningError {
463                                 err: err.clone(),
464                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
465                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
466                                                 channel_id,
467                                                 data: err
468                                         },
469                                 },
470                         },
471                         chan_id: None,
472                         shutdown_finish: None,
473                         channel_capacity: None,
474                 }
475         }
476         #[inline]
477         fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
478                 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None, channel_capacity: None }
479         }
480         #[inline]
481         fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId, user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>, channel_capacity: u64) -> Self {
482                 let err_msg = msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: err.clone() };
483                 let action = if shutdown_res.monitor_update.is_some() {
484                         // We have a closing `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, which means the channel was funded and we
485                         // should disconnect our peer such that we force them to broadcast their latest
486                         // commitment upon reconnecting.
487                         msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(err_msg) }
488                 } else {
489                         msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: err_msg }
490                 };
491                 Self {
492                         err: LightningError { err, action },
493                         chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
494                         shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
495                         channel_capacity: Some(channel_capacity)
496                 }
497         }
498         #[inline]
499         fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
500                 Self {
501                         err: match err {
502                                 ChannelError::Warn(msg) =>  LightningError {
503                                         err: msg.clone(),
504                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
505                                                 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
506                                                         channel_id,
507                                                         data: msg
508                                                 },
509                                                 log_level: Level::Warn,
510                                         },
511                                 },
512                                 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
513                                         err: msg,
514                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
515                                 },
516                                 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
517                                         err: msg.clone(),
518                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
519                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
520                                                         channel_id,
521                                                         data: msg
522                                                 },
523                                         },
524                                 },
525                         },
526                         chan_id: None,
527                         shutdown_finish: None,
528                         channel_capacity: None,
529                 }
530         }
531
532         fn closes_channel(&self) -> bool {
533                 self.chan_id.is_some()
534         }
535 }
536
537 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
538 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
539 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
540 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
541 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
542
543 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
544 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
545 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
546 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
547 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
548 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
549         /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
550         CommitmentFirst,
551         /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
552         RevokeAndACKFirst,
553 }
554
555 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
556 struct ClaimingPayment {
557         amount_msat: u64,
558         payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
559         receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
560         htlcs: Vec<events::ClaimedHTLC>,
561         sender_intended_value: Option<u64>,
562 }
563 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
564         (0, amount_msat, required),
565         (2, payment_purpose, required),
566         (4, receiver_node_id, required),
567         (5, htlcs, optional_vec),
568         (7, sender_intended_value, option),
569 });
570
571 struct ClaimablePayment {
572         purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
573         onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
574         htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
575 }
576
577 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
578 struct ClaimablePayments {
579         /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
580         /// failed/claimed by the user.
581         ///
582         /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
583         /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
584         ///
585         /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
586         /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
587         claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
588
589         /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
590         /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
591         /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
592         pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
593 }
594
595 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
596 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
597 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
598 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
599 #[derive(Debug)]
600 enum BackgroundEvent {
601         /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
602         /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
603         /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
604         /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
605         ///
606         /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
607         /// are regenerated on startup.
608         ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
609         /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
610         /// channel to continue normal operation.
611         ///
612         /// In general this should be used rather than
613         /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
614         /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
615         /// error the other variant is acceptable.
616         ///
617         /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
618         /// are regenerated on startup.
619         MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
620                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
621                 funding_txo: OutPoint,
622                 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
623         },
624         /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
625         /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
626         /// on a channel.
627         MonitorUpdatesComplete {
628                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
629                 channel_id: ChannelId,
630         },
631 }
632
633 #[derive(Debug)]
634 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
635         /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
636         /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
637         /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
638         /// event can be generated.
639         PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
640         /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
641         /// operation of another channel.
642         ///
643         /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
644         /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
645         /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
646         /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
647         /// outbound edge.
648         EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
649                 event: events::Event,
650                 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
651         },
652         /// Indicates we should immediately resume the operation of another channel, unless there is
653         /// some other reason why the channel is blocked. In practice this simply means immediately
654         /// removing the [`RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction`] provided from the blocking set.
655         ///
656         /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
657         /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
658         /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. However, we use this variant
659         /// instead of [`Self::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel`] when we discover that the claim was in
660         /// fact duplicative and we simply want to resume the outbound edge channel immediately.
661         ///
662         /// This variant should thus never be written to disk, as it is processed inline rather than
663         /// stored for later processing.
664         FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
665                 downstream_counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
666                 downstream_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
667                 blocking_action: RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
668         },
669 }
670
671 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
672         (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
673         // Note that FreeOtherChannelImmediately should never be written - we were supposed to free
674         // *immediately*. However, for simplicity we implement read/write here.
675         (1, FreeOtherChannelImmediately) => {
676                 (0, downstream_counterparty_node_id, required),
677                 (2, downstream_funding_outpoint, required),
678                 (4, blocking_action, required),
679         },
680         (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
681                 (0, event, upgradable_required),
682                 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
683                 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
684                 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
685                 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
686                 // downgrades to prior versions.
687                 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
688         },
689 );
690
691 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
692 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
693         ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
694                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
695                 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
696         },
697 }
698 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
699         (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
700                 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
701                 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
702         };
703 );
704
705 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
706 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
707 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
708 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
709         /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
710         /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
711         /// durably to disk.
712         ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
713                 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
714                 channel_id: ChannelId,
715                 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
716                 htlc_id: u64,
717         },
718 }
719
720 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
721         fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
722                 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
723                         channel_id: prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
724                         htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
725                 }
726         }
727 }
728
729 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
730         (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
731 ;);
732
733
734 /// State we hold per-peer.
735 pub(super) struct PeerState<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
736         /// `channel_id` -> `ChannelPhase`
737         ///
738         /// Holds all channels within corresponding `ChannelPhase`s where the peer is the counterparty.
739         pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>,
740         /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundChannelRequest`.
741         ///
742         /// When manual channel acceptance is enabled, this holds all unaccepted inbound channels where
743         /// the peer is the counterparty. If the channel is accepted, then the entry in this table is
744         /// removed, and an InboundV1Channel is created and placed in the `inbound_v1_channel_by_id` table. If
745         /// the channel is rejected, then the entry is simply removed.
746         pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, InboundChannelRequest>,
747         /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
748         latest_features: InitFeatures,
749         /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
750         /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
751         pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
752         /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
753         /// user but which have not yet completed.
754         ///
755         /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
756         /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
757         /// for a missing channel.
758         in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
759         /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
760         /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
761         ///
762         /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
763         /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
764         /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
765         /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
766         ///
767         /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
768         /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
769         /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
770         /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
771         /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
772         /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
773         monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
774         /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
775         /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
776         /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
777         /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
778         actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
779         /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
780         /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
781         /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
782         is_connected: bool,
783 }
784
785 impl <SP: Deref> PeerState<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
786         /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
787         /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
788         /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
789         fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
790                 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
791                         return false
792                 }
793                 self.channel_by_id.iter().filter(|(_, phase)| matches!(phase, ChannelPhase::Funded(_))).count() == 0
794                         && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
795                         && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
796         }
797
798         // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
799         fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
800                 self.channel_by_id.len() + self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
801         }
802
803         // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
804         fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId) -> bool {
805                 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
806                         self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
807         }
808 }
809
810 /// A not-yet-accepted inbound (from counterparty) channel. Once
811 /// accepted, the parameters will be used to construct a channel.
812 pub(super) struct InboundChannelRequest {
813         /// The original OpenChannel message.
814         pub open_channel_msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
815         /// The number of ticks remaining before the request expires.
816         pub ticks_remaining: i32,
817 }
818
819 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unaccepted inbound channel to be
820 /// accepted. An unaccepted channel that exceeds this limit will be abandoned.
821 const UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: i32 = 2;
822
823 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
824 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
825 ///
826 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
827 /// here.
828 ///
829 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
830 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
831 struct PendingInboundPayment {
832         /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
833         payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
834         /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
835         /// this payment being removed.
836         expiry_time: u64,
837         /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
838         user_payment_id: u64,
839         // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
840         payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
841         min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
842 }
843
844 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
845 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
846 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
847 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
848 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
849 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
850 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
851 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
852 ///
853 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
854 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
855 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
856         Arc<M>,
857         Arc<T>,
858         Arc<KeysManager>,
859         Arc<KeysManager>,
860         Arc<KeysManager>,
861         Arc<F>,
862         Arc<DefaultRouter<
863                 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
864                 Arc<L>,
865                 Arc<RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
866                 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
867                 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
868         >>,
869         Arc<L>
870 >;
871
872 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
873 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
874 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
875 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
876 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
877 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
878 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
879 /// or, respectively, [`Router`]  for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
880 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
881 ///
882 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
883 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
884 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
885         ChannelManager<
886                 &'a M,
887                 &'b T,
888                 &'c KeysManager,
889                 &'c KeysManager,
890                 &'c KeysManager,
891                 &'d F,
892                 &'e DefaultRouter<
893                         &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
894                         &'g L,
895                         &'h RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
896                         ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
897                         ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
898                 >,
899                 &'g L
900         >;
901
902 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`].
903 ///
904 /// This is not exported to bindings users as general cover traits aren't useful in other
905 /// languages.
906 pub trait AChannelManager {
907         /// A type implementing [`chain::Watch`].
908         type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
909         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Watch`].
910         type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
911         /// A type implementing [`BroadcasterInterface`].
912         type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
913         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Broadcaster`].
914         type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
915         /// A type implementing [`EntropySource`].
916         type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
917         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::EntropySource`].
918         type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
919         /// A type implementing [`NodeSigner`].
920         type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
921         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::NodeSigner`].
922         type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
923         /// A type implementing [`WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner`].
924         type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
925         /// A type implementing [`SignerProvider`] for [`Self::Signer`].
926         type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<EcdsaSigner= Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
927         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::SignerProvider`].
928         type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
929         /// A type implementing [`FeeEstimator`].
930         type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
931         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::FeeEstimator`].
932         type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
933         /// A type implementing [`Router`].
934         type Router: Router + ?Sized;
935         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Router`].
936         type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
937         /// A type implementing [`Logger`].
938         type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
939         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Logger`].
940         type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
941         /// Returns a reference to the actual [`ChannelManager`] object.
942         fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
943 }
944
945 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
946 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
947 where
948         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
949         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
950         ES::Target: EntropySource,
951         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
952         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
953         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
954         R::Target: Router,
955         L::Target: Logger,
956 {
957         type Watch = M::Target;
958         type M = M;
959         type Broadcaster = T::Target;
960         type T = T;
961         type EntropySource = ES::Target;
962         type ES = ES;
963         type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
964         type NS = NS;
965         type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner;
966         type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
967         type SP = SP;
968         type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
969         type F = F;
970         type Router = R::Target;
971         type R = R;
972         type Logger = L::Target;
973         type L = L;
974         fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
975 }
976
977 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
978 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
979 ///
980 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
981 /// to individual Channels.
982 ///
983 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
984 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
985 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
986 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
987 ///
988 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
989 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST durably write each
990 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] before returning from
991 /// [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`] or before completing async writes. With
992 /// `ChannelManager`s, writing updates happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other
993 /// `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during the serialization process). If the
994 /// deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to
995 /// [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds
996 /// will be lost (modulo on-chain transaction fees).
997 ///
998 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
999 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
1000 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
1001 ///
1002 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
1003 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
1004 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
1005 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
1006 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
1007 ///
1008 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
1009 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
1010 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
1011 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
1012 ///
1013 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
1014 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
1015 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
1016 ///
1017 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
1018 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
1019 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
1020 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
1021 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
1022 ///
1023 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
1024 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
1025 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
1026 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
1027 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
1028 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
1029 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
1030 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
1031 //
1032 // Lock order:
1033 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
1034 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
1035 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
1036 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
1037 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
1038 //
1039 // Lock order tree:
1040 //
1041 // `pending_offers_messages`
1042 //
1043 // `total_consistency_lock`
1044 //  |
1045 //  |__`forward_htlcs`
1046 //  |   |
1047 //  |   |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
1048 //  |
1049 //  |__`per_peer_state`
1050 //      |
1051 //      |__`pending_inbound_payments`
1052 //          |
1053 //          |__`claimable_payments`
1054 //          |
1055 //          |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
1056 //              |
1057 //              |__`peer_state`
1058 //                  |
1059 //                  |__`id_to_peer`
1060 //                  |
1061 //                  |__`short_to_chan_info`
1062 //                  |
1063 //                  |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
1064 //                  |
1065 //                  |__`best_block`
1066 //                  |
1067 //                  |__`pending_events`
1068 //                      |
1069 //                      |__`pending_background_events`
1070 //
1071 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
1072 where
1073         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1074         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1075         ES::Target: EntropySource,
1076         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1077         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1078         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1079         R::Target: Router,
1080         L::Target: Logger,
1081 {
1082         default_configuration: UserConfig,
1083         chain_hash: ChainHash,
1084         fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1085         chain_monitor: M,
1086         tx_broadcaster: T,
1087         #[allow(unused)]
1088         router: R,
1089
1090         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1091         #[cfg(test)]
1092         pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1093         #[cfg(not(test))]
1094         best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1095         secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1096
1097         /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
1098         /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
1099         /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
1100         /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
1101         ///
1102         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1103         pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
1104
1105         /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
1106         /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
1107         /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
1108         /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
1109         /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
1110         /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
1111         /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
1112         /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
1113         ///
1114         /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
1115         ///
1116         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1117         pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
1118
1119         /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
1120         ///
1121         /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1122         /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1123         /// and via the classic SCID.
1124         ///
1125         /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1126         /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
1127         ///
1128         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1129         #[cfg(test)]
1130         pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1131         #[cfg(not(test))]
1132         forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1133         /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
1134         /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
1135         ///
1136         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1137         pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
1138
1139         /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
1140         /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1141         ///
1142         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1143         claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1144
1145         /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1146         /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1147         /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1148         /// active channel list on load.
1149         ///
1150         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1151         outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1152
1153         /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1154         ///
1155         /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
1156         /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
1157         /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
1158         ///
1159         /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1160         /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1161         /// the handling of the events.
1162         ///
1163         /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1164         /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1165         ///
1166         /// TODO:
1167         /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1168         /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1169         /// would break backwards compatability.
1170         /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1171         /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1172         /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1173         ///
1174         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1175         id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<ChannelId, PublicKey>>,
1176
1177         /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1178         ///
1179         /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1180         /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1181         /// confirmation depth.
1182         ///
1183         /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1184         /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1185         /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1186         ///
1187         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1188         #[cfg(test)]
1189         pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1190         #[cfg(not(test))]
1191         short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1192
1193         our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
1194
1195         inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
1196
1197         /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
1198         /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
1199         /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
1200         ///
1201         /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
1202         fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1203
1204         /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
1205         /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
1206         /// keeping additional state.
1207         probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
1208
1209         /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1210         /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1211         /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1212         highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1213
1214         /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
1215         /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
1216         ///
1217         /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1218         /// are currently open with that peer.
1219         ///
1220         /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1221         /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
1222         /// channels.
1223         ///
1224         /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
1225         ///
1226         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1227         #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1228         per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1229         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1230         pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1231
1232         /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
1233         /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
1234         /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
1235         /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
1236         /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
1237         ///
1238         /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
1239         /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
1240         ///
1241         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1242         #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1243         pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1244         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1245         pub(crate) pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1246
1247         /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
1248         pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
1249
1250         /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
1251         /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
1252         /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
1253         /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
1254         /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
1255         ///
1256         /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
1257         ///
1258         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1259         ///
1260         /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1261         pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1262         /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1263         /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1264         /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1265         /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1266         /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1267         /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1268         total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1269         /// Tracks the progress of channels going through batch funding by whether funding_signed was
1270         /// received and the monitor has been persisted.
1271         ///
1272         /// This information does not need to be persisted as funding nodes can forget
1273         /// unfunded channels upon disconnection.
1274         funding_batch_states: Mutex<BTreeMap<Txid, Vec<(ChannelId, PublicKey, bool)>>>,
1275
1276         background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
1277
1278         event_persist_notifier: Notifier,
1279         needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool,
1280
1281         pending_offers_messages: Mutex<Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>>>,
1282
1283         entropy_source: ES,
1284         node_signer: NS,
1285         signer_provider: SP,
1286
1287         logger: L,
1288 }
1289
1290 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1291 ///
1292 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1293 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1294 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1295 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1296 pub struct ChainParameters {
1297         /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1298         pub network: Network,
1299
1300         /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1301         ///
1302         /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1303         pub best_block: BestBlock,
1304 }
1305
1306 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1307 #[must_use]
1308 enum NotifyOption {
1309         DoPersist,
1310         SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1311         SkipPersistNoEvents,
1312 }
1313
1314 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1315 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1316 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1317 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1318 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1319 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1320 ///
1321 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1322 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1323 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1324 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1325         event_persist_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1326         needs_persist_flag: &'a AtomicBool,
1327         should_persist: F,
1328         // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1329         _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1330 }
1331
1332 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1333         /// Notifies any waiters and indicates that we need to persist, in addition to possibly having
1334         /// events to handle.
1335         ///
1336         /// This must always be called if the changes included a `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, as well as in
1337         /// other cases where losing the changes on restart may result in a force-close or otherwise
1338         /// isn't ideal.
1339         fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1340                 Self::optionally_notify(cm, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
1341         }
1342
1343         fn optionally_notify<F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C, mut persist_check: F)
1344         -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1345                 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1346                 let force_notify = cm.get_cm().process_background_events();
1347
1348                 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1349                         event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1350                         needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1351                         should_persist: move || {
1352                                 // Pick the "most" action between `persist_check` and the background events
1353                                 // processing and return that.
1354                                 let notify = persist_check();
1355                                 match (notify, force_notify) {
1356                                         (NotifyOption::DoPersist, _) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1357                                         (_, NotifyOption::DoPersist) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1358                                         (NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents, _) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1359                                         (_, NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1360                                         _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
1361                                 }
1362                         },
1363                         _read_guard: read_guard,
1364                 }
1365         }
1366
1367         /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
1368         /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first (or
1369         /// [`Self::optionally_notify`] used).
1370         fn optionally_notify_skipping_background_events<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>
1371         (cm: &'a C, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1372                 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1373
1374                 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1375                         event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1376                         needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1377                         should_persist: persist_check,
1378                         _read_guard: read_guard,
1379                 }
1380         }
1381 }
1382
1383 impl<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1384         fn drop(&mut self) {
1385                 match (self.should_persist)() {
1386                         NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
1387                                 self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
1388                                 self.event_persist_notifier.notify()
1389                         },
1390                         NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
1391                                 self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
1392                         NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
1393                 }
1394         }
1395 }
1396
1397 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1398 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1399 ///
1400 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1401 ///
1402 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1403 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1404 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1405 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1406 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1407
1408 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1409 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1410 ///
1411 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1412 ///
1413 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1414 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1415 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1416 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1417 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1418 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1419 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1420 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1421 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1422 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1423 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1424 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1425 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1426
1427 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1428 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1429 /// this value.
1430 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1431 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1432 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1433 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1434
1435 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1436 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1437 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1438 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1439 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1440 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1441 #[deny(const_err)]
1442 #[allow(dead_code)]
1443 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1444
1445 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1446 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1447 #[deny(const_err)]
1448 #[allow(dead_code)]
1449 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1450
1451 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1452 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1453
1454 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1455 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1456 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1457
1458 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1459 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1460 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1461
1462 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1463 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1464 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1465 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1466
1467 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1468 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1469 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1470
1471 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1472 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1473 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1474
1475 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1476 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1477 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1478         /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1479         pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1480         /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1481         pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1482         /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1483         /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1484         /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1485         pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1486 }
1487
1488 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1489 /// to better separate parameters.
1490 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1491 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1492         /// The node_id of our counterparty
1493         pub node_id: PublicKey,
1494         /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1495         /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1496         /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1497         pub features: InitFeatures,
1498         /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1499         /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1500         /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1501         ///
1502         /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1503         ///
1504         /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1505         pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1506         /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1507         /// payments to us through this channel.
1508         pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1509         /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1510         /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1511         /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1512         pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1513         /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1514         pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1515 }
1516
1517 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1518 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1519 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1520         /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1521         /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1522         /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1523         /// lifetime of the channel.
1524         pub channel_id: ChannelId,
1525         /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1526         pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1527         /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1528         /// our counterparty already.
1529         ///
1530         /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1531         /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1532         pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1533         /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1534         ///
1535         /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1536         pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1537         /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1538         /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1539         ///
1540         /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1541         /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1542         ///
1543         /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1544         /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1545         ///
1546         /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1547         /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1548         /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1549         /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1550         /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1551         pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1552         /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1553         /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1554         /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1555         /// `Some(0)`).
1556         ///
1557         /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1558         ///
1559         /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1560         /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1561         pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1562         /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1563         /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1564         /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1565         /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1566         ///
1567         /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1568         /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1569         ///
1570         /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1571         pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1572         /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1573         pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1574         /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1575         /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1576         /// this value on chain.
1577         ///
1578         /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1579         ///
1580         /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1581         ///
1582         /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1583         pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1584         /// The `user_channel_id` value passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound
1585         /// channels, or to [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
1586         /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] config flag is set to true. Otherwise
1587         /// `user_channel_id` will be randomized for an inbound channel.  This may be zero for objects
1588         /// serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1589         ///
1590         /// [`ChannelManager::create_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_channel
1591         /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
1592         /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels
1593         pub user_channel_id: u128,
1594         /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1595         /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1596         ///
1597         /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1598         pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1599         /// Our total balance.  This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1600         /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1601         /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1602         ///
1603         /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1604         /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1605         /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1606         /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1607         ///
1608         /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1609         pub balance_msat: u64,
1610         /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1611         /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1612         /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1613         /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1614         ///
1615         /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1616         ///
1617         /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1618         /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1619         /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1620         pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1621         /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1622         /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1623         /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1624         /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1625         ///
1626         /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`],
1627         /// [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`], and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1628         pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1629         /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
1630         /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
1631         /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
1632         /// route which is valid.
1633         pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1634         /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1635         /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1636         /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1637         /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1638         /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1639         ///
1640         /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1641         /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1642         /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1643         pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1644         /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1645         /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1646         /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1647         /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1648         /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1649         ///
1650         /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1651         ///
1652         /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1653         /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1654         /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1655         pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1656         /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1657         ///
1658         /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1659         pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1660         /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1661         /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1662         /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1663         /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1664         /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1665         ///
1666         /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1667         pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1668         /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1669         pub is_outbound: bool,
1670         /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1671         /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1672         /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1673         /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1674         /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1675         ///
1676         /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1677         pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1678         /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
1679         /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
1680         pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
1681         /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1682         /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1683         ///
1684         /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1685         pub is_usable: bool,
1686         /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1687         pub is_public: bool,
1688         /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1689         /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1690         pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1691         /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1692         pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1693         /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1694         ///
1695         /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1696         pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1697 }
1698
1699 impl ChannelDetails {
1700         /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1701         /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1702         /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1703         ///
1704         /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1705         /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1706         pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1707                 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1708         }
1709
1710         /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1711         /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1712         /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1713         ///
1714         /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1715         /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1716         pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1717                 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1718         }
1719
1720         fn from_channel_context<SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
1721                 context: &ChannelContext<SP>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
1722                 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
1723         ) -> Self
1724         where
1725                 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1726                 F::Target: FeeEstimator
1727         {
1728                 let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
1729                 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1730                         context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1731                 ChannelDetails {
1732                         channel_id: context.channel_id(),
1733                         counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1734                                 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1735                                 features: latest_features,
1736                                 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1737                                 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1738                                 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1739                                 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1740                                 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1741                                 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1742                                 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1743                                 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
1744                                         Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1745                                 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1746                         },
1747                         funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
1748                         // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1749                         // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1750                         channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1751                         short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
1752                         outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1753                         inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1754                         channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
1755                         feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1756                         unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1757                         balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1758                         inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1759                         outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1760                         next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1761                         next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1762                         user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
1763                         confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
1764                         confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1765                         force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1766                         is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
1767                         is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
1768                         is_usable: context.is_live(),
1769                         is_public: context.should_announce(),
1770                         inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1771                         inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1772                         config: Some(context.config()),
1773                         channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
1774                 }
1775         }
1776 }
1777
1778 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1779 /// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
1780 /// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
1781 /// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
1782 /// the channel will be removed shortly.
1783 /// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
1784 /// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
1785 pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
1786         /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
1787         NotShuttingDown,
1788         /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
1789         ShutdownInitiated,
1790         /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
1791         /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
1792         ResolvingHTLCs,
1793         /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
1794         NegotiatingClosingFee,
1795         /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
1796         /// to drop the channel.
1797         ShutdownComplete,
1798 }
1799
1800 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1801 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1802 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1803 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1804         /// When an invoice was requested and thus a payment has not yet been sent.
1805         AwaitingInvoice {
1806                 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1807                 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1808                 payment_id: PaymentId,
1809         },
1810         /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1811         Pending {
1812                 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1813                 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1814                 payment_id: PaymentId,
1815                 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1816                 /// abandoned.
1817                 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1818                 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1819                 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1820                 total_msat: u64,
1821         },
1822         /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1823         /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1824         /// payment is removed from tracking.
1825         Fulfilled {
1826                 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1827                 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1828                 payment_id: PaymentId,
1829                 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1830                 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1831                 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1832         },
1833         /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1834         /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1835         /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1836         Abandoned {
1837                 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1838                 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1839                 payment_id: PaymentId,
1840                 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1841                 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1842         },
1843 }
1844
1845 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1846 ///
1847 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
1848 #[derive(Clone)]
1849 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1850         /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1851         pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1852         /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1853         /// route hints.
1854         pub phantom_scid: u64,
1855         /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1856         pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1857 }
1858
1859 macro_rules! handle_error {
1860         ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1861                 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1862                 // entering the macro.
1863                 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1864                 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1865
1866                 match $internal {
1867                         Ok(msg) => Ok(msg),
1868                         Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish, channel_capacity }) => {
1869                                 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1870
1871                                 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1872                                         $self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1873                                         if let Some(update) = update_option {
1874                                                 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1875                                                         msg: update
1876                                                 });
1877                                         }
1878                                         if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1879                                                 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1880                                                         channel_id, user_channel_id,
1881                                                         reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() },
1882                                                         counterparty_node_id: Some($counterparty_node_id),
1883                                                         channel_capacity_sats: channel_capacity,
1884                                                 }, None));
1885                                         }
1886                                 }
1887
1888                                 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1889                                 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1890                                 } else {
1891                                         msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1892                                                 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1893                                                 action: err.action.clone()
1894                                         });
1895                                 }
1896
1897                                 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1898                                         let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1899                                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1900                                                 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1901                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1902                                         }
1903                                 }
1904
1905                                 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1906                                 Err(err)
1907                         },
1908                 }
1909         } };
1910         ($self: ident, $internal: expr) => {
1911                 match $internal {
1912                         Ok(res) => Ok(res),
1913                         Err((chan, msg_handle_err)) => {
1914                                 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1915                                 handle_error!($self, Err(msg_handle_err), counterparty_node_id).map_err(|err| (chan, err))
1916                         },
1917                 }
1918         };
1919 }
1920
1921 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1922         ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
1923                 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.channel_id());
1924                 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1925                 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
1926                         short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1927                 } else {
1928                         // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1929                         // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1930                         // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1931                         // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1932                         // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1933                         // stage.
1934                         let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1935                         debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1936                 }
1937                 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1938         }}
1939 }
1940
1941 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1942 macro_rules! convert_chan_phase_err {
1943         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, $channel_update: expr) => {
1944                 match $err {
1945                         ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1946                                 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), *$channel_id))
1947                         },
1948                         ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1949                                 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), *$channel_id))
1950                         },
1951                         ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1952                                 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", $channel_id, msg);
1953                                 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel.context);
1954                                 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
1955                                 let user_id = $channel.context.get_user_id();
1956                                 let channel_capacity_satoshis = $channel.context.get_value_satoshis();
1957
1958                                 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, user_id,
1959                                         shutdown_res, $channel_update, channel_capacity_satoshis))
1960                         },
1961                 }
1962         };
1963         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, FUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
1964                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, { $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast($channel).ok() })
1965         };
1966         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
1967                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, None)
1968         };
1969         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_phase: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1970                 match $channel_phase {
1971                         ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
1972                                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL)
1973                         },
1974                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel) => {
1975                                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
1976                         },
1977                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel) => {
1978                                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
1979                         },
1980                 }
1981         };
1982 }
1983
1984 macro_rules! break_chan_phase_entry {
1985         ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1986                 match $res {
1987                         Ok(res) => res,
1988                         Err(e) => {
1989                                 let key = *$entry.key();
1990                                 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
1991                                 if drop {
1992                                         $entry.remove_entry();
1993                                 }
1994                                 break Err(res);
1995                         }
1996                 }
1997         }
1998 }
1999
2000 macro_rules! try_chan_phase_entry {
2001         ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2002                 match $res {
2003                         Ok(res) => res,
2004                         Err(e) => {
2005                                 let key = *$entry.key();
2006                                 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2007                                 if drop {
2008                                         $entry.remove_entry();
2009                                 }
2010                                 return Err(res);
2011                         }
2012                 }
2013         }
2014 }
2015
2016 macro_rules! remove_channel_phase {
2017         ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2018                 {
2019                         let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
2020                         update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context());
2021                         channel
2022                 }
2023         }
2024 }
2025
2026 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
2027         ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
2028                 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
2029                         node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2030                         msg: $channel_ready_msg,
2031                 });
2032                 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
2033                 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
2034                 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2035                 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2036                 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2037                         "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2038                 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
2039                         let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2040                         assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2041                                 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2042                 }
2043         }}
2044 }
2045
2046 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
2047         ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2048                 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
2049                         $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
2050                                 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2051                                 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
2052                                 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2053                                 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2054                                 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
2055                         }, None));
2056                         $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
2057                 }
2058         }
2059 }
2060
2061 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
2062         ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2063                 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
2064                         debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
2065                         $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
2066                                 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2067                                 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2068                                 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2069                                 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
2070                         }, None));
2071                         $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
2072                 }
2073         }
2074 }
2075
2076 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
2077         ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2078                 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
2079                         &$self.node_signer, $self.chain_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
2080                         $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
2081                 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
2082                 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
2083                         // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
2084                         // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
2085                         // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
2086                         // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
2087                         // now.
2088                         if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
2089                                 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2090                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2091                                         msg,
2092                                 })
2093                         } else { None }
2094                 } else { None };
2095
2096                 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
2097                         .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
2098
2099                 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
2100                         &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
2101                         updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
2102                         updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
2103                         updates.announcement_sigs);
2104                 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
2105                         $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
2106                 }
2107
2108                 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
2109                 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = $chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2110                 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
2111                 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
2112
2113                 // If the channel belongs to a batch funding transaction, the progress of the batch
2114                 // should be updated as we have received funding_signed and persisted the monitor.
2115                 if let Some(txid) = unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2116                         let mut funding_batch_states = $self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2117                         let mut batch_completed = false;
2118                         if let Some(batch_state) = funding_batch_states.get_mut(&txid) {
2119                                 let channel_state = batch_state.iter_mut().find(|(chan_id, pubkey, _)| (
2120                                         *chan_id == channel_id &&
2121                                         *pubkey == counterparty_node_id
2122                                 ));
2123                                 if let Some(channel_state) = channel_state {
2124                                         channel_state.2 = true;
2125                                 } else {
2126                                         debug_assert!(false, "Missing channel batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2127                                 }
2128                                 batch_completed = batch_state.iter().all(|(_, _, completed)| *completed);
2129                         } else {
2130                                 debug_assert!(false, "Missing batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2131                         }
2132
2133                         // When all channels in a batched funding transaction have become ready, it is not necessary
2134                         // to track the progress of the batch anymore and the state of the channels can be updated.
