1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see routing::router::get_route for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
26 use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
27 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
30 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
35 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
39 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator};
40 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
41 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
42 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
43 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
44 use routing::router::{Route, RouteHop};
46 use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
48 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, OptionalField};
49 use chain::keysinterface::{ChannelKeys, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemoryChannelKeys};
50 use util::config::UserConfig;
51 use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
52 use util::{byte_utils, events};
53 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer};
54 use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader};
55 use util::logger::Logger;
56 use util::errors::APIError;
59 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
60 use std::io::{Cursor, Read};
61 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock};
62 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
63 use std::time::Duration;
64 use std::marker::{Sync, Send};
66 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
68 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
70 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
71 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
72 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
74 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
75 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
76 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
77 // before we forward it.
79 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
80 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
81 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
82 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
83 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
85 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
86 enum PendingHTLCRouting {
88 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
89 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
92 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
93 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
97 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
98 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
99 routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
100 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
101 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
102 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
103 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
106 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
107 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
108 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
109 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
112 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
113 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
114 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
115 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
116 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
119 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
121 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
123 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
124 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
125 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
127 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
129 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
133 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
137 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
138 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
139 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
140 short_channel_id: u64,
142 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
144 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
145 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
149 struct ClaimableHTLC {
150 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
152 /// Filled in when the HTLC was received with a payment_secret packet, which contains a
153 /// total_msat (which may differ from value if this is a Multi-Path Payment) and a
154 /// payment_secret which prevents path-probing attacks and can associate different HTLCs which
155 /// are part of the same payment.
156 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
160 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
161 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
162 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
163 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
166 session_priv: SecretKey,
167 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
168 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
169 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
174 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
175 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
177 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
178 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
183 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
184 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
186 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
194 /// payment_hash type, use to cross-lock hop
195 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
196 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
197 pub struct PaymentHash(pub [u8;32]);
198 /// payment_preimage type, use to route payment between hop
199 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
200 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
201 pub struct PaymentPreimage(pub [u8;32]);
202 /// payment_secret type, use to authenticate sender to the receiver and tie MPP HTLCs together
203 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
204 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
205 pub struct PaymentSecret(pub [u8;32]);
207 type ShutdownResult = (Option<OutPoint>, ChannelMonitorUpdate, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
209 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
210 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
211 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
212 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
213 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
215 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
216 err: msgs::LightningError,
217 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
219 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
221 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
223 err: LightningError {
225 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
226 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
232 shutdown_finish: None,
236 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
238 err: LightningError {
240 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
242 shutdown_finish: None,
246 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
247 Self { err, shutdown_finish: None }
250 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
252 err: LightningError {
254 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
255 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
261 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
265 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
268 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
270 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
272 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
274 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
275 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
281 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => LightningError {
283 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
284 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
291 shutdown_finish: None,
296 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
297 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
298 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
299 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
300 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
302 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
303 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
304 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
305 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
306 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
307 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
308 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
310 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
314 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
315 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> {
316 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<ChanSigner>>,
317 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
318 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
319 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
320 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
321 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
322 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
323 /// (payment_hash, payment_secret) -> Vec<HTLCs> for tracking HTLCs that
324 /// were to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
325 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
326 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
328 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<(PaymentHash, Option<PaymentSecret>), Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
329 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
330 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
331 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
334 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
335 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
337 latest_features: InitFeatures,
340 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
341 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
343 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
344 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
345 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
346 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
347 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
348 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
349 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
350 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = Arc<ChannelManager<InMemoryChannelKeys, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>>;
352 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
353 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
354 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
355 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
356 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
357 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
358 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
359 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
360 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemoryChannelKeys, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
362 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
363 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
365 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
366 /// to individual Channels.
368 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
369 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
370 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
371 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
373 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
374 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
375 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
376 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
377 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
378 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
379 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
381 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager), which
382 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
383 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
384 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
387 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
388 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
389 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
390 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
391 /// timer_chan_freshness_every_min roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
393 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
394 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
395 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
396 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
397 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
398 pub struct ChannelManager<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
399 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Keys=ChanSigner>,
400 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
401 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
402 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
405 default_configuration: UserConfig,
406 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
412 pub(super) latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
414 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
415 last_block_hash: Mutex<BlockHash>,
416 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
418 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
419 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>,
420 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
421 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>,
422 our_network_key: SecretKey,
424 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
425 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
426 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
428 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
429 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
430 /// are currently open with that peer.
431 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
432 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
434 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
436 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
437 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
438 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
439 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
440 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
447 /// The amount of time we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time between when
448 /// we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
449 pub(crate) const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
450 /// The amount of time we're willing to wait to claim money back to us
451 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24 * 7;
453 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
454 /// HTLC's CLTV. This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
455 /// ie the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
456 /// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
457 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
458 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 12; //TODO?
459 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
461 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
462 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
463 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
464 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
465 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
466 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
469 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
471 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
472 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
475 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
477 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
478 pub struct ChannelDetails {
479 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
480 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
481 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
482 /// lifetime of the channel.
483 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
484 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
485 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
486 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
487 /// The node_id of our counterparty
488 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
489 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
490 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
491 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
492 pub counterparty_features: InitFeatures,
493 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
494 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
495 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
497 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
498 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
499 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
500 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
501 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
502 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
503 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
504 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
505 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
506 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
507 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
508 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
509 /// the peer is connected, and (c) no monitor update failure is pending resolution.
513 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
514 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
517 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
518 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
519 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
520 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
521 ParameterError(APIError),
522 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
523 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
524 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
527 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
529 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
530 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
531 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
532 /// paths than the ones selected).
533 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
534 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
535 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
536 /// in over-/re-payment.
538 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
539 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
540 /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
542 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
543 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
544 /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
545 /// with the latest update_id.
546 PartialFailure(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
549 macro_rules! handle_error {
550 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
553 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish }) => {
554 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
556 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
557 // entering the macro.