2135                         if batch_completed {
2136                                 let removed_batch_state = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2137                                 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2138                                 let mut batch_funding_tx = None;
2139                                 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, _) in removed_batch_state {
2140                                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2141                                                 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2142                                                 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2143                                                         batch_funding_tx = batch_funding_tx.or_else(|| chan.context.unbroadcasted_funding());
2144                                                         chan.set_batch_ready();
2145                                                         let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2146                                                         emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, chan);
2147                                                 }
2148                                         }
2149                                 }
2150                                 if let Some(tx) = batch_funding_tx {
2151                                         log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting batch funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
2152                                         $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
2153                                 }
2154                         }
2155                 }
2156
2157                 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
2158
2159                 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
2160                         $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
2161                 }
2162                 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
2163                 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2164                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2165                         $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
2166                 }
2167         } }
2168 }
2169
2170 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
2171         ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $completed: expr) => { {
2172                 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
2173                 match $update_res {
2174                         ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::UnrecoverableError => {
2175                                 let err_str = "ChannelMonitor[Update] persistence failed unrecoverably. This indicates we cannot continue normal operation and must shut down.";
2176                                 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err_str);
2177                                 panic!("{}", err_str);
2178                         },
2179                         ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
2180                                 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
2181                                         &$chan.context.channel_id());
2182                                 false
2183                         },
2184                         ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
2185                                 $completed;
2186                                 true
2187                         },
2188                 }
2189         } };
2190         ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
2191                 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $chan, _internal,
2192                         handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
2193         };
2194         ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2195                 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
2196                         .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
2197                 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
2198                 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
2199                 // filter for uniqueness here.
2200                 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
2201                         .unwrap_or_else(|| {
2202                                 in_flight_updates.push($update);
2203                                 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
2204                         });
2205                 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
2206                 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $chan, _internal,
2207                         {
2208                                 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
2209                                 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
2210                                         handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
2211                                 }
2212                         })
2213         } };
2214 }
2215
2216 macro_rules! process_events_body {
2217         ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
2218                 let mut processed_all_events = false;
2219                 while !processed_all_events {
2220                         if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
2221                                 return;
2222                         }
2223
2224                         let mut result;
2225
2226                         {
2227                                 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
2228                                 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
2229                                 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2230
2231                                 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
2232                                 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
2233                                 result = $self.process_background_events();
2234
2235                                 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
2236                                 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
2237                                 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
2238                                         result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2239                                 }
2240                         }
2241
2242                         let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
2243                         let num_events = pending_events.len();
2244                         if !pending_events.is_empty() {
2245                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2246                         }
2247
2248                         let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
2249
2250                         for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
2251                                 $event_to_handle = event;
2252                                 $handle_event;
2253                                 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
2254                                         post_event_actions.push(action);
2255                                 }
2256                         }
2257
2258                         {
2259                                 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2260                                 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
2261                                 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
2262                                 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
2263                                 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
2264                                 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
2265                         }
2266
2267                         if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
2268                                 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
2269                                 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
2270                                 processed_all_events = false;
2271                         }
2272
2273                         match result {
2274                                 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
2275                                         $self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
2276                                         $self.event_persist_notifier.notify();
2277                                 },
2278                                 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
2279                                         $self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
2280                                 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
2281                         }
2282                 }
2283         }
2284 }
2285
2286 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
2287 where
2288         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
2289         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2290         ES::Target: EntropySource,
2291         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2292         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2293         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2294         R::Target: Router,
2295         L::Target: Logger,
2296 {
2297         /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
2298         ///
2299         /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
2300         ///
2301         /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
2302         /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
2303         ///
2304         /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
2305         ///
2306         /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
2307         /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
2308         /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
2309         /// more details.
2310         ///
2311         /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
2312         /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
2313         /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
2314         pub fn new(
2315                 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
2316                 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
2317                 current_timestamp: u32,
2318         ) -> Self {
2319                 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2320                 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
2321                 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
2322                 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
2323                 ChannelManager {
2324                         default_configuration: config.clone(),
2325                         chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(params.network),
2326                         fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
2327                         chain_monitor,
2328                         tx_broadcaster,
2329                         router,
2330
2331                         best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
2332
2333                         outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
2334                         pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2335                         pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
2336                         forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2337                         claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
2338                         pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2339                         id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2340                         short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2341
2342                         our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
2343                         secp_ctx,
2344
2345                         inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
2346                         fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2347
2348                         probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2349
2350                         highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
2351
2352                         per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2353
2354                         pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2355                         pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
2356                         pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2357                         total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2358                         background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
2359                         event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
2360                         needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
2361                         funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
2362
2363                         pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2364
2365                         entropy_source,
2366                         node_signer,
2367                         signer_provider,
2368
2369                         logger,
2370                 }
2371         }
2372
2373         /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
2374         pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
2375                 &self.default_configuration
2376         }
2377
2378         fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2379                 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2380                 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
2381                 let mut i = 0;
2382                 loop {
2383                         if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
2384                                 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
2385                         } else {
2386                                 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
2387                         }
2388                         if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
2389                                 break;
2390                         }
2391                         i += 1;
2392                         if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
2393                 }
2394                 outbound_scid_alias
2395         }
2396
2397         /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2398         ///
2399         /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2400         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2401         /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2402         /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2403         /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2404         ///
2405         /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2406         /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2407         ///
2408         /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2409         /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2410         /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2411         ///
2412         /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2413         /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2414         /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2415         ///
2416         /// If `temporary_channel_id` is specified, it will be used as the temporary channel ID of the
2417         /// channel. Otherwise, a random one will be generated for you.
2418         ///
2419         /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2420         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2421         /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2422         /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2423         /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2424         /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2425         ///
2426         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2427         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2428         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2429         pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<ChannelId, APIError> {
2430                 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2431                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2432                 }
2433
2434                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2435                 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2436                 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2437
2438                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2439
2440                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2441                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2442
2443                 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2444
2445                 if let Some(temporary_channel_id) = temporary_channel_id {
2446                         if peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(&temporary_channel_id) {
2447                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Channel with temporary channel ID {} already exists!", temporary_channel_id)});
2448                         }
2449                 }
2450
2451                 let channel = {
2452                         let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2453                         let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2454                         let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2455                         match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2456                                 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2457                                 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias, temporary_channel_id)
2458                         {
2459                                 Ok(res) => res,
2460                                 Err(e) => {
2461                                         self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
2462                                         return Err(e);
2463                                 },
2464                         }
2465                 };
2466                 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash);
2467
2468                 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
2469                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
2470                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2471                                 if cfg!(fuzzing) {
2472                                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
2473                                 } else {
2474                                         panic!("RNG is bad???");
2475                                 }
2476                         },
2477                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel)); }
2478                 }
2479
2480                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
2481                         node_id: their_network_key,
2482                         msg: res,
2483                 });
2484                 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
2485         }
2486
2487         fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&ChannelId, &Channel<SP>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2488                 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2489                 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2490                 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2491                 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2492                 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2493                 // the same channel.
2494                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2495                 {
2496                         let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2497                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2498                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2499                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2500                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2501                                 res.extend(peer_state.channel_by_id.iter()
2502                                         .filter_map(|(chan_id, phase)| match phase {
2503                                                 // Only `Channels` in the `ChannelPhase::Funded` phase can be considered funded.
2504                                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => Some((chan_id, chan)),
2505                                                 _ => None,
2506                                         })
2507                                         .filter(f)
2508                                         .map(|(_channel_id, channel)| {
2509                                                 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2510                                                         peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2511                                         })
2512                                 );
2513                         }
2514                 }
2515                 res
2516         }
2517
2518         /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
2519         /// more information.
2520         pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2521                 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2522                 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2523                 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2524                 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2525                 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2526                 // the same channel.
2527                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2528                 {
2529                         let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2530                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2531                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2532                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2533                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2534                                 for context in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, phase)| phase.context()) {
2535                                         let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height,
2536                                                 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2537                                         res.push(details);
2538                                 }
2539                         }
2540                 }
2541                 res
2542         }
2543
2544         /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
2545         /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
2546         ///
2547         /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
2548         /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
2549         /// are.
2550         pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2551                 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2552                 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2553                 // really wanted anyway.
2554                 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
2555         }
2556
2557         /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2558         pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2559                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2560                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2561
2562                 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2563                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2564                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2565                         let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2566                         let context_to_details = |context| {
2567                                 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2568                         };
2569                         return peer_state.channel_by_id
2570                                 .iter()
2571                                 .map(|(_, phase)| phase.context())
2572                                 .map(context_to_details)
2573                                 .collect();
2574                 }
2575                 vec![]
2576         }
2577
2578         /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2579         /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2580         ///
2581         /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2582         /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2583         /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2584         ///
2585         /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2586         pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2587                 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2588                         .filter_map(|(payment_id, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2589                                 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {
2590                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2591                                 },
2592                                 // InvoiceReceived is an intermediate state and doesn't need to be exposed
2593                                 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {
2594                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2595                                 },
2596                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2597                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2598                                                 payment_id: *payment_id,
2599                                                 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2600                                                 total_msat: *total_msat,
2601                                         })
2602                                 },
2603                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2604                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2605                                 },
2606                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2607                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2608                                 },
2609                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2610                         })
2611                         .collect()
2612         }
2613
2614         /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
2615         fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, context: &ChannelContext<SP>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
2616                 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2617                 match context.unbroadcasted_funding() {
2618                         Some(transaction) => {
2619                                 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2620                                         channel_id: context.channel_id(), transaction
2621                                 }, None));
2622                         },
2623                         None => {},
2624                 }
2625                 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2626                         channel_id: context.channel_id(),
2627                         user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
2628                         reason: closure_reason,
2629                         counterparty_node_id: Some(context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
2630                         channel_capacity_sats: Some(context.get_value_satoshis()),
2631                 }, None));
2632         }
2633
2634         fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2635                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2636
2637                 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
2638                 let shutdown_result;
2639                 loop {
2640                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2641
2642                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2643                                 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2644
2645                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2646                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2647
2648                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2649                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
2650                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
2651                                                 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
2652                                                 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2653                                                 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs, local_shutdown_result) =
2654                                                         chan.get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2655                                                 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2656                                                 shutdown_result = local_shutdown_result;
2657                                                 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
2658
2659                                                 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2660                                                 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2661                                                 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2662                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2663                                                         node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2664                                                         msg: shutdown_msg,
2665                                                 });
2666
2667                                                 debug_assert!(monitor_update_opt.is_none() || !chan.is_shutdown(),
2668                                                         "We can't both complete shutdown and generate a monitor update");
2669
2670                                                 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2671                                                 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2672                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
2673                                                                 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
2674                                                         break;
2675                                                 }
2676
2677                                                 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2678                                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
2679                                                                 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2680                                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2681                                                                                 msg: channel_update
2682                                                                         });
2683                                                                 }
2684                                                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2685                                                         }
2686                                                 }
2687                                                 break;
2688                                         }
2689                                 },
2690                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2691                                         // If we reach this point, it means that the channel_id either refers to an unfunded channel or
2692                                         // it does not exist for this peer. Either way, we can attempt to force-close it.
2693                                         //
2694                                         // An appropriate error will be returned for non-existence of the channel if that's the case.
2695                                         mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
2696                                         mem::drop(per_peer_state);
2697                                         return self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, false).map(|_| ())
2698                                 },
2699                         }
2700                 }
2701
2702                 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2703                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2704                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2705                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2706                 }
2707
2708                 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
2709                         self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2710                 }
2711
2712                 Ok(())
2713         }
2714
2715         /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2716         /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2717         /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2718         ///
2719         ///  * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] and
2720         ///    [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
2721         ///    fee estimate.
2722         ///  * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2723         ///    transaction feerate of at least our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] feerate or the feerate which
2724         ///    would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2725         ///    counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2726         ///
2727         /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2728         ///
2729         /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2730         /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2731         /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2732         /// channel.
2733         ///
2734         /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2735         /// [`ChannelCloseMinimum`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum
2736         /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
2737         /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2738         pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2739                 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2740         }
2741
2742         /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2743         /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2744         /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2745         ///
2746         /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2747         /// the channel being closed or not:
2748         ///  * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2749         ///    transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2750         ///    [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
2751         ///    fee estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2752         ///  * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2753         ///    transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2754         ///    will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2755         ///
2756         /// The `shutdown_script` provided  will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2757         /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2758         /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2759         /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2760         ///
2761         /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2762         ///
2763         /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2764         /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2765         /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2766         /// channel.
2767         ///
2768         /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2769         /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
2770         /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2771         pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2772                 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2773         }
2774
2775         fn finish_close_channel(&self, mut shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2776                 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2777                 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2778                 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
2779                         debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2780                 }
2781
2782                 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.len());
2783                 for htlc_source in shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.drain(..) {
2784                         let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2785                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2786                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2787                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2788                 }
2789                 if let Some((_, funding_txo, monitor_update)) = shutdown_res.monitor_update {
2790                         // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2791                         // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2792                         // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2793                         // ignore the result here.
2794                         let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2795                 }
2796                 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
2797                 if let Some(txid) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2798                         let mut funding_batch_states = self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2799                         let affected_channels = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2800                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2801                         let mut has_uncompleted_channel = None;
2802                         for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, state) in affected_channels {
2803                                 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2804                                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2805                                         if let Some(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id) {
2806                                                 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
2807                                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context(), ClosureReason::FundingBatchClosure);
2808                                                 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
2809                                         }
2810                                 }
2811                                 has_uncompleted_channel = Some(has_uncompleted_channel.map_or(!state, |v| v || !state));
2812                         }
2813                         debug_assert!(
2814                                 has_uncompleted_channel.unwrap_or(true),
2815                                 "Closing a batch where all channels have completed initial monitor update",
2816                         );
2817                 }
2818                 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
2819                         self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2820                 }
2821         }
2822
2823         /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2824         /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2825         fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2826         -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2827                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2828                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2829                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2830                 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
2831                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2832                         let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2833                                 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
2834                         } else {
2835                                 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
2836                         };
2837                         if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2838                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", channel_id);
2839                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan_phase_entry.get().context(), closure_reason);
2840                                 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
2841                                 mem::drop(peer_state);
2842                                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
2843                                 match chan_phase {
2844                                         ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) => {
2845                                                 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2846                                                 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2847                                         },
2848                                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
2849                                                 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
2850                                                 // Unfunded channel has no update
2851                                                 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
2852                                         },
2853                                 }
2854                         } else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
2855                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
2856                                 // N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
2857                                 // don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
2858                                 // events anyway.
2859                                 (None, *peer_node_id)
2860                         } else {
2861                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, peer_node_id) });
2862                         }
2863                 };
2864                 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
2865                         // Try to send the `BroadcastChannelUpdate` to the peer we just force-closed on, but if
2866                         // not try to broadcast it via whatever peer we have.
2867                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2868                         let a_peer_state_opt = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2869                                 .ok_or(per_peer_state.values().next());
2870                         if let Ok(a_peer_state_mutex) = a_peer_state_opt {
2871                                 let mut a_peer_state = a_peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2872                                 a_peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2873                                         msg: update
2874                                 });
2875                         }
2876                 }
2877
2878                 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
2879         }
2880
2881         fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2882                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2883                 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2884                         Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2885                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2886                                 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2887                                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2888                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2889                                                 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2890                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2891                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
2892                                                                 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
2893                                                         },
2894                                                 }
2895                                         );
2896                                 }
2897                                 Ok(())
2898                         },
2899                         Err(e) => Err(e)
2900                 }
2901         }
2902
2903         /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2904         /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2905         /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2906         /// channel.
2907         pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2908         -> Result<(), APIError> {
2909                 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2910         }
2911
2912         /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2913         /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2914         /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2915         ///
2916         /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2917         /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2918         pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2919         -> Result<(), APIError> {
2920                 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2921         }
2922
2923         /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2924         /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2925         pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2926                 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2927                         let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2928                 }
2929         }
2930
2931         /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2932         /// local transaction(s).
2933         pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2934                 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2935                         let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2936                 }
2937         }
2938
2939         fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
2940                 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC
2941         ) -> Result<
2942                 (onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg
2943         > {
2944                 let (next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_details_opt) = decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion(
2945                         msg, &self.node_signer, &self.logger, &self.secp_ctx
2946                 )?;
2947
2948                 macro_rules! return_err {
2949                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2950                                 {
2951                                         log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2952                                         return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2953                                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2954                                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2955                                                 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2956                                                         .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2957                                         }));
2958                                 }
2959                         }
2960                 }
2961
2962                 let NextPacketDetails {
2963                         next_packet_pubkey, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_scid, outgoing_cltv_value
2964                 } = match next_packet_details_opt {
2965                         Some(next_packet_details) => next_packet_details,
2966                         // it is a receive, so no need for outbound checks
2967                         None => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
2968                 };
2969
2970                 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
2971                 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
2972                 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
2973                         let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid).cloned();
2974                         let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
2975                                 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2976                                         // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2977                                         // phantom or an intercept.
2978                                         if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2979                                                 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)) ||
2980                                                 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)
2981                                         {
2982                                                 None
2983                                         } else {
2984                                                 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2985                                         }
2986                                 },
2987                                 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
2988                         };
2989                         let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
2990                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2991                                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
2992                                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
2993                                         break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2994                                 }
2995                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2996                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2997                                 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).map(
2998                                         |chan_phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
2999                                 ).flatten() {
3000                                         None => {
3001                                                 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
3002                                                 // have no consistency guarantees.
3003                                                 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3004                                         },
3005                                         Some(chan) => chan
3006                                 };
3007                                 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
3008                                         // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
3009                                         // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
3010                                         // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
3011                                         break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3012                                 }
3013                                 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
3014                                         // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
3015                                         // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
3016                                         // we don't have the channel here.
3017                                         break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3018                                 }
3019                                 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3020
3021                                 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
3022                                 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
3023                                 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
3024                                 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
3025                                 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
3026                                 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
3027                                         // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
3028                                         // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
3029                                         // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
3030                                         if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
3031                                                 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
3032                                         } else {
3033                                                 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
3034                                         }
3035                                 }
3036                                 if outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
3037                                         break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
3038                                 }
3039                                 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value) {
3040                                         break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
3041                                 }
3042                                 chan_update_opt
3043                         } else {
3044                                 None
3045                         };
3046
3047                         let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3048
3049                         if let Err((err_msg, code)) = check_incoming_htlc_cltv(
3050                                 cur_height, outgoing_cltv_value, msg.cltv_expiry
3051                         ) {
3052                                 if code & 0x1000 != 0 && chan_update_opt.is_none() {
3053                                         // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
3054                                         // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
3055                                         // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
3056                                         break Some((err_msg, 0x2000 | 2, None))
3057                                 }
3058                                 let chan_update_opt = if code & 0x1000 != 0 { chan_update_opt } else { None };
3059                                 break Some((err_msg, code, chan_update_opt));
3060                         }
3061
3062                         break None;
3063                 }
3064                 {
3065                         let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
3066                         if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
3067                                 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
3068                                         msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3069                                 }
3070                                 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
3071                                         msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3072                                 }
3073                                 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3074                                         // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3075                                         0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3076                                 }
3077                                 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3078                                 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3079                                 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3080                         } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3081                                 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
3082                                 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
3083                                 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
3084                                 // instead.
3085                                 code = 0x2000 | 2;
3086                         }
3087                         return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
3088                 }
3089                 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, Some(next_packet_pubkey)))
3090         }
3091
3092         fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
3093                 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, shared_secret: [u8; 32], decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop,
3094                 allow_underpay: bool, next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
3095         ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
3096                 macro_rules! return_err {
3097                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3098                                 {
3099                                         log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3100                                         return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3101                                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3102                                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3103                                                 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3104                                                         .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3105                                         }));
3106                                 }
3107                         }
3108                 }
3109                 match decoded_hop {
3110                         onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
3111                                 // OUR PAYMENT!
3112                                 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3113                                 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
3114                                         msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat,
3115                                         current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
3116                                 {
3117                                         Ok(info) => {
3118                                                 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
3119                                                 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
3120                                                 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
3121                                                 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
3122                                                 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
3123                                         },
3124                                         Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3125                                 }
3126                         },
3127                         onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
3128                                 match create_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
3129                                         new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
3130                                         Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
3131                                         Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3132                                 }
3133                         }
3134                 }
3135         }
3136
3137         /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
3138         /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
3139         /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
3140         ///
3141         /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
3142         /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
3143         /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3144         ///
3145         /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3146         /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3147         fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3148                 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
3149                         return Err(LightningError {
3150                                 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
3151                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
3152                         });
3153                 }
3154                 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
3155                         return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
3156                 }
3157                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3158                 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
3159         }
3160
3161         /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
3162         /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
3163         /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
3164         /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
3165         ///
3166         /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
3167         /// `peer_state`  corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
3168         /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3169         ///
3170         /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3171         /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3172         fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3173                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3174                 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
3175                         None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
3176                         Some(id) => id,
3177                 };
3178
3179                 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
3180         }
3181
3182         fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3183                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3184                 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3185
3186                 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
3187                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
3188                         ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
3189                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
3190                         ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
3191                 };
3192
3193                 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
3194                         chain_hash: self.chain_hash,
3195                         short_channel_id,
3196                         timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
3197                         flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
3198                         cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
3199                         htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
3200                         htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
3201                         fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
3202                         fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
3203                         excess_data: Vec::new(),
3204                 };
3205                 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
3206                 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
3207                 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
3208                 // channel.
3209                 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
3210
3211                 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
3212                         signature: sig,
3213                         contents: unsigned
3214                 })
3215         }
3216
3217         #[cfg(test)]
3218         pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3219                 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3220                 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
3221                         path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3222                         session_priv_bytes
3223                 })
3224         }
3225
3226         fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3227                 let SendAlongPathArgs {
3228                         path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3229                         session_priv_bytes
3230                 } = args;
3231                 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
3232                 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3233
3234                 log_trace!(self.logger,
3235                         "Attempting to send payment with payment hash {} along path with next hop {}",
3236                         payment_hash, path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
3237                 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
3238                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
3239
3240                 let (onion_packet, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::create_payment_onion(
3241                         &self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height,
3242                         payment_hash, keysend_preimage, prng_seed
3243                 )?;
3244
3245                 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3246                         let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
3247                                 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
3248                                 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3249                         };
3250
3251                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3252                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3253                                 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
3254                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3255                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3256                         if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
3257                                 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
3258                                         ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
3259                                                 if !chan.context.is_live() {
3260                                                         return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3261                                                 }
3262                                                 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3263                                                 let send_res = chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
3264                                                         htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3265                                                                 path: path.clone(),
3266                                                                 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
3267                                                                 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
3268                                                                 payment_id,
3269                                                         }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
3270                                                 match break_chan_phase_entry!(self, send_res, chan_phase_entry) {
3271                                                         Some(monitor_update) => {
3272                                                                 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
3273                                                                         false => {
3274                                                                                 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
3275                                                                                 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
3276                                                                                 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
3277                                                                                 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
3278                                                                                 // which we do in the send_payment check for
3279                                                                                 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
3280                                                                                 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
3281                                                                         },
3282                                                                         true => {},
3283                                                                 }
3284                                                         },
3285                                                         None => {},
3286                                                 }
3287                                         },
3288                                         _ => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel to first hop is unfunded".to_owned()}),
3289                                 };
3290                         } else {
3291                                 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
3292                                 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
3293                                 // `channel_by_id` map.
3294                                 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
3295                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
3296                         }
3297                         return Ok(());
3298                 };
3299
3300                 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
3301                         Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3302                         Err(e) => {
3303                                 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
3304                         },
3305                 }
3306         }
3307
3308         /// Sends a payment along a given route.
3309         ///
3310         /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
3311         /// fields for more info.
3312         ///
3313         /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
3314         /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
3315         ///
3316         /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
3317         ///
3318         /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
3319         /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
3320         /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
3321         /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
3322         /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
3323         ///
3324         /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
3325         /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
3326         /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
3327         /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
3328         /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
3329         ///
3330         /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
3331         /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
3332         /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
3333         /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
3334         ///
3335         /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
3336         ///
3337         /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
3338         /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
3339         /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
3340         ///
3341         /// In general, a path may raise:
3342         ///  * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
3343         ///    node public key) is specified.
3344         ///  * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available as it has been
3345         ///    closed, doesn't exist, or the peer is currently disconnected.
3346         ///  * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
3347         ///    relevant updates.
3348         ///
3349         /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
3350         /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
3351         /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
3352         ///
3353         /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
3354         /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3355         /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3356         /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
3357         /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
3358         /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3359         pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3360                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3361                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3362                 self.pending_outbound_payments
3363                         .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
3364                                 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3365                                 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3366         }
3367
3368         /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
3369         /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3370         pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
3371                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3372                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3373                 self.pending_outbound_payments
3374                         .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
3375                                 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
3376                                 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3377                                 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3378         }
3379
3380         #[cfg(test)]
3381         pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3382                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3383                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3384                 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
3385                         keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
3386                         best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3387         }
3388
3389         #[cfg(test)]
3390         pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
3391                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3392                 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3393         }
3394
3395         #[cfg(test)]
3396         pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3397                 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3398         }
3399
3400         pub(super) fn send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&self, invoice: &Bolt12Invoice, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), Bolt12PaymentError> {
3401                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3402                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3403                 self.pending_outbound_payments
3404                         .send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(
3405                                 invoice, payment_id, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3406                                 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer,
3407                                 best_block_height, &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
3408                                 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args)
3409                         )
3410         }
3411
3412         /// Signals that no further attempts for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
3413         /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
3414         /// retries are exhausted.
3415         ///
3416         /// # Event Generation
3417         ///
3418         /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
3419         /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
3420         ///
3421         /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
3422         /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
3423         /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
3424         ///
3425         /// # Requested Invoices
3426         ///
3427         /// In the case of paying a [`Bolt12Invoice`] via [`ChannelManager::pay_for_offer`], abandoning
3428         /// the payment prior to receiving the invoice will result in an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`]
3429         /// and prevent any attempts at paying it once received. The other events may only be generated
3430         /// once the invoice has been received.
3431         ///
3432         /// # Restart Behavior
3433         ///
3434         /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated and we restart without first persisting the
3435         /// [`ChannelManager`], another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated; likewise for
3436         /// [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
3437         ///
3438         /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
3439         pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
3440                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3441                 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
3442         }
3443
3444         /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
3445         /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
3446         /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
3447         /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
3448         /// never reach the recipient.
3449         ///
3450         /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
3451         /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
3452         ///
3453         /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
3454         /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
3455         ///
3456         /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
3457         pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
3458                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3459                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3460                 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
3461                         route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
3462                         &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3463         }
3464
3465         /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
3466         /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3467         ///
3468         /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
3469         /// payments.
3470         ///
3471         /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
3472         pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
3473                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3474                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3475                 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
3476                         payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3477                         || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),  &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3478                         &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3479         }
3480
3481         /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
3482         /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
3483         /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
3484         pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
3485                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3486                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3487                 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
3488                         &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3489                         |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3490         }
3491
3492         /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
3493         /// payment probe.
3494         #[cfg(test)]
3495         pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
3496                 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
3497         }
3498
3499         /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay the given
3500         /// amount to the given `node_id`.
3501         ///
3502         /// See [`ChannelManager::send_preflight_probes`] for more information.
3503         pub fn send_spontaneous_preflight_probes(
3504                 &self, node_id: PublicKey, amount_msat: u64, final_cltv_expiry_delta: u32,
3505                 liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3506         ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3507                 let payment_params =
3508                         PaymentParameters::from_node_id(node_id, final_cltv_expiry_delta);
3509
3510                 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, amount_msat);
3511
3512                 self.send_preflight_probes(route_params, liquidity_limit_multiplier)
3513         }
3514
3515         /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay a route found
3516         /// according to the given [`RouteParameters`].
3517         ///
3518         /// This may be used to send "pre-flight" probes, i.e., to train our scorer before conducting
3519         /// the actual payment. Note this is only useful if there likely is sufficient time for the
3520         /// probe to settle before sending out the actual payment, e.g., when waiting for user
3521         /// confirmation in a wallet UI.
3522         ///
3523         /// Otherwise, there is a chance the probe could take up some liquidity needed to complete the
3524         /// actual payment. Users should therefore be cautious and might avoid sending probes if
3525         /// liquidity is scarce and/or they don't expect the probe to return before they send the
3526         /// payment. To mitigate this issue, channels with available liquidity less than the required
3527         /// amount times the given `liquidity_limit_multiplier` won't be used to send pre-flight
3528         /// probes. If `None` is given as `liquidity_limit_multiplier`, it defaults to `3`.
3529         pub fn send_preflight_probes(
3530                 &self, route_params: RouteParameters, liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3531         ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3532                 let liquidity_limit_multiplier = liquidity_limit_multiplier.unwrap_or(3);
3533
3534                 let payer = self.get_our_node_id();
3535                 let usable_channels = self.list_usable_channels();
3536                 let first_hops = usable_channels.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>();
3537                 let inflight_htlcs = self.compute_inflight_htlcs();
3538
3539                 let route = self
3540                         .router
3541                         .find_route(&payer, &route_params, Some(&first_hops), inflight_htlcs)
3542                         .map_err(|e| {
3543                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to find path for payment probe: {:?}", e);
3544                                 ProbeSendFailure::RouteNotFound
3545                         })?;
3546
3547                 let mut used_liquidity_map = HashMap::with_capacity(first_hops.len());
3548
3549                 let mut res = Vec::new();
3550
3551                 for mut path in route.paths {
3552                         // If the last hop is probably an unannounced channel we refrain from probing all the
3553                         // way through to the end and instead probe up to the second-to-last channel.
3554                         while let Some(last_path_hop) = path.hops.last() {
3555                                 if last_path_hop.maybe_announced_channel {
3556                                         // We found a potentially announced last hop.
3557                                         break;
3558                                 } else {
3559                                         // Drop the last hop, as it's likely unannounced.
3560                                         log_debug!(
3561                                                 self.logger,
3562                                                 "Avoided sending payment probe all the way to last hop {} as it is likely unannounced.",
3563                                                 last_path_hop.short_channel_id
3564                                         );
3565                                         let final_value_msat = path.final_value_msat();
3566                                         path.hops.pop();
3567                                         if let Some(new_last) = path.hops.last_mut() {
3568                                                 new_last.fee_msat += final_value_msat;
3569                                         }
3570                                 }
3571                         }
3572
3573                         if path.hops.len() < 2 {
3574                                 log_debug!(
3575                                         self.logger,
3576                                         "Skipped sending payment probe over path with less than two hops."