558 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
561 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
563 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
564 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
565 if let Some(update) = update_option {
566 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
572 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
573 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
575 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
576 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
577 action: err.action.clone()
581 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
582 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
585 // Return error in case higher-API need one
592 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
593 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
596 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
597 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
599 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
600 log_trace!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
601 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
602 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
603 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
605 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
607 Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_)) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
612 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
613 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
616 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
617 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
619 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
620 log_trace!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
621 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
622 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
623 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
625 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
627 Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg)) => {
628 log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
629 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
630 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
631 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
633 let shutdown_res = chan.force_shutdown(false);
634 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
640 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
641 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
642 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
644 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
646 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
647 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]));
648 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
649 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
650 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
652 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
653 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
654 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
655 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
656 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
657 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
658 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
659 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
660 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
661 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()));
664 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
665 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards and {} fails",
666 log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]),
667 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
669 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
670 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
672 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
673 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
675 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
676 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len());
677 if !$resend_commitment {
678 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
681 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
683 $entry.get_mut().monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
684 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$entry.key()))
690 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
691 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
692 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
694 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
695 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
699 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
700 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
701 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
702 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
703 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
706 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
711 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>
712 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Keys=ChanSigner>,
713 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
714 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
715 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
718 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
720 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
721 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
723 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
725 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
727 /// Users must provide the current blockchain height from which to track onchain channel
728 /// funding outpoints and send payments with reliable timelocks.
730 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
731 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods.
732 pub fn new(network: Network, fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, current_blockchain_height: usize) -> Self {
733 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
736 default_configuration: config.clone(),
737 genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.block_hash(),
738 fee_estimator: fee_est,
742 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(current_blockchain_height),
743 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(Default::default()),
746 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
747 by_id: HashMap::new(),
748 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
749 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
750 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
751 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
753 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
755 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
757 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
759 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
760 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
768 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
770 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
771 /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
772 /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
773 /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
775 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
776 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
778 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
779 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
780 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
781 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
782 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
785 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
786 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, config)?;
787 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
789 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
790 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
791 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
792 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
793 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
794 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
796 panic!("RNG is bad???");
799 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
801 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
802 node_id: their_network_key,
808 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<ChanSigner>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
809 let mut res = Vec::new();
811 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
812 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
813 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
814 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
815 res.push(ChannelDetails {
816 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
817 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
818 remote_network_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
819 counterparty_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
820 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
821 inbound_capacity_msat,
822 outbound_capacity_msat,
823 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
824 is_live: channel.is_live(),
828 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
829 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
830 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.remote_network_id) {
831 chan.counterparty_features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
837 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
838 /// more information.
839 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
840 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
843 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
844 /// get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
846 /// These are guaranteed to have their is_live value set to true, see the documentation for
847 /// ChannelDetails::is_live for more info on exactly what the criteria are.
848 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
849 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
850 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
851 // really wanted anyway.
852 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
855 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
856 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
857 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
859 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
860 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
861 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
863 let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
864 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
865 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
866 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
867 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
868 let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
869 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
870 node_id: chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
873 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
874 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
875 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
877 (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
878 } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
880 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
883 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
884 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
886 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
887 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
892 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
893 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
894 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
903 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
904 let (funding_txo_option, monitor_update, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
905 log_trace!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
906 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
907 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
909 if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_option {
910 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
911 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
912 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
913 // ignore the result here.
914 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
918 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
919 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
920 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
921 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
924 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
925 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
926 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
927 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
928 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
935 log_trace!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
936 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
937 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
938 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
939 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
945 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
946 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
947 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
948 for chan in self.list_channels() {
949 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
953 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>) {
954 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
955 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
957 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
958 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
959 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
960 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
961 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
962 failure_code: $err_code,
963 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
968 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
969 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
972 let shared_secret = {
973 let mut arr = [0; 32];
974 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
977 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
979 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
980 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
981 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
982 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
983 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
984 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
985 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
986 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
989 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
990 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
991 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
992 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
993 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
996 let mut channel_state = None;
997 macro_rules! return_err {
998 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
1000 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1001 if channel_state.is_none() {
1002 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1004 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1005 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1006 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1007 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
1008 })), channel_state.unwrap());
1013 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
1014 let mut chacha_stream = ChaChaReader { chacha: &mut chacha, read: Cursor::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..]) };
1015 let (next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac) = {
1016 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut chacha_stream) {
1018 let error_code = match err {
1019 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
1020 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature|
1021 msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue|
1022 msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead => 0x4000 | 22, // invalid_onion_payload
1023 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
1025 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
1028 let mut hmac = [0; 32];
1029 if let Err(_) = chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut hmac[..]) {
1030 return_err!("Unable to decode hop data", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1037 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_hmac == [0; 32] {
1040 // In tests, make sure that the initial onion pcket data is, at least, non-0.
1041 // We could do some fancy randomness test here, but, ehh, whatever.
1042 // This checks for the issue where you can calculate the path length given the
1043 // onion data as all the path entries that the originator sent will be here
1044 // as-is (and were originally 0s).
1045 // Of course reverse path calculation is still pretty easy given naive routing
1046 // algorithms, but this fixes the most-obvious case.
1047 let mut next_bytes = [0; 32];
1048 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1049 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1050 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1051 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1055 // final_expiry_too_soon
1056 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure we have at least
1057 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
1058 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown payment hash, our payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward
1059 // before our onchain logic triggers a channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational).
1060 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) <= self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
1061 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
1063 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
1064 if next_hop_data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
1065 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1067 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1068 if next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1069 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1072 let payment_data = match next_hop_data.format {
1073 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => None,
1074 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => return_err!("Got non final data with an HMAC of 0", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]),
1075 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data } => payment_data,
1078 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1079 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1080 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1081 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1083 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1084 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
1086 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1088 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1089 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1090 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1091 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1094 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1095 let read_pos = chacha_stream.read(&mut new_packet_data).unwrap();
1096 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1098 // Check two things:
1099 // a) that the behavior of our stream here will return Ok(0) even if the TLV
1100 // read above emptied out our buffer and the unwrap() wont needlessly panic
1101 // b) that we didn't somehow magically end up with extra data.