3577                                 );
3578                                 continue;
3579                         }
3580
3581                         if let Some(first_path_hop) = path.hops.first() {
3582                                 if let Some(first_hop) = first_hops.iter().find(|h| {
3583                                         h.get_outbound_payment_scid() == Some(first_path_hop.short_channel_id)
3584                                 }) {
3585                                         let path_value = path.final_value_msat() + path.fee_msat();
3586                                         let used_liquidity =
3587                                                 used_liquidity_map.entry(first_path_hop.short_channel_id).or_insert(0);
3588
3589                                         if first_hop.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat
3590                                                 < (*used_liquidity + path_value) * liquidity_limit_multiplier
3591                                         {
3592                                                 log_debug!(self.logger, "Skipped sending payment probe to avoid putting channel {} under the liquidity limit.", first_path_hop.short_channel_id);
3593                                                 continue;
3594                                         } else {
3595                                                 *used_liquidity += path_value;
3596                                         }
3597                                 }
3598                         }
3599
3600                         res.push(self.send_probe(path).map_err(|e| {
3601                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to send pre-flight probe: {:?}", e);
3602                                 ProbeSendFailure::SendingFailed(e)
3603                         })?);
3604                 }
3605
3606                 Ok(res)
3607         }
3608
3609         /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
3610         /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
3611         fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: FnMut(&OutboundV1Channel<SP>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
3612                 &self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, is_batch_funding: bool,
3613                 mut find_funding_output: FundingOutput,
3614         ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3615                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3616                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3617                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3618
3619                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3620                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3621                 let (chan, msg_opt) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
3622                         Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) => {
3623                                 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
3624
3625                                 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, is_batch_funding, &self.logger)
3626                                         .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
3627                                                 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
3628                                                 let user_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
3629                                                 let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
3630                                                 let channel_capacity = chan.context.get_value_satoshis();
3631                                                 (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, channel_capacity))
3632                                         } else { unreachable!(); });
3633                                 match funding_res {
3634                                         Ok((chan, funding_msg)) => (chan, funding_msg),
3635                                         Err((chan, err)) => {
3636                                                 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3637                                                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3638
3639                                                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
3640                                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3641                                                         err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3642                                                 });
3643                                         },
3644                                 }
3645                         },
3646                         Some(phase) => {
3647                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(*temporary_channel_id, phase);
3648                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3649                                         err: format!(
3650                                                 "Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is not an unfunded, outbound V1 channel",
3651                                                 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3652                                 })
3653                         },
3654                         None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {err: format!(
3655                                 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3656                                 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3657                                 }),
3658                 };
3659
3660                 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
3661                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3662                                 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3663                                 msg,
3664                         });
3665                 }
3666                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
3667                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3668                                 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3669                         },
3670                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3671                                 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3672                                 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.context.channel_id(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
3673                                         panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
3674                                 }
3675                                 e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan));
3676                         }
3677                 }
3678                 Ok(())
3679         }
3680
3681         #[cfg(test)]
3682         pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3683                 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, false, |_, tx| {
3684                         Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3685                 })
3686         }
3687
3688         /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3689         ///
3690         /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3691         /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3692         ///
3693         /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3694         /// across the p2p network.
3695         ///
3696         /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3697         /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3698         ///
3699         /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3700         /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3701         /// keys per-channel).
3702         ///
3703         /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3704         /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3705         /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3706         ///
3707         /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3708         /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3709         /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3710         ///
3711         /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3712         /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3713         /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3714         /// for more details.
3715         ///
3716         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3717         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3718         pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3719                 self.batch_funding_transaction_generated(&[(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id)], funding_transaction)
3720         }
3721
3722         /// Call this upon creation of a batch funding transaction for the given channels.
3723         ///
3724         /// Return values are identical to [`Self::funding_transaction_generated`], respective to
3725         /// each individual channel and transaction output.
3726         ///
3727         /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. This batch funding transaction
3728         /// will only be broadcast when we have safely received and persisted the counterparty's
3729         /// signature for each channel.
3730         ///
3731         /// If there is an error, all channels in the batch are to be considered closed.
3732         pub fn batch_funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channels: &[(&ChannelId, &PublicKey)], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3733                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3734                 let mut result = Ok(());
3735
3736                 if !funding_transaction.is_coin_base() {
3737                         for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3738                                 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3739                                         result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3740                                                 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3741                                         }));
3742                                 }
3743                         }
3744                 }
3745                 if funding_transaction.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
3746                         result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3747                                 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3748                         }));
3749                 }
3750                 {
3751                         let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3752                         // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3753                         // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3754                         // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3755                         // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3756                         if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) &&
3757                                 funding_transaction.lock_time.is_block_height() &&
3758                                 funding_transaction.lock_time.to_consensus_u32() > height + 1
3759                         {
3760                                 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3761                                         err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3762                                 }));
3763                         }
3764                 }
3765
3766                 let txid = funding_transaction.txid();
3767                 let is_batch_funding = temporary_channels.len() > 1;
3768                 let mut funding_batch_states = if is_batch_funding {
3769                         Some(self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap())
3770                 } else {
3771                         None
3772                 };
3773                 let mut funding_batch_state = funding_batch_states.as_mut().and_then(|states| {
3774                         match states.entry(txid) {
3775                                 btree_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3776                                         result = result.clone().and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3777                                                 err: "Batch funding transaction with the same txid already exists".to_owned()
3778                                         }));
3779                                         None
3780                                 },
3781                                 btree_map::Entry::Vacant(vacant) => Some(vacant.insert(Vec::new())),
3782                         }
3783                 });
3784                 for &(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in temporary_channels {
3785                         result = result.and_then(|_| self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(
3786                                 temporary_channel_id,
3787                                 counterparty_node_id,
3788                                 funding_transaction.clone(),
3789                                 is_batch_funding,
3790                                 |chan, tx| {
3791                                         let mut output_index = None;
3792                                         let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3793                                         for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3794                                                 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
3795                                                         if output_index.is_some() {
3796                                                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3797                                                                         err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3798                                                                 });
3799                                                         }
3800                                                         output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3801                                                 }
3802                                         }
3803                                         if output_index.is_none() {
3804                                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3805                                                         err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3806                                                 });
3807                                         }
3808                                         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() };
3809                                         if let Some(funding_batch_state) = funding_batch_state.as_mut() {
3810                                                 funding_batch_state.push((outpoint.to_channel_id(), *counterparty_node_id, false));
3811                                         }
3812                                         Ok(outpoint)
3813                                 })
3814                         );
3815                 }
3816                 if let Err(ref e) = result {
3817                         // Remaining channels need to be removed on any error.
3818                         let e = format!("Error in transaction funding: {:?}", e);
3819                         let mut channels_to_remove = Vec::new();
3820                         channels_to_remove.extend(funding_batch_states.as_mut()
3821                                 .and_then(|states| states.remove(&txid))
3822                                 .into_iter().flatten()
3823                                 .map(|(chan_id, node_id, _state)| (chan_id, node_id))
3824                         );
3825                         channels_to_remove.extend(temporary_channels.iter()
3826                                 .map(|(&chan_id, &node_id)| (chan_id, node_id))
3827                         );
3828                         let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
3829                         {
3830                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3831                                 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in channels_to_remove {
3832                                         per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3833                                                 .map(|peer_state_mutex| peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap())
3834                                                 .and_then(|mut peer_state| peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id))
3835                                                 .map(|mut chan| {
3836                                                         update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
3837                                                         self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context(), ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: e.clone() });
3838                                                         shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
3839                                                 });
3840                                 }
3841                         }
3842                         for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
3843                                 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
3844                         }
3845                 }
3846                 result
3847         }
3848
3849         /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
3850         ///
3851         /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3852         /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3853         /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3854         /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3855         ///
3856         /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3857         /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3858         ///
3859         /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3860         /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3861         ///
3862         /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3863         ///
3864         /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3865         /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3866         /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3867         /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3868         /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3869         /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3870         /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3871         pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
3872                 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
3873         ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3874                 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
3875                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3876                                 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
3877                         });
3878                 }
3879
3880                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3881                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3882                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3883                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3884                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3885                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3886                 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3887                         if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
3888                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3889                                         err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3890                                 });
3891                         };
3892                 }
3893                 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3894                         if let Some(channel_phase) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
3895                                 let mut config = channel_phase.context().config();
3896                                 config.apply(config_update);
3897                                 if !channel_phase.context_mut().update_config(&config) {
3898                                         continue;
3899                                 }
3900                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = channel_phase {
3901                                         if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
3902                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
3903                                         } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
3904                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3905                                                         node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3906                                                         msg,
3907                                                 });
3908                                         }
3909                                 }
3910                                 continue;
3911                         } else {
3912                                 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
3913                                 debug_assert!(false);
3914                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3915                                         err: format!(
3916                                                 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
3917                                                 channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3918                                 });
3919                         };
3920                 }
3921                 Ok(())
3922         }
3923
3924         /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
3925         ///
3926         /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3927         /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3928         /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3929         /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3930         ///
3931         /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3932         /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3933         ///
3934         /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3935         /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3936         ///
3937         /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3938         ///
3939         /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3940         /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3941         /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3942         /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3943         /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3944         /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3945         /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3946         pub fn update_channel_config(
3947                 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config: &ChannelConfig,
3948         ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3949                 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
3950         }
3951
3952         /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
3953         /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
3954         ///
3955         /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
3956         /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
3957         ///
3958         /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
3959         /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
3960         /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
3961         /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
3962         /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
3963         ///
3964         /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
3965         /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
3966         /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
3967         /// than expected.
3968         ///
3969         /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3970         /// backwards.
3971         ///
3972         /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
3973         /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3974         /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
3975         // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
3976         // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
3977         pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &ChannelId, next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3978                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3979
3980                 let next_hop_scid = {
3981                         let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3982                         let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
3983                                 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
3984                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3985                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3986                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
3987                                 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) => {
3988                                         if !chan.context.is_usable() {
3989                                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3990                                                         err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", next_hop_channel_id)
3991                                                 })
3992                                         }
3993                                         chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
3994                                 },
3995                                 Some(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3996                                         err: format!("Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is still opening.",
3997                                                 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
3998                                 }),
3999                                 None => {
4000                                         let error = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
4001                                                 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id);
4002                                         log_error!(self.logger, "{} when attempting to forward intercepted HTLC", error);
4003                                         return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4004                                                 err: error
4005                                         })
4006                                 }
4007                         }
4008                 };
4009
4010                 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4011                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4012                                 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4013                         })?;
4014
4015                 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
4016                         PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
4017                                 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
4018                         },
4019                         _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4020                 };
4021                 let skimmed_fee_msat =
4022                         payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
4023                 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
4024                         skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
4025                         outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
4026                 };
4027
4028                 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
4029                         payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4030                         payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4031                         payment.prev_user_channel_id,
4032                         vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
4033                 )];
4034                 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
4035                 Ok(())
4036         }
4037
4038         /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
4039         /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
4040         ///
4041         /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4042         /// backwards.
4043         ///
4044         /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4045         pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4046                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4047
4048                 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4049                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4050                                 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4051                         })?;
4052
4053                 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
4054                         let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4055                                 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4056                                 user_channel_id: Some(payment.prev_user_channel_id),
4057                                 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4058                                 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
4059                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4060                                 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4061                         });
4062
4063                         let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
4064                         let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
4065                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4066                 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4067
4068                 Ok(())
4069         }
4070
4071         /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
4072         ///
4073         /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
4074         /// Will likely generate further events.
4075         pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
4076                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4077
4078                 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
4079                 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
4080                 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
4081                 {
4082                         let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
4083                         mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
4084
4085                         for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
4086                                 if short_chan_id != 0 {
4087                                         macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
4088                                                 () => {
4089                                                         for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4090                                                                 match forward_info {
4091                                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4092                                                                                 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4093                                                                                 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4094                                                                                         routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4095                                                                                         outgoing_cltv_value, ..
4096                                                                                 }
4097                                                                         }) => {
4098                                                                                 macro_rules! failure_handler {
4099                                                                                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
4100                                                                                                 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
4101
4102                                                                                                 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4103                                                                                                         short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4104                                                                                                         user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4105                                                                                                         outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4106                                                                                                         htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4107                                                                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4108                                                                                                         phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
4109                                                                                                 });
4110
4111                                                                                                 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
4112                                                                                                         HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
4113                                                                                                 } else {
4114                                                                                                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
4115                                                                                                 };
4116
4117                                                                                                 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4118                                                                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
4119                                                                                                         reason
4120                                                                                                 ));
4121                                                                                                 continue;
4122                                                                                         }
4123                                                                                 }
4124                                                                                 macro_rules! fail_forward {
4125                                                                                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4126                                                                                                 {
4127                                                                                                         failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
4128                                                                                                 }
4129                                                                                         }
4130                                                                                 }
4131                                                                                 macro_rules! failed_payment {
4132                                                                                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4133                                                                                                 {
4134                                                                                                         failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
4135                                                                                                 }
4136                                                                                         }
4137                                                                                 }
4138                                                                                 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
4139                                                                                         let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
4140                                                                                         if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.chain_hash) {
4141                                                                                                 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4142                                                                                                 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
4143                                                                                                         phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac,
4144                                                                                                         payment_hash, &self.node_signer
4145                                                                                                 ) {
4146                                                                                                         Ok(res) => res,
4147                                                                                                         Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4148                                                                                                                 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).to_byte_array();
4149                                                                                                                 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
4150                                                                                                                 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
4151                                                                                                                 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
4152                                                                                                                 // of the onion.
4153                                                                                                                 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
4154                                                                                                         },
4155                                                                                                         Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4156                                                                                                                 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
4157                                                                                                         },
4158                                                                                                 };
4159                                                                                                 match next_hop {
4160                                                                                                         onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
4161                                                                                                                 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4162                                                                                                                 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
4163                                                                                                                         incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4164                                                                                                                         outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None,
4165                                                                                                                         current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
4166                                                                                                                 {
4167                                                                                                                         Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
4168                                                                                                                         Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
4169                                                                                                                 }
4170                                                                                                         },
4171                                                                                                         _ => panic!(),
4172                                                                                                 }
4173                                                                                         } else {
4174                                                                                                 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4175                                                                                         }
4176                                                                                 } else {
4177                                                                                         fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4178                                                                                 }
4179                                                                         },
4180                                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4181                                                                                 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
4182                                                                                 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
4183                                                                                 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
4184                                                                                 // problem, not ours.
4185                                                                         }
4186                                                                 }
4187                                                         }
4188                                                 }
4189                                         }
4190                                         let chan_info_opt = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id).cloned();
4191                                         let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match chan_info_opt {
4192                                                 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id, chan_id),
4193                                                 None => {
4194                                                         forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4195                                                         continue;
4196                                                 }
4197                                         };
4198                                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4199                                         let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4200                                         if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
4201                                                 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4202                                                 continue;
4203                                         }
4204                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4205                                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4206                                         if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
4207                                                 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4208                                                         match forward_info {
4209                                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4210                                                                         prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4211                                                                         forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4212                                                                                 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
4213                                                                                 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4214                                                                         },
4215                                                                 }) => {
4216                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id);
4217                                                                         let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4218                                                                                 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4219                                                                                 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4220                                                                                 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4221                                                                                 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4222                                                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4223                                                                                 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
4224                                                                                 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4225                                                                         });
4226                                                                         if let Err(e) = chan.queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
4227                                                                                 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
4228                                                                                 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, &self.fee_estimator,
4229                                                                                 &self.logger)
4230                                                                         {
4231                                                                                 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4232                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", &payment_hash, msg);
4233                                                                                 } else {
4234                                                                                         panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
4235                                                                                 }
4236                                                                                 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan);
4237                                                                                 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4238                                                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
4239                                                                                         HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
4240                                                                                 ));
4241                                                                                 continue;
4242                                                                         }
4243                                                                 },
4244                                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
4245                                                                         panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
4246                                                                 },
4247                                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
4248                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4249                                                                         if let Err(e) = chan.queue_fail_htlc(
4250                                                                                 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
4251                                                                         ) {
4252                                                                                 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4253                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
4254                                                                                 } else {
4255                                                                                         panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
4256                                                                                 }
4257                                                                                 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
4258                                                                                 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
4259                                                                                 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
4260                                                                                 continue;
4261                                                                         }
4262                                                                 },
4263                                                         }
4264                                                 }
4265                                         } else {
4266                                                 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4267                                                 continue;
4268                                         }
4269                                 } else {
4270                                         'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4271                                                 match forward_info {
4272                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4273                                                                 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4274                                                                 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4275                                                                         routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
4276                                                                         skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4277                                                                 }
4278                                                         }) => {
4279                                                                 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
4280                                                                         PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret, custom_tlvs } => {
4281                                                                                 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
4282                                                                                 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
4283                                                                                                 payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
4284                                                                                 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
4285                                                                                         Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
4286                                                                         },
4287                                                                         PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs } => {
4288                                                                                 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
4289                                                                                         payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
4290                                                                                         payment_metadata,
4291                                                                                         custom_tlvs,
4292                                                                                 };
4293                                                                                 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
4294                                                                                         payment_data, None, onion_fields)
4295                                                                         },
4296                                                                         _ => {
4297                                                                                 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
4298                                                                         }
4299                                                                 };
4300                                                                 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
4301                                                                         prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
4302                                                                                 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4303                                                                                 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4304                                                                                 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4305                                                                                 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4306                                                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4307                                                                                 phantom_shared_secret,
4308                                                                         },
4309                                                                         // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
4310                                                                         // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
4311                                                                         // if routing nodes overpay
4312                                                                         value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
4313                                                                         sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
4314                                                                         timer_ticks: 0,
4315                                                                         total_value_received: None,
4316                                                                         total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
4317                                                                         cltv_expiry,
4318                                                                         onion_payload,
4319                                                                         counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
4320                                                                 };
4321
4322                                                                 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
4323
4324                                                                 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
4325                                                                         ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
4326                                                                                 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
4327                                                                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4328                                                                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
4329                                                                                         &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
4330                                                                                 );
4331                                                                                 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4332                                                                                                 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
4333                                                                                                 user_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.user_channel_id,
4334                                                                                                 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4335                                                                                                 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
4336                                                                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
4337                                                                                                 phantom_shared_secret,
4338                                                                                         }), payment_hash,
4339                                                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
4340                                                                                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
4341                                                                                 ));
4342                                                                                 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
4343                                                                         }
4344                                                                 }
4345                                                                 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
4346                                                                 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4347                                                                 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4348                                                                         receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4349                                                                                 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4350                                                                 }
4351
4352                                                                 macro_rules! check_total_value {
4353                                                                         ($purpose: expr) => {{
4354                                                                                 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
4355                                                                                 let is_keysend = match $purpose {
4356                                                                                         events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(_) => true,
4357                                                                                         events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { .. } => false,
4358                                                                                 };
4359                                                                                 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4360                                                                                 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
4361                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4362                                                                                 }
4363                                                                                 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
4364                                                                                         .entry(payment_hash)
4365                                                                                         // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
4366                                                                                         .or_insert_with(|| {
4367                                                                                                 committed_to_claimable = true;
4368                                                                                                 ClaimablePayment {
4369                                                                                                         purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
4370                                                                                                 }
4371                                                                                         });
4372                                                                                 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
4373                                                                                         let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
4374                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), &payment_hash, log_keysend(!is_keysend));
4375                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4376                                                                                 }
4377                                                                                 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4378                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", &payment_hash);
4379                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4380                                                                                 }
4381                                                                                 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
4382                                                                                         if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
4383                                                                                                 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4384                                                                                         }
4385                                                                                 } else {
4386                                                                                         claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
4387                                                                                 }
4388                                                                                 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
4389                                                                                 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
4390                                                                                 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
4391                                                                                 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
4392                                                                                         total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
4393                                                                                         earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
4394                                                                                         if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4395                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
4396                                                                                                         &payment_hash, claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
4397                                                                                                 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
4398                                                                                         }
4399                                                                                         if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
4400                                                                                 }
4401                                                                                 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
4402                                                                                 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
4403                                                                                 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
4404                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4405                                                                                 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4406                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
4407                                                                                                 &payment_hash);
4408                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4409                                                                                 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4410                                                                                         #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4411                                                                                                 committed_to_claimable = true;
4412                                                                                         }
4413                                                                                         let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
4414                                                                                         htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4415                                                                                         let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
4416                                                                                         htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
4417                                                                                         let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
4418                                                                                                 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
4419                                                                                         debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
4420                                                                                                 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
4421                                                                                         new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
4422                                                                                                 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4423                                                                                                 payment_hash,
4424                                                                                                 purpose: $purpose,
4425                                                                                                 amount_msat,
4426                                                                                                 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
4427                                                                                                 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
4428                                                                                                 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4429                                                                                                 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
4430                                                                                                 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
4431                                                                                         }, None));
4432                                                                                         payment_claimable_generated = true;
4433                                                                                 } else {
4434                                                                                         // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
4435                                                                                         // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
4436                                                                                         // MPP parts.
4437                                                                                         htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4438                                                                                         #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4439                                                                                                 committed_to_claimable = true;
4440                                                                                         }
4441                                                                                 }
4442                                                                                 payment_claimable_generated
4443                                                                         }}
4444                                                                 }
4445
4446                                                                 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
4447                                                                 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
4448                                                                 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
4449                                                                 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
4450                                                                 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
4451                                                                 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
4452                                                                 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4453                                                                 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4454                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4455                                                                                 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4456                                                                                         OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
4457                                                                                                 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4458                                                                                                 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
4459                                                                                                         Ok(result) => result,
4460                                                                                                         Err(()) => {
4461                                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", &payment_hash);
4462                                                                                                                 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4463                                                                                                         }
4464                                                                                                 };
4465                                                                                                 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
4466                                                                                                         let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
4467                                                                                                         if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
4468                                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
4469                                                                                                                         &payment_hash, cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
4470                                                                                                                 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4471                                                                                                         }
4472                                                                                                 }
4473                                                                                                 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4474                                                                                                         payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4475                                                                                                         payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4476                                                                                                 };
4477                                                                                                 check_total_value!(purpose);
4478                                                                                         },
4479                                                                                         OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
4480                                                                                                 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
4481                                                                                                 check_total_value!(purpose);
4482                                                                                         }
4483                                                                                 }
4484                                                                         },
4485                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
4486                                                                                 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4487                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", &payment_hash);
4488                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4489                                                                                 }
4490                                                                                 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4491                                                                                 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
4492                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", &payment_hash);
4493                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4494                                                                                 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
4495                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
4496                                                                                                 &payment_hash, payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
4497                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4498                                                                                 } else {
4499                                                                                         let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4500                                                                                                 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
4501                                                                                                 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4502                                                                                         };
4503                                                                                         let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
4504                                                                                         if payment_claimable_generated {
4505                                                                                                 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
4506                                                                                         }
4507                                                                                 }
4508                                                                         },
4509                                                                 };
4510                                                         },
4511                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4512                                                                 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
4513                                                         }
4514                                                 }
4515                                         }
4516                                 }
4517                         }
4518                 }
4519
4520                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4521                 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
4522                         || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4523                         &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
4524
4525                 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
4526                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4527                 }
4528                 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
4529
4530                 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
4531                 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
4532                 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
4533                 // network stack.
4534                 self.check_free_holding_cells();
4535
4536                 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
4537                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4538                 events.append(&mut new_events);
4539         }
4540
4541         /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
4542         ///
4543         /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
4544         fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
4545                 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
4546
4547                 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
4548
4549                 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
4550                 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
4551                 if background_events.is_empty() {
4552                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4553                 }
4554
4555                 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
4556                         match event {
4557                                 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, update)) => {
4558                                         // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
4559                                         // monitor updating completing.
4560                                         let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4561                                 },
4562                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update } => {
4563                                         let mut updated_chan = false;
4564                                         {
4565                                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4566                                                 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4567                                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4568                                                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4569                                                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4570                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase) => {
4571                                                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase.get_mut() {
4572                                                                                 updated_chan = true;
4573                                                                                 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
4574                                                                                         peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4575                                                                         } else {
4576                                                                                 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't have an update for a non-funded channel");
4577                                                                         }
4578                                                                 },
4579                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {},
4580                                                         }
4581                                                 }
4582                                         }
4583                                         if !updated_chan {
4584                                                 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
4585                                                 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4586                                         }
4587                                 },
4588                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
4589                                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4590                                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4591                                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4592                                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4593                                                 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
4594                                                         handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4595                                                 } else {
4596                                                         let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
4597                                                                 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
4598                                                         mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4599                                                         mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4600                                                         self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
4601                                                 }
4602                                         }
4603                                 },
4604                         }
4605                 }
4606                 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4607         }
4608
4609         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4610         /// Process background events, for functional testing
4611         pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
4612                 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
4613                 let _ = self.process_background_events();
4614         }
4615
4616         fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &ChannelId, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
4617                 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
4618                 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
4619                 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4620                         if new_feerate != chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4621                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4622                                 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4623                         }
4624                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4625                 }
4626                 if !chan.context.is_live() {
4627                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
4628                                 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4629                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4630                 }
4631                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4632                         &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4633
4634                 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
4635                 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4636         }
4637
4638         #[cfg(fuzzing)]
4639         /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
4640         /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
4641         /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
4642         /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
4643         pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
4644                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4645                         let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4646
4647                         let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4648                         let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
4649
4650                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4651                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4652                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4653                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4654                                 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
4655                                         |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
4656                                 ) {
4657                                         let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4658                                                 anchor_feerate
4659                                         } else {
4660                                                 non_anchor_feerate
4661                                         };
4662                                         let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4663                                         if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4664                                 }
4665                         }
4666
4667                         should_persist
4668                 });
4669         }
4670
4671         /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
4672         ///
4673         /// This currently includes:
4674         ///  * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
4675         ///  * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
4676         ///    than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
4677         ///    the channel.
4678         ///  * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
4679         ///    with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
4680         ///  * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
4681         ///  * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
4682         ///  * Forgetting about stale outbound payments, either those that have already been fulfilled
4683         ///    or those awaiting an invoice that hasn't been delivered in the necessary amount of time.
4684         ///    The latter is determined using the system clock in `std` and the highest seen block time
4685         ///    minus two hours in `no-std`.
4686         ///
4687         /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
4688         /// estimate fetches.
4689         ///
4690         /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4691         /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
4692         pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
4693                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4694                         let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4695
4696                         let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4697                         let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
4698
4699                         let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
4700                         let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
4701                         let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
4702                         let mut shutdown_channels = Vec::new();
4703
4704                         let mut process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
4705                                 chan_id: &ChannelId,
4706                                 context: &mut ChannelContext<SP>,
4707                                 unfunded_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
4708                                 pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4709                                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
4710                         | {
4711                                 context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4712                                 if unfunded_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
4713                                         log_error!(self.logger,
4714                                                 "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner", chan_id);
4715                                         update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
4716                                         self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4717                                         shutdown_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false));
4718                                         pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4719                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4720                                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4721                                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
4722                                                                 channel_id: *chan_id,
4723                                                                 data: "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake".to_owned(),
4724                                                         },
4725                                                 },
4726                                         });
4727                                         false
4728                                 } else {
4729                                         true
4730                                 }
4731                         };
4732
4733                         {
4734                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4735                                 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4736                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4737                                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4738                                         let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
4739                                         let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
4740                                         peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, phase| {
4741                                                 match phase {
4742                                                         ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
4743                                                                 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4744                                                                         anchor_feerate
4745                                                                 } else {
4746                                                                         non_anchor_feerate
4747                                                                 };
4748                                                                 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4749                                                                 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4750
4751                                                                 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
4752                                                                         let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
4753                                                                         handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
4754                                                                         if needs_close { return false; }
4755                                                                 }
4756
4757                                                                 match chan.channel_update_status() {
4758                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
4759                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
4760                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
4761                                                                                 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
4762                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
4763                                                                                 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
4764                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
4765                                                                                 n += 1;
4766                                                                                 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4767                                                                                         chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
4768                                                                                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4769                                                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4770                                                                                                         msg: update
4771                                                                                                 });
4772                                                                                         }
4773                                                                                         should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4774                                                                                 } else {
4775                                                                                         chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
4776                                                                                 }
4777                                                                         },
4778                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
4779                                                                                 n += 1;
4780                                                                                 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4781                                                                                         chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
4782                                                                                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4783                                                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4784                                                                                                         msg: update
4785                                                                                                 });
4786                                                                                         }
4787                                                                                         should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4788                                                                                 } else {
4789                                                                                         chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
4790                                                                                 }
4791                                                                         },
4792                                                                         _ => {},
4793                                                                 }
4794
4795                                                                 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4796
4797                                                                 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
4798                                                                         log_debug!(self.logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
4799                                                                                         counterparty_node_id, chan_id);
4800                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4801                                                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4802                                                                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
4803                                                                                         msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
4804                                                                                                 channel_id: *chan_id,
4805                                                                                                 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
4806                                                                                         },
4807                                                                                 },
4808                                                                         });
4809                                                                 }
4810
4811                                                                 true
4812                                                         },
4813                                                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
4814                                                                 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
4815                                                                         pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
4816                                                         },
4817                                                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
4818                                                                 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
4819                                                                         pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
4820                                                         },
4821                                                 }
4822                                         });
4823
4824                                         for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
4825                                                 if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
4826                                                         log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", &chan_id);
4827                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
4828                                                                 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4829                                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4830                                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4831                                                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_id.clone(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
4832                                                                         },
4833                                                                 }
4834                                                         );
4835                                                 }
4836                                         }
4837                                         peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.retain(|_, req| req.ticks_remaining > 0);
4838
4839                                         if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
4840                                                 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
4841                                         }
4842                                 }
4843                         }
4844
4845                         // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
4846                         // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
4847                         // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
4848                         // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
4849                         // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
4850                         // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
4851                         // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
4852                         if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
4853                                 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4854                                 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
4855                                         match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
4856                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
4857                                                         // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
4858                                                         // have no channels to the peer.
4859                                                         let remove_entry = {
4860                                                                 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
4861                                                                 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
4862                                                         };
4863                                                         if remove_entry {
4864                                                                 entry.remove_entry();
4865                                                         }
4866                                                 },
4867                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
4868                                         }
4869                                 }
4870                         }
4871
4872                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
4873                                 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4874                                         // This should be unreachable
4875                                         debug_assert!(false);
4876                                         return false;
4877                                 }
4878                                 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
4879                                         // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
4880                                         // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
4881                                         // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
4882                                         // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
4883                                         if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
4884                                                 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
4885                                         {
4886                                                 return true;
4887                                         } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
4888                                                 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
4889                                                 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
4890                                         }) {
4891                                                 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
4892                                                         .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
4893                                                 return false;
4894                                         }
4895                                 }
4896                                 true
4897                         });
4898
4899                         for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
4900                                 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
4901                                 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
4902                                 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
4903                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
4904                         }
4905
4906                         for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4907                                 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4908                         }
4909
4910                         for shutdown_res in shutdown_channels {
4911                                 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
4912                         }
4913
4914                         #[cfg(feature = "std")]
4915                         let duration_since_epoch = std::time::SystemTime::now()
4916                                 .duration_since(std::time::SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH)
4917                                 .expect("SystemTime::now() should come after SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH");
4918                         #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
4919                         let duration_since_epoch = Duration::from_secs(
4920                                 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire).saturating_sub(7200) as u64
4921                         );
4922
4923                         self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_payments(
4924                                 duration_since_epoch, &self.pending_events
4925                         );
4926
4927                         // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
4928                         // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
4929                         // than block the message queueing pipeline.
4930                         if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
4931                                 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4932                         }
4933
4934                         should_persist
4935                 });
4936         }
4937
4938         /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
4939         /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
4940         /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
4941         ///
4942         /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
4943         /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
4944         /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
4945         /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
4946         ///
4947         /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
4948         /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
4949         /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
4950         /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
4951         pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
4952                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
4953         }
4954
4955         /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
4956         /// reason for the failure.
4957         ///
4958         /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
4959         pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
4960                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4961
4962                 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
4963                 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
4964                         for htlc in payment.htlcs {
4965                                 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
4966                                 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4967                                 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
4968                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4969                         }
4970                 }
4971         }
4972
4973         /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
4974         fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
4975                 match failure_code {
4976                         FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
4977                         FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
4978                         FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
4979                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4980                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4981                                 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
4982                         },
4983                         FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
4984                                 let fail_data = match data {
4985                                         Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
4986                                         None => Vec::new(),
4987                                 };
4988                                 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
4989                         }
4990                 }
4991         }
4992
4993         /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4994         /// that we want to return and a channel.
4995         ///
4996         /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
4997         /// forwarding
4998         fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4999                 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
5000                 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
5001                 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
5002                 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
5003                 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
5004                         chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
5005                 } else {
5006                         chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
5007                 };
5008                 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
5009                         self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
5010                 } else {
5011                         (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5012                 }
5013         }
5014
5015
5016         /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5017         /// that we want to return and a channel.
5018         fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5019                 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
5020                 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
5021                         let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
5022                         if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
5023                                 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
5024                                 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
5025                                 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5026                         }
5027                         (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5028                         msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5029                         upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5030                         (desired_err_code, enc.0)
5031                 } else {
5032                         // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
5033                         // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
5034                         // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
5035                         // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
5036                         (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5037                 }
5038         }
5039
5040         // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
5041         // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
5042         // be surfaced to the user.
5043         fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
5044                 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: ChannelId,
5045                 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
5046         ) {
5047                 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
5048                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5049                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
5050                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5051                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5052                                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
5053                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
5054                                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get() {
5055                                                         self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan)
5056                                                 } else {
5057                                                         // We shouldn't be trying to fail holding cell HTLCs on an unfunded channel.
5058                                                         debug_assert!(false);
5059                                                         (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5060                                                 }
5061                                         },
5062                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5063                                 }
5064                         } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
5065                 };
5066
5067                 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
5068                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
5069                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
5070                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5071                 }
5072         }
5073
5074         /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
5075         /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
5076         fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
5077                 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
5078                 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
5079                 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
5080                 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
5081                 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5082                 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5083                         debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5084                 }
5085
5086                 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
5087                 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
5088                 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
5089                 //timer handling.
5090
5091                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5092                 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
5093                 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5094                 match source {
5095                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
5096                                 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
5097                                         session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
5098                                         &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
5099                                 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5100                         },
5101                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint, .. }) => {
5102                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", &payment_hash, onion_error);
5103                                 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
5104
5105                                 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
5106                                 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5107                                 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
5108                                         push_forward_ev = true;
5109                                 }
5110                                 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
5111                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5112                                                 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
5113                                         },
5114                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5115                                                 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
5116                                         }
5117                                 }
5118                                 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
5119                                 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5120                                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5121                                 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
5122                                         prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
5123                                         failed_next_destination: destination,
5124                                 }, None));
5125                         },
5126                 }
5127         }
5128
5129         /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
5130         /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
5131         ///
5132         /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
5133         /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
5134         /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
5135         /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
5136         ///
5137         /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
5138         /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
5139         /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
5140         /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
5141         ///
5142         /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
5143         /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
5144         /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
5145         ///
5146         /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5147         /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
5148         /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
5149         /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
5150         /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5151         /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5152         /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
5153         pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5154                 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
5155         }
5156
5157         /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
5158         /// even type numbers.
5159         ///
5160         /// # Note
5161         ///
5162         /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
5163         /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
5164         ///
5165         /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5166         pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5167                 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
5168         }
5169
5170         fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
5171                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
5172
5173                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5174
5175                 let mut sources = {
5176                         let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
5177                         if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
5178                                 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
5179                                 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
5180                                         if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
5181                                                 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
5182                                                         .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
5183                                                 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
5184                                                 break;
5185                                         }
5186                                 }
5187
5188                                 let htlcs = payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect();
5189                                 let sender_intended_value = payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat);
5190                                 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
5191                                         ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
5192                                         payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id, htlcs, sender_intended_value
5193                                 });
5194                                 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
5195                                         debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
5196                                         log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
5197                                                 &payment_hash);
5198                                 }
5199
5200                                 if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = payment.onion_fields {
5201                                         if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
5202                                                 log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
5203                                                         &payment_hash, log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
5204                                                 claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5205                                                 mem::drop(claimable_payments);
5206                                                 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5207                                                         let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
5208                                                         let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5209                                                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5210                                                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5211                                                 }
5212                                                 return;
5213                                         }
5214                                 }
5215
5216                                 payment.htlcs
5217                         } else { return; }
5218                 };
5219                 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
5220
5221                 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
5222                 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
5223                 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
5224                 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
5225                 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
5226                 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
5227                 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
5228                 let mut valid_mpp = true;
5229                 let mut errs = Vec::new();
5230                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5231                 for htlc in sources.iter() {
5232                         if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
5233                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5234                                 debug_assert!(false);
5235                                 valid_mpp = false;
5236                                 break;
5237                         }
5238                         prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
5239
5240                         if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
5241                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5242                                 debug_assert!(false);
5243                                 valid_mpp = false;
5244                                 break;
5245                         }
5246                         expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
5247                         claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
5248                 }
5249                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5250                 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
5251                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5252                         log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
5253                         return;
5254                 }
5255                 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
5256                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5257                         log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
5258                                 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
5259                         return;
5260                 }
5261                 if valid_mpp {
5262                         for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5263                                 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
5264                                         htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
5265                                         |_, definitely_duplicate| {
5266                                                 debug_assert!(!definitely_duplicate, "We shouldn't claim duplicatively from a payment");
5267                                                 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash })
5268                                         }
5269                                 ) {
5270                                         if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
5271                                                 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
5272                                                 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
5273                                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
5274                                         } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
5275                                 }
5276                         }
5277                 }
5278                 if !valid_mpp {
5279                         for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5280                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5281                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
5282                                 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5283                                 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
5284                                 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5285                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5286                         }
5287                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5288                 }
5289
5290                 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
5291                 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
5292                         let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5293                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
5294                 }
5295         }
5296
5297         fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>, bool) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
5298                 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
5299         -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
5300                 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
5301
5302                 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
5303                 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
5304                 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
5305                 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5306
5307                 // As we may call handle_monitor_update_completion_actions in rather rare cases, check that
5308                 // the required mutexes are not held before we start.
5309                 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5310                 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5311
5312                 {
5313                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5314                         let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
5315                         let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
5316                                 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
5317                                 None => None
5318                         };
5319
5320                         let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
5321                                 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5322                                         .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
5323                         ).unwrap_or(None);
5324
5325                         if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
5326                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
5327                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5328                                 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5329                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
5330                                                 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5331                                                 let fulfill_res = chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
5332
5333                                                 match fulfill_res {
5334                                                         UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } => {
5335                                                                 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat), false) {
5336                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
5337                                                                                 chan_id, action);
5338                                                                         peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
5339                                                                 }
5340                                                                 if !during_init {
5341                                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
5342                                                                                 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5343                                                                 } else {
5344                                                                         // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
5345                                                                         // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
5346                                                                         // monitor update as a background event.
5347                                                                         self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5348                                                                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5349                                                                                         counterparty_node_id,
5350                                                                                         funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
5351                                                                                         update: monitor_update.clone(),
5352                                                                                 });
5353                                                                 }
5354                                                         }
5355                                                         UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => {
5356                                                                 let action = if let Some(action) = completion_action(None, true) {
5357                                                                         action
5358                                                                 } else {
5359                                                                         return Ok(());
5360                                                                 };
5361                                                                 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5362
5363                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Completing monitor update completion action for channel {} as claim was redundant: {:?}",
5364                                                                         chan_id, action);
5365                                                                 let (node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker) =
5366                                                                 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5367                                                                         downstream_counterparty_node_id: node_id,
5368                                                                         downstream_funding_outpoint: funding_outpoint,
5369                                                                         blocking_action: blocker,
5370                                                                 } = action {
5371                                                                         (node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)
5372                                                                 } else {
5373                                                                         debug_assert!(false,
5374                                                                                 "Duplicate claims should always free another channel immediately");
5375                                                                         return Ok(());
5376                                                                 };
5377                                                                 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
5378                                                                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5379                                                                         if let Some(blockers) = peer_state
5380                                                                                 .actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
5381                                                                                 .get_mut(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
5382                                                                         {
5383                                                                                 let mut found_blocker = false;
5384                                                                                 blockers.retain(|iter| {
5385                                                                                         // Note that we could actually be blocked, in
5386                                                                                         // which case we need to only remove the one
5387                                                                                         // blocker which was added duplicatively.
5388                                                                                         let first_blocker = !found_blocker;
5389                                                                                         if *iter == blocker { found_blocker = true; }
5390                                                                                         *iter != blocker || !first_blocker
5391                                                                                 });
5392                                                                                 debug_assert!(found_blocker);
5393                                                                         }
5394                                                                 } else {
5395                                                                         debug_assert!(false);
5396                                                                 }
5397                                                         }
5398                                                 }
5399                                         }
5400                                         return Ok(());
5401                                 }
5402                         }
5403                 }
5404                 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5405                         update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
5406                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5407                                 payment_preimage,
5408                         }],
5409                 };
5410
5411                 if !during_init {
5412                         // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
5413                         // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
5414                         let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
5415                         if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
5416                                 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
5417                                 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
5418                                 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
5419                                 // again on restart.
5420                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
5421                                         payment_preimage, update_res);
5422                         }
5423                 } else {
5424                         // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
5425                         // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
5426                         // event.
5427                         // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
5428                         // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
5429                         // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
5430                         // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
5431                         // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
5432                         // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
5433                         // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
5434                         self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5435                                 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
5436                                         prev_hop.outpoint, preimage_update,
5437                                 )));
5438                 }
5439                 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
5440                 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
5441                 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
5442                 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
5443                 // `PaymentForwarded`).
5444                 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None, false));
5445                 Ok(())
5446         }
5447
5448         fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
5449                 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
5450         }
5451
5452         fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
5453                 forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, startup_replay: bool,
5454                 next_channel_counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>, next_channel_outpoint: OutPoint
5455         ) {
5456                 match source {
5457                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
5458                                 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
5459                                         "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
5460                                 if let Some(pubkey) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5461                                         debug_assert_eq!(pubkey, path.hops[0].pubkey);
5462                                 }
5463                                 let ev_completion_action = EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
5464                                         channel_funding_outpoint: next_channel_outpoint,
5465                                         counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
5466                                 };
5467                                 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage,
5468                                         session_priv, path, from_onchain, ev_completion_action, &self.pending_events,
5469                                         &self.logger);
5470                         },
5471                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
5472                                 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5473                                 let completed_blocker = RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&hop_data);
5474                                 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5475                                 let claiming_chan_funding_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5476                                 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
5477                                         |htlc_claim_value_msat, definitely_duplicate| {
5478                                                 let chan_to_release =
5479                                                         if let Some(node_id) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5480                                                                 Some((node_id, next_channel_outpoint, completed_blocker))
5481                                                         } else {
5482                                                                 // We can only get `None` here if we are processing a
5483                                                                 // `ChannelMonitor`-originated event, in which case we
5484                                                                 // don't care about ensuring we wake the downstream
5485                                                                 // channel's monitor updating - the channel is already
5486                                                                 // closed.
5487                                                                 None
5488                                                         };
5489
5490                                                 if definitely_duplicate && startup_replay {
5491                                                         // On startup we may get redundant claims which are related to
5492                                                         // monitor updates still in flight. In that case, we shouldn't
5493                                                         // immediately free, but instead let that monitor update complete
5494                                                         // in the background.
5495                                                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
5496                                                                 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
5497                                                                 // There should be a `BackgroundEvent` pending...
5498                                                                 assert!(background_events.iter().any(|ev| {
5499                                                                         match ev {
5500                                                                                 // to apply a monitor update that blocked the claiming channel,
5501                                                                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5502                                                                                         funding_txo, update, ..
5503                                                                                 } => {
5504                                                                                         if *funding_txo == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint {
5505                                                                                                 assert!(update.updates.iter().any(|upd|
5506                                                                                                         if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5507                                                                                                                 payment_preimage: update_preimage
5508                                                                                                         } = upd {
5509                                                                                                                 payment_preimage == *update_preimage
5510                                                                                                         } else { false }
5511                                                                                                 ), "{:?}", update);
5512                                                                                                 true
5513                                                                                         } else { false }
5514                                                                                 },
5515                                                                                 // or the channel we'd unblock is already closed,
5516                                                                                 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup(
5517                                                                                         (funding_txo, monitor_update)
5518                                                                                 ) => {
5519                                                                                         if *funding_txo == next_channel_outpoint {
5520                                                                                                 assert_eq!(monitor_update.updates.len(), 1);
5521                                                                                                 assert!(matches!(
5522                                                                                                         monitor_update.updates[0],
5523                                                                                                         ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. }
5524                                                                                                 ));
5525                                                                                                 true
5526                                                                                         } else { false }
5527                                                                                 },
5528                                                                                 // or the monitor update has completed and will unblock
5529                                                                                 // immediately once we get going.
5530                                                                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
5531                                                                                         channel_id, ..
5532                                                                                 } =>
5533                                                                                         *channel_id == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(),
5534                                                                         }
5535                                                                 }), "{:?}", *background_events);
5536                                                         }
5537                                                         None
5538                                                 } else if definitely_duplicate {
5539                                                         if let Some(other_chan) = chan_to_release {
5540                                                                 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5541                                                                         downstream_counterparty_node_id: other_chan.0,
5542                                                                         downstream_funding_outpoint: other_chan.1,
5543                                                                         blocking_action: other_chan.2,
5544                                                                 })
5545                                                         } else { None }
5546                                                 } else {
5547                                                         let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
5548                                                                 if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
5549                                                                         Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
5550                                                                 } else { None }
5551                                                         } else { None };
5552                                                         Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5553                                                                 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
5554                                                                         fee_earned_msat,
5555                                                                         claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
5556                                                                         prev_channel_id: Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5557                                                                         next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5558                                                                         outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
5559                                                                 },
5560                                                                 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: chan_to_release,
5561                                                         })
5562                                                 }
5563                                         });
5564                                 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
5565                                         let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5566                                         let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
5567                                 }
5568                         },
5569                 }
5570         }
5571
5572         /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
5573         pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
5574                 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
5575         }
5576
5577         fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
5578                 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5579                 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5580                 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5581
5582                 for action in actions.into_iter() {
5583                         match action {
5584                                 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
5585                                         let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5586                                         if let Some(ClaimingPayment {
5587                                                 amount_msat,
5588                                                 payment_purpose: purpose,
5589                                                 receiver_node_id,
5590                                                 htlcs,
5591                                                 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_total_msat,
5592                                         }) = payment {
5593                                                 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
5594                                                         payment_hash,
5595                                                         purpose,
5596                                                         amount_msat,
5597                                                         receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
5598                                                         htlcs,
5599                                                         sender_intended_total_msat,
5600                                                 }, None));
5601                                         }
5602                                 },
5603                                 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5604                                         event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
5605                                 } => {
5606                                         self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
5607                                         if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
5608                                                 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, Some(blocker));
5609                                         }
5610                                 },
5611                                 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5612                                         downstream_counterparty_node_id, downstream_funding_outpoint, blocking_action,
5613                                 } => {
5614                                         self.handle_monitor_update_release(
5615                                                 downstream_counterparty_node_id,
5616                                                 downstream_funding_outpoint,
5617                                                 Some(blocking_action),
5618                                         );
5619                                 },
5620                         }
5621                 }
5622         }
5623
5624         /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
5625         /// update completion.
5626         fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5627                 channel: &mut Channel<SP>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
5628                 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
5629                 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
5630                 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
5631         -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
5632                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
5633                         &channel.context.channel_id(),
5634                         if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
5635                         if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
5636                         if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
5637                         if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
5638                         if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
5639
5640                 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
5641
5642                 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5643                 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5644                         htlc_forwards = Some((channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias()),
5645                                 channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
5646                 }
5647
5648                 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
5649                         send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
5650                 }
5651                 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
5652                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5653                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5654                                 msg,
5655                         });
5656                 }
5657
5658                 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
5659                         if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
5660                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5661                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5662                                         updates: update,
5663                                 });
5664                         }
5665                 } }
5666                 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
5667                         if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
5668                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
5669                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5670                                         msg: revoke_and_ack,
5671                                 });
5672                         }
5673                 } }
5674                 match order {
5675                         RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
5676                                 handle_cs!();
5677                                 handle_raa!();
5678                         },
5679                         RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
5680                                 handle_raa!();
5681                                 handle_cs!();
5682                         },
5683                 }
5684
5685                 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
5686                         log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
5687                         self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
5688                 }
5689
5690                 {
5691                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5692                         emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
5693                         emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
5694                 }
5695
5696                 htlc_forwards
5697         }
5698
5699         fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
5700                 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5701
5702                 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
5703                         Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5704                         None => {
5705                                 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5706                                 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5707                                 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5708                                 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5709                                         Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5710                                         None => return,
5711                                 }
5712                         }
5713                 };
5714                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5715                 let mut peer_state_lock;
5716                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
5717                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
5718                 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5719                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5720                 let channel =
5721                         if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5722                                 chan
5723                         } else {
5724                                 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
5725                                         .remove(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
5726                                 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5727                                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5728                                 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
5729                                 return;
5730                         };
5731                 let remaining_in_flight =
5732                         if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
5733                                 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
5734                                 pending.len()
5735                         } else { 0 };
5736                 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
5737                         highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
5738                         remaining_in_flight);
5739                 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
5740                         return;
5741                 }
5742                 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
5743         }
5744
5745         /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
5746         ///
5747         /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
5748         /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
5749         /// the channel.
5750         ///
5751         /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5752         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5753         /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5754         ///
5755         /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
5756         /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
5757         /// used to accept such channels.
5758         ///
5759         /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5760         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5761         pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5762                 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
5763         }
5764
5765         /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
5766         /// it as confirmed immediately.
5767         ///
5768         /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5769         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5770         /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5771         ///
5772         /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
5773         /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
5774         ///
5775         /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
5776         /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
5777         ///
5778         /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
5779         /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
5780         ///
5781         /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5782         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5783         pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5784                 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
5785         }
5786
5787         fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5788                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5789
5790                 let peers_without_funded_channels =
5791                         self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
5792                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5793                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5794                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
5795                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5796                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5797                 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
5798
5799                 // Find (and remove) the channel in the unaccepted table. If it's not there, something weird is
5800                 // happening and return an error. N.B. that we create channel with an outbound SCID of zero so
5801                 // that we can delay allocating the SCID until after we're sure that the checks below will
5802                 // succeed.
5803                 let mut channel = match peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
5804                         Some(unaccepted_channel) => {
5805                                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5806                                 InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
5807                                         counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
5808                                         &unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
5809                                         &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|e| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.to_string() })
5810                         }
5811                         _ => Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() })
5812                 }?;
5813
5814                 if accept_0conf {
5815                         // This should have been correctly configured by the call to InboundV1Channel::new.
5816                         debug_assert!(channel.context.minimum_depth().unwrap() == 0);
5817                 } else if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
5818                         let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5819                                 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5820                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5821                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
5822                                 }
5823                         };
5824                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5825                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
5826                 } else {
5827                         // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
5828                         // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
5829                         // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
5830                         if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
5831                                 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5832                                         node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5833                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5834                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
5835                                         }
5836                                 };
5837                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5838                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
5839                         }
5840                 }
5841
5842                 // Now that we know we have a channel, assign an outbound SCID alias.
5843                 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
5844                 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
5845
5846                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
5847                         node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5848                         msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
5849                 });
5850
5851                 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(temporary_channel_id.clone(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
5852
5853                 Ok(())
5854         }
5855
5856         /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
5857         /// or 0-conf channels.
5858         ///
5859         /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
5860         /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
5861         fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
5862         where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<SP>) -> bool {
5863                 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
5864                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5865                 {
5866                         let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5867                         for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
5868                                 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5869                                 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
5870                                 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
5871                                 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
5872                                         peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
5873                                 }
5874                         }
5875                 }
5876                 return peers_without_funded_channels;
5877         }
5878
5879         fn unfunded_channel_count(
5880                 peer: &PeerState<SP>, best_block_height: u32
5881         ) -> usize {
5882                 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
5883                 for (_, phase) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
5884                         match phase {
5885                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
5886                                         // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
5887                                         // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
5888                                         if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
5889                                                 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
5890                                         {
5891                                                 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
5892                                         }
5893                                 },
5894                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
5895                                         if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
5896                                                 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
5897                                         }
5898                                 },
5899                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
5900                                         // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
5901                                         continue;
5902                                 }
5903                         }
5904                 }
5905                 num_unfunded_channels + peer.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
5906         }
5907
5908         fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5909                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
5910                 // likely to be lost on restart!
5911                 if msg.chain_hash != self.chain_hash {
5912                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5913                 }
5914
5915                 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
5916                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5917                 }
5918
5919                 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
5920                 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
5921                 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
5922                 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
5923                         self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
5924
5925                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5926                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5927                     .ok_or_else(|| {
5928                                 debug_assert!(false);
5929                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
5930                         })?;
5931                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5932                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5933
5934                 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
5935                 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
5936                 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
5937                 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
5938                         channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
5939                         !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
5940                 {
5941                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5942                                 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
5943                                 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5944                 }
5945
5946                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5947                 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
5948                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5949                                 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
5950                                 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5951                 }
5952
5953                 let channel_id = msg.temporary_channel_id;
5954                 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
5955                 if channel_exists {
5956                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5957                 }
5958
5959                 // If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
5960                 if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
5961                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5962                         pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
5963                                 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
5964                                 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5965                                 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
5966                                 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
5967                                 channel_type: msg.channel_type.clone().unwrap(),
5968                         }, None));
5969                         peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
5970                                 open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
5971                                 ticks_remaining: UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS,
5972                         });
5973                         return Ok(());
5974                 }
5975
5976                 // Otherwise create the channel right now.
5977                 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
5978                 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
5979                 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
5980                 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
5981                         counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
5982                         &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
5983                 {
5984                         Err(e) => {
5985                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
5986                         },
5987                         Ok(res) => res
5988                 };
5989
5990                 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
5991                 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
5992                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5993                 }
5994                 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5995                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5996                 }
5997
5998                 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
5999                 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6000
6001                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6002                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6003                         msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6004                 });
6005                 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6006                 Ok(())
6007         }
6008
6009         fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6010                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6011                 // likely to be lost on restart!
6012                 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
6013                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6014                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6015                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
6016                                         debug_assert!(false);
6017                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6018                                 })?;
6019                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6020                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6021                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6022                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut phase) => {
6023                                         match phase.get_mut() {
6024                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
6025                                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), phase);
6026                                                         (chan.context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.context.get_user_id())
6027                                                 },
6028                                                 _ => {
6029                                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected accept_channel message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id));
6030                                                 }
6031                                         }
6032                                 },
6033                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6034                         }
6035                 };
6036                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6037                 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
6038                         temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6039                         counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6040                         channel_value_satoshis: value,
6041                         output_script,
6042                         user_channel_id: user_id,
6043                 }, None));
6044                 Ok(())
6045         }
6046
6047         fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6048                 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6049
6050                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6051                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6052                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6053                                 debug_assert!(false);
6054                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6055                         })?;
6056
6057                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6058                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6059                 let (chan, funding_msg_opt, monitor) =
6060                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6061                                 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan)) => {
6062                                         match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger) {
6063                                                 Ok(res) => res,
6064                                                 Err((mut inbound_chan, err)) => {
6065                                                         // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
6066                                                         // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
6067                                                         // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
6068                                                         update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &inbound_chan.context);
6069                                                         let user_id = inbound_chan.context.get_user_id();
6070                                                         let shutdown_res = inbound_chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
6071                                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(format!("{}", err),
6072                                                                 msg.temporary_channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, inbound_chan.context.get_value_satoshis()));
6073                                                 },
6074                                         }
6075                                 },
6076                                 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(_)) | Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_)) => {
6077                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected funding_created message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id));
6078                                 },
6079                                 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6080                         };
6081
6082                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
6083                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6084                                 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6085                                         "Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(),
6086                                         chan.context.channel_id()
6087                                 ))
6088                         },
6089                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6090                                 let mut id_to_peer_lock = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6091                                 match id_to_peer_lock.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
6092                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6093                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6094                                                         "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
6095                                                         chan.context.channel_id()))
6096                                         },
6097                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
6098                                                 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
6099                                                 if let Ok(persist_state) = monitor_res {
6100                                                         i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
6101                                                         mem::drop(id_to_peer_lock);
6102
6103                                                         // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
6104                                                         // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
6105                                                         // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
6106                                                         // until we have persisted our monitor.
6107                                                         if let Some(msg) = funding_msg_opt {
6108                                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
6109                                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6110                                                                         msg,
6111                                                                 });
6112                                                         }
6113
6114                                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) {
6115                                                                 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_state, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
6116                                                                         per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6117                                                         } else {
6118                                                                 unreachable!("This must be a funded channel as we just inserted it.");
6119                                                         }
6120                                                         Ok(())
6121                                                 } else {
6122                                                         log_error!(self.logger, "Persisting initial ChannelMonitor failed, implying the funding outpoint was duplicated");
6123                                                         let channel_id = match funding_msg_opt {
6124                                                                 Some(msg) => msg.channel_id,
6125                                                                 None => chan.context.channel_id(),
6126                                                         };
6127                                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6128                                                                 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
6129                                                                 channel_id));
6130                                                 }
6131                                         }
6132                                 }
6133                         }
6134                 }
6135         }
6136
6137         fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6138                 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6139                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6140                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6141                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6142                                 debug_assert!(false);
6143                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6144                         })?;
6145
6146                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6147                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6148                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6149                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6150                                 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6151                                         ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => {
6152                                                 let monitor = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6153                                                         chan.funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6154                                                 if let Ok(persist_status) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
6155                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_status, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6156                                                         Ok(())
6157                                                 } else {
6158                                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel funding outpoint was a duplicate".to_owned())), chan_phase_entry)
6159                                                 }
6160                                         },
6161                                         _ => {
6162                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
6163                                         },
6164                                 }
6165                         },
6166                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
6167                 }
6168         }
6169
6170         fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6171                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6172                 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6173                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6174                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6175                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6176                                 debug_assert!(false);
6177                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6178                         })?;
6179                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6180                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6181                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6182                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6183                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6184                                         let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
6185                                                 self.chain_hash, &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6186                                         if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
6187                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6188                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6189                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6190                                                         msg: announcement_sigs,
6191                                                 });
6192                                         } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
6193                                                 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
6194                                                 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
6195                                                 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
6196                                                 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
6197                                                 // announcement_signatures.
6198                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6199                                                 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
6200                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6201                                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6202                                                                 msg,
6203                                                         });
6204                                                 }
6205                                         }
6206
6207                                         {
6208                                                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6209                                                 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan);
6210                                         }
6211
6212                                         Ok(())
6213                                 } else {
6214                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6215                                                 "Got a channel_ready message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry)
6216                                 }
6217                         },
6218                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
6219                                 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6220                         }
6221                 }
6222         }
6223
6224         fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6225                 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
6226                 let mut finish_shutdown = None;
6227                 {
6228                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6229                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6230                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
6231                                         debug_assert!(false);
6232                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6233                                 })?;
6234                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6235                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6236                         if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6237                                 let phase = chan_phase_entry.get_mut();
6238                                 match phase {
6239                                         ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6240                                                 if !chan.received_shutdown() {
6241                                                         log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
6242                                                                 msg.channel_id,
6243                                                                 if chan.sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
6244                                                 }
6245
6246                                                 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6247                                                 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6248                                                         chan.shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6249                                                 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
6250
6251                                                 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
6252                                                         // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
6253                                                         // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
6254                                                         // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
6255                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6256                                                                 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6257                                                                 msg,
6258                                                         });
6259                                                 }
6260                                                 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
6261                                                 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6262                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
6263                                                                 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6264                                                 }
6265                                         },
6266                                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6267                                                 let context = phase.context_mut();
6268                                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
6269                                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel);
6270                                                 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
6271                                                 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
6272                                         },
6273                                 }
6274                         } else {
6275                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6276                         }
6277                 }
6278                 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
6279                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
6280                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
6281                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
6282                 }
6283                 if let Some(shutdown_res) = finish_shutdown {
6284                         self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
6285                 }
6286
6287                 Ok(())
6288         }
6289
6290         fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6291                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6292                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6293                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6294                                 debug_assert!(false);
6295                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6296                         })?;
6297                 let (tx, chan_option, shutdown_result) = {
6298                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6299                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6300                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6301                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6302                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6303                                                 let (closing_signed, tx, shutdown_result) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6304                                                 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
6305                                                 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
6306                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
6307                                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6308                                                                 msg,
6309                                                         });
6310                                                 }
6311                                                 if tx.is_some() {
6312                                                         // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
6313                                                         // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
6314                                                         // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
6315                                                         // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
6316                                                         // watch for old state broadcasts)!
6317                                                         (tx, Some(remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry)), shutdown_result)
6318                                                 } else { (tx, None, shutdown_result) }
6319                                         } else {
6320                                                 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6321                                                         "Got a closing_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6322                                         }
6323                                 },
6324                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6325                         }
6326                 };
6327                 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
6328                         log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
6329                         self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
6330                 }
6331                 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = chan_option {
6332                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6333                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6334                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6335                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6336                                         msg: update
6337                                 });
6338                         }
6339                         self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
6340                 }
6341                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6342                 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
6343                         self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
6344                 }
6345                 Ok(())
6346         }
6347
6348         fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6349                 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
6350                 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
6351                 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
6352                 //
6353                 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
6354                 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
6355                 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
6356                 //but we should prevent it anyway.
6357
6358                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6359                 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6360
6361                 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
6362                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6363                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6364                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6365                                 debug_assert!(false);
6366                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6367                         })?;
6368                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6369                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6370                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6371                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6372                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6373                                         let pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
6374                                                 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
6375                                                         self.construct_pending_htlc_status(msg, shared_secret, next_hop,
6376                                                                 chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt),
6377                                                 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
6378                                         };
6379                                         let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<SP>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
6380                                                 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
6381                                                 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
6382                                                 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
6383                                                 match pending_forward_info {
6384                                                         PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
6385                                                                 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
6386                                                                         let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
6387                                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
6388                                                                 } else {
6389                                                                         HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
6390                                                                 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
6391                                                                 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6392                                                                         channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6393                                                                         htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
6394                                                                         reason
6395                                                                 };
6396                                                                 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
6397                                                         },
6398                                                         _ => pending_forward_info
6399                                                 }
6400                                         };
6401                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6402                                 } else {
6403                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6404                                                 "Got an update_add_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6405                                 }
6406                         },
6407                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6408                 }
6409                 Ok(())
6410         }
6411
6412         fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6413                 let funding_txo;
6414                 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
6415                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6416                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6417                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
6418                                         debug_assert!(false);
6419                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6420                                 })?;
6421                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6422                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6423                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6424                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6425                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6426                                                 let res = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6427                                                 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop) = &res.0 {
6428                                                         log_trace!(self.logger,
6429                                                                 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
6430                                                                 msg.channel_id);
6431                                                         peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates.entry(msg.channel_id)
6432                                                                 .or_insert_with(Vec::new)
6433                                                                 .push(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&prev_hop));
6434                                                 }
6435                                                 // Note that we do not need to push an `actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates`
6436                                                 // entry here, even though we *do* need to block the next RAA monitor update.
6437                                                 // We do this instead in the `claim_funds_internal` by attaching a
6438                                                 // `ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate` action to the event generated when the
6439                                                 // outbound HTLC is claimed. This is guaranteed to all complete before we
6440                                                 // process the RAA as messages are processed from single peers serially.