1103 debug_assert!(chacha_stream.read(&mut t).unwrap() == 0);
1105 // Once we've emptied the set of bytes our peer gave us, encrypt 0 bytes until we
1106 // fill the onion hop data we'll forward to our next-hop peer.
1107 chacha_stream.chacha.process_in_place(&mut new_packet_data[read_pos..]);
1109 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1111 let blinding_factor = {
1112 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
1113 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1114 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1115 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
1118 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
1120 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
1122 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1125 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1126 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
1129 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
1130 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1131 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1132 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
1133 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1137 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1138 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
1139 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
1142 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1143 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1144 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1145 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1149 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1150 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1151 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
1152 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
1153 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
1154 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
1155 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1156 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1157 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1158 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
1160 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1162 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1163 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1165 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1166 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1167 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1168 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1169 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1170 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1171 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1173 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1174 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1176 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_holder_fee_base_msat(&self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
1177 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1178 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1180 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1181 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1183 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1184 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now, but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty
1185 // packet sanitization (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational)
1186 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1187 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1189 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1190 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1192 // In theory, we would be safe against unitentional channel-closure, if we only required a margin of LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1193 // But, to be safe against policy reception, we use a longuer delay.
1194 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER) as u64 {
1195 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1201 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1202 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1203 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1204 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1206 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1207 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1209 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
1210 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
1211 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
1213 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1215 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1220 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1223 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
1224 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1225 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel<ChanSigner>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1226 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1227 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1231 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
1233 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1234 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1236 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
1237 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
1238 cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
1239 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1240 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()),
1241 fee_base_msat: chan.get_holder_fee_base_msat(&self.fee_estimator),
1242 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
1243 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1246 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1247 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
1249 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1255 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
1256 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1257 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
1258 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
1259 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
1261 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
1262 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
1263 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height)?;
1264 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
1265 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
1267 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
1269 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1271 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
1272 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1273 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1274 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
1275 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1278 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1279 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
1281 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1282 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1284 if !chan.get().is_live() {
1285 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
1287 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1289 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1290 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1291 }, onion_packet, &self.logger), channel_state, chan)
1293 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
1294 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1295 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
1296 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
1297 // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
1298 // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
1299 // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
1300 // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
1301 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1304 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1305 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1306 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1307 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1308 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1309 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1310 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1318 } else { unreachable!(); }
1322 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
1323 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1325 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
1330 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1332 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1333 /// fields for more info.
1335 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1336 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1337 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1338 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1339 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1340 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1342 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
1344 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
1345 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
1346 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
1348 /// In general, a path may raise:
1349 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
1350 /// node public key) is specified.
1351 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
1352 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
1354 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
1355 /// relevant updates.
1357 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
1358 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
1359 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
1361 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
1362 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
1363 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
1364 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
1366 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
1367 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
1368 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
1369 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
1370 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
1371 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
1373 if route.paths.len() > 10 {
1374 // This limit is completely arbitrary - there aren't any real fundamental path-count
1375 // limits. After we support retrying individual paths we should likely bump this, but
1376 // for now more than 10 paths likely carries too much one-path failure.
1377 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Sending over more than 10 paths is not currently supported"}));
1379 let mut total_value = 0;
1380 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1381 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
1382 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
1383 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
1384 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
1385 continue 'path_check;
1387 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
1388 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1389 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
1390 continue 'path_check;
1393 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
1394 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
1396 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
1397 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
1400 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1401 let mut results = Vec::new();
1402 for path in route.paths.iter() {
1403 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height));
1405 let mut has_ok = false;
1406 let mut has_err = false;
1407 for res in results.iter() {
1408 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
1409 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
1410 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
1411 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
1418 if has_err && has_ok {
1419 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure(results))
1421 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
1427 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1429 /// Note that ALL inputs in the transaction pointed to by funding_txo MUST spend SegWit outputs
1430 /// or your counterparty can steal your funds!
1432 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1434 /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1435 /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1436 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1437 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1440 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1442 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo, &self.logger)
1443 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
1444 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
1445 } else { unreachable!(); })
1450 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
1451 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1454 Err(_) => { return; }
1458 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1459 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
1460 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1463 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1464 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1465 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1467 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1473 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel<ChanSigner>) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1474 if !chan.should_announce() {
1475 log_trace!(self.logger, "Can't send announcement_signatures for private channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
1479 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1481 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1483 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1484 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1486 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1487 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1488 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1489 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1490 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1495 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
1496 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
1497 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
1499 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::std::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
1502 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
1503 // smaller than 500:
1504 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
1506 /// Generates a signed node_announcement from the given arguments and creates a
1507 /// BroadcastNodeAnnouncement event. Note that such messages will be ignored unless peers have
1508 /// seen a channel_announcement from us (ie unless we have public channels open).
1510 /// RGB is a node "color" and alias is a printable human-readable string to describe this node
1511 /// to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
1513 /// addresses represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node accepts
1514 /// incoming connections. These will be broadcast to the network, publicly tying these
1515 /// addresses together. If you wish to preserve user privacy, addresses should likely contain
1516 /// only Tor Onion addresses.
1518 /// Panics if addresses is absurdly large (more than 500).
1519 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
1520 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1522 if addresses.len() > 500 {
1523 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
1526 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1527 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1528 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
1529 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
1530 rgb, alias, addresses,
1531 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
1532 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1534 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1536 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1537 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
1538 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
1539 signature: self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key),
1540 contents: announcement
1545 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1547 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1548 /// Will likely generate further events.
1549 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1550 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1552 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1553 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1554 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
1556 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1557 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1559 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1560 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1561 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1562 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1564 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1565 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1566 match forward_info {
1567 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info,
1568 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
1569 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1570 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1571 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
1572 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1573 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1575 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
1576 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() }
1579 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1580 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
1581 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
1582 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
1583 // problem, not ours.
1590 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
1591 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1592 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1593 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1594 match forward_info {
1595 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
1596 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
1598 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
1599 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
1600 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), prev_short_channel_id, short_chan_id);
1601 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1602 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1603 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
1604 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1605 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
1607 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet) {
1609 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1610 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
1612 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
1614 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap();
1615 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
1616 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }
1622 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1624 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1625 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1626 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1627 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1628 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1629 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1630 // this channel currently :/.