6441                                                 funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().expect("We won't accept a fulfill until funded");
6442                                                 res
6443                                         } else {
6444                                                 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6445                                                         "Got an update_fulfill_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6446                                         }
6447                                 },
6448                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6449                         }
6450                 };
6451                 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, false, Some(*counterparty_node_id), funding_txo);
6452                 Ok(())
6453         }
6454
6455         fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6456                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6457                 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6458                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6459                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6460                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6461                                 debug_assert!(false);
6462                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6463                         })?;
6464                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6465                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6466                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6467                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6468                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6469                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan_phase_entry);
6470                                 } else {
6471                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6472                                                 "Got an update_fail_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6473                                 }
6474                         },
6475                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6476                 }
6477                 Ok(())
6478         }
6479
6480         fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6481                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6482                 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6483                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6484                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6485                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6486                                 debug_assert!(false);
6487                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6488                         })?;
6489                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6490                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6491                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6492                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6493                                 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
6494                                         let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
6495                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan_phase_entry);
6496                                 }
6497                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6498                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan_phase_entry);
6499                                 } else {
6500                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6501                                                 "Got an update_fail_malformed_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6502                                 }
6503                                 Ok(())
6504                         },
6505                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6506                 }
6507         }
6508
6509         fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6510                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6511                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6512                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6513                                 debug_assert!(false);
6514                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6515                         })?;
6516                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6517                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6518                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6519                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6520                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6521                                         let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6522                                         let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6523                                         if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6524                                                 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
6525                                                         peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6526                                         }
6527                                         Ok(())
6528                                 } else {
6529                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6530                                                 "Got a commitment_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6531                                 }
6532                         },
6533                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6534                 }
6535         }
6536
6537         #[inline]
6538         fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
6539                 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
6540                         let mut push_forward_event = false;
6541                         let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
6542                         let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
6543                         if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
6544                                 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
6545                                         let scid = match forward_info.routing {
6546                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6547                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
6548                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
6549                                         };
6550                                         // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
6551                                         let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
6552
6553                                         let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6554                                         let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
6555                                         match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
6556                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6557                                                         entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6558                                                                 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
6559                                                 },
6560                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6561                                                         if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
6562                                                            fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.chain_hash)
6563                                                         {
6564                                                                 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).to_byte_array());
6565                                                                 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6566                                                                 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
6567                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6568                                                                                 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
6569                                                                                         requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
6570                                                                                         payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
6571                                                                                         inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
6572                                                                                         expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
6573                                                                                         intercept_id
6574                                                                                 }, None));
6575                                                                                 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6576                                                                                         prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
6577                                                                         },
6578                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6579                                                                                 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
6580                                                                                 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6581                                                                                         short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
6582                                                                                         user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
6583                                                                                         outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
6584                                                                                         htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
6585                                                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6586                                                                                         phantom_shared_secret: None,
6587                                                                                 });
6588
6589                                                                                 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
6590                                                                                                 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
6591                                                                                                 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
6592                                                                                 ));
6593                                                                         }
6594                                                                 }
6595                                                         } else {
6596                                                                 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
6597                                                                 // payments are being processed.
6598                                                                 if forward_htlcs_empty {
6599                                                                         push_forward_event = true;
6600                                                                 }
6601                                                                 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6602                                                                         prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
6603                                                         }
6604                                                 }
6605                                         }
6606                                 }
6607                         }
6608
6609                         for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
6610                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
6611                         }
6612
6613                         if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
6614                                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6615                                 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
6616                         }
6617                         if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
6618                 }
6619         }
6620
6621         fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
6622                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6623                 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6624                 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
6625                         if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
6626                 ).count();
6627                 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
6628                 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
6629                 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
6630                 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
6631                 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
6632                 // real by taking more time.
6633                 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
6634                         pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6635                                 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
6636                         }, None));
6637                 }
6638         }
6639
6640         /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
6641         /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
6642         /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
6643         /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
6644         fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6645                 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
6646                 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
6647         ) -> bool {
6648                 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6649                         .get(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
6650                 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
6651                         action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6652                                 channel_funding_outpoint,
6653                                 counterparty_node_id,
6654                         })
6655                 })
6656         }
6657
6658         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6659         pub(crate) fn test_raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6660                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_id: ChannelId
6661         ) -> bool {
6662                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6663                 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6664                         let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6665                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
6666
6667                         if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id) {
6668                                 return self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
6669                                         chan.context().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), counterparty_node_id);
6670                         }
6671                 }
6672                 false
6673         }
6674
6675         fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6676                 let htlcs_to_fail = {
6677                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6678                         let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6679                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
6680                                         debug_assert!(false);
6681                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6682                                 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
6683                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6684                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6685                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6686                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6687                                                 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6688                                                 let mon_update_blocked = if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_opt {
6689                                                         self.raa_monitor_updates_held(
6690                                                                 &peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates, funding_txo,
6691                                                                 *counterparty_node_id)
6692                                                 } else { false };
6693                                                 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6694                                                         chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger, mon_update_blocked), chan_phase_entry);
6695                                                 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6696                                                         let funding_txo = funding_txo_opt
6697                                                                 .expect("Funding outpoint must have been set for RAA handling to succeed");
6698                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update,
6699                                                                 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6700                                                 }
6701                                                 htlcs_to_fail
6702                                         } else {
6703                                                 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6704                                                         "Got a revoke_and_ack message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6705                                         }
6706                                 },
6707                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6708                         }
6709                 };
6710                 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
6711                 Ok(())
6712         }
6713
6714         fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6715                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6716                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6717                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6718                                 debug_assert!(false);
6719                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6720                         })?;
6721                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6722                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6723                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6724                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6725                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6726                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6727                                 } else {
6728                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6729                                                 "Got an update_fee message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6730                                 }
6731                         },
6732                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6733                 }
6734                 Ok(())
6735         }
6736
6737         fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6738                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6739                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6740                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6741                                 debug_assert!(false);
6742                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6743                         })?;
6744                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6745                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6746                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6747                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6748                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6749                                         if !chan.context.is_usable() {
6750                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
6751                                         }
6752
6753                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6754                                                 msg: try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.announcement_signatures(
6755                                                         &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
6756                                                         msg, &self.default_configuration
6757                                                 ), chan_phase_entry),
6758                                                 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6759                                                 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6760                                                 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan).unwrap()),
6761                                         });
6762                                 } else {
6763                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6764                                                 "Got an announcement_signatures message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6765                                 }
6766                         },
6767                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6768                 }
6769                 Ok(())
6770         }
6771
6772         /// Returns DoPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersistNoEvents or an Err.
6773         fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6774                 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
6775                         Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
6776                         None => {
6777                                 // It's not a local channel
6778                                 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6779                         }
6780                 };
6781                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6782                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
6783                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
6784                         return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6785                 }
6786                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6787                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6788                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
6789                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6790                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6791                                         if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6792                                                 if chan.context.should_announce() {
6793                                                         // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
6794                                                         // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
6795                                                         // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
6796                                                         return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
6797                                                 }
6798                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
6799                                         }
6800                                         let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
6801                                         let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
6802                                         if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
6803                                                 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
6804                                         } else {
6805                                                 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update {:?} for channel {}.", msg, chan_id);
6806                                                 let did_change = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_update(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6807                                                 // If nothing changed after applying their update, we don't need to bother
6808                                                 // persisting.
6809                                                 if !did_change {
6810                                                         return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
6811                                                 }
6812                                         }
6813                                 } else {
6814                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6815                                                 "Got a channel_update for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6816                                 }
6817                         },
6818                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6819                 }
6820                 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
6821         }
6822
6823         fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6824                 let htlc_forwards;
6825                 let need_lnd_workaround = {
6826                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6827
6828                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6829                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
6830                                         debug_assert!(false);
6831                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6832                                                 format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
6833                                                 msg.channel_id
6834                                         )
6835                                 })?;
6836                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6837                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6838                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6839                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6840                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6841                                                 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
6842                                                 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
6843                                                 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
6844                                                 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
6845                                                 let responses = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_reestablish(
6846                                                         msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash,
6847                                                         &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan_phase_entry);
6848                                                 let mut channel_update = None;
6849                                                 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
6850                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6851                                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6852                                                                 msg,
6853                                                         });
6854                                                 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
6855                                                         // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
6856                                                         // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
6857                                                         // they have the latest channel parameters.
6858                                                         if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
6859                                                                 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6860                                                                         node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6861                                                                         msg,
6862                                                                 });
6863                                                         }
6864                                                 }
6865                                                 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
6866                                                 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
6867                                                         &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
6868                                                         Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
6869                                                 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
6870                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
6871                                                 }
6872                                                 need_lnd_workaround
6873                                         } else {
6874                                                 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6875                                                         "Got a channel_reestablish message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6876                                         }
6877                                 },
6878                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
6879                                         log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending bogus ChannelReestablish for unknown channel {} to force channel closure",
6880                                                 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id.0));
6881                                         // Unfortunately, lnd doesn't force close on errors
6882                                         // (https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/blob/abb1e3463f3a83bbb843d5c399869dbe930ad94f/htlcswitch/link.go#L2119).
6883                                         // One of the few ways to get an lnd counterparty to force close is by
6884                                         // replicating what they do when restoring static channel backups (SCBs). They
6885                                         // send an invalid `ChannelReestablish` with `0` commitment numbers and an
6886                                         // invalid `your_last_per_commitment_secret`.
6887                                         //
6888                                         // Since we received a `ChannelReestablish` for a channel that doesn't exist, we
6889                                         // can assume it's likely the channel closed from our point of view, but it
6890                                         // remains open on the counterparty's side. By sending this bogus
6891                                         // `ChannelReestablish` message now as a response to theirs, we trigger them to
6892                                         // force close broadcasting their latest state. If the closing transaction from
6893                                         // our point of view remains unconfirmed, it'll enter a race with the
6894                                         // counterparty's to-be-broadcast latest commitment transaction.
6895                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6896                                                 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6897                                                 msg: msgs::ChannelReestablish {
6898                                                         channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6899                                                         next_local_commitment_number: 0,
6900                                                         next_remote_commitment_number: 0,
6901                                                         your_last_per_commitment_secret: [1u8; 32],
6902                                                         my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_slice(&[2u8; 33]).unwrap(),
6903                                                         next_funding_txid: None,
6904                                                 },
6905                                         });
6906                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6907                                                 format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}",
6908                                                         counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6909                                         )
6910                                 }
6911                         }
6912                 };
6913
6914                 let mut persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
6915                 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
6916                         self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
6917                         persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6918                 }
6919
6920                 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
6921                         self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
6922                 }
6923                 Ok(persist)
6924         }
6925
6926         /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
6927         fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
6928                 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
6929
6930                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6931                 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
6932                 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
6933                 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
6934                         for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
6935                                 match monitor_event {
6936                                         MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
6937                                                 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
6938                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", preimage);
6939                                                         self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, false, counterparty_node_id, funding_outpoint);
6940                                                 } else {
6941                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash);
6942                                                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
6943                                                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
6944                                                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
6945                                                 }
6946                                         },
6947                                         MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(funding_outpoint) => {
6948                                                 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
6949                                                         Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
6950                                                         None => {
6951                                                                 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
6952                                                                 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
6953                                                                 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6954                                                                 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
6955                                                         }
6956                                                 };
6957                                                 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
6958                                                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6959                                                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6960                                                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6961                                                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6962                                                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6963                                                                 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
6964                                                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
6965                                                                                 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
6966                                                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6967                                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6968                                                                                                 msg: update
6969                                                                                         });
6970                                                                                 }
6971                                                                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
6972                                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6973                                                                                         node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6974                                                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
6975                                                                                                 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
6976                                                                                         },
6977                                                                                 });
6978                                                                         }
6979                                                                 }
6980                                                         }
6981                                                 }
6982                                         },
6983                                         MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
6984                                                 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
6985                                         },
6986                                 }
6987                         }
6988                 }
6989
6990                 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6991                         self.finish_close_channel(failure);
6992                 }
6993
6994                 has_pending_monitor_events
6995         }
6996
6997         /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
6998         /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
6999         /// update events as a separate process method here.
7000         #[cfg(fuzzing)]
7001         pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
7002                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7003                 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
7004         }
7005
7006         /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
7007         /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
7008         /// update was applied.
7009         fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
7010                 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
7011                 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7012
7013                 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
7014                 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
7015                 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
7016                 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
7017                 'peer_loop: loop {
7018                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7019                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7020                                 'chan_loop: loop {
7021                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7022                                         let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7023                                         for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
7024                                                 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
7025                                         ) {
7026                                                 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
7027                                                 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7028                                                 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
7029                                                         chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
7030                                                 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
7031                                                         failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
7032                                                 }
7033                                                 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
7034                                                         has_monitor_update = true;
7035
7036                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
7037                                                                 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7038                                                         continue 'peer_loop;
7039                                                 }
7040                                         }
7041                                         break 'chan_loop;
7042                                 }
7043                         }
7044                         break 'peer_loop;
7045                 }
7046
7047                 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty();
7048                 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7049                         self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
7050                 }
7051
7052                 has_update
7053         }
7054
7055         /// When a call to a [`ChannelSigner`] method returns an error, this indicates that the signer
7056         /// is (temporarily) unavailable, and the operation should be retried later.
7057         ///
7058         /// This method allows for that retry - either checking for any signer-pending messages to be
7059         /// attempted in every channel, or in the specifically provided channel.
7060         ///
7061         /// [`ChannelSigner`]: crate::sign::ChannelSigner
7062         #[cfg(test)] // This is only implemented for one signer method, and should be private until we
7063                      // actually finish implementing it fully.
7064         pub fn signer_unblocked(&self, channel_opt: Option<(PublicKey, ChannelId)>) {
7065                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7066
7067                 let unblock_chan = |phase: &mut ChannelPhase<SP>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>| {
7068                         let node_id = phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id();
7069                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
7070                                 let msgs = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger);
7071                                 if let Some(updates) = msgs.commitment_update {
7072                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
7073                                                 node_id,
7074                                                 updates,
7075                                         });
7076                                 }
7077                                 if let Some(msg) = msgs.funding_signed {
7078                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
7079                                                 node_id,
7080                                                 msg,
7081                                         });
7082                                 }
7083                                 if let Some(msg) = msgs.funding_created {
7084                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
7085                                                 node_id,
7086                                                 msg,
7087                                         });
7088                                 }
7089                                 if let Some(msg) = msgs.channel_ready {
7090                                         send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
7091                                 }
7092                         }
7093                 };
7094
7095                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7096                 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, channel_id)) = channel_opt {
7097                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7098                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7099                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7100                                 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
7101                                         unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7102                                 }
7103                         }
7104                 } else {
7105                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7106                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7107                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7108                                 for (_, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
7109                                         unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7110                                 }
7111                         }
7112                 }
7113         }
7114
7115         /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
7116         /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
7117         /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
7118         fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
7119                 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
7120                 let mut has_update = false;
7121                 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
7122                 {
7123                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7124
7125                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7126                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7127                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7128                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7129                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, phase| {
7130                                         match phase {
7131                                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7132                                                         match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
7133                                                                 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt, shutdown_result_opt)) => {
7134                                                                         if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
7135                                                                                 has_update = true;
7136                                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
7137                                                                                         node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
7138                                                                                 });
7139                                                                         }
7140                                                                         debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result_opt.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
7141                                                                         if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result_opt {
7142                                                                                 shutdown_results.push(shutdown_result);
7143                                                                         }
7144                                                                         if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
7145                                                                                 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
7146                                                                                 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
7147                                                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7148                                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7149                                                                                                 msg: update
7150                                                                                         });
7151                                                                                 }
7152
7153                                                                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
7154
7155                                                                                 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
7156                                                                                 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
7157                                                                                 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7158                                                                                 false
7159                                                                         } else { true }
7160                                                                 },
7161                                                                 Err(e) => {
7162                                                                         has_update = true;
7163                                                                         let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
7164                                                                         handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
7165                                                                         !close_channel
7166                                                                 }
7167                                                         }
7168                                                 },
7169                                                 _ => true, // Retain unfunded channels if present.
7170                                         }
7171                                 });
7172                         }
7173                 }
7174
7175                 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
7176                         let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
7177                 }
7178
7179                 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
7180                         self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
7181                 }
7182
7183                 has_update
7184         }
7185
7186         /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
7187         /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
7188         /// Channel object.
7189         fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
7190                 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7191                         // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
7192                         // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
7193                         // reorganized out of the main chain.
7194                         // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
7195                         // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
7196                         // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
7197                         // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
7198                         if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = failure.monitor_update.take() {
7199                                 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
7200                                 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
7201                                         assert!(should_broadcast);
7202                                 } else { unreachable!(); }
7203                                 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
7204                                         BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
7205                                                 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
7206                                         });
7207                         }
7208                         self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7209                 }
7210         }
7211
7212         /// Creates an [`OfferBuilder`] such that the [`Offer`] it builds is recognized by the
7213         /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`InvoiceRequest`] messages for the offer. The offer will
7214         /// not have an expiration unless otherwise set on the builder.
7215         ///
7216         /// # Privacy
7217         ///
7218         /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the offer with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the
7219         /// introduction node and a derived signing pubkey for recipient privacy. As such, currently,
7220         /// the node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction
7221         /// node in order to send the [`InvoiceRequest`].
7222         ///
7223         /// # Limitations
7224         ///
7225         /// Requires a direct connection to the introduction node in the responding [`InvoiceRequest`]'s
7226         /// reply path.
7227         ///
7228         /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
7229         ///
7230         /// [`Offer`]: crate::offers::offer::Offer
7231         /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
7232         pub fn create_offer_builder(
7233                 &self, description: String
7234         ) -> OfferBuilder<DerivedMetadata, secp256k1::All> {
7235                 let node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7236                 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7237                 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7238                 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7239                 let path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7240
7241                 OfferBuilder::deriving_signing_pubkey(description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx)
7242                         .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)
7243                         .path(path)
7244         }
7245
7246         /// Creates a [`RefundBuilder`] such that the [`Refund`] it builds is recognized by the
7247         /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`Bolt12Invoice`] messages for the refund.
7248         ///
7249         /// # Payment
7250         ///
7251         /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the refund.
7252         /// See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has been sent.
7253         ///
7254         /// The builder will have the provided expiration set. Any changes to the expiration on the
7255         /// returned builder will not be honored by [`ChannelManager`]. For `no-std`, the highest seen
7256         /// block time minus two hours is used for the current time when determining if the refund has
7257         /// expired.
7258         ///
7259         /// To revoke the refund, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
7260         /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received before expiration, the payment will fail
7261         /// with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
7262         ///
7263         /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
7264         /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
7265         ///
7266         /// # Privacy
7267         ///
7268         /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the refund with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as
7269         /// the introduction node and a derived payer id for payer privacy. As such, currently, the
7270         /// node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node
7271         /// in order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
7272         ///
7273         /// # Limitations
7274         ///
7275         /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in the responding
7276         /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
7277         ///
7278         /// # Errors
7279         ///
7280         /// Errors if a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link
7281         /// or if `amount_msats` is invalid.
7282         ///
7283         /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
7284         ///
7285         /// [`Refund`]: crate::offers::refund::Refund
7286         /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7287         /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
7288         pub fn create_refund_builder(
7289                 &self, description: String, amount_msats: u64, absolute_expiry: Duration,
7290                 payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
7291         ) -> Result<RefundBuilder<secp256k1::All>, Bolt12SemanticError> {
7292                 let node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7293                 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7294                 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7295                 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7296                 let path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7297
7298                 let builder = RefundBuilder::deriving_payer_id(
7299                         description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, amount_msats, payment_id
7300                 )?
7301                         .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)
7302                         .absolute_expiry(absolute_expiry)
7303                         .path(path);
7304
7305                 let expiration = StaleExpiration::AbsoluteTimeout(absolute_expiry);
7306                 self.pending_outbound_payments
7307                         .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
7308                                 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat,
7309                         )
7310                         .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
7311
7312                 Ok(builder)
7313         }
7314
7315         /// Pays for an [`Offer`] using the given parameters by creating an [`InvoiceRequest`] and
7316         /// enqueuing it to be sent via an onion message. [`ChannelManager`] will pay the actual
7317         /// [`Bolt12Invoice`] once it is received.
7318         ///
7319         /// Uses [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`] such that the [`InvoiceRequest`] it builds is recognized by
7320         /// the [`ChannelManager`] when handling a [`Bolt12Invoice`] message in response to the request.
7321         /// The optional parameters are used in the builder, if `Some`:
7322         /// - `quantity` for [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`] which must be set if
7323         ///   [`Offer::expects_quantity`] is `true`.
7324         /// - `amount_msats` if overpaying what is required for the given `quantity` is desired, and
7325         /// - `payer_note` for [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`].
7326         ///
7327         /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
7328         /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
7329         ///
7330         /// # Payment
7331         ///
7332         /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the request
7333         /// when received. See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has
7334         /// been sent.
7335         ///
7336         /// To revoke the request, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
7337         /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received in a reasonable amount of time, the
7338         /// payment will fail with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
7339         ///
7340         /// # Privacy
7341         ///
7342         /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the reply path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`]
7343         /// as the introduction node and a derived payer id for payer privacy. As such, currently, the
7344         /// node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node
7345         /// in order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
7346         ///
7347         /// # Limitations
7348         ///
7349         /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Offer::paths`] or to
7350         /// [`Offer::signing_pubkey`], if empty. A similar restriction applies to the responding
7351         /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
7352         ///
7353         /// # Errors
7354         ///
7355         /// Errors if a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link
7356         /// or if the provided parameters are invalid for the offer.
7357         ///
7358         /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
7359         /// [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::quantity
7360         /// [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::payer_note
7361         /// [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequestBuilder
7362         /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7363         /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
7364         /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
7365         pub fn pay_for_offer(
7366                 &self, offer: &Offer, quantity: Option<u64>, amount_msats: Option<u64>,
7367                 payer_note: Option<String>, payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry,
7368                 max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
7369         ) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
7370                 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7371                 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7372                 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7373
7374                 let builder = offer
7375                         .request_invoice_deriving_payer_id(expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, payment_id)?
7376                         .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)?;
7377                 let builder = match quantity {
7378                         None => builder,
7379                         Some(quantity) => builder.quantity(quantity)?,
7380                 };
7381                 let builder = match amount_msats {
7382                         None => builder,
7383                         Some(amount_msats) => builder.amount_msats(amount_msats)?,
7384                 };
7385                 let builder = match payer_note {
7386                         None => builder,
7387                         Some(payer_note) => builder.payer_note(payer_note),
7388                 };
7389
7390                 let invoice_request = builder.build_and_sign()?;
7391                 let reply_path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7392
7393                 let expiration = StaleExpiration::TimerTicks(1);
7394                 self.pending_outbound_payments
7395                         .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
7396                                 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat
7397                         )
7398                         .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
7399
7400                 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
7401                 if offer.paths().is_empty() {
7402                         let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7403                                 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request),
7404                                 Destination::Node(offer.signing_pubkey()),
7405                                 Some(reply_path),
7406                         );
7407                         pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7408                 } else {
7409                         // Send as many invoice requests as there are paths in the offer (with an upper bound).
7410                         // Using only one path could result in a failure if the path no longer exists. But only
7411                         // one invoice for a given payment id will be paid, even if more than one is received.
7412                         const REQUEST_LIMIT: usize = 10;
7413                         for path in offer.paths().into_iter().take(REQUEST_LIMIT) {
7414                                 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7415                                         OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request.clone()),
7416                                         Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
7417                                         Some(reply_path.clone()),
7418                                 );
7419                                 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7420                         }
7421                 }
7422
7423                 Ok(())
7424         }
7425
7426         /// Creates a [`Bolt12Invoice`] for a [`Refund`] and enqueues it to be sent via an onion
7427         /// message.
7428         ///
7429         /// The resulting invoice uses a [`PaymentHash`] recognized by the [`ChannelManager`] and a
7430         /// [`BlindedPath`] containing the [`PaymentSecret`] needed to reconstruct the corresponding
7431         /// [`PaymentPreimage`].
7432         ///
7433         /// # Limitations
7434         ///
7435         /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Refund::paths`] or to
7436         /// [`Refund::payer_id`], if empty. This request is best effort; an invoice will be sent to each
7437         /// node meeting the aforementioned criteria, but there's no guarantee that they will be
7438         /// received and no retries will be made.
7439         ///
7440         /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7441         pub fn request_refund_payment(&self, refund: &Refund) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
7442                 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7443                 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7444                 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7445
7446                 let amount_msats = refund.amount_msats();
7447                 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
7448
7449                 match self.create_inbound_payment(Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None) {
7450                         Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => {
7451                                 let payment_paths = vec![
7452                                         self.create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(payment_secret),
7453                                 ];
7454                                 #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
7455                                 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys(
7456                                         payment_paths, payment_hash, expanded_key, entropy
7457                                 )?;
7458                                 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
7459                                 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
7460                                         self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
7461                                 );
7462                                 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
7463                                 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
7464                                         payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at, expanded_key, entropy
7465                                 )?;
7466                                 let invoice = builder.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)?;
7467                                 let reply_path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7468
7469                                 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
7470                                 if refund.paths().is_empty() {
7471                                         let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7472                                                 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice),
7473                                                 Destination::Node(refund.payer_id()),
7474                                                 Some(reply_path),
7475                                         );
7476                                         pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7477                                 } else {
7478                                         for path in refund.paths() {
7479                                                 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7480                                                         OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice.clone()),
7481                                                         Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
7482                                                         Some(reply_path.clone()),
7483                                                 );
7484                                                 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7485                                         }
7486                                 }
7487
7488                                 Ok(())
7489                         },
7490                         Err(()) => Err(Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount),
7491                 }
7492         }
7493
7494         /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
7495         /// to pay us.
7496         ///
7497         /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
7498         /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
7499         ///
7500         /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
7501         /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
7502         /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
7503         /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
7504         ///
7505         /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
7506         ///
7507         /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
7508         /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
7509         ///
7510         /// # Note
7511         ///
7512         /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
7513         /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
7514         ///
7515         /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
7516         ///
7517         /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
7518         /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
7519         ///
7520         /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
7521         /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
7522         /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
7523         /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
7524         /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
7525         /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
7526         pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
7527                 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
7528                 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
7529                         &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
7530                         min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
7531         }
7532
7533         /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
7534         /// stored external to LDK.
7535         ///
7536         /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
7537         /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
7538         /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
7539         ///
7540         /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
7541         /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
7542         /// payments.
7543         ///
7544         /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
7545         /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
7546         /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
7547         /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
7548         ///
7549         /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
7550         /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
7551         /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
7552         /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
7553         /// invoices when no timeout is set.
7554         ///
7555         /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
7556         /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
7557         /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
7558         /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
7559         /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
7560         ///
7561         /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
7562         /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
7563         ///
7564         /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
7565         /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
7566         ///
7567         /// # Note
7568         ///
7569         /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
7570         /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
7571         ///
7572         /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
7573         ///
7574         /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
7575         /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
7576         ///
7577         /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
7578         /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
7579         pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
7580                 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
7581                 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
7582                         invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
7583                         min_final_cltv_expiry)
7584         }
7585
7586         /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
7587         /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
7588         ///
7589         /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
7590         pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
7591                 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
7592         }
7593
7594         /// Creates a one-hop blinded path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction
7595         /// node.
7596         fn create_one_hop_blinded_path(&self) -> BlindedPath {
7597                 let entropy_source = self.entropy_source.deref();
7598                 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7599                 BlindedPath::one_hop_for_message(self.get_our_node_id(), entropy_source, secp_ctx).unwrap()
7600         }
7601
7602         /// Creates a one-hop blinded path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction
7603         /// node.
7604         fn create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(
7605                 &self, payment_secret: PaymentSecret
7606         ) -> (BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath) {
7607                 let entropy_source = self.entropy_source.deref();
7608                 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7609
7610                 let payee_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7611                 let max_cltv_expiry = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
7612                 let payee_tlvs = ReceiveTlvs {
7613                         payment_secret,
7614                         payment_constraints: PaymentConstraints {
7615                                 max_cltv_expiry,
7616                                 htlc_minimum_msat: 1,
7617                         },
7618                 };
7619                 // TODO: Err for overflow?
7620                 BlindedPath::one_hop_for_payment(
7621                         payee_node_id, payee_tlvs, entropy_source, secp_ctx
7622                 ).unwrap()
7623         }
7624
7625         /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
7626         /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
7627         ///
7628         /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
7629         pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
7630                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7631                 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
7632                 loop {
7633                         let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
7634                         // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
7635                         match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
7636                                 Some(_) => continue,
7637                                 None => return scid_candidate
7638                         }
7639                 }
7640         }
7641
7642         /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
7643         ///
7644         /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
7645         pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
7646                 PhantomRouteHints {
7647                         channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
7648                         phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
7649                         real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
7650                 }
7651         }
7652
7653         /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
7654         /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
7655         /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
7656         ///
7657         /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
7658         /// times to get a unique scid.
7659         pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
7660                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7661                 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
7662                 loop {
7663                         let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
7664                         // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
7665                         if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
7666                         return scid_candidate
7667                 }
7668         }
7669
7670         /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
7671         /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
7672         pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
7673                 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
7674
7675                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7676                 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7677                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7678                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7679                         for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(
7680                                 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
7681                         ) {
7682                                 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7683                                         if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
7684                                                 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
7685                                         }
7686                                 }
7687                         }
7688                 }
7689
7690                 inflight_htlcs
7691         }
7692
7693         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7694         pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
7695                 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
7696                 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
7697                 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
7698                 events.into_inner()
7699         }
7700
7701         #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
7702         pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
7703                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7704                 events.push_back((event, None));
7705         }
7706
7707         #[cfg(test)]
7708         pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
7709                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7710                 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
7711         }
7712
7713         #[cfg(test)]
7714         pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
7715                 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
7716         }
7717
7718         #[cfg(test)]
7719         pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
7720                 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
7721         }
7722
7723         /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
7724         /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
7725         /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
7726         /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
7727         fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
7728                 loop {
7729                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7730                         if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7731                                 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
7732                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
7733
7734                                 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
7735                                         // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
7736                                         if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
7737                                                 .get_mut(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
7738                                         {
7739                                                 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
7740                                         }
7741                                 }
7742
7743                                 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
7744                                         channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id) {
7745                                         // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
7746                                         // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
7747                                         // update(s) when those blockers complete.
7748                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
7749                                                 &channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7750                                         break;
7751                                 }
7752
7753                                 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
7754                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7755                                                 debug_assert_eq!(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
7756                                                 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
7757                                                         log_debug!(self.logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
7758                                                                 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7759                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
7760                                                                 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7761                                                         if further_update_exists {
7762                                                                 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
7763                                                                 // top of the loop.
7764                                                                 continue;
7765                                                         }
7766                                                 } else {
7767                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
7768                                                                 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7769                                                 }
7770                                         }
7771                                 }
7772                         } else {
7773                                 log_debug!(self.logger,
7774                                         "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
7775                                         log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7776                         }
7777                         break;
7778                 }
7779         }
7780
7781         fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
7782                 for action in actions {
7783                         match action {
7784                                 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
7785                                         channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
7786                                 } => {
7787                                         self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, None);
7788                                 }
7789                         }
7790                 }
7791         }
7792
7793         /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
7794         /// using the given event handler.
7795         ///
7796         /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
7797         pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
7798                 &self, handler: H
7799         ) {
7800                 let mut ev;
7801                 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
7802         }
7803 }
7804
7805 fn create_fwd_pending_htlc_info(
7806         msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, hop_hmac: [u8; 32],
7807         new_packet_bytes: [u8; onion_utils::ONION_DATA_LEN], shared_secret: [u8; 32],
7808         next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
7809 ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
7810         debug_assert!(next_packet_pubkey_opt.is_some());
7811         let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
7812                 version: 0,
7813                 public_key: next_packet_pubkey_opt.unwrap_or(Err(secp256k1::Error::InvalidPublicKey)),
7814                 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
7815                 hmac: hop_hmac,
7816         };
7817
7818         let (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value) = match hop_data {
7819                 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value } =>
7820                         (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value),
7821                 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. } | msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive { .. } =>
7822                         return Err(InboundOnionErr {
7823                                 msg: "Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node",
7824                                 err_code: 0x4000 | 22,
7825                                 err_data: Vec::new(),
7826                         }),
7827         };
7828
7829         Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
7830                 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
7831                         onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
7832                         short_channel_id,
7833                 },
7834                 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
7835                 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
7836                 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
7837                 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward,
7838                 outgoing_cltv_value,
7839                 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7840         })
7841 }
7842
7843 fn create_recv_pending_htlc_info(
7844         hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, shared_secret: [u8; 32], payment_hash: PaymentHash,
7845         amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>, allow_underpay: bool,
7846         counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, current_height: u32, accept_mpp_keysend: bool,
7847 ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
7848         let (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, onion_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata) = match hop_data {
7849                 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
7850                         payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata, ..