1636 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
1637 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
1639 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
1640 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} after delay", short_chan_id);
1641 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1643 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1644 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail backwards to short_id {}: {}", short_chan_id, msg);
1646 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
1648 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
1649 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
1650 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
1653 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1655 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1656 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
1657 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
1658 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
1659 // messages when we can.
1660 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
1661 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
1662 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
1669 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1670 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
1673 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
1674 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
1675 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1676 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
1677 ChannelError::Ignore(_) => {
1678 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1680 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1681 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
1682 let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
1683 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1684 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1686 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update(&channel).ok()))
1688 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
1690 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
1694 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1695 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
1698 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1699 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
1700 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1701 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1702 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1703 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
1704 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1706 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1714 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1715 match forward_info {
1716 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
1717 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry },
1718 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
1719 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
1720 let prev_hop = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1721 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1722 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
1723 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1724 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
1727 let mut total_value = 0;
1728 let payment_secret_opt =
1729 if let &Some(ref data) = &payment_data { Some(data.payment_secret.clone()) } else { None };
1730 let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry((payment_hash, payment_secret_opt))
1731 .or_insert(Vec::new());
1732 htlcs.push(ClaimableHTLC {
1734 value: amt_to_forward,
1735 payment_data: payment_data.clone(),
1736 cltv_expiry: incoming_cltv_expiry,
1738 if let &Some(ref data) = &payment_data {
1739 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
1740 total_value += htlc.value;
1741 if htlc.payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat != data.total_msat {
1742 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
1744 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
1746 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > data.total_msat {
1747 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
1748 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
1749 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
1750 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(
1751 self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire)
1755 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1756 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
1757 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
1758 htlc_id: htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
1759 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
1761 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
1764 } else if total_value == data.total_msat {
1765 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1767 payment_secret: Some(data.payment_secret),
1772 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1774 payment_secret: None,
1775 amt: amt_to_forward,
1779 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
1780 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
1782 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1783 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
1791 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1792 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
1795 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
1796 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
1799 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1800 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1801 events.append(&mut new_events);
1804 /// If a peer is disconnected we mark any channels with that peer as 'disabled'.
1805 /// After some time, if channels are still disabled we need to broadcast a ChannelUpdate
1806 /// to inform the network about the uselessness of these channels.
1808 /// This method handles all the details, and must be called roughly once per minute.
1809 pub fn timer_chan_freshness_every_min(&self) {
1810 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1811 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1812 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1813 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter_mut() {
1814 if chan.is_disabled_staged() && !chan.is_live() {
1815 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1816 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1821 } else if chan.is_disabled_staged() && chan.is_live() {
1823 } else if chan.is_disabled_marked() {
1824 chan.to_disabled_staged();
1829 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
1830 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
1831 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
1832 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
1833 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
1834 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> bool {
1835 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1837 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1838 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&(*payment_hash, *payment_secret));
1839 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1840 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
1841 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1842 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
1843 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
1844 self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32,
1846 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
1847 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
1848 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
1854 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
1855 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
1856 // be surfaced to the user.
1857 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(&self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
1858 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
1860 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
1861 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
1862 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
1863 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
1864 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update(&chan_entry.get()) {
1865 (0x1000|7, upd.encode_with_len())
1867 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
1870 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
1872 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1873 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
1874 htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
1876 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1877 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1878 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1880 rejected_by_dest: false,
1892 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
1893 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
1894 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
1895 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
1896 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
1897 /// still-available channels.
1898 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
1899 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
1900 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
1901 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
1904 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, .. } => {
1905 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1906 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1907 match &onion_error {
1908 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
1910 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
1912 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
1913 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
1914 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
1915 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
1916 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
1917 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1918 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
1923 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1924 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1925 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1926 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
1928 error_code: onion_error_code,
1930 error_data: onion_error_data
1934 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
1940 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
1941 // TODO: We'd like to generate a PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate for temporary
1942 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as get_route
1943 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
1945 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
1946 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
1947 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1948 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1949 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1950 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
1952 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
1954 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
1960 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, .. }) => {
1961 let err_packet = match onion_error {
1962 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
1963 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
1964 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
1965 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
1967 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
1968 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1969 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
1973 let mut forward_event = None;
1974 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
1975 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
1977 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
1978 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1979 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
1981 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1982 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
1985 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1986 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
1987 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1988 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
1989 time_forwardable: time
1996 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
1997 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
1998 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
2000 /// You must specify the expected amounts for this HTLC, and we will only claim HTLCs
2001 /// available within a few percent of the expected amount. This is critical for several
2002 /// reasons : a) it avoids providing senders with `proof-of-payment` (in the form of the
2003 /// payment_preimage without having provided the full value and b) it avoids certain
2004 /// privacy-breaking recipient-probing attacks which may reveal payment activity to
2005 /// motivated attackers.
2007 /// Note that the privacy concerns in (b) are not relevant in payments with a payment_secret
2008 /// set. Thus, for such payments we will claim any payments which do not under-pay.
2010 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
2011 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, expected_amount: u64) -> bool {
2012 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2014 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2016 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2017 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&(payment_hash, *payment_secret));
2018 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
2019 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
2021 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
2022 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
2023 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
2024 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
2026 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
2027 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
2028 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
2029 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
2030 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
2033 let (is_mpp, mut valid_mpp) = if let &Some(ref data) = &sources[0].payment_data {
2034 assert!(payment_secret.is_some());
2035 (true, data.total_msat >= expected_amount)
2037 assert!(payment_secret.is_none());
2041 for htlc in sources.iter() {
2042 if !is_mpp || !valid_mpp { break; }
2043 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
2048 let mut errs = Vec::new();
2049 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
2050 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
2051 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
2052 if (is_mpp && !valid_mpp) || (!is_mpp && (htlc.value < expected_amount || htlc.value > expected_amount * 2)) {
2053 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
2054 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
2055 self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32,
2057 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
2058 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
2059 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
2061 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
2063 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = e.1.err.action {
2064 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
2065 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
2066 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", e.1.err.err);
2067 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
2068 } else { errs.push(e); }
2070 Err(None) if is_mpp => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
2072 log_warn!(self.logger, "Channel we expected to claim an HTLC from was closed.");
2074 Ok(()) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
2079 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
2080 // which were generated.