7851                 } =>
7852                         (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata),
7853                 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive {
7854                         amt_msat, total_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_secret, ..
7855                 } => {
7856                         let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData { payment_secret, total_msat };
7857                         (Some(payment_data), None, Vec::new(), amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, None)
7858                 }
7859                 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { .. } => {
7860                         return Err(InboundOnionErr {
7861                                 err_code: 0x4000|22,
7862                                 err_data: Vec::new(),
7863                                 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
7864                         })
7865                 },
7866         };
7867         // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
7868         if outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry {
7869                 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
7870                         msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender",
7871                         err_code: 18,
7872                         err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
7873                 })
7874         }
7875         // final_expiry_too_soon
7876         // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
7877         // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
7878         //
7879         // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
7880         // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
7881         // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
7882         if cltv_expiry <= current_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 {
7883                 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
7884                 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
7885                 err_data.extend_from_slice(&current_height.to_be_bytes());
7886                 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
7887                         err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
7888                         msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
7889                 });
7890         }
7891         if (!allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat > amt_msat) ||
7892                 (allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat >
7893                  amt_msat.saturating_add(counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)))
7894         {
7895                 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
7896                         err_code: 19,
7897                         err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
7898                         msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
7899                 });
7900         }
7901
7902         let routing = if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
7903                 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
7904                 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
7905                 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
7906                 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
7907                 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
7908                 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
7909                 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
7910                         return Err(InboundOnionErr {
7911                                 err_code: 0x4000|22,
7912                                 err_data: Vec::new(),
7913                                 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
7914                         });
7915                 }
7916                 if !accept_mpp_keysend && payment_data.is_some() {
7917                         return Err(InboundOnionErr {
7918                                 err_code: 0x4000|22,
7919                                 err_data: Vec::new(),
7920                                 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
7921                         });
7922                 }
7923                 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
7924                         payment_data,
7925                         payment_preimage,
7926                         payment_metadata,
7927                         incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
7928                         custom_tlvs,
7929                 }
7930         } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
7931                 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
7932                         payment_data: data,
7933                         payment_metadata,
7934                         incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
7935                         phantom_shared_secret,
7936                         custom_tlvs,
7937                 }
7938         } else {
7939                 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
7940                         err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
7941                         err_data: Vec::new(),
7942                         msg: "We require payment_secrets",
7943                 });
7944         };
7945         Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
7946                 routing,
7947                 payment_hash,
7948                 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
7949                 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
7950                 outgoing_amt_msat: onion_amt_msat,
7951                 outgoing_cltv_value,
7952                 skimmed_fee_msat: counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
7953         })
7954 }
7955
7956 /// Peel one layer off an incoming onion, returning [`PendingHTLCInfo`] (either Forward or Receive).
7957 /// This does all the relevant context-free checks that LDK requires for payment relay or
7958 /// acceptance. If the payment is to be received, and the amount matches the expected amount for
7959 /// a given invoice, this indicates the [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC`], once fully committed in the
7960 /// channel, will generate an [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
7961 pub fn peel_payment_onion<NS: Deref, L: Deref, T: secp256k1::Verification>(
7962         msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, node_signer: &NS, logger: &L, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>,
7963         cur_height: u32, accept_mpp_keysend: bool,
7964 ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr>
7965 where
7966         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7967         L::Target: Logger,
7968 {
7969         let (hop, shared_secret, next_packet_details_opt) =
7970                 decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion(msg, node_signer, logger, secp_ctx
7971         ).map_err(|e| {
7972                 let (err_code, err_data) = match e {
7973                         HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(m) => (m.failure_code, Vec::new()),
7974                         HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(r) => (0x4000 | 22, r.reason.data),
7975                 };
7976                 let msg = "Failed to decode update add htlc onion";
7977                 InboundOnionErr { msg, err_code, err_data }
7978         })?;
7979         Ok(match hop {
7980                 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
7981                         let NextPacketDetails {
7982                                 next_packet_pubkey, outgoing_amt_msat: _, outgoing_scid: _, outgoing_cltv_value
7983                         } = match next_packet_details_opt {
7984                                 Some(next_packet_details) => next_packet_details,
7985                                 // Forward should always include the next hop details
7986                                 None => return Err(InboundOnionErr {
7987                                         msg: "Failed to decode update add htlc onion",
7988                                         err_code: 0x4000 | 22,
7989                                         err_data: Vec::new(),
7990                                 }),
7991                         };
7992
7993                         if let Err((err_msg, code)) = check_incoming_htlc_cltv(
7994                                 cur_height, outgoing_cltv_value, msg.cltv_expiry
7995                         ) {
7996                                 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
7997                                         msg: err_msg,
7998                                         err_code: code,
7999                                         err_data: Vec::new(),
8000                                 });
8001                         }
8002                         create_fwd_pending_htlc_info(
8003                                 msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes, shared_secret,
8004                                 Some(next_packet_pubkey)
8005                         )?
8006                 },
8007                 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(received_data) => {
8008                         create_recv_pending_htlc_info(
8009                                 received_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry,
8010                                 None, false, msg.skimmed_fee_msat, cur_height, accept_mpp_keysend,
8011                         )?
8012                 }
8013         })
8014 }
8015
8016 struct NextPacketDetails {
8017         next_packet_pubkey: Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>,
8018         outgoing_scid: u64,
8019         outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
8020         outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
8021 }
8022
8023 fn decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion<NS: Deref, L: Deref, T: secp256k1::Verification>(
8024         msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, node_signer: &NS, logger: &L, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>,
8025 ) -> Result<(onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<NextPacketDetails>), HTLCFailureMsg>
8026 where
8027         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8028         L::Target: Logger,
8029 {
8030         macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
8031                 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
8032                         {
8033                                 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
8034                                 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
8035                                         channel_id: msg.channel_id,
8036                                         htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
8037                                         sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).to_byte_array(),
8038                                         failure_code: $err_code,
8039                                 }));
8040                         }
8041                 }
8042         }
8043
8044         if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
8045                 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
8046         }
8047
8048         let shared_secret = node_signer.ecdh(
8049                 Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
8050         ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
8051
8052         if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
8053                 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
8054                 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
8055                 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
8056                 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
8057                 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
8058                 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
8059                 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
8060         }
8061         macro_rules! return_err {
8062                 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
8063                         {
8064                                 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
8065                                 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
8066                                         channel_id: msg.channel_id,
8067                                         htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
8068                                         reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
8069                                                 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
8070                                 }));
8071                         }
8072                 }
8073         }
8074
8075         let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
8076                 shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac,
8077                 msg.payment_hash, node_signer
8078         ) {
8079                 Ok(res) => res,
8080                 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
8081                         return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
8082                 },
8083                 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
8084                         return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
8085                 },
8086         };
8087
8088         let next_packet_details = match next_hop {
8089                 onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
8090                         next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward {
8091                                 short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value
8092                         }, ..
8093                 } => {
8094                         let next_packet_pubkey = onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(secp_ctx,
8095                                 msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &shared_secret);
8096                         NextPacketDetails {
8097                                 next_packet_pubkey, outgoing_scid: short_channel_id,
8098                                 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value
8099                         }
8100                 },
8101                 onion_utils::Hop::Receive { .. } => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
8102                 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. }, .. } |
8103                         onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive { .. }, .. } =>
8104                 {
8105                         return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0; 0]);
8106                 }
8107         };
8108
8109         Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, Some(next_packet_details)))
8110 }
8111
8112 fn check_incoming_htlc_cltv(
8113         cur_height: u32, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, cltv_expiry: u32
8114 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
8115         if (cltv_expiry as u64) < (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
8116                 return Err((
8117                         "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
8118                         0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
8119                 ));
8120         }
8121         // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
8122         // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
8123         // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
8124         if cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
8125                 return Err(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14));
8126         }
8127         if cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
8128                 return Err(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21));
8129         }
8130         // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
8131         // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
8132         // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
8133         // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
8134         // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
8135         // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
8136         // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
8137         // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
8138         if (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
8139                 return Err(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14));
8140         }
8141
8142         Ok(())
8143 }
8144
8145 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8146 where
8147         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8148         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8149         ES::Target: EntropySource,
8150         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8151         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8152         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8153         R::Target: Router,
8154         L::Target: Logger,
8155 {
8156         /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
8157         /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
8158         /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
8159         /// is always placed next to each other.
8160         ///
8161         /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
8162         /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
8163         /// `MessageSendEvent`s  for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
8164         /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
8165         ///
8166         /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
8167         /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
8168         /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
8169         fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
8170                 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
8171                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8172                         let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8173
8174                         // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
8175                         // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
8176                         if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
8177                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8178                         }
8179
8180                         if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
8181                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8182                         }
8183                         if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
8184                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8185                         }
8186
8187                         let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
8188                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8189                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8190                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8191                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8192                                 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
8193                                         pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
8194                                 }
8195                         }
8196
8197                         if !pending_events.is_empty() {
8198                                 events.replace(pending_events);
8199                         }
8200
8201                         result
8202                 });
8203                 events.into_inner()
8204         }
8205 }
8206
8207 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8208 where
8209         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8210         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8211         ES::Target: EntropySource,
8212         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8213         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8214         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8215         R::Target: Router,
8216         L::Target: Logger,
8217 {
8218         /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
8219         ///
8220         /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
8221         /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
8222         fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
8223                 let mut ev;
8224                 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
8225         }
8226 }
8227
8228 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8229 where
8230         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8231         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8232         ES::Target: EntropySource,
8233         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8234         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8235         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8236         R::Target: Router,
8237         L::Target: Logger,
8238 {
8239         fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
8240                 {
8241                         let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
8242                         assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
8243                                 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
8244                         assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
8245                                 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
8246                 }
8247
8248                 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
8249                 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
8250         }
8251
8252         fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
8253                 let _persistence_guard =
8254                         PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8255                                 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8256                 let new_height = height - 1;
8257                 {
8258                         let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
8259                         assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
8260                                 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
8261                         assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
8262                                 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
8263                         *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
8264                 }
8265
8266                 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
8267         }
8268 }
8269
8270 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8271 where
8272         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8273         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8274         ES::Target: EntropySource,
8275         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8276         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8277         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8278         R::Target: Router,
8279         L::Target: Logger,
8280 {
8281         fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
8282                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8283                 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8284                 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8285
8286                 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
8287                 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
8288
8289                 let _persistence_guard =
8290                         PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8291                                 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8292                 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
8293                         .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
8294
8295                 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
8296                 if height < last_best_block_height {
8297                         let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
8298                         self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
8299                 }
8300         }
8301
8302         fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
8303                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8304                 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8305                 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8306
8307                 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
8308                 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
8309
8310                 let _persistence_guard =
8311                         PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8312                                 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8313                 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
8314
8315                 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
8316
8317                 macro_rules! max_time {
8318                         ($timestamp: expr) => {
8319                                 loop {
8320                                         // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
8321                                         // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
8322                                         // having an explicit local time source.
8323                                         // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
8324                                         // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
8325                                         let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
8326                                         if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
8327                                         if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
8328                                                 break;
8329                                         }
8330                                 }
8331                         }
8332                 }
8333                 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
8334                 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8335                 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
8336                         inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
8337                 });
8338         }
8339
8340         fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, u32, Option<BlockHash>)> {
8341                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
8342                 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
8343                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8344                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8345                         for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(|phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }) {
8346                                 let txid_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
8347                                 let height_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmation_height();
8348                                 let hash_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in();
8349                                 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(conf_height), Some(block_hash)) = (txid_opt, height_opt, hash_opt) {
8350                                         res.push((funding_txo.txid, conf_height, Some(block_hash)));
8351                                 }
8352                         }
8353                 }
8354                 res
8355         }
8356
8357         fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
8358                 let _persistence_guard =
8359                         PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8360                                 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8361                 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
8362                         if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
8363                                 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
8364                                         channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
8365                                 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8366                         } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8367                 });
8368         }
8369 }
8370
8371 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8372 where
8373         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8374         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8375         ES::Target: EntropySource,
8376         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8377         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8378         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8379         R::Target: Router,
8380         L::Target: Logger,
8381 {
8382         /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
8383         /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
8384         /// the function.
8385         fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
8386                         (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
8387                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8388                 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8389                 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8390
8391                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8392                 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
8393                 {
8394                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8395                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8396                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8397                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8398                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8399                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
8400                                         match phase {
8401                                                 // Retain unfunded channels.
8402                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => true,
8403                                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
8404                                                         let res = f(channel);
8405                                                         if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
8406                                                                 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
8407                                                                         let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
8408                                                                         timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
8409                                                                                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
8410                                                                 }
8411                                                                 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
8412                                                                         send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
8413                                                                         if channel.context.is_usable() {
8414                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8415                                                                                 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
8416                                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
8417                                                                                                 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8418                                                                                                 msg,
8419                                                                                         });
8420                                                                                 }
8421                                                                         } else {
8422                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8423                                                                         }
8424                                                                 }
8425
8426                                                                 {
8427                                                                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8428                                                                         emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
8429                                                                 }
8430
8431                                                                 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
8432                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8433                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
8434                                                                                 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8435                                                                                 msg: announcement_sigs,
8436                                                                         });
8437                                                                         if let Some(height) = height_opt {
8438                                                                                 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
8439                                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
8440                                                                                                 msg: announcement,
8441                                                                                                 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
8442                                                                                                 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
8443                                                                                                 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
8444                                                                                         });
8445                                                                                 }
8446                                                                         }
8447                                                                 }
8448                                                                 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
8449                                                                         if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
8450                                                                                 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
8451                                                                                 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
8452                                                                                 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
8453                                                                                 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
8454                                                                                 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
8455                                                                                 // is always consistent.
8456                                                                                 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
8457                                                                                 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8458                                                                                 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
8459                                                                                         "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
8460                                                                                         fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
8461                                                                         }
8462                                                                 }
8463                                                         } else if let Err(reason) = res {
8464                                                                 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
8465                                                                 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
8466                                                                 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
8467                                                                 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true));
8468                                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
8469                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
8470                                                                                 msg: update
8471                                                                         });
8472                                                                 }
8473                                                                 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
8474                                                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, reason);
8475                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
8476                                                                         node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8477                                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
8478                                                                                 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage {
8479                                                                                         channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8480                                                                                         data: reason_message,
8481                                                                                 })
8482                                                                         },
8483                                                                 });
8484                                                                 return false;
8485                                                         }
8486                                                         true
8487                                                 }
8488                                         }
8489                                 });
8490                         }
8491                 }
8492
8493                 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
8494                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
8495                                 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
8496                                         // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
8497                                         // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
8498                                         // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
8499                                         // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
8500                                         if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8501                                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
8502                                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
8503
8504                                                 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
8505                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
8506                                                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
8507                                                 false
8508                                         } else { true }
8509                                 });
8510                                 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
8511                         });
8512
8513                         let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8514                         intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
8515                                 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8516                                         let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
8517                                                 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
8518                                                 user_channel_id: Some(htlc.prev_user_channel_id),
8519                                                 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
8520                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
8521                                                 phantom_shared_secret: None,
8522                                                 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
8523                                         });
8524
8525                                         let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
8526                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
8527                                                 _ => unreachable!(),
8528                                         };
8529                                         timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
8530                                                         HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
8531                                                         HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
8532                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
8533                                         false
8534                                 } else { true }
8535                         });
8536                 }
8537
8538                 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
8539
8540                 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
8541                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
8542                 }
8543         }
8544
8545         /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] may need to be persisted or
8546         /// may have events that need processing.
8547         ///
8548         /// In order to check if this [`ChannelManager`] needs persisting, call
8549         /// [`Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence`].
8550         ///
8551         /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
8552         /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
8553         pub fn get_event_or_persistence_needed_future(&self) -> Future {
8554                 self.event_persist_notifier.get_future()
8555         }
8556
8557         /// Returns true if this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
8558         pub fn get_and_clear_needs_persistence(&self) -> bool {
8559                 self.needs_persist_flag.swap(false, Ordering::AcqRel)
8560         }
8561
8562         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
8563         pub fn get_event_or_persist_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
8564                 self.event_persist_notifier.notify_pending()
8565         }
8566
8567         /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
8568         /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
8569         pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
8570                 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
8571         }
8572
8573         /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8574         /// [`ChannelManager`].
8575         pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
8576                 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
8577         }
8578
8579         /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8580         /// [`ChannelManager`].
8581         ///
8582         /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
8583         /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
8584         #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
8585         pub fn bolt11_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
8586                 provided_bolt11_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
8587         }
8588
8589         /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8590         /// [`ChannelManager`].
8591         fn bolt12_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
8592                 provided_bolt12_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
8593         }
8594
8595         /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8596         /// [`ChannelManager`].
8597         pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
8598                 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
8599         }
8600
8601         /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8602         /// [`ChannelManager`].
8603         pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
8604                 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
8605         }
8606
8607         /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8608         /// [`ChannelManager`].
8609         pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
8610                 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
8611         }
8612 }
8613
8614 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8615         ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8616 where
8617         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8618         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8619         ES::Target: EntropySource,
8620         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8621         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8622         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8623         R::Target: Router,
8624         L::Target: Logger,
8625 {
8626         fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
8627                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8628                 // open_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
8629                 // change to the contents.
8630                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8631                         let res = self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8632                         let persist = match &res {
8633                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => {
8634                                         debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't close a new channel");
8635                                         NotifyOption::DoPersist
8636                                 },
8637                                 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8638                         };
8639                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8640                         persist
8641                 });
8642         }
8643
8644         fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
8645                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8646                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8647                          msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8648         }
8649
8650         fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
8651                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8652                 // accept_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
8653                 // change to the contents.
8654                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8655                         let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8656                         NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents
8657                 });
8658         }
8659
8660         fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
8661                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8662                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8663                          msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8664         }
8665
8666         fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
8667                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8668                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8669         }
8670
8671         fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
8672                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8673                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8674         }
8675
8676         fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
8677                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8678                 // channel_ready message - while the channel's state will change, any channel_ready message
8679                 // will ultimately be re-sent on startup and the `ChannelMonitor` won't be updated so we
8680                 // will not force-close the channel on startup.
8681                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8682                         let res = self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8683                         let persist = match &res {
8684                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8685                                 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8686                         };
8687                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8688                         persist
8689                 });
8690         }
8691
8692         fn handle_stfu(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Stfu) {
8693                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8694                         "Quiescence not supported".to_owned(),
8695                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8696         }
8697
8698         fn handle_splice(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Splice) {
8699                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8700                         "Splicing not supported".to_owned(),
8701                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8702         }
8703
8704         fn handle_splice_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceAck) {
8705                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8706                         "Splicing not supported (splice_ack)".to_owned(),
8707                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8708         }
8709
8710         fn handle_splice_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceLocked) {
8711                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8712                         "Splicing not supported (splice_locked)".to_owned(),
8713                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8714         }
8715
8716         fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
8717                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8718                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8719         }
8720
8721         fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
8722                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8723                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8724         }
8725
8726         fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
8727                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8728                 // update_add_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8729                 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8730                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8731                         let res = self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8732                         let persist = match &res {
8733                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8734                                 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8735                                 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8736                         };
8737                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8738                         persist
8739                 });
8740         }
8741
8742         fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
8743                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8744                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8745         }
8746
8747         fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
8748                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8749                 // update_fail_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8750                 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8751                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8752                         let res = self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8753                         let persist = match &res {
8754                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8755                                 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8756                                 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8757                         };
8758                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8759                         persist
8760                 });
8761         }
8762
8763         fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
8764                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8765                 // update_fail_malformed_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state
8766                 // only the `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8767                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8768                         let res = self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8769                         let persist = match &res {
8770                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8771                                 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8772                                 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8773                         };
8774                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8775                         persist
8776                 });
8777         }
8778
8779         fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
8780                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8781                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8782         }
8783
8784         fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
8785                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8786                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8787         }
8788
8789         fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
8790                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8791                 // update_fee message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8792                 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8793                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8794                         let res = self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8795                         let persist = match &res {
8796                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8797                                 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8798                                 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8799                         };
8800                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8801                         persist
8802                 });
8803         }
8804
8805         fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
8806                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8807                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8808         }
8809
8810         fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
8811                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8812                         if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
8813                                 persist
8814                         } else {
8815                                 NotifyOption::DoPersist
8816                         }
8817                 });
8818         }
8819
8820         fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
8821                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8822                         let res = self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8823                         let persist = match &res {
8824                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8825                                 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8826                                 Ok(persist) => *persist,
8827                         };
8828                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8829                         persist
8830                 });
8831         }
8832
8833         fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
8834                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
8835                         self, || NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents);
8836                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8837                 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8838                 let remove_peer = {
8839                         log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
8840                                 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8841                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
8842                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8843                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8844                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8845                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
8846                                         let context = match phase {
8847                                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
8848                                                         if chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger).is_ok() {
8849                                                                 // We only retain funded channels that are not shutdown.
8850                                                                 return true;
8851                                                         }
8852                                                         &mut chan.context
8853                                                 },
8854                                                 // Unfunded channels will always be removed.
8855                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
8856                                                         &mut chan.context
8857                                                 },
8858                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
8859                                                         &mut chan.context
8860                                                 },
8861                                         };
8862                                         // Clean up for removal.
8863                                         update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
8864                                         self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
8865                                         failed_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false));
8866                                         false
8867                                 });
8868                                 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
8869                                 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
8870                                 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
8871                                 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
8872                                         match msg {
8873                                                 // V1 Channel Establishment
8874                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
8875                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
8876                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
8877                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
8878                                                 // V2 Channel Establishment
8879                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
8880                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
8881                                                 // Common Channel Establishment
8882                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
8883                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
8884                                                 // Quiescence
8885                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendStfu { .. } => false,
8886                                                 // Splicing
8887                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSplice { .. } => false,
8888                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceAck { .. } => false,
8889                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceLocked { .. } => false,
8890                                                 // Interactive Transaction Construction
8891                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
8892                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
8893                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
8894                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
8895                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
8896                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
8897                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
8898                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
8899                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
8900                                                 // Channel Operations
8901                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
8902                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
8903                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
8904                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
8905                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
8906                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
8907                                                 // Gossip
8908                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
8909                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
8910                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
8911                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
8912                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
8913                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
8914                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
8915                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
8916                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
8917                                         }
8918                                 });
8919                                 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
8920                                 peer_state.is_connected = false;
8921                                 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
8922                         } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
8923                 };
8924                 if remove_peer {
8925                         per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
8926                 }
8927                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
8928
8929                 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
8930                         self.finish_close_channel(failure);
8931                 }
8932         }
8933
8934         fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
8935                 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
8936                         log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8937                         return Err(());
8938                 }
8939
8940                 let mut res = Ok(());
8941
8942                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8943                         // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
8944                         // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
8945                         // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
8946                         // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
8947                         let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
8948                         let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
8949
8950                         {
8951                                 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8952                                 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
8953                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
8954                                                 if inbound_peer_limited {
8955                                                         res = Err(());
8956                                                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8957                                                 }
8958                                                 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
8959                                                         channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8960                                                         inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8961                                                         latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
8962                                                         pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
8963                                                         in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8964                                                         monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
8965                                                         actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8966                                                         is_connected: true,
8967                                                 }));
8968                                         },
8969                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
8970                                                 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
8971                                                 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
8972
8973                                                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
8974                                                 if inbound_peer_limited &&
8975                                                         Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
8976                                                         peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
8977                                                 {
8978                                                         res = Err(());
8979                                                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8980                                                 }
8981
8982                                                 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
8983                                                 peer_state.is_connected = true;
8984                                         },
8985                                 }
8986                         }
8987
8988                         log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8989
8990                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8991                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
8992                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8993                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8994                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8995
8996                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(|(_, phase)|
8997                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else {
8998                                                 // Since unfunded channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer, and they're not persisted
8999                                                 // (so won't be recovered after a crash), they shouldn't exist here and we would never need to
9000                                                 // worry about closing and removing them.
9001                                                 debug_assert!(false);
9002                                                 None
9003                                         }
9004                                 ).for_each(|chan| {
9005                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
9006                                                 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9007                                                 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
9008                                         });
9009                                 });
9010                         }
9011
9012                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
9013                         //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
9014                 });
9015                 res
9016         }
9017
9018         fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
9019                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9020
9021                 match &msg.data as &str {
9022                         "cannot co-op close channel w/ active htlcs"|
9023                         "link failed to shutdown" =>
9024                         {
9025                                 // LND hasn't properly handled shutdown messages ever, and force-closes any time we
9026                                 // send one while HTLCs are still present. The issue is tracked at
9027                                 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/6039 and has had multiple patches
9028                                 // to fix it but none so far have managed to land upstream. The issue appears to be
9029                                 // very low priority for the LND team despite being marked "P1".
9030                                 // We're not going to bother handling this in a sensible way, instead simply
9031                                 // repeating the Shutdown message on repeat until morale improves.
9032                                 if !msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
9033                                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9034                                         let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9035                                         if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
9036                                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9037                                         if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&msg.channel_id) {
9038                                                 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_outbound_shutdown() {
9039                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
9040                                                                 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9041                                                                 msg,
9042                                                         });
9043                                                 }
9044                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
9045                                                         node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9046                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
9047                                                                 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
9048                                                                         channel_id: msg.channel_id,
9049                                                                         data: "You appear to be exhibiting LND bug 6039, we'll keep sending you shutdown messages until you handle them correctly".to_owned()
9050                                                                 },
9051                                                                 log_level: Level::Trace,
9052                                                         }
9053                                                 });
9054                                         }
9055                                 }
9056                                 return;
9057                         }
9058                         _ => {}
9059                 }
9060
9061                 if msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
9062                         let channel_ids: Vec<ChannelId> = {
9063                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9064                                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9065                                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
9066                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9067                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9068                                 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
9069                                 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
9070                                 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
9071                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
9072                         };
9073                         for channel_id in channel_ids {
9074                                 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
9075                                 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
9076                         }
9077                 } else {
9078                         {
9079                                 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
9080                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9081                                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9082                                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
9083                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9084                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9085                                 if let Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
9086                                         if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
9087                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
9088                                                         node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9089                                                         msg,
9090                                                 });
9091                                                 return;
9092                                         }
9093                                 }
9094                         }
9095
9096                         // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
9097                         let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
9098                 }
9099         }
9100
9101         fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
9102                 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
9103         }
9104
9105         fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
9106                 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
9107         }
9108
9109         fn get_chain_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
9110                 Some(vec![self.chain_hash])
9111         }
9112
9113         fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
9114                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9115                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9116                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9117         }
9118
9119         fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
9120                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9121                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9122                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9123         }
9124
9125         fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
9126                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9127                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9128                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9129         }
9130
9131         fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
9132                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9133                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9134                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9135         }
9136
9137         fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
9138                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9139                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9140                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9141         }
9142
9143         fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
9144                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9145                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9146                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9147         }
9148
9149         fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
9150                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9151                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9152                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9153         }
9154
9155         fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
9156                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9157                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9158                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9159         }
9160
9161         fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
9162                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9163                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9164                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9165         }
9166 }
9167
9168 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9169 OffersMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9170 where
9171         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9172         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9173         ES::Target: EntropySource,
9174         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9175         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9176         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9177         R::Target: Router,
9178         L::Target: Logger,
9179 {
9180         fn handle_message(&self, message: OffersMessage) -> Option<OffersMessage> {
9181                 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
9182                 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
9183
9184                 match message {
9185                         OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request) => {
9186                                 let amount_msats = match InvoiceBuilder::<DerivedSigningPubkey>::amount_msats(
9187                                         &invoice_request
9188                                 ) {
9189                                         Ok(amount_msats) => Some(amount_msats),
9190                                         Err(error) => return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
9191                                 };
9192                                 let invoice_request = match invoice_request.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
9193                                         Ok(invoice_request) => invoice_request,
9194                                         Err(()) => {
9195                                                 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidMetadata;
9196                                                 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
9197                                         },
9198                                 };
9199                                 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
9200
9201                                 match self.create_inbound_payment(amount_msats, relative_expiry, None) {
9202                                         Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) if invoice_request.keys.is_some() => {
9203                                                 let payment_paths = vec![
9204                                                         self.create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(payment_secret),
9205                                                 ];
9206                                                 #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
9207                                                 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys(
9208                                                         payment_paths, payment_hash
9209                                                 );
9210                                                 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
9211                                                 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
9212                                                         self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
9213                                                 );
9214                                                 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
9215                                                 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
9216                                                         payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
9217                                                 );
9218                                                 match builder.and_then(|b| b.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)) {
9219                                                         Ok(invoice) => Some(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
9220                                                         Err(error) => Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
9221                                                 }
9222                                         },
9223                                         Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => {
9224                                                 let payment_paths = vec![
9225                                                         self.create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(payment_secret),
9226                                                 ];
9227                                                 #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
9228                                                 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with(payment_paths, payment_hash);
9229                                                 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
9230                                                 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
9231                                                         self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
9232                                                 );
9233                                                 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
9234                                                 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with_no_std(
9235                                                         payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
9236                                                 );
9237                                                 let response = builder.and_then(|builder| builder.allow_mpp().build())
9238                                                         .map_err(|e| OffersMessage::InvoiceError(e.into()))
9239                                                         .and_then(|invoice|
9240                                                                 match invoice.sign(|invoice| self.node_signer.sign_bolt12_invoice(invoice)) {
9241                                                                         Ok(invoice) => Ok(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
9242                                                                         Err(SignError::Signing(())) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
9243                                                                                         InvoiceError::from_string("Failed signing invoice".to_string())
9244                                                                         )),
9245                                                                         Err(SignError::Verification(_)) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
9246                                                                                         InvoiceError::from_string("Failed invoice signature verification".to_string())
9247                                                                         )),
9248                                                                 });
9249                                                 match response {
9250                                                         Ok(invoice) => Some(invoice),
9251                                                         Err(error) => Some(error),
9252                                                 }
9253                                         },
9254                                         Err(()) => {
9255                                                 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount.into()))
9256                                         },
9257                                 }
9258                         },
9259                         OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice) => {
9260                                 match invoice.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
9261                                         Err(()) => {
9262                                                 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string("Unrecognized invoice".to_owned())))
9263                                         },
9264                                         Ok(_) if invoice.invoice_features().requires_unknown_bits_from(&self.bolt12_invoice_features()) => {
9265                                                 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(Bolt12SemanticError::UnknownRequiredFeatures.into()))
9266                                         },
9267                                         Ok(payment_id) => {
9268                                                 if let Err(e) = self.send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&invoice, payment_id) {
9269                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed paying invoice: {:?}", e);
9270                                                         Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string(format!("{:?}", e))))
9271                                                 } else {
9272                                                         None
9273                                                 }
9274                                         },
9275                                 }
9276                         },
9277                         OffersMessage::InvoiceError(invoice_error) => {
9278                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received invoice_error: {}", invoice_error);
9279                                 None
9280                         },
9281                 }
9282         }
9283
9284         fn release_pending_messages(&self) -> Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>> {
9285                 core::mem::take(&mut self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap())
9286         }
9287 }
9288
9289 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9290 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9291 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
9292         let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
9293         node_features.set_keysend_optional();
9294         node_features
9295 }
9296
9297 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9298 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9299 ///
9300 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
9301 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
9302 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
9303 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt11_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
9304         provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9305 }
9306
9307 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9308 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9309 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt12_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
9310         provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9311 }
9312
9313 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9314 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9315 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
9316         provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9317 }
9318
9319 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9320 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9321 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
9322         ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
9323 }
9324
9325 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9326 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9327 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
9328         // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
9329         // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
9330         // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
9331         let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
9332         features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
9333         features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
9334         features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
9335         features.set_static_remote_key_required();
9336         features.set_payment_secret_required();
9337         features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
9338         features.set_wumbo_optional();
9339         features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
9340         features.set_channel_type_optional();
9341         features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
9342         features.set_zero_conf_optional();
9343         if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
9344                 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
9345         }
9346         features
9347 }
9348
9349 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
9350 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
9351
9352 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
9353         (2, fee_base_msat, required),
9354         (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
9355         (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
9356 });
9357
9358 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
9359         (2, node_id, required),
9360         (4, features, required),
9361         (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
9362         (8, forwarding_info, option),
9363         (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9364         (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9365 });
9366
9367 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
9368         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9369                 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
9370                 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
9371                 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
9372                 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
9373                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9374                         (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
9375                         (2, self.channel_id, required),
9376                         (3, self.channel_type, option),
9377                         (4, self.counterparty, required),
9378                         (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
9379                         (6, self.funding_txo, option),
9380                         (7, self.config, option),
9381                         (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
9382                         (9, self.confirmations, option),
9383                         (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
9384                         (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
9385                         (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
9386                         (16, self.balance_msat, required),
9387                         (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
9388                         (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
9389                         (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
9390                         (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
9391                         (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
9392                         (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
9393                         (26, self.is_outbound, required),
9394                         (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
9395                         (30, self.is_usable, required),
9396                         (32, self.is_public, required),
9397                         (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9398                         (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9399                         (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
9400                         (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
9401                         (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
9402                 });
9403                 Ok(())
9404         }
9405 }
9406
9407 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
9408         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9409                 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9410                         (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
9411                         (2, channel_id, required),
9412                         (3, channel_type, option),
9413                         (4, counterparty, required),
9414                         (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
9415                         (6, funding_txo, option),
9416                         (7, config, option),
9417                         (8, short_channel_id, option),
9418                         (9, confirmations, option),
9419                         (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
9420                         (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
9421                         (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
9422                         (16, balance_msat, required),
9423                         (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
9424                         // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
9425                         // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
9426                         (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
9427                         (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
9428                         (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
9429                         (22, confirmations_required, option),
9430                         (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
9431                         (26, is_outbound, required),
9432                         (28, is_channel_ready, required),
9433                         (30, is_usable, required),
9434                         (32, is_public, required),
9435                         (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9436                         (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9437                         (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
9438                         (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
9439                         (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
9440                 });
9441
9442                 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
9443                 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
9444                 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
9445                 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
9446                         ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
9447
9448                 Ok(Self {
9449                         inbound_scid_alias,
9450                         channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
9451                         channel_type,
9452                         counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
9453                         outbound_scid_alias,
9454                         funding_txo,
9455                         config,
9456                         short_channel_id,
9457                         channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
9458                         unspendable_punishment_reserve,
9459                         user_channel_id,
9460                         balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
9461                         outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
9462                         next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
9463                         next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
9464                         inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
9465                         confirmations_required,
9466                         confirmations,
9467                         force_close_spend_delay,
9468                         is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
9469                         is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
9470                         is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
9471                         is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
9472                         inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
9473                         inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
9474                         feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
9475                         channel_shutdown_state,
9476                 })
9477         }
9478 }
9479
9480 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
9481         (2, channels, required_vec),
9482         (4, phantom_scid, required),
9483         (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
9484 });
9485
9486 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
9487         (0, Forward) => {
9488                 (0, onion_packet, required),
9489                 (2, short_channel_id, required),
9490         },
9491         (1, Receive) => {
9492                 (0, payment_data, required),
9493                 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
9494                 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
9495                 (3, payment_metadata, option),
9496                 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
9497         },
9498         (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
9499                 (0, payment_preimage, required),
9500                 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
9501                 (3, payment_metadata, option),
9502                 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
9503                 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
9504         },
9505 ;);
9506
9507 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
9508         (0, routing, required),
9509         (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
9510         (4, payment_hash, required),
9511         (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
9512         (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
9513         (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
9514         (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9515 });
9516
9517
9518 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
9519         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9520                 match self {
9521                         HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
9522                                 0u8.write(writer)?;
9523                                 channel_id.write(writer)?;
9524                                 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
9525                                 reason.write(writer)?;
9526                         },
9527                         HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
9528                                 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
9529                         }) => {
9530                                 1u8.write(writer)?;
9531                                 channel_id.write(writer)?;
9532                                 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
9533                                 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
9534                                 failure_code.write(writer)?;
9535                         },
9536                 }
9537                 Ok(())
9538         }
9539 }
9540
9541 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
9542         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9543                 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9544                 match id {
9545                         0 => {
9546                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
9547                                         channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9548                                         htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9549                                         reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
9550                                 }))
9551                         },
9552                         1 => {
9553                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
9554                                         channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9555                                         htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9556                                         sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
9557                                         failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
9558                                 }))
9559                         },
9560                         // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
9561                         // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
9562                         // messages contained in the variants.
9563                         // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
9564                         // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
9565                         // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
9566                         2 => {
9567                                 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
9568                                 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
9569                                 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
9570                                 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
9571                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
9572                         },
9573                         3 => {
9574                                 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
9575                                 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
9576                                 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
9577                                 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
9578                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
9579                         },
9580                         _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
9581                 }
9582         }
9583 }
9584
9585 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
9586         (0, Forward),
9587         (1, Fail),
9588 );
9589
9590 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
9591         (0, short_channel_id, required),
9592         (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
9593         (2, outpoint, required),
9594         (4, htlc_id, required),
9595         (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required),
9596         (7, user_channel_id, option),
9597 });
9598
9599 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
9600         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9601                 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
9602                         OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
9603                         OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
9604                 };
9605                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9606                         (0, self.prev_hop, required),
9607                         (1, self.total_msat, required),
9608                         (2, self.value, required),
9609                         (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
9610                         (4, payment_data, option),
9611                         (5, self.total_value_received, option),
9612                         (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
9613                         (8, keysend_preimage, option),
9614                         (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9615                 });
9616                 Ok(())
9617         }
9618 }
9619
9620 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
9621         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9622                 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9623                         (0, prev_hop, required),
9624                         (1, total_msat, option),
9625                         (2, value_ser, required),
9626                         (3, sender_intended_value, option),
9627                         (4, payment_data_opt, option),
9628                         (5, total_value_received, option),
9629                         (6, cltv_expiry, required),
9630                         (8, keysend_preimage, option),
9631                         (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9632                 });
9633                 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
9634                 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
9635                 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
9636                         Some(p) => {
9637                                 if payment_data.is_some() {
9638                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9639                                 }
9640                                 if total_msat.is_none() {
9641                                         total_msat = Some(value);
9642                                 }
9643                                 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
9644                         },
9645                         None => {
9646                                 if total_msat.is_none() {
9647                                         if payment_data.is_none() {
9648                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9649                                         }
9650                                         total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
9651                                 }
9652                                 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
9653                         },
9654                 };
9655                 Ok(Self {
9656                         prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
9657                         timer_ticks: 0,
9658                         value,
9659                         sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
9660                         total_value_received,
9661                         total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
9662                         onion_payload,
9663                         cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
9664                         counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
9665                 })
9666         }
9667 }
9668
9669 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
9670         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9671                 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9672                 match id {
9673                         0 => {
9674                                 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
9675                                 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
9676                                 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
9677                                 let mut payment_id = None;
9678                                 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
9679                                 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
9680                                 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9681                                         (0, session_priv, required),
9682                                         (1, payment_id, option),
9683                                         (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
9684                                         (4, path_hops, required_vec),
9685                                         (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
9686                                         (6, blinded_tail, option),
9687                                 });
9688                                 if payment_id.is_none() {
9689                                         // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
9690                                         // instead.
9691                                         payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
9692                                 }
9693                                 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
9694                                 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
9695                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9696                                 }
9697                                 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
9698                                         if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
9699                                                 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
9700                                                         *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9701                                                 }
9702                                         }
9703                                 }
9704                                 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
9705                                         session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
9706                                         first_hop_htlc_msat,
9707                                         path,
9708                                         payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
9709                                 })
9710                         }
9711                         1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
9712                         _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
9713                 }
9714         }
9715 }
9716
9717 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
9718         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
9719                 match self {
9720                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
9721                                 0u8.write(writer)?;
9722                                 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
9723                                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9724                                         (0, session_priv, required),
9725                                         (1, payment_id_opt, option),
9726                                         (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
9727                                         // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
9728                                         (4, path.hops, required_vec),
9729                                         (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
9730                                         (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
9731                                  });
9732                         }
9733                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
9734                                 1u8.write(writer)?;
9735                                 field.write(writer)?;
9736                         }
9737                 }
9738                 Ok(())
9739         }
9740 }
9741
9742 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
9743         (0, forward_info, required),
9744         (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
9745         (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
9746         (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
9747         (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
9748 });
9749
9750 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
9751         (1, FailHTLC) => {
9752                 (0, htlc_id, required),
9753                 (2, err_packet, required),
9754         };
9755         (0, AddHTLC)
9756 );
9757
9758 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
9759         (0, payment_secret, required),
9760         (2, expiry_time, required),
9761         (4, user_payment_id, required),
9762         (6, payment_preimage, required),
9763         (8, min_value_msat, required),
9764 });
9765
9766 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9767 where
9768         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9769         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9770         ES::Target: EntropySource,
9771         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9772         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9773         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9774         R::Target: Router,
9775         L::Target: Logger,
9776 {
9777         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9778                 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
9779
9780                 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
9781
9782                 self.chain_hash.write(writer)?;
9783                 {
9784                         let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
9785                         best_block.height().write(writer)?;
9786                         best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
9787                 }
9788
9789                 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
9790                 {
9791                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9792                         let mut number_of_funded_channels = 0;
9793                         for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9794                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9795                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9796                                 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
9797                                         serializable_peer_count += 1;
9798                                 }
9799
9800                                 number_of_funded_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(
9801                                         |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { chan.context.is_funding_broadcast() } else { false }
9802                                 ).count();
9803                         }
9804
9805                         (number_of_funded_channels as u64).write(writer)?;
9806
9807                         for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9808                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9809                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9810                                 for channel in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter_map(
9811                                         |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = phase {
9812                                                 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() { Some(channel) } else { None }
9813                                         } else { None }
9814                                 ) {
9815                                         channel.write(writer)?;
9816                                 }
9817                         }
9818                 }
9819
9820                 {
9821                         let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
9822                         (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9823                         for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
9824                                 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
9825                                 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9826                                 for forward in pending_forwards {
9827                                         forward.write(writer)?;
9828                                 }
9829                         }
9830                 }
9831
9832                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
9833
9834                 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
9835                 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
9836                 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
9837
9838                 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
9839                 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
9840                 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9841                 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
9842                         payment_hash.write(writer)?;
9843                         (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9844                         for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
9845                                 htlc.write(writer)?;
9846                         }
9847                         htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
9848                         htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
9849                 }
9850
9851                 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
9852                 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
9853                 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9854                         // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
9855                         // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
9856                         // per_peer_state lock at all.
9857                         peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
9858                 }
9859
9860                 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
9861                 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
9862                         // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
9863                         // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
9864                         // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
9865                         // no channels.
9866                         if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
9867                                 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
9868                                 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
9869                                 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
9870                                         monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
9871                                                 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
9872                                                 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
9873                                 }
9874                         }
9875                 }
9876
9877                 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
9878                 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
9879                 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
9880                 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
9881                 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
9882                 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
9883                         // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
9884                         // well save the space and not write any events here.
9885                         0u64.write(writer)?;
9886                 } else {
9887                         (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9888                         for (event, _) in events.iter() {
9889                                 event.write(writer)?;
9890                         }
9891                 }
9892
9893                 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
9894                 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
9895                 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
9896                 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
9897                 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
9898                 0u64.write(writer)?;
9899
9900                 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
9901                 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
9902                 // likely to be identical.
9903                 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
9904                 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
9905
9906                 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9907                 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
9908                         hash.write(writer)?;
9909                         pending_payment.write(writer)?;
9910                 }
9911
9912                 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
9913                 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
9914                 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
9915                         if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
9916                                 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
9917                         }
9918                 }
9919                 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
9920                 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
9921                         match outbound {
9922                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
9923                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
9924                                         for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
9925                                                 session_priv.write(writer)?;
9926                                         }
9927                                 }
9928                                 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {},
9929                                 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {},
9930                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
9931                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
9932                         }
9933                 }
9934
9935                 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
9936                 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
9937                 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
9938                         match outbound {
9939                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
9940                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
9941                                         pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
9942                                 },
9943                                 _ => {},
9944                         }
9945                 }
9946
9947                 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
9948                 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
9949                 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
9950                         pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
9951                 }
9952
9953                 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
9954                 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
9955                         // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
9956                         // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
9957                         pending_claiming_payments = None;
9958                 }
9959
9960                 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
9961                 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
9962                         for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
9963                                 if !updates.is_empty() {
9964                                         if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(HashMap::new()); }
9965                                         in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
9966                                 }
9967                         }
9968                 }
9969
9970                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9971                         (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
9972                         (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
9973                         (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
9974                         (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
9975                         (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
9976                         (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
9977                         (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
9978                         (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
9979                         (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
9980                         (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
9981                         (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
9982                         (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
9983                 });
9984
9985                 Ok(())
9986         }
9987 }
9988
9989 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
9990         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9991                 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
9992                 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
9993                         event.write(w)?;
9994                         action.write(w)?;
9995                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
9996                                 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
9997                                 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
9998                                 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
9999                                 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
10000                                 // check that the event is sane here.
10001                                 let event_encoded = event.encode();
10002                                 let event_read: Option<Event> =
10003                                         MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
10004                                 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
10005                         }
10006                 }
10007                 Ok(())
10008         }
10009 }
10010 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
10011         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10012                 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10013                 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
10014                 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
10015                         MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
10016                         len) as usize);
10017                 for _ in 0..len {
10018                         let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
10019                         let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
10020                         if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
10021                                 events.push_back((ev, action));
10022                         } else if action.is_some() {
10023                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10024                         }
10025                 }
10026                 Ok(events)
10027         }
10028 }
10029
10030 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
10031         (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
10032         (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
10033         (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
10034         (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
10035         (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
10036 );
10037
10038 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
10039 ///
10040 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
10041 /// is:
10042 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
10043 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
10044 ///    `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
10045 ///    This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
10046 ///    [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
10047 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
10048 ///    same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
10049 ///    [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
10050 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
10051 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
10052 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
10053 ///    Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
10054 ///    will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
10055 ///    the next step.
10056 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
10057 ///    [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
10058 ///
10059 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
10060 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
10061 ///
10062 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
10063 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
10064 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
10065 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
10066 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
10067 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
10068 ///
10069 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
10070 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10071 where
10072         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10073         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10074         ES::Target: EntropySource,
10075         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10076         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10077         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10078         R::Target: Router,
10079         L::Target: Logger,
10080 {
10081         /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
10082         pub entropy_source: ES,
10083
10084         /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
10085         pub node_signer: NS,
10086
10087         /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
10088         /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
10089         /// signing data.
10090         pub signer_provider: SP,
10091
10092         /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
10093         ///
10094         /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
10095         pub fee_estimator: F,
10096         /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
10097         ///
10098         /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
10099         /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
10100         /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
10101         pub chain_monitor: M,
10102
10103         /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
10104         /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
10105         /// force-closed during deserialization.
10106         pub tx_broadcaster: T,
10107         /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
10108         /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
10109         ///
10110         /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
10111         pub router: R,
10112         /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
10113         /// deserialization.
10114         pub logger: L,
10115         /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
10116         /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
10117         pub default_config: UserConfig,
10118
10119         /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
10120         /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
10121         ///
10122         /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
10123         /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
10124         /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
10125         /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
10126         ///
10127         /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
10128         /// this struct.
10129         ///
10130         /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
10131         pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>,
10132 }
10133
10134 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10135                 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
10136 where
10137         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10138         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10139         ES::Target: EntropySource,
10140         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10141         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10142         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10143         R::Target: Router,
10144         L::Target: Logger,
10145 {
10146         /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
10147         /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
10148         /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
10149         pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
10150                         mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>) -> Self {
10151                 Self {
10152                         entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
10153                         channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
10154                 }
10155         }
10156 }
10157
10158 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
10159 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
10160 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10161         ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
10162 where
10163         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10164         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10165         ES::Target: EntropySource,
10166         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10167         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10168         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10169         R::Target: Router,
10170         L::Target: Logger,
10171 {
10172         fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10173                 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
10174                 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
10175         }
10176 }
10177
10178 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10179         ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
10180 where
10181         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10182         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10183         ES::Target: EntropySource,
10184         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10185         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10186         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10187         R::Target: Router,
10188         L::Target: Logger,
10189 {
10190         fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10191                 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
10192
10193                 let chain_hash: ChainHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10194                 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10195                 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10196
10197                 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
10198
10199                 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10200                 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10201                 let mut funded_peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10202                 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10203                 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10204                 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
10205                 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
10206                 for _ in 0..channel_count {
10207                         let mut channel: Channel<SP> = Channel::read(reader, (
10208                                 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
10209                         ))?;
10210                         let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10211                         funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
10212                         if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
10213                                 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
10214                                                 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
10215                                                 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
10216                                                 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
10217                                         // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
10218                                         log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
10219                                         log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
10220                                         if channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
10221                                                 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
10222                                                         &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
10223                                         }
10224                                         if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() {
10225                                                 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at holder commitment number {} but the ChannelManager is at holder commitment number {}.",
10226                                                         &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number());
10227                                         }
10228                                         if channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() {
10229                                                 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at revoked counterparty transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at revoked counterparty transaction number {}.",
10230                                                         &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
10231                                         }
10232                                         if channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() {
10233                                                 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at counterparty commitment transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at counterparty commitment transaction number {}.",
10234                                                         &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
10235                                         }
10236                                         let mut shutdown_result = channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
10237                                         if shutdown_result.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid.is_some() {
10238                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10239                                         }
10240                                         if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = shutdown_result.monitor_update {
10241                                                 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
10242                                                         counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
10243                                                 });
10244                                         }
10245                                         failed_htlcs.append(&mut shutdown_result.dropped_outbound_htlcs);
10246                                         channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
10247                                                 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
10248                                                 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
10249                                                 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
10250                                                 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10251                                                 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
10252                                         }, None));
10253                                         for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
10254                                                 let mut found_htlc = false;
10255                                                 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
10256                                                         if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
10257                                                 }
10258                                                 if !found_htlc {
10259                                                         // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
10260                                                         // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
10261                                                         // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
10262                                                         // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
10263                                                         // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
10264                                                         // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
10265                                                         // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
10266                                                         log_info!(args.logger,
10267                                                                 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
10268                                                                 &channel.context.channel_id(), &payment_hash);
10269                                                         failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
10270                                                 }
10271                                         }
10272                                 } else {
10273                                         log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
10274                                                 &channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
10275                                                 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
10276                                         if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
10277                                                 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
10278                                         }
10279                                         if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() {
10280                                                 id_to_peer.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
10281                                         }
10282                                         match funded_peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
10283                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
10284                                                         let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
10285                                                         by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
10286                                                 },
10287                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
10288                                                         let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
10289                                                         by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
10290                                                         entry.insert(by_id_map);
10291                                                 }
10292                                         }
10293                                 }
10294                         } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
10295                                 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
10296                                 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
10297                                 // safely discard the channel.
10298                                 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false);
10299                                 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
10300                                         channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
10301                                         user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
10302                                         reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
10303                                         counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10304                                         channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
10305                                 }, None));
10306                         } else {
10307                                 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", &channel.context.channel_id());
10308                                 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10309                                 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10310                                 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10311                                 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10312                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10313                         }
10314                 }
10315
10316                 for (funding_txo, _) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10317                         if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
10318                                 log_info!(args.logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
10319                                         &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10320                                 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
10321                                         update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
10322                                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
10323                                 };
10324                                 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
10325                         }
10326                 }
10327
10328                 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
10329                 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10330                 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
10331                 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
10332                         let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
10333                         let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10334                         let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
10335                         for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
10336                                 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
10337                         }
10338                         forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
10339                 }
10340
10341                 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10342                 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
10343                 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
10344                         let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10345                         let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10346                         let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
10347                         for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
10348                                 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
10349                         }
10350                         claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
10351                 }
10352
10353                 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
10354                         PeerState {
10355                                 channel_by_id,
10356                                 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
10357                                 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
10358                                 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
10359                                 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10360                                 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
10361                                 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10362                                 is_connected: false,
10363                         }
10364                 };
10365
10366                 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10367                 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>)>()));
10368                 for _ in 0..peer_count {
10369                         let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
10370                         let peer_chans = funded_peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new());
10371                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
10372                         peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
10373                         per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
10374                 }
10375
10376                 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10377                 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
10378                         VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
10379                 for _ in 0..event_count {
10380                         match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
10381                                 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
10382                                 None => continue,
10383                         }
10384                 }
10385
10386                 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10387                 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
10388                         match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
10389                                 0 => {
10390                                         // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
10391                                         // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
10392                                         // on-startup monitor updates.
10393                                         let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
10394                                         let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
10395                                 }
10396                                 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
10397                         }
10398                 }
10399
10400                 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
10401                 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10402
10403                 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10404                 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
10405                 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
10406                         if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
10407                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10408                         }
10409                 }
10410
10411                 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10412                 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
10413                         HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
10414                 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
10415                         let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
10416                         let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
10417                                 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
10418                         };
10419                         if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
10420                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10421                         };
10422                 }
10423
10424                 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
10425                 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
10426                 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
10427                 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
10428                 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
10429                 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
10430                 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
10431                 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
10432                 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
10433                 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
10434                 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
10435                 let mut events_override = None;
10436                 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
10437                 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10438                         (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
10439                         (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
10440                         (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
10441                         (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
10442                         (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
10443                         (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
10444                         (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
10445                         (8, events_override, option),
10446                         (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
10447                         (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
10448                         (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
10449                         (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
10450                 });
10451                 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
10452                         fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10453                 }
10454
10455                 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
10456                         probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10457                 }
10458
10459                 if let Some(events) = events_override {
10460                         pending_events_read = events;
10461                 }
10462
10463                 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
10464                         pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
10465                 }
10466
10467                 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
10468                         pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
10469                 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
10470                         let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
10471                         for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
10472                                 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
10473                         }
10474                         pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
10475                 }
10476                 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
10477                         pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
10478                         retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
10479                 };
10480
10481                 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
10482                 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
10483                 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
10484                 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
10485                 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
10486                 //
10487                 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
10488                 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
10489                 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
10490                 //
10491                 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
10492                 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
10493                 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
10494                         ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
10495                          $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
10496                         ) => { {
10497                                 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
10498                                 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
10499                                 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
10500                                         log_trace!(args.logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
10501                                                 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, &$funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10502                                         max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
10503                                         pending_background_events.push(
10504                                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
10505                                                         counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
10506                                                         funding_txo: $funding_txo,
10507                                                         update: update.clone(),
10508                                                 });
10509                                 }
10510                                 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
10511                                         // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
10512                                         // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
10513                                         // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
10514                                         pending_background_events.push(
10515                                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
10516                                                         counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
10517                                                         channel_id: $funding_txo.to_channel_id(),
10518                                                 });
10519                                 }
10520                                 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
10521                                         log_error!(args.logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
10522                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10523                                 }
10524                                 max_in_flight_update_id
10525                         } }
10526                 }
10527
10528                 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
10529                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
10530                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10531                         for phase in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
10532                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
10533                                         // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
10534                                         // discarded.
10535                                         let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10536                                         let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
10537                                                 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
10538                                         let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
10539                                         if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
10540                                                 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
10541                                                         max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
10542                                                                 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
10543                                                                         funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, ""));
10544                                                 }
10545                                         }
10546                                         if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
10547                                                 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
10548                                                 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
10549                                                 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
10550                                                         chan.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
10551                                                 log_error!(args.logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
10552                                                 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10553                                                 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10554                                                 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10555                                                 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10556                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10557                                         }
10558                                 } else {
10559                                         // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
10560                                         // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
10561                                         debug_assert!(false);
10562                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10563                                 }
10564                         }
10565                 }
10566
10567                 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
10568                         for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
10569                                 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
10570                                         // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
10571                                         // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
10572                                         // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
10573                                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
10574                                                 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(HashMap::new()))
10575                                         });
10576                                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10577                                         handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
10578                                                 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, "closed ");
10579                                 } else {
10580                                         log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
10581                                         log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.",
10582                                                 &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10583                                         log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10584                                         log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10585                                         log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10586                                         log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10587                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10588                                 }
10589                         }
10590                 }
10591
10592                 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
10593                 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
10594
10595                 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
10596                 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
10597                 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
10598                 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
10599
10600                 {
10601                         // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
10602                         // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
10603                         // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
10604                         // corresponding `Channel` at all).
10605                         // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
10606                         // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
10607                         // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
10608                         // 0.0.102+
10609                         for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10610                                 let counterparty_opt = id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
10611                                 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
10612                                         for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
10613                                                 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
10614                                                         if path.hops.is_empty() {
10615                                                                 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
10616                                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10617                                                         }
10618
10619                                                         let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
10620                                                         let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
10621                                                         session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
10622                                                         match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
10623                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
10624                                                                         let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
10625                                                                         log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
10626                                                                                 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), &htlc.payment_hash);
10627                                                                 },
10628                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
10629                                                                         let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
10630                                                                         entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
10631                                                                                 retry_strategy: None,
10632                                                                                 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
10633                                                                                 payment_params: None,
10634                                                                                 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
10635                                                                                 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
10636                                                                                 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10637                                                                                 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10638                                                                                 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10639                                                                                 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10640                                                                                 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
10641                                                                                 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
10642                                                                                 total_msat: path_amt,
10643                                                                                 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
10644                                                                                 remaining_max_total_routing_fee_msat: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10645                                                                         });
10646                                                                         log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
10647                                                                                 path_amt, &htlc.payment_hash,  log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
10648                                                                 }
10649                                                         }
10650                                                 }
10651                                         }
10652                                         for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
10653                                                 match htlc_source {
10654                                                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
10655                                                                 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
10656                                                                         info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
10657                                                                                 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
10658                                                                 };
10659                                                                 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
10660                                                                 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
10661                                                                 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
10662                                                                 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
10663                                                                 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
10664                                                                 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
10665                                                                         forwards.retain(|forward| {
10666                                                                                 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
10667                                                                                         if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
10668                                                                                                 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
10669                                                                                                         &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
10670                                                                                                 false
10671                                                                                         } else { true }
10672                                                                                 } else { true }
10673                                                                         });
10674                                                                         !forwards.is_empty()
10675                                                                 });
10676                                                                 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
10677                                                                         if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
10678                                                                                 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
10679                                                                                         &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
10680                                                                                 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
10681                                                                                         if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
10682                                                                                                 intercepted_id != ev_id
10683                                                                                         } else { true }
10684                                                                                 });
10685                                                                                 false
10686                                                                         } else { true }
10687                                                                 });
10688                                                         },
10689                                                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
10690                                                                 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
10691                                                                         let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
10692                                                                         // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
10693                                                                         // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
10694                                                                         // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
10695                                                                         // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
10696                                                                         // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
10697                                                                         // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
10698                                                                         // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
10699                                                                         // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
10700                                                                         let compl_action =
10701                                                                                 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
10702                                                                                         channel_funding_outpoint: monitor.get_funding_txo().0,
10703                                                                                         counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
10704                                                                                 };
10705                                                                         pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv,
10706                                                                                 path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &args.logger);
10707                                                                         pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
10708                                                                 }
10709                                                         },
10710                                                 }
10711                                         }
10712                                 }
10713
10714                                 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
10715                                 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
10716                                 // payments.
10717                                 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
10718                                         .into_iter()
10719                                         .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
10720                                                 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
10721                                                         if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
10722                                                                 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
10723                                                                         // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
10724                                                                         // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
10725                                                                         // channel_id -> peer map entry).
10726                                                                         counterparty_opt.is_none(),
10727                                                                         counterparty_opt.cloned().or(monitor.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10728                                                                         monitor.get_funding_txo().0))
10729                                                         } else { None }
10730                                                 } else {
10731                                                         // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
10732                                                         // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
10733                                                         // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
10734                                                         // channel still live case here.
10735                                                         None
10736                                                 }
10737                                         });
10738                                 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
10739                                         pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
10740                                 }
10741                         }
10742                 }
10743
10744                 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
10745                         // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
10746                         // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
10747                         // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
10748                         // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
10749                         // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
10750                         pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
10751                                 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
10752                         }, None));
10753                 }
10754
10755                 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
10756                 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
10757
10758                 let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
10759                 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
10760                         if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
10761                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10762                         }
10763                         if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
10764                                 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
10765                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10766                                 }
10767                                 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
10768                                         purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
10769                                 {
10770                                         let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10771                                                 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
10772                                         });
10773                                         if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10774                                 }
10775                         } else {
10776                                 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
10777                                         let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10778                                                 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
10779                                         });
10780                                         if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10781                                 }
10782                         }
10783                 } else {
10784                         // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
10785                         // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
10786                         for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
10787                                 if htlcs.is_empty() {
10788                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10789                                 }
10790                                 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
10791                                         OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
10792                                                 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
10793                                                         events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
10794                                                                 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
10795                                                                         Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
10796                                                                         None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
10797                                                                                 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
10798                                                                                 Err(()) => {
10799                                                                                         log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", &payment_hash);
10800                                                                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10801                                                                                 }
10802                                                                         }
10803                                                                 },
10804                                                                 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
10805                                                         }
10806                                                 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10807                                         },
10808                                         OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
10809                                                 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
10810                                 };
10811                                 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10812                                         purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
10813                                 });
10814                         }
10815                 }
10816
10817                 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10818                 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10819
10820                 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
10821                         Ok(key) => key,
10822                         Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10823                 };
10824                 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
10825                         if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
10826                                 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
10827                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10828                         }
10829                 }
10830
10831                 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
10832                 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
10833                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10834                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10835                         for (chan_id, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
10836                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
10837                                         if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
10838                                                 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
10839                                                 loop {
10840                                                         outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
10841                                                                 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &chain_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
10842                                                         if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
10843                                                 }
10844                                                 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
10845                                         } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
10846                                                 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
10847                                                 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
10848                                                 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
10849                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10850                                         }
10851                                         if chan.context.is_usable() {
10852                                                 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
10853                                                         // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
10854                                                         // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
10855                                                         log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
10856                                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10857                                                 }
10858                                         }
10859                                 } else {
10860                                         // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
10861                                         // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
10862                                         debug_assert!(false);
10863                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10864                                 }
10865                         }
10866                 }
10867
10868                 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
10869
10870                 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10871                         for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
10872                                 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
10873                                         log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", &payment_hash);
10874                                         let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
10875                                         let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
10876                                         let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
10877                                         if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
10878                                                 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
10879                                                         .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
10880                                                 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
10881                                         }
10882                                         for claimable_htlc in &payment.htlcs {
10883                                                 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
10884
10885                                                 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
10886                                                 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
10887                                                 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
10888                                                 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
10889                                                 //
10890                                                 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
10891                                                 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
10892                                                 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
10893                                                 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
10894                                                 // reason to.
10895                                                 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
10896                                                 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
10897                                                 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
10898                                                 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
10899                                                 // restart.