2081 channel_state.take();
2083 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
2084 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
2085 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
2092 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> Result<(), Option<(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)>> {
2093 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
2094 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
2095 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
2096 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
2102 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
2103 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
2104 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
2105 Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
2106 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_option {
2107 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2108 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
2109 assert!(msgs.is_none());
2111 return Err(Some((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err())));
2115 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
2116 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2117 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
2118 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2119 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2120 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
2121 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2122 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2131 // TODO: Do something with e?
2132 // This should only occur if we are claiming an HTLC at the same time as the
2133 // HTLC is being failed (eg because a block is being connected and this caused
2134 // an HTLC to time out). This should, of course, only occur if the user is the
2135 // one doing the claiming (as it being a part of a peer claim would imply we're
2136 // about to lose funds) and only if the lock in claim_funds was dropped as a
2137 // previous HTLC was failed (thus not for an MPP payment).
2138 debug_assert!(false, "This shouldn't be reachable except in absurdly rare cases between monitor updates and HTLC timeouts: {:?}", e);
2142 } else { unreachable!(); }
2145 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
2147 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
2148 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2149 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2150 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
2154 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
2155 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
2156 if let Err((counterparty_node_id, err)) = match self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage) {
2159 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2160 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
2161 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2162 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
2165 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
2166 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
2167 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
2168 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) {
2169 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
2170 payment_preimage, e);
2174 Err(Some(res)) => Err(res),
2176 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2177 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
2178 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
2184 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
2185 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
2186 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
2189 /// Restores a single, given channel to normal operation after a
2190 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
2193 /// All ChannelMonitor updates up to and including highest_applied_update_id must have been
2194 /// fully committed in every copy of the given channels' ChannelMonitors.
2196 /// Note that there is no effect to calling with a highest_applied_update_id other than the
2197 /// current latest ChannelMonitorUpdate and one call to this function after multiple
2198 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures is fine. The highest_applied_update_id field
2199 /// exists largely only to prevent races between this and concurrent update_monitor calls.
2201 /// Thus, the anticipated use is, at a high level:
2202 /// 1) You register a chain::Watch with this ChannelManager,
2203 /// 2) it stores each update to disk, and begins updating any remote (eg watchtower) copies of
2204 /// said ChannelMonitors as it can, returning ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures
2205 /// any time it cannot do so instantly,
2206 /// 3) update(s) are applied to each remote copy of a ChannelMonitor,
2207 /// 4) once all remote copies are updated, you call this function with the update_id that
2208 /// completed, and once it is the latest the Channel will be re-enabled.
2209 pub fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
2210 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2212 let mut close_results = Vec::new();
2213 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
2214 let mut htlc_failures = Vec::new();
2215 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
2218 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2219 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2220 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2221 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2222 let channel = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
2226 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
2230 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, needs_broadcast_safe, funding_locked) = channel.monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger);
2231 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2232 htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), funding_txo.clone(), pending_forwards));
2234 htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures);
2236 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
2237 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
2238 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2239 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2244 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
2245 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
2246 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2247 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2248 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2253 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2257 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2262 if needs_broadcast_safe {
2263 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
2264 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(),
2265 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
2268 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
2269 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2270 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2273 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
2274 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2275 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2276 msg: announcement_sigs,
2279 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2283 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().append(&mut pending_events);
2285 for failure in htlc_failures.drain(..) {
2286 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2288 self.forward_htlcs(&mut htlc_forwards[..]);
2290 for res in close_results.drain(..) {
2291 self.finish_force_close_channel(res);
2295 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2296 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
2297 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
2300 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, counterparty_node_id.clone(), their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration)
2301 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
2302 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2303 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2304 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
2305 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
2306 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2307 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
2308 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2309 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
2311 entry.insert(channel);
2317 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2318 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
2319 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2320 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2321 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
2322 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2323 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2324 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
2326 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, their_features), channel_state, chan);
2327 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
2329 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
2332 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2333 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
2334 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
2335 channel_value_satoshis: value,
2337 user_channel_id: user_id,
2342 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2343 let ((funding_msg, monitor), mut chan) = {
2344 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2345 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2346 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
2347 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2348 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2349 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
2351 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
2353 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
2356 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
2357 // lock before watch_channel
2358 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
2360 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
2361 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
2362 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
2363 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
2364 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
2365 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), None));
2367 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
2368 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
2369 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
2370 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
2371 // until we have persisted our monitor.
2372 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2376 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2377 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2378 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
2379 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2380 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
2382 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2383 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
2384 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2393 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2394 let (funding_txo, user_id) = {
2395 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2396 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2397 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2398 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2399 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2400 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2402 let monitor = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
2403 Ok(update) => update,
2404 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
2406 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
2407 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
2409 (chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get().get_user_id())
2411 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2414 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2415 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
2417 user_channel_id: user_id,
2422 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2423 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2424 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2425 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2426 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2427 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2428 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2430 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg), channel_state, chan);
2431 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
2432 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for {} in response to funding_locked", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2433 // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our
2434 // announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote
2435 // funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking
2436 // block connection. We should guanrantee to broadcast announcement_sigs to our peer whatever
2437 // the order of the events but our peer may not receive it due to disconnection. The specs
2438 // lacking an acknowledgement for announcement_sigs we may have to re-send them at peer
2439 // connection in the future if simultaneous misses by both peers due to network/hardware
2440 // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs
2441 // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network.
2442 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2443 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2444 msg: announcement_sigs,
2449 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2453 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2454 let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
2455 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2456 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2458 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
2459 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2460 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2461 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2463 let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
2464 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2465 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2466 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2470 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2471 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2472 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2476 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
2477 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2478 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2480 (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2481 } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
2483 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2486 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
2487 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2489 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2490 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2491 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2492 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2500 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2501 let (tx, chan_option) = {
2502 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2503 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2504 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
2505 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2506 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2507 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2509 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
2510 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2511 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2512 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2517 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
2518 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
2519 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
2520 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
2521 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
2522 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2523 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2525 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2526 } else { (tx, None) }
2528 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2531 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
2532 log_trace!(self.logger, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
2533 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
2535 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2536 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2537 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2538 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2546 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2547 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
2548 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
2549 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
2551 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
2552 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
2553 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
2554 //but we should prevent it anyway.
2556 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
2557 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2559 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2560 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2561 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2562 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2565 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<ChanSigner>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
2566 // Ensure error_code has the UPDATE flag set, since by default we send a
2567 // channel update along as part of failing the HTLC.
2568 assert!((error_code & 0x1000) != 0);
2569 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
2570 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
2571 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
2572 match pending_forward_info {
2573 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
2574 let reason = if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update(chan) {
2575 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &{
2576 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
2577 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
2578 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
2579 res.extend_from_slice(&upd.encode_with_len()[..]);
2583 // The only case where we'd be unable to
2584 // successfully get a channel update is if the
2585 // channel isn't in the fully-funded state yet,
2586 // implying our counterparty is trying to route
2587 // payments over the channel back to themselves
2588 // (cause no one else should know the short_id
2589 // is a lightning channel yet). We should have
2590 // no problem just calling this
2591 // unknown_next_peer (0x4000|10).
2592 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
2594 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2595 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2596 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2599 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
2601 _ => pending_forward_info
2604 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
2606 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2611 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2612 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2614 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2615 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2616 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2617 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2618 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2620 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
2622 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2625 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
2629 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2630 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2631 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2632 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2633 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2634 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2635 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2637 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
2639 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2644 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2645 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2646 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2647 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2648 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2649 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2650 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2652 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
2653 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
2654 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
2656 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
2659 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2663 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2664 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2665 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2666 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2667 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2668 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2669 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2671 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, monitor_update) =
2672 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
2673 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
2674 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
2675 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
2676 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
2677 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
2682 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2683 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
2684 //TODO: Rebroadcast closing_signed if present on monitor update restoration
2686 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2687 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2688 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2690 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
2691 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2692 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2693 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2694 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2695 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2696 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2697 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2699 commitment_signed: msg,
2703 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2704 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2705 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2711 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2716 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
2717 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
2718 let mut forward_event = None;
2719 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2720 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2721 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2722 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
2724 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2725 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
2726 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
2727 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
2729 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2730 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
2731 prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
2733 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2734 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
2735 prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
2740 match forward_event {
2742 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2743 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2744 time_forwardable: time
2752 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2753 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
2755 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2756 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2757 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2758 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2759 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2760 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2762 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
2763 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail_in) =
2764 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
2765 htlcs_to_fail = htlcs_to_fail_in;
2766 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2767 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
2768 assert!(commitment_update.is_none() && closing_signed.is_none() && pending_forwards.is_empty() && pending_failures.is_empty());
2769 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
2771 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, commitment_update.is_some(), pending_forwards, pending_failures) {
2773 } else { unreachable!(); }
2776 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2777 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2778 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2782 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2783 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2784 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2788 break Ok((pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"), chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
2790 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2793 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id);
2795 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) => {
2796 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
2797 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2799 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
2806 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2807 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2808 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2809 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2810 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2811 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2812 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2814 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
2816 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2821 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2822 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2823 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2825 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2826 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2827 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2828 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2830 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2831 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
2834 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2835 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) =
2836 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone()), channel_state, chan);
2838 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
2839 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2841 let their_node_key = if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 };
2842 let their_bitcoin_key = if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 };
2843 match (self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, their_node_key),
2844 self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, their_bitcoin_key)) {
2846 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close(format!("Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature: {:?}. Maybe using different node_secret for transport and routing msg? UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}", e, &announcement, their_node_key));
2847 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
2850 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close(format!("Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature: {:?}. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})", e, &announcement, their_bitcoin_key));
2851 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
2857 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2859 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2860 msg: msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
2861 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
2862 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
2863 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
2864 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
2865 contents: announcement,
2867 update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
2870 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2875 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2876 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2877 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2879 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2880 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2881 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2882 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2884 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
2885 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
2886 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
2887 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
2888 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, monitor_update_opt, mut order, shutdown) =
2889 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
2890 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
2891 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2892 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
2893 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
2894 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
2895 if revoke_and_ack.is_none() {
2896 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
2898 if commitment_update.is_none() {
2899 order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
2901 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, order, revoke_and_ack.is_some(), commitment_update.is_some());
2902 //TODO: Resend the funding_locked if needed once we get the monitor running again
2905 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
2906 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2907 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2911 macro_rules! send_raa { () => {
2912 if let Some(msg) = revoke_and_ack {
2913 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2914 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2919 macro_rules! send_cu { () => {
2920 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2921 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2922 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2928 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2932 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2937 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2938 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2939 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2945 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2949 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
2950 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
2951 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
2952 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
2953 /// (C-not exported) Cause its doc(hidden) anyway
2955 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2956 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2957 let counterparty_node_id;
2958 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2959 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2960 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2962 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id) {
2963 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("Failed to find corresponding channel for id {}", channel_id.to_hex())}),
2964 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2965 if !chan.get().is_outbound() {
2966 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel".to_owned()});
2968 if chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
2969 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2971 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2972 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected".to_owned()});
2974 counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
2975 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) =
2976 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw, &self.logger), channel_state, chan)
2978 if let Err(_e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2981 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2982 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
2983 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2984 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2985 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2986 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2987 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2988 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2998 match handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id) {
2999 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3000 Err(e) => { Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: e.err })}
3004 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`.