10900                                                 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
10901                                                 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
10902                                                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
10903                                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10904                                                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10905                                                         if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(channel)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
10906                                                                 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
10907                                                         }
10908                                                 }
10909                                                 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
10910                                                         previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
10911                                                 }
10912                                         }
10913                                         pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
10914                                                 receiver_node_id,
10915                                                 payment_hash,
10916                                                 purpose: payment.purpose,
10917                                                 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
10918                                                 htlcs: payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect(),
10919                                                 sender_intended_total_msat: payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat),
10920                                         }, None));
10921                                 }
10922                         }
10923                 }
10924
10925                 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
10926                         if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
10927                                 for (_, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
10928                                         for action in actions.iter() {
10929                                                 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
10930                                                         downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
10931                                                                 Some((blocked_node_id, blocked_channel_outpoint, blocking_action)), ..
10932                                                 } = action {
10933                                                         if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&blocked_node_id) {
10934                                                                 log_trace!(args.logger,
10935                                                                         "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
10936                                                                         blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id());
10937                                                                 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
10938                                                                         .entry(blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id())
10939                                                                         .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
10940                                                         } else {
10941                                                                 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
10942                                                                 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
10943                                                                 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
10944                                                                 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
10945                                                                 // anymore.
10946                                                         }
10947                                                 }
10948                                                 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately { .. } = action {
10949                                                         debug_assert!(false, "Non-event-generating channel freeing should not appear in our queue");
10950                                                 }
10951                                         }
10952                                 }
10953                                 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
10954                         } else {
10955                                 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
10956                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10957                         }
10958                 }
10959
10960                 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
10961                         chain_hash,
10962                         fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
10963                         chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
10964                         tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
10965                         router: args.router,
10966
10967                         best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
10968
10969                         inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
10970                         pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
10971                         pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
10972                         pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
10973
10974                         forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
10975                         claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
10976                         outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
10977                         id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
10978                         short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
10979                         fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
10980
10981                         probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
10982
10983                         our_network_pubkey,
10984                         secp_ctx,
10985
10986                         highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
10987
10988                         per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
10989
10990                         pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
10991                         pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
10992                         pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
10993                         total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
10994                         background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
10995
10996                         event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
10997                         needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
10998
10999                         funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
11000
11001                         pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
11002
11003                         entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
11004                         node_signer: args.node_signer,
11005                         signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
11006
11007                         logger: args.logger,
11008                         default_configuration: args.default_config,
11009                 };
11010
11011                 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
11012                         let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
11013                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
11014                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
11015                         channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
11016                 }
11017
11018                 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding) in pending_claims_to_replay {
11019                         // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
11020                         // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
11021                         // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
11022                         channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value),
11023                                 downstream_closed, true, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding);
11024                 }
11025
11026                 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
11027                 //connection or two.
11028
11029                 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
11030         }
11031 }
11032
11033 #[cfg(test)]
11034 mod tests {
11035         use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
11036         use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
11037         use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
11038         use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
11039         use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
11040         use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
11041         use crate::ln::ChannelId;
11042         use crate::ln::channelmanager::{create_recv_pending_htlc_info, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
11043         use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, NodeFeatures};
11044         use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
11045         use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
11046         use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
11047         use crate::routing::router::{Path, PaymentParameters, RouteHop, RouteParameters, find_route};
11048         use crate::util::errors::APIError;
11049         use crate::util::test_utils;
11050         use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
11051         use crate::sign::EntropySource;
11052
11053         #[test]
11054         fn test_notify_limits() {
11055                 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
11056                 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
11057                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
11058                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
11059                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
11060                 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11061
11062                 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
11063                 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
11064                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11065                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11066                 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11067
11068                 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11069
11070                 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
11071                 // to connect messages with new values
11072                 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
11073                 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
11074                 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
11075                         &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
11076                 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
11077                         &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
11078
11079                 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
11080                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11081                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11082                 // ... but the last node should not.
11083                 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11084                 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
11085                 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11086                 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11087
11088                 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
11089                 // about the channel.
11090                 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
11091                 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
11092                 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11093
11094                 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
11095                 // parties.
11096                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
11097                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
11098                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
11099                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
11100                 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11101                 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11102
11103                 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
11104                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11105                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11106
11107                 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
11108                 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
11109                 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
11110                 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
11111                 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
11112                 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
11113
11114                 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
11115                 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
11116                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
11117                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
11118                 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11119                 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11120                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11121                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11122
11123                 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
11124                 // the channel info has updated.
11125                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
11126                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
11127                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11128                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11129                 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11130                 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11131         }
11132
11133         #[test]
11134         fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
11135                 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
11136                 // expected.
11137                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11138                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11139                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11140                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11141                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11142
11143                 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
11144                 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
11145                 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
11146                 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
11147
11148                 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
11149                 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
11150                 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
11151                 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
11152                 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
11153                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
11154                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
11155                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
11156                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11157                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11158                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11159                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
11160
11161                 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
11162                 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11163                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11164                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11165                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11166                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11167                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11168                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11169                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11170                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11171                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11172                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11173                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
11174                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11175                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11176                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11177                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11178                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11179                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11180                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11181                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11182                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11183                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
11184
11185                 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
11186                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
11187                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
11188                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11189                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11190                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11191                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
11192
11193                 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
11194                 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
11195                 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
11196                 // lightning messages manually.
11197                 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
11198                 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
11199                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
11200
11201                 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11202                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
11203                 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
11204                 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
11205                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11206                 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11207                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
11208                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11209                 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11210                 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
11211                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11212                 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11213                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
11214                 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
11215                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11216                 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11217                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
11218                 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11219                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11220                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
11221                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11222                 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
11223                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11224                 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11225                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
11226                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11227
11228                 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
11229                 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
11230                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11231                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
11232                 match events[0] {
11233                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
11234                                 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
11235                                 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
11236                                 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
11237                         },
11238                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11239                 }
11240                 match events[1] {
11241                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
11242                                 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
11243                                 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
11244                                 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
11245                         },
11246                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11247                 }
11248         }
11249
11250         #[test]
11251         fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
11252                 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
11253                 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
11254         }
11255
11256         fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
11257                 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
11258                 //      outbound regular payment fails as expected.
11259                 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
11260                 //      fails as expected.
11261                 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
11262                 //      payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
11263                 //      reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
11264                 //      secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
11265                 //      `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
11266                 //      payment secrets and reject otherwise.
11267                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11268                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11269                 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11270                 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
11271                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
11272                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11273                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11274                 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11275                 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11276
11277                 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
11278                 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
11279                 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
11280
11281                 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
11282                 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11283                         PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(),
11284                         TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false), 100_000);
11285                 let route = find_route(
11286                         &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11287                         None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11288                 ).unwrap();
11289                 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11290                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11291                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11292                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11293                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11294                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11295                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11296                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11297                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11298                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11299                 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
11300                 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
11301                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11302                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11303                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11304                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11305                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11306                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11307                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11308                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11309                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11310                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11311                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11312                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11313
11314                 // Finally, claim the original payment.
11315                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11316
11317                 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
11318                 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11319                 let route = find_route(
11320                         &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11321                         None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11322                 ).unwrap();
11323                 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11324                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11325                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11326                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11327                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11328                 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
11329                 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
11330                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
11331
11332                 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
11333                 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
11334                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
11335                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
11336                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11337                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11338                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11339                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11340                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11341                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11342                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11343                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11344                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11345                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11346                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11347                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11348                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11349                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11350                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11351                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11352                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11353                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11354                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11355                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11356
11357                 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
11358                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11359
11360                 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
11361                 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
11362                 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11363                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
11364                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11365                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11366                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11367                 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
11368                 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
11369                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
11370
11371                 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
11372                 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11373                         PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
11374                         100_000
11375                 );
11376                 let route = find_route(
11377                         &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11378                         None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11379                 ).unwrap();
11380                 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
11381                 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11382                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
11383                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11384                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11385                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11386                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11387                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11388                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11389                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11390                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11391                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11392                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11393                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11394                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11395                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11396                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11397                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11398                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11399                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11400                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11401                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11402                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11403
11404                 // Finally, claim the original payment.
11405                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11406         }
11407
11408         #[test]
11409         fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
11410                 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
11411                 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
11412                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11413                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11414                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11415                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11416
11417                 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
11418                 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11419
11420                 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
11421                 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11422                         PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
11423                 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
11424                 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
11425                 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11426                 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11427                 let route = find_route(
11428                         &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
11429                         nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11430                 ).unwrap();
11431
11432                 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11433                 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
11434                 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
11435                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
11436                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
11437                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
11438                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11439
11440                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11441                 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
11442                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11443                 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
11444                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11445                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11446                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
11447
11448                 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
11449         }
11450
11451         #[test]
11452         fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
11453                 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
11454                 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
11455                 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11456                 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
11457                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11458                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11459                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
11460                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11461
11462                 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
11463                 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11464
11465                 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
11466                 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11467                         PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
11468                 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
11469                 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
11470                 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11471                 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11472                 let route = find_route(
11473                         &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
11474                         nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11475                 ).unwrap();
11476
11477                 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11478                 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
11479                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
11480                 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
11481                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
11482                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
11483                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
11484                         PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
11485                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11486
11487                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11488                 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
11489                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11490                 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
11491                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11492                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11493                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
11494
11495                 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
11496         }
11497
11498         #[test]
11499         fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
11500                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
11501                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
11502                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
11503                 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11504
11505                 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11506                 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11507                 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11508                 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11509
11510                 // Marshall an MPP route.
11511                 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
11512                 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
11513                 route.paths.push(path);
11514                 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11515                 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
11516                 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
11517                 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
11518                 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
11519                 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
11520
11521                 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
11522                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
11523                 .unwrap_err() {
11524                         PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
11525                                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
11526                         },
11527                         _ => panic!("unexpected error")
11528                 }
11529         }
11530
11531         #[test]
11532         fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
11533                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11534                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11535                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11536                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11537
11538                 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11539
11540                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11541                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11542
11543                 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11544                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
11545                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11546                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
11547
11548                 {
11549                         // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
11550                         // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
11551                         let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
11552                         // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
11553                         assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
11554                         assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
11555                 }
11556
11557                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
11558
11559                 {
11560                         // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
11561                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
11562                 }
11563         }
11564
11565         #[test]
11566         fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
11567                 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
11568                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11569                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11570                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11571                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11572
11573                 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
11574                 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11575                         payment_secret,
11576                         total_msat: 100_000,
11577                 };
11578
11579                 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
11580                 // payment verification fails as expected.
11581                 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
11582                 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
11583                 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
11584                         Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
11585                         Err(()) => {
11586                                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
11587                         }
11588                 }
11589
11590                 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
11591                 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
11592         }
11593
11594         #[test]
11595         fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
11596                 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
11597                 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
11598                 // the channel is successfully closed.
11599                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11600                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11601                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11602                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11603
11604                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11605                 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11606                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
11607                 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11608                 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
11609
11610                 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
11611                 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.txid().to_byte_array());
11612                 {
11613                         // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
11614                         // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
11615                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11616                         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11617                 }
11618
11619                 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
11620                 {
11621                         // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
11622                         // as it has the funding transaction.
11623                         let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11624                         assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11625                         assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11626                 }
11627
11628                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11629
11630                 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11631
11632                 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
11633                 {
11634                         let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11635                         assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11636                         assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11637                 }
11638                 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11639
11640                 {
11641                         // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
11642                         // as it has the funding transaction.
11643                         let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11644                         assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11645                         assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11646                 }
11647                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11648                 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11649                 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
11650                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11651                 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11652                 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
11653                 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
11654                 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
11655
11656                 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11657                 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
11658                 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11659                 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
11660
11661                 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11662                 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
11663                 {
11664                         // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
11665                         // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
11666                         // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
11667                         // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
11668                         let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11669                         assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11670                         assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11671                 }
11672
11673                 {
11674                         // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
11675                         // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
11676                         // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
11677                         // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
11678                         let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11679                         assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11680                         assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11681                 }
11682
11683                 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
11684                 {
11685                         // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
11686                         // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
11687                         // closing transaction).
11688                         // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
11689                         // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
11690                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11691
11692                         // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s  `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
11693                         // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
11694                         let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11695                         assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11696                         assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11697                 }
11698
11699                 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11700
11701                 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
11702                 {
11703                         // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
11704                         // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
11705                         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11706                 }
11707                 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11708
11709                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
11710                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
11711         }
11712
11713         fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
11714                 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
11715                 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11716         }
11717
11718         fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
11719                 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
11720                 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11721         }
11722
11723         fn check_channel_unavailable_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_channel_id: ChannelId, peer_node_id: PublicKey) {
11724                 let expected_message = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_channel_id, peer_node_id);
11725                 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11726         }
11727
11728         fn check_api_misuse_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
11729                 let expected_message = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_string();
11730                 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11731         }
11732
11733         fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
11734                 match res_err {
11735                         Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
11736                                 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
11737                         },
11738                         Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
11739                                 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
11740                         },
11741                         Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
11742                         Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
11743                 }
11744         }
11745
11746         #[test]
11747         fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
11748                 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
11749                 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
11750                 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
11751                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11752                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11753                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
11754                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11755
11756                 // Dummy values
11757                 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
11758                 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
11759                 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
11760
11761                 // Test the API functions.
11762                 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None), unkown_public_key);
11763
11764                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
11765
11766                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11767
11768                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11769
11770                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11771
11772                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
11773
11774                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
11775         }
11776
11777         #[test]
11778         fn test_api_calls_with_unavailable_channel() {
11779                 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` and a `channel_id`
11780                 // as input, behaves as expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is a known peer in the
11781                 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map, but the peer state doesn't contain a channel with
11782                 // the given `channel_id`.
11783                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11784                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11785                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
11786                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11787
11788                 let counterparty_node_id = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11789
11790                 // Dummy values
11791                 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
11792
11793                 // Test the API functions.
11794                 check_api_misuse_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, 42));
11795
11796                 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11797
11798                 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11799
11800                 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11801
11802                 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(InterceptId([0; 32]), &channel_id, counterparty_node_id, 1_000_000), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11803
11804                 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&counterparty_node_id, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11805         }
11806
11807         #[test]
11808         fn test_connection_limiting() {
11809                 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
11810                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11811                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11812                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11813                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11814
11815                 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11816
11817                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11818                 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11819
11820                 let mut funding_tx = None;
11821                 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
11822                         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11823                         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11824
11825                         if idx == 0 {
11826                                 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
11827                                 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
11828                                 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
11829                                 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
11830                                 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11831
11832                                 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
11833                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11834                                 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11835
11836                                 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11837
11838                                 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
11839                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11840                                 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11841                         }
11842                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11843                 }
11844
11845                 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
11846                 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11847                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11848                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11849                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11850
11851                 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
11852                 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
11853                 // limit.
11854                 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
11855                 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
11856                         let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11857                                 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11858                         peer_pks.push(random_pk);
11859                         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11860                                 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11861                         }, true).unwrap();
11862                 }
11863                 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11864                         &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11865                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11866                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11867                 }, true).unwrap_err();
11868
11869                 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
11870                 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
11871                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11872                 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11873                 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
11874                 for ev in chan_closed_events {
11875                         if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
11876                 }
11877                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11878                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11879                 }, true).unwrap();
11880                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11881                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11882                 }, true).unwrap_err();
11883
11884                 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
11885                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11886                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11887                 }, false).unwrap();
11888                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11889
11890                 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
11891                 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
11892                 // open channels.
11893                 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
11894                 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
11895                         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
11896                         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
11897                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11898                 }
11899                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11900                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
11901                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11902
11903                 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
11904                 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11905                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
11906
11907                 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
11908                 // "protected" and can connect again.
11909                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
11910                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11911                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11912                 }, true).unwrap();
11913                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11914
11915                 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
11916                 // last_random_pk.
11917                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11918                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
11919         }
11920
11921         #[test]
11922         fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
11923                 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
11924                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11925                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11926                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11927                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11928
11929                 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11930
11931                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11932                 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11933
11934                 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
11935                         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11936                         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11937                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11938                 }
11939
11940                 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
11941                 // rejected.
11942                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11943                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11944                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11945
11946                 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
11947                 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11948                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11949
11950                 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
11951                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11952                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11953                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11954         }
11955
11956         #[test]
11957         fn test_0conf_limiting() {
11958                 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
11959                 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
11960                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11961                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11962                 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
11963                 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
11964                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
11965                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11966
11967                 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11968
11969                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11970                 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11971
11972                 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
11973                 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
11974                         let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11975                                 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11976                         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11977                                 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11978                         }, true).unwrap();
11979
11980                         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11981                         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11982                         match events[0] {
11983                                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11984                                         nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
11985                                 }
11986                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11987                         }
11988                         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
11989                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11990                 }
11991
11992                 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
11993                 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11994                         &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11995                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11996                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11997                 }, true).unwrap();
11998                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11999                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12000                 match events[0] {
12001                         Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12002                                 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
12003                                         Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
12004                                                 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
12005                                         _ => panic!(),
12006                                 }
12007                         }
12008                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12009                 }
12010                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
12011                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
12012
12013                 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
12014                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12015                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12016                 match events[0] {
12017                         Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12018                                 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
12019                         }
12020                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12021                 }
12022                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
12023         }
12024
12025         #[test]
12026         fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
12027                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
12028                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
12029                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
12030                 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12031                 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
12032                 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
12033                 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
12034                         amt_msat: 100,
12035                         outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
12036                         payment_metadata: None,
12037                         keysend_preimage: None,
12038                         payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12039                                 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
12040                         }),
12041                         custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
12042                 };
12043                 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
12044                 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
12045                 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
12046                 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundOnionErr { err_code, .. }) =
12047                         create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
12048                                 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
12049                                 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
12050                 {
12051                         assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
12052                 } else { panic!(); }
12053
12054                 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
12055                 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
12056                         amt_msat: 100,
12057                         outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
12058                         payment_metadata: None,
12059                         keysend_preimage: None,
12060                         payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12061                                 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
12062                         }),
12063                         custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
12064                 };
12065                 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
12066                 assert!(create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
12067                         sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
12068                         current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend).is_ok());
12069         }
12070
12071         #[test]
12072         fn test_final_incorrect_cltv(){
12073                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
12074                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
12075                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
12076                 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12077
12078                 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
12079                 let result = create_recv_pending_htlc_info(msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
12080                         amt_msat: 100,
12081                         outgoing_cltv_value: 22,
12082                         payment_metadata: None,
12083                         keysend_preimage: None,
12084                         payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12085                                 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: 100,
12086                         }),
12087                         custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
12088                 }, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]), 100, 23, None, true, None, current_height,
12089                         node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend);
12090
12091                 // Should not return an error as this condition:
12092                 // https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/4dcc377209509b13cf89a4b91fde7d478f5b46d8/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L334
12093                 // is not satisfied.
12094                 assert!(result.is_ok());
12095         }
12096
12097         #[test]
12098         fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
12099                 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
12100                 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
12101                 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
12102                 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
12103
12104                 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
12105                 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
12106
12107                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
12108                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
12109                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
12110                         &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
12111                 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12112
12113                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12114                 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12115
12116                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12117                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
12118                 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12119                 match &msg_events[0] {
12120                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
12121                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12122                                 match action {
12123                                         ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
12124                                                 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
12125                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
12126                                 }
12127                         }
12128                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12129                 }
12130
12131                 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12132                 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12133                 match events[0] {
12134                         Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
12135                                 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
12136                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12137                 }
12138                 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12139         }
12140
12141         #[test]
12142         fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
12143                 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
12144                 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
12145                 // the channel without the anchors feature.
12146                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12147                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12148                 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
12149                 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
12150                 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
12151                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
12152                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12153
12154                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None, None).unwrap();
12155                 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12156                 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
12157
12158                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12159                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12160                 match events[0] {
12161                         Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12162                                 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12163                         }
12164                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12165                 }
12166
12167                 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12168                 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
12169
12170                 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12171                 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
12172
12173                 // Since nodes[1] should not have accepted the channel, it should
12174                 // not have generated any events.
12175                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
12176         }
12177
12178         #[test]
12179         fn test_update_channel_config() {
12180                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12181                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12182                 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
12183                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
12184                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12185                 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12186                 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
12187
12188                 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
12189                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12190                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12191
12192                 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
12193                 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
12194                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
12195                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12196                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12197                 match &events[0] {
12198                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12199                         _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12200                 }
12201
12202                 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
12203                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12204                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12205
12206                 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
12207                 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12208                         cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
12209                         ..Default::default()
12210                 }).unwrap();
12211                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
12212                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12213                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12214                 match &events[0] {
12215                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12216                         _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12217                 }
12218
12219                 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
12220                 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12221                         forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
12222                         ..Default::default()
12223                 }).unwrap();
12224                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
12225                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
12226                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12227                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12228                 match &events[0] {
12229                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12230                         _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12231                 }
12232
12233                 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
12234                 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
12235                 let bad_channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_txid(&[10; 32], 10);
12236                 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
12237                 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
12238                 assert!(
12239                         matches!(
12240                                 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12241                                         forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
12242                                         ..Default::default()
12243                                 }),
12244                                 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
12245                         )
12246                 );
12247                 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
12248                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
12249                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12250                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12251         }
12252
12253         #[test]
12254         fn test_payment_display() {
12255                 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
12256                 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12257                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
12258                 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_hash), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12259                 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12260                 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_preimage), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12261         }
12262
12263         #[test]
12264         fn test_trigger_lnd_force_close() {
12265                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12266                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12267                 let user_config = test_default_channel_config();
12268                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
12269                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12270
12271                 // Open a channel, immediately disconnect each other, and broadcast Alice's latest state.
12272                 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12273                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12274                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12275                 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12276                 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
12277                 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
12278                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12279                 {
12280                         let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
12281                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
12282                         check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
12283                 }
12284
12285                 // Since they're disconnected, Bob won't receive Alice's `Error` message. Reconnect them
12286                 // such that Bob sends a `ChannelReestablish` to Alice since the channel is still open from
12287                 // their side.
12288                 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12289                         features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12290                 }, true).unwrap();
12291                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12292                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12293                 }, false).unwrap();
12294                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
12295                 let channel_reestablish = get_event_msg!(
12296                         nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()
12297                 );
12298                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channel_reestablish);
12299
12300                 // Alice should respond with an error since the channel isn't known, but a bogus
12301                 // `ChannelReestablish` should be sent first, such that we actually trigger Bob to force
12302                 // close even if it was an lnd node.
12303                 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12304                 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
12305                 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { node_id, msg } = &msg_events[0] {
12306                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12307                         assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 0);
12308                         assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
12309                         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
12310                 } else { panic!() };
12311                 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
12312                 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
12313                 let expected_close_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
12314                         err: "Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_string()
12315                 };
12316                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, expected_close_reason, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12317                 {
12318                         let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
12319                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
12320                         check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
12321                 }
12322         }
12323
12324         #[test]
12325         fn test_peel_payment_onion() {
12326                 use super::*;
12327                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
12328
12329                 let bob = crate::sign::KeysManager::new(&[2; 32], 42, 42);
12330                 let bob_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &bob.get_node_secret_key());
12331                 let charlie = crate::sign::KeysManager::new(&[3; 32], 42, 42);
12332                 let charlie_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &charlie.get_node_secret_key());
12333
12334                 let (session_priv, total_amt_msat, cur_height, recipient_onion, preimage, payment_hash,
12335                         prng_seed, hops, recipient_amount, pay_secret) = payment_onion_args(bob_pk, charlie_pk);
12336
12337                 let path = Path {
12338                         hops: hops,
12339                         blinded_tail: None,
12340                 };
12341
12342                 let (amount_msat, cltv_expiry, onion) = create_payment_onion(
12343                         &secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv, total_amt_msat, recipient_onion, cur_height,
12344                         payment_hash, Some(preimage), prng_seed
12345                 ).unwrap();
12346
12347                 let msg = make_update_add_msg(amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, onion);
12348                 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("bob".to_string());
12349
12350                 let peeled = peel_payment_onion(&msg, &&bob, &&logger, &secp_ctx, cur_height, true)
12351                         .map_err(|e| e.msg).unwrap();
12352
12353                 let next_onion = match peeled.routing {
12354                         PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: _ } => {
12355                                 onion_packet
12356                         },
12357                         _ => panic!("expected a forwarded onion"),
12358                 };
12359
12360                 let msg2 = make_update_add_msg(amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, next_onion);
12361                 let peeled2 = peel_payment_onion(&msg2, &&charlie, &&logger, &secp_ctx, cur_height, true)
12362                         .map_err(|e| e.msg).unwrap();
12363
12364                 match peeled2.routing {
12365                         PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, .. } => {
12366                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, preimage);
12367                                 assert_eq!(peeled2.outgoing_amt_msat, recipient_amount);
12368                                 assert_eq!(incoming_cltv_expiry, peeled2.outgoing_cltv_value);
12369                                 let msgs::FinalOnionHopData{total_msat, payment_secret} = payment_data.unwrap();
12370                                 assert_eq!(total_msat, total_amt_msat);
12371                                 assert_eq!(payment_secret, pay_secret);
12372                         },
12373                         _ => panic!("expected a received keysend"),
12374                 };
12375         }
12376
12377         fn make_update_add_msg(
12378                 amount_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, payment_hash: PaymentHash,
12379                 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket
12380         ) -> msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
12381                 msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
12382                         channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([0; 32]),
12383                         htlc_id: 0,
12384                         amount_msat,
12385                         cltv_expiry,
12386                         payment_hash,
12387                         onion_routing_packet,
12388                         skimmed_fee_msat: None,
12389                 }
12390         }
12391
12392         fn payment_onion_args(hop_pk: PublicKey, recipient_pk: PublicKey) -> (
12393                 SecretKey, u64, u32, RecipientOnionFields, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, [u8; 32],
12394                 Vec<RouteHop>, u64, PaymentSecret,
12395         ) {
12396                 let session_priv_bytes = [42; 32];
12397                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes).unwrap();
12398                 let total_amt_msat = 1000;
12399                 let cur_height = 1000;
12400                 let pay_secret = PaymentSecret([99; 32]);
12401                 let recipient_onion = RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(pay_secret);
12402                 let preimage_bytes = [43; 32];
12403                 let preimage = PaymentPreimage(preimage_bytes);
12404                 let rhash_bytes = Sha256::hash(&preimage_bytes).to_byte_array();
12405                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(rhash_bytes);
12406                 let prng_seed = [44; 32];
12407
12408                 // make a route alice -> bob -> charlie
12409                 let hop_fee = 1;
12410                 let recipient_amount = total_amt_msat - hop_fee;
12411                 let hops = vec![
12412                         RouteHop {
12413                                 pubkey: hop_pk,
12414                                 fee_msat: hop_fee,
12415                                 cltv_expiry_delta: 42,
12416                                 short_channel_id: 1,
12417                                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
12418                                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
12419                                 maybe_announced_channel: false,
12420                         },
12421                         RouteHop {
12422                                 pubkey: recipient_pk,
12423                                 fee_msat: recipient_amount,
12424                                 cltv_expiry_delta: 42,
12425                                 short_channel_id: 2,
12426                                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
12427                                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
12428                                 maybe_announced_channel: false,
12429                         }
12430                 ];
12431
12432                 (session_priv, total_amt_msat, cur_height, recipient_onion, preimage, payment_hash,
12433                         prng_seed, hops, recipient_amount, pay_secret)
12434         }
12435
12436         pub fn create_payment_onion<T: bitcoin::secp256k1::Signing>(
12437                 secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, path: &Path, session_priv: &SecretKey, total_msat: u64,
12438                 recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, best_block_height: u32, payment_hash: PaymentHash,
12439                 keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, prng_seed: [u8; 32]
12440         ) -> Result<(u64, u32, msgs::OnionPacket), ()> {
12441                 let onion_keys = super::onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv).map_err(|_| ())?;
12442                 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = super::onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(
12443                         &path,
12444                         total_msat,
12445                         recipient_onion,
12446                         best_block_height + 1,
12447                         &keysend_preimage,
12448                 ).map_err(|_| ())?;
12449                 let onion_packet = super::onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(
12450                         onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, &payment_hash
12451                 )?;
12452                 Ok((htlc_msat, htlc_cltv, onion_packet))
12453         }
12454 }
12455
12456 #[cfg(ldk_bench)]
12457 pub mod bench {
12458         use crate::chain::Listen;
12459         use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
12460         use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
12461         use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
12462         use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
12463         use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
12464         use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
12465         use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
12466         use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
12467         use crate::util::test_utils;
12468         use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
12469
12470         use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
12471         use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
12472         use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
12473         use bitcoin::{Block, Transaction, TxOut};
12474
12475         use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
12476
12477         use criterion::Criterion;
12478
12479         type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
12480                 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
12481                         &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
12482                         &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
12483                 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
12484                 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
12485                 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
12486
12487         struct ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
12488                 node: &'node_cfg Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>,
12489         }
12490         impl<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg, P> {
12491                 type CM = Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>;
12492                 #[inline]
12493                 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P> { self.node }
12494                 #[inline]
12495                 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
12496         }
12497
12498         pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
12499                 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
12500         }
12501
12502         pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
12503                 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
12504                 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
12505                 // calls per node.
12506                 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
12507                 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
12508
12509                 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
12510                 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
12511                 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
12512                 let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
12513                 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
12514
12515                 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
12516                 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
12517                 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
12518
12519                 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
12520                 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
12521                 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
12522                 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
12523                         network,
12524                         best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
12525                 }, genesis_block.header.time);
12526                 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
12527
12528                 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
12529                 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
12530                 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
12531                 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
12532                 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
12533                         network,
12534                         best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
12535                 }, genesis_block.header.time);
12536                 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
12537
12538                 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
12539                         features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12540                 }, true).unwrap();
12541                 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
12542                         features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12543                 }, false).unwrap();
12544                 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12545                 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12546                 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12547
12548                 let tx;
12549                 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
12550                         tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
12551                                 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
12552                         }]};
12553                         node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
12554                 } else { panic!(); }
12555
12556                 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12557                 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12558                 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
12559                 match events_b[0] {
12560                         Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12561                                 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12562                         },
12563                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12564                 }
12565
12566                 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12567                 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12568                 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
12569                 match events_a[0] {
12570                         Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12571                                 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
12572                         },
12573                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12574                 }
12575
12576                 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
12577
12578                 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), 42, vec![tx]);
12579                 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
12580                 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
12581
12582                 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12583                 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12584                 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
12585                 match msg_events[0] {
12586                         MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
12587                                 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
12588                                 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12589                         },
12590                         _ => panic!(),
12591                 }
12592                 match msg_events[1] {
12593                         MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12594                         _ => panic!(),
12595                 }
12596
12597                 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12598                 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
12599                 match events_a[0] {
12600                         Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12601                                 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
12602                         },
12603                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12604                 }
12605
12606                 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12607                 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
12608                 match events_b[0] {
12609                         Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12610                                 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12611                         },
12612                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12613                 }
12614
12615                 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
12616                 macro_rules! send_payment {
12617                         ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
12618                                 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
12619                                         .with_bolt11_features($node_b.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
12620                                 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
12621                                 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
12622                                 payment_count += 1;
12623                                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
12624                                 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
12625
12626                                 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
12627                                         PaymentId(payment_hash.0),
12628                                         RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000),
12629                                         Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
12630                                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
12631                                 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12632                                 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
12633                                 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
12634                                 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
12635                                 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
12636                                 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12637
12638                                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
12639                                 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
12640                                 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
12641                                 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
12642
12643                                 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
12644                                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
12645                                                 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
12646                                                 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
12647                                                 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
12648                                         },
12649                                         _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
12650                                 }
12651
12652                                 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
12653                                 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
12654                                 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
12655                                 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12656
12657                                 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
12658                         }
12659                 }
12660
12661                 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
12662                         send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
12663                         send_payment!(node_b, node_a);
12664                 }));
12665         }
12666 }