3005 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) {
3006 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3008 for monitor_event in self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events() {
3009 match monitor_event {
3010 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
3011 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
3012 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
3013 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
3015 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
3016 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
3019 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(funding_outpoint) => {
3020 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3021 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3022 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
3023 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3024 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3025 if let Some(mut chan) = by_id.remove(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
3026 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3027 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3029 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
3030 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
3031 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3041 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3042 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3047 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>
3048 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Keys=ChanSigner>,
3049 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3050 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
3051 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3054 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
3055 //TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's non-intuitive that we query
3056 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
3057 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
3059 let mut ret = Vec::new();
3060 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3061 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
3066 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>
3067 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Keys=ChanSigner>,
3068 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3069 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
3070 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3073 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<Event> {
3074 //TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's non-intuitive that we query
3075 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
3076 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
3078 let mut ret = Vec::new();
3079 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3080 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
3085 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>
3086 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Keys=ChanSigner>,
3087 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3088 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
3089 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3092 /// Updates channel state based on transactions seen in a connected block.
3093 pub fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
3094 let header_hash = header.block_hash();
3095 log_trace!(self.logger, "Block {} at height {} connected", header_hash, height);
3096 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3097 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3098 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
3100 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3101 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3102 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3103 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3104 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
3105 let res = channel.block_connected(header, txdata, height);
3106 if let Ok((chan_res, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs)) = res {
3107 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
3108 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&channel).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
3109 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3110 failure_code: 0x1000 | 14, // expiry_too_soon, or at least it is now
3114 if let Some(funding_locked) = chan_res {
3115 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
3116 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3117 msg: funding_locked,
3119 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
3120 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked and announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
3121 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
3122 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3123 msg: announcement_sigs,
3126 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
3128 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
3130 } else if let Err(e) = res {
3131 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
3132 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3133 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e },
3137 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
3138 for &(_, tx) in txdata.iter() {
3139 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
3140 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
3141 log_trace!(self.logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
3142 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3143 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3145 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
3146 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
3147 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
3148 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
3149 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
3150 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3162 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|&(ref payment_hash, _), htlcs| {
3163 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3164 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
3165 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
3166 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
3167 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
3168 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
3169 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3170 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
3171 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3172 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
3173 data: htlc_msat_height_data
3178 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
3181 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3182 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3185 for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
3186 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
3188 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
3189 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header_hash;
3191 // Update last_node_announcement_serial to be the max of its current value and the
3192 // block timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
3193 // having an explicit local time source.
3194 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully update
3195 // last_node_announcement_serial or decide we don't need to.
3196 let old_serial = self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire);
3197 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
3198 if self.last_node_announcement_serial.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
3204 /// Updates channel state based on a disconnected block.
3206 /// If necessary, the channel may be force-closed without letting the counterparty participate
3207 /// in the shutdown.
3208 pub fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader) {
3209 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3210 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3212 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3213 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3214 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3215 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3216 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| {
3217 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
3218 if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
3219 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3221 failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown(true));
3222 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
3223 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3233 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3234 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3236 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
3237 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header.block_hash();
3241 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref + Sync + Send, T: Deref + Sync + Send, K: Deref + Sync + Send, F: Deref + Sync + Send, L: Deref + Sync + Send>
3242 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>
3243 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Keys=ChanSigner>,
3244 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3245 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
3246 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3249 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
3250 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3251 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3254 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
3255 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3256 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3259 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
3260 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3261 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3264 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
3265 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3266 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3269 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
3270 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3271 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3274 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
3275 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3276 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3279 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
3280 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3281 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3284 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
3285 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3286 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3289 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
3290 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3291 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3294 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
3295 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3296 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3299 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
3300 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3301 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3304 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
3305 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3306 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3309 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
3310 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3311 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3314 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
3315 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3316 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3319 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
3320 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3321 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3324 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
3325 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3326 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3329 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
3330 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3331 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3332 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
3333 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
3335 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3336 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3337 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3338 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3339 if no_connection_possible {
3340 log_debug!(self.logger, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
3341 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
3342 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
3343 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3344 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3346 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(true));
3347 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
3348 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3358 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
3359 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
3360 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
3361 // Note that currently on channel reestablish we assert that there are no
3362 // holding cell add-HTLCs, so if in the future we stop removing uncommitted HTLCs
3363 // on peer disconnect here, there will need to be corresponding changes in
3364 // reestablish logic.
3365 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
3366 chan.to_disabled_marked();
3367 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
3368 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
3369 failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
3371 if chan.is_shutdown() {
3372 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3373 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3377 no_channels_remain = false;
3383 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
3385 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3386 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3387 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3388 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3389 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3390 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3391 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3392 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3393 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3394 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3395 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3396 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
3397 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
3398 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
3399 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3400 &events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => true,
3404 if no_channels_remain {
3405 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
3408 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3409 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3411 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
3412 for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
3413 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
3418 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
3419 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
3421 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3424 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3425 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
3426 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3427 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
3428 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
3431 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
3432 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
3437 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3438 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3439 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3440 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
3441 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
3442 if !chan.have_received_message() {
3443 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
3444 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
3445 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
3449 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
3450 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3451 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
3457 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
3460 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
3461 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3463 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
3464 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3465 if chan.remote_network_id == *counterparty_node_id {
3466 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
3470 self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
3475 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
3476 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
3478 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCInfo {
3479 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3480 match &self.routing {
3481 &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id } => {
3483 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
3484 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3486 &PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { ref payment_data, ref incoming_cltv_expiry } => {
3488 payment_data.write(writer)?;
3489 incoming_cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
3492 self.incoming_shared_secret.write(writer)?;
3493 self.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3494 self.amt_to_forward.write(writer)?;
3495 self.outgoing_cltv_value.write(writer)?;
3500 impl Readable for PendingHTLCInfo {
3501 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, DecodeError> {
3502 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
3503 routing: match Readable::read(reader)? {
3504 0u8 => PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
3505 onion_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
3506 short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3508 1u8 => PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
3509 payment_data: Readable::read(reader)?,
3510 incoming_cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
3512 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3514 incoming_shared_secret: Readable::read(reader)?,
3515 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
3516 amt_to_forward: Readable::read(reader)?,
3517 outgoing_cltv_value: Readable::read(reader)?,
3522 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
3523 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3525 &HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(ref fail_msg) => {
3527 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3529 &HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(ref fail_msg) => {
3531 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3538 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
3539 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailureMsg, DecodeError> {
3540 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3541 0 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3542 1 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3543 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3548 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCStatus {
3549 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3551 &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(ref forward_info) => {
3553 forward_info.write(writer)?;
3555 &PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(ref fail_msg) => {
3557 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3564 impl Readable for PendingHTLCStatus {
3565 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCStatus, DecodeError> {
3566 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3567 0 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3568 1 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3569 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3574 impl_writeable!(HTLCPreviousHopData, 0, {
3578 incoming_packet_shared_secret
3581 impl_writeable!(ClaimableHTLC, 0, {
3588 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
3589 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3591 &HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref hop_data) => {
3593 hop_data.write(writer)?;
3595 &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
3597 path.write(writer)?;
3598 session_priv.write(writer)?;
3599 first_hop_htlc_msat.write(writer)?;
3606 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
3607 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCSource, DecodeError> {
3608 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3609 0 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3610 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3611 path: Readable::read(reader)?,
3612 session_priv: Readable::read(reader)?,
3613 first_hop_htlc_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
3615 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3620 impl Writeable for HTLCFailReason {
3621 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3623 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
3627 &HTLCFailReason::Reason { ref failure_code, ref data } => {
3629 failure_code.write(writer)?;
3630 data.write(writer)?;
3637 impl Readable for HTLCFailReason {
3638 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailReason, DecodeError> {
3639 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3640 0 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: Readable::read(reader)? }),
3641 1 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3642 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
3643 data: Readable::read(reader)?,
3645 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3650 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
3651 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3653 &HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { ref prev_short_channel_id, ref prev_funding_outpoint, ref prev_htlc_id, ref forward_info } => {
3655 prev_short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3656 prev_funding_outpoint.write(writer)?;
3657 prev_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3658 forward_info.write(writer)?;
3660 &HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3662 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3663 err_packet.write(writer)?;
3670 impl Readable for HTLCForwardInfo {
3671 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCForwardInfo, DecodeError> {
3672 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3673 0 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC {
3674 prev_short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3675 prev_funding_outpoint: Readable::read(reader)?,
3676 prev_htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3677 forward_info: Readable::read(reader)?,
3679 1 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC {
3680 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3681 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
3683 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3688 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Writeable, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>
3689 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Keys=ChanSigner>,
3690 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3691 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
3692 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3695 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3696 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
3698 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3699 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3701 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
3702 (self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
3703 self.last_block_hash.lock().unwrap().write(writer)?;
3705 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3706 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
3707 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3708 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3709 unfunded_channels += 1;
3712 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
3713 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3714 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3715 channel.write(writer)?;
3719 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3720 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
3721 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3722 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3723 for forward in pending_forwards {
3724 forward.write(writer)?;
3728 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3729 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
3730 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3731 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3732 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
3733 htlc.write(writer)?;
3737 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3738 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3739 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3740 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
3741 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3742 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
3745 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3746 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3747 for event in events.iter() {
3748 event.write(writer)?;
3751 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
3757 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
3759 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
3761 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
3762 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling <(Sha256dHash,
3763 /// ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args).
3764 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
3765 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
3766 /// 3) Register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints with your chain watch mechanism using
3767 /// ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch() and ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
3768 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
3769 /// 5) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local chain::Watch.
3770 /// 6) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
3771 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner: 'a + ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
3772 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Keys=ChanSigner>,
3773 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3774 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
3775 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3778 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
3779 /// deserialization.
3780 pub keys_manager: K,
3782 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3784 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
3785 pub fee_estimator: F,
3786 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3788 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
3789 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
3790 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
3791 pub chain_monitor: M,
3793 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
3794 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
3795 /// force-closed during deserialization.
3796 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
3797 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
3798 /// deserialization.
3800 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
3801 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
3802 pub default_config: UserConfig,
3804 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
3805 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
3807 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
3808 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
3809 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
3810 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
3812 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
3815 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
3816 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>>,
3819 impl<'a, ChanSigner: 'a + ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
3820 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>
3821 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Keys=ChanSigner>,
3822 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3823 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
3824 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3827 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
3828 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
3829 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
3830 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
3831 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>>) -> Self {
3833 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
3834 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
3839 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
3840 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
3841 impl<'a, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
3842 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>>)
3843 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Keys=ChanSigner>,
3844 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3845 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
3846 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3849 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3850 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
3851 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
3855 impl<'a, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
3856 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>)
3857 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Keys=ChanSigner>,
3858 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3859 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
3860 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3863 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3864 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3865 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3866 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
3867 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
3870 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3871 let latest_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3872 let last_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3874 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3876 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3877 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3878 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3879 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3880 for _ in 0..channel_count {
3881 let mut channel: Channel<ChanSigner> = Readable::read(reader)?;
3882 if channel.last_block_connected != Default::default() && channel.last_block_connected != last_block_hash {
3883 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3886 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
3887 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
3888 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
3889 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
3890 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
3891 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
3892 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
3893 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
3894 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3895 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
3896 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
3897 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
3898 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
3899 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
3900 let (_, _, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
3901 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
3902 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
3904 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3905 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
3907 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
3910 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3914 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
3915 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
3916 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
3920 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
3921 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3922 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3923 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
3924 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3925 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3926 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
3927 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
3928 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3930 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
3933 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3934 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3935 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
3936 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3937 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3938 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
3939 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
3940 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3942 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
3945 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3946 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
3947 for _ in 0..peer_count {
3948 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
3949 let peer_state = PeerState {
3950 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
3952 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
3955 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3956 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
3957 for _ in 0..event_count {
3958 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
3959 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
3964 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3966 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
3968 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
3969 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
3970 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
3972 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(latest_block_height as usize),
3973 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(last_block_hash),
3974 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
3976 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
3981 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
3983 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
3985 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
3987 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
3989 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
3990 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
3991 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
3992 logger: args.logger,
3993 default_configuration: args.default_config,
3996 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
3997 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
4000 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
4001 //connection or two.
4003 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))